Case Doctrine:

In a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations of the parties during the period of
cohabitation is governed by the provisions of Article 147 or Article 148, such as the case may be, of the Family Code.
Facts: Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married in 1971. They begot 5 children. In 1992, Valdez filed a
petition for declaration of nullity of their marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. The trial court granted
the petition, thereby declaring their marriage null and void. It also directed the parties to start proceedings on the
liquidation of their common properties as defined by Article 147 of the Family Code, and to comply with the provisions
of Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the same code.
Gomez sought a clarification of that portion in the decision. She asserted that the Family Code contained no provisions
on the procedure for the liquidation of common property in "unions without marriage.
In an Order, the trial court made the following clarification: "Consequently, considering that Article 147 of the Family
Code explicitly provides that the property acquired by both parties during their union, in the absence of proof to the
contrary, are presumed to have been obtained through the joint efforts of the parties and will be owned by them in
equal shares, plaintiff and defendant will own their 'family home' and all their other properties for that matter in equal
shares. In the liquidation and partition of the properties owned in common by the plaintiff and defendant, the
provisions on co-ownership found in the Civil Code shall apply."
Valdes moved for reconsideration of the Order which was denied. Valdes appealed, arguing that: (1) Article 147 of the
Family Code does not apply to cases where the parties are psychological incapacitated; (2) Articles 50, 51 and 52 in
relation to Articles 102 and 129 of the Family Code govern the disposition of the family dwelling in cases where a
marriage is declared void ab initio, including a marriage declared void by reason of the psychological incapacity of the
spouses; (3) Assuming arguendo that Article 147 applies to marriages declared void ab initio on the ground of the
psychological incapacity of a spouse, the same may be read consistently with Article 129.
Issues:
Whether Art 147 FC is the correct law governing the disposition of property in the case at bar.
Held:
Yes. In a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations of the parties during the period of
cohabitation is governed by the provisions of Article 147 or Article 148, such as the case may be, of the Family Code.
Article 147 applies when a man and a woman, suffering no illegal impediment to marry each other, so exclusively live
together as husband and wife under a void marriage or without the benefit of marriage. Under this property regime,
property acquired by both spouses through their work and industry shall be governed by the rules on equal coownership. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint
efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall be considered as having contributed
thereto jointly if said party's "efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family household." Unlike the
conjugal partnership of gains, the fruits of the couple's separate property are not included in the co-ownership.
When the common-law spouses suffer from a legal impediment to marry or when they do not live exclusively with each
other (as husband and wife), only the property acquired by both of them through their actual joint contribution of
money, property or industry shall be owned in common and in proportion to their respective contributions. Such
contributions and corresponding shares, however, are prima facie presumed to be equal. The share of any party who is
married to another shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership, as the case may be, if so existing
under a valid marriage. If the party who has acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her share shall
be forfeited in the manner already heretofore expressed.
In deciding to take further cognizance of the issue on the settlement of the parties' common property, the trial court
acted neither imprudently nor precipitately; a court which has jurisdiction to declare the marriage a nullity must be
deemed likewise clothed in authority to resolve incidental and consequential matters. Nor did it commit a reversible

error in ruling that petitioner and private respondent own the "family home" and all their common property in equal
shares, as well as in concluding that, in the liquidation and partition of the property owned in common by them, the
provisions on co-ownership under the Civil Code, not Articles 50, 51 and 52, in relation to Articles 102 and 129, 12 of
the Family Code, should aptly prevail. The rules set up to govern the liquidation of either the absolute community or
the conjugal partnership of gains, the property regimes recognized for valid and voidable marriages (in the latter case
until the contract is annulled), are irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-ownership that exists between common-law
spouses.
The first paragraph of Articles 50 of the Family Code, applying paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and 95) of Article 43, 13 relates
only, by its explicit terms, to voidable marriages and, exceptionally, to void marriages under Article 40 14 of the Code,
i.e., the declaration of nullity of a subsequent marriage contracted by a spouse of a prior void marriage before the
latter is judicially declared void. (Valdes vs Regional Trial Court, G.R. No. 122749. July 31, 1996).
Pana v. Heirs of Juanite, G.R. No. 164201, Dec. 10, 2012
The Facts:
Efren (Pana) and his wife, Melecia, along with several others, were charged with murder before the RTC of Surigao
City. In a decision rendered on July 9, 1997, the RTC acquitted Efren, but convict Melecia and another person guilty as
charged. It ordered them to pay each of the heirs of the victims, jointly and severally, P50,000.00 as civil indemnity,
P50,000.00 each as moral damages, and P150,000.00 actual damages. The judgment was affirmed by the Supreme
Court on May 24, 2001 with the modification that deleted the award of actual damages but added P15,000.00 each as
temperate damages, and P50,000.00 as exemplary damages. Thus, the heirs of the deceased filed a motion for
execution which the RTC granted, resulting in the levy of real properties registered in the name of the spouses Efrena
dn Melecia, and a notice of levy and notice of execution sale were issued. The spouses Efren and Melecia then filed a
motion to quash warrant of writ of execution, averring that the levies properties were conjugal assets, not paraphernal
properties of Melecia. The RTC denied the motion, and the motion for reconsideration thereof. Upon petition for
certiorari with the CA, the latter also dismissed it. Thus, Efren and Pama elevated the case for review to the Supreme
Court, arguing that the marriage between him and Melecia was covered by the regime of conjugal partnership of gains,
not absolute community of property, since they were married before the enactment of the Family Code and did not
execute any prenuptial agreement. On the other hand, the heirs of the deceased argue otherwise. Although admitting
that the marriage was contracted prior to the enactment of the Family Code, still the same is governed by the absolute
community of gains, and finds application in Art. 256 of the Family Code, which provides: This code shall have
retroactive effect in so far as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil
Code or other laws. Since none of the spouses are dead, there is no vested right acquired by each over the others
properties, and the obligation imposed on accused-spouse may be charged against the community. The RTC sided with
the heirs. Since no vested rights was impaired, the transitory provisions of the Family Code automatically converted
the property relations between Efren and Melecia from conjugal partnership of gains to absolute community of gains,
especially since they had no pre-nuptial agreement.
ISSUE: WON the conjugal properties of spouses Efren and Melecia can be levied and executed upon for the satisfaction
of Melecias civil liability in the murder case.
HELD: Art. 122. The payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife before or during the marriage
shall not be charged to the conjugal properties partnership except insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the
family.
Neither shall the fines and pecuniary indemnities imposed upon them be charged to the partnership.
The payment of fines and indemnities imposed upon the spouses may be enforced against the partnership assets if the
spouse who is bound should have no exclusive property or if it should be insufficient.
Since Efren does not dispute the RTCs finding that Melecia has no exclusive property of her own, the above applies.
The civil indemnity that the decision in the murder case imposed on her may be enforced against their conjugal assets
after the responsibilities enumerated in Article 121 of the Family Code have been covered.
HEIRS OF DORONIO vs. HEIRS OF DORONIO[2008]
Facts:

Spouses Simeon Doronio and Cornelia Gante deceased,were the registered owners of a parcel of land located.


Marcelino Doronio and Fortunato Doronio, deceased, were the children of the spouses and the parties in this
case are their heirs.

Petitioners are the heirs of Marcelino Doronio, while respondents are the heirs of Fortunato Doronio.

Eager to obtain the entire property, the heirs of Marcelino Doronio and Veronica Pico filed before the RTC in
Urdaneta, Pangasinana petition "For the Registration of a Private Deed of Donation"docketed as Petition Case No. U920.

No respondents were named in the said petition although notices of hearing were posted on the bulletin boards
of Barangay Cabalitaan, Municipalities of Asingan and Lingayen. During the hearings, no one interposed an objection to
the petition. After the RTC ordered a general default, the petition was eventually granted on September 22, 1993.

This led to the registration of the deed of donation, cancellation of OCT No. 352 and issuance of anew Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 44481 in the names of Marcelino Doronio and Veronica Pico. Thus, the entire property was
titled in the names of petitioners predecessors.

On April 28, 1994,the heirs of Fortunato Doronio filed a pleading before the RTC in the form of a petition in the
same Petition Case No. U-920. The petition was for the reconsideration of the decision of the RTC that ordered the
registration of the subject deed of donation. It was prayed in the petition that an order be issued declaring null and
void the registration of the private deed of donation and that TCT No. 44481 be cancelled. However, the petition was
dismissed on the ground that the decision in Petition Case No. U-920 had already become final as it was not appealed.
Issue: Can respondents be bound by the decision in Petition CaseNo. U-920 even if they were not made parties in the
said case?
Held: Petitioners cannot use the finality of the RTC decision in Petition Case No. U-920 as a shield against the
verification of the validity of the deed of donation. According to petitioners, the said final decision is one for quieting
of title. In other words, it is a case for declaratory relief under Rule 64 (now Rule 63) of the Rules of Court. Suits to
quiet title are not technically suits in rem, nor are they, strictly speaking, in personam, but being against the person in
respect of the res, these proceedings are characterized as quasi in rem. The judgment in such proceedings is conclusive
only between the parties. Thus, respondents are not bound by the decision in Petition Case No. U-920 as they were not
made parties in the said case.The rules on quieting of title expressly provide that any declaration in a suit to quiet title
shall not prejudice persons who are not parties to the action. That respondents filed a subsequent pleading in the same
Petition Case No. U-920 after the decision there had become final did not change the fact that said decision became
final without their being impleaded in the case. Said subsequent pleading was dismissed onthe ground of finality of the
decision.
VALENCIA VS LOQUIAO
FACTS:
Sps. Locquiao (6 children) executed a deed of donation propter nuptias in favor of their son, R Benito Locquiao bride,
R Tomasa Mara. R were gifted with 4 parcels of land, as well as a male cow and 1/3 portion of the conjugal house of the
Sps. Locquiao. Later, the R got married. The donees took their marriage vows on June 4, 1944 and the fact of their
marriage was inscribed at the back of O.C.T. No. 18383.
The Sps. Locquiao died. With the permission of R Sps, P Romana took possession and cultivated the subject land. When
Ps husband got sick, her daughter P Constancia took over and has been in possession of the land. Meanwhile, R Sps.
registered the deed with the Office of the Register of Deeds. A new TCT was issued under the R sps names.
Subsequently, the heirs of the Sps. Loq., including R Benito and P Valencia, executed a Deed of Partition with
Recognition of Rights, wherein they distributed among only 3 of them, the 12 parcels of land left by parents, excluding
the land in question and other lots disposed of by the Locquiao spouses earlier.
The Deed contained a statement that R Benito and Marciano Locquiao, along with the heirs of Lucio Locquiao, have
already received our shares in the estates of our parents, and because of that the heirs of Lucio Locquaio were not
made parties to the deed. All the living children of the Locquaio spouses at the time, including P Valencia, confirmed
the previous dispositions and waived their rights to whomsoever the properties covered by the deed of partition were
adjudicated.

Later, P Romana disagreed the distribution of the 2 lots covered by the deed of partition. So they again executed a
Deed of Compromise Agreement which redistributed the land. Benito also signed the CA. all of them confirmed the
stipulations etc in the CA.
Sometime in 1983, P Constancia filed an action for annulment of title against the R Sps. R then filed a Complaint
seeking the ejectment of P Constancia from the subject property. MTC: P Constancia vacate the land.
Ps Romana and Constancia filed a Complaint for the annulment of TCT No. 84897 against R Sps. They alleged that the
issuance of the transfer certificate of title was fraudulent; that the Inventario Ti Sagut is spurious; that the notary
public who notarized the document had no authority to do so, and; that the donation did not observe the form
required by law as there was no written acceptance on the document itself or in a separate public instrument.
Meanwhile, the decision in the ejectment case was appealed to the same RTC, the court issued an Order suspending
the proceedings in the ejectment case until it shall have decided the ownership issue in the title annulment case. RTC:
Inventario- valid, complaint dismissed. CA: affirmed RTCs decision, action- prescribed; it was filed beyond the 10yr
prescriptive period for actions for reconveyance (>15 yrs). The donation was valid kc nagpakasal tlaga sila.
ISSUED: (1) WON the donation propter nuptias is authentic;
(2) W/ respect on the formal requirements of donation propter nuptias, which one should be followed? OLD
OR NCC?
HELD: FIRST ISSUE: YES. The certification is not sufficient to prove the alleged inexistence or spuriousness of the
challenged document. The appellate court is correct in pointing out that the mere absence of the notarial record does
not prove that the notary public does not have a valid notarial commission and neither does the absence of a file copy
of the document with the archives effect evidence of the falsification of the document. the failure of the notary
public to furnish a copy of the deed to the appropriate office is a ground for disciplining him, but certainly not for
invalidating the document or for setting aside the transaction therein involved.
Similarly, Marciano Locquiao and the heirs of Lucio Locquiao were not allocated any more share in the deed of partition
since they received theirs by virtue of prior donations or conveyances.
SECOND ISSUE: Under the New Civil Code, the rules are different. Article 127 thereof provides that the form of
donations propter nuptias are regulated by the Statute of Frauds. Article 1403, paragraph 2, which contains the Statute
of Frauds requires that the contracts mentioned thereunder need be in writing only to be enforceable. However, as
provided in Article 129, express acceptance is not necessary for the validity of these donations. Thus, implied
acceptance is sufficient. (OLD CC marriage between the beneficiary couple, in tandem with compliance with the
prescribed form => VALID donation propter nuptias.).
Since the donation propter nuptias was executed in 1944 and the New Civil Code took effect only on August 30, 1950.
As a consequence, applying Article 1330 of the Old Civil Code in the determination of the validity of the questioned
donation, it does not matter whether or not the donees had accepted the donation. The validity of the donation is
unaffected in either case.
Even if the provisions of the New Civil Code were to be applied, still even the implied acceptance of a donation
propter nuptias suffices under the NCC.