Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
The holographic will of the deceased was written in Ilocano and was
allegedly undated since the date was mentioned in the first paragraph of the
will and that the date referred to the partitioning and assigning of a fishpond
and not the date of the execution of the will. Therefore, what was signed was
not a will but rather, a mere agreement, which was allegedly done to the
prejudice of the other heirs
ISSUE: Is a holographic will considered dated within the purview of Art
810 of the Civil Code when the date appears in the middle of the
paragraph of the alleged will?
RULING: Yes, the law does not specify a particular location where the date
should be placed in a will.
There was no pretierition in this case. The Supreme Court held that,
Segundos document, although it may initially come across as a mere
disinheritance instrument, conforms to the formalities of a holographic will
prescribed by law. It is written, dated and signed by the hand of Segundo
himself. An intent to dispose mortis causa can be clearly deduced from the
terms of the instrument, and while it does not make an affirmative disposition
of the latters property, the disinheritance of Alfredo, nonetheless, is an act of
disposition in itself. In other words, the disinheritance results in the
disposition of the property of the testator Segundo in favor of those who
would succeed in the absence of Alfredo. Moreover, it is a fundamental
principle that the intent or the will of the testator, expressed in the form and
within the limits prescribed by law, must be recognized as the supreme law in
HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled that the law only requires that the will be dated and
executed in the hand of the testator. Furthermore, the fact that the words of
the testator provided for partitioning and assigning the said fishpond does
not mean that what was executed was not a will. In fact, the tenor of the
words used by the testator shows his unilateral act of executing a will and
partitioning his estate.
Hence, the holographic will executed by Labrador is valid, making Sagrado
lawfully entitled to possession of the property in question.
Petitioners concede that although Olars death passed all his rights and
interest over the lot to his legal heirs, his intent of not bequeathing them to
his estranged wife but to a relative, who helped him in tilling the lot and who
took care of him, should be accorded respect over the intent of the law on
hereditary succession.
On the contrary, petitioners claimed that they have been in possession of the
lot since 1960 and presented a "Waiver of Rights" executed by Olar wherein
he renounced in their favor his rights and participation over the lot.
Petitioners further claim that respondent Fortunata was already separated
from Olar and she even remarried, thus giving her no right to inherit from
Olar.
While Elbambuena and Olars petition was pending before the Provincial
Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD), petitioners Capitle filed before the
Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) a petition for cancellation of the
CLOA issued to Olar, on the ground that they are the new farmerbeneficiaries. PARAD ruled in favor of petitioners Capitle. Elbambuena and
Olar appealed the decision to the Department of Agrarian Reform Ajudication
Board. The DARAB set aside PARADs decision stating that Cristobal Olars
death substantially passed all his rights and interest in and over the subject
property to his legal heirs by operation of law. This is as it should,
considering that rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of
death of the decedent. The case was then elevated to the Court of Appeals
which affirmed the decision of DARAB.
FACTS:
Cristobal Olar possessed a Certificate of Land Ownership Award covering a
parcel of land. Consequently, a TCT in his name was issued. When Cristobal
died, respondents Fortunata Elbambuena, the wife of Cristobal and
Rosalinda Olar, daughter-in law of the deceased
claimed that Olar
relinquished one-half of the lot in favour of Rosalinda which was witnessed
by petitioner Cirilo Capitle and the remaining portion of land was surrendered
to Fortunata.
ISSUE: Does an estranged wife have the right to inherit from her deceased
husband?
HELD: Yes. Although estranged from Olar, respondent Fortunata remained
his wife and legal heir, mere estrangement not being a legal ground for the
disqualification of a surviving spouse as an heir of the deceased spouse.
Rosalinda, on the other hand, is the surviving spouse of Olars son.
facing several criminal charges when he testified did not in any way
disqualify him as a witness.
The testimony of a witness should be given full faith and credit, in the
absence of evidence that he was actuated by improper motive (People v.
Melgar, G.R. No. 75268,29 January 1988, 157 SCRA 718). Hence, in the
absence of any evidence that witness Francisco Manalo was actuated by
improper motive, his testimony must be accorded full credence.
FACTS:
Francisco Manalo (Manalo), who was a detention prisoner in Tiaong
Municipal Jail, served as a poseur buyer of marijuana for the Tiaong Police
Department. Manalo was instructed to purchase from sources known to him.
He was given marked money to be used for the purchase. Manalo was able
to purchase two (2) marijuana foils from defendant appellant Gloria Umali
(Gloria). Through an affidavit and the two (2) marijuana foils, the police was
able to secure a search warrant against Gloria. Glorias residence was
searched and illegal drugs were seized along with the marked money which
was previously used by Manalo in purchasing the two (2) marijuana foils from
Gloria.
Defendants-appellants Gloria Umali and Suzeth Umali were charged
for violation of Sec. 4, Art.1 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. After trial,
finds accused Gloria guilty beyond reasonable doubt, while her co-accused
Suzeth Umali remained at large. Gloria interposed the defense, among
others, that the trial court erred in giving credence to the testimony of
Manalo. She alleged that Manalo is not reputed to be trustworthy and
reliable and that his words should not be taken on its face value.
Furthermore, she stressed that said witness has several charges in court and
because of his desire to have some of his cases dismissed, he was likely to
tell falsehood.
ISSUE: Does the prohibition of Art. 821 of the Civil Code apply to Manalo
and thus disqualifying him to be a witness?
HELD: No. Rule 130, Section 20 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that:
Except as provided in the next succeeding section, all persons who
can perceive, and perceiving can make known their perception to
others may be witnesses.
Religious or political belief, interest in the outcome of the case, or
conviction of a crime unless otherwise provided by law, shall not be a
ground for disqualification.
The phrase "conviction of a crime unless otherwise provided by law"
takes into account Art. 821 of the Civil Code which states that persons
convicted of falsification of a document, perjury or false testimony are
disqualified from being witnesses to a will" (Paras, RULES OF COURT
ANNOTATED, Vol. IV First Ed., p. 44).
Since the witness Manalo is not convicted of any of the abovementioned crimes to disqualify him as a witness and this case does not
involve the probate of a will, the Court rules that the fact that said witness is
Yes. A holographic will which was lost or cannot be found can be proved by
means of a photostatic copy.
Anent the contestants submission that the will is fatally defective for the
reason that its attestation clause states that the will is composed of three (3)
pages while in truth and in fact, the will consists of two (2) pages only
because the attestation is not a part of the notarial will, the same is not
accurate. While it is true that the attestation clause is not a part of the will,
the court, after examining the totality of the will, is of the considered opinion
that error in the number of pages of the will as stated in the attestation clause
is not material to invalidate the subject will. It must be noted that the subject
instrument is consecutively lettered with pages A, B, and C which is a
sufficient safeguard from the possibility of an omission of some of the
pages. The error must have been brought about by the honest belief that the
will is the whole instrument consisting of three (3) pages inclusive of the
attestation clause and the acknowledgement.
As a rule, if the holographic will has been lost or destroyed and no other copy
is available, the will can not be probated because the best and only evidence
is the handwriting of the testator in said will. It is necessary that there be a
comparison between sample handwritten statements of the testator and the
handwritten will. However, a photostatic copy or xerox copy of the
holographic will may be allowed because comparison can be made with the
standard writings of the testator. Evidently, the photostatic or xerox copy of
the lost or destroyed holographic will may be admitted because then the
authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased can be determined by the
probate court.
Hence, a holographic will which was lost or cannot be found can be proved
by means of a photostatic copy.
22. SPOUSES ROBERTO AND THELMA AJERO v. COURT OF APPEALS
GR No. 106720 September 15, 1994
Puno, J.
Facts:
Spouses Ajero instituted a special proceeding for allowance of the
holographic will of late Annie Sand who died on November 25, 1982. In the
will, spouses Ajero together with private respondents one Clemente Sand
and others were named as devisees. Private respondents however opposed
the petition on the grounds that: neither the testament's body nor the
signature therein was in decedent's handwriting; it contained alterations and
corrections which were not duly signed by decedent; and, the will was
procured by petitioners through improper pressure and undue influence.
Facts:
Petitioner filed a petition for the probate of the holographic will of Ricardo B.
Bonilla and the issuance of letters testamentary in her favor. A photostatic
copy of the will was presented in court. The petition was opposed by
respondents alleging among others that lost or destroyed holographic wills
cannot be proved by secondary evidence unlike ordinary wills.
The lower court denied the motion to dismiss the probate of the will filed by
respondents.
Issue:
Should the holographic will be disallowed for failure to comply with the
formalities prescribed by law?
Issue:
Can a holographic will which was lost or cannot be found be proved by
means of a photostatic copy?
Ruling:
No.
In a petition to admit a holographic will to probate, the only issues to be
resolved are: (1) whether the instrument submitted is, indeed, the decedent's
last will and testament; (2) whether said will was executed in accordance with
Held:
already very sick and that petitioner having admitted her living in
concubinage with the testator, she is wanting in integrity and thus, letters
testamentary should not be issued to her.
On January 6, 1976, the lower court denied the probate of the Will on the
ground that as the testator admitted in his Will to cohabiting with the
petitioner from December 1952 until his death on July 16, 1974, the Will's
admission to probate will be an Idle exercise because on the face of the Will,
the invalidity of its intrinsic provisions is evident. On appeal, the decision was
reversed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent court acted in excess of its jurisdiction when
after declaring the last Will and Testament of the deceased Martin Jugo
validly drawn, it went on to pass upon the intrinsic validity of the testamentary
provision in favor of herein petitioner.
Failure to strictly observe other formalities will not result in the disallowance
of a holographic will that is unquestionably handwritten by the testator.
23. NEPOMUCENO v. CA
GR No. L-62952; October 9, 1985
Gutierrez Jr., J.
HELD:
The respondent court acted within its jurisdiction when after declaring the Will
to be validly drawn, it went on to pass upon the intrinsic validity of the Will
and declared the devise in favor of the petitioner null and void.
The general rule is that in probate proceedings, the court's area of inquiry is
limited to an examination and resolution of the extrinsic validity of the Will.
The rule, however, is not inflexible and absolute. Given exceptional
circumstances, the probate court is not powerless to do what the situation
constrains it to do and pass upon certain provisions of the Will.
In Nuguid v. Nuguid (17 SCRA 449) cited by the trial court, the testator
instituted the petitioner as universal heir and completely preterited her
surviving forced heirs. A will of this nature, no matter how valid it may appear
extrinsically, would be null and void. Separate or latter proceedings to
determine the intrinsic validity of the testamentary provisions would be
superfluous.
Even before establishing the formal validity of the will, the Court in Balanay
.Jr. v. Martinez (64 SCRA 452) passed upon the validity of its intrinsic
provisions. The court invoked practical considerations in the case at hand.
There appears to be no more dispute at this time over the extrinsic validity of
the Will. Both parties are agreed that the Will of Martin Jugo was executed
with all the formalities required by law and that the testator had the mental
capacity to execute his Will.
We see no useful purpose that would be served if we remand the nullified
provision to the proper court in a separate action for that purpose simply
FACTS:
In the will of Martin Hugo, the testator named and appointed herein petitioner
Sofia J. Nepomuceno as his sole and only executor of his estate. It is clearly
stated in the Will that the testator was legally married to a certain Rufina
Gomez by whom he had two legitimate children, Oscar and Carmelita, but
since 1952, he had been estranged from his lawfully wedded wife and had
been living with petitioner as husband and wife. In fact, on December 5,
1952, the testator Martin Jugo and the petitioner herein, Sofia J.
Nepomuceno were married in Victoria, Tarlac before the Justice of the
Peace. The testator devised to his forced heirs, namely, his legal wife Rufina
Gomez and his children Oscar and Carmelita his entire estate and the free
portion thereof to herein petitioner.
On August 21, 1974, the petitioner filed a petition for the probate of the last
Will and Testament of the deceased Martin Jugo and asked for the issuance
to her of letters testamentary.
On May 13, 1975, the legal wife of the testator, Rufina Gomez and her
children filed an opposition alleging inter alia that the execution of the Will
was procured by undue and improper influence on the part of the
petitioner, that at the time of the execution of the Will, the testator was
24. Polly Cayetano vs. Hon. Tomas Leonidas, in his capacity as the
Presiding Judge of Court of First Instance of Manila and Nenita Paguia,
G.R. No. L-54919 May 30, 1984
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.
FACTS:
Adoracion C. Campos died, leaving her father, petitioner
Hermogenes Campos and her sisters, private respondents Nenita Paguia, et
al as the surviving heirs. As Hermogenes Campos was the only compulsory
heir, he executed an affidavit adjudicating unto himself the ownership of the
entire estate of the deceased Adoracion Campos.
Several months thereafter, Nenita Paguia filed a petition for the
reprobate of a will of the deceased, Adoracion Campos, which was allegedly
executed in Pennsylvania United States and for her appointment as
administratrix of the estate of the deceased testatrix.
Nenita alleged that the testatrix was an American citizen at the time
of her death and was a permanent resident of Pennsylvania, U.S.A. that the
testatrix died in Manila and that during her lifetime, the testatrix made her last
will and testament according to the laws of Pennsylvania, U.S.A. and that
after the testatrix death, her last will and testament was presented, probated,
allowed, and registered in Philadelphia, U.S.A.
Petitioner filed an opposition to the reprobate of the will alleging that
its intrinsic provisions are null and void and that even if pertinent American
laws on intrinsic provisions are invoked, the same could not apply because
they would work injustice and injury to him.
Respondent judge issued an order admitting said will and allowed
probate in the Philippines. Nenita Paguia was appointed administratrix.
ISSUE:
Is the reprobation of the will invalid for it divested the father of his
legitime which was reserved by the law for the latter and the same would
work injustice and injury to him? NO.
RULING:
NO. Under Article 16 par. (2) and 1039 of the Civil Code which
respectively provide:
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the
order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the
ISSUE: Can it 1939 will revoke the 1918 will notwithstanding its disallowance
for probate?
RULING: No. The 1939 will cannot revoke the 1918 will because it was
precisely disallowed for probate.
It is true that the law on the matter (Sec. 623, Code of Civil Procedure)
provides that a will may be revoked by some will, codicil, or other writing
executed as provided in case of wills.
It cannot be said that the 1939 will should be regarded, not as a will within
the meaning of said word, but as other writing executed as provided in the
case of wills, simply because it was denied probate. And even if it be
regarded as any other writing within the meaning of said clause, there is
authority holding that unless said writing is admitted to probate, it cannot
have the effect of revocation.
Therefore, the 1918 will should be admitted to probate.
26. The Heirs of the Late Jesus Fran v. Salas
G.R. No. L-53546 June 25, 1992
DAVIDE, JR. J:
FACTS: Remedios M. Vda. de Tiosejo died, leaving real and personal
properties. She executed a last will and testament wherein she bequeathed
to her collateral relatives all her properties.
On 15 July 1972, Jesus Fran filed a petition for the probate of the will. On 10
August 1972, the private respondents, who are sisters of the deceased, filed
a manifestation alleging that they needed time to study the petition. Private
respondents did not file any opposition. Instead, they filed on 18 September
1972 a "Withdrawal of Opposition to the Allowance of Probate of the Will.
The petition thus became uncontested.
On 13 November 1972, the probate court rendered a decision admitting to
probate the will. A Project of Partition based on the dispositions made in the
will and signed by all the devisees and legatees, with the exception of Luis
Fran, Remedios Mejia and respondent Concepcion Espina, was submitted.
Said legatees and devisees submitted certifications wherein they admit
receipt of a copy of the Project of Partition together with the notice of hearing,
and state that they had no objection to its approval. After the hearing on the
Project of Partition, the court issued its Order of 10 September
1973 approving the same, declaring the parties therein as the only heirs
and the witnesses also signed the will and all its pages in the presence of
testator and of one another renders the will invalid?
Held: Yes.
It will be noted that Article 805 requires that the witnesses should both attest
and subscribe to the will in the presence of the testator and of one another.
"Attestation" and "subscription" differ in meaning. Attestation is that act of the
senses, while subscription is the act of the hand. The former is mental, the
latter mechanical, and to attest a will is to know that it was published as such,
and to certify the facts required to constitute an actual and legal publication;
but to subscribe a paper published as a will is only to write on the same
paper the names of the witnesses, for the sole purpose of identification. An
attestation clause refers to that part of an ordinary will whereby the attesting
witnesses certify that the instrument has been executed before them and to
the manner of the execution of the same.
What is fairly apparent upon a careful reading of the attestation clause herein
assailed is the fact that while it recites that the testator indeed signed the will
and all its pages in the presence of the three attesting witnesses and states
as well the number of pages that were used, the same does not expressly
state therein the circumstance that said witnesses subscribed their
respective signatures to the will in the presence of the testator and of each
other. The phrase "and he has signed the same and every page thereof, on
the spaces provided for his signature and on the left hand margin," obviously
refers to the testator and not the instrumental witnesses as it is immediately
preceded by the words "as his Last Will and Testament." On the other hand,
although the words "in the presence of the testator and in the presence of
each and all of us" may, at first blush, appear to likewise signify and refer to
the witnesses, it must however, be interpreted as referring only to the testator
signing in the presence of the witnesses since said phrase immediately
follows the words "he has signed the same and every page thereof, on the
spaces provided for his signature and on the left hand margin." What is then
clearly lacking, in the final logical analysis, is the statement that the
witnesses signed the will and every page thereof in the presence of the
testator and of one another.
It is our considered view that the absence of that statement required by law is
a fatal defect or imperfection which must necessarily result in the
disallowance of the will that is here sought to be admitted to probate.
Petitioners are correct in pointing out that the aforestated defect in the
attestation clause obviously cannot be characterized as merely involving the
form of the will or the language used therein which would warrant the
ISSUE: Can Erlinda claim a better right of ownership over the subject
properties?
Reyes executed his last will and testament where he bequeathed in favour of
his alleged wife Asuncion Oning R. Reyes most of his properties.
HELD: NO. Erlinda cannot assert ownership of the properties she had
acquired during her union with Miguel.
With respect to the riceland, Article 148 of the Family Code is applicable.
Under Article 148, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through
their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned
After Reyes died on May 12, 1992 private respondent filed a petition for
probate of the will on May 21, 1992 before the RTC of Mambajao, Camiguin.
Here, the lower court was not asked to rule upon the intrinsic validity or
efficacy of the provisions of the will. As a result, the declaration of the testator
that Asuncion Oning Reyes was his wife did not have to be scrutinized during
the probate proceedings. Moreover, the CA correctly held that the trial court
relied on uncorroborated testimonial evidence that Asuncion Reyes was still
married to another during the time she cohabited with the testator. The
testimonies of the witnesses were merely hearsay and even uncertain as to
the whereabouts or existence of Lupo Ebarle, the supposed husband of
Asuncion.
The RTC declared that the will was executed in accordance with the
formalities prescribed by law. It, however, nullified the provisions involving
Asuncion Reyes on the ground that she is disqualified due to her illicit
relationship with the decedent. The CA likewise admitted the will but restored
the provisions nullified by the trial court. Aggrieved, the oppositors filed this
petition for review.
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