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ONG CHIA, petitioner, vs.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE


COURT OF APPEALS, respondents. marie
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision1[1] of the Court of Appeals reversing the
decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 24, Koronadal, South Cotabato 2[2] admitting
petitioner Ong Chia to Philippines citizenship.
The facts are as follows:
Petitioner was born on January 1, 1923 in Amoy, China. In 1932, as a nine-year old boy,
he arrived at the port of Manila on board the vessel "Angking." Since then, he has
stayed in the Philippines where he found employment and eventually started his own
business, married a Filipina, with whom he had four children. On July 4, 1989, at the
age of 66, he filed a verified petition to be admitted as a Filipino citizen under C.A. No.
473, otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Law, as amended. Petitioner, after
stating his qualifications as required in 2, and lack of the disqualifications enumerated in
3 of the law, stated 17. That he has heretofore made (a) petition for citizenship under the
provisions of Letter of Instruction No.270 with the Special Committee on
Naturalization, Office of the Solicitor General, Manila, docketed as SCN
Case No.031776, but the same was not acted upon owing to the fact that
the said Special Committee on Naturalization was not reconstituted after
the February, 1986 revolution such that processing of petitions for
naturalization by administrative process was suspended;
During the hearings, petitioner testified as to his qualifications and presented three
witnesses to corroborate his testimony. So impressed was Prosecutor Isaac Alvero V.
Moran with the testimony of petitioner that, upon being asked by the court whether the
State intended to present any witness against him, he remarked: novero
Actually, Your Honor, with the testimony of the petitioner himself which is
rather surprising, in the sense that he seems to be well-versed with the
major portion of the history of the Philippines, so, on our part, we are
convinced, Your Honor Please, that petitioner really deserves to be
admitted as a citizen of the Philippines. And for this reason, we do not
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wish to present any evidence to counteract or refute the testimony of the


witnesses for the petitioner, as well as the petitioner himself.3[3]
Accordingly, on August 25, 1999, the trial court granted the petition and admitted
petitioner to Philippine citizenship. The State, however, through the Office of the
Solicitor General, appealed contending that petitioner: (1) failed to state all the names
by which he is or had been known; (2) failed to state all his former places of residence
in violation of C.A. No. 473, 7; (3) failed to conduct himself in a proper and
irreproachable manner during his entire stay in the Philippines, in violation of 2; (4) has
no known lucrative trade or occupation and his previous incomes have been insufficient
or misdeclared, also in contravention of 2; and (5) failed to support his petition with the
appropriate documentary evidence.4[4]
Annexed to the State's appellant's brief was a copy of a 1977 petition for naturalization
filed by petitioner with the Special Committee on Naturalization in SCN Case No.
031767,5[5] in which petitioner stated that in addition to his name of "Ong Chia," he had
likewise been known since childhood as "Loreto Chia Ong." As petitioner, however,
failed to state this other name in his 1989 petition for naturalization, it was contended
that his petition must fail.6[6] The state also annexed income tax returns7[7] allegedly filed
by petitioner from 1973 to 1977 to show that his net income could hardly support himself
and his family. To prove that petitioner failed to conduct himself in a proper and
irreproachable manner during his stay in the Philippines, the State contended that,
although petitioner claimed that he and Ramona Villaruel had been married twice, once
before a judge in 1953, and then again in church in 1977, petitioner actually lived with
his wife without the benefit of marriage from 1953 until they were married in 1977. It was
alleged that petitioner failed to present his 1953 marriage contract, if there be any. The
State also annexed a copy of petitioner's 1977 marriage contract 8[8] and a JointAffidavit9[9] executed by petitioner and his wife. These documents show that when
petitioner married Ramona Villaruel on February 23, 1977, no marriage license had
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been required in accordance with Art.76 of the Civil Code because petitioner and
Ramona Villaruel had been living together as husband and wife since 1953 without the
benefit of marriage. This, according to the State, belies his claim that when he started
living with his wife in 1953, they had already been married. ella
The State also argued that, as shown by petitioner's Immigrant Certificate of
Residence,10[10] petitioner resided at "J.M. Basa Street, Iloilo," but he did not include said
address in his petition.
On November 15, 1996, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision which, as already
noted, reversed the trial court and denied petitioner's application for naturalization. It
ruled that due to the importance of naturalization cases, the State is not precluded from
raising questions not presented in the lower court and brought up for the first time on
appeal.11[11] The appellate court held:
As correctly observed by the Office of the Solicitor General, petitioner Ong
Chia failed to state in this present petition for naturalization his other
name, "LORETO CHIA ONG," which name appeared in his previous
application under Letter of Instruction No.270. Names and pseudonyms
must be stated in the petition for naturalization and failure to include the
same militates against a decision in his favor...This is a mandatory
requirement to allow those persons who know (petitioner) by those other
names to come forward and inform the authorities of any legal objection
which might adversely affect his application for citizenship.
Furthermore, Ong Chia failed to disclose in his petition for naturalization
that he formerly resided in "J.M. Basa St., Iloilo" and "Alimodian, Iloilo."
Section 7 of the Revised Naturalization Law requires the applicant to state
in his petition "his present and former places of residence." This
requirement is mandatory and failure of the petitioner to comply with it is
fatal to the petition. As explained by the Court, the reason for the provision
is to give the public, as well as the investigating agencies of the
government, upon the publication of the petition, an opportunity to be
informed thereof and voice their objections against the petitioner. By failing
to comply with this provision, the petitioner is depriving the public and said
agencies of such opportunity, thus defeating the purpose of the law
Ong Chia had not also conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable
manner when he lived-in with his wife for several years, and sired four
children out of wedlock. It has been the consistent ruling that the
"applicant's 8-year cohabitation with his wife without the benefit of clergy
and begetting by her three children out of wedlock is a conduct far from
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being proper and irreproachable as required by the Revised Naturalization


Law", and therefore disqualifies him from becoming a citizen of the
Philippines by naturalizationnigel
Lastly, petitioner Ong Chia's alleged annual income in 1961 of P5,000.00,
exclusive of bonuses, commissions and allowances, is not lucrative
income. His failure to file an income tax return "because he is not liable for
income tax yet" confirms that his income is low. . ."It is not only that the
person having the employment gets enough for his ordinary necessities in
life. It must be shown that the employment gives one an income such that
there is an appreciable margin of his income over expenses as to be able
to provide for an adequate support in the event of unemployment,
sickness, or disability to work and thus avoid one's becoming the object of
charity or public charge." ...Now that they are in their old age, petitioner
Ong Chia and his wife are living on the allowance given to them by their
children. The monthly pension given by the elder children of the applicant
cannot be added to his income to make it lucrative because like bonuses,
commissions and allowances, said pensions are contingent, speculative
and precarious
Hence, this petition based on the following assignment of errors:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
RULING THAT IN NATURALIZATION CASES, THE APPELLATE COURT
CAN DENY AN APPLCATION FOR PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP ON THE
BASIS OF DOCUMENTS NOT PRESENTED BEFORE THE TRIAL
COURT AND NOT FORMING PART OF THE RECORDS OF THE CASE.
II. THE FINDING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS THAT THE PETITIONER
HAS BEEN KNOWN BY SOME OTHER NAME NOT STATED IN HIS
PETITION IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD.
III. CONTRARY TO THE FINDING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE
PETITIONER STATED IN HIS PETITION AND ITS ANNEXES HIS
PRESENT AND FORMER PLACES OF RESIDENCE.
IV. THE FINDING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS THAT THE
PETITIONER FAILED TO CONDUCT HIMSELF IN A PROPER AND
IRREPROACHABLE MANNER IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE
EVIDENCE ON RECORD. brando
Petitioner's principal contention is that the appellate court erred in considering the
documents which had merely been annexed by the State to its appellant's brief and, on
the basis of which, justified the reversal of the trial court's decision. Not having been
presented and formally offered as evidence, they are mere "scrap(s) of paper devoid of

any evidentiary value,"12[12] so it was argued, because under Rule 132, 34 of the
Revised Rules on Evidence, the court shall consider no evidence which has not been
formally offered.
The contention has no merit. Petitioner failed to note Rule 143 13[13] of the Rules of Court
which provides that These rules shall not apply to land registration, cadastral and election
cases, naturalization and insolvency proceedings, and other cases not
herein provided for, except by analogy or in a suppletory character and
whenever practicable and convenient. (Emphasis added)
Prescinding from the above, the rule on formal offer of evidence (Rule 132, 34) now
being invoked by petitioner is clearly not applicable to the present case involving a
petition for naturalization. The only instance when said rules may be applied by analogy
or suppletorily in such cases is when it is "practicable and convenient." That is not the
case here, since reliance upon the documents presented by the State for the first time
on appeal, in fact, appears to be the more practical and convenient course of action
considering that decision in naturalization proceedings are not covered by the rule on
res judicata.14[14] Consequently, a final favorable judgment does not preclude the State
from later on moving for a revocation of the grant of naturalization on the basis of the
same documents.
Petitioner claims that as a result of the failure of the State to present and formally offer
its documentary evidence before the trial court, he was denied the right to object against
their authenticity, effectively depriving him of his fundamental right to procedural due
process.15[15] We are not persuaded. Indeed, the reason for the rule prohibiting the
admission of evidence which has not been formally offered is to afford the opposite
party the chance to object to their admissibility.16[16] Petitioner cannot claim that he was
deprived of the right to object to the authenticity of the documents submitted to the
appellate court by the State. He could have included his objections, as he, in fact, did, in
the brief he filed with the Court of Appeals, thus: nigella

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The authenticity of the alleged petition for naturalization (SCN Case No.
031767) which was supposedly filed by Ong Chia under LOI 270 has not
been established. In fact, the case number of the alleged petition for
naturalization is 031767 while the case number of the petition actually filed
by the appellee is 031776. Thus, said document is totally unreliable and
should not be considered by the Honorable Court in resolving the instant
appeal.17[17]
Indeed, the objection is flimsy as the alleged discrepancy is trivial, and, at most, can be
accounted for as a typographical error on the part of petitioner himself. That "SCN Case
No. 031767," a copy of which was annexed to the petition, is the correct case number is
confirmed by the Evaluation Sheet18[18] of the Special Committee on Naturalization
which was also docketed as "SCN Case No. 031767." Other than this, petitioner offered
no evidence to disprove the authenticity of the documents presented by the State.
Furthermore, the Court notes that these documents - namely, the petition in SCN Case
No. 031767, petitioner's marriage contract, the joint affidavit executed by him and his
wife, and petitioner's income tax returns - are all public documents. As such, they have
been executed under oath. They are thus reliable. Since petitioner failed to make
satisfactory showing of any flaw or irregularity that may cast doubt on the authenticity of
these documents, it is our conclusion that the appellate court did not err in relying upon
them.
One last point. The above discussion would have been enough to dispose of this case,
but to settle all the issues raised, we shall briefly discuss the effect of petitioner's failure
to include the address "J.M. Basa St., Iloilo" in his petition, in accordance with 7, C.A.
No. 473. This address appears on petitioner's Immigrant Certificate of Residence, a
document which forms part of the records as Annex A of his 1989 petition for
naturalization. Petitioner admits that he failed to mention said address in his petition, but
argues that since the Immigrant Certificate of Residence containing it had been fully
published,19[19] with the petition and the other annexes, such publication constitutes
substantial compliance with 7.20[20] This is allegedly because the publication effectively
satisfied the objective sought to be achieved by such requirement, i.e., to give
investigating agencies of the government the opportunity to check on the background of
the applicant and prevent suppression of information regarding any possible
misbehavior on his part in any community where he may have lived at one time or
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another.21[21] It is settled, however, that naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced


and strictly construed in favor of the government and against the applicant. 22[22] As noted
by the State, C.A. No. 473, 7 clearly provides that the applicant for naturalization shall
set forth in the petition his present and former places of residence. 23[23] This provision
and the rule of strict application of the law in naturalization cases defeat petitioner's
argument of "substantial compliance" with the requirement under the Revised
Naturalization Law. On this ground alone, the instant petition ought to be denied. marinella
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED and the instant
petition is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
CECILIA ZULUETA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ALFREDO MARTIN,
respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch X) which ordered petitioner to return documents and
papers taken by her from private respondents clinic without the latters knowledge and consent.
The facts are as follows:
Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. On March 26, 1982,
petitioner entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her
mother, a driver and private respondents secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in her
husbands clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private correspondence between Dr.
Martin and his alleged paramours, greetings cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martins
passport, and photographs. The documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case
for legal separation and for disqualification from the practice of medicine which petitioner had
filed against her husband.
Dr. Martin brought this action below for recovery of the documents and papers and for damages
against petitioner. The case was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch X, which,
after trial, rendered judgment for private respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin, declaring him the
capital/exclusive owner of the properties described in paragraph 3 of plaintiffs Complaint or
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those further described in the Motion to Return and Suppress and ordering Cecilia Zulueta and
any person acting in her behalf to immediately return the properties to Dr. Martin and to pay him
P5,000.00, as nominal damages; P5,000.00, as moral damages and attorneys fees; and to pay the
costs of the suit. The writ of preliminary injunction earlier issued was made final and petitioner
Cecilia Zulueta and her attorneys and representatives were enjoined from using or
submitting/admitting as evidence the documents and papers in question. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court. Hence this petition.
There is no question that the documents and papers in question belong to private respondent, Dr.
Alfredo Martin, and that they were taken by his wife, the herein petitioner, without his
knowledge and consent. For that reason, the trial court declared the documents and papers to be
properties of private respondent, ordered petitioner to return them to private respondent and
enjoined her from using them in evidence. In appealing from the decision of the Court of
Appeals affirming the trial courts decision, petitioners only ground is that in Alfredo Martin v.
Alfonso Felix, Jr.,1 this Court ruled that the documents and papers (marked as Annexes A-i to J-7
of respondents comment in that case) were admissible in evidence and, therefore, their use by
petitioners attorney, Alfonso Felix, Jr., did not constitute malpractice or gross misconduct. For
this reason it is contended that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the decision of the trial
court instead of dismissing private respondents complaint.
Petitioners contention has no merit. The case against Atty. Felix, Jr. was for disbarment. Among
other things, private respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin, as complainant in that case, charged that in
using the documents in evidence, Atty. Felix, Jr. committed malpractice or gross misconduct
because of the injunctive order of the trial court. In dismissing the complaint against Atty. Felix,
Jr., this Court took note of the following defense of Atty. Felix, Jr. which it found to be impressed
with merit:2
On the alleged malpractice or gross misconduct of respondent [Alfonso Felix, Jr.], he maintains
that:
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4. When respondent refiled Cecilias case for legal separation before the Pasig Regional Trial
Court, there was admittedly an order of the Manila Regional Trial Court prohibiting Cecilia from
using the documents Annex A-I to J-7. On September 6, 1983, however having appealed the said
order to this Court on a petition for certiorari, this Court issued a restraining order on aforesaid
date which order temporarily set aside the order of the trial court. Hence, during the
enforceability of this Courts order, respondents request for petitioner to admit the genuineness
and authenticity of the subject annexes cannot be looked upon as malpractice. Notably, petitioner
Dr. Martin finally admitted the truth and authenticity of the questioned annexes. At that point in
time, would it have been malpractice for respondent to use petitioners admission as evidence
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against him in the legal separation case pending in the Regional Trial Court of Makati?
Respondent submits it is- not malpractice.
Significantly, petitioners admission was done not thru his counsel but by Dr. Martin himself
under oath. Such verified admission constitutes an affidavit, and, therefore, receivable in
evidence against him. Petitioner became bound by his admission. For Cecilia to avail herself of
her husbands admission and use the same in her action for legal separation cannot be treated as
malpractice.
Thus, the acquittal of Atty. Felix, Jr. in the administrative case amounts to no more than a
declaration that his use of the documents and papers for the purpose of securing Dr. Martins
admission as to their genuiness and authenticity did not constitute a violation of the injunctive
order of the trial court. By no means does the decision in that case establish the admissibility of
the documents and papers in question.
It cannot be overemphasized that if Atty. Felix, Jr. was acquitted of the charge of violating the
writ of preliminary injunction issued by the trial court, it was only because, at the time he used
the documents and papers, enforcement of the order of the trial court was temporarily restrained
by this Court. The TRO issued by this Court was eventually lifted as the petition for certiorari
filed by petitioner against the trial courts order was dismissed and, therefore, the prohibition
against the further use of the documents and papers became effective again.
Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional
injunction declaring the privacy of communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable3 is no
less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husbands
infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only
exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a lawful order [from a] court or when
public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law.4 Any violation of this provision
renders the evidence obtained inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.5
The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers
and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A
person, by contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an
individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.
The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it
privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of
the affected spouse while the marriage subsists.6 Neither may be examined without the consent
of the other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other during the
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marriage, save for specified exceptions.7 But one thing is freedom of communication; quite
another is a compulsion for each one to share what one knows with the other. And this has
nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to the other.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 155208

March 27, 2007

NENA LAZALITA* TATING, Petitioner,


vs.
FELICIDAD TATING MARCELLA, represented by SALVADOR MARCELLA, CARLOS
TATING, and the COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Assailed in the Special Civil Action for Certiorari before the Court are the Decision1 dated
February 22, 2002 and the Resolution dated August 22, 2002 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CV No. 64122, which affirmed the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Cadiz City, Negros Occidental, Branch 60.
The present case arose from a controversy involving a parcel of land denominated as Lot 56 of
Subdivision plan Psd-31182, located at Abelarde St., Cadiz City, Negros Occidental. The subject
lot, containing an area of 200 square meters, was owned by Daniela Solano Vda. de Tating
(Daniela) as evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-4393 issued by the Registry
of Deeds of the City of Cadiz.3
On October 14, 1969, Daniela sold the subject property to her granddaughter, herein petitioner
Nena Lazalita Tating (Nena). The contract of sale was embodied in a duly notarized Deed of
Absolute Sale executed by Daniela in favor of Nena.4 Subsequently, title over the subject
property was transferred in the name of Nena.5 She declared the property in her name for tax
purposes and paid the real estate taxes due thereon for the years 1972, 1973, 1975 to 1986 and
1988.6 However, the land remained in possession of Daniela.

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On December 28, 1977, Daniela executed a sworn statement claiming that she had actually no
intention of selling the property; the true agreement between her and Nena was simply to transfer
title over the subject property in favor of the latter to enable her to obtain a loan by mortgaging
the subject property for the purpose of helping her defray her business expenses; she later
discovered that Nena did not secure any loan nor mortgage the property; she wants the title in the
name of Nena cancelled and the subject property reconveyed to her.7
Daniela died on July 29, 19888 leaving her children as her heirs, namely: Ricardo, Felicidad,
Julio, Carlos and Cirilo who predeceased Daniela and was represented by herein petitioner.
In a letter dated March 1, 1989, Carlos informed Nena that when Daniela died they discovered
the sworn statement she executed on December 28, 1977 and, as a consequence, they are
demanding from Nena the return of their rightful shares over the subject property as heirs of
Daniela.9 Nena did not reply. Efforts to settle the case amicably proved futile.
Hence, on September 6, 1989, Carlos and Felicidad, represented by her son Salvador, filed a
complaint with the RTC of Cadiz City, Negros Occidental against Nena praying for the
nullification of the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Daniela in her favor, cancellation of the
TCT issued in the name of Nena, and issuance of a new title and tax declaration in favor of the
heirs of Daniela.10 The complaint also prayed for the award of moral and exemplary damages as
well as attorneys fees and litigation expenses. On March 19, 1993, the plaintiffs filed an
amended complaint with leave of court for the purpose of excluding Ricardo as a party plaintiff,
he having died intestate and without issue in March 1991.11 He left Carlos, Felicidad, Julio, and
Nena as his sole heirs.
In her Answer, Nena denied that any fraud or misrepresentation attended the execution of the
subject Deed of Absolute Sale. She also denied having received the letter of her uncle, Carlos.
She prayed for the dismissal of the complaint, and in her counterclaim, she asked the trial court
for the award of actual, exemplary and moral damages as well as attorneys fees and litigation
expenses.12
Trial ensued. On November 4, 1998, the RTC rendered judgment with the following dispositive
portion:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
plaintiffs and against the defendant, and hereby declaring the document of sale dated October 14,
1969 (Exh. "Q") executed between Daniela Solano Vda. de Tating and Nena Lazalita Tating as
NULL and VOID and further ordering:
1. The Register of Deeds of Cadiz City to cancel TCT No. 5975 and in lieu thereof to
issue a new title in the names of Carlos Tating, Pro-indiviso owner of one-fourth ()

portion of the property; Felicidad Tating Marcella, Pro-indiviso owner of one-fourth ()


portion; Julio Tating, Pro-indiviso owner of one-fourth () portion and Nena Lazalita
Tating, Pro-indiviso owner of one-fourth () portion, all of lot 56 after payment of the
prescribed fees;
2. The City Assessor of the City of Cadiz to cancel Tax Declaration No. 143-00672 and in
lieu thereof issue a new Tax Declaration in the names of Carlos Tating, Pro-indiviso
portion; Felicidad Tating Marcella, Pro-indiviso portion; Julio Tating, Pro-indiviso
portion; and Nena Lazalita Tating, Pro-indiviso portion, all of lot 56 as well as the
house standing thereon be likewise declared in the names of the persons mentioned in the
same proportions as above-stated after payment of the prescribed fees;
3. The defendant is furthermore ordered to pay plaintiffs the sum of P20,000.00 by way
of moral damages, P10,000.00 by way of exemplary damages, P5,000.00 by way of
attorneys fees and P3,000.00 by way of litigation expenses; and to
4. Pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.13
Nena filed an appeal with the CA. On February 22, 2002, the CA rendered its Decision affirming
the judgment of the RTC.14
Nenas Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the CA in its Resolution dated August 22,
2002.15
Hence, herein petition for certiorari anchored on the ground that the CA "has decided the instant
case without due regard to and in violation of the applicable laws and Decisions of this
Honorable Court and also because the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, which it has
affirmed, is not supported by and is even against the evidence on record."16
At the outset, it must be stated that the filing of the instant petition for certiorari under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court is inappropriate. Considering that the assailed Decision and Resolution of
the CA finally disposed of the case, the proper remedy is a petition for review under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court.
The Court notes that while the instant petition is denominated as a Petition for Certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, there is no allegation that the CA committed grave abuse of
discretion. On the other hand, the petition actually avers errors of judgment, rather than of
jurisdiction, which are the proper subjects of a petition for review on certiorari. Hence, in
accordance with the liberal spirit pervading the Rules of Court and in the interest of justice, the

Court decided to treat the present petition for certiorari as having been filed under Rule 45,
especially considering that it was filed within the reglementary period for filing the same.17
As to the merits of the case, petitioner contends that the case for the private respondents rests on
the proposition that the Deed of Absolute Sale dated October 14, 1969 is simulated because
Danielas actual intention was not to dispose of her property but simply to help petitioner by
providing her with a collateral. Petitioner asserts that the sole evidence which persuaded both the
RTC and the CA in holding that the subject deed was simulated was the Sworn Statement of
Daniela dated December 28, 1977. However, petitioner argues that said Sworn Statement should
have been rejected outright by the lower courts considering that Daniela has long been dead
when the document was offered in evidence, thereby denying petitioner the right to crossexamine her.
Petitioner also contends that while the subject deed was executed on October 14, 1969, the
Sworn Statement was purportedly executed only on December 28, 1977 and was discovered only
after the death of Daniela in 1994.18 Petitioner argues that if the deed of sale is indeed simulated,
Daniela would have taken action against the petitioner during her lifetime. However, the fact
remains that up to the time of her death or almost 20 years after the Deed of Absolute Sale was
executed, she never uttered a word of complaint against petitioner.
Petitioner further asserts that the RTC and the CA erred in departing from the doctrine held time
and again by the Supreme Court that clear, strong and convincing evidence beyond mere
preponderance is required to show the falsity or nullity of a notarial document. Petitioner also
argues that the RTC and the CA erred in its pronouncement that the transaction between Daniela
and petitioner created a trust relationship between them because of the settled rule that where the
terms of a contract are clear, it should be given full effect.
In their Comment and Memorandum, private respondents contend that petitioner failed to show
that the CA or the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in arriving at their assailed
judgments; that Danielas Sworn Statement is sufficient evidence to prove that the contract of
sale by and between her and petitioner was merely simulated; and that, in effect, the agreement
between petitioner and Daniela created a trust relationship between them.
The Court finds for the petitioner.
The CA and the trial court ruled that the contract of sale between petitioner and Daniela is
simulated. A contract is simulated if the parties do not intend to be bound at all (absolutely
simulated) or if the parties conceal their true agreement (relatively simulated).19 The primary
consideration in determining the true nature of a contract is the intention of the parties.20 Such
intention is determined from the express terms of their agreement as well as from their
contemporaneous and subsequent acts.21

In the present case, the main evidence presented by private respondents in proving their
allegation that the subject deed of sale did not reflect the true intention of the parties thereto is
the sworn statement of Daniela dated December 28, 1977. The trial court admitted the said sworn
statement as part of private respondents evidence and gave credence to it. The CA also accorded
great probative weight to this document.
There is no issue in the admissibility of the subject sworn statement. However, the admissibility
of evidence should not be equated with weight of evidence.22 The admissibility of evidence
depends on its relevance and competence while the weight of evidence pertains to evidence
already admitted and its tendency to convince and persuade.23 Thus, a particular item of evidence
may be admissible, but its evidentiary weight depends on judicial evaluation within the
guidelines provided by the rules of evidence.24 It is settled that affidavits are classified as hearsay
evidence since they are not generally prepared by the affiant but by another who uses his own
language in writing the affiants statements, which may thus be either omitted or misunderstood
by the one writing them.25 Moreover, the adverse party is deprived of the opportunity to crossexamine the affiant.26 For this reason, affidavits are generally rejected for being hearsay, unless
the affiants themselves are placed on the witness stand to testify thereon.27 The Court finds that
both the trial court and the CA committed error in giving the sworn statement probative weight.
Since Daniela is no longer available to take the witness stand as she is already dead, the RTC and
the CA should not have given probative value on Danielas sworn statement for purposes of
proving that the contract of sale between her and petitioner was simulated and that, as a
consequence, a trust relationship was created between them.
Private respondents should have presented other evidence to sufficiently prove their allegation
that Daniela, in fact, had no intention of disposing of her property when she executed the subject
deed of sale in favor of petitioner. As in all civil cases, the burden is on the plaintiff to prove the
material allegations of his complaint and he must rely on the strength of his evidence and not on
the weakness of the evidence of the defendant.28 Aside from Danielas sworn statement, private
respondents failed to present any other documentary evidence to prove their claim. Even the
testimonies of their witnesses failed to establish that Daniela had a different intention when she
entered into a contract of sale with petitioner.
In Suntay v. Court of Appeals,29 the Court ruled that the most protuberant index of simulation is
the complete absence, on the part of the vendee, of any attempt in any manner to assert his rights
of ownership over the disputed property.30 In the present case, however, the evidence clearly
shows that petitioner declared the property for taxation and paid realty taxes on it in her name.
Petitioner has shown that from 1972 to 1988 she religiously paid the real estate taxes due on the
said lot and that it was only in 1974 and 1987 that she failed to pay the taxes thereon. While tax
receipts and declarations and receipts and declarations of ownership for taxation purposes are
not, in themselves, incontrovertible evidence of ownership, they constitute at least proof that the
holder has a claim of title over the property.31 The voluntary declaration of a piece of property for

taxation purposes manifests not only ones sincere and honest desire to obtain title to the
property and announces his adverse claim against the State and all other interested parties, but
also the intention to contribute needed revenues to the Government.32 Such an act strengthens
ones bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership.33 On the other hand, private respondents failed
to present even a single tax receipt or declaration showing that Daniela paid taxes due on the
disputed lot as proof that she claims ownership thereof. The only Tax Declaration in the name of
Daniela, which private respondents presented in evidence, refers only to the house standing on
the lot in controversy.34 Even the said Tax Declaration contains a notation that herein petitioner
owns the lot (Lot 56) upon which said house was built.
Moreover, the Court agrees with petitioner that if the subject Deed of Absolute Sale did not
really reflect the real intention of Daniela, why is it that she remained silent until her death; she
never told any of her relatives regarding her actual purpose in executing the subject deed; she
simply chose to make known her true intentions through the sworn statement she executed on
December 28, 1977, the existence of which she kept secret from her relatives; and despite her
declaration therein that she is appealing for help in order to get back the subject lot, she never
took any concrete step to recover the subject property from petitioner until her death more than
ten years later.
It is true that Daniela retained physical possession of the property even after she executed the
subject Absolute Deed of Sale and even after title to the property was transferred in petitioners
favor. In fact, Daniela continued to occupy the property in dispute until her death in 1988 while,
in the meantime, petitioner continued to reside in Manila. However, it is well-established that
ownership and possession are two entirely different legal concepts.35 Just as possession is not a
definite proof of ownership, neither is non-possession inconsistent with ownership. The first
paragraph of Article 1498 of the Civil Code states that when the sale is made through a public
instrument, the execution thereof shall be equivalent to the delivery of the thing which is the
object of the contract, if from the deed the contrary does not appear or cannot clearly be inferred.
Possession, along with ownership, is transferred to the vendee by virtue of the notarized deed of
conveyance.36 Thus, in light of the circumstances of the present case, it is of no legal
consequence that petitioner did not take actual possession or occupation of the disputed property
after the execution of the deed of sale in her favor because she was already able to perfect and
complete her ownership of and title over the subject property.
As to Danielas affidavit dated June 9, 1983, submitted by petitioner, which confirmed the
validity of the sale of the disputed lot in her favor, the same has no probative value, as the sworn
statement earlier adverted to, for being hearsay. Naturally, private respondents were not able to
cross-examine the deceased-affiant on her declarations contained in the said affidavit.
However, even if Danielas affidavit of June 9, 1983 is disregarded, the fact remains that private
respondents failed to prove by clear, strong and convincing evidence beyond mere

preponderance of evidence37 that the contract of sale between Daniela and petitioner was
simulated. The legal presumption is in favor of the validity of contracts and the party who
impugns its regularity has the burden of proving its simulation.38 Since private respondents failed
to discharge the burden of proving their allegation that the contract of sale between petitioner and
Daniela was simulated, the presumption of regularity and validity of the October 14, 1969 Deed
of Absolute Sale stands.
Considering that the Court finds the subject contract of sale between petitioner and Daniela to be
valid and not fictitious or simulated, there is no more necessity to discuss the issue as to whether
or not a trust relationship was created between them.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 64122, affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Cadiz City, Negros Occidental, Branch 60, in Civil Case No. 278-C, are REVERSED AND SET
ASIDE. The complaint of the private respondents is DISMISSED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

-versus-

G.R. No. 173476

Present:

CORONA, C.J., Chairperson,


LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BERSAMIN,
VILLARAMA, JR., and
*
PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ.

Promulgated:
RODRIGO SALAFRANCA
y BELLO,

February 22, 2012

Accused-Appellant.
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

An ante-mortem declaration of a victim of murder, homicide, or parricide


that meets the conditions of admissibility under the Rules of Court and pertinent
jurisprudence is admissible either as a dying declaration or as a part of the res
gestae, or both.

Rodrigo Salafranca y Bello was charged with and tried for murder for the
fatal stabbing of Johnny Bolanon, and was ultimately found guilty of the felony by
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, in Manila on September 23, 2004. On appeal,
his conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals (CA) through its decision
promulgated on November 24, 2005.24[1]

Salafranca has come to the Court on a final appeal, continuing to challenge


the credibility of the witnesses who had incriminated him.

The established facts show that past midnight on July 31, 1993 Bolanon was
stabbed near the Del Pan Sports Complex in Binondo, Manila; that after stabbing
Bolanon, his assailant ran away; that Bolanon was still able to walk to the house of
his uncle Rodolfo B. Estao in order to seek help; that his uncle rushed him to the
Philippine General Hospital by taxicab; that on their way to the hospital Bolanon
told Estao that it was Salafranca who had stabbed him; that Bolanon eventually
succumbed at the hospital at 2:30 am despite receiving medical attention; and that
24

the stabbing of Bolanon was personally witnessed by Augusto Mendoza, then still
a minor of 13 years, who was in the complex at the time.25[2]

As stated, Salafranca fled after stabbing Bolanon. He evaded arrest for a


long period, despite the warrant for his arrest being issued. He was finally arrested
on April 23, 2003, and detained at the Manila City Jail.

After trial, the RTC convicted Salafranca, stating:

The evidence is clear that it was Rodrigo Salafranca who delivered two (2)
stabbing blows to the victim while holding Johnny Bolanon with his left arm
encircled around Bolanons neck stabbing the latter with the use of his right hand
at the right sub costal area which caused Bolanons death. Not only because it was
testified to by Augusto Mendoza but corroborated by Rodolfo Estao, the victims
uncle who brought Bolanon to the hospital and who relayed to the court that when
he aided Bolanon and even on their way to the hospital while the latter was
suffering from hard breathing, victim Bolanon was able to say that it was Rodrigo
Salafranca who stabbed him.26[3]

The RTC appreciated treachery based on the testimony of Prosecution witness


Mendoza on how Salafranca had effected his attack

25
26

against Bolanon, observing that by encircling his (accused) left arm, while behind
the victim on the latters neck and stabbing the victim with the use of his right hand,
Salafranca did not give Bolanon any opportunity to defend himself. 27[4] The RTC
noted inconsistencies in Salafrancas and his witness testimonies, as well as the fact
that he had fled from his residence the day after the incident and had stayed away
in Bataan for eight years until his arrest. The RTC opined that had he not been
hiding, there would be no reason for him to immediately leave his residence,
especially because he was also working near the area.28[5]

The RTC disposed thus:

With the above observations and findings, accused Rodrigo Salafranca is


hereby found guilty of the crime of Murder defined and punished under Article
248 as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 in relation to Article 63 of the Revised
Penal Code with the presence of the qualifying aggravating circumstance of
treachery (248 par. 1 as amended) without any mitigating nor other aggravating
circumstance attendant to its commission, Rodrigo Salafranca is hereby sentenced
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
He shall be credited with the full extent of his preventive imprisonment
under Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code.
His body is hereby committed to the custody of the Director of the Bureau
of Correction, National Penitentiary, Muntinlupa City thru the City Jail Warden of
Manila.
He is hereby ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim the sum of
P50,000.00 representing death indemnity.
There being no claim of other damages, no pronouncement is hereby made.
27
28

SO ORDERED.29[6]

On appeal, the CA affirmed the findings and conclusions of the RTC, 30[7]
citing the dying declaration made to his uncle pointing to Salafranca as his
assailant,31[8] and Salafrancas positive identification as the culprit by Mendoza. 32[9]
It stressed that Salafrancas denial and his alibi of being in his home during the
incident did not overcome the positive identification, especially as his unexplained
flight after the stabbing, leaving his home and employment, constituted a
circumstance highly indicative of his guilt.33[10]

Presently, Salafranca reiterates his defenses, and insists that the State did not
prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

The appeal lacks merit.

29
30
31
32
33

Discrediting Mendoza and Estao as witnesses against Salafranca would be


unwarranted. The RTC and the CA correctly concluded that Mendoza and Estao
were credible and reliable. The determination of the competence and credibility of
witnesses at trial rested primarily with the RTC as the trial court due to its unique
and unequalled position of observing their deportment during testimony, and of
assessing their credibility and appreciating their truthfulness, honesty and candor.
Absent a substantial reason to justify the reversal of the assessment made and
conclusions reached by the RTC, the CA as the reviewing court was bound by such
assessment and conclusions,34[11] considering that the CA as the appellate court
could neither substitute its assessment nor draw different conclusions without a
persuasive showing that the RTC misappreciated the circumstances or omitted
significant evidentiary matters that would alter the result.35[12] Salafranca did not
persuasively show a misappreciation or omission by the RTC. Hence, the Court, in
this appeal, is in no position to undo or to contradict the findings of the RTC and
the CA, which were entitled to great weight and respect.36[13]

Salafrancas denial and alibi were worthless in the face of his positive
identification by Mendoza as the assailant of Bolanon. The lower courts properly
accorded full faith to such incrimination by Mendoza considering that Salafranca

34
35
36

did not even project any ill motive that could have impelled Mendoza to testify
against him unless it was upon the truth.37[14]

Based on Mendozas account, Salafranca had attacked Bolanon from behind


and had encircled his left arm over the neck (of Bolanon) and delivered the
stabbing blow using the right(hand) and coming from wnnt (sic) up right sideways
and another one encircling the blow towards below the left nipple. 38[15] Relying on
Mendozas recollection of how Salafranca had attacked Bolanon, the RTC found
treachery to be attendant in the killing. This finding the CA concurred with. We
join the CAs concurrence because Mendozas eyewitness account of the manner of
attack remained uncontested by Salafranca who merely insisted on his alibi. The
method and means Salafranca employed constituted a surprise deadly attack
against Bolanon from behind and included an aggressive physical control of the
latters movements that ensured the success of the attack without any retaliation or
defense on the part of Bolanon. According to the Revised Penal Code,39[16]
treachery is present when the offender commits any of the crimes against the
person, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend
directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from
the defense which the offended party might make.

37
38
39

The Court further notes Estaos testimony on the utterance by Bolanon of


statements identifying Salafranca as his assailant right after the stabbing incident.
The testimony follows:

QCan you tell what happened on the said date?


A My nephew arrived in our house with a stab wound on his left chest.
Q What time was that?
A 12:50 a.m.
Q When you saw your nephew with a stab wound, what did he say?
A

Tito dalhin mo ako sa Hospital sinaksak ako.

Q What did you do?


A I immediately dressed up and brought him to PGH.
Q On the way to the PGH what transpired?
A While traveling toward PGH I asked my nephew who stabbed him?, and he
answered, Rod Salafranca.
Q Do you know this Rod Salafranca?
A Yes, Sir.
Q How long have you known him?
A Matagal na ho kasi mag-neighbor kami.
Q If you see him inside the courtroom will you be able to identify him?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Will you look around and point him to us?
A (Witness pointing to a man who answered by the name of Rod Salafranca.)
COURT

When he told you the name of his assailant what was his condition?
A He was suffering from hard breathing so I told him not to talk anymore because
he will just suffer more.
Q What happened when you told him that?
A He kept silent.
Q What time did you arrive at the PGH?
A I cannot remember the time because I was already confused at that time.
Q When you arrived at the PGH what happened?
A He was brought to Emergency Room.
Q When he was brought to the emergency room what happened?
A He was pronounced dead.40[17]

It appears from the foregoing testimony that Bolanon had gone to the
residence of Estao, his uncle, to seek help right after being stabbed by Salafranca;
that Estao had hurriedly dressed up to bring his nephew to the Philippine General
Hospital by taxicab; that on the way to the hospital, Estao had asked Bolanon who
had stabbed him, and the latter had told Estao that his assailant had been
Salafranca; that at the time of the utterance Bolanon had seemed to be having a
hard time breathing, causing Estao to advise him not to talk anymore; and that
about ten minutes after his admission at the emergency ward of the hospital,
Bolanon had expired and had been pronounced dead. Such circumstances qualified
the utterance of Bolanon as both a dying declaration and as part of the res gestae,
considering that the Court has recognized that the statement of the victim an hour
before his death and right after the hacking incident bore all the earmarks either of
40

a dying declaration or part of the res gestae either of which was an exception to the
hearsay rule.41[18]

A dying declaration, although generally inadmissible as evidence due to its


hearsay character, may nonetheless be admitted when the following requisites
concur, namely: (a) that the declaration must concern the cause and surrounding
circumstances of the declarants death; (b) that at the time the declaration is made,
the declarant is under a consciousness of an impending death; (c) that the declarant
is competent as a witness; and (d) that the declaration is offered in a criminal case
for homicide, murder, or parricide, in which the declarant is a victim.42[19]

All the requisites were met herein. Bolanon communicated his ante-mortem
statement to Estao, identifying Salafranca as the person who had stabbed him. At
the time of his statement, Bolanon was conscious of his impending death, having
sustained a stab wound in the chest and, according to Estao, was then experiencing
great difficulty in breathing. Bolanon succumbed in the hospital emergency room a
few minutes from admission, which occurred under three hours after the stabbing.
There is ample authority for the view that the declarants belief in the imminence of
his death can be shown by the declarants own statements or from circumstantial
evidence, such as the nature of his wounds, statements made in his presence, or by
the opinion of his physician.43[20] Bolanon would have been competent to testify

41
42

on the subject of the declaration had he survived. Lastly, the dying declaration was
offered in this criminal prosecution for murder in which Bolanon was the victim.

A declaration or an utterance is deemed as part of the res gestae and thus


admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule when the following
requisites concur, to wit: (a) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling
occurrence; (b) the statements are made before the declarant had time to contrive
or devise; and (c) the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its
immediately attending circumstances.44[21]

The requisites for admissibility of a declaration as part of the res gestae concur
herein. Surely, when he gave the identity of the assailant to Estao, Bolanon was
referring to a startling occurrence, i.e., his stabbing by Salafranca. Bolanon was
then on board the taxicab that would bring him to the hospital, and thus had no
time to contrive his identification of Salafranca as the assailant. His utterance about
Salafranca having stabbed him was made in spontaneity and only in reaction to the
startling occurrence. The statement was relevant because it identified Salafranca as
the perpetrator.

The term res gestae has been defined as those circumstances which are the
undesigned incidents of a particular litigated act and which are admissible when
43
44

illustrative of such act.45[22] In a general way, res gestae refers to the


circumstances, facts, and declarations that grow out of the main fact and serve to
illustrate its character and are so spontaneous and contemporaneous with the main
fact as to exclude the idea of deliberation and fabrication. 46[23] The rule on res
gestae encompasses the exclamations and statements made by either the
participants, victims, or spectators to a crime immediately before, during, or
immediately after the commission of the crime when the circumstances are such
that the statements were made as a spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by
the excitement of the occasion and there was no opportunity for the declarant to
deliberate and to fabricate a false statement.47[24] The test of admissibility of
evidence as a part of the res gestae is, therefore, whether the act, declaration, or
exclamation is so intimately interwoven or connected with the principal fact or
event that it characterizes as to be regarded as a part of the transaction itself, and
also whether it clearly negatives any premeditation or purpose to manufacture
testimony.48[25]

We modify the limiting of civil damages by the CA and the RTC to only the
death indemnity of P50,000.00. We declare that the surviving heirs of Bolanon
were entitled by law to more than such indemnity, because the damages to be
awarded when death occurs due to a crime may include: (a) civil indemnity ex
45
46
47
48

delicto for the death of the victim (which was granted herein); (b) actual or
compensatory damages; (c) moral damages; (d) exemplary damages; and (e)
temperate damages.49[26]

We hold that the CA and the RTC should have further granted moral
damages which were different from the death indemnity.50[27] The death indemnity
compensated the loss of life due to crime, but appropriate and reasonable moral
damages would justly assuage the mental anguish and emotional sufferings of the
surviving family of the victim.51[28] Although mental anguish and emotional
sufferings of the surviving heirs were not quantifiable with mathematical precision,
the Court must nonetheless strive to set an amount that would restore the heirs of
Bolanon to their moral status quo ante. Given the circumstances, the amount of
P50,000.00 is reasonable as moral damages, which, pursuant to prevailing
jurisprudence,52[29] we are bound to award despite the absence of any allegation
and proof of the heirs mental anguish and emotional suffering. The rationale for
doing so rested on human nature and experience having shown that:

xxx a violent death invariably and necessarily brings about emotional pain and
anguish on the part of the victims family. It is inherently human to suffer sorrow,
torment, pain and anger when a loved one becomes the victim of a violent or
49
50
51
52

brutal killing. Such violent death or brutal killing not only steals from the family
of the deceased his precious life, deprives them forever of his love, affection and
support, but often leaves them with the gnawing feeling that an injustice has been
done to them.53[30]

The CA and the RTC committed another omission consisting in their nonrecognition of the right of the heirs of Bolanon to temperate damages. It is already
settled that when actual damages for burial and related expenses are not
substantiated by receipts, temperate damages of at least P25,000.00 are warranted,
for it would certainly be unfair to the surviving heirs of the victim to deny them
compensation by way of actual damages.54[31]

Moreover, the Civil Code provides that exemplary damages may be imposed
in criminal cases as part of the civil liability when the crime was committed with
one or more aggravating circumstances.55[32] The Civil Code permits such damages
to be awarded by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to
the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages. 56[33] Conformably with
such legal provisions, the CA and the RTC should have recognized the entitlement
of the heirs of the victim to exemplary damages because of the attendance of
treachery. It was of no moment that treachery was an attendant circumstance in
53
54
55
56

murder, and, as such, inseparable and absorbed in murder. The Court explained so
in People v. Catubig:57[34]

The term aggravating circumstances used by the Civil Code, the law not
having specified otherwise, is to be understood in its broad or generic sense. The
commission of an offense has a two-pronged effect, one on the public as it
breaches the social order and the other upon the private victim as it causes
personal sufferings, each of which is addressed by, respectively, the prescription
of heavier punishment for the accused and by an award of additional damages to
the victim. The increase of the penalty or a shift to a graver felony underscores the
exacerbation of the offense by the attendance of aggravating circumstances,
whether ordinary or qualifying, in its commission. Unlike the criminal liability
which is basically a State concern, the award of damages, however, is
likewise, if not primarily, intended for the offended party who suffers
thereby. It would make little sense for an award of exemplary damages to be
due the private offended party when the aggravating circumstance is
ordinary but to be withheld when it is qualifying. Withal, the ordinary or
qualifying nature of an aggravating circumstance is a distinction that should
only be of consequence to the criminal, rather than to the civil, liability of the
offender. In fine, relative to the civil aspect of the case, an aggravating
circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, should entitle the offended
party to an award of exemplary damages within the unbridled meaning of
Article 2230 of the Civil Code.

For the purpose of fixing the exemplary damages, the sum of P30,000.00 is
deemed reasonable and proper,58[35] because we think that a lesser amount could
not result in genuine exemplarity.

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals


promulgated on November 24, 2005, but MODIFIES the awards of civil damages
57
58

by adding to the amount of P50,000.00 awarded as death indemnity the amounts of


P50,000.00 as moral damages; P25,000.00 as temperate damages; and P30,000.00
as exemplary damages, all of which awards shall bear interest of 6% per annum
from the finality of this decision.

The accused shall further pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.
SCC CHEMICALS CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, STATE INVESTMENT HOUSE, INC., DANILO ARRIETA and LEOPOLDO
HALILI, respondents.
RESOLUTION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Before us is a petition for review, pursuant to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, of the Decision of
the Court of Appeals dated in November 12, 1996 in CA-G.R. CV No. 45742 entitled State
Investment House, Inc., v. Danilo Arrieta, et al., and SCC Chemical Corporation. The questioned
decision affirmed in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 33, dated
March 22, 1993, in Civil Case No. 84-25881, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and
against the defendants ordering the latter to pay jointly and severally the plaintiff the following:
a) To pay plaintiff State Investment House, Inc., the sum of P150,483.16 with interest thereon at
30% per annum reckond (sic) from April, 1984 until the whole amount is fully paid; b) To pay
plaintiff an amount equivalent to 25% of the total amount due and demandable as attorneys fees
and to pay the cost(s) of suit.
SO ORDERED.i[1]
Equally challenged in this petition is the Resolution of the appellate court dated February 27,
1997, denying SCC Chemicals Corporations motion for reconsideration.
The background of this case, as culled from the decision of the Court of Appeals, is as follows:

On December 13, 1983, SCC Chemicals Corporation (SCC for brevity) through its chairman,
private respondent Danilo Arrieta and vice president, Pablo (Pablito) Bermundo, obtained a loan
from State Investment House Inc., (hereinafter SIHI) in the amount of P129,824.48. The loan
carried an annual interest rate of 30% plus penalty charges of 2% per month on the remaining
balance of the principal upon non-payment on the due date-January 12, 1984. To secure the
payment of the loan, Danilo Arrieta and private respondent Leopoldo Halili executed a
Comprehensive Surety Agreement binding themselves jointly and severally to pay the obligation
on the maturity date. SCC failed to pay the loan when it matured. SIHI then sent demand letters
to SCC, Arrieta and Halili, but notwithstanding receipt thereof, no payment was made.
On August 2, 1984, SIHI filed Civil Case No. 84-25881 for a sum of money with a prayer for
preliminary attachment against SCC, Arrieta, and Halili with the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
In its answer, SCC asserted SIHIs lack of cause of action. Petitioner contended that the
promissory note upon which SIHI anchored its cause of action was null, void, and of no binding
effect for lack or failure of consideration.
The case was then set for pre-trial. The parties were allowed to meet out-of-court in an effort to
settle the dispute amicably. No settlement was reached, but the following stipulation of facts was
agreed upon:
1. Parties agree that this Court has jurisdiction over the plaintiff and the defendant and that it has
jurisdiction to try and decide this case on its merits and that plaintiff and the defendant have each
the capacity to sue and to be sued in this present action;
2. Parties agree that plaintiff sent a demand letter to the defendant SCC Chemical Corporation
dated April 4, 1984 together with a statement of account of even date which were both received
by the herein defendant; and
3. Parties finally agree that the plaintiff and the defendant SCC Chemical Corporation the latter
acting through defendants Danilo E. Arrieta and Pablito Bermundo executed a promissory note
last December 13, 1983 for the amount of P129,824.48 with maturity date on January 12, 1984.ii
[2]

The case then proceeded to trial on the sole issue of whether or not the defendants were liable to
the plaintiff and to what extent was the liability.
SIHI presented one witness to prove its claim. The cross-examination of said witness was
postponed several times due to one reason or another at the instance of either party. The case was
calendared several times for hearing but each time, SCC or its counsel failed to appear despite
notice. SCC was finally declared by the trial court to have waived its right to cross-examine the
witness of SIHI and the case was deemed submitted for decision.
On March 22, 1993, the lower court promulgated its decision in favor of SIHI.

Aggrieved by the verdict, SCC elevated the case to the Court of Appeals where it was docketed
as CA-G.R. CV No. 45742.
On appeal, SCC contended that SIHI had failed to show, by a preponderance of evidence, that
the latter had a case against it. SCC argued that the lone witness presented by SIHI to prove its
claim was insufficient as the competency of the witness was not established and there was no
showing that he had personal knowledge of the transaction. SCC further maintained that no proof
was shown of the genuineness of the signatures in the documentary exhibits presented as
evidence and that these signatures were neither marked nor offered in evidence by SIHI. Finally,
SCC pointed out that the original copies of the documents were not presented in court.
On November 12, 1996, the appellate court affirmed in toto the judgment appealed from.
On December 11, 1996 SCC filed its motion for reconsideration, which the Court of Appeals
denied in its resolution dated February 27, 1997.
Hence, petitioners recourse to this Court relying on the following assignments of error:
I
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT
PRIVATE RESPONDENT PROVED ITS CAUSE OF ACTION AND OVERCAME ITS
BURDEN OF PROOF.
II
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AWARDING
ATTORNEYS FEES TO THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT.
We find the pertinent issues submitted for resolution to be:
(1) Whether or not the Court of Appeals made an error of law in holding that private respondent
SIHI had proved its cause of action by preponderant evidence; and
(2) Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the award of attorneys fees to SIHI.
Anent the first issue, petitioner contends that SIHI introduced documentary evidence through the
testimony of a witness whose competence was not established and whose personal knowledge of
the truthfulness of the facts testified to was not demonstrated. It argues that the same was in
violation of Sections 36iii[3] and 48,iv[4] Rule 130 of the Rules of Court and it was manifest error
for the Court of Appeals to have ruled otherwise. In addition, SCC points out that the sole
witness of SIHI did not profess to have seen the document presented in evidence executed or
written by SCC. Thus, no proof of its genuineness was adduced. SIHI thus ran afoul of Section
2,v[5] Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, which requires proof of due execution and authenticity of
private documents before the same can be received as evidence. Petitioner likewise submits that
none of the signatures affixed in the documentary evidence presented by SIHI were offered in

evidence. It vehemently argues that such was in violation of the requirement of Section 34,vi[6]
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. It was thus an error of law on the part of the appellate court to
consider the same. Finally, petitioner posits that the non-production of the originals of the
documents presented in evidence allows the presumption of suppression of evidence provided for
in Section 3 (e),vii[7] Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, to come into play.
Petitioners arguments lack merit; they fail to persuade us.
We note that the Court of Appeals found that SCC failed to appear several times on scheduled
hearing dates despite due notice to it and counsel. On all those scheduled hearing dates,
petitioner was supposed to cross-examine the lone witness offered by SIHI to prove its case.
Petitioner now charges the appellate court with committing an error of law when it failed to
disallow the admission in evidence of said testimony pursuant to the hearsay rule contained in
Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
Rule 130, Section 36 reads:
SEC. 36. Testimony generally confined to personal knowledge; hearsay excluded. A witness can
testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge; that is, which are derived
from his own perception, except as otherwise provided in these rules.
Petitioners reliance on Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court is misplaced. As a rule,
hearsay evidence is excluded and carries no probative value.viii[8] However, the rule does admit
of an exception. Where a party failed to object to hearsay evidence, then the same is admissible.ix
[9] The rationale for this exception is to be found in the right of a litigant to cross-examine. It is
settled that it is the opportunity to cross-examine which negates the claim that the matters
testified to by a witness are hearsay.x[10] However, the right to cross-examine may be waived.
The repeated failure of a party to cross-examine the witness is an implied waiver of such right.
Petitioner was afforded several opportunities by the trial court to cross-examine the other partys
witness. Petitioner repeatedly failed to take advantage of these opportunities. No error was thus
committed by the respondent court when it sustained the trial courts finding that petitioner had
waived its right to cross-examine the opposing partys witness. It is now too late for petitioner to
be raising this matter of hearsay evidence.
Nor was the assailed testimony hearsay. The Court of Appeals correctly found that the witness of
SIHI was a competent witness as he testified to facts, which he knew of his personal knowledge.
Thus, the requirements of Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court as to the admissibility of
his testimony were satisfied.
Respecting petitioners other submissions, the same are moot and academic. As correctly found
by the Court of Appeals, petitioners admission as to the execution of the promissory note by it
through private respondent Arrieta and Bermundo at pre-trial sufficed to settle the question of the
genuineness of signatures. The admission having been made in a stipulation of facts at pre-trial
by the parties, it must be treated as a judicial admission. Under Section 4,xi[11] Rule 129 of the
Rules of Court, a judicial admission requires no proof.

Nor will petitioners reliance on the best evidence rulexii[12] advance its cause. Respondent SIHI
had no need to present the original of the documents as there was already a judicial admission by
petitioner at pre-trial of the execution of the promissory note and receipt of the demand letter. It
is now too late for petitioner to be questioning their authenticity. Its admission of the existence of
these documents was sufficient to establish its obligation. Petitioner failed to submit any
evidence to the contrary or proof of payment or other forms of extinguishment of said obligation.
No reversible error was thus committed by the appellate court when it held petitioner liable on its
obligation, pursuant to Article 1159 of the Civil Code which reads:
ART. 1159. Obligations arising from contracts have the force of law between the contracting
parties and should be complied with in good faith.
On the second issue, petitioner charges the Court of Appeals with reversible error for having
sustained the trial courts award of attorneys fees. Petitioner relies on Radio Communications of
the Philippines v. Rodriguez, 182 SCRA 899,909 (1990), where we held that when attorneys fees
are awarded, the reason for the award of attorneys fees must be stated in the text of the courts
decision. Petitioner submits that since the trial court did not state any reason for awarding the
same, the award of attorneys fees should have been disallowed by the appellate court.
We find for petitioner in this regard.
It is settled that the award of attorneys fees is the exception rather than the rule, hence it is
necessary for the trial court to make findings of fact and law, which would bring the case within
the exception and justify the grant of the award.xiii[13] Otherwise stated, given the failure by the
trial court to explicitly state the rationale for the award of attorneys fees, the same shall be
disallowed. In the present case, a perusal of the records shows that the trial court failed to explain
the award of attorneys fees. We hold that the same should thereby be deleted.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The decision dated November 12,
1996 of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION that the award of
attorneys fees to private respondent SIHI is hereby deleted. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
LANDBANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. SPOUSES VICENTE BANAL and
LEONIDAS ARENAS-BANAL, respondents.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Spouses Vicente and Leonidas Banal, respondents, are the registered owners of 19.3422 hectares
of agricultural land situated in San Felipe, Basud, Camarines Norte covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-6296. A portion of the land consisting of 6.2330 hectares (5.4730 of
which is planted to coconut and 0.7600 planted to palay) was compulsorily acquired by the

Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657,59[1] as
amended, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988.
In accordance with the formula prescribed in DAR Administrative Order No. 6, Series of 1992,60
61
[2] as amended by DAR Administrative Order No. 11, Series of 1994, [3] the Land Bank of the
62
Philippines [4] (Landbank), petitioner, made the following valuation of the property:
Acquired property
Coconut land
Riceland

Area in hectares
5.4730
0.7600

Value
P148,675.19
25,243.36
==========
P173,918.55

Respondents rejected the above valuation. Thus, pursuant to Section 16(d) of R.A. 6657, as
amended, a summary administrative proceeding was conducted before the Provincial Agrarian
Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) to determine the valuation of the land. Eventually, the PARAD
rendered its Decision affirming the Landbanks valuation.
Dissatisfied with the Decision of the PARAD, respondents filed with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 40, Daet, Camarines Norte, designated as a Special Agrarian Court, a petition for
determination of just compensation, docketed as Civil Case No. 6806. Impleaded as respondents
were the DAR and the Landbank. Petitioners therein prayed for a compensation of P100,000.00
per hectare for both coconut land and riceland, or an aggregate amount of P623,000.00.
During the pre-trial on September 23, 1998, the parties submitted to the RTC the following
admissions of facts: (1) the subject property is governed by the provisions of R.A. 6657, as
amended; (2) it was distributed to the farmers-beneficiaries; and (3) the Landbank deposited the
provisional compensation based on the valuation made by the DAR.63[5]
On the same day after the pre-trial, the court issued an Order dispensing with the hearing and
directing the parties to submit their respective memoranda.64[6]
59
60
61
62
63
64

In its Decision dated February 5, 1999, the trial court computed the just compensation for the
coconut land at P657,137.00 and for the riceland at P46,000.00, or a total of P703,137.00, which
is beyond respondents valuation of P623,000.00. The court further awarded compounded interest
at P79,732.00 in cash. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1.Ordering respondent Landbank to pay the petitioners, the spouses Dr. Vicente Banal
and Leonidas Arenas-Banal, for the 5.4730 hectares of coconut land the sum of
SIX HUNDRED FIFTY-SEVEN THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED THIRTYSEVEN PESOS (P657,137.00) in cash and in bonds in the proportion provided by
law;
2.

Ordering respondent Landbank to pay the petitioners for the .7600 hectares of
riceland the sum of FORTY-SIX THOUSAND PESOS (P46,000.00) in cash and
in bonds in the proportion provided by law; and

3.

Ordering respondent Landbank to pay the petitioners the sum of SEVENTYNINE THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED THIRTY-TWO PESOS (P79,732.00) as
the compounded interest in cash.

IT IS SO ORDERED.65[7]
In determining the valuation of the land, the trial court based the same on the facts established in
another case pending before it (Civil Case No. 6679, Luz Rodriguez vs. DAR, et al.), using the
following formula:
For the coconut land
1.Average Gross Production (AGP) x .70 x 9.70 (price per kilo of coconut) = Net
Income (NI)
2.

NI / 6% = Price Per Hectare (PPH) (applying the capitalization formula under


Republic Act No. 384466[8])

For the riceland


1.2.5 x AGP x Government Support Price (GSP) = Land Value (LV) or PPH (using the
formula under Executive Order No. 22867[9])
65
66
67

2.AGP x 6% compounded annually for 26 years x GSP = Interest (pursuant to DAR AO


No. 13, Series of 1994)
Forthwith, the Landbank filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review, docketed as CAG.R. SP No. 52163.
On March 20, 2000, the Appellate Court rendered a Decision68[10] affirming in toto the judgment
of the trial court. The Landbanks motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.69[11]
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
The fundamental issue for our resolution is whether the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the
trial courts valuation of the land. As earlier mentioned, there was no trial on the merits.
To begin with, under Section 1 of Executive Order No. 405 (1990), the Landbank is charged
primarily with the determination of the land valuation and compensation for all private lands
suitable for agriculture under the Voluntary Offer to Sell or Compulsory Acquisition arrangement
For its part, the DAR relies on the determination of the land valuation and compensation by the
Landbank.70[12]
Based on the Landbanks valuation of the land, the DAR makes an offer to the landowner.71[13] If
the landowner accepts the offer, the Landbank shall pay him the purchase price of the land after
he executes and delivers a deed of transfer and surrenders the certificate of title in favor of the
government.72[14] In case the landowner rejects the offer or fails to reply thereto, the DAR
adjudicator73[15] conducts summary administrative proceedings to determine the compensation for
the land by requiring the landowner, the Landbank and other interested parties to submit
evidence as to the just compensation for the land.74[16] These functions by the DAR are in
accordance with its quasi-judicial powers under Section 50 of R.A. 6657, as amended, which
provides:
68
69
70
71
72
73
74

SEC. 50. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR. The DAR is hereby vested with primary
jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform, except those
falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture (DA) and the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).
x x x.
A party who disagrees with the decision of the DAR adjudicator may bring the matter to the RTC
designated as a Special Agrarian Court75[17] for final determination of just compensation.76[18]
In the proceedings before the RTC, it is mandated to apply the Rules of Court77[19] and, on its
own initiative or at the instance of any of the parties, appoint one or more commissioners to
examine, investigate and ascertain facts relevant to the dispute, including the valuation of
properties, and to file a written report thereof x x x.78[20] In determining just compensation, the
RTC is required to consider several factors enumerated in Section 17 of R.A. 6657, as amended,
thus:
Sec. 17. Determination of Just Compensation. In determining just compensation, the cost of
acquisition of the land, the current value of like properties, its nature, actual use and income, the
sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declarations, and the assessment made by government
assessors shall be considered. The social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and
the farmworkers and by the Government to the property, as well as the non-payment of taxes or
loans secured from any government financing institution on the said land, shall be considered as
additional factors to determine its valuation.
These factors have been translated into a basic formula in DAR Administrative Order No. 6,
Series of 1992, as amended by DAR Administrative Order No. 11, Series of 1994, issued
pursuant to the DARs rule-making power to carry out the object and purposes of R.A. 6657, as
amended.79[21]
The formula stated in DAR Administrative Order No. 6, as amended, is as follows:
LV = (CNI x 0.6) + (CS x 0.3) + (MV x 0.1)
75
76
77
78
79

LV = Land Value
CNI = Capitalized Net Income
CS = Comparable Sales
MV = Market Value per Tax Declaration
The above formula shall be used if all the three factors are present, relevant and applicable.
A.1When the CS factor is not present and CNI and MV are applicable, the formula shall be:
LV = (CNI x 0.9) + (MV x 0.1)
A.2

When the CNI factor is not present, and CS and MV are applicable, the formula shall be:
LV = (CS x 0.9) + (MV x 0.1)

A.3
be:

When both the CS and CNI are not present and only MV is applicable, the formula shall
LV = MV x 2

Here, the RTC failed to observe the basic rules of procedure and the fundamental requirements in
determining just compensation for the property. Firstly, it dispensed with the hearing and merely
ordered the parties to submit their respective memoranda. Such action is grossly erroneous since
the determination of just compensation involves the examination of the following factors
specified in Section 17 of R.A. 6657, as amended:
1.

the cost of the acquisition of the land;

2.

the current value of like properties;

3.

its nature, actual use and income;

4.

the sworn valuation by the owner; the tax declarations;

5.

the assessment made by government assessors;

6.

the social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers
and by the government to the property; and

7.

the non-payment of taxes or loans secured from any government financing


institution on the said land, if any.

Obviously, these factors involve factual matters which can be established only during a hearing
wherein the contending parties present their respective evidence. In fact, to underscore the
intricate nature of determining the valuation of the land, Section 58 of the same law even
authorizes the Special Agrarian Courts to appoint commissioners for such purpose.
Secondly, the RTC, in concluding that the valuation of respondents property is P703,137.00,
merely took judicial notice of the average production figures in the Rodriguez case pending

before it and applied the same to this case without conducting a hearing and worse, without the
knowledge or consent of the parties, thus:
x x x. In the case x x x of the coconut portion of the land 5.4730 hectares, defendants determined
the average gross production per year at 506.95 kilos only, but in the very recent case of Luz
Rodriguez vs. DAR, et al., filed and decided by this court in Civil Case No. 6679 also for just
compensation for coconut lands and Riceland situated at Basud, Camarines Norte wherein also
the lands in the above-entitled case are situated, the value fixed therein was 1,061.52 kilos per
annum per hectare for coconut land and the price per kilo is P8.82, but in the instant case
the price per kilo is P9.70. In the present case, we consider 506.95 kilos average gross
production per year per hectare to be very low considering that farm practice for coconut lands is
harvest every forty-five days. We cannot also comprehended why in the Rodriguez case and in
this case there is a great variance in average production per year when in the two cases the lands
are both coconut lands and in the same place of Basud, Camarines Norte. We believe that it is
more fair to adapt the 1,061.52 kilos per hectare per year as average gross production. In the
Rodriguez case, the defendants fixed the average gross production of palay at 3,000 kilos or 60
cavans per year. The court is also constrained to apply this yearly palay production in the
Rodriguez case to the case at bar.
xxx

xxx

xxx

As shown in the Memorandum of Landbank in this case, the area of the coconut land taken under
CARP is 5.4730 hectares. But as already noted, the average gross production a year of 506.96
kilos per hectare fixed by Landbank is too low as compared to the Rodriguez case which
was 1,061 kilos when the coconut land in both cases are in the same town of Basud,
Camarines Norte, compelling this court then to adapt 1,061 kilos as the average gross
production a year of the coconut land in this case. We have to apply also the price of P9.70
per kilo as this is the value that Landbank fixed for this case.
The net income of the coconut land is equal to 70% of the gross income. So, the net income of
the coconut land is 1,061 x .70 x 9.70 equals P7,204.19 per hectare. Applying the capitalization
formula of R.A. 3844 to the net income of P7,204.19 divided by 6%, the legal rate of interest,
equals P120,069.00 per hectare. Therefore, the just compensation for the 5.4730 hectares is
P657,137.00.
The Riceland taken under Presidential Decree No. 27 as of October 21, 1972 has an area of .
7600 hectare. If in the Rodriguez case the Landbank fixed the average gross production of 3000
kilos or 60 cavans of palay per year, then the .7600 hectare in this case would be 46 cavans. The
value of the riceland therefore in this case is 46 cavans x 2.5 x P400.00 equals P46,000.00.80[22]
PARC Resolution 94-24-1 of 25 October 1994, implemented by DAR AO 13, granted interest on
the compensation at 6% compounded annually. The compounded interest on the 46 cavans for 26

80

years is 199.33 cavans. At P400.00 per cavan, the value of the compounded interest is
P79,732.00.81[23] (emphasis added)
Well-settled is the rule that courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of the
records of other cases even when said cases have been tried or are pending in the same court or
before the same judge.82[24] They may only do so in the absence of objection and with the
knowledge of the opposing party,83[25] which are not obtaining here.
Furthermore, as earlier stated, the Rules of Court shall apply to all proceedings before the
Special Agrarian Courts. In this regard, Section 3, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules on Evidence is
explicit on the necessity of a hearing before a court takes judicial notice of a certain matter, thus:
SEC. 3. Judicial notice, when hearing necessary. During the trial, the court, on its own initiative,
or on request of a party, may announce its intention to take judicial notice of any matter and
allow the parties to be heard thereon.
After the trial, and before judgment or on appeal, the proper court, on its own initiative or on
request of a party, may take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard
thereon if such matter is decisive of a material issue in the case. (emphasis added)
The RTC failed to observe the above provisions.
Lastly, the RTC erred in applying the formula prescribed under Executive Order (EO) No.
22884[26] and R.A. No. 3844,85[27] as amended, in determining the valuation of the property; and in
granting compounded interest pursuant to DAR Administrative Order No. 13, Series of 1994.86[28]
It must be stressed that EO No. 228 covers private agricultural lands primarily devoted to rice
and corn, while R.A. 3844 governs agricultural leasehold relation between the person who
furnishes the landholding, either as owner, civil law lessee, usufructuary, or legal possessor, and
the person who personally cultivates the same.87[29] Here, the land is planted to coconut and rice
81
82
83
84
85
86
87

and does not involve agricultural leasehold relation. What the trial court should have applied is
the formula in DAR Administrative Order No. 6, as amended by DAR Administrative Order No.
11 discussed earlier.
As regards the award of compounded interest, suffice it to state that DAR Administrative Order
No. 13, Series of 1994 does not apply to the subject land but to those lands taken under
Presidential Decree No. 2788[30] and Executive Order No. 228 whose owners have not been
compensated. In this case, the property is covered by R.A. 6657, as amended, and respondents
have been paid the provisional compensation thereof, as stipulated during the pre-trial.
While the determination of just compensation involves the exercise of judicial discretion,
however, such discretion must be discharged within the bounds of the law. Here, the RTC
wantonly disregarded R.A. 6657, as amended, and its implementing rules and regulations. (DAR
Administrative Order No. 6, as amended by DAR Administrative Order No.11).
In sum, we find that the Court of Appeals and the RTC erred in determining the valuation of the
subject land. Thus, we deem it proper to remand this case to the RTC for trial on the merits
wherein the parties may present their respective evidence. In determining the valuation of the
subject property, the trial court shall consider the factors provided under Section 17 of R.A.
6657, as amended, mentioned earlier. The formula prescribed by the DAR in Administrative
Order No. 6, Series of 1992, as amended by DAR Administrative Order No. 11, Series of 1994,
shall be used in the valuation of the land. Furthermore, upon its own initiative, or at the instance
of any of the parties, the trial court may appoint one or more commissioners to examine,
investigate and ascertain facts relevant to the dispute.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
March 20, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 52163 is REVERSED. Civil Case No. 6806 is REMANDED
to the RTC, Branch 40, Daet, Camarines Norte, for trial on the merits with dispatch. The trial
judge is directed to observe strictly the procedures specified above in determining the proper
valuation of the subject property.
SO ORDERED.

MENANDRO B. LAUREANO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND


SINGAPORE AIRLINES LIMITED, respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks to
reverse the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated October 29, 1993, in C.A. G.R. No.
CV 34476, as well as its Resolution dated February 28, 1994, which denied the motion
for reconsideration.
88

The facts of the case as summarized by the respondent appellate court are as follows:
"Sometime in 1978, plaintiff [Menandro B. Laureano, herein petitioner],
then Director of Flight Operations and Chief Pilot of Air Manila, applied for
employment with defendant company [herein private respondent] through
its Area Manager in Manila.
On September 30, 1978, after the usual personal interview, defendant
wrote to plaintiff, offering a contract of employment as an expatriate B-707
captain for an original period of two (2) years commencing on January 21,
1978, Plaintiff accepted the offer and commenced working on January 20,
1979. After passing the six-month probation period, plaintiff's appointment
was confirmed effective July 21, 1979. (Annex "B", p. 30, Rollo).
On July 21, 1979, defendant offered plaintiff an extension of his two-year
contract to five (5) years effective January 21, 1979 to January 20, 1984
subject to the terms and conditions set forth in the contract of
employment, which the latter accepted (Annex "C", p. 31, Rec.).
During his service as B-707 captain, plaintiff on August 24, 1980, while in
command of a flight, committed a noise violation offense at the Zurich
Airport, for which plaintiff apologized. (Exh. "3", p. 307, Rec.).
Sometime in 1980, plaintiff featured in a tail scraping incident wherein the
tail of the aircraft scraped or touched the runway during landing. He was
suspended for a few days until he was investigated by a board headed by
Capt. Choy. He was reprimanded. Scjuris
On September 25, 1981, plaintiff was invited to take a course of A-300
conversion training at Aeroformacion, Toulouse, France at defendant's
expense. Having successfully completed and passed the training course,
plaintiff was cleared on April 7, 1981 for solo duty as captain of the Airbus
A-300 and subsequently appointed as captain of the A-300 fleet
commanding an Airbus A-300 in flights over Southeast Asia. (Annexes "D",
"E" and "F", pp. 34-38, Rec.).
Sometime in 1982, defendant, hit by a recession, initiated cost-cutting
measures. Seventeen (17) expatriate captains in the Airbus fleet were
found in excess of the defendant's requirement (t.s.n., July 6, 1988. p. 11).
Consequently, defendant informed its expatriate pilots including plaintiff of
the situation and advised them to take advance leaves. (Exh. "15", p. 466,
Rec.).
Realizing that the recession would not be for a short time, defendant
decided to terminate its excess personnel (t.s.n., July 6, 1988, p. 17). It did
not, however, immediately terminate it's A-300 pilots. It reviewed their

qualifications for possible promotion to the B-747 fleet. Among the 17


excess Airbus pilots reviewed, twelve were found qualified. Unfortunately,
plaintiff was not one of the twelve. Jurissc
On October 5, 1982, defendant informed plaintiff of his termination
effective November 1, 1982 and that he will be paid three (3) months
salary in lieu of three months notice (Annex "I", pp. 41-42, Rec.). Because
he could not uproot his family on such short notice, plaintiff requested a
three-month notice to afford him time to exhaust all possible avenues for
reconsideration and retention. Defendant gave only two (2) months notice
and one (1) month salary. (t.s.n., Nov. 12, 1987. p. 25).
Aggrieved, plaintiff on June 29, 1983, instituted a case for illegal dismissal
before the Labor Arbiter. Defendant moved to dismiss on jurisdictional
grounds. Before said motion was resolved, the complaint was withdrawn.
Thereafter, plaintiff filed the instant case for damages due to illegal
termination of contract of services before the court a quo (Complaint, pp.
1-10, Rec.).
Again, defendant on February 11, 1987 filed a motion to dismiss alleging
inter alia: (1) that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of
the case, and (2) that Philippine courts have no jurisdiction over the
instant case. Defendant contends that the complaint is for illegal dismissal
together with a money claim arising out of and in the course of plaintiff's
employment "thus it is the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC who have the
jurisdiction pursuant to Article 217 of the Labor Code" and that, since
plaintiff was employed in Singapore, all other aspects of his employment
contract and/or documents executed in Singapore. Thus, defendant
postulates that Singapore laws should apply and courts thereat shall have
jurisdiction. (pp. 50-69, Rec.). Misjuris
In traversing defendant's arguments, plaintiff claimed that: (1) where the
items demanded in a complaint are the natural consequences flowing from
a breach of an obligation and not labor benefits, the case is intrinsically a
civil dispute; (2) the case involves a question that is beyond the field of
specialization of labor arbiters; and (3) if the complaint is grounded not on
the employee's dismissal per se but on the manner of said dismissal and
the consequence thereof, the case falls under the jurisdiction of the civil
courts. (pp. 70-73, Rec.)
On March 23, 1987, the court a quo denied defendant's motion to dismiss
(pp. 82-84, Ibid). The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. (p.
95 ibid)
On September 16, 1987, defendant filed its answer reiterating the grounds
relied upon in its motion to dismiss and further arguing that plaintiff is

barred by laches, waiver, and estoppel from instituting the complaint and
that he has no cause of action. (pp. 102-115)" 89[1]
On April 10, 1991, the trial court handed down its decision in favor of plaintiff. The
dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff
Menandro Laureano and against defendant Singapore Airlines Limited,
ordering defendant to pay plaintiff the amounts of SIN$396,104.00, or its equivalent in Philippine currency at the current rate
of exchange at the time of payment, as and for unearned compensation
with legal interest from the filing of the complaint until fully paid; Jjlex
SIN$154,742.00, or its equivalent in Philippine currency at the current rate
of exchange at the time of payment; and the further amounts of
P67,500.00 as consequential damages with legal interest from the filing of
the complaint until fully paid;
P1,000,000.00 as and for moral damages; P1,000,000.00 as and for
exemplary damages; and P100,000.00 as and for attorney's fees.
Costs against defendant.
SO ORDERED."90[2]
Singapore Airlines timely appealed before the respondent court and raised the issues of
jurisdiction, validity of termination, estoppel, and damages.
On October 29, 1993, the appellate court set aside the decision of the trial court, thus,
"...In the instant case, the action for damages due to illegal termination
was filed by plaintiff-appellee only on January 8, 1987 or more than four
(4) years after the effectivity date of his dismissal on November 1, 1982.
Clearly, plaintiff-appellee's action has already prescribed.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The complaint is hereby dismissed.
SO ORDERED."91[3] Newmiso
Petitioner's and Singapore Airlines' respective motions for reconsideration were denied.
89
90

Now, before the Court, petitioner poses the following queries:


1.IS THE PRESENT ACTION ONE BASED ON CONTRACT WHICH
PRESCRIBES IN TEN YEARS UNDER ARTICLE 1144 OF THE NEW
CIVIL CODE OR ONE FOR DAMAGES ARISING FROM AN INJURY TO
THE RIGHTS OF THE PLAINTIFF WHICH PRESCRIBES IN FOUR
YEARS UNDER ARTICLE 1146 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE?
2.
CAN AN EMPLOYEE WITH A FIXED PERIOD OF EMPLOYMENT
BE RETRENCHED BY HIS EMPLOYER?
3.
CAN THERE BE VALID RETRENCHMENT IF AN EMPLOYER
MERELY FAILS TO REALIZE THE EXPECTED PROFITS EVEN IF IT
WERE NOT, IN FACT, INCURRING LOSSES?
At the outset, we find it necessary to state our concurrence on the assumption of
jurisdiction by the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 9. The trial court rightly ruled
on the application of Philippine law, thus: Acctmis
"Neither can the Court determine whether the termination of the plaintiff is
legal under the Singapore Laws because of the defendant's failure to
show which specific laws of Singapore Laws apply to this case. As
substantially discussed in the preceding paragraphs, the Philippine Courts
do not take judicial notice of the laws of Singapore. The defendant that
claims the applicability of the Singapore Laws to this case has the burden
of proof. The defendant has failed to do so. Therefore, the Philippine law
should be applied."92[4]
Respondent Court of Appeals acquired jurisdiction when defendant filed its appeal
before said court.93[5] On this matter, respondent court was correct when it barred
defendant-appellant below from raising further the issue of jurisdiction. 94[6]
Petitioner now raises the issue of whether his action is one based on Article 1144 or on
Article 1146 of the Civil Code. According to him, his termination of employment effective
November 1, 1982, was based on an employment contract which is under Article 1144,
so his action should prescribe in 10 years as provided for in said article. Thus he claims
the ruling of the appellate court based on Article 1146 where prescription is only four (4)
91
92
93
94

years, is an error. The appellate court concluded that the action for illegal dismissal
originally filed before the Labor Arbiter on June 29, 1983, but which was withdrawn, then
filed again in 1987 before the Regional Trial Court, had already prescribed.
In our view, neither Article 114495[7] nor Article 114696[8] of the Civil Code is here
pertinent. What is applicable is Article 291 of the Labor Code, viz:
"Article 291. Money claims. - All money claims arising from employeeemployer relations accruing during the effectivity of this Code shall be filed
within three (3) years from the time the cause of action accrued; otherwise
they shall be forever barred.
x x x" Misact
What rules on prescription should apply in cases like this one has long been decided by
this Court. In illegal dismissal, it is settled, that the ten-year prescriptive period fixed in
Article 1144 of the Civil Code may not be invoked by petitioners, for the Civil Code is a
law of general application, while the prescriptive period fixed in Article 292 of the Labor
Code [now Article 291] is a SPECIAL LAW applicable to claims arising from employeeemployer relations.97[9]
More recently in De Guzman. vs. Court of Appeals,98[10] where the money claim was
based on a written contract, the Collective Bargaining Agreement, the Court held:
"...The language of Art. 291 of the Labor Code does not limit its application
only to 'money claims specifically recoverable under said Code' but covers
all money claims arising from an employee-employer relations" (Citing
Cadalin v. POEA Administrator, 238 SCRA 721, 764 [1994]; and Uy v.
National Labor Relations Commission, 261 SCRA 505, 515 [1996]). ...
It should be noted further that Article 291 of the Labor Code is a special
law applicable to money claims arising from employer-employee relations;
thus, it necessarily prevails over Article 1144 of the Civil Code, a general
law. Basic is the rule in statutory construction that 'where two statutes are
of equal theoretical application to a particular case, the one designed

95
96
97
98

therefore should prevail.' (Citing Leveriza v. Intermediate Appellate Court,


157 SCRA 282, 294.) Generalia specialibus non derogant." 99[11]
In the light of Article 291, aforecited, we agree with the appellate court's conclusion that
petitioner's action for damages due to illegal termination filed again on January 8, 1987
or more than four (4) years after the effective date of his dismissal on November 1,
1982 has already prescribed.
"In the instant case, the action for damages due to illegal termination was
filed by plaintiff-appellee only on January 8, 1987 or more than four (4)
years after the effectivity date of his dismissal on November 1, 1982.
Clearly, plaintiff-appellee's action has already prescribed."
We base our conclusion not on Article 1144 of the Civil Code but on Article 291 of the
Labor Code, which sets the prescription period at three (3) years and which governs
under this jurisdiction.
Petitioner claims that the running of the prescriptive period was tolled when he filed his
complaint for illegal dismissal before the Labor Arbiter of the National Labor Relations
Commission. However, this claim deserves scant consideration; it has no legal leg to
stand on. In Olympia International, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, we held that "although the
commencement of a civil action stops the running of the statute of prescription or
limitations, its dismissal or voluntary abandonment by plaintiff leaves the parties in
exactly the same position as though no action had been commenced at all." 100[12]
Now, as to whether petitioner's separation from the company due to retrenchment was
valid, the appellate court found that the employment contract of petitioner allowed for
pre-termination of employment. We agree with the Court of Appeals when it said, Sdjad
"It is a settled rule that contracts have the force of law between the parties.
From the moment the same is perfected, the parties are bound not only to
the fulfillment of what has been expressly stipulated but also to all
consequences which, according to their nature, may be in keeping with
good faith, usage and law. Thus, when plaintiff-appellee accepted the offer
of employment, he was bound by the terms and conditions set forth in the
contract, among others, the right of mutual termination by giving three
months written notice or by payment of three months salary. Such
provision is clear and readily understandable, hence, there is no room for
interpretation."
xxx
99
100

Further, plaintiff-appellee's contention that he is not bound by the


provisions of the Agreement, as he is not a signatory thereto, deserves no
merit. It must be noted that when plaintiff-appellee's employment was
confirmed, he applied for membership with the Singapore Airlines Limited
(Pilots) Association, the signatory to the aforementioned Agreement. As
such, plaintiff-appellee is estopped from questioning the legality of the said
agreement or any proviso contained therein." 101[13]
Moreover, the records of the present case clearly show that respondent court's decision
is amply supported by evidence and it did not err in its findings, including the reason for
the retrenchment:
"When defendant-appellant was faced with the world-wide recession of the
airline industry resulting in a slow down in the company's growth
particularly in the regional operation (Asian Area) where the Airbus 300
operates. It had no choice but to adopt cost cutting measures, such as
cutting down services, number of frequencies of flights, and reduction of
the number of flying points for the A-300 fleet (t.s.n., July 6, 1988, pp. 1718). As a result, defendant-appellant had to layoff A-300 pilots, including
plaintiff-appellee, which it found to be in excess of what is reasonably
needed."102[14]
All these considered, we find sufficient factual and legal basis to conclude that
petitioner's termination from employment was for an authorized cause, for which he was
given ample notice and opportunity to be heard, by respondent company. No error nor
grave abuse of discretion, therefore, could be attributed to respondent appellate court.
Sppedsc

ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition is DISMISSED. The decision of the Court of


Appeals in C.A. CV No. 34476 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 195649

July 2, 2013

CASAN MACODE MACQUILING, PETITIONER,


vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ROMMEL ARNADO Y CAGOCO, AND LINOG G.
BALUA. RESPONDENTS.
RESOLUTION
101
102

SERENO, J.:
This Resolution resolves the Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondent on May 10, 2013
and the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration filed on May 20, 2013.
We are not unaware that the term of office of the local officials elected in the May 2010 elections
has already ended on June 30, 2010. Arnado, therefore, has successfully finished his term of
office. While the relief sought can no longer be granted, ruling on the motion for reconsideration
is important as it will either affirm the validity of Arnados election or affirm that Arnado never
qualified to run for public office.
Respondent failed to advance any argument to support his plea for the reversal of this Courts
Decision dated April 16, 2013. Instead, he presented his accomplishments as the Mayor of
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte and reiterated that he has taken the Oath of Allegiance not only
twice but six times. It must be stressed, however, that the relevant question is the efficacy of his
renunciation of his foreign citizenship and not the taking of the Oath of Allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines. Neither do his accomplishments as mayor affect the question before
this Court.
Respondent cites Section 349 of the Immigration and Naturalization Act of the United States as
having the effect of expatriation when he executed his Affidavit of Renunciation of American
Citizenship on April 3, 2009 and thus claims that he was divested of his American citizenship. If
indeed, respondent was divested of all the rights of an American citizen, the fact that he was still
able to use his US passport after executing his Affidavit of Renunciation repudiates this claim.
The Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws,1 which must be presented as public
documents2 of a foreign country and must be "evidenced by an official publication thereof."3
Mere reference to a foreign law in a pleading does not suffice for it to be considered in deciding
a case.
Respondent likewise contends that this Court failed to cite any law of the United States
"providing that a person who is divested of American citizenship thru an Affidavit of
Renunciation will re-acquire such American citizenship by using a US Passport issued prior to
expatriation."4
American law does not govern in this jurisdiction. Instead, Section 40(d) of the Local
Government Code calls for application in the case before us, given the fact that at the time
Arnado filed his certificate of candidacy, he was not only a Filipino citizen but, by his own
declaration, also an American citizen. It is the application of this law and not of any foreign law
that serves as the basis for Arnados disqualification to run for any local elective position.

With all due respect to the dissent, the declared policy of Republic Act No. (RA) 9225 is that "all
Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their
Philippine citizenship under the conditions of this Act."5 This policy pertains to the reacquisition
of Philippine citizenship. Section 5(2)6 requires those who have re-acquired Philippine
citizenship and who seek elective public office, to renounce any and all foreign citizenship.
This requirement of renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship, when read together with
Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code7 which disqualifies those with dual citizenship
from running for any elective local position, indicates a policy that anyone who seeks to run for
public office must be solely and exclusively a Filipino citizen. To allow a former Filipino who
reacquires Philippine citizenship to continue using a foreign passport which indicates the
recognition of a foreign state of the individual as its national even after the Filipino has
renounced his foreign citizenship, is to allow a complete disregard of this policy.
Further, we respectfully disagree that the majority decision rules on a situation of doubt.
Indeed, there is no doubt that Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code disqualifies those
with dual citizenship from running for local elective positions.
There is likewise no doubt that the use of a passport is a positive declaration that one is a citizen
of the country which issued the passport, or that a passport proves that the country which issued
it recognizes the person named therein as its national.
It is unquestioned that Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen, or that he acquired American
citizenship by naturalization. There is no doubt that he reacquired his Filipino citizenship by
taking his Oath of Allegiance to the Philippines and that he renounced his American citizenship.
It is also indubitable that after renouncing his American citizenship, Arnado used his U.S.
passport at least six times.
If there is any remaining doubt, it is regarding the efficacy of Arnados renunciation of his
American citizenship when he subsequently used his U.S. passport. The renunciation of foreign
citizenship must be complete and unequivocal. The requirement that the renunciation must be
made through an oath emphasizes the solemn duty of the one making the oath of renunciation to
remain true to what he has sworn to. Allowing the subsequent use of a foreign passport because it
is convenient for the person to do so is rendering the oath a hollow act. It devalues the act of
taking of an oath, reducing it to a mere ceremonial formality.
The dissent states that the Court has effectively left Arnado "a man without a country".1wphi1
On the contrary, this Court has, in fact, found Arnado to have more than one. Nowhere in the
decision does it say that Arnado is not a Filipino citizen. What the decision merely points out is
that he also possessed another citizenship at the time he filed his certificate of candidacy.

Well-settled is the rule that findings of fact of administrative bodies will not be interfered with by
the courts in the absence of grave abuse of discretion on the part of said agencies, or unless the
aforementioned findings are not supported by substantial evidence.8 They are accorded not only
great respect but even finality, and are binding upon this Court, unless it is shown that the
administrative body had arbitrarily disregarded or misapprehended evidence before it to such an
extent as to compel a contrary conclusion had such evidence been properly appreciated.9
Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that COMELEC First Division found that Arnado used his
U.S. Passport at least six times after he renounced his American citizenship. This was debunked
by the COMELEC En Banc, which found that Arnado only used his U.S. passport four times,
and which agreed with Arnados claim that he only used his U.S. passport on those occasions
because his Philippine passport was not yet issued. The COMELEC En Banc argued that Arnado
was able to prove that he used his Philippine passport for his travels on the following dates: 12
January 2010, 31 January 2010, 31 March 2010, 16 April 2010, 20 May 2010, and 4 June 2010.
None of these dates coincide with the two other dates indicated in the certification issued by the
Bureau of Immigration showing that on 21 January 2010 and on 23 March 2010, Arnado arrived
in the Philippines using his U.S. Passport No. 057782700 which also indicated therein that his
nationality is USA-American. Adding these two travel dates to the travel record provided by the
Bureau of Immigration showing that Arnado also presented his U.S. passport four times (upon
departure on 14 April 2009, upon arrival on 25 June 2009, upon departure on 29 July 2009 and
upon arrival on 24 November 2009), these incidents sum up to six.
The COMELEC En Banc concluded that "the use of the US passport was because to his
knowledge, his Philippine passport was not yet issued to him for his use."10 This conclusion,
however, is not supported by the facts. Arnado claims that his Philippine passport was issued on
18 June 2009. The records show that he continued to use his U.S. passport even after he already
received his Philippine passport. Arnados travel records show that he presented his U.S. passport
on 24 November 2009, on 21 January 2010, and on 23 March 2010. These facts were never
refuted by Arnado.
Thus, the ruling of the COMELEC En Banc is based on a misapprehension of the facts that the
use of the U.S. passport was discontinued when Arnado obtained his Philippine passport.
Arnados continued use of his U.S. passport cannot be considered as isolated acts contrary to
what the dissent wants us to believe.
It must be stressed that what is at stake here is the principle that only those who are exclusively
Filipinos are qualified to run for public office. If we allow dual citizens who wish to run for
public office to renounce their foreign citizenship and afterwards continue using their foreign
passports, we are creating a special privilege for these dual citizens, thereby effectively junking
the prohibition in Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code.

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration and the Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration are hereby DENIED with finality.
SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

G.R. No. 188314

Plaintiff-Appellee,

- versus

KHADDAFY
JANJALANI,
GAMAL B. BAHARAN a.k.a.
Tapay, ANGELO TRINIDAD
a.k.a. Abu Khalil, GAPPAL
BANNAH ASALI a.k.a. Maidan or
Negro, JAINAL SALI a.k.a. Abu
Solaiman,
ROHMAT
ABDURROHIM a.k.a. Jackie or
Zaky, and other JOHN and JANE
DOES,

Present:

CARPIO MORALES, J.,


Chairperson,
BRION,
BERSAMIN,
VILLARAMA, JR., and
SERENO, JJ.

Accused,

GAMAL B. BAHARAN a.k.a.


Tapay, ANGELO TRINIDAD
a.k.a. Abu Khalil, and ROHMAT
ABDURROHIM a.k.a. Abu Jackie
or Zaky,

Promulgated:

January 10, 2011


Accused-Appellants.

x--------------------------------------------------x

DECISION
SERENO, J.:

Before the Court is an appeal from the Decision of the Court of Appeals
(CA) dated 30 June 2008, which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court
of Makati City in Criminal Case Nos. 05-476 and 05-4777 dated 18 October 2005.
The latter Decision convicted the three accused-appellants namely, Gamal B.
Baharan a.k.a. Tapay, Angelo Trinidad a.k.a. Abu Khalil, and Rohmat Abdurrohim
a.k.a. Abu Jackie or Zaky of the complex crime of multiple murder and multiple
frustrated murder, and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of death by lethal
injection. The CA modified the sentence to reclusion perpetua as required by
Republic Act No. 9346 (Act Abolishing the Imposition of Death Penalty).

Statement of Facts

The pertinent facts, as determined by the trial court, are as follows:

On 14 February 2005, an RRCG bus was plying its usual southbound route,
from its Navotas bus terminal towards its Alabang bus terminal via Epifanio de los
Santos Avenue (EDSA). Around 6:30 to 7:30 in the evening, while they were about
to move out of the Guadalupe-EDSA southbound bus stop, the bus conductor
noticed two men running after the bus. The two insisted on getting on the bus, so
the conductor obliged and let them in.

According to Elmer Andales, the bus conductor, he immediately became


wary of the two men, because, even if they got on the bus together, the two sat
away from each other one sat two seats behind the driver, while the other sat at the
back of the bus. At the time, there were only 15 passengers inside the bus. He also
noticed that the eyes of one of the men were reddish. When he approached the
person near the driver and asked him whether he was paying for two passengers,
the latter looked dumb struck by the question. He then stuttered and said he was
paying for two and gave PhP20. Andales grew more concerned when the other man
seated at the back also paid for both passengers. At this point, Andales said he
became more certain that the two were up to no good, and that there might be a
holdup.

Afterwards, Andales said he became more suspicious because both men kept
on asking him if the bus was going to stop at Ayala Avenue. The witness also
noticed that the man at the back appeared to be slouching, with his legs stretched
out in front of him and his arms hanging out and hidden from view as if he was
tinkering with something. When Andales would get near the man, the latter would
glare at him. Andales admitted, however, that he did not report the suspicious
characters to the police.

As soon as the bus reached the stoplight at the corner of Ayala Avenue and
EDSA, the two men insisted on getting off the bus. According to Andales, the bus
driver initially did not want to let them off the bus, because a Makati ordinance
prohibited unloading anywhere except at designated bus stops. Eventually, the bus
driver gave in and allowed the two passengers to alight. The two immediately got
off the bus and ran towards Ayala Avenue. Moments after, Andales felt an
explosion. He then saw fire quickly engulfing the bus. He ran out of the bus
towards a nearby mall. After a while, he went back to where the bus was. He saw
their bus passengers either lying on the ground or looking traumatized. A few hours
after, he made a statement before the Makati Police Station narrating the whole
incident.

The prosecution presented documents furnished by the Department of


Justice, confirming that shortly before the explosion, the spokesperson of the Abu
Sayyaf Group Abu Solaiman announced over radio station DZBB that the group

had a Valentines Day gift for former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. After the
bombing, he again went on radio and warned of more bomb attacks.

As stipulated during pretrial, accused Trinidad gave ABS-CBN News


Network an exclusive interview some time after the incident, confessing his
participation in the Valentines Day bombing incident. In another exclusive
interview on the network, accused Baharan likewise admitted his role in the
bombing incident. Finally, accused Asali gave a television interview, confessing
that he had supplied the explosive devices for the 14 February 2005 bombing. The
bus conductor identified the accused Baharan and Trinidad, and confirmed that
they were the two men who had entered the RRCG bus on the evening of 14
February.

Members of the Abu Sayyaf Group namely Khaddafy Janjalani, Gamal B.


Baharan, Angelo Trinidad, Gappal Bannah Asali, Jainal Asali, Rohmat Abdurrohim
a.k.a. Abu Jackie or Zaky, and other John and Jane Does were then charged with
multiple murder and multiple frustrated murder. Only Baharan, Trinidad, Asali, and
Rohmat were arrested, while the other accused remain at-large.

On their arraignment for the multiple murder charge (Crim. Case No. 05476), Baharan, Trinidad, and Asali all entered a plea of guilty. On the other hand,
upon arraignment for the multiple frustrated murder charge (Crim. Case No. 05477), accused Asali pled guilty. Accused Trinidad and Baharan pled not guilty.

Rohmat pled not guilty to both charges. During the pretrial hearing, the parties
stipulated the following:

1.)

The jurisdiction of this court over the offenses charged.

2.)

That all three accused namely alias Baharan, Trinidad, and Asali admitted
knowing one another before February 14, 2005.

3.)

All the same three accused likewise admitted that a bomb exploded in the
RRCG bus while the bus was plying the EDSA route fronting the MRT
terminal which is in front of the Makati Commercial Center.

4.)

Accused Asali admitted knowing the other accused alias Rohmat whom
he claims taught him how to make explosive devices.

5.)

The accused Trinidad also admitted knowing Rohmat before the February
14 bombing incident.

6.)

The accused Baharan, Trinidad, and Asali all admitted to causing the
bomb explosion inside the RRCG bus which left four people dead and
more or less forty persons injured.

7.)

Both Baharan and Trinidad agreed to stipulate that within the period
March 20-24 each gave separate interviews to the ABS-CBN news
network admitting their participation in the commission of the said crimes,
subject of these cases.

8.)

Accused Trinidad and Baharan also admitted to pleading guilty to these


crimes, because they were guilt-stricken after seeing a man carrying a
child in the first bus that they had entered.

9.)

Accused Asali likewise admitted that in the middle of March 2005 he


gave a television news interview in which he admitted that he supplied the
explosive devices which resulted in this explosion inside the RRCG bus
and which resulted in the filing of these charges.

10.)

Finally, accused Baharan, Trinidad, and Asali admitted that they are
members of the Abu Sayyaf.103[1]

In the light of the pretrial stipulations, the trial court asked whether accused
Baharan and Trinidad were amenable to changing their not guilty pleas to the
charge of multiple frustrated murder, considering that they pled guilty to the
heavier charge of multiple murder, creating an apparent inconsistency in their
pleas. Defense counsel conferred with accused Baharan and Trinidad and explained
to them the consequences of the pleas. The two accused acknowledged the
inconsistencies and manifested their readiness for re-arraignment. After the
Information was read to them, Baharan and Trinidad pled guilty to the charge of
multiple frustrated murder.104[2]

After being discharged as state witness, accused Asali testified that while
under training with the Abu Sayyaf in 2004, Rohmat, a.k.a Abu Jackie or Zaky, and
two other persons taught him how to make bombs and explosives. The trainees
were told that they were to wage battles against the government in the city, and that
their first mission was to plant bombs in malls, the Light Railway Transit (LRT),
and other parts of Metro Manila.

103
104

As found by the trial court, Asali, after his training, was required by the Abu
Sayyaf leadership, specifically Abu Solaiman and Rohmat, to secure eight kilos of
TNT, a soldering gun, aluminum powder, a tester, and Christmas lights, all of
which he knew would be used to make a bomb. He then recalled that sometime in
November to December 2004, Trinidad asked him for a total of 4 kilos of TNT that
is, 2 kilos on two separate occasions. Rohmat allegedly called Asali to confirm that
Trinidad would get TNT from Asali and use it for their first mission. The TNT was
allegedly placed in two buses sometime in December 2004, but neither one of them
exploded.

Asali then testified that the night before the Valentines Day bombing,
Trinidad and Baharan got another two kilos of TNT from him. Late in the evening
of 14 February, he received a call from Abu Solaiman. The latter told Asali not to
leave home or go to crowded areas, since the TNT taken by Baharan and Trinidad
had already been exploded in Makati. Thirty minutes later, Trinidad called Asali,
repeating the warning of Abu Solaiman. The next day, Asali allegedly received a
call from accused Rohmat, congratulating the former on the success of the
mission.105[3] According to Asali, Abu Zaky specifically said, Sa wakas nag
success din yung tinuro ko sayo.

Assignment of Errors

105

Accused-appellants raise the following assignment of errors:

I.

The trial court gravely erred in accepting accused-appellants


plea of guilt despite insufficiency of searching inquiry into the
voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of
the said plea.

II.

The trial court gravely erred in finding that the guilt of


accused-appellants for the crimes charged had been proven
beyond reasonable doubt.106[4]

First Assignment of Error

Accused-appellants Baharan and Trinidad argue that the trial court did not conduct
a searching inquiry after they had changed their plea from not guilty to guilty. The
transcript of stenographic notes during the 18 April 2005 re-arraignment before the
Makati Regional Trial Court is reproduced below:

COURT

106

: Anyway, I think what we should have to do, considering the


stipulations that were agreed upon during the last hearing, is to
address this matter of pleas of not guilty entered for the
frustrated murder charges by the two accused, Mr. Trinidad and
Mr. Baharan, because if you will recall they entered pleas of
guilty to the multiple murder charges, but then earlier pleas of

not guilty for the frustrated multiple murder charges remain


[I]s that not inconsistent considering the stipulations that were
entered into during the initial pretrial of this case? [If] you will
recall, they admitted to have caused the bomb explosion that
led to the death of at least four people and injury of about forty
other persons and so under the circumstances, Atty Pea, have
you discussed this matter with your clients?
ATTY. PEA

: Then we should be given enough time to talk with them. I


havent conferred with them about this with regard to the
multiple murder case.

COURT

: Okay. So let us proceed now. Atty. Pea, can you assist the two
accused because if they are interested in withdrawing their
[pleas], I want to hear it from your lips.

ATTY. PEA

: Yes, your Honor.


(At this juncture, Atty. Pea confers with the two accused,
namely Trinidad and Baharan)
I have talked to them, your Honor, and I have explained to
them the consequence of their pleas, your Honor, and that the
plea of guilt to the murder case and plea of not guilty to the
frustrated multiple murder actually are inconsistent with their
pleas.

COURT

: With matters that they stipulated upon?

ATTY. PEA

: Yes, your Honor. So, they are now, since they already plead
guilt to the murder case, then they are now changing their
pleas, your Honor, from not guilty to the one of guilt. They are
now ready, your Honor, for re-arraignment.

INTERPRETER: (Read again that portion [of the information] and translated it
in Filipino in a clearer way and asked both accused what their
pleas are).
Your Honor, both accused are entering separate pleas of guilt to
the crime charged.
COURT

: All right. So after the information was re-read to the accused,


they have withdrawn their pleas of not guilty and changed it to
the pleas of guilty to the charge of frustrated murder. Thank
you. Are there any matters you need to address at pretrial now?

If there are none, then I will terminate pretrial and


accommodate107[5]

As early as in People v. Apduhan, the Supreme Court has ruled that all trial
judges must refrain from accepting with alacrity an accused's plea of guilty, for
while justice demands a speedy administration, judges are duty bound to be extra
solicitous in seeing to it that when an accused pleads guilty, he understands fully
the meaning of his plea and the import of an inevitable conviction. 108[6] Thus, trial
court judges are required to observe the following procedure under Section 3, Rule
116 of the Rules of Court:

SEC. 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence. When the accused
pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a searching inquiry
into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea
and shall require the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of
culpability. The accused may also present evidence in his behalf. (Emphasis
supplied)

The requirement to conduct a searching inquiry applies more so in cases of rearraignment. In People v. Galvez, the Court noted that since accused-appellant's
original plea was not guilty, the trial court should have exerted careful effort in
inquiring into why he changed his plea to guilty.109[7] According to the Court:

107
108
109

The stringent procedure governing the reception of a plea of guilt, especially in a


case involving the death penalty, is imposed upon the trial judge in order to leave
no room for doubt on the possibility that the accused might have misunderstood
the nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea.110[8]

Likewise, the requirement to conduct a searching inquiry should not be deemed


satisfied in cases in which it was the defense counsel who explained the
consequences of a guilty plea to the accused, as it appears in this case. In People v.
Alborida, this Court found that there was still an improvident plea of guilty, even if
the accused had already signified in open court that his counsel had explained the
consequences of the guilty plea; that he understood the explanation of his counsel;
that the accused understood that the penalty of death would still be meted out to
him; and that he had not been intimidated, bribed, or threatened.111[9]

We have reiterated in a long line of cases that the conduct of a searching


inquiry remains the duty of judges, as they are mandated by the rules to satisfy
themselves that the accused had not been under coercion or duress; mistaken
impressions; or a misunderstanding of the significance, effects, and consequences
of their guilty plea.112[10] This requirement is stringent and mandatory.113[11]

110
111
112
113

Nevertheless, we are not unmindful of the context under which the rearraignment was conducted or of the factual milieu surrounding the finding of guilt
against the accused. The Court observes that accused Baharan and Trinidad
previously pled guilty to another charge multiple murder based on the same act
relied upon in the multiple frustrated murder charge. The Court further notes that
prior to the change of plea to one of guilt, accused Baharan and Trinidad made two
other confessions of guilt one through an extrajudicial confession (exclusive
television interviews, as stipulated by both accused during pretrial), and the other
via

judicial

admission

(pretrial

stipulation).

Considering

the

foregoing

circumstances, we deem it unnecessary to rule on the sufficiency of the searching


inquiry in this instance. Remanding the case for re-arraignment is not warranted, as
the accuseds plea of guilt was not the sole basis of the condemnatory judgment
under consideration.114[12]

Second Assignment of Error

In People v. Oden, the Court declared that even if the requirement of


conducting a searching inquiry was not complied with, [t]he manner by which the
plea of guilt is made loses much of great significance where the conviction can be
based on independent evidence proving the commission by the person accused of
the offense charged.115[13] Thus, in People v. Nadera, the Court stated:

114

Convictions based on an improvident plea of guilt are set aside only if such
plea is the sole basis of the judgment. If the trial court relied on sufficient and
credible evidence to convict the accused, the conviction must be sustained,
because then it is predicated not merely on the guilty plea of the accused but on
evidence proving his commission of the offense charged. 116[14] (Emphasis
supplied.)

In their second assignment of error, accused-appellants assert that guilt was not
proven beyond reasonable doubt. They pointed out that the testimony of the
conductor was merely circumstantial, while that of Asali as to the conspiracy was
insufficient.

Insofar as accused-appellants Baharan and Trinidad are concerned, the


evidence for the prosecution, in addition to that which can be drawn from the
stipulation of facts, primarily consisted of the testimonies of the bus conductor,
Elmer Andales, and of the accused-turned-state-witness, Asali. Andales positively
identified accused Baharan and Trinidad as the two men who had acted
suspiciously while inside the bus; who had insisted on getting off the bus in
violation of a Makati ordinance; and who had scampered away from the bus
moments before the bomb exploded. On the other hand, Asali testified that he had
given accused Baharan and Trinidad the TNT used in the bombing incident in
Makati City. The guilt of the accused Baharan and Trinidad was sufficiently
established by these corroborating testimonies, coupled with their respective
115
116

judicial admissions (pretrial stipulations) and extrajudicial confessions (exclusive


television interviews, as they both stipulated during pretrial) that they were indeed
the perpetrators of the Valentines Day bombing. 117[15] Accordingly, the Court
upholds the findings of guilt made by the trial court as affirmed by the Court of
Appeals.

Anent accused Rohmat, the evidence for the prosecution consisted of the
testimony of accused-turned-state-witness Asali. Below is a reproduction of the
transcript of stenographic notes on the state prosecutors direct examination of
state-witness Asali during the 26 May 2005 trial:

117

Q:

You stated that Zaky trained you and Trinidad. Under what
circumstances did he train you, Mr. Witness, to assemble those
explosives, you and Trinidad?

: Abu Zaky, Abu Solaiman, Khadaffy Janjalani, the three of


them, that Angelo Trinidad and myself be the one to be trained
to make an explosive, sir.

: Mr. witness, how long that training, or how long did it take that
training?

: If I am not mistaken, we were thought to make bomb about one


month and two weeks.

: Now, speaking of that mission, Mr. witness, while you were


still in training at Mr. Cararao, is there any mission that you
undertook, if any, with respect to that mission?

: Our first mission was to plant a bomb in the malls, LRT, and
other parts of Metro Manila, sir.118[16]

The witness then testified that he kept eight kilos of TNT for accused
Baharan and Trinidad.

118

Q:

Now, going back to the bomb. Mr. witness, did you know what
happened to the 2 kilos of bomb that Trinidad and Tapay took
from you sometime in November 2004?

: That was the explosive that he planted in the G-liner, which did
not explode.

: How did you know, Mr. witness?

: He was the one who told me, Mr. Angelo Trinidad, sir.

: What happened next, Mr. witness, when the bomb did not
explode, as told to you by Trinidad?

: On December 29, Angelo Trinidad got 2 more kilos of TNT


bombs.

: Did Trinidad tell you why he needed another amount of


explosive on that date, December 29, 2004? Will you kindly
tell us the reason why?

: He told me that Abu Solaiman instructed me to get the TNT so


that he could detonate a bomb

: Were there any other person, besides Abu Solaiman, who called
you up, with respect to the taking of the explosives from you?

: There is, sir Abu Zaky, sir, called up also.

: What did Abu Zaky tell you when he called you up?

: He told me that this is your first mission.

: Please enlighten the Honorable Court. What is that mission you


are referring to?

: That is the first mission where we can show our anger towards
the Christians.

: The second time that he got a bomb from you, Mr. witness, do
you know if the bomb explode?

: I did not know what happened to the next 2 kilos taken by


Angelo Trinidad from me until after I was caught, because I
was told by the policeman that interviewed me after I was
arrested that the 2 kilos were planted in a bus, which also did
not explode.

: So besides these two incidents, were there any other incidents


that Angelo Trinidad and Tapay get an explosive for you, Mr.
witness?

: If I am not mistaken, sir, on February 13, 2005 at 6:30 p.m.

: Who got from you the explosive Mr. witness?

: Its Angelo Trinidad and Tapay, sir.

: How many explosives did they get from you, Mr. witness, at
that time?

: They got 2 kilos TNT bomb, sir.

: Did they tell you, Mr. witness, where are they going to use that
explosive?

: No, sir.

: Do you know, Mr. witness, what happened to the third batch of


explosives, which were taken from you by Trinidad and Tapay?

: That is the bomb that exploded in Makati, sir.

: Why did you know, Mr. witness?

: Because I was called in the evening of February 14 by Abu


Solaiman. He told me not to leave the house because the
explosive that were taken by Tapay and Angelo Trinidad
exploded.

: Was there any other call during that time, Mr. Witness?

: I was told by Angelo Trinidad not to leave the house because


the explosive that he took exploded already, sir.

: How sure were you, Mr. witness, at that time, that indeed, the
bomb exploded at Makati, beside the call of Abu Solaiman and
Trinidad?

: It was told by Abu Solaiman that the bombing in Makati should


coincide with the bombing in General Santos.

: He told it to me, sir I cannot remember the date anymore, but I


know it was sometime in February 2005.

: Any other call, Mr. witness, from Abu Solaiman and Trinidad
after the bombing exploded in Makati, any other call?

: There is, sir The call came from Abu Zaky.

: What did Abu Zaky tell you, Mr. witness?

: He just greeted us congratulations, because we have a


successful mission.

: He told me that sa wakas, nag success din yung tinuro ko sayo.

: By the way, Mr. witness, I would just like to clarify this. You
stated that Abu Zaky called you up the following day, that was

February 15, and congratulating you for the success of the


mission. My question to you, Mr. witness, if you know what is
the relation of that mission, wherein you were congratulated by
Abu Zaky, to the mission, which have been indoctrinated to
you, while you were in Mt. Cararao, Mr. witness?
A

: They are connected, sir.

: Connected in what sense, Mr. witness?

: Because when we were undergoing training, we were told that


the Abu Sayyaf should not wage war to the forest, but also
wage our battles in the city.

: Wage the battle against who, Mr. witness?

: The government, sir.119[17]

What can be culled from the testimony of Asali is that the Abu Sayyaf Group
was determined to sow terror in Metro Manila, so that they could show their anger
towards the Christians.120[18] It can also be seen that Rohmat, together with
Janjalani and Abu Solaiman, had carefully planned the Valentines Day bombing
incident, months before it happened. Rohmat had trained Asali and Trinidad to
make bombs and explosives. While in training, Asali and others were told that their
mission was to plant bombs in malls, the LRT, and other parts of Metro Manila.
According to Asali, Rohmat called him on 29 December 2004 to confirm that
Trinidad would get two kilos of TNT from Asali, as they were about to commence
their first mission.121[19] They made two separate attempts to bomb a bus in Metro
Manila, but to no avail. The day before the Valentines Day bombing, Trinidad got
119
120
121

another two kilos of TNT from Asali. On Valentines Day, the Abu Sayyaf Group
announced that they had a gift for the former President, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.
On their third try, their plan finally succeeded. Right after the bomb exploded, the
Abu Sayyaf Group declared that there would be more bombings in the future. Asali
then received a call from Rohmat, praising the former: Sa wakas nag success din
yung tinuro ko sayo.122[20]

In the light of the foregoing evidence, the Court upholds the finding of guilt
against Rohmat. Article 17 of the Revised Penal Code reads:

Art. 17. Principals. The following are considered principals:

1. Those who take a direct part in the execution of the act


2. Those who directly force or induce others to commit it
3. Those who cooperate in the commission of the offense by another act without which
it would not have been accomplished

Accused Rohmat is criminally responsible under the second paragraph, or


the provision on principal by inducement. The instructions and training he had
given Asali on how to make bombs coupled with their careful planning and
persistent attempts to bomb different areas in Metro Manila and Rohmats
confirmation that Trinidad would be getting TNT from Asali as part of their
mission prove the finding that Rohmats co-inducement was the determining cause
122

of the commission of the crime.123[21] Such command or advice [was] of such


nature that, without it, the crime would not have materialized.124[22]

Further, the inducement was so influential in producing the criminal act that
without it, the act would not have been performed. 125[23] In People v. Sanchez, et
al., the Court ruled that, notwithstanding the fact that Mayor Sanchez was not at
the crime scene, evidence proved that he was the mastermind of the criminal act or
the principal by inducement. Thus, because Mayor Sanchez was a co-principal and
co-conspirator, and because the act of one conspirator is the act of all, the mayor
was rendered liable for all the resulting crimes. 126[24] The same finding must be
applied to the case at bar.

The Court also affirms the finding of the existence of conspiracy involving
accused Baharan, Trinidad, and Rohmat. Conspiracy was clearly established from
the collective acts of the accused-appellants before, during and after the
commission of the crime. As correctly declared by the trial court in its Omnibus
Decision:

123
124
125
126

Asalis clear and categorical testimony, which remains unrebutted on its


major points, coupled with the judicial admissions freely and voluntarily given by
the two other accused, are sufficient to prove the existence of a conspiracy
hatched between and among the four accused, all members of the terrorist group
Abu Sayyaf, to wreak chaos and mayhem in the metropolis by indiscriminately
killing and injuring civilian victims by utilizing bombs and other similar
destructive explosive devices.

While said conspiracy involving the four malefactors has not been
expressly admitted by accused Baharan, Angelo Trinidad, and Rohmat, more
specifically with respect to the latters participation in the commission of the
crimes, nonetheless it has been established by virtue of the aforementioned
evidence, which established the existence of the conspiracy itself and the
indispensable participation of accused Rohmat in seeing to it that the conspirators
criminal design would be realized.
It is well-established that conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of the
accused, which clearly manifests a concurrence of wills, a common intent or
design to commit a crime (People v. Lenantud, 352 SCRA 544). Hence, where
acts of the accused collectively and individually demonstrate the existence of a
common design towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful purpose,
conspiracy is evident and all the perpetrators will be held liable as principals
(People v. Ellado, 353 SCRA 643).127[25]

In People v. Geronimo, the Court pronounced that it would be justified in


concluding that the defendants therein were engaged in a conspiracy when the
defendants by their acts aimed at the same object, one performing one part and the
other performing another part so as to complete it, with a view to the attainment of
the same object; and their acts, though apparently independent, were in fact
concerted and cooperative, indicating closeness of personal association, concerted
action and concurrence of sentiments.128[26]

127
128

Accused contend that the testimony of Asali is inadmissible pursuant to Sec.


30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. It is true that under the rule, statements made
by a conspirator against a co-conspirator are admissible only when made during
the existence of the conspiracy. However, as the Court ruled in People v. Buntag, if
the declarant repeats the statement in court, his extrajudicial confession becomes a
judicial admission, making the testimony admissible as to both conspirators. 129[27]
Thus, in People v. Palijon, the Court held the following:

[W]e must make a distinction between extrajudicial and judicial confessions. An


extrajudicial confession may be given in evidence against the confessant but not
against his co-accused as they are deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine
him. A judicial confession is admissible against the declarants co-accused since
the latter are afforded opportunity to cross-examine the former. Section 30, Rule
130 of the Rules of Court applies only to extrajudicial acts or admissions and
not to testimony at trial where the party adversely affected has the
opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. Mercenes admission implicating
his co-accused was given on the witness stand. It is admissible in evidence against
appellant Palijon. Moreover, where several accused are tried together for the same
offense, the testimony of a co-accused implicating his co-accused is competent
evidence against the latter.130[28]

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Regional


Trial Court of Makati, as affirmed with modification by the Court of Appeals, is
hereby AFFIRMED.
129
130

Republic of the Philippines, petitioner, vs. Sandiganbayan, Major General Josephus Q. Ramas
and Elizabeth Dimaano, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the Resolutions of the
Sandiganbayan (First Division)131[1] dated 18 November 1991 and 25 March 1992 in Civil Case
No. 0037. The first Resolution dismissed petitioners Amended Complaint and ordered the return
of the confiscated items to respondent Elizabeth Dimaano, while the second Resolution denied
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. Petitioner prays for the grant of the reliefs sought in its
Amended Complaint, or in the alternative, for the remand of this case to the Sandiganbayan
(First Division) for further proceedings allowing petitioner to complete the presentation of its
evidence.
Antecedent Facts
Immediately upon her assumption to office following the successful EDSA Revolution, then
President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order No. 1 (EO No. 1) creating the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG). EO No. 1 primarily tasked the PCGG to recover all
ill-gotten wealth of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives,
subordinates and close associates. EO No. 1 vested the PCGG with the power (a) to conduct
investigation as may be necessary in order to accomplish and carry out the purposes of this order
and the power (h) to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the
purpose of this order. Accordingly, the PCGG, through its then Chairman Jovito R. Salonga,
created an AFP Anti-Graft Board (AFP Board) tasked to investigate reports of unexplained
wealth and corrupt practices by AFP personnel, whether in the active service or retired.132[2]
Based on its mandate, the AFP Board investigated various reports of alleged unexplained wealth
of respondent Major General Josephus Q. Ramas (Ramas). On 27 July 1987, the AFP Board
issued a Resolution on its findings and recommendation on the reported unexplained wealth of
Ramas. The relevant part of the Resolution reads:
III. FINDINGS and EVALUATION:
Evidence in the record showed that respondent is the owner of a house and lot located at 15Yakan St., La Vista, Quezon City. He is also the owner of a house and lot located in Cebu City.
The lot has an area of 3,327 square meters.
131
132

The value of the property located in Quezon City may be estimated modestly at P700,000.00.
The equipment/items and communication facilities which were found in the premises of
Elizabeth Dimaano and were confiscated by elements of the PC Command of Batangas were all
covered by invoice receipt in the name of CAPT. EFREN SALIDO, RSO Command Coy, MSC,
PA. These items could not have been in the possession of Elizabeth Dimaano if not given for her
use by respondent Commanding General of the Philippine Army.
Aside from the military equipment/items and communications equipment, the raiding team was
also able to confiscate money in the amount of P2,870,000.00 and $50,000 US Dollars in the
house of Elizabeth Dimaano on 3 March 1986.
Affidavits of members of the Military Security Unit, Military Security Command, Philippine
Army, stationed at Camp Eldridge, Los Baos, Laguna, disclosed that Elizabeth Dimaano is the
mistress of respondent. That respondent usually goes and stays and sleeps in the alleged house of
Elizabeth Dimaano in Barangay Tengga, Itaas, Batangas City and when he arrives, Elizabeth
Dimaano embraces and kisses respondent. That on February 25, 1986, a person who rode in a car
went to the residence of Elizabeth Dimaano with four (4) attache cases filled with money and
owned by MGen Ramas.
Sworn statement in the record disclosed also that Elizabeth Dimaano had no visible means of
income and is supported by respondent for she was formerly a mere secretary.
Taking in toto the evidence, Elizabeth Dimaano could not have used the military
equipment/items seized in her house on March 3, 1986 without the consent of respondent, he
being the Commanding General of the Philippine Army. It is also impossible for Elizabeth
Dimaano to claim that she owns the P2,870,000.00 and $50,000 US Dollars for she had no
visible source of income.
This money was never declared in the Statement of Assets and Liabilities of respondent. There
was an intention to cover the existence of these money because these are all ill-gotten and
unexplained wealth. Were it not for the affidavits of the members of the Military Security Unit
assigned at Camp Eldridge, Los Baos, Laguna, the existence and ownership of these money
would have never been known.
The Statement of Assets and Liabilities of respondent were also submitted for scrutiny and
analysis by the Boards consultant. Although the amount of P2,870,000.00 and $50,000 US
Dollars were not included, still it was disclosed that respondent has an unexplained wealth of
P104,134. 60.
IV. CONCLUSION:
In view of the foregoing, the Board finds that a prima facie case exists against respondent for illgotten and unexplained wealth in the amount of P2,974,134.00 and $50,000 US Dollars.
V. RECOMMENDATION:

Wherefore it is recommended that Maj. Gen. Josephus Q. Ramas (ret.) be prosecuted and tried
for violation of RA 3019, as amended, otherwise known as Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
and RA 1379, as amended, otherwise known as The Act for the Forfeiture of Unlawfully
Acquired Property.133[3]
Thus, on 1 August 1987, the PCGG filed a petition for forfeiture under Republic Act No. 1379
(RA No. 1379) 134[4] against Ramas.
Before Ramas could answer the petition, then Solicitor General Francisco I. Chavez filed an
Amended Complaint naming the Republic of the Philippines (petitioner), represented by the
PCGG, as plaintiff and Ramas as defendant. The Amended Complaint also impleaded Elizabeth
Dimaano (Dimaano) as co-defendant.
The Amended Complaint alleged that Ramas was the Commanding General of the Philippine
Army until 1986. On the other hand, Dimaano was a confidential agent of the Military Security
Unit, Philippine Army, assigned as a clerk-typist at the office of Ramas from 1 January 1978 to
February 1979. The Amended Complaint further alleged that Ramas acquired funds, assets and
properties manifestly out of proportion to his salary as an army officer and his other income from
legitimately acquired property by taking undue advantage of his public office and/or using his
power, authority and influence as such officer of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and as a
subordinate and close associate of the deposed President Ferdinand Marcos.135[5]
The Amended Complaint also alleged that the AFP Board, after a previous inquiry, found
reasonable ground to believe that respondents have violated RA No. 1379.136[6] The Amended
Complaint prayed for, among others, the forfeiture of respondents properties, funds and
equipment in favor of the State.
Ramas filed an Answer with Special and/or Affirmative Defenses and Compulsory Counterclaim
to the Amended Complaint. In his Answer, Ramas contended that his property consisted only of a
residential house at La Vista Subdivision, Quezon City, valued at P700,000, which was not out of
proportion to his salary and other legitimate income. He denied ownership of any mansion in
Cebu City and the cash, communications equipment and other items confiscated from the house
of Dimaano.
Dimaano filed her own Answer to the Amended Complaint. Admitting her employment as a
clerk-typist in the office of Ramas from January-November 1978 only, Dimaano claimed
133
134
135
136

ownership of the monies, communications equipment, jewelry and land titles taken from her
house by the Philippine Constabulary raiding team.
After termination of the pre-trial,137[7] the court set the case for trial on the merits on 9-11
November 1988.
On 9 November 1988, petitioner asked for a deferment of the hearing due to its lack of
preparation for trial and the absence of witnesses and vital documents to support its case. The
court reset the hearing to 17 and 18 April 1989.
On 13 April 1989, petitioner filed a motion for leave to amend the complaint in order to charge
the delinquent properties with being subject to forfeiture as having been unlawfully acquired by
defendant Dimaano alone x x x.138[8]
Nevertheless, in an order dated 17 April 1989, the Sandiganbayan proceeded with petitioners
presentation of evidence on the ground that the motion for leave to amend complaint did not state
when petitioner would file the amended complaint. The Sandiganbayan further stated that the
subject matter of the amended complaint was on its face vague and not related to the existing
complaint. The Sandiganbayan also held that due to the time that the case had been pending in
court, petitioner should proceed to present its evidence.
After presenting only three witnesses, petitioner asked for a postponement of the trial.
On 28 September 1989, during the continuation of the trial, petitioner manifested its inability to
proceed to trial because of the absence of other witnesses or lack of further evidence to present.
Instead, petitioner reiterated its motion to amend the complaint to conform to the evidence
already presented or to change the averments to show that Dimaano alone unlawfully acquired
the monies or properties subject of the forfeiture.
The Sandiganbayan noted that petitioner had already delayed the case for over a year mainly
because of its many postponements. Moreover, petitioner would want the case to revert to its
preliminary stage when in fact the case had long been ready for trial. The Sandiganbayan ordered
petitioner to prepare for presentation of its additional evidence, if any.
During the trial on 23 March 1990, petitioner again admitted its inability to present further
evidence. Giving petitioner one more chance to present further evidence or to amend the
complaint to conform to its evidence, the Sandiganbayan reset the trial to 18 May 1990. The
Sandiganbayan, however, hinted that the re-setting was without prejudice to any action that
private respondents might take under the circumstances.
However, on 18 May 1990, petitioner again expressed its inability to proceed to trial because it
had no further evidence to present. Again, in the interest of justice, the Sandiganbayan granted
137
138

petitioner 60 days within which to file an appropriate pleading. The Sandiganbayan, however,
warned petitioner that failure to act would constrain the court to take drastic action.
Private respondents then filed their motions to dismiss based on Republic v. Migrino.139[9] The
Court held in Migrino that the PCGG does not have jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute
military officers by reason of mere position held without a showing that they are subordinates of
former President Marcos.
On 18 November 1991, the Sandiganbayan rendered a resolution, the dispositive portion of
which states:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the Amended Complaint, without
pronouncement as to costs. The counterclaims are likewise dismissed for lack of merit, but the
confiscated sum of money, communications equipment, jewelry and land titles are ordered
returned to Elizabeth Dimaano.
The records of this case are hereby remanded and referred to the Hon. Ombudsman, who has
primary jurisdiction over the forfeiture cases under R.A. No. 1379, for such appropriate action as
the evidence warrants. This case is also referred to the Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue for a determination of any tax liability of respondent Elizabeth Dimaano in connection
herewith.
SO ORDERED.
On 4 December 1991, petitioner filed its Motion for Reconsideration.
In answer to the Motion for Reconsideration, private respondents filed a Joint
Comment/Opposition to which petitioner filed its Reply on 10 January 1992.
On 25 March 1992, the Sandiganbayan rendered a Resolution denying the Motion for
Reconsideration.
Ruling of the Sandiganbayan
The Sandiganbayan dismissed the Amended Complaint on the following grounds:
(1.)The actions taken by the PCGG are not in accordance with the rulings of the Supreme
Court in Cruz, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan140[10] and Republic v. Migrino141[11] which
involve the same issues.
139
140
141

(2.)No previous inquiry similar to preliminary investigations in criminal cases was


conducted against Ramas and Dimaano.
(3.)

The evidence adduced against Ramas does not constitute a prima facie case against
him.

(4.)

There was an illegal search and seizure of the items confiscated.

The Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues:
A.

RESPONDENT COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN CONCLUDING


THAT PETITIONERS EVIDENCE CANNOT MAKE A CASE FOR
FORFEITURE AND THAT THERE WAS NO SHOWING OF
CONSPIRACY, COLLUSION OR RELATIONSHIP BY
CONSANGUINITY OR AFFINITY BY AND BETWEEN
RESPONDENT RAMAS AND RESPONDENT DIMAANO
NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT SUCH CONCLUSIONS
WERE CLEARLY UNFOUNDED AND PREMATURE, HAVING BEEN
RENDERED PRIOR TO THE COMPLETION OF THE
PRESENTATION OF THE EVIDENCE OF THE PETITIONER.

B.

RESPONDENT COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT


THE ACTIONS TAKEN BY THE PETITIONER, INCLUDING THE
FILING OF THE ORIGINAL COMPLAINT AND THE AMENDED
COMPLAINT, SHOULD BE STRUCK OUT IN LINE WITH THE
RULINGS OF THE SUPREME COURT IN CRUZ, JR. v.
SANDIGANBAYAN, 194 SCRA 474 AND REPUBLIC v. MIGRINO,
189 SCRA 289, NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT:

C.

1.

The cases of Cruz, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, supra, and Republic v.


Migrino, supra, are clearly not applicable to this case;

2.

Any procedural defect in the institution of the complaint in Civil


Case No. 0037 was cured and/or waived by respondents with the
filing of their respective answers with counterclaim; and

3.

The separate motions to dismiss were evidently improper


considering that they were filed after commencement of the
presentation of the evidence of the petitioner and even before the
latter was allowed to formally offer its evidence and rest its case;

RESPONDENT COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT


THE ARTICLES AND THINGS SUCH AS SUMS OF MONEY,
COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT, JEWELRY AND LAND TITLES

CONFISCATED FROM THE HOUSE OF RESPONDENT DIMAANO


WERE ILLEGALLY SEIZED AND THEREFORE EXCLUDED AS
EVIDENCE.142[12]
The Courts Ruling
First Issue: PCGGs Jurisdiction to Investigate Private Respondents
This case involves a revisiting of an old issue already decided by this Court in Cruz, Jr. v.
Sandiganbayan143[13] and Republic v. Migrino.144[14]
The primary issue for resolution is whether the PCGG has the jurisdiction to investigate and
cause the filing of a forfeiture petition against Ramas and Dimaano for unexplained wealth under
RA No. 1379.
We hold that PCGG has no such jurisdiction.
The PCGG created the AFP Board to investigate the unexplained wealth and corrupt practices of
AFP personnel, whether in the active service or retired.145[15] The PCGG tasked the AFP Board to
make the necessary recommendations to appropriate government agencies on the action to be
taken based on its findings.146[16] The PCGG gave this task to the AFP Board pursuant to the
PCGGs power under Section 3 of EO No. 1 to conduct investigation as may be necessary in
order to accomplish and to carry out the purposes of this order. EO No. 1 gave the PCGG
specific responsibilities, to wit:
SEC. 2. The Commission shall be charged with the task of assisting the President in regard to the
following matters:
(a)The recovery of all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by former President Ferdinand E.
Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates,
whether located in the Philippines or abroad, including the takeover and
sequestration of all business enterprises and entities owned or controlled by
them, during his administration, directly or through nominees, by taking undue
142
143
144
145
146

advantage of their public office and/ or using their powers, authority, influence,
connections or relationship.
(b)

The investigation of such cases of graft and corruption as the President may
assign to the Commission from time to time.

x x x.
The PCGG, through the AFP Board, can only investigate the unexplained wealth and corrupt
practices of AFP personnel who fall under either of the two categories mentioned in Section 2 of
EO No. 1. These are: (1) AFP personnel who have accumulated ill-gotten wealth during the
administration of former President Marcos by being the latters immediate family, relative,
subordinate or close associate, taking undue advantage of their public office or using their
powers, influence x x x;147[17] or (2) AFP personnel involved in other cases of graft and
corruption provided the President assigns their cases to the PCGG.148[18]
Petitioner, however, does not claim that the President assigned Ramas case to the PCGG.
Therefore, Ramas case should fall under the first category of AFP personnel before the PCGG
could exercise its jurisdiction over him. Petitioner argues that Ramas was undoubtedly a
subordinate of former President Marcos because of his position as the Commanding General of
the Philippine Army. Petitioner claims that Ramas position enabled him to receive orders directly
from his commander-in-chief, undeniably making him a subordinate of former President Marcos.
We hold that Ramas was not a subordinate of former President Marcos in the sense contemplated
under EO No. 1 and its amendments.
Mere position held by a military officer does not automatically make him a subordinate as this
term is used in EO Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A absent a showing that he enjoyed close association
with former President Marcos. Migrino discussed this issue in this wise:
A close reading of EO No. 1 and related executive orders will readily show what is contemplated
within the term subordinate. The Whereas Clauses of EO No. 1 express the urgent need to
recover the ill-gotten wealth amassed by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate
family, relatives, and close associates both here and abroad.
EO No. 2 freezes all assets and properties in the Philippines in which former President Marcos
and/or his wife, Mrs. Imelda Marcos, their close relatives, subordinates, business associates,
dummies, agents, or nominees have any interest or participation.
Applying the rule in statutory construction known as ejusdem generis that is-

147
148

[W]here general words follow an enumeration of persons or things by words of a particular and
specific meaning, such general words are not to be construed in their widest extent, but are to be
held as applying only to persons or things of the same kind or class as those specifically
mentioned [Smith, Bell & Co, Ltd. vs. Register of Deeds of Davao, 96 Phil. 53, 58, citing Black
on Interpretation of Laws, 2nd Ed., 203].
[T]he term subordinate as used in EO Nos. 1 & 2 refers to one who enjoys a close association
with former President Marcos and/or his wife, similar to the immediate family member, relative,
and close associate in EO No. 1 and the close relative, business associate, dummy, agent, or
nominee in EO No. 2.
xxx
It does not suffice, as in this case, that the respondent is or was a government official or
employee during the administration of former President Marcos. There must be a prima facie
showing that the respondent unlawfully accumulated wealth by virtue of his close association
or relation with former Pres. Marcos and/or his wife. (Emphasis supplied)
Ramas position alone as Commanding General of the Philippine Army with the rank of Major
General149[19] does not suffice to make him a subordinate of former President Marcos for
purposes of EO No. 1 and its amendments. The PCGG has to provide a prima facie showing that
Ramas was a close associate of former President Marcos, in the same manner that business
associates, dummies, agents or nominees of former President Marcos were close to him. Such
close association is manifested either by Ramas complicity with former President Marcos in the
accumulation of ill-gotten wealth by the deposed President or by former President Marcos
acquiescence in Ramas own accumulation of ill-gotten wealth if any.
This, the PCGG failed to do.
Petitioners attempt to differentiate the instant case from Migrino does not convince us. Petitioner
argues that unlike in Migrino, the AFP Board Resolution in the instant case states that the AFP
Board conducted the investigation pursuant to EO Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A in relation to RA No.
1379. Petitioner asserts that there is a presumption that the PCGG was acting within its
jurisdiction of investigating crony-related cases of graft and corruption and that Ramas was truly
a subordinate of the former President. However, the same AFP Board Resolution belies this
contention. Although the Resolution begins with such statement, it ends with the following
recommendation:
V. RECOMMENDATION:
Wherefore it is recommended that Maj. Gen. Josephus Q. Ramas (ret.) be prosecuted and tried
for violation of RA 3019, as amended, otherwise known as Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act

149

and RA 1379, as amended, otherwise known as The Act for the Forfeiture of Unlawfully
Acquired Property.150[20]
Thus, although the PCGG sought to investigate and prosecute private respondents under EO Nos.
1, 2, 14 and 14-A, the result yielded a finding of violation of Republic Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379
without any relation to EO Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A. This absence of relation to EO No. 1 and its
amendments proves fatal to petitioners case. EO No. 1 created the PCGG for a specific and
limited purpose, and necessarily its powers must be construed to address such specific and
limited purpose.
Moreover, the resolution of the AFP Board and even the Amended Complaint do not show that
the properties Ramas allegedly owned were accumulated by him in his capacity as a subordinate
of his commander-in-chief. Petitioner merely enumerated the properties Ramas allegedly owned
and suggested that these properties were disproportionate to his salary and other legitimate
income without showing that Ramas amassed them because of his close association with former
President Marcos. Petitioner, in fact, admits that the AFP Board resolution does not contain a
finding that Ramas accumulated his wealth because of his close association with former
President Marcos, thus:
10. While it is true that the resolution of the Anti-Graft Board of the New Armed Forces of
the Philippines did not categorically find a prima facie evidence showing that respondent
Ramas unlawfully accumulated wealth by virtue of his close association or relation with
former President Marcos and/or his wife, it is submitted that such omission was not fatal.
The resolution of the Anti-Graft Board should be read in the context of the law creating the same
and the objective of the investigation which was, as stated in the above, pursuant to Republic Act
Nos. 3019 and 1379 in relation to Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-a;151[21] (Emphasis
supplied)
Such omission is fatal. Petitioner forgets that it is precisely a prima facie showing that the illgotten wealth was accumulated by a subordinate of former President Marcos that vests
jurisdiction on PCGG. EO No. 1152[22] clearly premises the creation of the PCGG on the urgent
need to recover all ill-gotten wealth amassed by former President Marcos, his immediate family,
relatives, subordinates and close associates. Therefore, to say that such omission was not fatal is
clearly contrary to the intent behind the creation of the PCGG.

150
151
152

In Cruz, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan,153[23] the Court outlined the cases that fall under the jurisdiction
of the PCGG pursuant to EO Nos. 1, 2,154[24] 14,155[25] 14-A:156[26]
A careful reading of Sections 2(a) and 3 of Executive Order No. 1 in relation with Sections 1, 2
and 3 of Executive Order No. 14, shows what the authority of the respondent PCGG to
investigate and prosecute covers:
(a)the investigation and prosecution of the civil action for the recovery of ill-gotten
wealth under Republic Act No. 1379, accumulated by former President
Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates,
whether located in the Philippines or abroad, including the take-over or
sequestration of all business enterprises and entities owned or controlled by them,
during his administration, directly or through his nominees, by taking undue
advantage of their public office and/or using their powers, authority and
influence, connections or relationships; and
(b)

the investigation and prosecution of such offenses committed in the acquisition of


said ill-gotten wealth as contemplated under Section 2(a) of Executive Order No.
1.

However, other violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act not otherwise falling
under the foregoing categories, require a previous authority of the President for the
respondent PCGG to investigate and prosecute in accordance with Section 2 (b) of
Executive Order No. 1. Otherwise, jurisdiction over such cases is vested in the Ombudsman
and other duly authorized investigating agencies such as the provincial and city
prosecutors, their assistants, the Chief State Prosecutor and his assistants and the state
prosecutors. (Emphasis supplied)
The proper government agencies, and not the PCGG, should investigate and prosecute forfeiture
petitions not falling under EO No. 1 and its amendments. The preliminary investigation of
unexplained wealth amassed on or before 25 February 1986 falls under the jurisdiction of the
Ombudsman, while the authority to file the corresponding forfeiture petition rests with the
Solicitor General.157[27] The Ombudsman Act or Republic Act No. 6770 (RA No. 6770) vests in

153
154
155
156
157

the Ombudsman the power to conduct preliminary investigation and to file forfeiture proceedings
involving unexplained wealth amassed after 25 February 1986.158[28]
After the pronouncements of the Court in Cruz, the PCGG still pursued this case despite the
absence of a prima facie finding that Ramas was a subordinate of former President Marcos. The
petition for forfeiture filed with the Sandiganbayan should be dismissed for lack of authority by
the PCGG to investigate respondents since there is no prima facie showing that EO No. 1 and its
amendments apply to respondents. The AFP Board Resolution and even the Amended Complaint
state that there are violations of RA Nos. 3019 and 1379. Thus, the PCGG should have
recommended Ramas case to the Ombudsman who has jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary
investigation of ordinary unexplained wealth and graft cases. As stated in Migrino:
[But] in view of the patent lack of authority of the PCGG to investigate and cause the
prosecution of private respondent for violation of Rep. Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379, the PCGG must
also be enjoined from proceeding with the case, without prejudice to any action that may be
taken by the proper prosecutory agency. The rule of law mandates that an agency of government
be allowed to exercise only the powers granted to it.
Petitioners argument that private respondents have waived any defect in the filing of the
forfeiture petition by submitting their respective Answers with counterclaim deserves no merit as
well.
Petitioner has no jurisdiction over private respondents. Thus, there is no jurisdiction to waive in
the first place. The PCGG cannot exercise investigative or prosecutorial powers never granted to
it. PCGGs powers are specific and limited. Unless given additional assignment by the President,
PCGGs sole task is only to recover the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses, their relatives and
cronies.159[29] Without these elements, the PCGG cannot claim jurisdiction over a case.
Private respondents questioned the authority and jurisdiction of the PCGG to investigate and
prosecute their cases by filing their Motion to Dismiss as soon as they learned of the
pronouncement of the Court in Migrino. This case was decided on 30 August 1990, which
explains why private respondents only filed their Motion to Dismiss on 8 October 1990.
Nevertheless, we have held that the parties may raise lack of jurisdiction at any stage of the
proceeding.160[30] Thus, we hold that there was no waiver of jurisdiction in this case. Jurisdiction
is vested by law and not by the parties to an action.161[31]

158
159
160
161

Consequently, the petition should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction by the PCGG to conduct
the preliminary investigation. The Ombudsman may still conduct the proper preliminary
investigation for violation of RA No. 1379, and if warranted, the Solicitor General may file the
forfeiture petition with the Sandiganbayan.162[32] The right of the State to forfeit unexplained
wealth under RA No. 1379 is not subject to prescription, laches or estoppel.163[33]
Second Issue: Propriety of Dismissal of Case
Before Completion of Presentation of Evidence
Petitioner also contends that the Sandiganbayan erred in dismissing the case before completion
of the presentation of petitioners evidence.
We disagree.
Based on the findings of the Sandiganbayan and the records of this case, we find that petitioner
has only itself to blame for non-completion of the presentation of its evidence. First, this case has
been pending for four years before the Sandiganbayan dismissed it. Petitioner filed its Amended
Complaint on 11 August 1987, and only began to present its evidence on 17 April 1989.
Petitioner had almost two years to prepare its evidence. However, despite this sufficient time,
petitioner still delayed the presentation of the rest of its evidence by filing numerous motions for
postponements and extensions. Even before the date set for the presentation of its evidence,
petitioner filed, on 13 April 1989, a Motion for Leave to Amend the Complaint.164[34] The motion
sought to charge the delinquent properties (which comprise most of petitioners evidence) with
being subject to forfeiture as having been unlawfully acquired by defendant Dimaano alone x x
x.
The Sandiganbayan, however, refused to defer the presentation of petitioners evidence since
petitioner did not state when it would file the amended complaint. On 18 April 1989, the
Sandiganbayan set the continuation of the presentation of evidence on 28-29 September and 9-11
October 1989, giving petitioner ample time to prepare its evidence. Still, on 28 September 1989,
petitioner manifested its inability to proceed with the presentation of its evidence. The
Sandiganbayan issued an Order expressing its view on the matter, to wit:
The Court has gone through extended inquiry and a narration of the above events because this
case has been ready for trial for over a year and much of the delay hereon has been due to the
inability of the government to produce on scheduled dates for pre-trial and for trial documents
and witnesses, allegedly upon the failure of the military to supply them for the preparation of the
presentation of evidence thereon. Of equal interest is the fact that this Court has been held to task
in public about its alleged failure to move cases such as this one beyond the preliminary stage,
162
163
164

when, in view of the developments such as those of today, this Court is now faced with a
situation where a case already in progress will revert back to the preliminary stage, despite a
five-month pause where appropriate action could have been undertaken by the plaintiff
Republic.165[35]
On 9 October 1989, the PCGG manifested in court that it was conducting a preliminary
investigation on the unexplained wealth of private respondents as mandated by RA No. 1379.166
[36] The PCGG prayed for an additional four months to conduct the preliminary investigation.
The Sandiganbayan granted this request and scheduled the presentation of evidence on 26-29
March 1990. However, on the scheduled date, petitioner failed to inform the court of the result of
the preliminary investigation the PCGG supposedly conducted. Again, the Sandiganbayan gave
petitioner until 18 May 1990 to continue with the presentation of its evidence and to inform the
court of what lies ahead insofar as the status of the case is concerned x x x.167[37] Still on the date
set, petitioner failed to present its evidence. Finally, on 11 July 1990, petitioner filed its ReAmended Complaint.168[38] The Sandiganbayan correctly observed that a case already pending for
years would revert to its preliminary stage if the court were to accept the Re-Amended
Complaint.
Based on these circumstances, obviously petitioner has only itself to blame for failure to
complete the presentation of its evidence. The Sandiganbayan gave petitioner more than
sufficient time to finish the presentation of its evidence. The Sandiganbayan overlooked
petitioners delays and yet petitioner ended the long-string of delays with the filing of a ReAmended Complaint, which would only prolong even more the disposition of the case.
Moreover, the pronouncements of the Court in Migrino and Cruz prompted the Sandiganbayan
to dismiss the case since the PCGG has no jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute the case
against private respondents. This alone would have been sufficient legal basis for the
Sandiganbayan to dismiss the forfeiture case against private respondents.
Thus, we hold that the Sandiganbayan did not err in dismissing the case before completion of the
presentation of petitioners evidence.
Third Issue: Legality of the Search and Seizure
Petitioner claims that the Sandiganbayan erred in declaring the properties confiscated from
Dimaanos house as illegally seized and therefore inadmissible in evidence. This issue bears a
significant effect on petitioners case since these properties comprise most of petitioners evidence
165
166
167
168

against private respondents. Petitioner will not have much evidence to support its case against
private respondents if these properties are inadmissible in evidence.
On 3 March 1986, the Constabulary raiding team served at Dimaanos residence a search warrant
captioned Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition. Dimaano was not present during the
raid but Dimaanos cousins witnessed the raid. The raiding team seized the items detailed in the
seizure receipt together with other items not included in the search warrant. The raiding team
seized these items: one baby armalite rifle with two magazines; 40 rounds of 5.56 ammunition;
one pistol, caliber .45; communications equipment, cash consisting of P2,870,000 and
US$50,000, jewelry, and land titles.
Petitioner wants the Court to take judicial notice that the raiding team conducted the search and
seizure on March 3, 1986 or five days after the successful EDSA revolution.169[39] Petitioner
argues that a revolutionary government was operative at that time by virtue of Proclamation No.
1 announcing that President Aquino and Vice President Laurel were taking power in the name
and by the will of the Filipino people.170[40] Petitioner asserts that the revolutionary government
effectively withheld the operation of the 1973 Constitution which guaranteed private respondents
exclusionary right.
Moreover, petitioner argues that the exclusionary right arising from an illegal search applies only
beginning 2 February 1987, the date of ratification of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioner contends
that all rights under the Bill of Rights had already reverted to its embryonic stage at the time of
the search. Therefore, the government may confiscate the monies and items taken from Dimaano
and use the same in evidence against her since at the time of their seizure, private respondents
did not enjoy any constitutional right.
Petitioner is partly right in its arguments.
The EDSA Revolution took place on 23-25 February 1986. As succinctly stated in President
Aquinos Proclamation No. 3 dated 25 March 1986, the EDSA Revolution was done in defiance
of the provisions of the 1973 Constitution.171[41] The resulting government was indisputably a
revolutionary government bound by no constitution or legal limitations except treaty obligations
that the revolutionary government, as the de jure government in the Philippines, assumed under
international law.
The correct issues are: (1) whether the revolutionary government was bound by the Bill of Rights
of the 1973 Constitution during the interregnum, that is, after the actual and effective take-over
of power by the revolutionary government following the cessation of resistance by loyalist forces
up to 24 March 1986 (immediately before the adoption of the Provisional Constitution); and (2)
169
170
171

whether the protection accorded to individuals under the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (Covenant) and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Declaration)
remained in effect during the interregnum.
We hold that the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution was not operative during the
interregnum. However, we rule that the protection accorded to individuals under the Covenant
and the Declaration remained in effect during the interregnum.
During the interregnum, the directives and orders of the revolutionary government were the
supreme law because no constitution limited the extent and scope of such directives and orders.
With the abrogation of the 1973 Constitution by the successful revolution, there was no
municipal law higher than the directives and orders of the revolutionary government. Thus,
during the interregnum, a person could not invoke any exclusionary right under a Bill of Rights
because there was neither a constitution nor a Bill of Rights during the interregnum. As the Court
explained in Letter of Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno:172[42]
A revolution has been defined as the complete overthrow of the established government in any
country or state by those who were previously subject to it or as a sudden, radical and
fundamental change in the government or political system, usually effected with violence or at
least some acts of violence. In Kelsen's book, General Theory of Law and State, it is defined as
that which occurs whenever the legal order of a community is nullified and replaced by a new
order . . . a way not prescribed by the first order itself.
It was through the February 1986 revolution, a relatively peaceful one, and more popularly
known as the people power revolution that the Filipino people tore themselves away from an
existing regime. This revolution also saw the unprecedented rise to power of the Aquino
government.
From the natural law point of view, the right of revolution has been defined as an inherent right
of a people to cast out their rulers, change their policy or effect radical reforms in their system of
government or institutions by force or a general uprising when the legal and constitutional
methods of making such change have proved inadequate or are so obstructed as to be
unavailable. It has been said that the locus of positive law-making power lies with the people of
the state and from there is derived the right of the people to abolish, to reform and to alter any
existing form of government without regard to the existing constitution.
xxx
It is widely known that Mrs. Aquinos rise to the presidency was not due to constitutional
processes; in fact, it was achieved in violation of the provisions of the 1973 Constitution as a
Batasang Pambansa resolution had earlier declared Mr. Marcos as the winner in the 1986
presidential election. Thus it can be said that the organization of Mrs. Aquinos Government
which was met by little resistance and her control of the state evidenced by the appointment of
the Cabinet and other key officers of the administration, the departure of the Marcos Cabinet
172

officials, revamp of the Judiciary and the Military signaled the point where the legal system then
in effect, had ceased to be obeyed by the Filipino. (Emphasis supplied)
To hold that the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution remained operative during the
interregnum would render void all sequestration orders issued by the Philippine Commission on
Good Government (PCGG) before the adoption of the Freedom Constitution. The sequestration
orders, which direct the freezing and even the take-over of private property by mere executive
issuance without judicial action, would violate the due process and search and seizure clauses of
the Bill of Rights.
During the interregnum, the government in power was concededly a revolutionary government
bound by no constitution. No one could validly question the sequestration orders as violative of
the Bill of Rights because there was no Bill of Rights during the interregnum. However, upon the
adoption of the Freedom Constitution, the sequestered companies assailed the sequestration
orders as contrary to the Bill of Rights of the Freedom Constitution.
In Bataan Shipyard & Engineering Co. Inc. vs. Presidential Commission on Good
Government,173[43] petitioner Baseco, while conceding there was no Bill of Rights during the
interregnum, questioned the continued validity of the sequestration orders upon adoption of the
Freedom Constitution in view of the due process clause in its Bill of Rights. The Court ruled that
the Freedom Constitution, and later the 1987 Constitution, expressly recognized the validity of
sequestration orders, thus:
If any doubt should still persist in the face of the foregoing considerations as to the validity and
propriety of sequestration, freeze and takeover orders, it should be dispelled by the fact that these
particular remedies and the authority of the PCGG to issue them have received constitutional
approbation and sanction. As already mentioned, the Provisional or Freedom Constitution
recognizes the power and duty of the President to enact measures to achieve the mandate of the
people to . . . (r)ecover ill-gotten properties amassed by the leaders and supporters of the
previous regime and protect the interest of the people through orders of sequestration or freezing
of assets or accounts. And as also already adverted to, Section 26, Article XVIII of the 1987
Constitution treats of, and ratifies the authority to issue sequestration or freeze orders under
Proclamation No. 3 dated March 25, 1986.
The framers of both the Freedom Constitution and the 1987 Constitution were fully aware that
the sequestration orders would clash with the Bill of Rights. Thus, the framers of both
constitutions had to include specific language recognizing the validity of the sequestration
orders. The following discourse by Commissioner Joaquin G. Bernas during the deliberations of
the Constitutional Commission is instructive:
FR. BERNAS: Madam President, there is something schizophrenic about the arguments in
defense of the present amendment.
For instance, I have carefully studied Minister Salongas lecture in the Gregorio Araneta
University Foundation, of which all of us have been given a copy. On the one hand, he
173

argues that everything the Commission is doing is traditionally legal. This is repeated by
Commissioner Romulo also. Minister Salonga spends a major portion of his lecture
developing that argument. On the other hand, almost as an afterthought, he says that in
the end what matters are the results and not the legal niceties, thus suggesting that the
PCGG should be allowed to make some legal shortcuts, another word for niceties or
exceptions.
Now, if everything the PCGG is doing is legal, why is it asking the CONCOM for
special protection? The answer is clear. What they are doing will not stand the test of
ordinary due process, hence they are asking for protection, for exceptions. Grandes
malos, grandes remedios, fine, as the saying stands, but let us not say grandes malos,
grande y malos remedios. That is not an allowable extrapolation. Hence, we should not
give the exceptions asked for, and let me elaborate and give three reasons:
First, the whole point of the February Revolution and of the work of the CONCOM is to
hasten constitutional normalization. Very much at the heart of the constitutional
normalization is the full effectivity of the Bill of Rights. We cannot, in one breath, ask
for constitutional normalization and at the same time ask for a temporary halt to the full
functioning of what is at the heart of constitutionalism. That would be hypocritical; that
would be a repetition of Marcosian protestation of due process and rule of law. The
New Society word for that is backsliding. It is tragic when we begin to backslide even
before we get there.
Second, this is really a corollary of the first. Habits tend to become ingrained. The
committee report asks for extraordinary exceptions from the Bill of Rights for six
months after the convening of Congress, and Congress may even extend this longer.
Good deeds repeated ripen into virtue; bad deeds repeated become vice. What the
committee report is asking for is that we should allow the new government to acquire
the vice of disregarding the Bill of Rights.
Vices, once they become ingrained, become difficult to shed. The practitioners of the
vice begin to think that they have a vested right to its practice, and they will fight tooth
and nail to keep the franchise. That would be an unhealthy way of consolidating the
gains of a democratic revolution.
Third, the argument that what matters are the results and not the legal niceties is an
argument that is very disturbing. When it comes from a staunch Christian like
Commissioner Salonga, a Minister, and repeated verbatim by another staunch Christian
like Commissioner Tingson, it becomes doubly disturbing and even discombobulating.
The argument makes the PCGG an auctioneer, placing the Bill of Rights on the auction
block. If the price is right, the search and seizure clause will be sold. Open your Swiss
bank account to us and we will award you the search and seizure clause. You can keep it
in your private safe.
Alternatively, the argument looks on the present government as hostage to the hoarders
of hidden wealth. The hoarders will release the hidden health if the ransom price is paid
and the ransom price is the Bill of Rights, specifically the due process in the search and
seizure clauses. So, there is something positively revolving about either argument. The
Bill of Rights is not for sale to the highest bidder nor can it be used to ransom captive
dollars. This nation will survive and grow strong, only if it would become convinced of
the values enshrined in the Constitution of a price that is beyond monetary estimation.

For these reasons, the honorable course for the Constitutional Commission is to delete
all of Section 8 of the committee report and allow the new Constitution to take effect in
full vigor. If Section 8 is deleted, the PCGG has two options. First, it can pursue the
Salonga and the Romulo argument that what the PCGG has been doing has been
completely within the pale of the law. If sustained, the PCGG can go on and should be
able to go on, even without the support of Section 8. If not sustained, however, the
PCGG has only one honorable option, it must bow to the majesty of the Bill of Rights.
The PCGG extrapolation of the law is defended by staunch Christians. Let me conclude
with what another Christian replied when asked to toy around with the law. From his
prison cell, Thomas More said, "I'll give the devil benefit of law for my nations safety
sake. I ask the Commission to give the devil benefit of law for our nations sake. And we
should delete Section 8.
Thank you, Madam President. (Emphasis supplied)
Despite the impassioned plea by Commissioner Bernas against the amendment excepting
sequestration orders from the Bill of Rights, the Constitutional Commission still adopted the
amendment as Section 26,174[44] Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution. The framers of the
Constitution were fully aware that absent Section 26, sequestration orders would not stand the
test of due process under the Bill of Rights.
Thus, to rule that the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution remained in force during the
interregnum, absent a constitutional provision excepting sequestration orders from such Bill of
Rights, would clearly render all sequestration orders void during the interregnum. Nevertheless,
even during the interregnum the Filipino people continued to enjoy, under the Covenant and the
Declaration, almost the same rights found in the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution.
The revolutionary government, after installing itself as the de jure government, assumed
responsibility for the States good faith compliance with the Covenant to which the Philippines is
a signatory. Article 2(1) of the Covenant requires each signatory State to respect and to ensure to
all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights175[45] recognized in the
present Covenant. Under Article 17(1) of the Covenant, the revolutionary government had the
duty to insure that [n]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his
privacy, family, home or correspondence.
The Declaration, to which the Philippines is also a signatory, provides in its Article 17(2) that
[n]o one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property. Although the signatories to the Declaration
did not intend it as a legally binding document, being only a declaration, the Court has
interpreted the Declaration as part of the generally accepted principles of international law and

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binding on the State.176[46] Thus, the revolutionary government was also obligated under
international law to observe the rights177[47] of individuals under the Declaration.
The revolutionary government did not repudiate the Covenant or the Declaration during the
interregnum. Whether the revolutionary government could have repudiated all its obligations
under the Covenant or the Declaration is another matter and is not the issue here. Suffice it to say
that the Court considers the Declaration as part of customary international law, and that Filipinos
as human beings are proper subjects of the rules of international law laid down in the Covenant.
The fact is the revolutionary government did not repudiate the Covenant or the Declaration in the
same way it repudiated the 1973 Constitution. As the de jure government, the revolutionary
government could not escape responsibility for the States good faith compliance with its treaty
obligations under international law.
It was only upon the adoption of the Provisional Constitution on 25 March 1986 that the
directives and orders of the revolutionary government became subject to a higher municipal law
that, if contravened, rendered such directives and orders void. The Provisional Constitution
adopted verbatim the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution.178[48] The Provisional Constitution
served as a self-limitation by the revolutionary government to avoid abuses of the absolute
powers entrusted to it by the people.
During the interregnum when no constitution or Bill of Rights existed, directives and orders
issued by government officers were valid so long as these officers did not exceed the authority
granted them by the revolutionary government. The directives and orders should not have also
violated the Covenant or the Declaration. In this case, the revolutionary government
presumptively sanctioned the warrant since the revolutionary government did not repudiate it.
The warrant, issued by a judge upon proper application, specified the items to be searched and
seized. The warrant is thus valid with respect to the items specifically described in the warrant.
However, the Constabulary raiding team seized items not included in the warrant. As admitted by
petitioners witnesses, the raiding team confiscated items not included in the warrant, thus:
Direct Examination of Capt. Rodolfo Sebastian
AJ AMORES
Q.According to the search warrant, you are supposed to seize only for weapons. What
else, aside from the weapons, were seized from the house of Miss Elizabeth
Dimaano?

176
177
178

A.

The communications equipment, money in Philippine currency and US dollars,


some jewelries, land titles, sir.

Q.

Now, the search warrant speaks only of weapons to be seized from the house
of Elizabeth Dimaano. Do you know the reason why your team also seized
other properties not mentioned in said search warrant?
During the conversation right after the conduct of said raid, I was informed
that the reason why they also brought the other items not included in the
search warrant was because the money and other jewelries were contained in
attach cases and cartons with markings Sony Trinitron, and I think three (3)
vaults or steel safes. Believing that the attach cases and the steel safes were
containing firearms, they forced open these containers only to find out that
they contained money.

A.

xxx
Q.
A.

You said you found money instead of weapons, do you know the reason why
your team seized this money instead of weapons?
I think the overall team leader and the other two officers assisting him
decided to bring along also the money because at that time it was already
dark and they felt most secured if they will bring that because they might be
suspected also of taking money out of those items, your Honor.179[49]

Cross-examination
Atty. Banaag

A.

Q.Were you present when the search warrant in connection with this case was
applied before the Municipal Trial Court of Batangas, Branch 1?
Yes, sir.
Q.

A.

And the search warrant applied for by you was for the search and seizure of
five (5) baby armalite rifles M-16 and five (5) boxes of ammunition?
Yes, sir.

xxx
AJ AMORES
Q.
A.
Q.
179

Before you applied for a search warrant, did you conduct surveillance in the
house of Miss Elizabeth Dimaano?
The Intelligence Operatives conducted surveillance together with the MSU
elements, your Honor.
And this party believed there were weapons deposited in the house of Miss
Elizabeth Dimaano?

A.

Yes, your Honor.


Q.
A.

And they so swore before the Municipal Trial Judge?


Yes, your Honor.

Q.

But they did not mention to you, the applicant for the search warrant, any
other properties or contraband which could be found in the residence of Miss
Elizabeth Dimaano?
They just gave us still unconfirmed report about some hidden items, for
instance, the communications equipment and money. However, I did not
include that in the application for search warrant considering that we have
not established concrete evidence about that. So when

A.

Q.
A.

So that when you applied for search warrant, you had reason to believe that
only weapons were in the house of Miss Elizabeth Dimaano?
Yes, your Honor.180[50]

xxx
Q.You stated that a .45 caliber pistol was seized along with one armalite rifle M-16
and how many ammunition?
A. Forty, sir.
Q.
A.

And this became the subject of your complaint with the issuing Court, with
the fiscals office who charged Elizabeth Dimaano for Illegal Possession of
Firearms and Ammunition?
Yes, sir.

Q.
A.

Do you know what happened to that case?


I think it was dismissed, sir.

Q.
A.

In the fiscals office?


Yes, sir.

Q.

Because the armalite rifle you seized, as well as the .45 caliber pistol had a
Memorandum Receipt in the name of Felino Melegrito, is that not correct?
I think that was the reason, sir.

A.
Q.
A.

xxx
180

There were other articles seized which were not included in the search
warrant, like for instance, jewelries. Why did you seize the jewelries?
I think it was the decision of the overall team leader and his assistant to bring
along also the jewelries and other items, sir. I do not really know where it was
taken but they brought along also these articles. I do not really know their
reason for bringing the same, but I just learned that these were taken because
they might get lost if they will just leave this behind.

Q.
A.

Q.
A.

How about the money seized by your raiding team, they were not also
included in the search warrant?
Yes sir, but I believe they were also taken considering that the money was
discovered to be contained in attach cases. These attach cases were suspected
to be containing pistols or other high powered firearms, but in the course of
the search the contents turned out to be money. So the team leader also
decided to take this considering that they believed that if they will just leave
the money behind, it might get lost also.
That holds true also with respect to the other articles that were seized by your
raiding team, like Transfer Certificates of Title of lands?
Yes, sir. I think they were contained in one of the vaults that were opened.181
[51]

It is obvious from the testimony of Captain Sebastian that the warrant did not include the monies,
communications equipment, jewelry and land titles that the raiding team confiscated. The search
warrant did not particularly describe these items and the raiding team confiscated them on its
own authority. The raiding team had no legal basis to seize these items without showing that
these items could be the subject of warrantless search and seizure.182[52] Clearly, the raiding team
exceeded its authority when it seized these items.
The seizure of these items was therefore void, and unless these items are contraband per se,183[53]
and they are not, they must be returned to the person from whom the raiding seized them.
However, we do not declare that such person is the lawful owner of these items, merely that the
search and seizure warrant could not be used as basis to seize and withhold these items from the
possessor. We thus hold that these items should be returned immediately to Dimaano.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. The questioned Resolutions of the
Sandiganbayan dated 18 November 1991 and 25 March 1992 in Civil Case No. 0037, remanding
the records of this case to the Ombudsman for such appropriate action as the evidence may
warrant, and referring this case to the Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue for a
determination of any tax liability of respondent Elizabeth Dimaano, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,


Appellee,
181
182
183

G.R. No. 179029

Present:

versus -

CARPIO MORALES, J., Chairperson,


BRION,
BERSAMIN,
ABAD, and

FELIMON PAGADUAN y
TAMAYO,
Appellant.

VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.

Promulgated:

August 12, 2010


x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION

BRION, J.:

We review the decision184[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CRH.C. No. 01597 which affirmed in toto the decision185[2] of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 27, Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, in Criminal Case No. 4600,
finding appellant Felimon Pagaduan y Tamayo (appellant) guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of illegal sale of shabu, under Section 5, Article II of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

BACKGROUND FACTS

The prosecution charged the appellant before the RTC with violation of Section 5,
Article II of R.A. No. 9165 under an Information that states:

That on or about December 27, 2003 at about 4:30 oclock (sic) in the
afternoon, in the Municipality of Solano, Province of Nueva Vizcaya, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, trade, dispense, deliver
and give away 0.01 gram, more or less, of methamphetamine hydrochloride
(shabu), a dangerous drug, as contained in a heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet
to PO3 Peter C. Almarez, a member of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency
(PDEA) who posed as a buyer of shabu in the amount of P200.00, to the damage
and prejudice of the Republic of the Philippines.
CONTRARY TO LAW.186[3]

184
185

The appellant pleaded not guilty on arraignment. Trial on the merits, thereafter,
followed.

The evidence for the prosecution reveals the following facts.

After having received information that the appellant was selling illegal drugs
in Nueva Vizcaya, Captain Jaime de Vera called, on his cellular phone, PO3 Peter
Almarez and SPO1 Domingo Balido who were both in Santiago City and informed
them of a planned buy-bust operation. They agreed to meet at the SSS Building
near LMN Hotel in Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya.187[4] On their arrival there,
Captain de Vera conducted a briefing and designated PO3 Almarez as the poseur
buyer. Thereafter, Captain de Vera introduced PO3 Almarez to the police informant
(tipster),188[5] and gave him (PO3 Almarez) two P100 bills (Exhibits D and E)
which the latter marked with his initials.189[6]

186
187
188
189

After this briefing, the buy-bust team went to Bintawan Road, Solano,
Nueva Vizcaya to conduct the entrapment operation. 190[7] PO3 Almarez and the
informant rode a tricycle, while Captain de Vera and SPO1 Balido followed on
board a tinted van.191[8] The buy-bust team arrived at the target area at around 4:30
p.m., and saw the appellant already waiting for the informant. The informant
approached the appellant and introduced PO3 Almarez to him as a buyer. PO3
Almarez told the appellant that he needed shabu worth P200, and inquired from
him (appellant) if he had a stock. The appellant replied in the affirmative, and then
handed one heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing white crystalline
substance to PO3 Almarez. PO3 Almarez, in turn, gave the two pre-marked P100
bills to the appellant.192[9] Immediately after, PO3 Almarez made the pre-arranged
signal to his companions, who then approached the appellant. Captain de Vera took
the marked money from the appellants right pocket, and then arrested him. 193[10]
PO3 Almarez, for his part, marked the sachet with his initials. 194[11] Thereafter, the
buy-bust team brought the appellant to the Diadi Police Station for investigation. 195
[12]

190
191
192
193
194
195

At the police station, Captain de Vera prepared a request for laboratory


examination (Exh. C).196[13] The appellant was transferred to the Diadi Municipal
Jail where he was detained.197[14] Two days later, or on December 29, 2003, PO3
Almarez transmitted the letter-request, for laboratory examination, and the seized
plastic sachet to the PNP Crime Laboratory, where they were received by PO2
Fernando Dulnuan.198[15] Police Senior Inspector (PSI) Alfredo Quintero, the
Forensic Chemist of the PNP Crime Laboratory, conducted an examination on the
specimen submitted, and found it to be positive for the presence of shabu (Exh.
B).199[16]

On the hearing of August 13, 2004, the prosecution offered the following as
exhibits:

Exhibit A the shabu confiscated from the appellant

Exhibit B the report by the PNP Crime Laboratory

Exhibit C the request for laboratory examination


196
197
198
199

Exhibits D and E the buy-bust money

Exhibit F - the request for laboratory examination received by Forensic


Chemist Quintero

The defense presented a different version of the events, summarized as


follows:

At around 4:30 p.m. of December 27, 2003, Jojo Jose came to the appellants
house and informed him that Captain de Vera was inviting him to be an asset. The
appellant and Jojo boarded a tricycle and proceeded to the SSS Building where
Captain de Vera was waiting for them.200[17] As the tricycle approached the
Methodist Church along Bintawan Road, Jojo dropped his slippers and ordered the
driver to stop. Immediately after, a van stopped in front of the tricycle; Captain de
Vera alighted from the van and handcuffed the appellant. Captain de Vera brought
the appellant inside the van, frisked him, and took P200 from his pocket.201[18]
Afterwards, Captain de Vera took the appellant to the SSS Building, where he
(Captain de Vera) and the building manager drank coffee. Captain de Vera then
brought the appellant to the Diadi Municipal Jail where he was detained for almost
two days.202[19]
200
201
202

On the morning of December 29, 2003, the appellant was transferred to the
Provincial Jail. He signed a document without the assistance of a lawyer after
being told that it would result in his immediate release.203[20]
The RTC, in its decision204[21] of August 16, 2005, convicted the appellant
of the crime charged, and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment.
The RTC likewise ordered the appellant to pay a P500,000.00 fine.

The appellant appealed to the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01597. The
CA, in its decision205[22] dated May 22, 2007, affirmed the RTC decision.

The CA found unmeritorious the appellants defense of instigation, and held


that the appellant was apprehended as a result of a legitimate entrapment operation.
It explained that in inducement or instigation, an innocent person is lured by a
public officer or private detective to commit a crime. In the case at bar, the buybust operation was planned only after the police had received information that the
appellant was selling shabu.

203
204
205

The CA also held that the failure of the police to conduct a prior surveillance
on the appellant was not fatal to the prosecutions case. It reasoned out that the
police are given wide discretion to select effective means to apprehend drug
dealers. A prior surveillance is, therefore, not necessary, especially when the police
are already accompanied by their informant.

The CA further ruled that the prosecution was able to sufficiently prove an
unbroken chain of custody of the shabu. It explained that PO3 Almarez sealed the
plastic sachet seized from the appellant, marked it with his initials, and transmitted
it to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination. PSI Quintero conducted a
qualitative examination and found the specimen positive for the presence of shabu.
According to the CA, the prosecution was able to prove that the substance seized
was the same specimen submitted to the laboratory and presented in court,
notwithstanding that this specimen was turned over to the crime laboratory only
after two days.

In his brief,206[23] the appellant claims that the lower courts erred in
convicting him of the crime charged despite the prosecutions failure to prove his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He harps on the fact that the police did not conduct
a prior surveillance on him before conducting the buy-bust operation.

206

The appellant further contends that the prosecution failed to show an


unbroken chain of custody in the handling of the seized drug. He claims that there
was no evidence to show when the markings were done. Moreover, a period of two
days had elapsed from the time the shabu was confiscated to the time it was
forwarded to the crime laboratory for examination.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters with the argument that
the chain of custody of the shabu was sufficiently established. It explained that the
shabu was turned over by the police officers to the PNP Crime Laboratory, where it
was found by the forensic chemist to be positive for the presence of shabu. The
OSG likewise claimed that the appellant failed to rebut the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duties by the police. The OSG further
added that a prior surveillance is not indispensable to a prosecution for illegal sale
of drugs.207[24]

THE COURTS RULING

After due consideration, we resolve to acquit the appellant for the prosecutions
failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Specifically, the prosecution
failed to show that the police complied with paragraph 1, Section 21, Article II of
R.A. No. 9165, and with the chain of custody requirement of this Act.

207

The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs


Act: A Brief Background

R.A. No. 9165 was enacted in 2002 to pursue the States policy to safeguard
the integrity of its territory and the well-being of its citizenry particularly the
youth, from the harmful effects of dangerous drugs on their physical and mental
well-being, and to defend the same against acts or omissions detrimental to their
development and preservation.

R.A. No. 9165 repealed and superseded R.A. No. 6425, known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. Realizing that dangerous drugs are one of the most
serious social ills of the society at present, Congress saw the need to further
enhance the efficacy of the law against dangerous drugs. The new law thus
mandates the government to pursue an intensive and unrelenting campaign against
the trafficking and use of dangerous drugs and other similar substances through an
integrated system of planning, implementation and enforcement of anti-drug abuse
policies, programs and projects.208[25]

Illegal Sale of Drugs under Section 5


vis--vis the Inventory and Photograph
Requirement under Section 21
208

In a prosecution for illegal sale of a prohibited drug under Section 5 of R.A.


No. 9165, the prosecution must prove the following elements: (1) the identity of
the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of
the thing sold and the payment therefor. All these require evidence that the sale
transaction transpired, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti,
i.e., the body or substance of the crime that establishes that a crime has actually
been committed, as shown by presenting the object of the illegal transaction. 209[26]
To remove any doubt or uncertainty on the identity and integrity of the seized drug,
evidence must definitely show that the illegal drug presented in court is the same
illegal drug actually recovered from the appellant; otherwise, the prosecution for
possession or for drug pushing under R.A. No. 9165 fails.210[27]

The required procedure on the seizure and custody of drugs is embodied in


Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, which states:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and
photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom
such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any
elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory
and be given a copy thereof[.]

This is implemented by Section 21(a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and


209
210

Regulations of R.A. No. 9165, which reads:


(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the
drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically
inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the
person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of
Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the
copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical
inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search
warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the
apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless
seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements under
justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized
items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render
void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items[.]

Strict compliance with the prescribed procedure is required because of the


illegal drug's unique characteristic rendering it indistinct, not readily identifiable,
and easily open to tampering, alteration or substitution either by accident or
otherwise.211[28] The records of the present case are bereft of evidence showing
that the buy-bust team followed the outlined procedure despite its mandatory
terms. The deficiency is patent from the following exchanges at the trial:

PROSECUTOR [EMERSON TURINGAN]:

Q:

After you handed this buy-bust money to the accused, what


happened next?

[PO3 ALMAREZ:]
A:
211

When the shabu was already with me and I gave him the money[,]
I signaled the two, Captain Jaime de Vera and SPO1 Balido, sir.

xxxx
Q:

After you gave that signal, what happened?

A:

Then they approached us and helped me in arresting Felimon


Pagaduan, sir.

Q:

After Pagaduan was arrested, what happened next?

A:

After arresting Pagaduan[,] we brought him directly in Diadi


Police Station, sir.

Q:

What happened when you brought the accused to the Police Station
in Diadi?

A:

When we were already in Diadi Police Station, we first put him in


jail in the Municipal Jail of Diadi, Nueva Vizcaya, sir.

Q:

What did you do with the shabu?

A:

The request for laboratory examination was prepared and was


brought to the Crime Lab. of Solano, Nueva Vizcaya, sir.
xxxx

Q:

After making the request, what did you do next[,] if any[,] Mr.
Witness?

A:

After submission of the request to the Crime Lab.[,] we


prepared our joint affidavit for submission of the case to the
Court, sir.212[29]

From the foregoing exchanges during trial, it is evident that the apprehending
team, upon confiscation of the drug, immediately brought the appellant and the
seized items to the police station, and, once there, made the request for laboratory
examination. No physical inventory and photograph of the seized items were taken
in the presence of the accused or his counsel, a representative from the media and
212

the Department of Justice, and an elective official. PO3 Almarez, on crossexamination, was unsure and could not give a categorical answer when asked
whether he issued a receipt for the shabu confiscated from the appellant.213[30] At
any rate, no such receipt or certificate of inventory appears in the records.

In several cases, we have emphasized the importance of compliance with the


prescribed procedure in the custody and disposition of the seized drugs. We have
repeatedly declared that the deviation from the standard procedure dismally
compromises the integrity of the evidence. In People v. Morales,214[31] we
acquitted the accused for failure of the buy-bust team to photograph and inventory
the seized items, without giving any justifiable ground for the non-observance of
the required procedures. People v. Garcia215[32] likewise resulted in an acquittal
because no physical inventory was ever made, and no photograph of the seized
items was taken under the circumstances required by R.A. No. 9165 and its
implementing rules. In Bondad, Jr. v. People,216[33] we also acquitted the accused
for the failure of the police to conduct an inventory and to photograph the seized
items, without justifiable grounds.

213
214
215
216

We had the same rulings in People v. Gutierrez,217[34] People v. Denoman,218


[35] People v. Partoza,219[36] People v. Robles,220[37] and People v. dela Cruz,221
[38] where we emphasized the importance of complying with the required
mandatory procedures under Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165.

We recognize that the strict compliance with the requirements of Section 21 of


R.A. No. 9165 may not always be possible under field conditions; the police
operates under varied conditions, and cannot at all times attend to all the niceties of
the procedures in the handling of confiscated evidence. For this reason, the last
sentence of the implementing rules provides that non-compliance with these
requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary
value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team,
shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items[.]
Thus, noncompliance with the strict directive of Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 is not
necessarily fatal to the prosecutions case; police procedures in the handling of
confiscated evidence may still have some lapses, as in the present case. These
lapses, however, must be recognized and explained in terms of their justifiable

217
218
219
220
221

grounds, and the integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence seized must
be shown to have been preserved.222[39]

In the present case, the prosecution did not bother to offer any explanation to
justify the failure of the police to conduct the required physical inventory and
photograph of the seized drugs. The apprehending team failed to show why an
inventory and photograph of the seized evidence had not been made either in the
place of seizure and arrest or at the nearest police station (as required by the
Implementing Rules in case of warrantless arrests). We emphasize that for the
saving clause to apply, it is important that the prosecution explain the reasons
behind the procedural lapses, and that the integrity and value of the seized
evidence had been preserved.223[40] In other words, the justifiable ground for
noncompliance must be proven as a fact. The court cannot presume what
these grounds are or that they even exist.224[41]

The Chain of Custody Requirement

Proof beyond reasonable doubt demands that unwavering exactitude be


observed in establishing the corpus delicti - the body of the crime whose core is the
222
223
224

confiscated illicit drug. Thus, every fact necessary to constitute the crime must be
established. The chain of custody requirement performs this function in buy-bust
operations as it ensures that doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are
removed.225[42]

Blacks Law Dictionary explains chain of custody in this wise:

In evidence, the one who offers real evidence, such as the narcotics in a
trial of drug case, must account for the custody of the evidence from the moment
in which it reaches his custody until the moment in which it is offered in evidence,
and such evidence goes to weight not to admissibility of evidence. Com. V. White,
353 Mass. 409, 232 N.E.2d 335.

Likewise, Section 1(b) of Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 1, Series of


2002 which implements R.A. No. 9165 defines chain of custody as follows:
Chain of Custody means the duly recorded authorized movements and
custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous
drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of
seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to
presentation in court for destruction. Such record of movements and custody of
seized item shall include the identity and signature of the person who held
temporary custody of the seized item, the date and time when such transfer of
custody were made in the course of safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and
the final disposition[.]

225

In Malillin v. People,226[43] the Court explained that the chain of custody


rule requires that there be testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment
the object seized was picked up to the time it is offered in evidence, in such a way
that every person who touched it would describe how and from whom it was
received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witness possession, the
condition in which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered to
the next link in the chain.

In the present case, the prosecutions evidence failed to establish the chain
that would have shown that the shabu presented in court was the very same
specimen seized from the appellant.
The first link in the chain of custody starts with the seizure of the heat-sealed
plastic sachet from the appellant. PO3 Almarez mentioned on cross-examination
that he placed his initials on the confiscated sachet after apprehending the
appellant. Notably, this testimony constituted the totality of the prosecutions
evidence on the marking of the seized evidence. PO3 Almarezs testimony, however,
lacked specifics on how he marked the sachet and who witnessed the marking. In
People v. Sanchez, we ruled that the marking of the seized items to truly ensure that
they are the same items that enter the chain and are eventually the ones offered in
evidence should be done (1) in the presence of the apprehended violator (2)
immediately upon confiscation. In the present case, nothing in the records gives us
an insight on the manner and circumstances that attended the marking of the
confiscated sachet. Whether the marking had been done in the presence of the

226

appellant is not at all clear from the evidence that merely mentioned that the
evidence had been marked after the appellants apprehension.

The second link in the chain of custody is its turnover from the apprehending
team to the police station. PO3 Almarez testified that the appellant was brought to
the Diadi Police Station after his arrest. However, he failed to identify the person
who had control and possession of the seized drug at the time of its transportation
to the police station. In the absence of clear evidence, we cannot presume that PO3
Almarez, as the poseur buyer, handled the seized sachet to the exclusion of others during its transfer from the place of arrest and confiscation to the police station.
The prosecution likewise failed to present evidence pertaining to the identity of the
duty desk officer who received the plastic sachet containing shabu from the buybust team. This is particularly significant since the seized specimen was turned over
to the PNP Crime Laboratory only after two days. It was not, therefore, clear who
had temporary custody of the seized items during this significant intervening period
of time. Although the records show that the request for laboratory examination of
the seized plastic sachet was prepared by Captain de Vera, the evidence does not
show that he was the official who received the marked plastic sachet from the buybust team.

As for the subsequent links in the chain of custody, the records show that the
seized specimen was forwarded by PO3 Almarez to the PNP Crime Laboratory on
December 29, 2003, where it was received by PO2 Dulnuan, and later examined by
PSI Quintero. However, the person from whom PO3 Almarez received the seized

illegal drug for transfer to the crime laboratory was not identified. As earlier
discussed, the identity of the duty desk officer who received the shabu, as well as
the person who had temporary custody of the seized items for two days, had not
been established.

The procedural lapses mentioned above show the glaring gaps in the chain of
custody, creating a reasonable doubt whether the drugs confiscated from the
appellant were the same drugs that were brought to the crime laboratory for
chemical analysis, and eventually offered in court as evidence. In the absence of
concrete evidence on the illegal drugs bought and sold, the body of the crime the
corpus delicti has not been adequately proven.227[44] In effect, the prosecution
failed to fully prove the elements of the crime charged, creating reasonable doubt
on the appellants criminal liability.

Presumption of Regularity in the Performance of Official Duties

In sustaining the appellants conviction, the CA relied on the evidentiary


presumption that official duties have been regularly performed. This presumption,
it must be emphasized, is not conclusive. 228[45] It cannot, by itself, overcome the
constitutional presumption of innocence. Any taint of irregularity affects the whole
performance and should make the presumption unavailable. In the present case, the
227
228

failure of the apprehending team to comply with paragraph 1, Section 21, Article II
of R.A. No. 9165, and with the chain of custody requirement of this Act effectively
negates this presumption. As we explained in Malillin v. People:229[46]

The presumption of regularity is merely just that - a mere presumption disputable


by contrary proof and which when challenged by the evidence cannot be regarded
as binding truth. Suffice it to say that this presumption cannot preponderate over
the presumption of innocence that prevails if not overthrown by proof beyond
reasonable doubt. In the present case the lack of conclusive identification of the
illegal drugs allegedly seized from petitioner, coupled with the irregularity in the
manner by which the same were placed under police custody before offered in
court, strongly militates a finding of guilt.

We are not unmindful of the pernicious effects of drugs in our society; they
are lingering maladies that destroy families and relationships, and engender crimes.
The Court is one with all the agencies concerned in pursuing an intensive and
unrelenting campaign against this social dilemma. Regardless of how much we
want to curb this menace, we cannot disregard the protection provided by the
Constitution, most particularly the presumption of innocence bestowed on the
appellant. Proof beyond reasonable doubt, or that quantum of proof sufficient to
produce moral certainty that would convince and satisfy the conscience of those
who act in judgment, is indispensable to overcome this constitutional presumption.
If the prosecution has not proved, in the first place, all the elements of the crime
charged, which in this case is the corpus delicti, then the appellant deserves no less
than an acquittal.

229

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby REVERSE and SET


ASIDE the May 22, 2007 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C.
No. 01597. Appellant Felimon Pagaduan y Tamayo is hereby ACQUITTED for
failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He is ordered
immediately RELEASED from detention unless he is confined for another lawful
cause.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Director, Bureau of Corrections,


Muntinlupa City for immediate implementation. The Director of the Bureau of
Corrections is directed to report the action he has taken to this Court within five
days from receipt of this Decision.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 180284, September 11, 2013
NARCISO SALAS, Petitioners, v.ANNABELLE MATUSALEM, Respondent.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to reverse and set aside the
Decision1 dated July 18, 2006 and Resolution2 dated October 19, 2007 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 64379.
The factual antecedents:
On May 26, 1995, Annabelle Matusalem (respondent) filed a complaint for Support/Damages
against Narciso Salas (petitioner) in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) ofCabanatuan City (Civil
Case No. 2124-AF).

Respondent claimed that petitioner is. the father of her son Christian Paulo Salas who was born
on December 28, 1994. Petitioner, already 56 years old at the time, enticed her as she was then
only 24 years old, making her believe that he is a widower. Petitioner rented an apartment where
respondent stayed and shouldered all expenses in the delivery of their child, including the cost of
caesarian operation and hospital confinement. However, when respondent refused the offer of
petitioners family to take the child from her, petitioner abandoned respondent and her child and
left them to the mercy of relatives and friends. Respondent further alleged that she attempted
suicide due to depression but still petitioner refused to support her and their child.
Respondent thus prayed for support pendente lite and monthly support in the amount of
P20,000.00, as well as actual, moral and exemplary damages, and attorneys fees.
Petitioner filed his answer4 with special and affirmative defenses and counterclaims. He
described respondent as a woman of loose morals, having borne her first child also out of
wedlock when she went to work in Italy. Jobless upon her return to the country, respondent spent
time riding on petitioners jeepney which was then being utilized by a female real estate agent
named Felicisima de Guzman. Respondent had seduced a senior police officer in San Isidro and
her charge of sexual abuse against said police officer was later withdrawn in exchange for the
quashing of drug charges against respondents brother-in-law who was then detained at the
municipal jail. It was at that time respondent introduced herself to petitioner whom she pleaded
for charity as she was pregnant with another child. Petitioner denied paternity of the child
Christian Paulo; he was motivated by no other reason except genuine altruism when he agreed to
shoulder the expenses for the delivery of said child, unaware of respondents chicanery and
deceit designed to scandalize him in exchange for financial favor.
At the trial, respondent and her witness Grace Murillo testified. Petitioner was declared to have
waived his right to present evidence and the case was considered submitted for decision based on
respondents evidence.
Respondent testified that she first met petitioner at the house of his kumadre Felicisima de
Guzman at Bgy. Malapit, San Isidro, Nueva Ecija. During their subsequent meeting, petitioner
told her he is already a widower and he has no more companion in life because his children are
all grown-up. She also learned that petitioner owns a rice mill, a construction business and a
housing subdivision (petitioner offered her a job at their family-owned Ma. Cristina Village).
Petitioner at the time already knows that she is a single mother as she had a child by her former
boyfriend in Italy. He then brought her to a motel, promising that he will take care of her and
marry her. She believed him and yielded to his advances, with the thought that she and her child
will have a better life. Thereafter, they saw each other weekly and petitioner gave her money for
her child. When she became pregnant with petitioners child, it was only then she learned that he
is in fact not a widower. She wanted to abort the baby but petitioner opposed it because he
wanted to have another child.5
On the fourth month of her pregnancy, petitioner rented an apartment where she stayed with a
housemaid; he also provided for all their expenses. She gave birth to their child on December 28,
1994 at the Good Samaritan Hospital in Cabanatuan City. Before delivery, petitioner even

walked her at the hospital room and massaged her stomach, saying he had not done this to his
wife. She filled out the form for the childs birth certificate and wrote all the information
supplied by petitioner himself. It was also petitioner who paid the hospital bills and drove her
baby home. He was excited and happy to have a son at his advanced age who is his look-alike,
and this was witnessed by other boarders, visitors and Grace Murillo, the owner of the apartment
unit petitioner rented. However, on the 18th day after the babys birth, petitioner went to Baguio
City for a medical check-up. He confessed to her daughter and eventually his wife was also
informed about his having sired an illegitimate child. His family then decided to adopt the baby
and just give respondent money so she can go abroad. When she refused this offer, petitioner
stopped seeing her and sending money to her. She and her baby survived through the help of
relatives and friends. Depressed, she tried to commit suicide by drug overdose and was brought
to the hospital by Murillo who paid the bill. Murillo sought the help of the Cabanatuan City
Police Station which set their meeting with petitioner. However, it was only petitioners wife
who showed up and she was very mad, uttering unsavory words against respondent.6
Murillo corroborated respondents testimony as to the payment by petitioner of apartment rental,
his weekly visits to respondent and financial support to her, his presence during and after
delivery of respondents baby, respondents attempted suicide through sleeping pills overdose
and hospitalization for which she paid the bill, her complaint before the police authorities and
meeting with petitioners wife at the headquarters.7
On April 5, 1999, the trial court rendered its decision8 in favor of respondent, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
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WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and
against the defendant as follows:
1. Ordering the defendant to give as monthly support of TWO THOUSAND (P2,000.00)
PESOS for the child Christian Paulo through the mother;
2. Directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of P20,000.00 by way of litigation
expenses; and
3. To pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.9
Petitioner appealed to the CA arguing that: (1) the trial court decided the case without affording
him the right to introduce evidence on his defense; and (2) the trial court erred in finding that
petitioner is the putative father of Christian Paulo and ordering him to give monthly support.
By Decision dated July 18, 2006, the CA dismissed petitioners appeal. The appellate court found
no reason to disturb the trial courts exercise of discretion in denying petitioners motion for
postponement on April 17, 1998, the scheduled hearing for the initial presentation of defendants
evidence, and the motion for reconsideration of the said order denying the motion for
postponement and submitting the case for decision.

On the paternity issue, the CA affirmed the trial courts ruling that respondent satisfactorily
established the illegitimate filiation of her son Christian Paulo, and consequently no error was
committed by the trial court in granting respondents prayer for support. The appellate court thus
held:
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Christian Paulo, in instant case, does not enjoy the benefit of a record of birth in the civil registry
which bears acknowledgment signed by Narciso Salas. He cannot claim open and continuous
possession of the status of an illegitimate child.
It had been established by plaintiffs evidence, however, that during her pregnancy, Annabelle
was provided by Narciso Salas with an apartment at a rental of P1,500.00 which he paid for
(TSN, October 6, 1995, p. 18). Narciso provided her with a household help with a salary of
P1,500.00 a month (TSN, October 6, 1995, ibid). He also provided her a monthly food allowance
of P1,500.00 (Ibid, p. 18). Narciso was with Annabelle at the hospital while the latter was in
labor, walking her around and massaging her belly (Ibid, p. 11). Narciso brought home
Christian Paulo to the rented apartment after Annabelles discharge from the hospital. People
living in the same apartment units were witnesses to Narcisos delight to father a son at his age
which was his look alike. It was only after the 18th day when Annabelle refused to give him
Christian Paulo that Narciso withdrew his support to him and his mother.
Said testimony of Annabelle aside from having been corroborated by Grace Murillo, the owner
of the apartment which Narciso rented, was never rebutted on record. Narciso did not present any
evidence, verbal or documentary, to repudiate plaintiffs evidence.
In the cases of Lim vs. CA (270 SCRA 1) and Rodriguez vs. CA (245 SCRA 150), the Supreme
Court made it clear that Article 172 of the Family Code is an adaptation of Article 283 of the
Civil Code. Said legal provision provides that the father is obliged to recognize the child as his
natural child x x 3) when the child has in his favor any evidence or proof that the defendant is
his father.
In fact, in Ilano vs. CA (230 SCRA 242, 258-259), it was held that
The last paragraph of Article 283 contains a blanket provision that practically covers all the
other cases in the preceding paragraphs. Any other evidence or proof that the defendant is the
father is broad enough to render unnecessary the other paragraphs of this article. When the
evidence submitted in the action for compulsory recognition is not sufficient to meet [the]
requirements of the first three paragraphs, it may still be enough under the last paragraph. This
paragraph permits hearsay and reputation evidence, as provided in the Rules of Court, with
respect to illegitimate filiation.
As a necessary consequence of the finding that Christian Paulo is the son of defendant Narciso
Salas, he is entitled to support from the latter (Ilano vs. CA, supra).
It shall be demandable from the time the person who has the right to recover the same needs it
for maintenance x x. (Art. 203, Family Code of the Philippines).10
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the CA.
Hence, this petition submitting the following arguments:

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1. THE VENUE OF THE CASE WAS IMPROPERLY LAID BEFORE THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT OF CABANATUAN CITY CONSIDERING THAT BOTH PETITIONER AND
RESPONDENT ARE ACTUAL RESIDENTS OF BRGY. MALAPIT, SAN ISIDRO, NUEVA
ECIJA.
2. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN PRONOUNCING THAT
PETITIONER WAS AFFORDED THE FULL MEASURE OF HIS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS
OF LAW AND IN UPHOLDING THAT THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT GRAVELY ABUSE
ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT
DECIDED THE INSTANT CASE WITHOUT AFFORDING PETITIONER THE RIGHT TO
INTRODUCE EVIDENCE IN HIS DEFENSE.
3. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE FILIATION
OF CHRISTIAN PAULO WAS DULY ESTABLISHED PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 175 IN
RELATION TO ARTICLE 172 OF THE FAMILY CODE AND EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE
AND THEREFORE ENTITLED TO SUPPORT FROM THE PETITIONER.11
We grant the petition.
It is a legal truism that the rules on the venue of personal actions are fixed for the convenience of
the plaintiffs and their witnesses. Equally settled, however, is the principle that choosing the
venue of an action is not left to a plaintiffs caprice; the matter is regulated by the Rules of
Court.12
In personal actions such as the instant case, the Rules give the plaintiff the option of choosing
where to file his complaint. He can file it in the place (1) where he himself or any of them
resides, or (2) where the defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be found.13 The
plaintiff or the defendant must be residents of the place where the action has been instituted at
the time the action is commenced.14
However, petitioner raised the issue of improper venue for the first time in the Answer itself and
no prior motion to dismiss based on such ground was filed. Under the Rules of Court before the
1997 amendments, an objection to an improper venue must be made before a responsive
pleading is filed. Otherwise, it will be deemed waived.15 Not having been timely raised,
petitioners objection on venue is therefore deemed waived.
As to the denial of the motion for postponement filed by his counsel for the resetting of the initial
presentation of defense evidence on April 17, 1998, we find that it was not the first time
petitioners motion for postponement was denied by the trial court.
Records disclosed that after the termination of the testimony of respondents last witness on
November 29, 1996, the trial court as prayed for by the parties, set the continuation of hearing
for the reception of evidence for the defendant (petitioner) on January 27, February 3, and
February 10, 1997. In the Order dated December 17, 1996, petitioner was advised to be ready
with his evidence at those hearing dates earlier scheduled. At the hearing on January 27, 1997,
petitioners former counsel, Atty. Rolando S. Bala, requested for the cancellation of the February

3 and 10, 1997 hearings in order to give him time to prepare for his defense, which request was
granted by the trial court which thus reset the hearing dates to March 3, 14 and 17, 1997. On
March 3, 1997, upon oral manifestation by Atty. Bala and without objection from respondents
counsel, Atty. Feliciano Wycoco, the trial court again reset the hearing to March 14 and 17, 1997.
With the non-appearance of both petitioner and Atty. Bala on March 14, 1997, the trial court
upon oral manifestation by Atty. Wycoco declared their absence as a waiver of their right to
present evidence and accordingly deemed the case submitted for decision.16
On July 4, 1997, Atty. Bala withdrew as counsel for petitioner and Atty. Rafael E. Villarosa filed
his appearance as his new counsel on July 21, 1997. On the same date he filed entry of
appearance, Atty. Villarosa filed a motion for reconsideration of the March 14, 1997 Order
pleading for liberality and magnanimity of the trial court, without offering any explanation for
Atty. Balas failure to appear for the initial presentation of their evidence. The trial court
thereupon reconsidered its March 14, 1997 Order, finding it better to give petitioner a chance to
present his evidence. On August 26, 1997, Atty. Villarosa received a notice of hearing for the
presentation of their evidence scheduled on September 22, 1997. On August 29, 1997, the trial
court received his motion requesting that the said hearing be re-set to October 10, 1997 for the
reason that he had requested the postponement of a hearing in another case which was
incidentally scheduled on September 22, 23 and 24, 1997. As prayed for, the trial court reset the
hearing to October 10, 1997. On said date, however, the hearing was again moved to December
15, 1997. On February 16, 1998, the trial court itself reset the hearing to April 17, 1998 since it
was unclear whether Atty. Wycoco received a copy of the motion.17
On April 17, 1998, petitioner and his counsel failed to appear but the trial court received on April
16, 1998 an urgent motion to cancel hearing filed by Atty. Villarosa. The reason given by the
latter was the scheduled hearing on the issuance of writ of preliminary injunction in another case
under the April 8, 1998 Order issued by the RTC of Gapan, Nueva Ecija, Branch 36 in Civil Case
No. 1946. But as clearly stated in the said order, it was the plaintiffs therein who requested the
postponement of the hearing and it behoved Atty. Villarosa to inform the RTC of Gapan that he
had a previous commitment considering that the April 17, 1998 hearing was scheduled as early
as February 16, 1998. Acting on the motion for postponement, the trial court denied for the
second time petitioners motion for postponement. Even at the hearing of their motion for
reconsideration of the April 17, 1998 Order on September 21, 1998, Atty. Villarosa failed to
appear and instead filed another motion for postponement. The trial court thus ordered that the
case be submitted for decision stressing that the case had long been pending and that petitioner
and his counsel have been given opportunities to present their evidence. It likewise denied a
second motion for reconsideration filed by Atty. Villarosa, who arrived late during the hearing
thereof on December 4, 1998.18
A motion for continuance or postponement is not a matter of right, but a request addressed to the
sound discretion of the court. Parties asking for postponement have absolutely no right to assume
that their motions would be granted. Thus, they must be prepared on the day of the hearing.19
Indeed, an order declaring a party to have waived the right to present evidence for performing
dilatory actions upholds the trial courts duty to ensure that trial proceeds despite the deliberate
delay and refusal to proceed on the part of one party.20

Atty. Villarosas plea for liberality was correctly rejected by the trial court in view of his own
negligence in failing to ensure there will be no conflict in his trial schedules. As we held in
Tiomico v. Court of Appeals21:
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Motions for postponement are generally frowned upon by Courts if there is evidence of bad faith,
malice or inexcusable negligence on the part of the movant. The inadvertence of the defense
counsel in failing to take note of the trial dates and in belatedly informing the trial court of any
conflict in his schedules of trial or court appearances, constitutes inexcusable negligence. It
should be borne in mind that a client is bound by his counsels conduct, negligence and mistakes
in handling the case.22
With our finding that there was no abuse of discretion in the trial courts denial of the motion for
postponement filed by petitioners counsel, petitioners contention that he was deprived of his
day in court must likewise fail. The essence of due process is that a party is given a reasonable
opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may have in support of ones defense.
Where a party was afforded an opportunity to participate in the proceedings but failed to do so,
he cannot complain of deprivation of due process. If the opportunity is not availed of, it is
deemed waived or forfeited without violating the constitutional guarantee.23
We now proceed to the main issue of whether the trial and appellate courts erred in ruling that
respondents evidence sufficiently proved that her son Christian Paulo is the illegitimate child of
petitioner.
Under Article 175 of the Family Code of the Philippines, illegitimate filiation may be established
in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children.
Article 172 of the Family Code of the Philippines states:

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The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:


(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument
and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. (Underscoring supplied.)
Respondent presented the Certificate of Live Birth24 (Exhibit A-1) of Christian Paulo Salas in
which the name of petitioner appears as his father but which is not signed by him. Admittedly, it
was only respondent who filled up the entries and signed the said document though she claims it
was petitioner who supplied the information she wrote therein.
We have held that a certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not

competent evidence of paternity when there is no showing that the putative father had a hand in
the preparation of the certificate.25 Thus, if the father did not sign in the birth certificate, the
placing of his name by the mother, doctor, registrar, or other person is incompetent evidence of
paternity.26 Neither can such birth certificate be taken as a recognition in a public instrument27
and it has no probative value to establish filiation to the alleged father.28
As to the Baptismal Certificate29 (Exhibit B) of Christian Paulo Salas also indicating petitioner
as the father, we have ruled that while baptismal certificates may be considered public
documents, they can only serve as evidence of the administration of the sacraments on the dates
so specified. They are not necessarily competent evidence of the veracity of entries therein with
respect to the childs paternity.30
The rest of respondents documentary evidence consists of handwritten notes and letters, hospital
bill and photographs taken of petitioner and respondent inside their rented apartment unit.
Pictures taken of the mother and her child together with the alleged father are inconclusive
evidence to prove paternity.31 Exhibits E and F32 showing petitioner and respondent inside
the rented apartment unit thus have scant evidentiary value. The Statement of Account33 (Exhibit
C) from the Good Samaritan General Hospital where respondent herself was indicated as the
payee is likewise incompetent to prove that petitioner is the father of her child notwithstanding
petitioners admission in his answer that he shouldered the expenses in the delivery of
respondents child as an act of charity.
As to the handwritten notes34 (Exhibits D to D-13) of petitioner and respondent showing
their exchange of affectionate words and romantic trysts, these, too, are not sufficient to establish
Christian Paulos filiation to petitioner as they were not signed by petitioner and contained no
statement of admission by petitioner that he is the father of said child. Thus, even if these notes
were authentic, they do not qualify under Article 172 (2) vis-- vis Article 175 of the Family
Code which admits as competent evidence of illegitimate filiation an admission of filiation in a
private handwritten instrument signed by the parent concerned.35
Petitioners reliance on our ruling in Lim v. Court of Appeals36 is misplaced. In the said case, the
handwritten letters of petitioner contained a clear admission that he is the father of private
respondents daughter and were signed by him. The Court therein considered the totality of
evidence which established beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner was indeed the father of
private respondents daughter. On the other hand, in Ilano v. Court of Appeals,37 the Court
sustained the appellate courts finding that private respondents evidence to establish her filiation
with and paternity of petitioner was overwhelming, particularly the latters public
acknowledgment of his amorous relationship with private respondents mother, and private
respondent as his own child through acts and words, her testimonial evidence to that effect was
fully supported by documentary evidence. The Court thus ruled that respondent had adduced
sufficient proof of continuous possession of status of a spurious child.
Here, while the CA held that Christian Paulo Salas could not claim open and continuous
possession of status of an illegitimate child, it nevertheless considered the testimonial evidence
sufficient proof to establish his filiation to petitioner.

An illegitimate child is now also allowed to establish his claimed filiation by any other means
allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws, like his baptismal certificate, a judicial
admission, a family Bible in which his name has been entered, common reputation respecting his
pedigree, admission by silence, the testimonies of witnesses, and other kinds of proof admissible
under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.38 Reviewing the records, we find the totality of
respondents evidence insufficient to establish that petitioner is the father of Christian Paulo.
The testimonies of respondent and Murillo as to the circumstances of the birth of Christian
Paulo, petitioners financial support while respondent lived in Murillos apartment and his
regular visits to her at the said apartment, though replete with details, do not approximate the
overwhelming evidence, documentary and testimonial presented in Ilano. In that case, we
sustained the appellate courts ruling anchored on the following factual findings by the appellate
court which was quoted at length in the ponencia:
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It was Artemio who made arrangement for the delivery of Merceditas (sic) at the Manila
Sanitarium and Hospital. Prior to the delivery, Leoncia underwent prenatal examination
accompanied by Artemio (TSN, p. 33, 5/17/74). After delivery, they went home to their residence
at EDSA in a car owned and driven by Artemio himself (id. p. 36).
Merceditas (sic) bore the surname of Ilano since birth without any objection on the part of
Artemio, the fact that since Merceditas (sic) had her discernment she had always known and
called Artemio as her Daddy (TSN, pp. 28-29, 10/18/74); the fact that each time Artemio was
at home, he would play with Merceditas (sic), take her for a ride or restaurants to eat, and
sometimes sleeping with Merceditas (sic) (id. p. 34) and does all what a father should do for his
child bringing home goodies, candies, toys and whatever he can bring her which a child
enjoys which Artemio gives to Merceditas (sic) (TSN, pp. 38-39, 5/17/74) are positive evidence
that Merceditas (sic) is the child of Artemio and recognized by Artemio as such. Special attention
is called to Exh. E-7 where Artemio was telling Leoncia the need for a frog test to know the
status of Leoncia.
Plaintiff pointed out that the support by Artemio for Leoncia and Merceditas (sic) was sometimes
in the form of cash personally delivered to her by Artemio, thru Melencio, thru Elynia (Exhs. E2 and E-3, and D-6), or thru Merceditas (sic) herself (TSN, p. 40, 5/17/74) and sometimes
in the form of a check as the Manila Banking Corporation Check No. 81532 (Exh. G) and the
signature appearing therein which was identified by Leoncia as that of Artemio because Artemio
often gives her checks and Artemio would write the check at home and saw Artemio sign the
check (TSN, p. 49, 7/18/73). Both Artemio and Nilda admitted that the check and signature were
those of Artemio (TSN, p. 53, 10/17/77; TSN, p. 19, 10/9/78).
During the time that Artemio and Leoncia were living as husband and wife, Artemio has shown
concern as the father of Merceditas (sic). When Merceditas (sic) was in Grade 1 at the St. Joseph
Parochial School, Artemio signed the Report Card of Merceditas (sic) (Exh. H) for the fourth
and fifth grading period(s) (Exh. H-1 and H-2) as the parent of Merceditas (sic). Those
signatures of Artemio [were] both identified by Leoncia and Merceditas (sic) because Artemio
signed Exh. H-1 and H-2 at their residence in the presence of Leoncia, Merceditas (sic) and
of Elynia (TSN, p. 57, 7/18/73; TSN, p. 28, 10/1/73). x x x.

xxx xxx xxx


When Artemio run as a candidate in the Provincial Board of Cavite[,] Artemio gave Leoncia his
picture with the following dedication: To Nene, with best regards, Temiong. (Exh. I). (pp.
19-20, Appellants Brief)
The mere denial by defendant of his signature is not sufficient to offset the totality of the
evidence indubitably showing that the signature thereon belongs to him. The entry in the
Certificate of Live Birth that Leoncia and Artemio was falsely stated therein as married does not
mean that Leoncia is not appellees daughter. This particular entry was caused to be made by
Artemio himself in order to avoid embarrassment.39
In sum, we hold that the testimonies of respondent and Murillo, by themselves are not competent
proof of paternity and the totality of respondents evidence failed to establish Christian Paulos
filiation to petitioner.
Time and again, this Court has ruled that a high standard of proof is required to establish
paternity and filiation. An order for recognition and support may create an unwholesome
situation or may be an irritant to the family or the lives of the parties so that it must be issued
only if paternity or filiation is established by clear and convincing evidence.40
Finally, we note the Manifestation and Motion41 filed by petitioners counsel informing this
Court that petitioner had died on May 6, 2010.
The action for support having been filed in the trial court when petitioner was still alive, it is not
barred under Article 175 (2)42 of the Family Code. We have also held that the death of the
putative father is not a bar to the action commenced during his lifetime by one claiming to be his
illegitimate child.43 The rule on substitution of parties provided in Section 16, Rule 3 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, thus applies.
SEC. 16. Death of party; duty of counsel. Whenever a party to a pending action dies, and the
claim is not thereby extinguished, it shall be the duty of his counsel to inform the court within
thirty (30) days after such death of the fact thereof, and to give the name and address of his legal
representative or representatives. Failure of counsel to comply with his duty shall be a ground for
disciplinary action.
The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when the
action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be brought
during the lifetime of the alleged parent.
The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without requiring
the appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may appoint a guardian ad litem
for the minor heirs.
The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or representatives to appear and be
substituted within a period of thirty (30) days from notice.

If no legal representative is named by the counsel for the deceased party, or if the one so named
shall fail to appear within the specified period, the court may order the opposing party, within a
specified time to procure the appointment of an executor or administrator for the estate of the
deceased and the latter shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the deceased. The court
charges in procuring such appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, may be recovered as
costs.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The Decision dated July
18, 2006 and Resolution dated October 19, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR. CV No.
64379 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. 2124-AF of the Regional Trial
Court of Cabanatuan City, Branch 26 is DISMISSED.
No pronouncement as to costs.

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SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-51770 March 20, 1985
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FRANCISCO GALIT, defendant-appellant.

CONCEPCION, JR., J:
1. The prisoner was arrested for killing the victim oil the occasion of a robbery. He had
been detained and interrogated almost continuously for five days, to no avail. He
consistently maintained his innocence. There was no evidence to link him to the crime.
Obviously, something drastic had to be done. A confession was absolutely necessary.
So the investigating officers began to maul him and to torture him physically. Still the
prisoner insisted on his innocence. His will had to be broken. A confession must be
obtained. So they continued to maltreat and beat him. 'They covered his face with a rag
and pushed his face into a toilet bowl full of human waste. The prisoner could not take
any more. His body could no longer endure the pain inflicted on him and the indignities
he had to suffer. His will had been broken. He admitted what the investigating officers
wanted him to admit and he signed the confession they prepared. Later, against his will,
he posed for pictures as directed by his investigators, purporting it to be a reenactment.
2. This incident could have happened in a Russian gulag or in Hitler's Germany. But no
it did not. It happened in the Philippines. In this case before Us.
3. The Revised Penal Code punishes the maltreatment of prisoners as follows:
ART. 235. Maltreatment of prisoners. The penalty of arresto mayor in its
medium period to prision correccional in its minimum period, in addition to

his liability for the physical injuries or damage caused, shall be imposed
upon any public officer or employee who shall over do himself in the
correction or handling of a prisoner or detention prisoner under his charge,
by the imposition of punishments in a cruel and humiliating manner.
If the purpose of the maltreatment is to extort a confession, or to obtain
some information from the prisoner, the offender shall be punished by
prision correccional in its minimum period, temporary special
disqualification and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos, in addition to his
liability for the physical injuries or damage caused.
4. This Court in a long line of decisions over the years, the latest being the case of
People vs. Cabrera, 1 has consistently and strongly condemned the practice of maltreating prisoners
to extort confessions from them as a grave and unforgivable violation of human rights. But the practice
persists. Fortunately, such instances constitute the exception rather than the general rule.
5. Before Us for mandatory review is the death sentence imposed upon the accused Francisco Galit by
the Circuit Criminal Court of Pasig, Rizal, in Crim. Case No. CCC-VII-2589 of said court.
6. The record shows that in the morning of August 23, 1977, Mrs. Natividad Fernando, a widow, was
found dead in the bedroom of her house located at Barrio Geronimo, Montalban, Rizal, as a result of
seven (7) wounds inflicted upon different parts of her body by a blunt instrument. 2 More than two weeks
thereafter, police authorities of Montalban picked up the herein accused, Francisco Galit, an ordinary
construction worker (pion) living in Marikina, Rizal, on suspicion of the murder. On the following day,
however, September 8, 1977, the case was referred to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for
further investigation in view of the alleged limited facilities of the Montalban police station. Accordingly, the
herein accused was brought to the NBI where he was investigated by a team headed by NBI Agent
Carlos Flores. 3 NBI Agent Flores conducted a preliminary interview of the suspect who allegedly gave
evasive answers to his questions. 4 But the following day, September 9, 1977, Francisco Galit voluntarily
executed a Salaysay admitting participation in the commission of the crime. He implicated Juling Dulay
and Pabling Dulay as his companions in the crime. 5 As a result, he was charged with the crime of
Robbery with Homicide, in an information filed before the Circuit Criminal Court of Pasig, Rizal, committed
as follows:
That on or about the 23rd day of August 1977 in the municipality of Montalban, province
of Rizal, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring and confederating together with Juling Doe and Pabling Doe, whose
true Identities and present whereabouts are still unknown and three of them mutually
helping and aiding one another, with intent of gain and by means of force, intimidation
and violence upon the person of one Natividad Fernando while in her dwelling, did, then
and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously take, steal and carry away from the person
of said Natividad Fernando, cash money of an undetermined amount, belonging to said
Natividad Fernando, thereby causing damage and prejudice to the latter in an
undetermined amount; that by reason or on the occasion of said robbery, and for purpose
of enabling them (accused) to take, steal and carry away the said cash money in
pursuance of their conspiracy and for the purpose of insuring the success of their criminal
act, with intent to kill, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack,
assault and stab with a dagger said Natividad Fernando on the different parts of her body,
thereby inflicting multiple injuries on the head and extremities, which directly caused her
death, and the total amount of the loss is P10,000.00 including valuables and cash.

Trial was held, and on August 11, 1978, immediately after the accused had terminated the presentation of
his evidence, the trial judge dictated his decision on the case in open court, finding the accused guilty as
charged and sentencing him to suffer the death penalty; to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the sum of
P110,000.00, and to pay the costs. Hence, the present recourse.
7. The incriminatory facts of the case, as found by the trial court, are as follows:
From the evidence adduced in this case, it was gathered that in the early morning of
August 23, 1977, a 70-year old woman named Natividad Fernando, widow, in the twilight
of her life, was robbed and then hacked to death by the accused and two others in her
(victim's) own residence at Montalban, Rizal.
Prosecution witness Florentino Valentino testified that he heard accused Francisco Galit
and his wife having an argument in connection with the robbery and killing of the victim,
Natividad Fernando. It appears that on August 18, 1977, accused Galit and two others,
namely, Juling Dulay and a certain "Pabling" accidentally met each other at Marikina,
Rizal, and in their conversation, the three agreed to rob Natividad Fernando; that it was
further agreed among them to enter the premises of the victim's house at the back yard
by climbing over the fence; that once inside the premises, they will search every room,
especially the aparador and filing cabinets, with the sole aim of looking for cash money
and other valuables.
Witness Valentino further testified that on August 22, 1977, at around 6:00 o'clock in the
afternoon, accused Francisco Galit and his two companions, Juling Dulay and Pabling,
as per their previous agreement, met at the place where they formerly saw each other in
Mariquina, Rizal; that the three conspirators took a jeepney for Montalban and upon
passing the Montalban Municipal Building, they stopped and they waited at the side of
the road until the hour of midnight; that at about 12:00 o'clock that night, the three
repaired to the premises of the victim, Natividad Fernando; that they entered the said
premises through the back wall of the house; that while entering the premises of said
house, Juling Dulay saw a bolo, lying near the piggery compound, which he picked up
and used it to destroy the back portion of the wall of the house; that it was Juling Dulay
who first entered the house through the hole that they made, followed by the accused
Galit and next to him was "Pabling", that it was already early dawn of August 23, 1977
when the three were able to gain entrance into the house of the victim; as the three could
not find anything valuable inside the first room that they entered, Juling Dulay destroyed
the screen of the door of the victim, Natividad Fernando; that upon entering the room of
the victim, the three accused decided to kill first the victim, Natividad Fernando, before
searching the room for valuables; that Juling Dulay, who was then holding the bolo,
began hacking the victim, who was then sleeping, and accused Galit heard a moaning
sound from the victim; that after the victim was killed, the three accused began searching
the room for valuables; that they helped each other in opening the iron cabinet inside the
room of the victim, where they found some money; that when the three accused left the
room of the victim, they brought with them some papers and pictures which they threw
outside; that after killing and robbing the victim, the three accused went out of the
premises of the house, using the same way by which they gained entrance, which was
through the back portion of the wall; that the three accused walked towards the river bank
where they divided the loot that they got from the room of the victim; that their respective
shares amount to P70.00 for each of them; and that after receiving their shares of the
loot, the three accused left and went home.
When witness Florentino Valentino was in his room, which was adjoining that of accused
Francisco Galit, he overheard accused Galit and his wife quarreling about the intention of
accused Galit to leave their residence immediately; that he further stated that he

overheard accused Galit saying that he and his other two companions robbed and killed
Natividad Fernando.
As a result of the killing, the victim, Natividad Fernando, suffered no less than seven stab
wounds. There was massive cerebral hemorrhage and the cause of death was due to
shock and hemorrhage, as evidenced by the Medico-Legal Necropsy Report (Exhs. 'C'
and 'C-2'), and the pictures taken of the deceased victim (Exhs. 'E', 'E-1' and 'E-2').
8. The accused, upon the other hand, denied participation in the commission of the crime. He claimed
that he was in his house in Marikina, Rizal, when the crime was committed in Montalban, Rizal. He also
assailed the admissibility of the extra-judicial confession extracted from him through torture, force and
intimidation as described earlier, and without the benefit of counsel.
9. After a review of the records, We find that the evidence presented by the prosecution does not support
a conviction. In fact, the findings of the trial court relative to the acts attributed to the accused are not
supported by competent evidence. The principal prosecution witness, Florentino Valentino merely testified
that he and the accused were living together in one house in Marikina, Rizal, on August 23, 1977,
because the mother of his wife is the wife of the accused; that when he returned home at about 4:00
o'clock in the morning from the police station of Marikina, Rizal, the accused and his wife were quarreling
(nagtatalo); that he heard that the accused was leaving the house because he and his companions had
robbed "Aling Nene", the owner of a poultry farm and piggery in Montalban, Rizal; that the wife of the
accused was imploring him not to leave, but the latter was insistent; that he saw the accused carrying a
bag containing about two handfuls (dakot) of coins which he had taken from Aling Nene; that upon
learning of what the accused had done, he went to the Montalban police the next day and reported to the
police chief about what he had heard; and that a week later, Montalban policemen went to their house
and arrested the accused. 6
10. This Court, in the case of Morales vs. Ponce Enrile, 7 laid down the correct procedure for peace
officers to follow when making an arrest and in conducting a custodial investigation, and which We
reiterate:
7. At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform him
of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any. He shall
be informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any
statement he might make could be used against him. The person arrested shall have the
right to communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses by the most
expedient means by telephone if possible or by letter or messenger. It shall be the
responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that this is accomplished. No custodial
investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged by the
person arrested, by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition
either of the detainee himself or by anyone on his behalf. The right to counsel may be
waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. Any
statement obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid down, whether exculpatory or
inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence.
11. There were no eyewitnesses, no property recovered from the accused, no state witnesses, and not
even fingerprints of the accused at the scene of the crime. The only evidence against the accused is his
alleged confession. It behooves Us therefore to give it a close scrutiny. The statement begins as follows:

I. TANONG: Ipinagbibigay-alam ko sa inyo ang inyong mga karapatan sa ilalim ng SaligangBatas ng Pilipinas na kung inyong nanaisin ay maaaring hindi kayo magbigay ng isang
salaysay, na hindi rin kayo maaaring pilitin o saktan at pangakuan upang magbigay ng
naturang salaysay, na anuman ang inyong sasabihin sa pagsisiyasat na ito ay maaaring

laban sa inyo sa anumang usapin na maaaring ilahad sa anumang hukuman o tribunal dito
sa Pilipinas, na sa pagsisiyasat na ito ay maaaring katulungin mo ang isang manananggol at
kung sakaling hindi mo kayang bayaran ang isang manananggol ay maaaring bigyan ka ng
isa ng NBI. Ngayon at alam mo na ang mga ito nakahanda ka bang magbigay ng isang
kusang-loob na salaysay sa pagtatanong na ito?

SAGOT: Opo.
12. Such a long question followed by a monosyllabic answer does not satisfy the requirements of the law that the accused be informed of his
rights under the Constitution and our laws. Instead there should be several short and clear questions and every right explained in simple
words in a dialect or language known to the person under investigation. Accused is from Samar and there is no showing that he understands
Tagalog. Moreover, at the time of his arrest, accused was not permitted to communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or a friend. In fact, his
sisters and other relatives did not know that he had been brought to the NBI for investigation and it was only about two weeks after he had
executed the salaysay that his relatives were allowed to visit him. His statement does not even contain any waiver of right to counsel and yet
during the investigation he was not assisted by one. At the supposed reenactment, again accused was not assisted by counsel of his choice.
These constitute gross violations of his rights.
13. The alleged confession and the pictures of the supposed re-enactment are inadmissible as evidence because they were obtained in a
manner contrary to law.
14. Trial courts are cautioned to look carefully into the circumstances surrounding the taking of any confession, especially where the prisoner
claims having been maltreated into giving one. Where there is any doubt as to its voluntariness, the same must be rejected in toto.
15. Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Minister of Justice for whatever action he may deem proper to take against the investigating
officers.
16. WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from should be, as it is hereby, SET ASIDE, and another one entered ACQUITTING the accused
Francisco Galit of the crime charged. Let him be released from custody immediately unless held on other charges. With costs de oficio.
17. SO ORDERED.

CITIBANK, N.A. MASTERCARD, petitioner, vs. EFREN S. TEODORO, respondent.


DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Before secondary evidence may be admitted to prove the contents of original documents, the
offeror must prove the due execution and the subsequent loss or unavailability of the original.
The Case
The Petition for Review230[1] before us assails the July 31, 2001 Decision231[2] and the November
22, 2001 Resolution232[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 62891. The dispositive
portion of the challenged Decision reads as follows:
230
231
232

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED; and the Decisions of the trial
courts are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No costs.233[4]
The assailed Resolution denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
The Facts
Petitioner operates a credit card system through which it extends credit accommodations to its
cardholders for the purchase of goods and services from its member establishments. The
purchases are later on paid for by cardholders upon receipt of the billings or statements of
account from the company. Respondent Efren S. Teodoro was one such cardholder. On
December 14, 1990, he applied for membership with petitioner. After his application was
approved, he was issued Citibank, N.A. Mastercard No. 5423-3920-4457-7009.
Under the terms and conditions governing the use of the Citibank credit card, the cardholder
undertakes to pay all the purchases made using the card within the period indicated on the
statement of account or within thirty (30) days from the date or dates of its use. Charges that
remain unpaid within the period fixed in the monthly statement of account shall earn interest at
the rate of 3.5 percent per month plus a penalty fee equivalent to 5 percent of the amount due for
every month or even a fraction of a months delay.
Respondent made various purchases through his credit card. Accordingly, he was billed by
petitioner for those purchases, for which he tendered various payments.
Petitioner claims that as of January 20, 1995, the obligations of respondent stood at P191,693.25,
inclusive of interest and service charges. Several times it demanded payment from him, but he
refused to pay, claiming that the amount demanded did not correspond to his actual obligations.
His refusal prompted petitioner to file a Complaint for collection on January 25, 1996 before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 96-092 and
raffled to Branch 133.
The RTC, in an Order dated April 23, 1996, dismissed the Complaint for lack of jurisdiction over
the amount involved. The case was then transferred to the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) of
Makati City, where it was docketed as Civil Case No. 51586 and raffled to Branch 66.
During the trial, petitioner presented several sales invoices or charge slips, which added up to
only P24,388.36. Although mere photocopies of the originals, the invoices were marked in
evidence as Exhibits F to F-4. Because all these copies appeared to bear the signatures of
respondent, the trial court deemed them sufficient proof of his purchases with the use of the
credit card. Accordingly, the MTC in its July 25, 2000 Decision234[5] ordered him to pay
petitioner the amount of P24,388.36 plus interest and penalty fee. The material portion of the
Decision reads:
233
234

[Petitioner] is claiming that [respondent] made use of its credit card. And as of January 20, 1995,
[respondents] obligation to [petitioner] ballooned to the sum of P191,693.25.
This is clear according to [petitioner] as shown by the Statement of Accounts.
To the mind of this Court, the Statement of Account alone will not prove that [respondent] has an
outstanding obligation to [petitioner] in the amount of P191,693.95. This must be substantiated
by the Sales Invoices which unearthed the purchases made by [respondent] when he availed
himself of the credit card of [petitioner].
While it is true that [petitioner] has offered the Sales Invoices (Exhibits F, F-1, F-4) to show the
purchases made by [respondent], it is equally true also that adding all the amount in said
invoices, the sum of P191,693.95 which according to [petitioner] is the outstanding obligation of
[respondent], is hardly met. [Petitioner] even admitted that it could not produce all the invoices.
Without the other Sales Invoices, there is a cloud of doubt hovering over the claim of [petitioner]
to [respondent].
In fact, summing up all the amount[s] indicated in the aforesaid Sales Invoices the fact that the
[respondent] has incurred to [petitioner] an obligation in the amount of P24,388.36 as a result of
the formers availment of the credit card of the latter.
It is elementary procedure that [petitioner] must prove [its] case with preponderance of evidence.
Without all the other Sales Invoices to uncover the purchases made by [respondent] when he
used the credit card of [petitioner], it is undeniable x x x that [petitioner] is caught in the web of
doubt with respect to the accuracy of its claim to the [respondent].
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court hereby renders judgment as follows:
1. Ordering [respondent] to pay [petitioner] P24,388.36 with an interest of 3.5% and a penalty
fee equivalent to another 5% of the amount due for every month due or a fraction of a months
delay starting February 21, 1995 until the entire obligation is fully paid;
2. Ordering [respondent] to pay [petitioner] 25% of any and all amounts due and payable as
agreed attorneys fees plus cost of suit.235[6]
Thereafter, respondent appealed the MTC judgment to the RTC of Makati City, where the appeal
was docketed as Civil Case No. 00-1051 and raffled to Branch 146. In its October 30, 2000
Decision,236[7] the RTC affirmed the MTC Decision in toto.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals

235
236

The focal issue of the case according to the CA was whether the photocopies of the sales
invoices or charge slips, marked as Exhibits F to F-4, were competent proofs of the obligations
of respondent. These were the only evidence presented by petitioner that could prove the actual
amount of obligation he had incurred in favor of the former. In reversing the trial courts, the CA
ruled that this evidence was insufficient to prove any liability on respondents part.
According to Sections 3 and 5 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, whenever the subject of inquiry
is the content of a document, its original must be produced, as it is the best evidence to prove
such content. Secondary evidence, like the subject photocopies, is inadmissible. It will be
admissible only if the offeror proves (a) any of the exceptions enumerated in Section 3 and (b)
the conditions for its admissibility set forth in Section 5 of Rule 130. For secondary evidence to
be admissible, there must be satisfactory proof of (1) the due execution of the original; (2) the
originals loss, destruction or unavailability that is not due to the offerors bad faith; and (3)
reasonable diligence and good faith in the search for or attempt to produce the original.
Although petitioner was able to prove the existence of the original sales invoices, it failed to
prove their due execution or to account for their loss or unavailability.
Hence, this Petition.237[8]
Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues for our consideration:
I.Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in reversing and setting aside the decision of the trial
courts for insufficiency of evidence to support its findings.
II.
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in holding that petitioner failed to prove the
due execution and the cause of the unavailability and non-production of the charge slips marked
in evidence as Exhibits F to F-4.238[9]
In brief, the main issue boils down to whether the photocopies of the sales invoices or charge
slips marked during trial as Exhibits F to F-4 are admissible in evidence.
The Courts Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
Main Issue:
Admissibility of Photocopies

237
238

Petitioner contends that the testimony239[10] of its principal witness - Mark Hernando, assistant
manager of Citibank, N.A. Mastercard -- proves the following:
a) the existence or due execution of the original sales invoices which sufficiently proved
respondents liability of P24,388.36;
b) the loss or unavailability of the original sales invoices; and
c) petitioners reasonable diligence and good faith in the search for or attempt to produce the
originals.
It further argues that Hernando competently identified the signatures of respondent on the sales
invoices, having recognized them as identical to the signature on the latters credit card
application form.
On the other hand, respondent maintains that petitioner failed to prove the due execution of the
sales invoices. According to him, Hernando was not privy to such execution and could not have
properly or competently declared that the signatures on the invoices and on the application form
belonged to the former. The latter was not the person before whom the application form was
signed, executed or acknowledged; he was not even present then. As to the sales invoices and
respondents alleged signatures thereon, he saw them only after the Complaint had been filed in
court or long after those invoices had been executed. He was therefore not competent to identify
the signatures.
Because Hernandez had not actually witnessed the execution of the sales invoices and the
application form, respondent concludes that petitioner failed to observe Section 5 of Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court, which provides that the contents of the original may be proven by the
testimony of witnesses.
Finally, respondent contends that the alleged loss or unavailability of the original sales invoices
was not sufficiently established. Allegedly, Hernandez had requested the originals from Equitable
Credit Card Network, Inc., but failed to show in court that he had followed up his request as
advised by another witness, Zen Hipolito. Therefore, the requirement of reasonable diligence and
good faith in the search for or attempt to produce the originals was not satisfied, because he had
shown no proof of having followed up the request.
The burden of proof rests upon petitioner, as plaintiff, to establish its case based on a
preponderance of evidence. It is well-settled that in civil cases, the party that alleges a fact has
the burden of proving it.240[11] Petitioner failed to prove that respondent had an obligation in the
principal amount of P24,388.36, because the photocopies of the original sales invoices it had

239
240

presented in court were inadmissible in evidence. Moreover, had they been admissible, they
would still have had little probative value.241[12]
The original copies of the sales invoices are the best evidence to prove the alleged obligation.
Photocopies thereof are mere secondary evidence. As such, they are inadmissible because
petitioner, as the offeror, failed to prove any of the exceptions provided under Section 3242[13] of
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, as well s the conditions of their admissibility. Because of the
inadmissibility of the photocopies in the absence of the originals, respondents obligation was not
established.
Section 5 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court states:
SEC. 5. When original document is unavailable. When the original document has been lost or
destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence
and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy,
or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the
order stated.
Applying the above Rule to the present case, before a party is allowed to adduce secondary
evidence to prove the contents of the original sales invoices, the offeror must prove the
following: (1) the existence or due execution of the original; (2) the loss and destruction of the
original or the reason for its nonproduction in court; and (3) on the part of the offeror, the
absence of bad faith to which the unavailability of the original can be attributed.243[14] The correct
order of proof is as follows: existence, execution, loss, and contents. At the sound discretion of
the court, this order may be changed if necessary.244[15]
In the present case, the existence of the original sales invoices was established by the
photocopies and the testimony of Hernandez. Petitioner, however, failed to prove that the
originals had been lost or could not be produced in court after reasonable diligence and good
faith in searching for them.
Indeed, the loss of the originals and reasonable diligence in the search for them were conditions
that were not met, because the sales invoices might have been found by Equitable. Hernandez,
testifying that he had requested the originals from Equitable, failed to show that he had
subsequently followed up the request.245[16]

241
242
243
244

Finally, when more than one original copy exists, it must appear that all of them have been lost,
destroyed, or cannot be produced in court before secondary evidence can be given of any one. A
photocopy may not be used without accounting for the other originals.246[17]
In Santos v. Santos247[18] the Court upheld the pronouncement of the CA that before the appellees
therein could be allowed to adduce secondary evidence to prove the contents of the original, they
had to prove -- with the requisite quantum of evidence -- the loss, the destruction or the
unavailability of all original copies of the document.
In the present case, triplicates were produced, although the cardholder signed the sales invoice
only once.248[19] During the trial, Hernandez explained that an original copy had gone to
respondent, another to the merchant, and still another to petitioner.249[20]
Each of these three copies is regarded as an original in accordance with Section 4 (b) of Rule 130
of the Rules of Court.250[21] Petitioner failed to show that all three original copies were
unavailable, and that due diligence had been exercised in the search for them.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-61259 April 26, 1983
LIONS CLUBS INTERNATIONAL and JAMES L. SO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. AUGUSTO M. AMORES, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Manila, Branch XXIV, COURT OF APPEALS and VICENTE JOSEFA, respondents.
Marcia M. Magsino Law Office for petitioners.
Arturo S. Santos for respondents.
245
246
247
248
249
250

GUERRERO, J.:
Where the Constitution of petitioner association, the Lions Clubs International,
specifically provides that all Lions Clubs so organized shall be under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the International Board of Directors (Sec. 5, Art. III) and that all District
Governor election results shall be adopted by the International Board of Directors and
thereby become effective, except in the case of an election protest filed or legal action
resulting therefrom, in which event the appointment or election of such District Governor
shall be subject to action by the International Board of Directors [Sec. 8(a), (1) 2nd par.,
Art. VII] and in accordance therewith, the election protest between petitioner So and
respondent Josefa for the position of District Governor of District 301-Al Philippines for
the fiscal year 1982-1983 was filed and elevated to the International Board of Directors
through its Constitution and By-Laws Committee following the prescribed Constitutional
Complaints Procedure and said Committee conducted a hearing therein attended by the
parties, each claiming to be duly elected to the disputed position, the decision of the
International Board of Directors adopting the Committee's Report and approving the
election of petitioner James L. So to server as District Governor of District 301-Al for the
fiscal year 1982-1983 is final, binding, and conclusive, it being a question of policy,
discipline, and internal government in the relation of the mother organization with local
clubs organized, chartered and supervised exclusively thereunder, absent any clear
showing of mistake, fraud, conclusion or arbitrariness and, therefore, the basic matter in
dispute in the instant petition as to who has the right to the contested office presents no
justiciable controversy that necessitates judicial interference or intervention.
The case at bar is a special civil action for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition with
prayer to lift the restraining order issued by the Court of Appeals, (now the Intermediate
Appellate Court) in CA-G.R. No. 14599- SP entitled "Vicente Josefa. Petitioner, versus
Hon. Judge Augusto M. Amores, Lions Clubs International, and James L. So.
Respondents."
The principal adversaries in this controversy are respondent Vicente Josefa of the
Manila Traders Lions Club and petitioner James L. So of the Manila Centrum Lions
Club, which Lions clubs are duly organized, chartered, and affiliated with Lions Clubs
International having its International offices at 300 22nd Street, Oakbrook, Illinois
60570, U.S.A. The Manila Traders Lions Club and the Manila Centrum Lions Club,
together with other Lions clubs, are embraced and constituted into the newly organized
District 301-Al. The Lions districts in the country form the so-called Multiple District
301,Philippines. All clubs so organized and chartered under the Constitution of Lions

Clubs International are under the exclusive supervision of the International Board of
Directors.
The records show that on July 1, 1982, Vicente Josefa filed a complaint for Quo
Warranto, Injunction, Damages with writ of preliminary injunction and prayer for
temporary restraining order docketed as Civil Case No. 82-10588 in the Court of First
Instance of Manila against Lions Clubs International and James L. So, defendants.
alleging inter alia the following material and pertinent allegations: that Josefa and So
filed their certificates of candidacy for the position of District Governor of District 301-Al
for the fiscal year 1982-83; that before the elections, or on April 22, 1982, an agreement
was executed between Josefa and So for the purpose of avoiding an expensive, fullblown election contest, whereby the latter withdrew his certificate of candidacy in favor
of Josefa; that said withdrawal of So was duly accepted by District 301-A through
Governor Huang who affixed his signature to the aforesaid agreement; that however,
news items were published conveying the Idea that So had not withdrawn from the
gubernatorial race; that Gov. Huang informed Josefa that So had not filed a new
certificate of candidacy and that the District did not recognize So as a candidate to any
position; that a telex was sent to Lions Clubs International requesting information
whether So was still a candidate after his withdrawal and Lions International
admonished incumbent Governor Huang to enforce the Constitution and By-Laws of
Multiple District 301 if the withdrawal was in fact made and accepted by the District.
It was further alleged that on the day of the election, June 6, 1982, the Chairman of the
Nominations Committee reported at the Plenary Session of the 33rd Multiple District
Convention held at the Little Theater of the Olongapo High School, Olongapo City, that
because of So's failure to file another certificate of candidacy, the District recognized
only one candidate, Vicente Josefa, for Governor; that, however, some members of the
Council of Past District Governors arbitrarily set aside said report and proclaimed So as
a qualified candidate, which action was vigorously objected to by some Lions present in
the Plenary Session on the ground that the session was not the proper quorum to
deliberate and decide on the matter as some of those present were Lions and
Lionesses who were not qualified to vote; that the Past District Governors dismissed the
members of the Nomination Committee, Election Committee, and other committees
incharge of the accreditation of votes and unlawfully appointed new members thereof.
The complaint likewise alleged that during all this time, armed men by force and
intimidation prevented known leaders and followers of Josefa from entering the Plenary
Session; that forced by the deteriorated peace and order in the convention hall and by
virtue of the powers vested in him by the State Council of Governors, as well as the
Rules of Procedure, Gov. Huang through his Cabinet Secretary announced in the
Plenary Session that he has changed the venue of the election from the Little Theater of

the Olongapo High School to its new site at the ground floor of Admiral Hotel, also at
Olongapo City; that to this transfer, Vice Chairman of the State Council of Governors,
Gov. Ramon Beleno and the Secretary General of the hosting clubs Estanislao Cesa, Jr.
made no objections, provided the cost of facilities of new venue is not shouldered by
them.
Plaintiff Josefa also alleged that So and some members of the Council of Past District
Governors continued to hold and supervise an illegal election at the old site where
voting and non-voting delegates and alternates were allowed to cast their votes without
ballots, without ballot boxes and without the issuance of valid accreditation papers of
the registered voting delegates; that in the meantime, at the election held at the Admiral
Hotel Supervised by Gov. Huang, Josefa obtained 115 votes, a majority of the qualified
voting delegates duly accredited, and was duly proclaimed as the Governor-elect of
District 301-Al by the State Council of Governors; that, however, defendant Lions Clubs
International unlawfully recognized So as the winner.
And finally alleging that So would assume the powers and prerogatives of Governor of
District 301-Al at the closing program of the International Convention on July 3, 1982,
Josefa prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or at least a temporary
restraining order. He likewise asked for moral damages and for attorney's fees.
Finding the foregoing allegations of the complaint to be sufficient in form and substance,
the Court of First Instance on the same date, July 1, 1982, issued a temporary
restraining order enjoining So from assuming the powers and prerogatives of the office
of Governor of District 301-Al, and Lions Clubs International, represented by Antonio
Ramos, from recognizing and proclaiming So as the Governor of District 301-Al for the
fiscal year 1982- 1983.
On July 8, 1982, defendants So and Lions Club International filed a Motion to Dismiss
and to Lift Restraining Order on the grounds that: (1) the Court of First Instance had no
jurisdiction over the person of the defendants or over the subject of the action or suit; (2)
venue is improperly laid; and (3) there is another action pending between the same
parties for the same cause. Plaintiff Josefa filed his Opposition, to which defendants
filed a Reply.
On July 26, 1982, the Court of First Instance issued an Order denying defendants'
motion to dismiss. Finding the Motion to lift restraining order to be meritorious, the Court
set aside said restraining order.
Before the hearing on the application for a writ of preliminary injunction, Josefa filed in
the Court of Appeals on July 29, 1982 a petition docketed as CA-G.R. No. 14599-SP for

certiorari with preliminary and mandatory injunction and a prayer for a temporary
restraining order, assailing that portion of the Order of the Court of First Instance dated
July 26, 1982 lifting the restraining order. Josefa contended that by lifting said
restraining order without awaiting the evidence on his petition for a writ of injunction, So
would immediately assume the contested position, the very act sought to be enjoined,
thereby making the action moot and academic and whatever favorable judgment may
be rendered in the main action would be rendered useless and nugatory.
The appellate court in a Resolution dated July 29, 1982 issued a temporary restraining
order "restraining and prohibiting the respondents (Hon. Judge Augusto M. Amores,
Lions Clubs International and James L. So) from implementing the questioned Order of
July 26, 1982 issued in Civil Case No. 82-10588 particularly the portion thereof lifting
the temporary restraining order issued by the respondent Judge on July 1, 1982 until
further orders ... "
Herein petitioners Lions Clubs International and James L. So now come to this Court
attributing grave abuse of discretion to the Court of First Instance of Manila for the
denial of their Motion to Dismiss dated July 6, 1982, and contending that the Court of
Appeals acted in excess of its jurisdiction in issuing its temporary restraining order of
July 29, 1982. As prayed for by said petitioners, We issued on August 4, 1982 a
temporary restraining order enjoining the enforcement of the assailed temporary
restraining order of the Court of Appeals.
The basic issue posed for Our determination is the justiciability of the election dispute
between herein petitioner James L. So and private respondent Vicente Josefa for the
position of District Governor of District 301-Al Philippines. It is petitioners' submission
that the subject matter of the instant case is purely an internal affair of the Lions
organization and, therefore, is beyond judicial review. On the other hand, private
respondent maintains that court intervention is warranted when, as he alleges in this
case, there is fraud, oppression. bad faith, when the proceedings in question are
violative of the laws of the association, or where the proceedings are illegal.
We find for the petitioners and in finding so, We adopt the general rule that "... the
courts will not interfere with the internal affairs of an unincorporated association so as to
settle disputes between the members, or questions of policy, discipline, or internal
government, so long as the government of the society is fairly and honestly
administered in conformity with its laws and the law of the land, and no property or civil
rights are invaded. Under such circumstances, the decision of the governing body or
established private tribunal of the association is binding and conclusive and not subject
to review or collateral attack in the courts. " (7 C.J.S. pp. 38- 39).

The general rule of non-interference in the internal affairs of associations is, however,
subject to exceptions, but the power of review is extremely limited. Accordingly, the
courts have and will exercise power to interfere in the internal affairs of an association
where law and justice so require, and the proceedings of the association are subject to
judicial review where there is fraud, oppression, or bad faith, or where the action
complained of is capricious, arbitrary, or unjustly discriminatory. Also, the courts will
usually entertain jurisdiction to grant relief in case property or civil rights are invaded,
although it has also been held that the involvement of property rights does not
necessarily authorize judicial intervention, in the absence of arbitrariness, fraud or
collusion. Moreover, the courts will intervene where the proceedings in question are
violative of the laws of the society, or the law of the land, as by depriving a person of
due process of law. Similarly, judicial intervention is warranted where there is a lack of
jurisdiction on the part of the tribunal conducting the proceedings, where the
organization exceeds its powers, or where the proceedings are otherwise illegal. (7
C.J.S., pp. 39-41).
In accordance with the general rules as to judicial interference cited above, the decision
of an unincorporated association on the question of an election to office is a matter
peculiarly and exclusively to be determined by the association, and, in the absence of
fraud, is final and binding on the courts. (7 C.J.S., p. 44).
The instant controversy between petitioner So and respondent Josefa falls squarely
within the ambit of the rule of judicial non-intervention or non- interference. The
elections in dispute, the manner by which it was conducted and the results thereof, is
strictly the internal affair that concerns only the Lions association and/or its members,
and We find from the records that the same was resolved within the organization of
Lions Clubs International in accordance with the Constitution and By-Laws which are
not immoral, unreasonable, contrary to public policy, or in contravention of the laws of
the land.
It is of judicial notice that a Lions club is a voluntary association of civic-minded men
whose general purpose and aim is to serve the people and the community. It appears
from the records that duly organized and chartered Lions clubs all over the world are
under the supervision of the mother club known as The International Association of
Lions Clubs for Lions Clubs International) which holds international offices in Illinois,
U.S.A., and is governed by its constitution and by-laws. The objects of this worldwide
organization are:
(a) To create and foster a spirit of understanding among the peoples of the
world.

(b) To promote the principles of good government and good citizenship.


(c) To take an active interest in the civil, cultural, social and moral welfare
of the community.
(d) To unite the clubs in the bonds of friendship, good fellowship and
mutual understanding.
(e) To provide a forum for the open discussion of all matters of public
interest provided, however, that partisan politics and secretarian religon
shall not be debated by club members.
(f) To encourage service-minded men to serve their community without
personal financial reward, and to encourage efficiency and -promote high
ethical standards in commerce, industry, professions, public works and
private endeavors. (Constitution of the International Association of Lions
Clubs, Article II, Section 2.)
Member clubs are chartered in accordance with the provisions of its constitution which
provide that:
Section 4. ... A Lions club shall be considered chartered when its charter
has been officially issued. The acceptance of a charter by a Lions Club
shall be a ratification of, and agreement on its part to be bound by, the
Constitution and By-Laws of this Association and a submission by said
Lions Club to have its relationship with this Association interpreted and
governed by this Constitution and By-Laws according to the laws in effect,
from time to time, in the State of Incorporation of The International
Association of Lions Clubs.
Section 5. Except as otherwise provided herein, the International Board of
Directors shall have full power and authority to sanction the organization
and chartering of all clubs, under such rules and regulations as it may
prescribe.
Subject to the provisions of this Constitution and By-Laws, all club so
organized shall be under the exclusive jurisdiction of said Board of
Directors."
Aside from the obligation to carry on activities for the advancement of the civic, cultural,
social or moral welfare of the community and for the promotion of international
understanding, a chartered Lions club shall "(j) abide by the policies and requirements

as determined, from time to time, by the International Board of Directors." (Constitution,


Art. XI, Sec. 1). The International Board of Directors is composed of the President,
Immediate Past President, First and Second and Third Vice Presidents and 28
Directors. (Art. V, Sec. 1, Constitution).
In the matter of the election for the office of District Governor, the Constitution of Lions
International provides:
Section 8 (a) Subject to the provisions of Sec. 2 of this Article VII:
(1) ...
An election for the office of District Governor shall be conducted in
accordance with the provisions of the respective District (Single, Sub or
Multiple) Constitution and By-Laws. The results of each District Governor
election shall be reported to the International Office by the respective
current District Governor and/or the Association's Extension
Representative. The results so reported shall be presented to the
International Board of Directors. All District Governor election results shall
be adopted by the International Board of Directors and thereby become
effective, except in the case of an election protest filed or legal action
resulting therefrom in which event the appointment or election of such
District Governor shall be subject to action by the International Board of
Directors, (Emphasis supplied)
The records disclose that the election dispute between petitioner James L. So and
respondent Vicente Josefa was brought before and elevated to the International Board
of Directors through the Constitution and By-Laws Committee of Lions Clubs
International, 300 22nd Street, Oakbrook, Illinois 60570, U.S.A. (See Letter Protest of
petitioner So marked Annex "20", pp. 187-190, Records and Answer of Gov. Huang
marked Annex "21 ", pp. 191-196, Records).
In his formal protest dated June 11, 1982, petitioner So assailed the validity of the
"alleged election and proclamation" of Lion Vicente Josefa as District Governor of
District 301-Al for the Lions fiscal year 1982-1983 and called attention to the "blatant
display of oppressive conduct of Gov. James T. Huang of District 301-Al before, during,
and after the just concluded convention in the hope that the mistakes and miscarriage of
justice be rectified." Narrating the sequence of events, petitioner claimed that Gov.
Huang failed to constitute and present within the prescribed periods, the District
Nominations and Elections Committee in violation of the Multiple District 301
Constitution and By-Laws; that duly registered delegates were deliberately

disenfranchised; that Gov. Huang arbitrarily transferred the venue of election from the
Little Theater, Olongapo City National High School, to the Admiral Hotel which was the
headquarters of his opponent, Vicente Josefa, without the sanction and authority of the
State Council of Governors and the Convention.
Petitioner So pointed out that he was duly nominated by the District Nominations
Committee as well as respondent Vicente Josefa and in the elections duly conducted by
the Election Committee at the official venue at the Little Theater, he received 147 votes
as against 3 votes in favor of Josefa and that the 147 votes he received is a clear
majority of the total number of registered delegates of District 301-Al which was 251, or
a clear majority of 59%. The election results were duly certified by the Convention
Chairman and by the official representative of the State Council of Governors, District
Gov. Ramon Beleno of District 301-E. Petitioner, therefore, prayed that he be
recognized as the duly elected District Governor of District 301-Al for the Lion fiscal year
1982-1983.
Answering the letter-protest of petitioner So and as directed by Lions Clubs
International, Gov. Huang in his letter dated June 17, 1982 denied the assertions of the
protestant, petitioner So, and maintained that he had faithfully performed all the duties
and responsibilities of his office in accordance With the Constitution and By-Laws, of the
Multiple District, citing incidents wherein followers of petitioner So allegedly created
trouble by booing, shouting and uttering invectives and armed men intimidated followers
of Josefa from entering the Little Theater. In changing the venue of elections, Huang
said he wanted "a democratic and peaceful election which could not be achieved in the
old site because of the unruly and deteriorated atmosphere caused by the agitations
from the camp of James L. So." Gov. Huang, moreover, contended that the election in
the Little Theater was never legally convened as there were no ballots, no accreditation
papers, no ballot boxes and other important papers relative to an honest election. And
since the election of Josefa was proclaimed by the State Council of Governors, Gov.
Huang prayed that the election of Governor-elect Vicente Josefa be sustained and
affirmed. Filed and attached to the Answer of Gov. Huang is the Report of the Governor
to Lions Clubs International including reports of the Election Committee, the Board of
Canvassers, Minutes of the Election Proceedings, Certification of the Proclamation of
Governor-elect Josefa and Resolution of the State Council of Governors confirming the
proclamation. (See Annex "22", pp.197-203).
Thereafter, the Constitution and by-Laws Committee, through Joseph D. Stone, General
Counsel of the International Association of Lions Clubs, submitted to the International
Board of Directors the following Report:

The International Board of Directors has received a complaint filed by Lion


James L. So. This complaint has been filed in accordance with the
Constitutional Complaints Procedure of the International Board of
Directors. All parties have been given the opportunity to respond and have
filed their official response with the International Association.
Your Committee has examined the evidence submitted by the parties and
has conducted a hearing attended by Lion So, District Governor of District
301-A Lion James Huang Lion Vicente Josefa and Multiple District 301
Council Chairman Lion Antonio Ramos.
Your Committee hereby makes the following finding of facts and
recommendations respecting the election for the office of District Governor
in District 301-Al for the fiscal year 1982-83:
1. That there were two properly nominated candidates for the
office of District Governor, District 301-Al, for the fiscal year
1982-83: Lion James L. So and Lion Vicente Josefa.
2. That one hour after the designated convening time,
District Governor Huang transferred the election meeting
from the designated site to the Admiral Royal Hotel.
3. That after the announcement of District Governor Huang
transferring the election meeting, a majority of the delegates
of the newly authorized District 301-Al remained at the
designated site and convened an election for District
Governor between the two candidates, Lion So and Lion
Josefa.
4. That there were two elections held on June 6, 1982 for the
office of District Governor of District 301-Al.
5. That one election was held as a part of the official District
Convention at the designated election meeting site, the Little
Theater Olongapo National High School, at which Lion So
received 147 votes and Lion Josefa received 3 votes.
6. That the other election was held at the Admiral Royale
Hotel at which Lion Josefa received 115 votes.

7. That the action of District Governor Huang in transferring


the election meeting away from the convention site was
without approval of a majority of the delegates and was
without any clear authority and justification.
8. That the said election meeting held at the Little Theatre
Olongapo National High School was properly conducted and
resulted in the election of Lion So.
9. That said election of Lion So was duly certified by the
official Election Committee Chairman Lion Ernesto
Castaeda, appointed by District Governor Huang and
District Governor Beleno of District 301-E, the official
Multiple District Council representative.
Based upon the above finding of facts your Committee is of the opinion
that Lion James L. So was duly elected as District Governor, District 301Al for the fiscal year 1982-83 and that said election should be recognized
by the International Board of Directors. Your Committee is also of the
opinion that the election conducted by District Governor Huang, 301-A, at
the Admiral Royale Hotel was unauthorized and improper and is thereby
null and void. Your Committee recommends that the Board concur in said
finding of facts and recommendations by the adoption of RESOLUTION
III-A hereinafter." (Annexes "O" and "O-1", Reply, pp. 237-238, Records).
At the meeting of the International Board of Directors held on June 27, 1982, the
election of petitioner James L. So to serve as District Governor of District 301-Al for the
fiscal year 1982-83 was approved and said petitioner was duly informed thereof by
Richard G. Rice, Manager, District Operations Department, Lions Clubs International in
his letter dated July 8, 1982 and marked Annex "K" to the petition, p. 79, Records.
Petitioner attended and completed the District Governors' Executive Seminar as District
Governor of 301-Al (see Annex "L", P. 80, Records). On June 29, 1982, petitioner So
was proclaimed, sworn to and installed to office as District Governor of District 301-Al
by the President of Lions International at the close of the 65th Lions Clubs International
Convention held in Atlanta, Georgia, U.S.A.
The Report of the Constitution and By-laws Committee duly approved and adopted by
the International Board of Directors clearly belies the claim of injustice alleged by
respondent Josefa in his complaint in Civil Case No. 82-10588 that petitioner So was
illegally and arbitrarily nominated; that the latter's election was illegal and that he
(Josefa) was legally elected in a valid election held at the new venue and was duly

proclaimed by the State Council of Governors and that Lions International unlawfully
recognized So as the winner on the basis of his illegal election. These findings upon the
evidence submitted and examined at the hearing of the election protest before the
Committee personally attended by both petitioner So and respondent Josefa may not be
disturbed by the courts. The decision of the Association's tribunal, the International
Board of Directors, is controlling since respondent Josefa alleges no invasion of this
property or civil rights and neither is it claimed that the government of the Association is
not fairly and honestly administered in conformity with its laws and the law of the land.
It is clear that under the Constitution of Lions International, Art. IV, Section, 8, the
District Governor serves without compensation. Lionism prides itself in that its motto is:
"We serve", and "Liberty, Intelligence, Our Nation's Safety" its slogan or credo. (Secs. 2
and 3, Art. 1, Constitution). There is, therefore, no proprietary or pecuniary interest
involved in the membership of the Lions and in the offices they seek and hold in the club
and district levels. Being merely a member or officer of the Lions Clubs or District is only
a privilege and an opportunity for service to the community that is not enforceable at
law. And since the disputed election to the position of District Governor is within the
peculiar province and function of Lions International through its established tribunal to
decide and determine in accordance with its governing laws, its resolution may not be
questioned elsewhere, much less in the courts.
Thus, in Our jurisprudence in U.S. vs. Caete 38 Phil. 253, the Supreme Court held that
in matters purely ecclesiastical, the decision of the proper church tribunals are
conclusive upon the civil tribunals and that a church member who is expelled from
membership by the church authorities or a priest or minister who is by then deprived of
his sacred office, is without remedy in the civil court, which will not inquire into the
correctness of the decision of the ecclesiastical tribunals. So also in Felipe vs. Leuterio,
et al, 91 Phil. 482, We held that the judiciary has no power to reverse the award of the
Board of Judges of an oratorical contest and for that matter, it would not interfere in
literary contests, beauty contests, and similar competitions.
In essence, the courts, considering the nature of the action or suit at bar, are without
jurisdiction and authority to review and reverse the decision of the International Board of
Directors, Lions Clubs International, approving and recognizing the petitioner as duly
elected District Governor of District 301-A1 for the fiscal year 1982-1983.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, Civil Case No. 82- 10588 entitled
"Vicente Josefa vs. Lions Clubs International, Antonio Ramos and Lion James L. So",
Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XXIV (now Regional Trial Court, National
Capital Region) and the petition entitled "Vicente Josefa vs. Hon. Judge Augusto M.

Amores, Lions Clubs International and James L. So", CA-G.R. No. 14599-SP (now
Intermediate Appellate Court) are hereby DISMISSED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
RAFAEL S. ORTAEZ, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, OSCAR INOCENTES, AND
ASUNCION LLANES INOCENTES, respondents.
RESOLUTION
FRANCISCO, J.:
On September 30, 1982, private respondents sold to petitioner two (2) parcels of registered land
in Quezon City for a consideration of P35,000.00 and P20,000.00, respectively. The first deed of
absolute sale covering Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 258628 provides in part:
"That for and in consideration of the sum of THIRTY FIVE THOUSAND (P35,000.00) PESOS,
receipt of which in full is hereby acknowledged, we have sold, transferred and conveyed, as we
hereby sell, transfer and convey, that subdivided portion of the property covered by TCT No.
258628 known as Lot No. 684-G-1-B-2 in favor of RAFAEL S. ORTANEZ, of legal age,
Filipino. whose marriage is under a regime of complete separation of property, and a resident of
942 Aurora Blvd., Quezon City, his heirs or assigns."xiv[1]
while the second deed of absolute sale covering TCT No. 243273 provides:
"That for and in consideration of the sum of TWENTY THOUSAND (P20,000.00) PESOS
receipt of which in full is hereby acknowledged, we have sold, transferred and conveyed, as we
hereby sell, transfer and convey, that consolidated-subdivided portion of the property covered by
TCT No. 243273 known as Lot No. 5 in favor of RAFAEL S. ORTANEZ, of legal age, Filipino,
whose marriage is under a regime of complete separation of property, and a resident of 942
Aurora Blvd., Cubao, Quezon City his heirs or assigns.xv[2]
Private respondents received the payments for the above-mentioned lots, but failed to deliver the
titles to petitioner. On April 9, 1990 the latter demanded from the former the delivery of said
titles.xvi[3] Private respondents, however, refused on the ground that the title of the first lot is in
the possession of another person,xvii[4] and petitioner's acquisition of the title of the other lot is
subject to certain conditions.
Offshoot, petitioner sued private respondents for specific performance before the RTC. In their
answer with counterclaim private respondents merely alleged the existence of the following oral
conditionsxviii[5] which were never reflected in the deeds of sale:xix[6]
"3.3.2 Title to the other property (TCT No. 243273) remains with the defendants (private
respondents) until plaintiff (petitioner) shows proof that all the following requirements have been
met:

(i) Plaintiff will cause the segregation of his right of way amounting to 398 sq. m.;
(ii) Plaintiff will submit to the defendants the approved plan for the segregation;
(iii) Plaintiff will put up a strong wall between his property and that of defendants' lot to
segregate his right of way;
(iv) Plaintiff will pay the capital gains tax and all other expenses that may be incurred by reason
of sale. x x x."
During trial, private respondent Oscar Inocentes, a former judge, orally testified that the sale was
subject to the above conditions,xx[7] although such conditions were not incorporated in the deeds
of sale. Despite petitioner's timely objections on the ground that the introduction of said oral
conditions was barred by the parol evidence rule, the lower court nonetheless, admitted them and
eventually dismissed the complaint as well as the counterclaim. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
(CA) affirmed the court a quo. Hence, this petition.
We are tasked to resolve the issue on the admissibility of parol evidence to establish the alleged
oral conditions-precedent to a contract of sale, when the deeds of sale are silent on such
conditions.
The parol evidence herein introduced is inadmissible. First, private respondents' oral testimony
on the alleged conditions, coming from a party who has an interest in the outcome of the case,
depending exclusively on human memory, is not as reliable as written or documentary
evidence.xxi[8] Spoken words could be notoriously unreliable unlike a written contract which
speaks of a uniform language.xxii[9] Thus, under the general rule in Section 9 of Rule 130xxiii[10] of
the Rules of Court, when the terms of an agreement were reduced to writing, as in this case, it is
deemed to contain all the terms agreed upon and no evidence of such terms can be admitted other
than the contents thereof.xxiv[11] Considering that the written deeds of sale were the only
repository of the truth, whatever is not found in said instruments must have been waived and
abandoned by the parties.xxv[12] Examining the deeds of sale, we cannot even make an inference
that the sale was subject to any condition. As a contract, it is the law between the parties.xxvi[13]
Secondly, to buttress their argument, private respondents rely on the case of Land Settlement
Development, Co. vs. Garcia Plantationxxvii[14] where the Court ruled that a condition precedent to
a contract may be established by parol evidence. However, the material facts of that case are
different from this case. In the former, the contract sought to be enforcedxxviii[15] expressly stated
that it is subject to an agreement containing the conditions-precedent which were proven through
parol evidence. Whereas, the deeds of sale in this case, made no reference to any pre- conditions
or other agreement. In fact, the sale is denominated as absolute in its own terms.
Third, the parol evidence herein sought to be introduced would vary, contradict or defeat the
operation of a valid instrument,xxix[16] hence, contrary to the rule that:

The parol evidence rule forbids any addition to x x x the terms of a written instrument by
testimony purporting to show that, at or before the signing of the document, other or different
terms were orally agreed upon by the parties.xxx[17]
Although parol evidence is admissible to explain the meaning of a contract, "it cannot serve the
purpose of incorporating into the contract additional contemporaneous conditions which are not
mentioned at all in the writing unless there has been fraud or mistake." xxxi[18] No such fraud or
mistake exists in this case.
Fourth, we disagree with private respondents' argument that their parol evidence is admissible
under the exceptions provided by the Rules, specifically, the alleged failure of the agreement to
express the true intent of the parties. Such exception obtains only in the following instance:
"[W]here the written contract is so ambiguous or obscure in terms that the contractual intention
of the parties cannot be understood from a mere reading of the instrument. In such a case,
extrinsic evidence of the subject matter of the contract, of the relations of the parties to each
other, and of the facts and circumstances surrounding them when they entered into the contract
may be received to enable the court to make a proper interpretation of the instrument." xxxii[19]
In this case, the deeds of sale are clear, without any ambiguity, mistake or imperfection, much
less obscurity or doubt in the terms thereof.
Fifth, we are not persuaded by private respondents contention that they "put in issue by the
pleadings" the failure of the written agreement to express the true intent of the parties. Record
showsxxxiii[20] that private respondents did not expressly plead that the deeds of sale were
incomplete or that it did not reflect the intentionxxxiv[21] of the buyer (petitioner) and the seller
(private respondents). Such issue must be "squarely presented."xxxv[22] Private respondents merely
alleged that the sale was subject to four (4) conditions which they tried to prove during trial by
parol evidence.xxxvi[23] Obviously, this cannot be done, because they did not plead any of the
exceptions mentioned in the parol evidence rule.xxxvii[24] Their case is covered by the general rule
that the contents of the writing are the only repository of the terms of the agreement. Considering
that private respondent Oscar Inocentes is a lawyer (and former judge) he was "supposed to be
steeped in legal knowledge and practices" and was "expected to know the consequences"xxxviii[25]
of his signing a deed of absolute sale. Had he given an iota's attention to scrutinize the deeds, he
would have incorporated important stipulations that the transfer of title to said lots were
conditional.xxxix[26]
One last thing, assuming arguendo that the parol evidence is admissible, it should nonetheless be
disbelieved as no other evidence appears from the record to sustain the existence of the alleged
conditions. Not even the other seller, Asuncion Inocentes, was presented to testify on such
conditions.
ACCORDINGLY, the appealed decision is REVERSED and the records of this case
REMANDED to the trial court for proper disposition in accordance with this ruling.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 110662 August 4, 1994


TERESITA SALCEDO-ORTANEZ, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ROMEO F. ZAMORA, Presiding Judge, Br. 94, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City and RAFAEL S.
ORTANEZ, respondents.
Oscar A. Inocentes & Associates Law Office for petitioner.
Efren A. Santos for private respondent.

PADILLA, J.:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which seeks to reverse the decision * of respondent Court of Appeals in CAG. R. SP No. 28545 entitled "Teresita Salcedo-Ortanez versus Hon. Romeo F. Zamora, Presiding Judge, Br. 94, Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City and Rafael S. Ortanez".
The relevant facts of the case are as follows:
On 2 May 1990, private respondent Rafael S. Ortanez filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a complaint for annulment of
marriage with damages against petitioner Teresita Salcedo-Ortanez, on grounds of lack of marriage license and/or psychological incapacity
of the petitioner. The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-90-5360 and raffled to Branch 94, RTC of Quezon City presided over by
respondent Judge Romeo F. Zamora.
Private respondent, after presenting his evidence, orally formally offered in evidence Exhibits "A" to "M".
Among the exhibits offered by private respondent were three (3) cassette tapes of alleged telephone conversations between petitioner and
unidentified persons.
Petitioner submitted her Objection/Comment to private respondent's oral offer of evidence on 9 June 1992; on the same day, the trial court
admitted all of private respondent's offered evidence.
A motion for reconsideration from petitioner was denied on 23 June 1992.
A petition for certiorari was then filed by petitioner in the Court of Appeals assailing the admission in evidence of the aforementioned cassette
tapes.
On 10 June 1993, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment which is the subject of the present petition, which in part reads:
It is much too obvious that the petition will have to fail, for two basic reasons:
(1) Tape recordings are not inadmissible per se. They and any other variant thereof can be admitted in evidence for
certain purposes, depending on how they are presented and offered and on how the trial judge utilizes them in the
interest of truth and fairness and the even handed administration of justice.
(2) A petition for certiorari is notoriously inappropriate to rectify a supposed error in admitting evidence adduced during
trial. The ruling on admissibility is interlocutory; neither does it impinge on jurisdiction. If it is erroneous, the ruling
should be questioned in the appeal from the judgment on the merits and not through the special civil action of
certiorari. The error, assuming gratuitously that it exists, cannot be anymore than an error of law, properly correctible by
appeal and not by certiorari. Otherwise, we will have the sorry spectacle of a case being subject of a counterproductive
"ping-pong" to and from the appellate court as often as a trial court is perceived to have made an error in any of its
rulings with respect to evidentiary matters in the course of trial. This we cannot sanction.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari being devoid of merit, is hereby DISMISSED.

From this adverse judgment, petitioner filed the present petition for review, stating:
Grounds for Allowance of the Petition
10. The decision of respondent [Court of Appeals] has no basis in law nor previous
decision of the Supreme Court.
10.1 In affirming the questioned order of respondent judge, the Court of
Appeals has decided a question of substance not theretofore determined
by the Supreme Court as the question of admissibility in evidence of tape
recordings has not, thus far, been addressed and decided squarely by
the Supreme Court.
11. In affirming the questioned order of respondent judge, the Court of Appeals has
likewise rendered a decision in a way not in accord with law and with applicable decisions
of the Supreme Court.
11.1 Although the questioned order is interlocutory in nature, the same
can still be [the] subject of a petition for certiorari. 2
The main issue to be resolved is whether or not the remedy of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court was properly availed of by the petitioner in the Court of Appeals.
The extraordinary writ of certiorari is generally not available to challenge an interlocutory order of a trial
court. The proper remedy in such cases is an ordinary appeal from an adverse judgment, incorporating in
said appeal the grounds for assailing the interlocutory order.
However, where the assailed interlocutory order is patently erroneous and the remedy of appeal would
not afford adequate and expeditious relief, the Court may allow certiorari as a mode of redress. 3
In the present case, the trial court issued the assailed order admitting all of the evidence offered by
private respondent, including tape recordings of telephone conversations of petitioner with unidentified
persons. These tape recordings were made and obtained when private respondent allowed his friends
from the military to wire tap his home telephone. 4
Rep. Act No. 4200 entitled "An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire Tapping and Other Related Violations of
the Privacy of Communication, and for other purposes" expressly makes such tape recordings
inadmissible in evidence. The relevant provisions of Rep. Act No. 4200 are as follows:
Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties
to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by
using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record
such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a
dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape-recorder, or
however otherwise described. . . .
Sec. 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the existence, contents,
substance, purport, or meaning of the same or any part thereof, or any

information therein contained, obtained or secured by any person in violation of


the preceding sections of this Act shall not be admissible in evidence in any
judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or administrative hearing or investigation.
Clearly, respondents trial court and Court of Appeals failed to consider the afore-quoted provisions of the
law in admitting in evidence the cassette tapes in question. Absent a clear showing that both parties to the
telephone conversations allowed the recording of the same, the inadmissibility of the subject tapes is
mandatory under Rep. Act No. 4200.
Additionally, it should be mentioned that the above-mentioned Republic Act in Section 2 thereof imposes
a penalty of imprisonment of not less than six (6) months and up to six (6) years for violation of said Act. 5
We need not address the other arguments raised by the parties, involving the applicability of American
jurisprudence, having arrived at the conclusion that the subject cassette tapes are inadmissible in
evidence under Philippine law.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. SP No. 28545 is hereby SET ASIDE. The
subject cassette tapes are declared inadmissible in evidence.
SO ORDERED.

LAPULAPU FOUNDATION, INC. and ELIAS Q. TAN, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS
(Seventeenth Division) and ALLIED BANKING CORP., respondents
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court is the petition for review on certiorari filed by the Lapulapu Foundation, Inc.
and Elias Q. Tan seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision251[1] dated June 26, 1996 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 37162 ordering the petitioners, jointly and solidarily,
to pay the respondent Allied Banking Corporation the amount of P493,566.61 plus interests and
other charges. Likewise, sought to be reversed and set aside is the appellate courts Resolution
dated August 19, 1996 denying the petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The case stemmed from the following facts:
Sometime in 1977, petitioner Elias Q. Tan, then President of the co-petitioner Lapulapu
Foundation, Inc., obtained four loans from the respondent Allied Banking Corporation covered
by four promissory notes in the amounts of P100,000 each. The details of the promissory notes
are as follows:
P/N No. Date of P/N Maturity Date Amount as of 1/23/79
BD No. 504
251

Nov. 7, 1977 Feb. 5, 1978

P123,377.76

BD No. 621

Nov. 28, 1977 Mar. 28, 1978 P123,411.10

BD No. 716

Dec. 12, 1977 Apr. 11, 1978 P122,322.21

BD No. 839

Jan. 5, 1978

May 5, 1978 P120,455.54252[2]

As of January 23, 1979, the entire obligation amounted to P493,566.61 and despite demands
made on them by the respondent Bank, the petitioners failed to pay the same. The respondent
Bank was constrained to file with the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 15, a complaint
seeking payment by the petitioners, jointly and solidarily, of the sum of P493,566.61
representing their loan obligation, exclusive of interests, penalty charges, attorneys fees and
costs.
In its answer to the complaint, the petitioner Foundation denied incurring indebtedness from the
respondent Bank alleging that the loans were obtained by petitioner Tan in his personal capacity,
for his own use and benefit and on the strength of the personal information he furnished the
respondent Bank. The petitioner Foundation maintained that it never authorized petitioner Tan to
co-sign in his capacity as its President any promissory note and that the respondent Bank fully
knew that the loans contracted were made in petitioner Tans personal capacity and for his own
use and that the petitioner Foundation never benefited, directly or indirectly, therefrom. The
petitioner Foundation then interposed a cross-claim against petitioner Tan alleging that he,
having exceeded his authority, should be solely liable for said loans, and a counterclaim against
the respondent Bank for damages and attorneys fees.
For his part, petitioner Tan admitted that he contracted the loans from the respondent Bank in his
personal capacity. The parties, however, agreed that the loans were to be paid from the proceeds
of petitioner Tans shares of common stocks in the Lapulapu Industries Corporation, a real estate
firm. The loans were covered by promissory notes which were automatically renewable (rolledover) every year at an amount including unpaid interests, until such time as petitioner Tan was
able to pay the same from the proceeds of his aforesaid shares.
According to petitioner Tan, the respondent Banks employee required him to affix two signatures
on every promissory note, assuring him that the loan documents would be filled out in
accordance with their agreement. However, after he signed and delivered the loan documents to
the respondent Bank, these were filled out in a manner not in accord with their agreement, such
that the petitioner Foundation was included as party thereto. Further, prior to its filing of the
complaint, the respondent Bank made no demand on him.
After due trial, the court a quo rendered judgment the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing evidences [sic], arguments and considerations, this
court hereby finds the preponderance of evidence in favor of the plaintiff and hereby renders
judgment as follows:

252

1.Requiring the defendants Elias Q. Tan and Lapulapu Foundation, Inc. [the petitioners herein] to
pay jointly and solidarily to the plaintiff Allied Banking Corporation [the respondent herein] the
amount of P493,566.61 as principal obligation for the four promissory notes, including all other
charges included in the same, with interest at 14% per annum, computed from January 24, 1979,
until the same are fully paid, plus 2% service charges and 1% monthly penalty charges.
2.
Requiring the defendants Elias Q. Tan and Lapulapu Foundation, Inc., to pay jointly and
solidarily, attorneys fees in the equivalent amount of 25% of the total amount due from the
defendants on the promissory notes, including all charges;
3.
Requiring the defendants Elias Q. Tan and Lapulapu Foundation, Inc., to pay jointly and
solidarily litigation expenses of P1,000.00 plus costs of the suit.253[3]
On appeal, the CA affirmed with modification the judgment of the court a quo by deleting the
award of attorneys fees in favor of the respondent Bank for being without basis.
The appellate court disbelieved petitioner Tans claim that the loans were his personal loans as the
promissory notes evidencing them showed upon their faces that these were obligations of the
petitioner Foundation, as contracted by petitioner Tan himself in his official and personal
character. Applying the parol evidence rule, the CA likewise rejected petitioner Tans assertion
that there was an unwritten agreement between him and the respondent Bank that he would pay
the loans from the proceeds of his shares of stocks in the Lapulapu Industries Corp.
Further, the CA found that demand had been made by the respondent Bank on the petitioners
prior to the filing of the complaint a quo. It noted that the two letters of demand dated January 3,
1979254[4] and January 30, 1979255[5] asking settlement of the obligation were sent by the
respondent Bank. These were received by the petitioners as shown by the registry return
cards256[6] presented during trial in the court a quo.
Finally, like the court a quo, the CA applied the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate entity
in holding the petitioners jointly and solidarily liable. The evidence showed that petitioner Tan
had represented himself as the President of the petitioner Foundation, opened savings and current
accounts in its behalf, and signed the loan documents for and in behalf of the latter. The CA,
likewise, found that the petitioner Foundation had allowed petitioner Tan to act as though he had
the authority to contract the loans in its behalf. On the other hand, petitioner Tan could not
escape liability as he had used the petitioner Foundation for his benefit.
253
254
255
256

Aggrieved, the petitioners now come to the Court alleging that:


I.THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE LOANS
SUBJECT MATTER OF THE INSTANT PETITION ARE ALREADY DUE AND
DEMANDABLE DESPITE ABSENCE OF PRIOR DEMAND.
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN APPLYING THE PAROL
EVIDENCE RULE AND THE DOCTRINE OF PIERCING THE VEIL OF CORPORATE
ENTITY AS BASIS FOR ADJUDGING JOINT AND SOLIDARY LIABILITY ON THE PART
OF PETITIONERS ELIAS Q. TAN AND LAPULAPU FOUNDATION, INC.257[7]
The petitioners assail the appellate courts finding that the loans had become due and demandable
in view of the two demand letters sent to them by the respondent Bank. The petitioners insist that
there was no prior demand as they vigorously deny receiving those letters. According to
petitioner Tan, the signatures on the registry return cards were not his.
The petitioners denial of receipt of the demand letters was rightfully given scant consideration by
the CA as it held:
Exhibits R and S are two letters of demand, respectively dated January 3, 1979 and January 30,
1979, asking settlement of the obligations covered by the promissory notes. The first letter was
written by Ben Tio Peng Seng, Vice-President of the bank, and addressed to Lapulapu
Foundation, Inc., attention of Mr. Elias Q. Tan, President, while the second was a final demand
written by the appellees counsel, addressed to both defendants-appellants, and giving them five
(5) days from receipt within which to settle or judicial action would be instituted against them.
Both letters were duly received by the defendants, as shown by the registry return cards, marked
as Exhibits R-2 and S-1, respectively. The allegation of Tan that he does not know who signed
the said registry return receipts merits scant consideration, for there is no showing that the
addresses thereon were wrong. Hence, the disputable presumption that a letter duly directed and
mailed was received in the regular course of mail (per par. V, Section 3, Rule 131 of the Revised
Rules on Evidence) still holds.258[8]
There is no dispute that the promissory notes had already matured. However, the petitioners
insist that the loans had not become due and demandable as they deny receipt of the respondent
Banks demand letters. When presented the registry return cards during the trial, petitioner Tan
claimed that he did not recognize the signatures thereon. The petitioners allegation and denial are
self-serving. They cannot prevail over the registry return cards which constitute documentary
evidence and which enjoy the presumption that, absent clear and convincing evidence to the
contrary, these were regularly issued by the postal officials in the performance of their official
duty and that they acted in good faith.259[9] Further, as the CA correctly opined, mails are
presumed to have been properly delivered and received by the addressee in the regular course of
257
258

the mail.260[10] As the CA noted, there is no showing that the addresses on the registry return cards
were wrong. It is the petitioners burden to overcome the presumptions by sufficient evidence,
and other than their barefaced denial, the petitioners failed to support their claim that they did not
receive the demand letters; therefore, no prior demand was made on them by the respondent
Bank.
Having established that the loans had become due and demandable, the Court shall now resolve
the issue of whether the CA correctly held the petitioners jointly and solidarily liable therefor.
In disclaiming any liability for the loans, the petitioner Foundation maintains that these were
contracted by petitioner Tan in his personal capacity and that it did not benefit therefrom. On the
other hand, while admitting that the loans were his personal obligation, petitioner Tan avers that
he had an unwritten agreement with the respondent Bank that these loans would be renewed on a
year-to-year basis and paid from the proceeds of his shares of stock in the Lapulapu Industries
Corp.
These contentions are untenable.
The Court particularly finds as incredulous petitioner Tans allegation that he was made to sign
blank loan documents and that the phrase IN MY OFFICIAL/PERSONAL CAPACITY was
superimposed by the respondent Banks employee despite petitioner Tans protestation. The Court
is hard pressed to believe that a businessman of petitioner Tans stature could have been so
careless as to sign blank loan documents.
In contrast, as found by the CA, the promissory notes261[11] clearly showed upon their faces that
they are the obligation of the petitioner Foundation, as contracted by petitioner Tan in his official
and personal capacity.262[12] Moreover, the application for credit accommodation,263[13] the
signature cards of the two accounts in the name of petitioner Foundation,264[14] as well as New
Current Account Record,265[15] all accompanying the promissory notes, were signed by petitioner
259
260
261
262
263
264
265

Tan for and in the name of the petitioner Foundation.266[16] These documentary evidence
unequivocally and categorically establish that the loans were solidarily contracted by the
petitioner Foundation and petitioner Tan.
As a corollary, the parol evidence rule likewise constrains this Court to reject petitioner Tans
claim regarding the purported unwritten agreement between him and the respondent Bank on the
payment of the obligation. Section 9, Rule 130 of the of the Revised Rules of Court provides that
[w]hen the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is to be considered as
containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their successorsin-interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written agreement.267[17]
In this case, the promissory notes are the law between the petitioners and the respondent Bank.
These promissory notes contained maturity dates as follows: February 5, 1978, March 28, 1978,
April 11, 1978 and May 5, 1978, respectively. That these notes were to be paid on these dates is
clear and explicit. Nowhere was it stated therein that they would be renewed on a year-to-year
basis or rolled-over annually until paid from the proceeds of petitioner Tans shares in the
Lapulapu Industries Corp. Accordingly, this purported unwritten agreement could not be made to
vary or contradict the terms and conditions in the promissory notes.
Evidence of a prior or contemporaneous verbal agreement is generally not admissible to vary,
contradict or defeat the operation of a valid contract.268[18] While parol evidence is admissible to
explain the meaning of written contracts, it cannot serve the purpose of incorporating into the
contract additional contemporaneous conditions which are not mentioned at all in writing, unless
there has been fraud or mistake.269[19] No such allegation had been made by the petitioners in this
case.
Finally, the appellate court did not err in holding the petitioners jointly and solidarily liable as it
applied the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate entity. The petitioner Foundation asserts that
it has a personality separate and distinct from that of its President, petitioner Tan, and that it
cannot be held solidarily liable for the loans of the latter.
The Court agrees with the CA that the petitioners cannot hide behind the corporate veil under the
following circumstances:
The evidence shows that Tan has been representing himself as the President of Lapulapu
Foundation, Inc. He opened a savings account and a current account in the names of the
corporation, and signed the application form as well as the necessary specimen signature cards
266
267
268
269

(Exhibits A, B and C) twice, for himself and for the foundation. He submitted a notarized
Secretarys Certificate (Exhibit G) from the corporation, attesting that he has been authorized,
inter alia, to sign for and in behalf of the Lapulapu Foundation any and all checks, drafts or other
orders with respect to the bank; to transact business with the Bank, negotiate loans, agreements,
obligations, promissory notes and other commercial documents; and to initially obtain a loan for
P100,000.00 from any bank (Exhibits G-1 and G-2). Under these circumstances, the defendant
corporation is liable for the transactions entered into by Tan on its behalf.270[20]
Per its Secretarys Certificate, the petitioner Foundation had given its President, petitioner Tan,
ostensible and apparent authority to inter alia deal with the respondent Bank. Accordingly, the
petitioner Foundation is estopped from questioning petitioner Tans authority to obtain the subject
loans from the respondent Bank. It is a familiar doctrine that if a corporation knowingly permits
one of its officers, or any other agent, to act within the scope of an apparent authority, it holds
him out to the public as possessing the power to do those acts; and thus, the corporation will, as
against anyone who has in good faith dealt with it through such agent, be estopped from denying
the agents authority.271[21]
In fine, there is no cogent reason to deviate from the CAs ruling that the petitioners are jointly
and solidarily liable for the loans contracted with the respondent Bank.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED and the Decision dated June 26,
1996 and Resolution dated August 19, 1996 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 37162
are AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
MODESTO LEOVERAS, PETITIONER, VS. CASIMERO VALDEZ, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari [1] assailing the March 31, 2005 decision [2]
and the October 6, 2005 resolution [3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 68549.
The CA decision reversed the June 23, 2000 decision [4] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 46, Urdaneta City, Pangasinan, dismissing respondent Casimero Valdez's complaint for
annulment of title, reconveyance and damages against petitioner Modesto Leoveras.
FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS
Maria Sta. Maria and Dominga Manangan were the registered owners - three-fourths () and
one-fourth () pro-indiviso, respectively - of a parcel of land located in Poblacion, Manaoag,
270
271

Pangasinan, covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 24695, with an area of 28,171
square meters. [5]
In September 1932, Sta. Maria sold her three-fourths () share to Benigna Llamas. [6] The sale
was duly annotated at the back of OCT No. 24695. When Benigna died in 1944, [7] she willed her
three-fourths () share equally to her sisters Alejandra Llamas and Josefa Llamas. [8] Thus,
Alejandra and Josefa each owned one-half () of Benigna's three-fourths () share.
On June 14, 1969, Alejandra's heirs sold their predecessor's one-half () share (roughly
equivalent to 10,564 square meters) to the respondent, as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale.
[9]

Also on June 14, 1969, Josefa sold her own one-half () share (subject property) to the
respondent and the petitioner, as evidenced by another Deed of Absolute Sale. [10] On even date,
the respondent and the petitioner executed an Agreement, [11] allotting their portions of the subject
property.
WITNESSETH
That we [petitioner and respondent] are the absolute owners of [the subject property] which is
particularly described as follows:
xxx
That our ownership over the said portion mentioned above is evidenced by a Deed of Absolute
Sale xxx
That in said deed of sale mentioned in the immediate preceding paragraph, our respective share
consist of 5, 282.13 [one-half of 10,564 square meters] square meter each.
That we hereby agreed and covenanted that our respective share shall be as follows:
Modesto Leoveras Casimero Valdez -

3,020 square meters residential portion on the northern part near the
Municipal road of Poblacion Pugaro, Manaoag, Pangasinan;
7,544.27 [12] square meters of the parcel of land described above. [13]

On June 8, 1977, the petitioner and the respondent executed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim over
the subject property. [14] The parties took possession of their respective portions of the subject
property and declared it in their name for taxation purposes. [15]
In 1996, the respondent asked the Register of Deeds of Lingayen, Pangasinan on the
requirements for the transfer of title over the portion allotted to him on the subject property. To
his surprise, the respondent learned that the petitioner had already obtained in his name two
transfer certificates of title (TCTs): one, TCT No. 195812 - covering an area of 3,020 square
meters; and two, TCT No. 195813 - covering an area of 1,004 square meters (or a total of 4,024
square meters).

The Register of Deeds informed the respondent that they could not find the record of OCT No.
24695; instead, the Register of Deeds furnished the respondent with the following [16]
(collectively, petitioner's documents):
1. Two (2) deeds of absolute sale dated June 14, 1969, both executed by Sta. Maria,
purportedly conveying an unspecified portion of OCT No. 24695 as follows:
a. 11, 568 square meters to the respondent and petitioner [17]
b. 8, 689 square meters to one Virgilia Li Meneses [18]

2. Deed of Absolute Sale (Benigna Deed) also dated June 14, 1969 executed by Benigna [19]
which reads:
I, Benigna Llamas, Fernandez xxx do sell xxx by way of ABSOLUTE SALE unto the
said Casimero Valdez, Modesto Leoveras and Virgilia Meneses their heirs and assigns,
7,544 sq.m.; 4,024 sq. m. and 8,689 sq. m. more or less respectively of a parcel of land
which is particularly described as follows:
"A parcel of land xxx covered by [OCT No.] 24695." (Emphases added)
3. Subdivision Plan of PSU 21864 of OCT No. 24695 [20]
4. Affidavit of Confirmation of Subdivision [21] dated May 3, 1994 (Affidavit), which reads:
That we, Virgilia Li Meneses, xxx Dominga Manangan; Modesto Leoveras; and
Casimero Valdez xxx
xxx are co-owners of a certain parcel of land with an area of 28, 171 sq. m. more or less
in subdivision plan Psu 21864 xxx covered by [OCT No.] 24695 situated at Poblacion
(now Pugaro), Manaoag, Pangasinan;
xxx we agree xxx to subdivide and hereby confirmed the subdivision in the following
manner xxx:
Lot 2 with an area of 3, 020 sq. m. xxx to Modesto Leoveras xxx;
Lot 3 with an area of 1,004 sq. m. xxx to Modesto Leoveras xxx;
Lot 4 with an area of 7,544 sq. m. xxx to Casimero Valdez xxx;
Lot 5 with an area of 8, 689 sq. m. xxx to Virgilia Meneses;
Lot 6 with an area of 7,043 sq. m. xxx to Dominga Manangan (Emphasis supplied.)
On June 21, 1996, the respondent filed a complaint for Annulment of Title, Reconveyance and

Damages against the petitioner, seeking the reconveyance of the 1,004-square meter portion
(disputed property) covered by TCT No. 195813, on the ground that the petitioner is entitled
only to the 3,020 square meters identified in the parties' Agreement.
The respondent sought the nullification of the petitioner's titles by contesting the authenticity of
the petitioner's documents. Particularly, the respondent assailed the Benigna Deed by presenting
Benigna's death certificate. The respondent argued that Benigna could not have executed a deed,
which purports to convey 4,024 square meters to the petitioner, in 1969 because Benigna already
died in 1944. The respondent added that neither could Sta. Maria have sold to the parties her
three-fourths () share in 1969 because she had already sold her share to Benigna in 1932. [22]
The respondent denied his purported signature appearing in the Affidavit, [23] and prayed for:
a) xxx the cancellation of the [petitioner's documents];
b) the cancellation of TCT No. 195813 in the name of Modesto Leoveras and that it be
reconveyed to the [respondent];
c) the cancellation and nullification of [TCT No. 195812] covering an area of 3,020 square
meters xxx;
d) [the issuance of] title xxx in the name of [respondent] over an area of 17, 104 square meters of
OCT 24695; [24] (Underscoring supplied)
In his defense, the petitioner claimed that the parties already had (i) delineated their respective
portions of the subject property even before they acquired it in 1969 and (ii) agreed that upon
acquisition, each would own the portion as delineated; that the area he actually possessed and
subsequently acquired has a total area of 4,024 square meters, which he subdivided into two
portions and caused to be covered by the two TCTs in question. The petitioner claimed that in
signing the Agreement, he was led to believe, based on the parties' rough estimation, that the area
he actually possessed is only 3,020 square meters contrary to the parties' real intention - i.e., the
extent of their ownership would be based on their actual possession. [25]
The petitioner further claimed that the respondent voluntarily participated in executing the
Affidavit, which corrected the mistake in the previously executed Agreement [26] and confirmed
the petitioner's ownership over the disputed property. The petitioner asked for the dismissal of
the complaint and for a declaration that he is the lawful owner of the parcels of land covered by
his titles.
RTC RULING
The RTC dismissed the complaint. The court ruled that the respondent failed to preponderantly
prove that the Benigna Deed and the Affidavit are fabricated and, consequently, no ground exists
to nullify the petitioner's titles. The court observed that the respondent did not even compare his
genuine signature with the signatures appearing in these documents.
CA RULING

On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC by ruling against the authenticity of the Benigna Deed and
the Affidavit. The CA gave weight to Benigna's death certificate which shows the impossibility
of Benigna's execution of the deed in 1969. The CA also noted the discrepancy between the
respondent's signatures as appearing in the Affidavit, on one hand, and the documents on record,
on the other. [27] The CA added that the respondent's failure to compare his genuine signature
from his purported signatures appearing in the petitioner's documents is not fatal, since Section
22, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court allows the court to make its own comparison. In light of its
observations, the CA ruled:
As the totality of the evidence presented sufficiently sustains [the respondent's] claim that the
titles issued to [the petitioner] were based on forged and spurious documents, it behooves this
Court to annul these certificates of title.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision dated June 23, 2000 is SET ASIDE. Declaring TCT No.
195812 and TCT No. 195813 as NULL and VOID, [the petitioner] is hereby directed to
reconvey the subject parcels of land to [the respondent]. [28] (Emphasis added.)
Unwilling to accept the CA's reversal of the RTC ruling, the petitioner filed the present appeal by
certiorari, claiming that the CA committed "gross misappreciation of the facts" [29] by going
beyond what the respondent sought in his complaint.
THE PETITION
The petitioner claims that the CA should not have ordered the reconveyance of both parcels of
land covered by the TCTs in question since the respondent only seeks the reconveyance of the
disputed property - i.e., the parcel of land covered by TCT No. 195813.
The petitioner asserts that after the subject sale, the parties physically partitioned the subject
property and possessed their respective portions, thereby setting the limits of their ownership.
The petitioner admits that the Benigna Deed is "fabricated" but hastens to add that it was only
designed (i) to affirm the "true intent and agreement" of the parties on the extent of their
ownership, as shown by their actual physical possession, and (ii) as a "convenient tool" to
facilitate the transfer of title to his name.
THE RESPONDENT'S COMMENT
The respondent claims that since the petitioner himself admitted using a spurious document in
obtaining his titles (as alleged in the complaint and as found by the CA), then the CA correctly
cancelled the latter's titles. [30]
The petitioner forged the respondent's signature in the Affidavit to make it appear that he agreed
to the division indicated in the document. The respondent defended the CA's reconveyance of
both parcels of land, covered by the petitioner's titles, to the respondent by arguing that if the
distribution in the Affidavit is followed, the "original intendment" of the parties on their shares of
the subject property would be "grievously impaired" [31]

THE ISSUES
The two basic issues [32] for our resolution are:
1. Whether the CA erred in nullifying the petitioner's titles.
2. Whether the CA erred in ordering the reconveyance of the parcel of land covered by the
petitioner's titles.
THE RULING
We partially grant the petition.
An action for reconveyance is a legal and equitable remedy granted to the rightful landowner,
whose land was wrongfully or erroneously registered in the name of another, to compel the
registered owner to transfer or reconvey the land to him. [33] The plaintiff in this action must
allege and prove his ownership of the land in dispute and the defendant's erroneous, fraudulent or
wrongful registration of the property.
We rule that the respondent adequately proved his ownership of the disputed property by virtue
of the (i) Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Josefa in favor of the parties; (ii) the parties'
Affidavit of Adverse Claim; and (iii) the parties' Agreement, which cover the subject property.
The petitioner does not dispute the due execution and the authenticity
of these documents, [34] particularly the Agreement. However, he claims that since the Agreement
does not reflect the true intention of the parties, the Affidavit was subsequently executed in order
to reflect the parties' true intention.
The petitioner's argument calls to fore the application of the parol evidence rule, [35] i.e., when the
terms of an agreement are reduced to writing, the written agreement is deemed to contain all the
terms agreed upon and no evidence of these terms can be admitted other than what is contained
in the written agreement. [36] Whatever is not found in the writing is understood to have been
waived and abandoned. [37]
To avoid the operation of the parol evidence rule, the Rules of Court allows a party to present
evidence modifying, explaining or adding to the terms of the written agreement if he puts in
issue in his pleading, as in this case, the failure of the written agreement to express the true intent
and agreement of the parties. The failure of the written agreement to express the true intention of
the parties is either by reason of mistake, fraud, inequitable conduct or accident, which
nevertheless did not prevent a meeting of the minds of the parties. [38]
At the trial, the petitioner attempted to prove, by parol evidence, the alleged true intention of the
parties by presenting the Affidavit, which allegedly corrected the mistake in the previously
executed Agreement and confirmed his ownership of the parcels of land covered by his titles. It

was the petitioner's staunch assertion that the respondent co-executed this Affidavit supposedly
to reflect the parties' true intention.
In the present petition, however, the petitioner made a damaging admission that the Benigna
Deed is fabricated, thereby completely bolstering the respondent's cause of action for
reconveyance of the disputed property on the ground of fraudulent registration of title. Since the
Affidavit merely reflects what is embodied in the Benigna Deed, the petitioner's admission,
coupled with the respondent's denial of his purported signature in the Affidavit, placed in serious
doubt the reliability of this document, supposedly the bedrock of the petitioner's defense.
Curiously, if the parties truly intended to include in the petitioner's share the disputed property,
the petitioner obviously need not go at length of fabricating a deed of sale to support his
application for the transfer of title of his rightful portion of the subject property. Notably, there is
nothing in the Affidavit (that supposedly corrected the mistake in the earlier Agreement) that
supports the petitioner's claim that the partition of the subject property is based on the parties'
actual possession.
Note that the RTC dismissed the complaint based on the respondent's alleged failure to prove the
spuriousness of the documents submitted by the petitioner to the Register of Deeds. However, by
admitting the presentation of a false deed in securing his title, the petitioner rendered moot the
issue of authenticity of the Benigna Deed and relieved the respondent of the burden of proving
its falsity as a ground to nullify the petitioner's titles.
By fraudulently causing the transfer of the registration of title over the disputed property in his
name, the petitioner holds the title to this disputed property in trust for the benefit of the
respondent as the true owner; [39] registration does not vest title but merely confirms or records
title already existing and vested. The Torrens system of registration cannot be used to protect a
usurper from the true owner, nor can it be used as a shield for the commission of fraud, or to
permit one to enrich oneself at the expense of others. [40] Hence, the CA correctly ordered the
reconveyance of the disputed property, covered by TCT No. 195813, to the respondent.
The parties' Agreement effectively
partitioned the subject property
The petitioner also relies on his alleged actual possession of the disputed property to support his
claim of ownership. Notably, both parties make conflicting assertions of possession of the
disputed property. [41] The petitioner testified on his possession as follows:
Q:
A:

How many square meters did you get from the land and how many square meters was
the share of [respondent]?
4 [0]20 square meters and my brother-in-law 6,000 plus square meters.
xxx

Q:
A:

Was there a boundary between the 4,020 square meters and the rest of the property
which (sic) designated by your brother-in-law?
There is sir, and the boundary is the fence.

Q:
A:

When did you put up that fence which is the boundary?


After the deed of sale was made.

Q:

And that boundary fence which you put according to you since the execution of the
Deed of Absolute Sale in 1969 up to the present does it still exist?
Yes, sir.

A:
Q:
A:

Since the time you purchased the property according to you you already divided the
property, is that correct?
Yes, sir.

Q:
A:

And that as of today who is in possession of that 4,020 square meters?


I, sir. [42]

The petitioner and the respondent were originally co-owners of the subject property when they
jointly bought it from the same vendor in 1969. However, the parties immediately terminated this
state of indivision by executing an Agreement, which is in the nature of a partition agreement.
The Civil Code of the Philippines defines partition as the separation, division and assignment of
a thing held in common among those to whom it may belong. [43] Partition is the division between
two or more persons of real or personal property, owned in common, by setting apart their
respective interests so that they may enjoy and possess these in severalty, [44] resulting in
the partial or total extinguishment of co-ownership. [45]
In the present case, the parties agreed to divide the subject property by giving the petitioner the
3,020 square meters "residential portion on the northern part near the Municipal road." [46] There
is no dispute that this 3,020- square meter portion is the same parcel of land identified as Lot No.
2 (which is not the subject of the respondent's action for reconveyance) in the Affidavit and the
Subdivision Plan presented by the petitioner before the Register of Deeds. The fact that the
Agreement lacks technical description of the parties' respective portions or that the subject
property was then still embraced by a single certificate of title could not legally prevent a
partition, where the different portions allotted to each were determined and became separately
identifiable, as in this case. [47]
What is strikingly significant is that even the petitioner's own testimony merely attempted to
confirm his actual possession of the disputed property, without, however, supporting his claim contrary to the written Agreement - that the parties' ownership of the subject property would be
co-extensive with their possession. This is the core of the petitioner's defense. At any rate, just as
non-possession does not negate ownership, neither does possession automatically prove
ownership, [48] especially in the face of an unambiguous document executed by the parties
themselves.
Contrary to the petitioner's claim that his actual possession determines the extent of his
ownership, it is the parties' Agreement that defines the extent of their ownership in the subject
property. One of the legal effects of partition, whether by agreement among the co-owners or by

judicial proceeding, is to terminate the co-ownership and, consequently, to make the previous coowners the absolute and exclusive owner of the share allotted to him. [49]
Parenthetically, the respondent declared for taxation purposes the portion he claims in December
1987. [50] The total area (7,544 square meters) of the properties declared is equivalent to the area
allotted to the respondent under the Agreement. On the other hand, the petitioner declared the
1,004-square meter portion only in September 1994, under Tax Declaration No. 9393, [51] despite
his claim of exclusive and adverse possession since 1969.
Nullification of the petitioner's title
over the 3,020 square meter portion
While the petitioner admitted using a spurious document in securing his titles, nonetheless, he
questions the CA's nullification of TCT No. 195812 on the ground that, per the respondent's own
admission and the parties' Agreement, he is the rightful owner of the land covered by this title.
We disagree.
The petitioner's argument confuses registration of title with ownership. [52] While the petitioner's
ownership over the land covered by TCT No. 195812 is undisputed, his ownership only gave him
the right to apply for the proper transfer of title to the property in his name. Obviously, the
petitioner, even as a rightful owner, must comply with the statutory provisions on the transfer of
registered title to lands. [53] Section 53 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 provides that the
subsequent registration of title procured by the presentation of a forged deed or other instrument
is null and void. Thus, the subsequent issuance of TCT No. 195812 gave the petitioner no better
right than the tainted registration which was the basis for the issuance of the same title. The
Court simply cannot allow the petitioner's attempt to get around the proper procedure for
registering the transfer of title in his name by using spurious documents.
Reconveyance is the remedy of
the rightful owner only
While the CA correctly nullified the petitioner's certificates of title, the CA erred in ordering the
reconveyance of the entire subject property in the respondent's favor. The respondent himself
admitted that the 3,020- square meter portion covered by TCT No. 195812 is the petitioner's just
share in the subject property. [54] Thus, although the petitioner obtained TCT No. 195812 using
the same spurious documents, the land covered by this title should not be reconveyed in favor of
the respondent since he is not the rightful owner of the property covered by this title. [55]
WHEREFORE, the petition is partially GRANTED. The assailed decision and resolution of the
Court of Appeals are MODIFIED. Accordingly, the petitioner is directed to RECONVEY to the
respondent the parcel of land covered by TCT No. 195813. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

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