POLITICAL DYNASTY HAS NEGATIVE EFFECTS

IN THE PHILIPPINES AND NEEDS

TO BE ABOLISHED
By

Alyka Abalos
Virpal Kaur
Jagjit Kingra

A Research Paper
Presented to the
Department of English
Far Eastern University
Nicanor Reyes Street, Sampaloc, Manila
In Partial Fulfilment
of the Requirements in
RESEARCH WRITING
Submitted to
Professor Timothy Sanchez
Dept. of English, FEU Manila

Introduction
The state shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service, and
prohibit political dynasty as may be defined by law. This provision in Section 26 of Article II of the 1987
Philippine Constitution, which went into effect, 27 years ago. Political Dynasty as defined, A succession
of rulers from the same family or bloodline, another definition says, A family or group that maintains
power of generations of generations. Though the constitution already mandates to prohibit political
dynasties theres always a loophole. For instance, the government setting of the Philippines nowadays is
ruled by dominant incumbent officials that also came from the same family, if not, are of the same
bloodline. This calls for change and needs to stop. Political Dynasty has negative effects in the
Philippines and needs to be abolished.

I.

Emergence of Political Dynasty in the Philippines

The occurrence of political dynasties was believed to be first recorded in the pre-Magellanic

period. In his book The Making of a Filipino, Renato Constantino pointed out that communities at this
time were already accustomed to an early form of government and politics, (Constantino, 1994). The precolonial society had the datu, raja, and maharlika as rulers and stewards of tribal communities. According
to Constantino, their strong familial bonds espoused the development of the leadership and social
prestige of this ruling class. Perhaps the datu, raja, and maharlika class served as archetypal models for
the formation of political dynasties in the Philippines. During the Spanish colonial period, the term
principalia was introduced. The principalia embodied the new kind of local elite. To Constantino, the
principalia was composed of the wealthy landowners, many of whom were descendants of the early datus
and maharlikas (Constantino, 2004). This time, the former datu has been entrusted with fiscal and
administrative duties and became adjuncts of Spanish power. From mere administrators of socially-owned
land during the pre-Magellanic period, the principalia eventually became formal owners of these lands.
The principalia, along with the mestizos, illustrados, mestizo-sangley, creole, and Chinese mestizos
constituted the local oligarchs of the country.
In Landlords and Capitalists, political scientist Temario Rivera revealed that about 87 families
controlled the top 120 manufacturing companies from 1964-1986. Sixteen of these families - about 20

percentwere involved in politics. Most of them were members of the landowning elite that emerged
during the 19th century, including the Aranetas, the Cojuangcos, the Jacintos, the Madrigals, and the
Yulos. Through government influence, writes Rivera, Landed capitalists caused the diversion of state
resources to traditional elite economic activities like sugar and coconut milling, limiting further industrial
diversification (Rivera, 1994). The third period was highlighted by The introduction of education and
suffrage by the US that catapulted the elites in the first local elections in 1903 and the first national
elections in 1907, Tuazon explained (Tuazon, 2012). The elites capitalized on education to acquire new
knowledge and information. Through education, both the local and national elites obtained a new form of
mechanism (Bordieu, 2005), which the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu called cultural capital.
Education was the ticket to election participation and a prerogative of wealth. In history, the first elections
only catered to the propertied class, which comprised less than one percent of the population. William
Howard Taft directed this first-ever election limiting the number of participation only to the local and
national elites.

II.

Political Dynasty as an Ideology

According to Tuazon, nearly 50 percent of the countrys current political dynasties owe their

ascendancy to post-Marcos (1986) political deals when most elective positions were filled up by
appointees of then President Corazon C. Aquino, including the Ampatuans of the infamous Maguindanao
massacre (Tuazon, 2012). In the entry of political appointees, it is understood that more families were
allowed to establish their respective dynasties in the political arena. The prevalence of political families in
various public posts has become commonplace in the Philippine government today.
The rampant political dynasty building today was described by Tuazon as tactics of selfpreservation and expansion, which are means for a continuing rule of political dynasties. The 2013
election clearly demonstrates how such tactics operate. For instance, the 2013 senatorial slates are
basically coalitions of political dynasties through party-switching for networking and political preservation.
Image and visual packaging have become key factors in the expansion, preservation, and continuing rule
of political dynasties. Partnerships with lawyers, the media, showbiz personalities and corporations have
favored wider expansion and greater popularity for these political dynasties, ensuring their rule over
Philippine politics.
The continuing phenomenon of political dynasties today reflects the encompassing influence of
traditional politics. Recent studies reveal that since 1903 to present, dynastic candidates have had about
thirty percent greater chance of winning over non-traditional rivals, (Tuazon, 2012). It has become
customary for citizens to base their decisions on personality-based campaigns backed by familial or
dynastic support. While an ideology is in place, for Tuazon, Such dynasties perpetuate and enjoy various
advantages in traditional kinship networks, political machineries, wealth, property, access to government
sources, weak political party system, weak electoral system, culture of powerlessness among the people,
and warlordism, (Tuazon, 2012).

III.

The Negative Sides of Political Dynasty in the Philippines

The very excess of the violence employed is one of the elements of glory: the fact that the guilty

man should moan and cry out under the blows is not a shameful side effect, it is the very ceremonial of
justice being expressed in all its force. Hence no doubt those tortures that take place even after death:
corpses burnt, ashes thrown to the winds, bodies dragged on hurdles and exhibited at the roadside.
Justice pursues the body beyond all possible pain, (Focault, 1977).
Similar to what Foucault had studied about power relations, this paper, uses the same theory but
relates it to the phenomenon of political dynasties in the Philippines. Throughout Philippine history, the
political dynasty has taken on a negative connotation. Often linked to problems like graft, corruption, and
abuse of power, it has taken on a detrimental role to society. Perhaps the most infamous of all would be
the political dynasty of the Marcos family. Alleged to have embezzled between US$5 billion and US$10
billion from the Philippines, Transparency International has ranked Ferdinand Marcos at second on a list
of the world's most corrupt political leaders of the past two decades; surpassed only by former Indonesian
President Suharto (Ferdinand Marcos: Killer File, 2000).
Names like the Estradas/ Ejercitos and the Singson families have also linked the image of the
political dynasty to allegations of graft and corruption. Luis "Chavit" Singson, governor of the province of
Ilocos Sur, alleged that he had personally given Estrada the sum of 400 million pesos as payoff from
illegal gambling profits such as jueteng, as well as 180 million pesos from the government price subsidy
for the tobacco farmers' marketing cooperative. Singson's allegation caused an uproar across the nation,
which culminated in Estrada's impeachment trial by the House of Representatives in November 13, 2000.
A more recent example, would be that of the Ampatuans, whose name has been thrust to the limelight
after the event of the Maguindanao Massacre where 58 individuals consisting of their family rivals, the
Mangudadatus, relatives and some journalists were shot and killed preventing them from filing their
patrons certificate of candidacy.

Families linked to political dynasties flood the news with allegations of all sorts of crime ranging
from corruption, theft, murder and even rape. Regardless of whether these are proven or unproven, it all
translates into the tarnished and dirty image that the political dynasty holds in todays society. This is
exactly what Michel Foucault talks about in the spectacle of the scaffold wherein there is a display of an
excessive use of power through torture. As Foucault mentions, there are three criterions where
punishment must follow in order to fall under the category of torture. The first being, that it must manifest
pain on a certain degree, that could be seen in the example of Francois Damiens torture. The second
being that such pain is regulated in a way that suffering is maximized rather than imposing death
immediately because this suffering would insure a more effective notice of change on the offenders part.
Last but not least, perhaps the most important would be that torture marks the individual and that it should
serve as a spectacle.
Torture marking the individual means that there is a reclaiming of the sovereign by the ruler and
that the making of the execution as a spectacle would serve as a public display of the rulers sovereignty.
Such a public execution seeks to reach out to the whole of the society by letting the thought of
punishment run through their consciousness making them aware of the total power of the sovereign, them
serving as his subjects. The context of the logic of torture is that there is contempt for body, wherein the
body serves a possession of the sovereign. There is a political need for the sovereign to display his power
which will serve as a recognition of his dominance over his subjects. In addition, this display of power
actually runs through an internal organization of politicization and serves as a disciplining factor towards
order. As Foucault mentions how the enlightment period called torture as an atrocity, Astrocity is one of
those that best designates the economy of public torture in the old penal practice, (Focault, 1977).
Further, he states that insofar as being the crime before everyones eyes in all its severity, the
punishment must take responsibility for this atrocity: it must bring to light by confessions, statements,
inscription that make it public, it must reproduce it in ceremonies that apply it to the body of the guilty
person in the form of humiliation and pain. Atrocity is that part of the crime that the punishment turns
back as torture in order to display it in the full light of day, (Focault, 1977).
In light of Michel Foucaults study of power, he shows how the display of excessive power can
serve as a negative connotation towards disciplining society. In relation to the existence of political

dynasties, their display of excessive power by means of running private armies or reliance on coercion in
order to establish and maintain their power, could very well serve as a detriment to public order as well as
to their own existence. This is where Vladimir Lenins theory on organization can come into play because
power alone in a democratic society, especially excessive power, can clash with the values of democracy
while power coupled with proper organization could compromise with the said values. Organization,
furthermore, would tweak how power is distributed, dispersed and used on the sovereigns subjects. In
the case of political dynasties where power is seen to be a tool used for political domination, power
alongside organization can produce an effective dynasty, which operates on behalf of and for the public
rather than for itself and its interests.

IV.

Laws Regarding Political Dynasty

In terms of the legality of political dynasties, Art. II, Sec. 26 of the Constitution says, The State

shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service, and prohibit political dynasties as may be
defined by law. However, there is no clear definition of political dynasties and therefore the provision is
none self-executing. It is the most ignored policy by Congress due to certain reasons. The framers left it
to the congress to define political dynasties - which it has not done (Cruz, 2007). This loophole in the law
has allowed the political dynasty to continue up to the present day even if it is technically not allowed. The
only law being actively enforced to prevent the abuse of power is the term limits on elective positions.
However, providing a term limit for elective officials is easily countered by having families pass on their
power. To retain political hold on his constituents, a forcibly retired official arranges to have his wife, a
mistress, one of his children, his own siblings, or a parent to occupy his position for one term. After which,
he will be qualified again to run for office (Cruz, 2007).
In an effort to ban political dynasties, there was an anti-dynasty bill that was filled by Majority
Floor Leader Arthur Defensor of Iloilo. Section Five of House Bill 783, which reads, Any person who has
a political dynasty relationship with an incumbent elective official is disqualified from running for any
elective public office within the same city and/or province where the elective public official is running. This
bill will only be proactive. It will not affect those who are already currently holding positions. The bill also

limits the definition of a political dynasty relationship as existing only among relatives up to the second
degree of affinity or consanguinity. Thus, only the spouse, children, siblings or parents of the incumbent
are deemed disqualified and similar in-law relationship. The bill disallows a relative of an incumbent from
running for a position like governor, vice governor, mayor, vice mayor, as these positions are vested
executive power. Another distinct feature of this bill is that it allows relatives of the incumbent to run for
posts such as board member or councilor where power is shared owing to the collegial nature of the
office. The idea of the bill is to bar relatives from holding positions where power is concentrated in an
individual, but not from positions where decision-making is made through deliberation and consensus
(Bordadora, 2007).

V.

Solution to the Problems regarding Political Dynasties

Although this new bill seems like a good and effective idea for countering the negative effects of

the existence political dynasties, it has yet to have been decided by legislators whether this will be fully
implemented or not. It is up to the Congress to decide whether this bill will be passed and it seems highly
unlikely that they will do so. This is partly due to the fact that political dynasties have become so much a
part of the current system of governance that it is almost impossible to change. I don't think it has much
of a chance under the present Congress, stated Defensor regarding his opinion on possibility of the bill
being passed (Bordadora, 2007).
Like it or not, the emergence of political dynasties in the Philippines still operate well within the
framework of so-called democracy (PHILIPPINEPOLITICS.NET., 2000). No matter how much effort is put
against the political dynasty, it is here to stay. It is simply futile to hope for any change regarding the
current laws on political dynasties. Instead of looking at something that is simply out of reach, people
should realize that there lies a much simpler solution. It would be impossible to ban all political dynasties
in general; however, it is possible to put an end to the bad political dynasties. People should realize that
they are the ones who elect their leaders into office. No matter how strong a political dynasty may be,
sovereignty is held by the people. At the end of the day, it will be the people to decide whether or not a

dynasty will be succeeded. Absolute power is when you have a dictatorship. We still have to go through
an election. The electorate will be the ones to dictate who are the ones who will lead. The people have the
power, not the officials, (Medel, 2007). All this talk about outlawing political dynasties and its bad effects
would not even be necessary if people were to vote more responsibly. What is happening in todays
society is that the people are the ones choosing to make themselves powerless. They are quick to find
faults in the system and demand for change, yet they do nothing to actually work for change. People need
to realize that as much as the bad political dynasties are to blame, they are also responsible for allowing
these dynasties to remain in power.
Ultimately, people have the power to put a stop to political dynasties if the need arises. If they see
that a certain dynasty abuses their power, they possess the power and responsibility to vote towards a
change in leadership. On the other hand, if a dynasty is doing a good job, then they have the option to
allow the dynasty to continue in the succeeding generations. According to then Representative of Tarlac
and now President Benigno Aquino, the issue of whether a member of a political family should continue in
office or not is a matter of public choice. At the end of the day, people deserve the government they get,
(Cusi, 2004). That being said, these traditional political dynasties, that which do not ground their
resources based on their economic stance, are still existing up to this day because they dont just merely
exercise power on behalf of their families but rather they direct this power towards an ordered use to
improve the publics welfare which is the way its supposed to be in a democratic society. While progress
continues to be delivered by these political clans to their constituents, then their dominance and relevance
in the Philippine political arena and society will be here to stay. On the other hand, if one lacks or exceeds
in either their organization or exercise of power, then that dynasty is bound to fail.
All in all, it is difficult to make a generalization whether the political dynasty is in fact good
or bad since this would differ on a case-to-case basis. It can be detrimental to Philippine society on some
instances, yet beneficial on other cases. There are both good political dynasties and bad ones. Each
political dynasty has its own strengths and weaknesses and it is the duty of the people to be the judge.
The political dynasty, like any other system of leadership, is prone to error. After all, no system of

government is truly perfect; problems will always arise. What are needed are the unified efforts of each
and every individual to continually strive in building the nation into a better place.

Conclusion
At the end of the day, people deserve the government they get, (Cusi, 2004). Philippine politics,
in short, is not broken because dynasties are strong; rather, dynasties are strong because politics is
broken. Prohibiting dynasties merely prevents some organizations from playing. What we really need is a
change in the rules of the game, (De Dios, 2012).
It is perhaps time to make things difficult, not for political dynasties but for political parties. For
me, as a young Political Science Student, what is urgently needed is not the prohibition of dynasties but
the tightening of rules in order to ensure commitment, enlarge the scope, and establish the longevity of
political parties. In this way, I am confident that we may never completely abolish such existence of
Political Dynasty, but we can make a better political arena not only focused on the rule of dynasties but an
equal opportunity for every citizen.

References
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