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AppendixM:SubhasChandraBose

APPENDIXM

SubhasChandraBose18971945
byProf.SatadruSen

Thistextisalectureheld1999byProf.SatadruSen(thenattheUniversityofWashington,Seattle,nowatPurdue
University,Indiana)tohisstudentsandverykindlymadeavailableforpublicationontheAndamanAssociatrion'swebsite,
forwhichwearedulygrateful.

IntroductorynotebyGeorgeWeber:
Prof.Sen'slecturedealswithwhatisundoubtedlythemostcontroversialfiguresofrecentIndianhistoryandamajorfigutre
inthehistoryoftheAndamanislands.
ForsomeonebroughtupontheBritishversionofevents(asIwas),tolandatCalcuttaairportandfinditnamedafterSubhas
ChandraBoseisabitofashockakinperhapstolandingatBerlinairportandfindingitnamedafterAdolfHitler.More
thanhalfacenturyafterhisdeath,BosestillarousesanastonishingamountofhostilityinBritainandanequallyfervent
admirationamongmanyhonestpeopleinIndia.HismonumenttodaystandsonthewaterfrontatPortBlair:

Prof.SenhasmanagedtheexceedinglydifficultfeattomakesenseoftheconfusionsurroundingBoseandtogiveaseven
handedanddispassionateevaluationofthemanasitispossibletogive.

SubhasChandraBose
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byProf.SatadruSen
Intheperiodbetweenthetwoworldwars,GandhiwasthemostpowerfulforcewithintheCongress,and,it'sprobablyfair
tosay,innationalistpolitics.BythisImeannotonlythatGandhiwasabletomakethebigdecisions,oratleastinfluence
thosedecisions,butalsothatGandhianmethodshadbecometheprimarytacticsofthenationalistmovement.Thesetactics
involvedanemphasisonnonviolence,andavacillationbetweennoncooperationandactiveparticipation.Inotherwards,
theGandhiandtheCongresswouldgoforyearsquietlycoexistingwithBritishrule,thenlaunchanoncooperation
campaign,gainsomeconcessionsfromtheBritish,andthengobacktoanotherperiodofrelativequiet.Forthemostpart,
therewerefewchallengestothisapproachoutsidetheCongress.Theterroristscarriedonincertainareasofthecountry,
especiallyBengal,buttheywere,atthemost,anuisance.BythetimeofWWII,ithadlongbecomeevidentthatelite
terrorismwasnotgoingtoinspireapopularrevolution.AfterGandhicamealonganddemonstratedhowapopular
movementmightbegenerated,theterroristsbecameevenlessrelevant.
ThechallengetothepredominanceofGandhiandGandhiantacticsinIndiannationalismcamefromwithintheCongress.It
camefromamannamedSubhasChandraBose,who,attheheightofhispoliticalinfluence,wasoneofthetwoorthree
mostpowerfulleadersintheCongress.GandhicertainlysawBoseasarivalandadangerousupstart,anddidhisbestto
destroyhimpolitically.IwanttofocusonBosetodaynotbecauseIthinkhisbattleswithGandhiareparticularly
fascinating,butbecauseBoseheldupanalternativevision,notonlyofpoliticaltactics,butalsoofpoliticalobjectives.
WhereasGandhisoughtcompromiseswiththeBritish,Bosesoughtabsolutevictories.Gandhiwaswillingtowaitalong
timeforindependence,Bosewantedimmediateaction,ifnotimmediateresults.Gandhiwasantimaterialisticandhostileto
moderntechnology,Bosesawtechnologyandmassproductionasessentialtosurvivalanddignity.Gandhiwanteda
decentralizedsocietyanddislikedthemodernstateBosewantedastrongcentralgovernmentandsawthemodernstateas
theonlysolutiontoIndia'sproblems.Andfinally,BosedidnotshareGandhi'sdedicationtononviolence.
BosecamefromaupperclassBengalifamily.HisfatherwasawellknownlawyerinCuttack.Hewastheninthchildina
big,busyfamilybuthisparentswerealoof,andBosegrewupasaloner.Hewasavoraciousreader,andhewasespecially
attractedtothewritingsofthe19th~centuryHindusocialreformer,SwamiVivekananda.FromVivekanandahepickedupa
desiretotakeIndia,especiallyHinduIndia,backtoanidealizedpastinwhichIndianshadbeenstrong,moralandfree.As
hegrewolder,andbecameinterestedinsocialism,helostthisinterestinmythicalgoldenagesandhisovertlyHindu
outlook.Buthekepthisdeterminationtodosomethingaboutwhathesawassocialinjusticetowardslowcastegroups,the
poor,andwomen.
Hewasabrilliantstudent,andbecameactiveinstudentpoliticsatCalcutta'sPresidencyCollege.Inthosewartimeyears,the
universityofferedmilitarytrainingtostudentswhowereinterested(sortofliketheROTCtoday),andBoseeagerlysigned
up.ButunlikeGandhi,whoalsohadmilitaryexperience,BosedidnotjoinbecausehesawitashisdutytotheEmpire.He
joinedbecausehebelievedmilitarytrainingwasanimportantpartofanationalist'seducation.Heferventlybelievedthat
India,andespeciallyHindus,hadbecomepoliticallysubjugatedbecauseoftheirmilitaryweakness.Ifthenationwastobe
freeandworthyofrespect,Bosefelt,itscitizensmustknowhowtofight.
AlsoatPresidencyCollege,hehadoneofhisfirstdirectencounterswiththeBritish.Hebecameinvolvedinanassaultby
studentsonaBritishprofessor,andwaskickedoutofschool.Thisincidenthassincebecomeoneofthemajormythsof
Indiannationalism,withBosepresentedastheheroandEdwardOaten,theprofessor,presentedasaracistvillain.Thetruth
isprobablynotsoclearcut.WhatismorelikelyisthatOatenwastactless,andBosewashotheaded.Asenseofhumorwas
notoneofBose'sstrongpointshetendedtobetouchyandtookeverythingveryseriously.
HeeventuallygraduatedfromScottishChurchcollegeinCalcutta(afterhisfatherpulledafewstringstogethimadmitted),
andwasthenpackedofftoEnglandbyhisfamilytopreparefortheICS(IndianCivilService)exams.HearrivedinEngland
in1919,whenhewas23yearsold.
It'sinterestingtocompareBose'sEnglishexperiencewithGandhi's.Bosewasprobablyabitlesssociallyisolatedthan
GandhihadbeenwhenhehadfirstarrivedthereweremoreIndiansaroundforhimtospendtimewith.AswithGandhi,the
timeBosespentinEnglandmadeadeepimpressiononhisthinking.LikeGandhi,Bosebecamesomethingofadandyin
England,alwayswearingexpensive,perfectlypressedclothes.LikeGandhi,Bosewasterrifiedofsex,andputallhisguards
upwhenhewasaroundEnglishwomen.AndlikeGandhi,BosebecamemoreconsciousofhisIndianidentitywhenhewas
inEngland.
Butthereweresomeverysignificantdifferences,aswell.GandhididnotbecomeanationalistwhilehewasinEngland.
Thatcamelater.Gandhi'snationalismdevelopedslowlyoverthedecades,andifwehadtolookforpivotalmovementswe
wouldhavetofindtheminSouthAfricaandlaterinJallianwallaBagh.BosearrivedinEnglandasabuddingnationalist,
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andassomebodywhowasveryconscious,andveryresentful,oftheracialbasisofBritishruleinIndia.InEngland,he
wroteoneofhisfriends:"Nothingmakesmehappierthantobeservedbythewhitesandtowatchthemcleanmyshoes.In
England,Bose'snationalismbecamemoreclearlydefined,andmoremilitant,thanithadbeenbefore.
A~thesametime,BoselikedEngland.HeenjoyedtheopennessofEnglishsociety,thefreedomofexpression,thedebates
inParliamentandattheuniversity,thefactthatstudentsweren'tshadowedbythepolice.Itmadehimacutelyawareofhow
differentlifewasincolonialIndia.Also,therewasalotthatBoseadmiredabouttheBritishinEngland.Hefoundthem
efficientandenergetic,heappreciatedtheirsenseofanationalinterest,andwhathesawastheircandoattitude.These
qualitiesefficiency,energy,discipline,asenseofpunctualityareallcentraltomodernindustrialsociety,andtheybecame
centraltoBose'svisionofwhatIndiashouldbelike.
HedidverywellintheICSexams,andthenfacedadilemmathathad,bythe1920's,becomecommonforIndian
nationalists.ShouldhejointhelAS,andparticipateintheadministrationofIndia,orshouldhekeephisdistancefromthe
colonialgovernment?Wouldparticipationconstitutecollaboration?EventuallyBosedecidedtostayawayfromthelAS.
QuiteapartfromhisqualmsabouttheIndianCivilService,therewasanothermajorfactorthatinfluencedhisdecision.Bose
wasoneofthosepeoplewhodesperatelyneededafatherfigureinhislife.Eversincehehadbeenachild,hehadattached
himselftohisteachersandtovariousswamis,hopingtofindsomebodywhocouldbeacombinationofspiritualadvisor,
politicalmentor,andintellectualguide.ForBose,whowasalreadyleaningtowardsacareerinnationalistpolitics,one
possiblechoicemighthavebeenGandhi,whoservedthosefunctionsforNehru.ButBoseneverdevelopedthisintimacy
withGandhi.HeadmiredGandhi,butthephilosophicaldifferencesweretoogreat.
AsheresignedfromtheIndianCivilService,Bosefinallyfoundhisfatherfigure.ThiswasC.R.Das,whowasanotherone
ofthosenationalistlawyerpoliticiansactiveintheCongress.Insomeways,Daswasacuriouschoiceofmentorforahot
headedextremistlikeBose.Daswastheultimatemachinepolitician.Hebelievedinbuildinganadministrativeorganization
withintheframeworkofthecolonialgovernment,andthenrunningthatorganizationasindependentlyaspossible.Hedid
notlookforrevolutionratherlikeGandhi,hebelievedinagradualprocessofpiecemealconcessions.LikeGandhi,hehad
respondedtotheRowlattActsbythrowinghimselfintothenoncooperationmovement.Hehadabandonedhislegalpractice
andhiswesternsuits,andadoptingkhadiandfrugality,althoughhewasneverquiteasfrugalasGandhi.
BosewasdrawntoC.R.Dasprimarilybecauseheadmiredthelatter'spersonalsacrifices.Thefactthatbothmenwere
Bengaliswasalsoafactor.Andperhaps,atapsychologicallevel,Daswithhissocial,culturalandprofessionalbackground
wassufficientlylikeBose'sownfather.
SoBosewrotetoC.R.Das,offeringhisservices,andratherboldlyoutlininghisownideasofhowtobuildanationalist
organization.Congress,hewrote,shouldhaveapermanenthouse.ItshouldcomeupwithasetofpoliciesforallofIndia,
includingtheprincelystates,Itshouldhavepoliciesforimprovingtheconditionsoflowcastegroups,Itshouldhaveitsown
researchandintelligencewing,andawellorganizedpublicrelationsmachine.
Theseideasareimportantforseveralreasons,Foronething,theytellusalotabouthowBosewasthinkingaboutthepresent
andthefuture.Already,in1921,hewantedtheCongresstofunctionasaparallelgovernment,Thisissomethingthatvery
fewpeopleinsidetheCongress,includingGandhi,hadgivenmuchthoughtto,orwerecomfortablecontemplating,For
another,theseideashighlighttheemphasisBosewouldplaceonefficientorganization.Theyreflecthisconvictionthat
society'sproblemscouldbesolvednotthroughmoralpersuasionwhichwastheGandhianlinebutthroughpressure
exertedbypowerfulorganizations,suchasaparallelgovernment,oranindependentnationstate.
DaswasimpressedbyBose'sideas,andinvitedBosetoworkwithhiminCalcutta.Sohewent,andin1921heplunged
immediatelyintohecticpoliticalactivitymatfullyutilizedhistalentsasanorganizer.Seeinganeedtodevelopalternatives
tothecolonialeducationalsystem,Bosethrewhimselfintocreatinganationalistcollege.Hesethimselfupastheprincipal,
foundprofessorswhowerewillingtolecture,inventedcourses,developedcourseschedules,andevenplannedontaking
somecourseshimself.Allthiswastypicaloftheman:hewantedtobetheleader,hewantedtoplanandtoorganize,andat
thesametimehewantedtolearn.
Whenhewasnotworkingonthenationalistcollege,BosewasorganizingstrikesanddemonstrationsinCalcuttaaspartof
thenoncooperationmovement.TheBritishthrewhiminjail,alongwithC.R.Dasandthousandsofotheractivists,butthis
wasprettymuchwhatthenoncooperationmovementaimedtoachieve.Hewasreleasedaftersixmonths,andwas
immediatelybackatwork,doingwhathedidbest:organizinglargescaleoperations.Therehadseriousfloodinginpartsof
Bengal.Bose,workingwithCongressvolunteers,setupreliefoperationsthatwerebiggerandmoreeffectivethananything
theCongresshaddonealongthoselinesuntilthen.Sincethecolonialgovernmentdidn'tdomuchtohelpthefloodvictims,
Bose'sreputationasaneffectivepoliticalleadergrewlarger.
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Ataroundthistime,BosebegantohavehisfirstopendisagreementswithGandhi.Actually,itwasDaswhohadthe
disagreementwithGandhi,andinitiallyBosewasinvolvedonlyasDas'righthandman,DaswantedtheCongresstocontest
electionstolocalcouncilsundertheMontaguChelmsfordActof1919,andtobecomeactivelyinvolvedinlocal
government.Gandhifeltthiswouldunderminenoncooperation,andrefused.ButDashadsupportwithintheCongresson
thisissue,particularlyfromthetwoNehrus.TheygottogetherandformedtheSwarajParty.Thiswasnotreallyaseparate
party,butagroupthatremainedwithintheoverallCongressorganization.FacedwiththistensionwithintheCongress,
GandhicompromisedandallowedtheSwarajPartytoparticipateintheelections.
Inthe1924electionstotheCalcuttaMunicipalCorporationi.e.,thecitygovernmentofCalcuttatheSwarajPartywona
twothirdsmajority.BosebecametheChiefExecutiveOfficer.Inotherwords,attheageof27,hewasoneofthemost
powerfulmeninthesecondlargestcityoftheBritishEmpire.Helovedthejob:itallowedhimtousehistalentfor
developingandrunningbigoperations,tobeinnovative,andtobetheboss.Hetookchargeofallkindsofdetails,from
designingcityemployees'uniforms,tocreatingnewmunicipalprogramsforeducationandpublichealth.
Inthemeantime,thecolonialsecretservicekeptaclosewatchonhim,andtriedtocomeupwithevidencethatwouldbring
himdown.ThecolonialgovernmenthadfirstnoticedBoseduringOatenepisode,andnowhewasseenasaparticularly
dangerousnationalistpolitician,whowasbecomingtoopowerfultoofast.Eventually,inthefallof1924,Bosewasarrested
onvaguechargesofconspiringwithterroriststokillthepolicecommissionerofCalcutta.Thechargeswerealmostcertainly
false.Boseprobablysympathizedwiththeterrorists,andmayhavehelpedthemfindjobs,etc.,butit'stotallyimplausible
thathewouldhavejeopardizedhiscareeratthatstagebytryingtokillhisownpolicechief.
Inanyevent,theBritishwantedtogethimoutofthecountry,andhewassentofftojailinBurma.Hishealthbrokedownin
prison,andhewaseventuallyreleasedin1927.HecamebacktoIndiaandfoundthatalothadchangedinhispolitical
fortunes.Foronething,C.R.Dashaddied,andtheleadershipoftheSwarajPartyhadbeentakenoverbyGandhiloyalists.
ThisleftBosewithoutasecurefootholdinthepoliticalestablishment.HeremainedactiveintheCongress,buthismoment
atthecenterofpowerhadpassed.Hewentbacktobeingthepermanentoutsider.Insonicways,thisfreedhimup,
especiallywhenitcametobeingabletocriticizeGandhi.Nowhehadlesstolose.
Hespokeoutstronglyontwoissues.Firstly,hecriticizedGandhi'shostilitytomoderntechnologyandmassHedeclared:
"Wehavetoliveinthepresentandtoadaptourselvestomodernconditions.Thedaysofthebullockcartaregoneforever."
And,forthoseofyouwhohavebeenfollowingtherecentcontroversyovertheIndiannuclearprogram,headded:"Free
Indiamustarmherselfforanyeventualityaslongasthewholeworlddoesnotacceptwholeheartedlythepolicyof
disarmament."
HissecondpointofdisagreementwithGandhiwasoverthepaceandtheobjectivesofthenationalistmovement.Gandhi
tendedtogivetheBritishalotoftimetorespondtoCongressdemands,andtherewerelonggapsbetweentheperiodsof
activeagitation.Bosewantedimmediateagitation,andcouldnotunderstandwhyGandhialwayswaitedfortheright
moment.Atruerevolutionary,hefelt,createdthemoment,ratherthanwaitforittoarrive.
Also,GandhiandhisallieswithintheCongresswerenot,in1928,readytocomeoutanddemandcompleteindependence.
Theypreferredtodefinethenationalistgoalasdominionstatus,i.e.,asautonomywithintheBritishEmpire.Bosefoundthis
unacceptable,andhedidnothesitatetosayso.
Nevertheless,hewasstillworkingcloselywiththeCongress.DuringtheCongress'conventioninCalcuttain1928,Bose
organizedtheceremonies.Intheprocess,heallowedhisimaginationtorunwild:heputCongressvolunteersinmilitary
styleuniforms,namedhimselfGeneralOfficerCommanding,andheldamilitarystylehonorguardforNehrusenior.Once
again,thiswashischildishdelightinuniformsandsmartsalutescomingtotheforefront.Mostpeopledidn'tknowwhether
tolaughortocry.Gandhi,mostlikely,wasnotamused.
In1929,BosewaselectedpresidentoftheBengalbranchoftheCongress,defeatingGandhi'scandidate.Notlongafterthat,
hewasjailedforprotestingthegovernment'streatmentofrevolutionariesandpoliticalprisoners.In1930Gandhifinally
gavethecallforcompleteindependence,andlaunchedanewcampaignofcivildisobedience.Bosewatchedthecampaign
fromprison.Whileinprison,hewaselectedmayorofCalcutta.W1~enhewasreleasedinthefallof1930,heimmediately
wentbacktobeingtheorganizerofmassivenationalistdemonstrations.Afteraconfrontationwiththepoliceinwhichhe
wasviolentlyassaulted,hewassentbacktojail.Forthetimebeing,hiscareerasanactivepoliticianinIndiacametoan
end.
Bose'shealthfailedagaininprison,andhewenttoEuropetorecover.Hespentmostofthe1930'sinEurope,shadowedby
theBritishsecretservice.Nevertheless,hetraveledextensivelyinSwitzerland,Germany,Austria,Italy,Irelandandeastern
Europe.HedevelopedextensivecontactswiththeEuropeanleftaswellaswiththeright,bothofwhichhadreasonstobe
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antiBritain,andtowelcomeBoseasamanwhowasfightingtheBritishinIndia.HemetMussolini,discussedhis
revolutionaryplanswithhim,andMussoliniwassuitablyimpressed.
ThisperiodinEuropehadaprofoundeffectonBose'spolitics.Foronething,hisexposuretotheleftsharpenedhisfaithin
revolutionarysocialism,andhisdeterminationtoleadasocialistrevolutioninIndia.Foranother,hisexposuretotheright
gavehimanadmirationforthetechniquesoforganizationandadministrationthattheNazisweretryingoutinGermany,and
thatMussolini'sfascistshadbeentryingoutinItaly.
WenowhavetodealwiththequestionofBose'spoliticalideologyatthispoint,especiallythequestionofwhetherornothe
wasafascist.Well,inaword:yes,Bosewasnowafascist.Hehadnoproblemswithopenlyadmiringfascism.Atthesame
time,hewasnotaNazi,inthesensethathewasnotaracist,andhehadnointerestintheoriesofnationalpurityandcultural
supremacy.BosedidnotseekaHinduIndia,or
somepureversionofIndianculture.HehadlongoutgrownhisoldpoliticsofHindunostalgia.HewelcomedMuslim
participationinIndiannationalism,andhedidnothesitatewhenitcametoformingallianceswithMuslimpoliticians.
ForBose,fascismwasatechniqueofpoliticalorganization,andadiagramforrelationsbetweengovernmentandsociety.
Bosewasnotademocrat.Hemayhavebeenoneinthe1920's,butbythelate1930'shewasquitecertainthatparliamentary
democracywasnotsuitableforIndia.Inhismind,Indianeededfirmcontrolbyasingleparty,whichwoulddirectevery
aspectofsocial,political,economicandevenpersonallife.
HebelievedthatIndia'sproblemssuchascastediscrimination,classinjustice,theneedforeconomicmodernization,etc.
weresodeeprootedthatmeycouldonlybeweededoutthroughmassivestateintervention.Forthis,Bosebelieved,the
machineryofthestatehadtobeinthehandsofasingle,powerful,reformingpartyorganization,suchastheNaziPartyin
GermanyortheCommunistPartyintheSovietUnion.Atthispoint,hestillbelievedthatthispartywouldbetheCongress.
BosefinallyreturnedtoIndiainJanuaryof1937.Hewasnowmuchmoreradicalthanhehadbeenwhenhehadleft.He
wasquicktorejecttheGovernmentofIndiaActof1935,whichhadallowedforgreaterIndianparticipationinthe
provincialgovernments.ForBose,thelawwastoolittletoolate.HewasunhappythattheCongresshadagreedto
participateinthegovernmentundertheAct,butthisdidnotkeephimawayfromCongresspolitics.TheyearsinEuropehad
notdiminishedhispopularityinIndia,andhehadnotroublegettingelectedasthepresidentoftheCongress.Heremained
presidentforonlyayear,beforeGandhischemedtobringhimdown.
Butforthatoneyear,Bosewasking,andheenjoyedhimselfthoroughly.Asinthepast,hethrewhimselfintobuilding
Congressupasapracticalparallelgovernment.Inkeepingwithhisfaithinmoderntechnology,hesetupacommitteeof
prominentscientiststodevelopaviableindustrialpolicy.Heraisedfunds,andhecampaignedtirelesslyalloverIndia.He
emphasizedhissocialistideals,andalongwithNehru,becametherecognizedleaderoftheCongressleft.
ButBoseandNehrudidnotbecomepoliticalallies.Thereareseveralreasons.Therewerethephilosophicaldifferences:
Nehruwasademocrat,Bosewasauthoritarian.AlsoNehru,atheart,wassomethingofanAnglophile,inthesensethathe
hadasoftspotforIndia'sconnectionwithEngland.Bosehadnosuchsentimentalattachment.Thenthereweredifferences
intemperamentthatplayedoutinthewaytheyeachapproachedsocialismandpolicymaking.Nehruwasavisionary
withoutmuchinterestinthedetailsofimplementinghisvisions.ButdetailsmatteredtoBose.Andfinally,therewasthe
Gandhifactor.
InspiteofhisphilosophicaldifferenceswithGandhi,NehruwasGandhi'sprotege,andeverybodyknewit.Nehruwould
disagreewithGandhionspecificissues,butwhenpushcametoshoveandadecisionhadtobemade,hewouldgiveinand
letGandhihavehisway.ThiswaspartlyOutofagenuinerespectforGandhi'sleadership,andpartlybecauseNehru
understoodverywellthathisownpoliticalfortuneswerelinkedtoGandhi's.AslongasNehruwasGandhi'sboy,hisown
futurewithintheCongressorganizationwasinsured.ThisreluctancetogoupagainstGandhimeantthatwhenGandhi
turnedonBose,Nehrumadenorealefforttodefendhisfellowsocialist.
WhenBosehadbeenelectedCongresspresident,Gandhihadacceptedit.Thebreakcameinthefallof1938,whenwarin
Europebecameadistinctpossibility.Boseandtheleftsawthepossibilityofwarasatremendouspoliticalopportunity,and
wantedtousethisopportunitytopressurethecolonialgovernmentforimmediateconcessions.GandhiandtheCongress
right,ontheotherhand,wantedtoissueamuchweakerresolution,hopingthattheBritishwouldsimplydotherightthingif
warbrokeout.Boseandtheleftrefusedtogivein,andGandhiwasfurious.EventhoughBosewastheCongresspresident
atthistime,GandhihadlongenjoyedthestatusoftheunofficialsuperpresidentoftheCongress,andhedidnotlikeBose's
disobedience.
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BosewasupforreelectioninJanuaryof1939,andGandhidecidedtoblockhim.Quiteapartfromhispersonalanimosity,
therewererealissuesinvolved.BosewantedtheCongresstowalkawayfromimplementingtheGovernmentofIndiaActof
1935.Healsowantedtogivethecolonialgovernmentanultimatumdemandingimmediateindependence,andtobeginall
outcivildisobedienceifthegovernmentrefused.GandhiandtheCongressrightfeltotherwise.Inanyevent,Bosewonhis
reelection,narrowlydefeatingP.Sitaramayya,whowasGandhi'schosencandidate.
GandhinowworkedactivelytobringBosedown.TheCongressconstitutionprovidedonlytwowaysforgettingridofthe
president:hecouldbevotedOutofoffice,orhecouldresign.SinceGandhiwasunwillingtowaitforthenextelection,he
decidedtoforceBosetoresign.EventhoughBosewastheCongresspresident,Gandhi'ssupporterscontrolledtheparty's
WorkingCommittee.Withouttheircooperation,thepresidentcouldnotoperateeffectivelyitwasasystemofchecksand
balancessimilartowhatwehaveintheUSgovernment.
Gandhi'ssupportersnowresigned,andBosefoundhimselfunabletoformanewWorkingCommitteeagainstGandhi's
opposition.HetriedhardtoworkoutacompromisewithGandhi.HeevenofferedtoletGandhinominatetheentire
WorkingCommittee,ifGandhiwouldonlyacceptBose'splantolaunchanagitationforimmediateindependence.Gandhi
politelyrefused,andBosehadnooptionexcepttoresign,fourmonthsintohissecondtermaspresident.
OneoftheinterestingthingsaboutthiswholeepisodeisthatBoseblamedNehrumorethanheblamedGandhi.Henever
completelycuthistieswithGandhi,andcontinuedtotrytorebuildhisbridges.ButheneverforgaveNehrufornothelping
himduringthiscrisis.
OnSeptember3of1939,warfinallybrokeoutinEurope.AndnotjustinEurope,becausetheViceroyLordLinlithgow
declaredwaronIndia'sbehalf,withoutconsultingasingleIndian.ThiswasamajorembarrassmentfortheCongress,which
wasnowfacedwithtwochoices.Itcouldeithergetsomesignificantconcessionsfromthecolonialgovernment.Oritcould
resignfromtheministriesitcontrolledundertheGovernmentofIndiaAct.SotheCongresswenttothegovernment,and
askedforaclearstatementofitsmilitaryobjectives.
Thegovernmentstonewalled,sayingthatitwastooearlyinthewartotalkaboutmilitaryobjectives.Italsorefusedtotalk
aboutIndianindependence,sayingthatanysuchdiscussionwouldhavetowaituntilafterthewar.Sincetherewasno
clearlydefinedmilitaryobjective,itmeantthatthegovernmentwoulddecidewhenthewarwasover,andwhenIndian
independencecouldbediscussed.Congressnowresignedfromitsministries.It'sbeensuggestedthattheBritishdeliberately
maneuveredCongressintoresigning,tohaveafreehandinrunningthegovernmentduringthewar.Whateverthecasemay
be,theCongressnowfounditselfoutofoffice,andwithnothingbutmoraloutragetoshowforit.StillGandhirefusedto
launchanagitation.
Bose,meanwhile,hadbeenbusyorganizinghisownparty,calledtheForwardBloc.Thiswasinitiallywithinthestructure
oftheCongress.Butby1940ithadbecomeanindependentpoliticalparty,mainlybecausetheCongresshadrefusedto
tolerateitsallegiancetoBoseinsteadoftoGandhi,andhadkickeditsofficersoutofoffice.Thingswerehappeningvery
fastforBose,asusual.InJulyof1940,hewasarrestedandsenttoprisonagainforplanningtoleadamarchdemandingthe
removalofamemorialtothevictimsoftheBlackHoleofCalcutta.Hewentonahungerstrike,andinDecemberhewas
released.
Thenbeganhisgreatadventure.Evenbeforehislastarrest,BosehadbeguntothinkaboutgettinghimselfOutofIndia.He
feltthattherewaslittlethathecouldachieveinIndiaunderthecircumstances.HiscareerintheCongresshadstalled,and
besides,theCongresswasunwillingtodowhathewantedittodo.Thewar,hefelt,wastooimportantanopportunityto
waste.Sohecameupwithaplan.HewouldescapefromIndia,gettotheSovietUnion,andthengoontoGermany.When
hegottoGermany,hewouldpersuadetheGermanstohelphiminhisfightagainsttheBritishinIndia.
BosenowcontactedacommunistorganizationinPunjab.Heaskediftheymightbeabletosmugglehimacrosstheborder
intoAfghanistan,andthroughAfghanistanintotheUSSR.Theytoldhimitwaspossible.Inthewinterof194041his
journeybegan.DisguisedasaMuslimlifeinsuranceagent,BoseescapedfromhisfamilyhomeinCalcuttainthemiddleof
thenight.Heboardedatrainataremoteruralstation,andtravelledtoPeshawarontheborderbetweenPunjaband
Afghanistan.Fromthere,inanewdisguiseasadeafmutePathan,andaccompaniedbyhiscommunistcontact,hetrekked
acrossthedeserttoKabul.HisplantotravelacrosstheborderdirectlyintotheSovietUnionhadbeendiscardedas
impractical.HiscurrentplanwastocontacttheSovietembassyinKabul.
Kabulinthe1940'swasbasicallyatruckstopvillagewithembassies.Bose,stillposingasadeafmute,stayedattruck
drivers'hotelforweeks,tryingtocontacttheRussians.Hehadnoluck,theRussianssuspectedthathewasaBritishagent
tryingtoinfiltratetheSovietUnion.NextBosecontactedtheGermans.Theyheardhimout,andwereintriguedbyhisideas,
butdraggedtheirfeet.EventuallyitwastheItalianswhorescuedhim.TheItaliandiplomatinKabulwasfascinatedby
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Bose'splans.HegaveBoseanItalianpassportandthenameOrlandoMazzotta,andpersuadedtheGermansandtheSoviets
tohelphim.Finally,inMarchof1941,BosetravelledtotheSovietborderinadiplomaticcar,tookatraintoMoscow,and
thenflewtoBerlin.
BoseremainedinGermanyforthenexttwoyears.HeofferedtheGermansadeal.Iftheyhelpedhim,hesaid,hecould
triggerarevolutioninIndia.HavingtodealwitharevolutionarysituationinIndiawoulddistractBritishforcesfromthewar
againstGermany.Intheprocess,BritainwouldlosethewarwithGermany,andloseIndiasimultaneously.Thiswasthebig
picture.Tobringallthisabout,Boseputforwardseveralideas.Someoftheseheaccomplishedinothersareashewas
frustrated.Let'slookathispoliticalobjectivesfirst.
BosewantedfacilitiesforbroadcastingradiomessagesintoIndia.ThistheGermansreadilyprovided,andhemaderegular
speechesdirectedattheIndianpublic.Inhisbroadcasts,Boseurgedpeopletousethewarasanopportunitytobreakfree.
Germanywouldwinthewar,andtheBritishshouldnotbeallowedtohangoninIndia.Thefirstbroadcastscreateda
sensationinIndia,largelybecauseBose'sdisappearancehadgeneratedalotofpublicinterest.Butitdidn'tgomuchfurther
thanthat.ThiswasbecauseinspiteofBose'spresenceinBerlin,tomostIndiansthewarwithGermanywasstillfaraway,
andpeoplecouldn'treallyvisualizetheGermanarmysweepingthroughtheCaucasustoliberateIndia.Also,bythistime,
GandhiandtheCongresshadfinallylaunchedtheQuitIndiamovement,andaviolentrevolutionarysituationalready
existedinIndia.
Bose'sothermajoraccomplishmentinGermanywasorganizingtheIndianLegion.Inthecourseofthefightinginnorth
Africa,theGermanshadtakenthousandsofIndianPOWs.BosewenttothePOWcamps,andaskedtheIndiansoldiersto
joinhimtofightagainsttheBritish.Thisideawasnotentirelynew.AnexpatriateIndiannamedMohammedlqbalShedai
hadalreadymadeastartorganizingIndianPOWscapturedbytheItalians.Forawhile,BoseandShedairanparallelefforts
withthePOWs.ThentheIndiansoldiersinShedai'scampmutinied,ThisdiscreditedShedai,andleftBoseastheonly
IndianorganizinganarmytofightonthesideoftheAxis.
Ultimately,theIndianLegionthatBoseorganizedinGermanynumberedabout3000soldiers.Itwasnoteasyputtingthis
forcetogether.Initially,whenBosevisitedthePOWcampstotalktothesoldiers,hegotahostilereception.TheBritish
IndianArmymayhavebeenanarmywithoutanationalistideology,butitwouldbeamistaketothinkofitasapurely
mercenaryforce.Thecolonialarmyhaditsownideology,whichwasacombinationofloyaltytotheBritishthrone,loyalty
tothecommandingofficer,loyaltytotheregiment,andatraditionofserviceinwhichthesamefamilyorsamevillagesent
manygenerationsofsoldiersintotheArmy.
ButBosepersisted.Hehadthemenseparatedfromtheirofficers,andtalkedtothemoneonone.Eventually,hegotthrough.
HepromisedthempropertreatmentfromtheGermans,appropriaterank,payandbenefits,andhepromisedthemvictory.
TheBritish,hetoldthem,werecertaintolosethewartheywerelikeadeadsnakethatpeoplecontinuetofear.Ifonlythey
shookoffthisfear,Bosesaid,victoryandfreedomwouldbetheirs.
BosehadplannedthatwhentheGermanswingthroughthesouthernUSSRandtheMiddleEastreachedIndia,theIndian
LegionwouldspearheadtheattackonIndia.Heanticipatedthatthiswouldhavetworesults.Onewasthatwhenthesoldiers
ofthecolonialIndianArmyfacedtheIndianLegion,theywouldrefusetocontinuetofightfortheBritishanddeserten
massetoBose'sside.TheotherwasthataninvasionofIndiabyIndianLegionwouldgalvanizetheIndianpopulationinto
risingupagainsttheBritish,andmakeBose'staskeasier.
Asthingsturnedout,however,theIndianLegioncametoarathersadend.First,theRussiansstoppedtheGermanadvance
atthebattleofStalingrad.This,combinedwiththedefeatatElAlamein,meantthattheGermanswouldbeunlikelytoget
anywherenearIndia.Second,afterBoseleftGermanyin1943,theLegionwasleftwithoutaneffectiveleadertolookOut
forthem.TheywereabsorbedintotheGermanarmyanddeployedinFrance.Nowtheyknewtheyweren'tgoingtobe
fightingforIndia'sfreedom,andtheirmoraleanddisciplinedisintegrated.Manydeserted,somejoinedtheFrench
resistance,andtherestdisappearedinthechaosoftheGermanretreat.
Bose'sbiggestfrustrationinGermanyhadtodowithdiplomaticrecognition.HewantedGermanytoofficiallyrecognize
Indiaasindependent,andhimastheleaderofagovernmentinexile.ThistheGermansrefusedtogivehim.Thereasonslay
partlyinapathy,partlyintheMasterRacementality,andpartlyinthepeculiaritiesofHitler'svisionofthepostwarworld.
HitlerwasnotentirelycomfortablewiththeideaofhelpingIndianswhomhesawasraciallyinferiortodefeattheBritish.
TheBritishwereAryans,afterall.Inhisownway,HitleradmiredtheEnglish,andthroughmuchofthewarhecontinuedto
hopethathecouldcometosomekindofanunderstandingwithBritain:essentially,thatGermanywouldgetafreehandin
Europe,andEnglandwouldgettokeepmostofitsempire.HewasperfectlywillingtouseBosetomaketroubleforthe
British,buthehadnolongterminterestinIndia'sfuture,onewayoranother.Boseknewthis,ofcourse.Hewantedtouse
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theGermansforhisownpurposes.Buteventually,asthingsturnedout,neitherwasabletodoverymuchfortheotherside.
,Butbythemiddleof1942,BosewasalreadylookingbeyondGermany,toJapan.ThestringofJapanesevictoriesafter
PearlHarborhadachievedtwothings.OnewasthatSingapore,whichwasamajorBritishmilitarystronghold,hadfallento
theJapanese.ThisplacedtensofthousandsofIndiansoldiersinJapanesehands.WhatBosehadtriedtodowiththeIndian
LegioninGermany,hecouldtryinSoutheastAsiaonamuchlargerscale.TheotherthingthatencouragedBosewasthe
factthatJapaneseforceshadcomeallthewaytotheIndianborderwithBurma.Inotherwords,ifhecouldorganizeanarmy
inJapaneseoccupiedterritory,andattackonIndiawouldbearelativelypracticalidea.
So,inFebruaryof1943,theGermansdidBoseonelastfavor:theyhelpedhimgettoJapan.HetravelledinaGerman
submarinetothecoastofMozambique,wherehetransferredtoaJapanesesubmarine.Thissubmarinetookhimtosoutheast
Asia.
TheformerBritishcoloniesofsoutheastAsiaBurma,Malaya,andSingaporehadlargeIndianpopulations,andBosewas
welcomedasaconqueringhero.Inasense,theyhadbeenwaitingforhiminspiteofalleffortstokeephisplanssecret,
rumorshadbeencirculatingthathewouldcome.TheJapanesewelcomedhimalso,andwerefarmoreenthusiasticabout
workingwithhimthantheGermanshadbeen.
I'llgiveyouanexampleofthedifferenceinattitude:whenBosewasontheGermansub,heatebreadthattastedlikeithad
beendippedindiesel.OntheJapanesesub,thecrewhadbroughtalongIndianspicesespeciallyforhim,andcookedhim
Indiancurriesuntilheprotestedaboutthefrequentmeals.AfterhereachedAsia,BosetravelledwidelyintheJapanesehelp
territories:toBurma,Malaya,Singapore,thePhilippines,Vietnam,occupiedChina,andofcourseJapan.Unlikehisuneasy
relationshipwithHitler,hequicklydevelopedanexcellentrelationshipwithTojo.
TheJapanesegaveBosetwothingswhichhehadwantedverybadly:diplomaticrecognitionasthepremieroffreeIndia,
andarealarmy.Let'stalkabouthispoliticalstatusfirst.Hedidn'thaveaterritory,buthehadapeople:theIndian
populationofsoutheastAsiawasplacedunderhisjurisdiction.Bosegotalltheprivilegesandtrappingsofaheadofstate:
themotorcade,theofficialaircraft,thehonorguards,theworks,Heenjoyedit.Inpart,thiswassheermegalomania:hisold
loveofplayingthegreatleaderwasresurfacingwithavengeance.Inpart,however,Boserecognizedthatitwasnecessary
forhimtoplaythisroleifwastodealeffectivelywiththeJapanese.HedidnothaveanyillusionsabouthowtheJapanese
treatedsubjectpeoples.Heknewthatifhe,andtheIndiansofsoutheastAsia,weretobetakenseriouslyasallies,hehadto
insistuponhisownstatusasanimportantpoliticalleader.
BosedidinfactrunarealgovernmentinsoutheastAsia.I'mreferringnottohisstatusasleaderofthegovernmentinexile
ofIndia,buttohisstatusasleaderofthelocalIndians.TheregimeBoseputtogetherinSingapore,withthehelpofpeople
whocameforwardtoworkwithhim,hadthepowertomakeandenforcelaws,tocollecttaxes,andtorecruitsoldiersforthe
army.Thispeoplewhopaidthetaxesandobeyedthelawsdidsowillinglyatfirst.Towardstheendofthewar,this
cooperationbecamestrained.AstheJapanesecollapsedandTokyo'sfundingforBose'sarmydriedup,Bosepressedthe
localIndiansforhigherwartaxes,andpunishedpeoplewhotriedtoholdback.Thiscosthimsomeofhislocalpopularity.
Thearmy,tosomeextent,alreadyexistedwhenBosearrivedinAsia.AfterthefallofSingapore,anIndianofficernamed
MohanSinghhadcreatedtheIndianNationalArmy,ortheINAasitcametobeknown,fromIndianPOWs.Thisforcewas
muchlargerthantheIndianLegioninGermany.Assuch,itwasaviablemilitaryandpoliticalresource.MohanSingh
himselfhadratheranunhappycareerwiththeINA.SoldiershadjoinedtheINAontheunderstandingthattheywouldfight
onlyontheIndianfront.WhentheJapanesetriedtosendtheINAtofightinotherpartsofsoutheastAsia,severalunits
mutinied.Theseunitsweredisbanded,andMohanSinghendedupinaJapaneseprison.
Thiswas,inaway,aparallelofwhathadhappenedinEuropewithShedai'sarmy.WhenBosecametoAsia,hequickly
assumedcommandofwhatwasleftofMohanSingh'soldINA.Atthistime,thisforcehadonly13,000soldiers.ButBose
hadbigplans.HewantedtoexpandtheINAintwophases,firstto50,000soldiers,andthentoaforceof3million.Themen
wouldcomefromthecolonialIndianArmyaswellasfromthesoutheastAsianIndiancommunity.
TheJapanesewereshockedatsuchanambitiousplan,andtoldBosethattheywouldbeabletoarmamuchsmallerforce,of
about30,000.Eventually,theINAreachedapeakstrengthofaround50,000.Itwasaninterestingsocialexperimentinmore
waysthanone.ThecolonialIndianArmyhadorganizeditsunitsaroundethnicityandreligion,sothattheBritishcouldplay
offonegroupofIndiansagainstanotherifnecessary.Incontrast,theINAhadfullyintegratedunits.Italsohadaregiment
offemaletroops:thiswastheRaniofJhansiBrigade,namedafterthequeenwhohaddiedfightingtheBritishinthe
Rebellionof1857.
ForBose,thebignumberswerenecessaryfortheirpoliticaleffect.Itdidn'tmatterifmostofthe3millionweren'tequipped
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withadequateweapons.HesawtheINAasapsychologicalforceaswellasamilitaryasset.HeknewthatifpeopleinIndia
becameawarethatanationalistarmyof3millionwaswaitingjustacrosstheborder,readytoinvade,itwouldhavea
tremendouseffectonthewayIndiansrelatedtotheBritish.Itwouldinspireprideandconfidence,itwouldtakeawaythe
fearofBritishpower,anditwouldmakeitimpossiblefortheBritishtomaintaincontrol.
Infact,Bose'swholestrategyforusingtheINAdependeduponthispsychologicalfactor.Hewantedtheforcetospearhead
aJapaneseinvasion,expectingthatthiswouldtotallydemoralizeanddissolvethecolonialIndianarmy,,,,drawingits
soldiersintotheINA.Heexpectedalsothatthegeneralpublicwouldrespondwithoverwhelmingsupport.
Itturnedoutthathewashalfright.TheINAlostthewar,butwonthepeace.Inthesummerof1944,theJapanesewere
finallyreadytobegintheirinvasionofIndia.TheyattackedfromBurmainatwoprongedapproach,hopingtocapturethe
townofImphal.Thiswouldthenbecomethebasefortherestoftheinvasion.But,atthiscriticalpointinBose'splan,
everythingthatcouldgowrongwentwrong,Themonsooncameearly,andtheJapaneseassaultbecameboggeddowninthe
rainandthemud.
Also,bythispoint,thewarinthePacificwasgoingverybadlyfortheJapanese.ThereforetheJapanesehadallocatedmost
oftheirairpowertothePacifictheater,leavingtheirforcesintheBurmaIndiatheaterwithoutanyaircover.Thisgavethe
Britishacrucialadvantage.
Thentherewereotherfactors.Foodrationsbecameexhausted.Alliedairstrikescutthesupplylines.JapaneseandINAunits
foundthemselveseatinggrassandjungleflowerstostayalive.Japanesecommandersonthegroundmadesomeserious
tacticalerrors.Normally,whenthingsaregoingwell,afewmistakesdon'thavetobefatal.Butby1944theJapanesehad
overreachedtheircapabilities.TheattackonImphalfailed,andthecounterattackwasdevastatinglyeffective.
TheINAbecamecaughtupinthisdisaster,andneverrecovered.TheINA'scoordinationwithJapaneseunitswaspoorto
beginwith.OncethingsbegantogobadlyfortheJapanese,INAunitsbecamestranded.Someunitsfoughtwellandthere
wereplentyofindividualheroicstogoaround,butitmadenodifferencetotheoverallfailure.
ThebiggestfailurewastheINA'sinabilitytobreakupthemoraleofthecolonialIndianArmy,whichdidmostofthe
fightingatImphal,andwhichplayedamajorroleintheAlliedcounterattack.BosehadexpectedthatwhentheINAmetthe
BritishIndianArmy,colonialtroopswouldimmediatelydeserttothenationalistside.Thisdidnothappen.Bosehad
seriouslyunderestimatedtheideologicalstrengthofthecolonialmilitary.Infact,whatoftenhappenedwasthereverse.
Starvingandoutofammunitioninthejungle,shockedbythefailureoftheJapaneseoffensive,manyINAtroopswereeager
toreturntotheiroldunitsandtheiroldcomradesinthecolonialarmy.Therewereover700desertions,andeventuallyBose
hadtogiveordersthatdeserterswouldbeshotonsuspicion.
AftertheImphaldefeat,theJapaneseretreatedsteadilythroughBurmaandintoMalaya,pursuedbyBritishandcolonial
Indiantroops.TheINAretreatedwiththem.Thisretreat,ironically,broughtOutBose'sbestqualitiesasaleader.Onthe
longtrekfromBurmatoBankok,followedcloselybyBritishtanksandunderfrequentattackfromtheair,hemarchedfor
daysonend,refusingtheofferofacarwhilehismenhadtowalk.Throughoutthemarch,hemadesurethatINAtroopshad
properfoodandmedicalcare.Inthechaosoftheretreat,Bosewastheirbestprotection,andeverybodyknewit.Without
him,theJapanesewouldhavebeenonlytooeagertoabandontheINA.
BosereturnedtoSingaporeandtriedforawhiletorebuildtheINA.Thiswastheperiodwhenhedemandedtenpercentof
thevalueofpeoplesassetstopayformilitaryexpenses,andmadehimselfunpopularwiththewealthierIndiansinMalaya.
ButforJapan,thewarwasalmostover.AfterthenuclearbombingofHiroshimaandNagasaki,therewasnothingleftfor
BoseinworkingwithTokyo.
Henowmadeapoliticalgamble.TheSovietshadbeenanallyoftheBritishduringthewar,andanenemyofhisallies,the
GermansandtheJapanese.ButBosecorrectlyforesawthattheSovietalliancewiththewestwouldnotlast.Hedecidedto
traveltoManchuria,whichhadjustbeenoverrunbytheUSSR.HeplannedtocontinuehisfightagainsttheBritish,but
fromRussiathistime.
On16thAugust,adayaftertheJapanesesurrendered,BoseboardedaJapanesebomberinSaigon,onhiswaytoDarien,in
China.Onthe18thofAugust,afterarefuelingstopinTaipei,thebombercrashed.Bosewasstillalive,butbadlyburned.He
diedinaJapanesemilitaryhospitalinTaipei,soonafterwards.
Thestorydidn'tendthere,Duringthewar,theBritishhadcarefullysuppressedallnewsabouttheINA.Thisnewsnow
finallybrokeinIndia.Boseimmediatelybecameaheroofmythicalproportions.Peoplerefusedtobelievehewasdeadin
fact,peoplerefusedtobelieveitfordecades.
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Also,Bose'spredictionsaboutthepsychologicalvalueofhisarmywerefinallyvindicated.TheBritishplayedintohishands
bymakingaseriesofmiscalculationsabouthowtodealwith25,000capturedINAsoldiers.Misreadingthepublicmood,
theBritishdecidedtostageaseriesofhighlypublicizedtrialsofINAofficersinNewDelhi.Incredibly,theybelievedthat
sincetheINAhadtakenuparmsagainstIndiansinthecolonialarmy,theIndianpublicwouldwantthemtobeseverely
punished.
Exactlytheoppositehappened.WhenthreeINAofficersShahNawazKhan,G.S.DhillonandPremKumarSahgalwere
putontrialfortreasonandmurderintheRedFort,thepublicquicklygraspedthesymbolismoftheaffair.Thethreeofficers
includedaHindu,aMuslimandaSikh.Inotherwords,allthreeofIndia'smajorreligiouscommunitieswereseenasbeing
ontrialforhavingcometogethertofightfortheircountry.ThefactthatthetrialswerebeingheldattheRedFort,wherethe
lastindependentIndianregimehadbeenbased,wasseenasanaddedinsult.
Evenbeforethetrialsbegan,celebrationshonoringtheINAwereheldalloverIndia.Whenthetrialsdidbegin,antiBritish
crowdsbesiegedtheRedFort,andmorethanahundredpeoplewerekilledorinjuredbypolicefiring.InCalcutta,Hindus
andMuslims,flyingtheflagsoftheCongressaswellastheMuslimLeague,attackedBritishandAmericanmilitarybases.
Scoresofmilitaryvehiclesweredamagedordestroyed.Over200militarypersonnelwereinjured,and32Indianswere
killed.TheviolencesoonspreadacrossmuchofnorthernIndia,allthewaytoBombayandKarachi.
CongressleaderslikeGandhiandNehru,whohadbeenuncomfortablewithBosewhilehewasalive,noweagerlyjumped
ontheINAbandwagon.Nehruputonhisoldlawyer'srobesandparticipatedinthedefenseoftheofficersontrial.Gandhi
madespeechespraisingBose.
Confrontedbythispublichostility,theBritishfoundthemselvesunabletopunishtheINAprisonersasseverelyasthey
wouldhaveliked.Mostgotcommutedsentences,orshortprisonterms.Nevertheless,theBritishpersistedwiththetrials,
andtheviolencecontinuedtogrow.Earlyin1946,martiallawhadtobedeclaredinCalcutta.
Ataroundthesametime,Indiantroopsinthecolonialnavyandairforcemutinied,citingsympathyfortheINAaswellas
unhappinessabouttheirconditionsofservice.Withindays,78warshipshadpulleddowntheUnionJack.Fiercebattles
eruptedinthestreetsofKarachiandBombay,inwhichtanksandmachinegunswereused.InBombay,themutineerswere
supportedbytheworkingclass.600,000textileworkerswentonstrike,andjoinedthesailorsinstreetbattlesagainstBritish
forces.
Therebelseventuallyfailed,inpartbecausetheydidn'thavethefirepowerthattheBritishwereabletocallin,andinpart
becausetheCongresspanickedandtoldthemtostopfighting.ThemutineershadlookedtotheCongressandtheMuslim
Leaguetoleadthem.Bythespringof1946,however,theCongressandtheLeagueweretoodeeplyimplicatedinthe
governmentofthecountrytoseeanygoodinthiskindofunrest.LeaderslikeNehruandJinnahknewthatindependence
wasnowatthemostonlyacoupleofyearsaway.Assuch,theydidnotwanttoencouragesomethingasmessy,asvolatile
andasdangerousasanarmedrebellion.Theyhadnoexperienceandnostomachforleadingthiskindofmovement,and
theyquietlysupportedtheBritisheffortstocrushtherebels.
ButBose'spredictionsaboutwhatwouldhappenwhentheINAenteredIndiahad,toaconsiderabledegree,cometrue,He
hadpredictedapublicuprisingandsympathyfromcolonialtroops,andnowhewasprovedright.ThisiswhatImeantwhen
IsaidthattheINAlostthewarbutwonthepeace.ButifBosewasright,wheredidhegowrong?
Well,asI'veargued,thatBosemisreadthenatureofthecolonialarmy.Onthebattlefield,wheneverythingwasatstake,the
colonialarmyretaineditsloyalties.Itwasonlyafterthewarthatsectionsofitmutinied.
ItcanalsobearguedthatBosemisreadthepoliticalsituationinIndiainthe1940's.BeingawayinGermanyandsoutheast
AsiahadisolatedhimfromthepoliticalrealitiesofwartimeIndia,andhehadmissedsomecrucialchangesinthewaythe
windwasblowing.By1942,theBritishwerewillingtodiscussindependenceforIndiawhenthewarended.By1945,there
wasnodoubtthatnegotiationswouldsoonbegin.YetBosecontinuedtofightamilitarybattle,insteadofrejoiningthe
politicalprocess.
Wasthisunnecessary,andamistake?NotifyouwereinBose'sshoes.HehadtakenuparmsagainsttheBritish,andhis
relationswiththeCongresshadcollapsed.HehadreasontobelievethatifhereturnedtoIndiawhileitwascontrolledbythe
BritishortheCongress,hewouldbetreatedasawarcriminal.
Also,althoughIndiawasclearlyonitswaytoindependencebythemid40's,thiswasnotthekindofindependencethat
Bosehadwanted.ForBose,therevolutionathomewasasimportantasthrowingouttheBritish,andforthisheneededtobe
completelyincharge.HedidnotbelievethatthereplacementofBritishrulebyaconservativeparliamentarydemocracy
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wouldnotbringaboutfundamentalchangesinthestructureofIndiansociety.
ThisbringsussomeofthemostbasicquestionsaboutBose,thenationalistandthepolitician.Whatarewetomakeofthe
factthathewantedtoinvitetheGermansandtheJapanesetoinvadeIndia?Andhowdowereconcilehisheroicstatuswith
thefactthathealignedhimselfwithNaziGermany,andthatheopenlyadvocateddictatorshipasthebestformof
governmentforIndia?
PerhapsthebiggestweaknessinBose'splanwashisbeliefthatevenafterbringingtheJapaneseintoIndia,hecould
maintaineffectivecontrolofthecountry.Atadiplomaticlevel,hehadgroundsforbelievinghecouldpullthisoff.He
refusedtotakeIndiaintotheJapaneseCoProsperitySphere,whichwastheeuphemismtheJapaneseusedfortheirnew
empireinAsia,TheJapaneseacceptedBose'sdecisiononthis.Still,iftheinvasionofIndiahadsucceeded,itisdifficultto
seehowhecouldhaveremainedfullyindependentofJapanesecontrol.
BosefeltthatsincethepeopleofIndiawouldbewithhim,hewouldbeabletoresistJapanesedemands.HeknewthatIndia
wasalongwayfromJapan,andthattheJapanesewerealreadyatthelimitsoftheircapabilities.Healsopointedoutthatthe
AmericanrevolutionarieshadacceptedassistancefromFrance,andthisdidn'tmaketheUSaFrenchcolony.Hemayhave
hadapoint.Butthisanalogyhasitslimits.GiventhefacttheINAwascompletelydependentonJapanforarmsand
ammunition,andthatitwouldtaketimetodevelopanindustrialinfrastructureinIndia,Japanwouldprobablyhavehadalot
ofleverage.
ThereisnogettingawayfromthefactthatBosedeliberatelyignoredthemoralevilthatNaziGermanyrepresented.Hehad
livedinGermanyformuchofthe1930sandtheearly40s.Hemusthaveknownsomethingofwhatwasgoingon.Hehad
thecouragetospeakoutagainstsomeoftheracistaspectsoftheNaziideology,andevenspeakhismindtoHitlerhimself.
ButhewasnotsufficientlydisturbedbyNazismtorejectHitler'shelp.Similarly,hisalliancewithJapanignoredthe
atrocitiesthattheJapanesehadperpetratedagainstpeopleinthecountriestheyhadoccupied.
UnlikeGandhiandNehru,Bosebelievedthattheendjustifiedthemeans.HewantedfreedomforIndia,andtosomeextent,
hedidn'tcarewhohehadtoapproachforassistance.Butthisexplanation,Ithink,istookindtoBose.Atsomebasiclevel,
Bosehadanideologicalaffinityforfascism,andhewasalittletoocomfortablewithusingthestatetocrushdissentand
ideologicaldiversity.
IndianswhorefusedtobelievethatBosewasdead,andwhocontinuedtobelievefordecadesthathewasalivesomewhere
intheSovietUnion,hopedhewouldjustsurfaceagainsomedaylikeamessiah,andsolveallofIndia'sproblems.Yetthese
peoplemisunderstandBose,andwhathestoodfor.HadtheINAandBosesucceededonthebattlefield,afreeIndiawould
havebeenatotalitariansociety.
Bosewaspassionateinhispatriotism,andgenuinelywellintentioned.Hewasgenuineinhisdesiretohelpthe
disadvantagedsegmentsofIndiansociety.Butgoodintentionsarenotenough.Someofthegreatesttyrantsofthe20th
centuryhadgoodintentions:Lenin,Mao,PolPot.(You'llnoticethatthesearealltyrantsoftheleft.Tyrantsoftherightlike
Hitler,Franco,ortheShahofIran,don'tgetcreditforgoodintentions.)
Bosedidn'tseemtorealizethatthemethodsyouchoosedomatterinthefinalanalysis.Totalitarianinstitutionsinevitably
corrupteventhebestintentionedpeople.Evenifithadn'tcorruptedBosehimself,evenifhehadremainedasocalled
benevolentdictator,therewouldhavebeennoguaranteesthathissuccessorwouldhavebeenbenevolent.Ultimately,dying
attheendofthewarwasthebestthingBosecouldhavedoneforIndia.

[ReturnHOME|ReturntoTABLEOFCONTENTS]
[ReturntoPREVIOUSAPPENDIX|ForwardtoNEXTAPPENDIX]
[SignourGUESTBOOK|ReadourFEEDBACK]

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