Javellana vs IAC

FACTS: Marsall and Co. is presently the owner of parcel of land adjoining the Iloilo
River up to and adjacent the lot where the L. Borres Elementary School is located at
Barangay Navais Mandurriao, Iloilo.
That in 1961, when Marcelino Florete, Sr. was still the owner of said Marsal property
having acquired the same by purchase from its former owners sometime in 1959,
there existed a main canal from the Iloilo River cutting across said property towards
the lot where the said school is located and thru a canal that traverses the school
premises going towards Lot 2344.
That sometime in July 1978, Javellana together with others closed the canal and
destroyed the dam, leading to damages caused to those benefiting from the canal.
ISSUE:Which of the two estates is the dominant estate?
HELD: The property where the barrio school is located and the nearby lands is the
dominant estate.
RATIO: The canals were in existence long before Florete Sr. had acquired that
property from the Maranons. It has been established that the main canal which is
traversing the property of Florete served as the passage of salt water from the Iloilo
River to the school fishpond and at the same time, as an outlet and drainage canal
or channel of rainwater from the school premises and adjacent lands that empty
into the Iloilo River. Even assuming that it was plaintiff Florete Sr. who constructed
the subject canal in 1961, an easement or servitude of water-right-of-way had
nonetheless been constituted on subject property because since then the same had
been in continuous use for no less than fifteen (15) years by the school fishpond
as well as by the adjacent lands. A positive easement (Art 616, New Civil Code) had
thereby been created and plaintiffs have no right to terminate it unilaterally without
violating Art. 629 of the New Civil Code which provides dominant estates. Art. 629
provides:
1. Art. 629: The owner of the servient estate cannot impair, in any
manner whatsoever, the use of the servitude.
2. Nevertheless, if by reason of the place originally assigned or of the manner
established for the use of the easement, the same should become very
inconvenient to the owner of the servient estate, or should prevent him from
making any important works, repairs or improvements thereon, it may be
charged at his expense, provided he offers another place or manner equally
convenient and in such a way that no injury is caused thereby to the owner of
the dominant estate or to those who may have a right to the use of the
easement.
3. Plaintiffs, however, did not recognize, much less, follow the above-quoted law
on easement. They closed the entrance of the canal and demolished portions
of the main dike thus impairing the use of the servitude by the dominant
estate. And by so doing, plaintiffs violated not only the law on easement but
also Presidential Degree No. 296 which enjoins any person, natural or
juridical, to demolish structures or improvements which tend to obstruct the

flow of water through rivers, creeks, esteros and drainage channels. For this
canal did not serve merely to supply salt water to the school fishpond but
also serves as drainage charged or channel of rainwater from adjacent lands
to the Iloilo River.
When a positive easement is constituted, the servient owner is prevented from
impairing the use of such by the dominant estate.
Javellana vs IAC
FACTS:
Marsal & Co., Inc., and Marcelino Florete, Sr. is the present owner of the land
adjoining the Iloilo River up to the adjacent lot where the L. Borres Elem. School is
located. There existed a main canal from the Iloilo River which passes through the
Marsal property and thru a canal that traverses the school property going towards
Lot 2344. Marsal & Co. closed the dike entrance and later on demolished the
portions of the main dike connecting the main canal to the canal running thru the
school grounds. This closure caused flooding in the premises of the school and its
vicinity because the canal serves as outlet of rain or flood water that empties into
the river. This prompted the school and barangay officials to complain to higher
authorities about the closure of the canal. When Florete was about to bury a pipe in
lieu of an open canal, he was prevented from doing so by the district supervisor,
Javellana, thus he instituted a complaint for recovery of damages for allegedly
denying his access to the use of the canal to his property.
The RTC ruled in favor of Javellana thus Florete appealed to the IAC which reversed
the decision thus the case at bar.
ISSUE: Whether or not an easement was established in favor of the school property
RULING: YES
A positive easement of water-right-of-way was constituted on the property of Florete
as the servient estate in favor of the L. Borres Elementary School and the nearby
lands as dominant estates since it has been in continuous use for no less than 15
years by the school fishpond as well as by the nearby adjacent lands.
As a positive easement, Florete had no right to terminate the use of the canal
without violating Art. 629 of the CC which provides that The owner of the servient
estate cannot impair, in any manner whatsoever, the use of the servitude.
Nevertheless if by reason of the place originally assigned or of the manner
established for the use of the easement, the same should become very
inconvenient to the owner of the servient estate, or should prevent him from
making any important works, repairs or improvements thereon, it may be charged
at his expense, provided he offers another place or manner equally convenient and
in such a way that no injury is caused thereby to the owner of the dominant estate
or to those who may have a right to the use of the easement.
When Florete closed the entrance of the canal and demolished portions of the main
dike it impaired the use of the servitude by the dominant estates.

Jabonete vs Monteverde

FACTS

Legaspi and Jabonete owned adjacent lots. In an action before the CFI between the
parties, the court pronounced that Legaspi acquired the lot with knowledge that a
right of way existed thereon, in favor of Jabonete. Notwithstanding the
pronouncement, the parties entered into an amicable settlement to the same effect,
which was ratified by the CFI in a subsequent order. Thereafter, Jabonete
transferred to another place and left the property. So Legaspi reconstructed his
fence and its footing, thereby closing the opening previously made.

In the course of time, Jabonetes lot was foreclosed by DBP, which later conveyed it
to Arcilla under a conditional sale. Arcilla demanded that the fence be reopened as
she plans to construct a house on the lot. Legaspi resisted, so DBP and Arcilla filed
an action for contempt of court against him for defying the court order recognizing
the easement.

ISSUE: Whether or not DBP and Arcilla may compel Legaspi to grant the right of
way.

RULING
No, they cannot because the easement awarded by the court to Jabonete was a
strictly personal one, being thus worded: The right of way granted was expressly
limited to the latter and their "family, friends, drivers, servants and jeeps." The
servitude established was clearly for the benefit alone of the plaintiffs and the
persons above enumerated and it is clear that the lower court, as well as the parties
addressed by the said order, did not intend the same to pass on to the plaintiffs'
successors-in-interest. In other words, the right acquired by the original plaintiffs
was a personal servitude under Article 614 of the Civil Code, and not a predial
servitude that inures to the benefit of whoever owns the dominant estate.
Another evidence that the servitude in question was personal to the plaintiffs is the
fact that the same was granted to the latter without any compensation to the
respondent-appellant.

ENCARNACION V. CA

- Legal Easement

An easement of right of way exists as a matter of law when a private property has
no access to a public road and the needs of such property determines the width of
the easement which requires payment of indemnity which consists of the value of
the land and the amount of the damages caused.

NATURE:

- Petition for Review

FACTS:

Petitioner Tomas Encarnacion and Private Respondent Heirs of the late Aniceta
Magsino Viuda de Sagun are the owners of two adjacent estates situated in Buco,
Talisay Batangas. Encarnacion owns the dominant estate bounded on the north by
the servient estate owned by Respondents Eusebio de Sagun and Mamerto Masigno,
on the south by a dried river and the Taal Lake.
The servient estate of the
Respondents stands between the dominant estate and the national road.

Prior to 1960, persons going to the national highway would just cross the servient
estate at no particular point. In 1960, Sagun and Masigno enclosed their lands with
a fence but provided a road path 25 meters long and about 1 meter in width. To
provide access to the highway, a 1- meter wide roadpath was constituted,
taking half a meter each from the estate of the Respondents and that of Magsino.
At the time, petitioner started his plant nursery business on his land, using
pushcarts to haul the plants and garden soil to and from the nursery and the
highway via the 1-meter road path.

When the business of Encarnacion flourished, it became more difficult to transfer

the plants and garden soil through the use of a pushcart so Encarnacion bought an
owner-type jeep for transporting the plants. However, the jeep could not pass
through the road path so he approached Sagun and Masigno asking them if they
would sell to him 1 meters of their property to add to the existing road path but

the 2 refused the offer.

Encarnacion then instituted an action before the RTC to seek the issuance of a writ
of easement of a right of way over an additional width of at least 2 meters. The RTC
and the CA ruled against Encarnacion holding that the necessity to justify
interference with the property rights was not compelling considering the presence
of another outlet, which is through the dried riverbed 80 meters away from the
dominant estate.

ISSUE:

WON Encarnacion is entitled to a widening of an already existing easement of rightof-way.

RULING:

YES. While there is a dried riverbed less than 100 meters from the dominant estate,
that access is grossly inadequate. Generally, a right of way may be demanded: (1)
when there is absolutely no access to a public highway, and (2) when, even if there
is one, it is difficult or dangerous to use or is grossly insufficient. In the case at bar,
although there is a dried riverbed, it is traversed by a semi-concrete bridge and
there is no egress or ingress from the highway. For the jeep to reach the level of the
highway, it must literally jump 4-5 meters up. Moreover, during rainy season, it is
impassable due to the floods. Thus, it can only be used at certain times of the
year. With the inherent disadvantages of the riverbed which make passage difficult,
if not impossible, it is as if there were no outlet at all.

When a private property has no access to a public road, it has the right of easement
over adjacent servient estates as a matter of law. With the non-availability of the
dried riverbed as an alternative route, the servient estates should accommodate the
needs of the dominant estate and under Art. 651 of the NCC, it is the needs of the
latter which ultimately determine the width of the easement of right of way.

Since the additional easement of right of way of 1 meters to be established in

favor of Encarnacion is of continuous and permanent nature, Encarnacion must

indemnify Sagun and Masigno the value of the land occupied plus amount of the
damages caused until his offer to buy the land is considered pursuant to Art. 649 of
the NCC.

CORTES v YU-TIBO
Facts
Cortes owned the house No. 65 that has certain windows through which it receives light and air.
Said windows were opened and facing the adjacent house No. 63. The tenant of house No. 63 has
commenced certain work which raised its roof and one-half of the windows in house No. 65 has
been covered, thus depriving the building of a large part of the air and light formerly received
through the window.
Cortes contends that the easement of light is positive. Therefore, by the constant and
uninterrupted use of the windows for a period of 59 years, he has acquired from prescription an
easement of light in favor of his house No. 65; and he has the right to restrain the making of
improvements in the house No. 63 which would be prejudicial to the enjoyment of the easement.
Defendant contends that the easement is negative. Therefore, the time for the prescriptive
acquisition must begin from the date on which the owner of the dominant estate may have
prohibited, by a formal act, the owner of the servient estate from doing something which would
be lawful were it not for the existence of the easement.
Issue
Whether the easement of light is positive or negative in this case.
Ruling
Negative.
it is our opinion that the easement of lights in the case of windows opened in one's own wall is
of a negative character, and, as such, can not be acquired by prescription under article 538 of the
Civil Code, except by counting the time of possession from the date on which the owner of the
dominant estate may, by a formal act have prohibited the owner of the servient estate from doing
something which would be lawful for him to do were it not for the easement.
"the prescription of the easement of lights does not take place unless there has been some act
of opposition on the part of the person attempting to acquire such a right against the person
attempting to obstruct its enjoyment." The easements of light and view,", "because they are of
a negative character, can not be acquired by a prescriptive title, even if continuous, or although
they may have been used for more than twenty-eight years, if the indispensable requisite for
prescription is absent, which is the prohibition on the one part, and the consent on the other, of
the freedom of the tenement which it is sought to charge with the easement." use does not
confer the right to maintain lateral openings or windows in one's own wall to the prejudice of the
owner of the adjacent tenement, who, being entitled to make use of the soil and of the space
above it, may, without restriction, build on his line or increase the height of existing buildings,
unless he has been "forbidden to increase the height of his buildings and to thus cut off the light,"

and such prohibition has been consented to and the time fixed by law subsequently expired. The
court also holds that it is error to give the mere existence or use of windows in a wall standing
wholly on the land of one proprietor the creative force of true easement, although they may have
existed from the time immemorial... openings made in walls standing wholly on the land of one
proprietor and which overlook the land of another exist by mere tolerance in the absence of an
agreement to the contrary, and can not be acquired by prescription, except by computing the time
from the execution of some act of possession which tends to deprive the owner of the tenement
affected of the right to build thereon."

Amor vs Florentino
SEVERO AMOR, petitioner,
vs.
GABRIEL FLORENTINO, ET AL., (respondents).
Nature:
AMOR asks for the setting aside of the decision of the CA which affirmed the judgment of the CFI . The TC declared
that an easement of light and view had been established in favor of the property of the GABRIEL ET AL. and ordered
AMOR to remove within 30 days all obstruction to the windows of respondents' house, to abstain from constructing
within three meters from the boundary line, and to pay P200.00 damages.
Facts:
Maria Florentino owned a house and a camarin or warehouse in Vigan, Ilocos Sur. The house had and still has, on
the north side, three windows on the upper story, and a fourth one on the ground floor. Through these windows the
house receives light and air from the lot where the camarin stands.
September 6, 1885, Maria Florentino made a will, giving the house and the land to Gabriel Florentino and to Jose
Florentino. In said will, Maria Florentino also gave the warehouse and the lot where it is situated to Maria
Encarnancion. Upon the death of the testatrix (Maria Florentino) in 1882, nothing was said or done by the devisees in
regard to the windows in question.
On July 14, 1911, Maria Encarnacion sold her lot and the warehouse thereon to Severo Amor, the deed of sale
stating that the vendor had inherited the property from her aunt, Maria Florentino.
In January, 1938, AMOR destroyed the old warehouse and started to build instead a two-story house.
On March1, 1938, GABRIEL ET. AL filed an action to prohibit AMOR from building higher than the original structure
and from executing any work which would shut off the light and air that had for many years been received through the
four windows referred to.
The Court of First Instance found on the March 15, 1935 that the construction of the new house had almost been
completed, so the court denied the writ of preliminary injunction.
Issues:
1. WON the Civil Code is applicable in this case. YES
2. WON there is an easement established prohibiting Amor from doing the said construction.

Ruling:

1. Yes. Amor failed to prove that the death of the testator occurred before the effectivity of the Old Civil Code. The
facts show that it happened after the effectivity of the said code so the law on easement is already applicable. In any
case, even if we assume Amors supposition, the law on easement was already integrated into the Spanish Law and

in fact, had been established by Jurisprudence.

2. Yes.
Art. 541 ( now Art 624). The existence of an apparent sign of easement between two estates, established by
the proprietor of both, shall be considered, if one of them is alienated, as a title so that the easement will
continue actively and passively, unless at the time the ownership of the two estates is divided, the contrary is
stated in the deed of alienation of either of them, or the sign is made to disappear before the instrument is
executed.
Easement are established by law or by will of the owners or by title. Under Art. 624, there is title by the doctrine of
apparent sign. When the estate is subsequently owned by two different persons and the service (it cannot be an
easement before the transfer) is not revoked in the title nor removed, an easement is established.
When Maria Florentino died in 1892, the ownership of the house and its lot passed to GABRIEL ET AL while the
dominion over the camarin and its lot was vested in Maria Encarnancion, from whom property was later bought by
AMOR.
At the time the devisees took possession of their inheritance, neither GABRIEL ET AL nor Maria Encarnacion said or
did anything with respect to the four windows of the respondents' house. GABRIEL ET AL did not renounce the use
of the windows, either by stipulation or by actually closing them permanently.
On the contrary, they exercised the right of receiving light and air through those windows. Neither did Maria
Encarnacion, object to them or demand that they be close.
The easement was therefore created from the time of the death of the original owner of both estates, so when AMOR
bought the land and the camarin from Maria Encarnancion, the burden of this easement continued on the real
property so acquired because according to Article 534 (now Art 618) , "easements are inseparable from the estate to
which they actively or passively pertain."
The Cortez vs. Yu-Tibo, cannot be invoked by Amor because it involved acquisition by prescription. Art 541 (now Art.
624) is acquisition by title. Therefore, while a formal prohibition was necessary Cortez vs Yu-Tibo case in order to
start the period of prescription, no such act is necessary here because the existence of the apparent sign when Maria
Florentino died was sufficient title in itself to created the easement.