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G.R. No. 159132

December 18, 2008
FE CAYAO-LASAM vs. SPOUSES CLARO and EDITHA RAMOLETE
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court filed by Dr. Fe Cayao-Lasam (petitioner) seeking to annul the Decision 1 dated July
4, 2003 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 62206.
The antecedent facts:
On July 28, 1994, respondent, three months pregnant Editha Ramolete (Editha) was
brought to the Lorma Medical Center (LMC) in San Fernando, La Union due to vaginal
bleeding. Upon advice of petitioner relayed via telephone, Editha was admitted to the
LMC on the same day. A pelvic sonogram2 was then conducted on Editha revealing the
fetus weak cardiac pulsation.3 The following day, Edithas repeat pelvic
sonogram4 showed that aside from the fetus weak cardiac pulsation, no fetal movement
was also appreciated. Due to persistent and profuse vaginal bleeding, petitioner advised
Editha to undergo a Dilatation and Curettage Procedure (D&C) or "raspa."
On July 30, 1994, petitioner performed the D&C procedure. Editha was discharged from
the hospital the following day.
On September 16, 1994, Editha was once again brought at the LMC, as she was
suffering from vomiting and severe abdominal pains. Editha was attended by Dr. Beatriz
de la Cruz, Dr. Victor B. Mayo and Dr. Juan V. Komiya. Dr. Mayo allegedly informed
Editha that there was a dead fetus in the latters womb. After, Editha underwent
laparotomy,5 she was found to have a massive intra-abdominal hemorrhage and a
ruptured uterus. Thus, Editha had to undergo a procedure for hysterectomy6 and as a
result, she has no more chance to bear a child.
On November 7, 1994, Editha and her husband Claro Ramolete (respondents) filed a
Complaint7 for Gross Negligence and Malpractice against petitioner before the
Professional Regulations Commission (PRC).
Respondents alleged that Edithas hysterectomy was caused by petitioners unmitigated
negligence and professional incompetence in conducting the D&C procedure and the
petitioners failure to remove the fetus inside Edithas womb. 8 Among the alleged acts of
negligence were: first, petitioners failure to check up, visit or administer medication on
Editha during her first day of confinement at the LMC;9 second, petitioner recommended
that a D&C procedure be performed on Editha without conducting any internal

examination prior to the procedure;10 third, petitioner immediately suggested a D&C

procedure instead of closely monitoring the state of pregnancy of Editha. 11
In her Answer,12 petitioner denied the allegations of negligence and incompetence with
the following explanations: upon Edithas confirmation that she would seek admission at
the LMC, petitioner immediately called the hospital to anticipate the arrival of Editha and
ordered through the telephone the medicines Editha needed to take, which the nurses
carried out; petitioner visited Editha on the morning of July 28, 1994 during her rounds;
on July 29, 1994, she performed an internal examination on Editha and she discovered
that the latters cervix was already open, thus, petitioner discussed the possible D&C
procedure, should the bleeding become more profuse; on July 30 1994, she conducted
another internal examination on Editha, which revealed that the latters cervix was still
open; Editha persistently complained of her vaginal bleeding and her passing out of
some meaty mass in the process of urination and bowel movement; thus, petitioner
advised Editha to undergo D&C procedure which the respondents consented to;
petitioner was very vocal in the operating room about not being able to see an
abortus;13 taking the words of Editha to mean that she was passing out some meaty
mass and clotted blood, she assumed that the abortus must have been expelled in the
process of bleeding; it was Editha who insisted that she wanted to be discharged;
petitioner agreed, but she advised Editha to return for check-up on August 5, 1994, which
the latter failed to do.
Petitioner contended that it was Edithas gross negligence and/or omission in insisting to
be discharged on July 31, 1994 against doctors advice and her unjustified failure to
return for check-up as directed by petitioner that contributed to her life-threatening
condition on September 16, 1994; that Edithas hysterectomy was brought about by her
very abnormal pregnancy known as placenta increta, which was an extremely rare and
very unusual case of abdominal placental implantation. Petitioner argued that whether or
not a D&C procedure was done by her or any other doctor, there would be no difference
at all because at any stage of gestation before term, the uterus would rupture just the
same.
On March 4, 1999, the Board of Medicine (the Board) of the PRC rendered a
Decision,14 exonerating petitioner from the charges filed against her. The Board held:
Based on the findings of the doctors who conducted the laparotomy on Editha,
hers is a case of Ectopic Pregnancy Interstitial. This type of ectopic pregnancy is
one that is being protected by the uterine muscles and manifestations may take
later than four (4) months and only attributes to two percent (2%) of ectopic
pregnancy cases.

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When complainant Editha was admitted at Lorma Medical Center on July 28,
1994 due to vaginal bleeding, an ultra-sound was performed upon her and the
result of the Sonogram Test reveals a morbid fetus but did not specify where the
fetus was located. Obstetricians will assume that the pregnancy is within the
uterus unless so specified by the Sonologist who conducted the ultra-sound.
Respondent (Dr. Lasam) cannot be faulted if she was not able to determine that
complainant Editha is having an ectopic pregnancy interstitial. The D&C
conducted on Editha is necessary considering that her cervix is already open and
so as to stop the profuse bleeding. Simple curettage cannot remove a fetus if the
patient is having an ectopic pregnancy, since ectopic pregnancy is pregnancy
conceived outside the uterus and curettage is done only within the uterus.
Therefore, a more extensive operation needed in this case of pregnancy in order
to remove the fetus.15
Feeling aggrieved, respondents went to the PRC on appeal. On November 22, 2000, the
PRC rendered a Decision16 reversing the findings of the Board and revoking petitioners
authority or license to practice her profession as a physician.17
Petitioner brought the matter to the CA in a Petition for Review under Rule 43 of the
Rules of Court. Petitioner also dubbed her petition as one for certiorari18 under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court.
In the Decision dated July 4, 2003, the CA held that the Petition for Review under Rule
43 of the Rules of Court was an improper remedy, as the enumeration of the quasijudicial agencies in Rule 43 is exclusive.19 PRC is not among the quasi-judicial bodies
whose judgment or final orders are subject of a petition for review to the CA, thus, the
petition for review of the PRC Decision, filed at the CA, was improper. The CA further
held that should the petition be treated as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, the
same would still be dismissed for being improper and premature. Citing Section 26 20 of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 2382 or the Medical Act of 1959, the CA held that the plain,
speedy and adequate remedy under the ordinary course of law which petitioner should
have availed herself of was to appeal to the Office of the President. 21
Hence, herein petition, assailing the decision of the CA on the following grounds:
1. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN HOLDING
THAT THE PROFESSIONAL REGULATION[S] COMMISSION (PRC) WAS
EXCLUDED AMONG THE QUASI-JUDICIAL AGENCIES CONTEMPLATED
UNDER RULE 43 OF THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE;

2. EVEN ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT PRC WAS EXCLUDED FROM THE

PURVIEW OF RULE 43 OF THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, THE
PETITIONER WAS NOT PRECLUDED FROM FILING A PETITION FOR
CERTIORARI WHERE THE DECISION WAS ALSO ISSUED IN EXCESS OF OR
WITHOUT JURISDICTION, OR WHERE THE DECISION WAS A PATENT
NULLITY;
3. HEREIN RESPONDENTS-SPOUSES ARE NOT ALLOWED BY LAW TO
APPEAL FROM THE DECISION OF THE BOARD OF MEDICINE TO THE
PROFESSIONAL REGULATION[S] COMMISSION;
4. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
IN DENYING FOR IMPROPER FORUM THE PETITION FOR
REVIEW/PETITION FOR CERTIORARI WITHOUT GOING OVER THE MERITS
OF THE GROUNDS RELIED UPON BY THE PETITIONER;
5. PRCS GRAVE OMISSION TO AFFORD HEREIN PETITONER A CHANCE
TO BE HEARD ON APPEAL IS A CLEAR VIOLATION OF HER
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS AND HAS THE EFFECT OF
RENDERING THE JUDGMENT NULL AND VOID;
6. COROLLARY TO THE FOURTH ASSIGNED ERROR, PRC COMMITTED
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION, AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION,
IN ACCEPTING AND CONSIDERING THE MEMORANDUM ON APPEAL
WITHOUT PROOF OF SERVICE TO HEREIN PETITIONER, AND IN
VIOLATION OF ART. IV, SEC. 35 OF THE RULES AND REGULATIONS
GOVERNING THE REGULATION AND PRACTICE OF PROFESSIONALS;
7. PRC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN REVOKING
PETITIONERS LICENSE TO PRACTICE MEDICINE WITHOUT AN EXPERT
TESTIMONY TO SUPPORT ITS CONCLUSION AS TO THE CAUSE OF
RESPONDENT EDITHAT [SIC] RAMOLETES INJURY;
8. PRC COMMITTED AN EVEN GRAVER ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
TOTALLY DISREGARDING THE FINDING OF THE BOARD OF MEDICINE,
WHICH HAD THE NECESSARY COMPETENCE AND EXPERTISE TO
ESTABLISH THE CAUSE OF RESPONDENT EDITHAS INJURY, AS WELL AS
THE TESTIMONY OF THE EXPERT WITNESS AUGUSTO MANALO, M.D. ;
[and]

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9. PRC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN MAKING
CONCLUSIONS OF FACTS THAT WERE NOT ONLY UNSUPPORTED BY
EVIDENCE BUT WERE ACTUALLY CONTRARY TO EVIDENCE ON
RECORD.22

defendant was acquitted or convicted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise

terminated without the express consent of the accused. 25 These elements were not
present in the proceedings before the Board of Medicine, as the proceedings involved in
the instant case were administrative and not criminal in nature. The Court has already
held that double jeopardy does not lie in administrative cases.26

The Court will first deal with the procedural issues.

Petitioner claims that the law does not allow complainants to appeal to the PRC from the
decision of the Board. She invokes Article IV, Section 35 of the Rules and Regulations
Governing the Regulation and Practice of Professionals, which provides:
Sec. 35. The respondent may appeal the decision of the Board within thirty days
from receipt thereof to the Commission whose decision shall be
final. Complainant, when allowed by law, may interpose an appeal from the
Decision of the Board within the same period. (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner asserts that a careful reading of the above law indicates that while the
respondent, as a matter of right, may appeal the Decision of the Board to the
Commission, the complainant may interpose an appeal from the decision of the Board
only when so allowed by law.23 Petitioner cited Section 26 of Republic Act No. 2382 or
"The Medical Act of 1959," to wit:
Section 26. Appeal from judgment. The decision of the Board of Medical
Examiners (now Medical Board) shall automatically become final thirty days after
the date of its promulgation unless the respondent, during the same period, has
appealed to the Commissioner of Civil Service (now Professional Regulations
Commission) and later to the Office of the President of the Philippines. If the final
decision is not satisfactory, the respondent may ask for a review of the case, or
may file in court a petition for certiorari.
Petitioner posits that the reason why the Medical Act of 1959 allows only the respondent
in an administrative case to file an appeal with the Commission while the complainant is
not allowed to do so is double jeopardy. Petitioner is of the belief that the revocation of
license to practice a profession is penal in nature.24

Moreover, Section 35 of the Rules and Regulations Governing the Regulation and
Practice of Professionals cited by petitioner was subsequently amended to read:
Sec. 35. The complainant/respondent may appeal the order, the resolution or
the decision of the Board within thirty (30) days from receipt thereof to the
Commission whose decision shall be final and executory. Interlocutory order shall
not be appealable to the Commission. (Amended by Res. 174, Series of
1990).27(Emphasis supplied)
Whatever doubt was created by the previous provision was settled with said amendment.
It is axiomatic that the right to appeal is not a natural right or a part of due process, but a
mere statutory privilege that may be exercised only in the manner prescribed by law.28 In
this case, the clear intent of the amendment is to render the right to appeal from a
decision of the Board available to both complainants and respondents.
Such conclusion is bolstered by the fact that in 2006, the PRC issued Resolution No. 06342(A), or the New Rules of Procedure in Administrative Investigations in the
Professional Regulations Commission and the Professional Regulatory Boards, which
provides for the method of appeal, to wit:
Sec. 1. Appeal; Period Non-Extendible.- The decision, order or resolution of
the Board shall be final and executory after the lapse of fifteen (15) days from
receipt of the decision, order or resolution without an appeal being perfected or
taken by either the respondent or the complainant. A party aggrieved by the
decision, order or resolution may file a notice of appeal from the decision,
order or resolution of the Board to the Commission within fifteen (15) days
from receipt thereof, and serving upon the adverse party a notice of appeal
together with the appellants brief or memorandum on appeal, and paying the
appeal and legal research fees. x x x29

The Court does not agree.

For one, the principle of double jeopardy finds no application in administrative cases.
Double jeopardy attaches only: (1) upon a valid indictment; (2) before a competent court;
(3) after arraignment; (4) when a valid plea has been entered; and (5) when the

The above-stated provision does not qualify whether only the complainant or respondent
may file an appeal; rather, the new rules provide that "a party aggrieved" may file a
notice of appeal. Thus, either the complainant or the respondent who has been
aggrieved by the decision, order or resolution of the Board may appeal to the

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Commission. It is an elementary rule that when the law speaks in clear and categorical
language, there is no need, in the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, for any
interpretation.30 Words and phrases used in the statute should be given their plain,
ordinary, and common usage or meaning.31
Petitioner also submits that appeals from the decisions of the PRC should be with the
CA, as Rule 4332 of the Rules of Court was precisely formulated and adopted to provide
for a uniform rule of appellate procedure for quasi-judicial agencies. 33 Petitioner further
contends that a quasi-judicial body is not excluded from the purview of Rule 43 just
because it is not mentioned therein.34
On this point, the Court agrees with the petitioner.

Specifically, the Court, in Yang v. Court of Appeals,37 ruled

that Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 12938 conferred upon the CA exclusive appellate
jurisdiction over appeals from decisions of the PRC. The Court held:
The law has since been changed, however, at least in the matter of the particular
court to which appeals from the Commission should be taken. On August 14,
1981, Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 became effective and in its Section 29,
conferred on the Court of Appeals "exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final
judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of Regional Trial Courts and
quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions except those
falling under the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. x x x." In virtue of
BP 129, appeals from the Professional Regulations Commission are now
exclusively cognizable by the Court of Appeals.39 (Emphasis supplied)

Sec. 1, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 1. Scope. - This Rule shall apply to appeals from judgments or final
orders of the Court of Tax Appeals, and from awards, judgments, final orders
or resolutions of or authorized by any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise
of its quasi-judicial functions. Among these agencies are the Civil Service
Commission, Central Board of Assessment Appeals, Securities and Exchange
Commission, Office of the President, Land Registration Authority, Social Security
Commission, Civil Aeronautics Board, Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and
Technology Transfer, National Electrification Administration, Energy Regulatory
Board, National Telecommunications Commission, Department of Agrarian
Reform under Republic Act No. 6657, Government Service Insurance System,
Employees Compensation Commission, Agricultural Inventions Board, Insurance
Commission, Philippine Atomic Energy Commission, Board of Investments,
Construction Industry Arbitration Commission, and voluntary arbitrators
authorized by law. (Emphasis supplied)
Indeed, the PRC is not expressly mentioned as one of the agencies which are expressly
enumerated under Section 1, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. However, its absence from
the enumeration does not, by this fact alone, imply its exclusion from the coverage of
said Rule.35 The Rule expressly provides that it should be applied to appeals from
awards, judgments final orders or resolutions of any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise
of its quasi-judicial functions. The phrase "among these agencies" confirms that the
enumeration made in the Rule is not exclusive to the agencies therein listed. 36

Clearly, the enactment of B.P. Blg. 129, the precursor of the present Rules of Civil
Procedure,40 lodged with the CA such jurisdiction over the appeals of decisions made by
the PRC.
Anent the substantive merits of the case, petitioner questions the PRC decision for being
without an expert testimony to support its conclusion and to establish the cause of
Edithas injury. Petitioner avers that in cases of medical malpractice, expert testimony is
necessary to support the conclusion as to the cause of the injury.41
Medical malpractice is a particular form of negligence which consists in the failure of a
physician or surgeon to apply to his practice of medicine that degree of care and skill
which is ordinarily employed by the profession generally, under similar conditions, and in
like surrounding circumstances.42 In order to successfully pursue such a claim, a patient
must prove that the physician or surgeon either failed to do something which a
reasonably prudent physician or surgeon would not have done, and that the failure or
action caused injury to the patient.43
There are four elements involved in medical negligence cases: duty, breach, injury and
proximate causation.44
A physician-patient relationship was created when Editha employed the services of the
petitioner. As Edithas physician, petitioner was duty-bound to use at least the same level
of care that any reasonably competent doctor would use to treat a condition under the
same circumstances.45 The breach of these professional duties of skill and care, or their
improper performance by a physician surgeon, whereby the patient is injured in body or
in health, constitutes actionable malpractice.46 As to this aspect of medical malpractice,

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the determination of the reasonable level of care and the breach thereof, expert
testimony is essential.47 Further, inasmuch as the causes of the injuries involved in
malpractice actions are determinable only in the light of scientific knowledge, it has been
recognized that expert testimony is usually necessary to support the conclusion as to
causation.48
In the present case, respondents did not present any expert testimony to support their
claim that petitioner failed to do something which a reasonably prudent physician or
surgeon would have done.

1994 which is about 1 months after the patient was discharged, after the D&C
was conducted. Would you tell us whether there is any relation at all of the D&C
and the rupture in this particular instance?
A: I dont think so for the two reasons that I have just mentioned- that it
would not be possible for the instrument to reach the site of
pregnancy. And, No. 2, if it is because of the D&C that rupture could have
occurred earlier.52 (Emphases supplied)

Petitioner, on the other hand, presented the testimony of Dr. Augusto M. Manalo, who
was clearly an expert on the subject.

Clearly, from the testimony of the expert witness and the reasons given by him, it is
evident that the D&C procedure was not the proximate cause of the rupture of Edithas
uterus.

Generally, to qualify as an expert witness, one must have acquired special knowledge of
the subject matter about which he or she is to testify, either by the study of recognized
authorities on the subject or by practical experience. 49

During his cross-examination, Dr. Manalo testified on how he would have addressed
Edithas condition should he be placed in a similar circumstance as the petitioner. He
stated:

Dr. Manalo specializes in gynecology and obstetrics, authored and co-authored various
publications on the subject, and is a professor at the University of the
Philippines.50 According to him, his diagnosis of Edithas case was "Ectopic Pregnancy
Interstitial (also referred to as Cornual), Ruptured."51 In stating that the D&C procedure
was not the proximate cause of the rupture of Edithas uterus resulting in her
hysterectomy, Dr. Manalo testified as follows:
Atty. Hidalgo:
Q: Doctor, we want to be clarified on this matter. The complainant had testified
here that the D&C was the proximate cause of the rupture of the uterus. The
condition which she found herself in on the second admission. Will you please
tell us whether that is true or not?
A: Yah, I do not think so for two reasons. One, as I have said earlier, the
instrument cannot reach the site of the pregnancy, for it to further push the
pregnancy outside the uterus. And, No. 2, I was thinking a while ago about
another reason- well, why I dont think so, because it is the triggering factor for
the rupture, it could havethe rupture could have occurred much earlier, right
after the D&C or a few days after the D&C.
Q: In this particular case, doctor, the rupture occurred to have happened
minutes prior to the hysterectomy or right upon admission on September 15,

Atty. Ragonton:
Q: Doctor, as a practicing OB-Gyne, when do you consider that you have done
a good, correct and ideal dilatation and curettage procedure?
A: Well, if the patient recovers. If the patient gets well. Because even after the
procedure, even after the procedure you may feel that you have scraped
everything, the patient stops bleeding, she feels well, I think you should still have
some reservations, and wait a little more time.
Q: If you were the OB-Gyne who performed the procedure on patient Editha
Ramolete, would it be your standard practice to check the fetal parts or fetal
tissues that were allegedly removed?
A: From what I have removed, yes. But in this particular case, I think it was
assumed that it was part of the meaty mass which was expelled at the time she
was urinating and flushed in the toilet. So theres no way.
Q:

There was [sic] some portions of the fetal parts that were removed?

A:

No, it was described as scanty scraping if I remember it rightscanty.

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Q: And you would not mind checking those scant or those little parts that were
removed?
A: Well, the fact that it was described means, I assume that it was
checked, no. It was described as scanty and the color also, I think was
described. Because it would be very unusual, even improbable that it would
not be examined, because when you scrape, the specimens are right there
before your eyes. Its in front of you. You can touch it. In fact, some of them
will stick to the instrument and therefore to peel it off from the instrument,
you have to touch them. So, automatically they are examined closely.
Q: As a matter of fact, doctor, you also give telephone orders to your patients
through telephone?
A: Yes, yes, we do that, especially here in Manila because you know,
sometimes a doctor can also be tied-up somewhere and if you have to wait until
he arrive at a certain place before you give the order, then it would be a lot of
time wasted. Because if you know your patient, if you have handled your patient,
some of the symptoms you can interpret that comes with practice. And, I see no
reason for not allowing telephone orders unless it is the first time that you
will be encountering the patient. That you have no idea what the problem is.
Q:

But, doctor, do you discharge patients without seeing them?

A: Sometimes yes, depending on how familiar I am with the patient. We are on

the question of telephone orders. I am not saying that that is the idle [sic] thing to
do, but I think the reality of present day practice somehow justifies
telephone orders. I have patients whom I have justified and then all of a
sudden, late in the afternoon or late in the evening, would suddenly call they
have decided that they will go home inasmuch as they anticipated that I will
discharge them the following day. So, I just call and ask our resident on duty or
the nurse to allow them to go because I have seen that patient and I think I have
full grasp of her problems. So, thats when I make this telephone orders. And, of
course before giving that order I ask about how she feels.53 (Emphases supplied)
From the foregoing testimony, it is clear that the D&C procedure was conducted in
accordance with the standard practice, with the same level of care that any reasonably
competent doctor would use to treat a condition under the same circumstances, and that
there was nothing irregular in the way the petitioner dealt with Editha.

Medical malpractice, in our jurisdiction, is often brought as a civil action for damages
under Article 217654 of the Civil Code. The defenses in an action for damages, provided
for under Article 2179 of the Civil Code are:
Art. 2179. When the plaintiffs own negligence was the immediate and
proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his
negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the
injury being the defendants lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages,
but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.
Proximate cause has been defined as that which, in natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces injury, and without which the result
would not have occurred.55 An injury or damage is proximately caused by an act or a
failure to act, whenever it appears from the evidence in the case that the act or omission
played a substantial part in bringing about or actually causing the injury or damage; and
that the injury or damage was either a direct result or a reasonably probable
consequence of the act or omission.56
In the present case, the Court notes the findings of the Board of Medicine:
When complainant was discharged on July 31, 1994, herein respondent
advised her to return on August 4, 1994 or four (4) days after the D&C. This
advise was clear in complainants Discharge Sheet.However, complainant
failed to do so. This being the case, the chain of continuity as required in order
that the doctrine of proximate cause can be validly invoked was interrupted. Had
she returned, the respondent could have examined her thoroughly.57 x x x
(Emphases supplied)
Also, in the testimony of Dr. Manalo, he stated further that assuming that there was in
fact a misdiagnosis, the same would have been rectified if Editha followed the
petitioners order to return for a check-up on August 4, 1994. Dr. Manalo stated:
Granting that the obstetrician-gynecologist has been misled (justifiably) up
to thus point that there would have been ample opportunity to rectify the
misdiagnosis, had the patient returned, as instructed for her follow-up
evaluation. It was one and a half months later that the patient sought
consultation with another doctor. The continued growth of an ectopic
pregnancy, until its eventual rupture, is a dynamic process. Much change in
physical findings could be expected in 1 months, including the emergence of
suggestive ones.58

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It is undisputed that Editha did not return for a follow-up evaluation, in defiance of the
petitioners advise. Editha omitted the diligence required by the circumstances which
could have avoided the injury. The omission in not returning for a follow-up evaluation
played a substantial part in bringing about Edithas own injury. Had Editha returned,
petitioner could have conducted the proper medical tests and procedure necessary to
determine Edithas health condition and applied the corresponding treatment which could
have prevented the rupture of Edithas uterus. The D&C procedure having been
conducted in accordance with the standard medical practice, it is clear that Edithas
omission was the proximate cause of her own injury and not merely a contributory
negligence on her part.
Contributory negligence is the act or omission amounting to want of ordinary care on the
part of the person injured, which, concurring with the defendants negligence, is the
proximate cause of the injury.59 Difficulty seems to be apprehended in deciding which
acts of the injured party shall be considered immediate causes of the accident. 60Where
the immediate cause of an accident resulting in an injury is the plaintiffs own act, which
contributed to the principal occurrence as one of its determining factors, he cannot
recover damages for the injury.61 Again, based on the evidence presented in the
present case under review, in which no negligence can be attributed to the
petitioner, the immediate cause of the accident resulting in Edithas injury was her
own omission when she did not return for a follow-up check up, in defiance of
petitioners orders. The immediate cause of Edithas injury was her own act; thus,
she cannot recover damages from the injury.
Lastly, petitioner asserts that her right to due process was violated because she was
never informed by either respondents or by the PRC that an appeal was pending before
the PRC.62 Petitioner claims that a verification with the records section of the PRC
revealed that on April 15, 1999, respondents filed a Memorandum on Appeal before the
PRC, which did not attach the actual registry receipt but was merely indicated therein. 63
Respondents, on the other hand avers that if the original registry receipt was not
attached to the Memorandum on Appeal, PRC would not have entertained the appeal or
accepted such pleading for lack of notice or proof of service on the other party.64 Also, the
registry receipt could not be appended to the copy furnished to petitioners former
counsel, because the registry receipt was already appended to the original copy of the
Memorandum of Appeal filed with PRC.65
It is a well-settled rule that when service of notice is an issue, the rule is that the person
alleging that the notice was served must prove the fact of service. The burden of proving
notice rests upon the party asserting its existence.66In the present case, respondents did

not present any proof that petitioner was served a copy of the Memorandum on Appeal.
Thus, respondents were not able to satisfy the burden of proving that they had in fact
informed the petitioner of the appeal proceedings before the PRC.
In EDI-Staffbuilders International, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission,67 in which
the National Labor Relations Commission failed to order the private respondent to furnish
the petitioner a copy of the Appeal Memorandum, the Court held that said failure
deprived the petitioner of procedural due process guaranteed by the Constitution, which
could have served as basis for the nullification of the proceedings in the appeal. The
same holds true in the case at bar. The Court finds that the failure of the respondents to
furnish the petitioner a copy of the Memorandum of Appeal submitted to the PRC
constitutes a violation of due process. Thus, the proceedings before the PRC were null
and void.
All told, doctors are protected by a special rule of law. They are not guarantors of care.
They are not insurers against mishaps or unusual consequences 68 specially so if the
patient herself did not exercise the proper diligence required to avoid the injury.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated July 4, 2003 in CA-GR SP No. 62206 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Decision of the Board of Medicine dated March 4, 1999 exonerating petitioner
is AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 130026 May 31, 2000
PEOPLE vs. MAGAT
Before this court for automatic review is the joint decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 103, in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-96-68119 and Q-96-68120, finding
accused-appellant Antonio Magat y Londonio guilty of raping his daughter, Ann Fideli L.
Magat, on two occasions and sentencing him to suffer the extreme penalty of death for
each case, and to pay the sum of P750,000.00 as compensatory, moral and exemplary
damages.
The two (2) Informations, charging accused-appellant with rape reads:
CRIMINAL CASE NO. Q-96-68119
The undersigned, upon sworn complaint of the offended party, nineteen
year old (19) ANN FIDELI LIMPOCO MAGAT, accuses ANTONIO
MAGAT y LONDONIO, her father, of the crime of rape defined and

8
penalized under Article 335, Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA
7659, committed as follows:
That on or about the 14th day of August 1994, during the 17th birthday of
Ann Fideli L. Magat in Kasunduan, Quezon City and within the jurisdiction
of the Honorable Court, accused ANTONIO MAGAT Y LONDONIO, with
lewd designs, and by means of threat and violence, did then and there,
unlawfully and feloniously, lie and succeeded in having sexual intercourse
with Ann Fideli Limpoco Magat.1

sentenced to suffer a jail term of ten (10) years imprisonment for each
case.3
After three months, the cases were revived at the instance of the complainant on the
ground that the penalty imposed was "too light."4 As a consequence, accused-appellant
was re-arraigned on both Informations on April 15, 1997 where he entered a plea of not
guilty.5
Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued with the prosecution presenting Dr. Ida Daniel,
medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of Investigation and complainant's mother.

CRIMINAL CASE NO. Q-96-68120

The undersigned, upon sworn complaint of the offended party, nineteen
year old (19) ANN FIDELI LIMPOCO MAGAT, accuses ANTONIO
MAGAT y LONDONIO, her father, of the crime of rape defined and
penalized under Article 335, Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA
7659, committed as follows:
That on or about the 1st day of September 1996, in Barangay Holy Spirit,
Quezon City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused
ANTONIO MAGAT Y LONDONIO, with lewd designs and by means of
threat and violence, did then and there, unlawfully and feloniously, lie and
succeeded in having sexual intercourse with Ann Fideli Limpoco Magat. 2
Upon arraignment on January 10, 1997, accused-appellant pleaded guilty but bargained
for a lesser penalty for each case. Complainant's mother, Ofelia Limpoco Magat, and the
public prosecutor, Rio Espiritu agreed with the plea bargain. Consequently, the trial court
issued, on that same day, an Order, the fallo of which reads:
On arraignment, accused with the assistance of his counsel Atty.
Diosdado Savellano and upon the request of the accused, the
information was read and explained to him in tagalog, a dialect known to
him and after which accused entered a plea of "GUILTY" to the crime
charged against him, and further pleads for a lower penalty to which the
Hon. Public Prosecutor interpose no objection.
ACCORDINGLY, the court hereby finds the accused ANTONIO
LONDONIO MAGAT, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Violation of Article 335, RPC in relation to RA 7659 and he is hereby

On July 3, 1997 accused-appellant entered anew a plea of guilty.6 The court read to him
the Informations in English and Tagalog and repeatedly asked whether he understood his
change of plea and propounded questions as to his understanding of the consequences
of his plea.7
Convinced of accused-appellant's voluntariness of his plea of guilty, the court required
the taking of complainant's testimony. The accused-appellant did not present any
evidence.
On July 15, 1997, the trial court rendered judgment, the decretal portion of which reads:
CONSEQUENTLY, the court renders judgment finding the accused
ANTONIO MAGAT y LONDONIO, GUILTY of the crime of Rape in
violation of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, beyond
reasonable doubt and accordingly, sentences him as follows:
1. In Crim. Case No. Q-96-68119, the accused
Antonio Magat y Londonio is sentenced to DEATH
by lethal injection; and
2. In Crim. Case No. Q-96-68120, the accused
Antonio Magat y Londonio is sentenced to DEATH
by lethal injection.
On the civil aspect, the accused Antonio Magat y Londonio is hereby
ordered to pay Ann Fideli Limpoco Magat the sum of P50,000.00 as
compensatory damages; further sum of P200,000.00 as moral damages
and another sum of P500,000.00 as exemplary and corrective damages.

9
SO ORDERED.8

accused may not foist a conditional plea of guilty on the court by admitting his guilt
provided that a certain penalty will be meted unto him. 10

Hence, this automatic review.

Accused-appellant contends that the trial court erred in re-arraigning and proceeding into
trial despite the fact that he was already convicted per Order of the trial court dated
January 10, 1997 based on his plea of guilt. He also argues that when the court rendered
judgment convicting him, the prosecution did not appeal nor move for reconsideration or
took steps to set aside the order. Consequently, the conviction having attained finality
can no longer be set aside or modified even if the prosecution later realizes that the
penalty imposed was too light. Accused-appellant likewise posit that the re-arraignment
and trial on the same information violated his right against double jeopardy.
The January 10, 1997 order of the trial court convicting the accused-appellant on his own
plea of guilt is void ab initio on the ground that accused-appellant's plea is not the plea
bargaining contemplated and allowed by law and the rules of procedure. The only
instance where a plea bargaining is allowed under the Rules is when an accused pleads
guilty to a lesser offense. Thus, Section 2, Rule 116 of Revised Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. The accused, with the
consent of the offended party and the fiscal, may be allowed by the trial
court to plead guilty to a lesser offense, regardless of whether or not it is
necessarily included in the crime charged, or is cognizable by a court of
lesser jurisdiction than the trial court. No amendment of the complaint or
information is necessary.
A conviction under this plea shall be equivalent to a conviction of the
offense charged for purposes of double jeopardy.
Here, the reduction of the penalty is only a consequence of the plea of guilt to a lesser
penalty.
It must be emphasized that accused-appellant did not plead to a lesser offense but
pleaded guilty to the rape charges and only bargained for a lesser penalty. In short, as
aptly observed by the Solicitor General, he did not plea bargain but made conditions on
the penalty to be imposed. This is erroneous because by pleading guilty to the offense
charged, accused-appellant should be sentenced to the penalty to which he pleaded.
It is the essence of a plea of guilty that the accused admits absolutely and
unconditionally his guilt and responsibility for the offense imputed to him. 9 Hence, an

Accused-appellant's plea of guilty is undoubtedly a conditional plea. Hence, the trial court
should have vacated such a plea and entered a plea of not guilty for a conditional plea of
guilty, or one subject to the proviso that a certain penalty be imposed upon him, is
equivalent to a plea of not guilty and would, therefore, require a full-blown trial before
judgment may be rendered. 11
In effect, the judgment rendered by the trial court which was based on a void plea
bargaining is also void ab initioand can not be considered to have attained finality for the
simple reason that a void judgment has no legality from its inception. 12 Thus, since the
judgment of conviction rendered against accused-appellant is void, double jeopardy will
not lie.
Nonetheless, whatever procedural infirmity in the arraignment of the accused-appellant
was rectified when he was re-arraigned and entered a new plea. Accused-appellant did
not question the procedural errors in the first arraignment and having failed to do so, he
is deemed to have abandoned his right to question the same 1 and waived the errors in
procedure. 14
Accused-appellant also maintains that assuming that there was proper basis for setting
aside the Order of January 10, 1997, the trial court erred in not finding that he made an
improvident plea of guilty. He faults the trial court in not complying with the procedure laid
down in the Section 3, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Court. 15 He claims that the
record of the case fails to support the trial court's assertion that it conducted a searching
inquiry to determine that the accused-appellant voluntarily entered his plea of guilty with
full understanding of the consequences of his plea. He claims that there is no evidence
that the trial court conducted searching inquiry in accordance with the rules.
Under the present rule, if the accused pleads guilty to capital offense, trial courts are now
enjoined: (a) to conduct searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension
of the consequences of his plea; (b) to require the prosecution to present evidence to
prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of his culpability; and (c) to ask the
accused if he so desires to present evidence in his behalf and allow him to do so if he
desires. 16
This Court, in a long line of decisions imposed upon trial judges to comply with the
procedure laid down in the rules of arraignment, particularly the rules governing a plea of
guilty to a capital offense in order to preclude any room for reasonable doubt in the mind

10
of either the trial court or of this Court, on review, as to the possibility that there might
have been some misunderstanding on the part of the accused as to the nature of the
charges to which he pleaded guilty and to ascertain the circumstances attendant to the
commission of the crime which justify or require the exercise of a greater or lesser
degree of severity in the imposition of the prescribed penalties. 17 Apart from the
circumstances that such procedure may remove any doubt that the accused fully
understood the consequences of his plea is the fact that the evidence taken thereon is
essential to the fulfillment by this Court of its duty of review of automatic appeals from
death sentences. 18
We have carefully reviewed the record of this case and are convinced that the trial judge
has faithfully discharged his bounden duty as minister of the law to determine the
voluntariness and full understanding of accused-appellants' plea of guilty. The absence
of the transcript of stenographic notes of the proceedings during the arraignment do not
make the procedure flawed. The minutes of the proceedings 19 indubitably show that the
judge read the Informations to the accused-appellant both in English and Tagalog, asked
him questions as to his understanding of the consequences of his plea, his educational
attainment and occupation. Accused-appellant could have known of the consequence of
his plea having pleaded twice to the charges against him. In fact, in the two (2) letters
sent to the trial court judge, accused-appellant not only admitted his "sins" but also asked
for forgiveness and prayed for a chance to reform. 20
Moreover, the prosecution has already presented its evidence. Thus, even assuming that
there was an improvident plea of guilt, the evidence on record can sustain the conviction
of the accused-appellant.
The testimony of the complainant, as summarized by the Solicitor General, reveal:
Complainant's . . . parents separated when she was only seven (7) years
old and she and her younger brother David were left with her father,
accused-appellant, while another brother, Jonathan, and sister, Abigail,
stayed with their mother (TSN, July 15, 1997, p. 46; May 22, 1997, pp.
38-41; 49-51).
On her 9th birthday, her father first raped her and she was beaten when
she resisted, thus, she found it futile to resist every time her father
touched her after that (TSN, supra, pp. 24-25).
August 14, 1994, was complainant's 17th birthday. That evening, while
sleeping together with accused-appellant and her brother in their rented

house at Kasunduan, Quezon City, she was awakened by the kisses of

her father. He then removed her clothes and after removing his own
clothes, went on top of her and inserted his penis inside her vagina as he
had done to her many times before this incident. After he had finished, he
told her to wash her vagina which she did (TSN,supra, pp. 12-17).
On September 1, 1996, complainant who was already 19 years old, was
at home with accused-appellant and her brother after "selling" when her
father ordered her and her brother to go to sleep. Her brother fell asleep
but complainant could not sleep and was restless that night. Again,
accused-appellant raped her on the same bed where her brother was
also sleeping. She did not resist him anymore because nothing would
happen anyway and he would just beat her if she did (TSN, supra, 2125).
. . . complainant further revealed that she was not only sexually abused
but also physically abused by accused-appellant who even beat her with
a whip while being tied and struck her with a bag containing tin cans
causing head injuries necessitating her hospitalization. She also
confirmed that her father started raping her on her 9th birthday which was
repeated several times after that. She likewise revealed that she felt
some fluid ('katas') coming out of her father's penis every time he raped
her but she did not become pregnant because her father made her drink
the water from boiled guava leaves and a medicine she identified as
"Gextex" (should be Gestex) if her menstruation was delayed. In fact,
when her menstrual period was delayed for three (3) months, her father
even boxed her stomach after making her drink the water boiled from
guava leaves and Gextex thereby causing her to bleed profusely. She
was not able to report or reveal what her father did to her because she
was warned by him that he would kill her, her brother, her mother and her
relatives if ever she would escape and reveal the rape. Besides, she had
nowhere else to go and was further made to believe by her father that
there was nothing wrong with what he was doing to her because it was
not forbidden by the Bible.
The medical examination confirmed complainant's testimony. Dr. Ida P. Daniel of the NBI
testified that complainant had "lax fourchette" and "distensible hymen" which may be
caused by sexual intercourse or penetration of a hard blunt object such as a penis. She
also concluded that the "shallow rugosities" inside her vagina lead to the conclusion that
there was more than one or even more than ten (10) times of sexual intercourse or

11
penetration of a hard blunt object that passed through her vaginal canal. Moreover, her
hymen orifice can allow complete penetration of an average-sized Filipino adult penis in
its erect stage which is from 2.5 to 3.0 cms. in diameter. 21
Surprisingly, accused-appellant did not present any evidence to rebut the prosecution's
evidence nor testified in his behalf to deny the in culpatory testimony of the complainant,
giving us the impression that he acknowledges the charges against him.
While we have in a catena of cases set aside convictions based on pleas of guilty in
capital offenses because of the improvidence of the plea, we did so only when such plea
is the sole basis of the judgment of the condemnatory judgment. Thus, when the trial
court in obedience to this Court's injunction, receives evidence to determine precisely
whether or not the accused has erred in admitting guilt, the manner in which the plea of
guilty is made loses legal significance, for the simple reason that the conviction is
predicated not on the plea but on the evidence proving the commission by the accused
of the offense charged. 22 In such case, it cannot be claimed that defendant was
sentenced to death without having been previously informed of the nature of the charges
against him and of the qualifying and aggravating circumstances recited in the
information, as he is fully apprised not only of the allegations in the information but of the
entire evidence of the prosecution. 2
Additionally, accused-appellant's second plea of guilty validated his first plea of guilt. It
removed any reasonable doubt as to his guilt. 24
Accused-appellant further impugns the trial court's imposition of the death penalty in
Criminal Case No. Q-96-68120 contending that the complainant was already nineteen
(19) years old when the alleged rape occurred.
Republic Act No. 7659 which amended Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed
with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1. when the victim is under eighteen (18)
years of age and the offender is a parent,
ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative
by consanguinity or affinity within the third
civil degree, or the common-law spouse of
the parent of the victim. (Emphasis
supplied)

Complainant was born on August 14, 1977. 25 On September 1, 1996, when the
rape was committed (Criminal Case No. Q-96-68120), complainant was already
nineteen (19) years of age. Therefore, the same does not fall under the last
paragraph of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA No.
7659. The proper penalty should be reclusion perpetua pursuant to Article 335 of
the Revised Penal Code.
However, the extreme penalty of death should be imposed in Criminal Case No. Q-9668119, complainant being only 17 years of age when accused-appellant, his father,
raped her.
Finally, accused-appellant likewise assails the award of P750,000.00 damages claiming
that the same is excessive.
With regard to the award of compensatory damages, we have ruled in People
vs. Victor, 26 which was later reaffirmed in People vs. Prades, 27 that "if the crime of rape
is committed or effectively qualified by any of the circumstances under which the death
penalty is authorized by the present amended law, the indemnity of the victim shall be in
the increased amount of not less than P75,000.00." 28 Accordingly, in Criminal Case NO.
Q-96-68119, the award of compensatory damages should be increased from P50,000.00
to P75,000.00. In Criminal Case No. Q-96-68120 however, while appellant was
sentenced to reclusion perpetua, the compensatory damage should be the same
(P75,000.00). As rightly argued by the Solicitor General, the trauma, ignominy, pain and
shame suffered by the complainant can not be treated or regarded any lesser.
The award of civil indemnity "is not only a reaction to the apathetic societal perception of
the penal law and the financial fluctuations overtime, but also an expression of the
displeasure of the Court over the incidence of heinous crimes against chastity." 29 More
so, if the crime is committed by the father against his own flesh and blood.
With respect to the award of moral damages, we have in People vs.
Prades 30 held:
. . . The Court has also resolved that in crimes of rape, such as that under
consideration, moral damages may additionally be awarded to the victim
in the criminal proceeding, in such amount as the Court deems just,
without the need for pleading or proof of the basis thereof as has
heretofore been the practice. Indeed, the conventional requirement
of allegata et probata in civil procedure and for essentially civil cases
should be dispensed with in criminal prosecution for rape with the civil

12
aspect included therein, since no appropriate pleadings are filed wherein
such allegations can be made.
Corollarily, the fact that complainant has suffered the trauma of mental,
physical and psychological sufferings which constitute the bases for
moral damages are too obvious to still require the recital thereof at the
trial by the victim, since the Court itself even assumes and acknowledges
such agony on her part as a gauge of her credibility. What exists by
necessary implication as being ineludibly present in the case need not go
through the superfluity of still being proved through a testimonial charade.
Nevertheless, we find the award of P200,000.00 moral damages excessive. An award of
P50,000.00 for each count of rape is to our mind more reasonable. However, we are
deleting the award of exemplary or corrective damages, in the absence of any legal basis
therefor.
Four members of the Court maintain their position that Republic Act No. 7659, insofar as
it prescribes the death penalty, is unconstitutional; nevertheless they submit to the ruling
of the Court, by majority vote, that the law is constitutional and the death penalty should
be imposed accordingly.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. Q-96-68119, the decision of the
Regional Trial Court convicting accused-appellant Antonio
Magat y Londonio of rape and sentencing him to the
Supreme Penalty of DEATH is hereby AFFIRMED with
the modification that the award of compensatory damages
be increased to Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos
(75,000.00), moral damages is reduced to Fifty Thousand
Pesos (P50,000.00) and exemplary damages deleted.
2. In Criminal Case No. Q-96-68120, the decision of the
Regional Trial Court convicting accused-appellant of rape
and sentencing him to the Supreme Penalty of DEATH is
hereby reduced to RECLUSION PERPETUA. The award
of compensatory damages is increased to Seventy-Five
Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00), moral damages is
reduced to Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) and
exemplary damages is deleted.

In accordance with Section 25 of the RA 7659, amending Article 83 of the Revised Penal
Code, upon the finality of this Decision, let the records of this case be forthwith forwarded
to the Office of the President for the possible exercise of executive clemency or
pardoning power. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-26376
August 31, 1966
PEOPLE vs. BALISACAN
This is an appeal by the prosecution from a decision of acquittal.
On February 1, 1965, Aurelio Balisacan was charged with homicide in the Court of First
Instance of Ilocos Norte. The information alleged:
That on or about December 3, 1964, in the Municipality of Nueva Era, province of
Ilocos Norte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
herein accused, with intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and stab one, Leonicio Bulaoat, inflicting upon the
latter wounds that immediately caused his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
To this charge the accused, upon being arraigned, entered a plea of guilty. In doing so,
he was assisted by counsel. At his de oficio counsel's petition, however, he was allowed
to present evidence to prove mitigating circumstances. Thereupon the accused testified
to the effect that he stabbed the deceased in self-defense because the latter was
strangling him. And he further stated that after the incident he surrendered himself
voluntarily to the police authorities.
Subsequently, on March 6, 1965, on the basis of the above-mentioned testimony of the
accused, the court a quorendered a decision acquitting the accused. As stated, the
prosecution appealed therefrom.
This appeal was first taken to the Court of Appeals. Appellant filed its brief on September
9, 1965. No appellee's brief was filed. After being submitted for decision without
appellee's brief, the appeal was certified to Us by the Court of Appeals on July 14, 1966,
as involving questions purely of law (Sec. 17, Republic Act 296). And on August 5, 1966,
We ordered it docketed herein.
1wph1.t

The sole assignment of error is:

13
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED OF THE
OFFENSE CHARGED DESPITE THE LATTER'S PLEA OF GUILTY WHEN
ARRAIGNED.
Appellant's contention is meritorious. A plea of guilty is an unconditional admission of
guilt with respect to the offense charged. It forecloses the right to defend oneself from
said charge and leaves the court with no alternative but to impose the penalty fixed by
law under the circumstances. (People v. Ng Pek, 81 Phil. 563). In this case, the
defendant was only allowed to testify in order to establish mitigating circumstances, for
the purposes of fixing the penalty. Said testimony, therefore, could not be taken as a trial
on the merits, to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused.
In view of the assertion of self-defense in the testimony of the accused, the proper
course should have been for the court a quo to take defendant's plea anew and then
proceed with the trial of the case, in the order set forth in Section 3 of Rule 119 of the
Rules of Court:
SEC. 3. Order of trial. The plea of not guilty having been entered, the trial must
proceed in the following order:
(a) The fiscal, on behalf of the People of the Philippines, must offer evidence in
support of the charges.
(b) The defendant or his attorney may offer evidence in support of the defense.
(c) The parties may then respectively offer rebutting evidence only, unless the
court, in furtherance of justice, permit them to offer new additional evidence
bearing upon the main issue in question.
(d) When the introduction of evidence shall have been concluded, unless the
case is submitted to the court without argument, the fiscal must open the
argument, the attorney for the defense must follow, and the fiscal may conclude
the same. The argument by either attorney may be oral or written, or partly
written, but only the written arguments, or such portions of the same as may be
in writing, shall be preserved in the record of the case.
In deciding the case upon the merits without the requisite trial, the court a quo not only
erred in procedure but deprived the prosecution of its day in court and right to be heard.
This Court now turns to Section 2, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court, which provides that:
"The People of the Philippines can not appeal if the defendant would be placed thereby
in double jeopardy." The present state of jurisprudence in this regard is that the above

provision applies even if the accused fails to file a brief and raise the question of double
jeopardy (People v. Ferrer, L-9072, October 23, 1956; People v. Bao, L-12102,
September 29, 1959; People v. De Golez, L-14160, June 30, 1960).
The next issue, therefore, is whether this appeal placed the accused in double jeopardy.
It is settled that the existence of a plea is an essential requisite to double jeopardy
(People v. Ylagan, 58 Phil. 851; People v. Quimsing, L-19860, December 23, 1964). In
the present case, it is true, the accused had first entered a plea of guilty. Subsequently,
however, he testified, in the course of being allowed to prove mitigating circumstances,
that he acted in complete self-defense. Said testimony, therefore as the court a
quo recognized in its decision had the effect of vacating his plea of guilty and the
court a quo should have required him to plead a new on the charge, or at least direct that
a new plea of not guilty be entered for him. This was not done. It follows that in effect
there having been no standing plea at the time the court a quo rendered its judgment of
acquittal, there can be no double jeopardy with respect to the appeal herein. 1
Furthermore, as afore-stated, the court a quo decided the case upon the merits without
giving the prosecution any opportunity to present its evidence or even to rebut the
testimony of the defendant. In doing so, it clearly acted without due process of law. And
for lack of this fundamental prerequisite, its action is perforce null and void. The acquittal,
therefore, being a nullity for want of due process, is no acquittal at all, and thus can not
constitute a proper basis for a claim of former jeopardy (People v. Cabero, 61 Phil. 121;
21 Am. Jur. 2d. 235; McCleary v. Hudspeth 124 Fed. 2d. 445).
It should be noted that in rendering the judgment of acquittal, the trial judge below
already gave credence to the testimony of the accused. In fairness to the prosecution,
without in any way doubting the integrity of said trial judge, We deem it proper to remand
this case to the court a quo for further proceedings under another judge of the same
court, in one of the two other branches of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte
sitting at Laoag.
Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is hereby set aside and this case is remanded to
the court a quo for further proceedings under another judge of said court, that is, for plea
by the defendant, trial with presentation of evidence for the prosecution and the defense,
and judgment thereafter, No costs. So ordered.
G.R. No. 181071
March 15, 2010
ESPINOSA vs. PEOPLE
This case comes before this Court as an appeal, by way of a Petition for Review on
Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, from the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals
affirming the conviction of herein petitioner, Ladislao Espinosa, for the crime of Serious

14
Physical Injuries under the third paragraph of Article 263 of the Revised Penal
Code.2 The dispositive portion of the assailed decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Iba, Zambales, Branch 71
dated 30 March 2005, finding appellant Ladislao Espinosa GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURIES is AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that he will suffer the straight penalty of six (6) months of Arresto Mayor
and pay the amount of P54,925.50 as actual damages.
With costs against accused-appellant.
The Facts
The undisputed facts of the case, as found by the Regional Trial Court, and as confirmed
by the Court of Appeals on appeal, may be so summarized:
On 6 August 2000, at about 10 oclock in the evening, private complainant Andy Merto,
bearing a grudge against the petitioner, went to the house of the latter in the Municipality
of Sta. Cruz, Zambales. While standing outside the house, private complainant Merto
shouted violent threats, challenging the petitioner to face him outside.
Sensing the private complainants agitated state and fearing for the safety of his family,
petitioner went out of his house to reason with and pacify Merto. However, as soon as he
drew near the private complainant, the latter hurled a stone at the petitioner. The
petitioner was able to duck just in time to avoid getting hit and instinctively retaliated by
hitting the left leg of the private complainant with a bolo scabbard. The private
complainant fell to the ground. Petitioner then continuously mauled the private
complainant with a bolo scabbard, until the latters cousin, Rodolfo Muya, restrained
him.3
As a consequence of the incident, private complainant Merto sustained two (2) bone
fractures, one in his left leg and another in his left wrist. It took about six (6) months for
these injuries to completely heal.4
On 22 September 2000, petitioner was originally charged with Frustrated Homicide,
under an Information5 which reads as follows:
That on or about the 6th day of August 2006 at about 10 oclock in the evening, at Brgy.
Pagatpat, in the Municipality of Sta. Cruz, Province of Zambales, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with treachery, evide[nt]

premeditation and intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
assault, attack and hack several times one Andy Merto, thereby inflicting upon the latter
the following physical injuries, to wit:
1. Fracture open III A P/3 Tibia left secondary to Hacking Wound;
2. Incised wound, wrist joint with Incised Extensor Pollicis Brevis Tendon, Left
S/P F Debridement Right Wrist S/P Long Circular Cast, Left
thus performing all the acts of execution which would produce the crime of murder as a
consequence, but nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes independent of
his will, that is by the timely and able medical assistance rendered to said Andy Merto
which prevented his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Petitioner pleaded not guilty, and trial thereafter ensued.
On 14 December 2004, the Regional Trial Court of Iba, Zambales, Branch 71, convicted
petitioner only of Serious Physical Injuries under the third paragraph of Article 263 of the
Revised Penal Code, noting that the prosecution had failed to prove the element of
"intent to kill," which is necessary to a conviction for Frustrated Homicide. The
dispositive6 portion of the ruling reads:
WHEREFORE premises considered, judgment is rendered finding accused Ladislao
Espinosa GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Serious Physical Injuries
defined and penalized under Art. 263, paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code and is
hereby sentenced [to] suffer the penalty of six (6) months of Arresto Mayor as minimum
to two (2) years, eleven (11) months and ten (10) days of prision correccional as
maximum. Accused is ordered to pay private complainant Andy Merto the amount
of P54,925.50 as and by way of actual damages.
Undeterred, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated 7 February 2005, before
the trial court, invoking for the first time complete self-defense, under the first paragraph
of Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code. In a Resolution7 dated 30 March 2005, the trial
court denied petitioners motion for reconsideration holding that self-defense cannot be
appreciated to justify the act of petitioner. The trial court cites the means adopted by the
petitioner in repelling the attack as not reasonably necessary in view of the surrounding
circumstances and the severity of the victims injuries.

15
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of conviction with the modification
that the penalty imposed by the trial court should be lowered by one degree in
accordance with the privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense under
Article 698 of the Revised Penal Code. Consequently, the Motion for
Reconsideration9 filed by the petitioner was also denied by the Court of Appeals via a
Resolution10 dated 4 January 2008.

First, unlawful aggression on the part of private complainant Merto was manifested by his
attack upon the person of the petitioner in throwing a stone at the latter. This sudden and
unexpected assault posed actual danger on the life or limb of the petitioner, prompting
the latter to take steps in his defense. To the mind of the Court, this is an offensive
positively strong enough to be the basis for a defensive action.
Second, there is lack of sufficient, if not total absence of, provocation on the part of the
petitioner. The facts are clear that it is private complainant Merto who invited the
confrontation with petitionerby shouting violent threats at the latter.

Hence, this appeal.

The Issue
The sole issue raised in this appeal is whether under the set of facts given in this case,
complete self-defense may be appreciated in favor of the petitioner.
The Ruling of the Court
The Court rules in the negative.
The requirements of self-defense as a justifying circumstance are found in the first
paragraph of Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code, to wit:
Article 11. Justifying circumstances. The following do not incur any criminal liability:
1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the following
requisites concur:
First. Unlawful aggression;
Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;
Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
In their decisions, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found that the first and
third elements of self-defense are present in the case at bar. This finding was never
questioned by either of the parties and, as such, may be taken as established for
purposes of this appeal. Nonetheless, to dispel any doubts, the Court hereby affirms the
existence of the first and third elements of self-defense, based on the following reasons:

The argumentation is on the existence of the second element, i.e., reasonable necessity
of the means employed to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression. The trial court and
the Court of Appeals were in agreement that the means employed by the petitioner in
conducting his defense is disproportionate to what was necessary to prevent or deter the
attack of private complainant Merto.
In arguing that the means employed was reasonable to repel the unlawful aggression,
the petitioner invokes the application of the "doctrine of rational equivalence," delineated
in People v. Gutual,11 to wit:
x x x It is settled that reasonable necessity of the means employed does not imply
material commensurability between the means of attack and defense. What the law
requires is rational equivalence, in the consideration of which will enter the principal
factors the emergency, the imminent danger to which the person attacked is exposed,
and the instinct, more than the reason, that moves or impels the defense, and the
proportionateness thereof does not depend upon the harm done, but rests upon the
imminent danger of such injury. (Emphasis supplied)
Tersely put, petitioner contends that the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in citing
the severity of the injuries sustained by private complainant Merto, as an indicator that
belies the reasonableness of the means adopted by the former to repel the attack of the
latter. Instead, petitioner wants to place emphasis on the fact that he merely acted out of
instinct and that he used a bolo scabbardas opposed to using the bolo itselfin
incapacitating the private complainant.
The Court is not impressed.
The very application of the doctrine of rational equivalence, invoked by the petitioner,
militates against his claim. The doctrine of rational equivalence presupposes the
consideration not only of the nature and quality of the weapons used by the defender and

16
the assailantbut of the totality of circumstances surrounding the defense vis--vis, the
unlawful aggression.

desire of defending himself. He was, by then, acting with intent to harm the private
complainant whose aggression had already ceased.

Significantly, a perusal of the facts shows that after petitioner was successful in taking
down private complainant Mertothe former continued to hack the latter, who was, by
then, already neutralized by the blow. This fact was clearly established by the testimony
of Rodolfo Muya, who recounted having seen the petitioner continuously hacking the
private complainant with the bolo scabbard, even as the latter lay almost motionless
upon the muddy ground.12 Clearly, this "continuous hacking" by the petitioner constitutes
force beyond what is reasonably required to repel the private complainants attackand
is therefore unjustified.

Finally, in trying to disprove the testimony of Rodolfo Muya that there was "continuous
hacking," the petitioner also posits that the injuries sustained by the private complainant
could not have been serious enough to be the product of repeated hacks, and claims that
the same are merely a product of a single blow. This contention has had ample study
and consideration in the trial court and in the Court of Appeals. It deserves no further
ado.

People v. Beltran, Jr.,13 which also involves repetitious hacking by the accused even after
the aggressor had been neutralized, is especially instructive:
The act of appellant in repeatedly hacking Norman on his head and neck was not a
reasonable and necessary means of repelling the aggression allegedly initiated by the
latter. As stated earlier, no convincing evidence was presented to show that Norman was
armed with an ice-pick at the time of the incident. In fact, no ice-pick was found in the
crime scene or in the body of the victim. There was also no proof showing that Norman
attempted to stab appellant or tried to barge into the latter's house. Granting arguendo
that Norman was armed with an ice-pick, the repeated hackings were not necessary
since he can overpower or disable Norman by a single blow on non-vital portion/s of his
body.
Again, as correctly observed by the OSG, had the appellant merely wanted to protect
himself from what he perceived as an unlawful aggression of Norman, he could have just
disabled Norman. When Norman fell on the ground, appellant should have ceased
hacking the former since the alleged aggression or danger no longer exists. By
appellant's own testimony, however, he hacked Norman with his bolo even when the
latter was already lying on the ground. It appears, therefore, that the means used by
appellant, which were simultaneous and repeated hackings, were adopted by him not
only to repel the aggression of Norman but to ensure the latter's death. In sum, such act
failed to pass the test of reasonableness of the means employed in preventing or
repelling an unlawful aggression. (Emphasis supplied)
Notwithstanding the fact that the petitioner merely used a scabbard in fending off the
unlawful aggressionthe totality of the circumstances shows that after the aggressor
was taken down to the ground, the petitioner ceased to be motivated with the lawful

1avvphi1

As to whether the fractures suffered by the private complainant resulted from a single
blow or a product of multiple hackings is a question of fact best left to the judgment of the
trial court. It is a well-settled principle that factual findings of the trial courtespecially if
already affirmed by an appellate courtare binding and conclusive upon this Court, save
only for certain compelling reasons which are absent in this case.14 Hence, the Court
refuses to disturb the facts, and defers to the determination of the Regional Trial Court
and of the Court of Appeals.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the appealed
Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 25 September 2007, in CA-G.R. CR No. 29633 is
hereby AFFIRMED IN TOTO. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No 166995
January 13, 2014
VILLAREAL vs. ALIGA
Challenged in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure (Rules) are the April 27, 2004 Decision and August 10, 2004
Resolution, of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. R No. 25581entitled People of he
Philippines v. Consuelo Cruz Aliga which acquitted respondent Consuelo C. Aliga (Aliga)
from the offense charged and, in effect, reversed and set aside the July 12, 2001
Decision of the Regional Trial Court RTC), Branch 147, Makati City.
1

On October 31, 1996, an Information was filed against respondent Aliga for the crime of
Qualified Theft thru Falsification of Commercial Document, committed as follows:
That on or about the 30th day of October 1996, in the City of Makati, Philippines, a place
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then an
accountant of Dentrade Inc., herein represented by Dennis T. Villareal, and who has
access to the companys checking accounts did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously with grave abuse of confidence, with intent [to] gain and without the consent

17
of the owner thereof, take, steal and carry away from complainants office, United
Coconut Planters Bank Check No. HOF 681039 dated October 24, 1996 in the amount
of P5,000.00, once in possession of said check, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously falsify the amount by changing it to P65,000.00 and having the same
encashed with the bank, thereafter misappropriate and convert to her own personal use
and benefit the amount ofP60,000.00 to the damage and prejudice of the herein
complainant, Dentrade Inc., in the aforementioned amount of P60,000.00.
4

During her arraignment on December 6, 1996, respondent Aliga pleaded not guilty. After
the RTC resolved to deny petitioners motion for issuance of a hold departure order
against respondent Aliga and the latters motion to suspend proceedings, trial on the
merits ensued. Both the prosecution and the defense were able to present the
testimonies of their witnesses and their respective documentary exhibits.

her findings. Villareal examined the returned checks and was surprised as he never
authorized the large encashments.
Upon advice of his lawyer, Atty. Victor Lazatin of the ACCRA Law Offices, Mr. Villareal
sent a letter to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) asking for assistance in the
investigation of the matter (Exh. "A"). A few days thereafter, NBI agents John Leonard
David and Rafael Ragos arrived at the Dentrade office. They examined the particular
checks which involved large amounts and interviewed Doroteo.

The Court of Appeals, substantially adopting the trial courts findings, narrated the
relevant facts as follows:
Apart from the documentary exhibits "A" to "F", the combined testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses Elsa Doroteo, Diosdado Corompido, Yolanda Martirez and NBI
agent John Leonard David tend to establish the following factual milieu:
Complainant Dennis T. Villareal is the President and General Manager of Dentrade, Inc.,
a corporation with principal office address at the 7/F Citibank Center 8741 Paseo de
Roxas, Makati City. As a businessman, Villareal maintains checking accounts with the
head office of China Banking Corporation (Chinabank) in Paseo de Roxas and United
Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) in Makati Avenue, both banks are located in Makati City.
He has under his employ, Elsa Doroteo, as executive secretary, Diosdado Corompido, as
messenger, Yolanda Martirez, as chief accountant, [respondent] Consuelo Cruz Aliga
and Annaliza Perez, as accounting clerks. [Respondent] has custody of the personal
checks of Villareal. She prepares the personal checks by typing its contents and submits
them to Villareal for his signature. After the signed checks are delivered to her, she in
turn, gives the checks to the messenger for encashment with the bank.
Sometime in October 1996, Villareals governess asked Doroteo for the payment
covering the year 1995 for his childrens teacher in horseback riding. Doroteo replied that
the said fees had been paid. To verify the matter, Doroteo instructed Perez, one of the
accounting clerks, to produce the originals of the returned checks from [the] personal
account of Villareal. Upon examining the returned checks, Doroteo found out that the
fees for the horseback riding instructor had indeed been paid and that there were large
encashments reflected on the checks in typewritten form. Doroteo informed Villareal of

When asked by the two NBI agents, Villareal told them that there were three (3) checks
pending for his signature, UCPB checks, all in petty cash: one check was for P1,000.00,
another for P5,000.00, and the last one forP6,000.00. They were all in typewritten form
which [respondent] prepared. As suggested by the NBI agents, Villareal signed the three
(3) checks. Doroteo had the three checks photocopied then released their originals to
[respondent].
On instruction of Villareal, Doroteo and NBI agent David went to UCPB the next day
hoping that one of the checks will be encashed. At or about 3:00 p.m. on that day,
Doroteo asked the bank teller if Villareals three checks were encashed. The bank teller
informed Doroteo that UCPB check in the amount of P65,000.00 was encashed. Doroteo
was surprised because she was then holding a photocopy of the original check
for P5,000.00 while she saw the teller holding a check for P65,000.00 but the check
number and date were exactly the same as that of its photocopy. Obviously, the number
"6" was intercalated in the check by adding the said number before the digits "5,000.00."
Upon Doroteos request, the teller gave her a photocopy of the supposedly altered
check.
Doroteo reported back to the Dentrade office and handed to Villareal the photocopy of
the check bearing the amount of P65,000.00. When summoned, [respondent] arrived
then executed a statement voluntarily giving back the amount of P60,000.00 to Villareal
in the presence of his lawyers Lazatin and Vallente, and Doroteo. The said statement
was in the handwriting of [respondent] (Exh. "D"), which reads:
"After being confronted by Mr. Dennis T. Villareal, I am voluntarily surrendering
the P60,000.00 as part of the proceeds of UCPB check # 681039 dated October 30,
1996 as follows (in P1,000.00 bills) (serial no. of P1,000.00 bills subject of the
statement)."

18
Doroteo photocopied the P1,000.00 bills (Exh. "E"). After [respondent] admitted the
taking of the excess amount ofP60,000.00, the NBI agents placed her under arrest and
took her to the NBI detention center.
According to witness Corompido, Villareals messenger, at 10:00 a.m. of October 30,
1996, he was bound for UCPB, Makati Avenue branch. [Respondent] requested him to
pay her "Extelcom" bill and asked him to meet her at the UCPB bank. After several
minutes, the two met at the bank. [Respondent] handed to Corompido her "Extelcom" bill
and one personal check of Villareal in the amount of P65,000.00. [Respondent] returned
to the Dentrade [office]. Corompido gave to the teller [respondents] "Extelcom" payment
and also the personal check of Villareal for P65,000.00. The teller release
the P65,000.00 to Corompido who signed on the stamped portion of the check.
[Respondent] Aliga has a different version for her defense. She claimed that on October
30, 1996 at around 2:30 p.m., the NBI agents arrested her but they did [not] inform [her]
of her constitutional rights to remain silent and to be assisted by counsel; that she was
actually an accounting assistant to Dentrades chief accountant, Yolanda Martirez, the
accounting clerk being Annaliza Perez; that she was not in charge of Villareals personal
checking account, but Martirez; that Perez was the one in custody of the [checkbooks]
pertaining to the personal checking accounts of Villareal with UCPB and [Chinabank];
that Doroteo was in possession of another [checkbook] and kept it in Villareals
residence.
[Respondent] admitted that the UCPB and Chinabank checks were also used for the
replenishment of the cash advances made by Villareal; that the replenishment was
prepared using a typewriter by Martirez, Perez, Doroteo and herself; that there was no
regulation or control mechanism in their office where the responsibility for preparing any
particular check on the personal account of Villareal could be identified; that the issuance
of checks against the personal checking accounts at the UCPB and Chinabank were
frequent, from 5 to 12 checks daily; and that there were no accompanying vouchers to
record the purposes for which the checks were issued; and that it was Martirez who
monitors Villareals personal checks at the UCPB and Chinabank.
7

Additionally, respondent Aliga claimed that Perez, Doroteo, and Martirez are also using
typewriter in the check preparation. Moreover, at the time she was summoned by
Villareal inside his office, the two NBI agents (David and Ragos) and Villareals counsels
(Attys. Lazatin and Vallente) were joined in by NBI Director Toledo. The extent of the
NBIs participation is disputed. While respondent Aliga maintained that she was already
arrested by the NBI at the moment she was called to the office of Villareal,
David testified that they were merely silent spectators therein, just witnessing the
8

10

11

confrontation or interview conducted by Villareal and not even talking to respondent

Aliga.
The RTC succinctly opined that the evidence of the prosecution is very clear that
respondent Aliga must have been the one who made the intercalation in the subject
check, and that even without her written admission (Exhibit "D"), the evidence presented
constitutes proof beyond reasonable doubt. The July 12, 2001 Decision disposed:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court, finding the accused CONSUELO
CRUZ ALIGA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged, hereby sentences
her to suffer an indeterminate sentence of 14 years, 8 months of reclusion temporal as
the minimum to 20 years of reclusion temporal as the maximum.
It appearing that the amount of P60,000.00 subject of the offense was already returned
by the accused, the Court hereby absolves the accused of civil liability in this case.
SO ORDERED.

12

Respondent Aliga appealed to the CA, which, on April 27, 2004, reversed and set aside
the judgment of the RTC on the grounds that: (1) her admission or confession of guilt
before the NBI authorities, which already qualifies as a custodial investigation, is
inadmissible in evidence because she was not informed of her rights to remain silent and
to have competent and independent counsel preferably of her own choice; and (2) the
totality of the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution is insufficient to
overcome the presumption of innocence of the accused.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied by the CA on August 10, 2004; hence,
this petition raising the issues for resolution as follows:
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING INADMISSIBLE
RESPONDENTS VOLUNTARY ADMISSION OF GUILT, ON ITS CLEARLY
SPECULATIVE AND CONJECTURAL PREMISE THAT RESPONDENTS FREEDOM OF
ACTION WAS IMPAIRED WHEN SHE MADE THE ADMISSION, CONSIDERING THAT:
A. AS LAID DOWN BY THIS HONORABLE COURT, AN ADMISSION OF GUILT
SHIFTS THE BURDEN TO THE DEFENSE TO SHOW THAT IT WAS
EXTRACTED BY FORCE OR DURESS.

19
B. CONTRARY TO THE JURISPRUDENTIAL GUIDELINES LAID DOWN BY
THIS HONORABLE COURT, THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY
CONCLUDED THAT RESPONDENT WAS "EFFECTIVELY PLACED UNDER
CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION" BY THE SHEER PHYSICAL PRESENCE OF
THE NBI AGENTS WHEN THE ADMISSION WAS MADE. C. RESPONDENTS
VOLUNTARY ADMISSION WAS MADE TO A PRIVATE INDIVIDUAL, I.E.,
PETITIONER HEREIN.
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED, IF NOT ACTED IN EXCESS OF ITS
JURISDICTION, WHEN IT CONCLUDED THAT THE PROSECUTIONS EVIDENCE
WAS INSUFFICIENT TO OVERCOME RESPONDENTS PRESUMPTION OF
INNOCENCE, CONSIDERING THAT:
A. CONTRARY TO THIS HONORABLE COURTS JURISPRUDENTIAL
RULING, THE COURT OF APPEALS ENTIRELY OVERLOOKED THE
EVIDENCE ON RECORD AND EXACTED DIRECT EVIDENCE FROM THE
PROSECUTION.
B. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUS CONCLUSION THAT
RESPONDENT IS INNOCENT IS BASED ON ITS FINDING OF A SUPPOSED
INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE WHICH IS CONTRADICTED BY THE
EVIDENCE ON RECORD.
C. THE COURT OF APPEALS DEPARTED FROM SETTLED
JURISPRUDENCE, REQUIRING FROM THE PROSECUTION A QUANTUM OF
EVIDENCE GREATER THAN PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT, WHEN
IT:
1. ERRONEOUSLY RULED THAT THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO
DISCOUNT THE POSSIBILITY THAT SOMEONE ELSE COULD HAVE
CAUSED THE ALTERATION ON THE CHECK; AND
2. FAULTING THE PROSECUTION FOR NOT PRESENTING
PETITIONER AS A WITNESS.
D. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN, BASED ON NOTHING MORE
THAN RESPONDENTS DENIALS, IT DEPARTED FROM THE WELL-SETTLED RULE
LAID DOWN BY THIS HONORABLE COURT THAT THE TRIAL COURTS FINDINGS

OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS BASED THEREON, AS WELL AS ITS ASSESSMENT

OF THE CREDIBILITY OF THE WITNESSES, ARE CONCLUSIVE UPON APPELLATE
COURTS.
13

On the other hand, respondent Aliga countered that:

I.
THE PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI SHOULD BE DISMISSED FOR
RAISING ONLY QUESTIONS OF FACTS.
II.
THE PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI SHOULD BE DISMISSED ON THE
GROUND OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY.
III.
PETITIONER HAS NO STANDING TO FILE THE INSTANT PETITION FOR REVIEW
ON CERTIORARI.
IV.
WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE FOREGOING ARGUMENTS, THE PETITION FOR
REVIEW ON CERTIORARI SHOULD BE DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO SHOW THAT
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRIEVOUS ERROR IN ISSUING THE 27
APRIL 2004 AND 10 AUGUST 2004 DECISIONS; ON THE CONTRARY, THE
DECISIONS APPEAR TO BE IN ACCORD WITH THE FACTS AND THE APPLICABLE
LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE.
14

The petition is unmeritorious.

The petition should have been filed
by the State through the OSG
Petitioner took a procedural misstep when he filed the present petition without the
representation of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). In Bautista v. CunetaPangilinan, We underscored:
15

20
x x x The authority to represent the State in appeals of criminal cases before the
Supreme Court and the CA is solely vested in the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG).
Section 35 (1), Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code explicitly
provides that the OSG shall represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies
and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding,
investigation or matter requiring the services of lawyers. It shall have specific powers and
functions to represent the Government and its officers in the Supreme Court and the CA,
and all other courts or tribunals in all civil actions and special proceedings in which the
Government or any officer thereof in his official capacity is a party. The OSG is the law
office of the Government.
To be sure, in criminal cases, the acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case
against him can only be appealed by the Solicitor General, acting on behalf of the State.
The private complainant or the offended party may question such acquittal or dismissal
only insofar as the civil liability of the accused is concerned. In a catena of cases, this
view has been time and again espoused and maintained by the Court. In Rodriguez v.
Gadiane, it was categorically stated that if the criminal case is dismissed by the trial court
or if there is an acquittal, the appeal on the criminal aspect of the case must be instituted
by the Solicitor General in behalf of the State. The capability of the private complainant to
question such dismissal or acquittal is limited only to the civil aspect of the case. The
same determination was also arrived at by the Court in Metropolitan Bank and Trust
Company v. Veridiano II. In the recent case of Bangayan, Jr. v. Bangayan, the Court
again upheld this guiding principle.

may be filed by the person aggrieved. In such case, the aggrieved parties are the State
and the private offended party or complainant. The complainant has an interest in the
civil aspect of the case so he may file such special civil action questioning the decision or
action of the respondent court on jurisdictional grounds. In so doing, complainant should
not bring the action in the name of the People of the Philippines. The action may be
prosecuted in [the] name of said complainant.
Thus, the Court has definitively ruled that in a criminal case in which the offended party is
the State, the interest of the private complainant or the private offended party is limited to
the civil liability arising therefrom. If a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if
there is an acquittal, an appeal of the criminal aspect may be undertaken, whenever
legally feasible, only by the State through the Solicitor General. As a rule, only the
Solicitor General may represent the People of the Philippines on appeal. The private
offended party or complainant may not undertake such appeal.
16

In the case at bar, the petition filed essentially assails the criminal, not the civil, aspect of
the CA Decision. It must even be stressed that petitioner never challenged before the
CA, and in this Court, the RTC judgment which absolved respondent Aliga from civil
liability in view of the return of the P60,000.00 subject matter of the offense on October
30, 1996. Therefore, the petition should have been filed only by the State through the
OSG. Petitioner lacks the personality or legal standing to question the CA Decision
because it is only the OSG which can bring actions on behalf of the State in criminal
proceedings before the Supreme Court and the CA. Unlike in Montaez v.
Cipriano where we adopted a liberal view, the OSG, in its Comment on this
case, neither prayed that the petition be granted nor expressly ratified and adopted as
its own the petition for the People of the Philippines. Instead, it merely begged to excuse
itself from filing a Comment due to conflict of interest and for not having been impleaded
in the case.
17

Worthy of note is the case of People v. Santiago, wherein the Court had the occasion to
bring this issue to rest. The Court elucidated:
It is well settled that in criminal cases where the offended party is the State, the interest
of the private complainant or the private offended party is limited to the civil liability. Thus,
in the prosecution of the offense, the complainant's role is limited to that of a witness for
the prosecution. If a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal,
an appeal therefrom on the criminal aspect may be undertaken only by the State through
the Solicitor General. Only the Solicitor General may represent the People of the
Philippines on appeal. The private offended party or complainant may not take such
appeal. However, the said offended party or complainant may appeal the civil aspect
despite the acquittal of the accused.
In a special civil action for certiorari filed under Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
wherein it is alleged that the trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack of jurisdiction or on other jurisdictional grounds, the rules state that the petition

18

A judgment of acquittal may be

assailed only in a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
Petitioner also committed another procedural blunder. A petition for certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules should have been filed instead of herein petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45. The People may assail a judgment of acquittal only via petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules. If the petition, regardless of its nomenclature,
merely calls for an ordinary review of the findings of the court a quo, the constitutional
right of the accused against double jeopardy would be violated. The Court made this
clear in People v. Sandiganbayan (First Div.), thus:
19

20

21
x x x A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court and a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court are two and separate remedies. A
petition under Rule 45 brings up for review errors of judgment, while a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 covers errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction. Grave abuse of discretion is not an allowable
ground under Rule 45. A petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is a
mode of appeal. Under Section 1 of the said Rule, a party aggrieved by the decision or
final order of the Sandiganbayan may file a petition for review on certiorari with this
Court:

virtual refusal to perform a duty imposed by law, or to act in contemplation of law or

where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion
and hostility. No grave abuse of discretion may be attributed to a court simply because of
its alleged misapplication of facts and evidence, and erroneous conclusions based on
said evidence. Certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction, and not errors or
mistakes in the findings and conclusions of the trial court.

Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. - A party desiring to appeal by certiorari
from a judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan,
the Regional Trial Court, or other courts whenever authorized by law, may file with the
Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only
questions of law which must be distinctly set forth.

x x x Certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion is an extraordinary remedy. Its use is

confined to extraordinary cases wherein the action of the inferior court is wholly void. Its
aim is to keep the inferior court within the parameters of its jurisdiction or to prevent it
from committing such a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. No grave abuse of discretion may be attributed to the court simply because
of its alleged misappreciation of facts and evidence. While certiorari may be used to
correct an abusive acquittal, the petitioner in such extraordinary proceeding must clearly
demonstrate that the lower court blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave as to
deprive it of its very power to dispense justice.

However, the provision must be read in relation to Section 1, Rule 122 of the Revised
Rules of Court, which provides that any party may appeal from a judgment or final order
"unless the accused will thereby be placed in double jeopardy." The judgment that may
be appealed by the aggrieved party envisaged in the Rule is a judgment convicting the
accused, and not a judgment of acquittal. The State is barred from appealing such
judgment of acquittal by a petition for review.
Section 21, Article III of the Constitution provides that "no person shall be twice put in
jeopardy of punishment for the same offense." The rule is that a judgment acquitting the
accused is final and immediately executory upon its promulgation, and that accordingly,
the State may not seek its review without placing the accused in double jeopardy. Such
acquittal is final and unappealable on the ground of double jeopardy whether it happens
at the trial court or on appeal at the CA. Thus, the State is proscribed from appealing the
judgment of acquittal of the accused to this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
xxxx
A judgment of acquittal may be assailed by the People in a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court without placing the accused in double jeopardy. However,
in such case, the People is burdened to establish that the court a quo, in this case, the
Sandiganbayan, acted without jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to
excess or lack of jurisdiction. Grave abuse of discretion generally refers to capricious or
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of
discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or

21

The nature of certiorari action was expounded in People v. Court of Appeals (Fifteenth
Div.):
22

23

and further in First Corporation v. Former Sixth Division of the Court of Appeals:

24

It is a fundamental aphorism in law that a review of facts and evidence is not the
province of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, which is extra ordinem beyond the
ambit of appeal. In certiorari proceedings, judicial review does not go as far as to
examine and assess the evidence of the parties and to weigh the probative value
thereof. It does not include an inquiry as to the correctness of the evaluation of evidence.
x x x It is not for this Court to re-examine conflicting evidence, re-evaluate the credibility
of the witnesses or substitute the findings of fact of the court a quo.
25

The case does not fall within the

exception to rule on double jeopardy
Indeed, a judgment of acquittal, whether ordered by the trial or the appellate court, is
final, unappealable, and immediately executory upon its promulgation. The rationale for
the rule is elucidated in the oft-cited case of People v. Hon. Velasco:
26

27

The fundamental philosophy highlighting the finality of an acquittal by the trial court cuts
deep into "the humanity of the laws and in a jealous watchfulness over the rights of the
citizen, when brought in unequal contest with the State. x x x." Thus, Green expressed

22
the concern that "(t)he underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least the AngloAmerican system of jurisprudence, is that the State with all its resources and power
should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged
offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling
him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the
possibility that even though innocent, he may be found guilty."

People v. Velasco, we stressed that an acquitted defendant is entitled to the right of

repose as a direct consequence of the finality of his acquittal x x x.
30

However, the rule against double jeopardy is not without exceptions, which are: (1)
Where there has been deprivation of due process and where there is a finding of a
mistrial, or (2) Where there has been a grave abuse of discretion under exceptional
circumstances. Unfortunately for petitioner, We find that these exceptions do not exist in
this case.
31

It is axiomatic that on the basis of humanity, fairness and justice, an acquitted defendant
is entitled to the right of repose as a direct consequence of the finality of his acquittal.
The philosophy underlying this rule establishing the absolute nature of acquittals is "part
of the paramount importance criminal justice system attaches to the protection of the
innocent against wrongful conviction." The interest in the finality-of-acquittal rule,
confined exclusively to verdicts of not guilty, is easy to understand: it is a need for
"repose," a desire to know the exact extent of one's liability. With this right of repose, the
criminal justice system has built in a protection to insure that the innocent, even those
whose innocence rests upon a jurys leniency, will not be found guilty in a subsequent
proceeding.
Related to his right of repose is the defendants interest in his right to have his trial
completed by a particular tribunal. This interest encompasses his right to have his guilt or
innocence determined in a single proceeding by the initial jury empanelled to try him, for
societys awareness of the heavy personal strain which the criminal trial represents for
the individual defendant is manifested in the willingness to limit Government to a single
criminal proceeding to vindicate its very vital interest in enforcement of criminal laws. The
ultimate goal is prevention of government oppression; the goal finds its voice in the
finality of the initial proceeding. As observed in Lockhart v. Nelson, "(t)he fundamental
tenet animating the Double Jeopardy Clause is that the State should not be able to
oppress individuals through the abuse of the criminal process." Because the innocence
of the accused has been confirmed by a final judgment, the Constitution conclusively
presumes that a second trial would be unfair.
28

People v. Court of Appeals (Fifteenth Div.) also stated:

29

x x x The finality-of-acquittal doctrine has several avowed purposes. Primarily, it prevents

the State from using its criminal processes as an instrument of harassment to wear out
the accused by a multitude of cases with accumulated trials. It also serves the additional
purpose of precluding the State, following an acquittal, from successively retrying the
defendant in the hope of securing a conviction. And finally, it prevents the State, following
conviction, from retrying the defendant again in the hope of securing a greater penalty. In

First, there is no deprivation of due process or a mistrial. In fact, petitioner did not make
any allegation to that effect. What the records show is that during the trial, both parties
had more than sufficient occasions to be heard and to present their evidence. The same
is true during the appeal before the CA. The State, represented by the OSG, was not
deprived of a fair opportunity to prove its case.
1wphi1

And second, no grave abuse of discretion could be attributed to the CA. It could not be
said that its judgment was issued without jurisdiction, and, for this reason, void. Again,
petitioner did not even allege that the CA gravely abused its discretion. Instead, what he
asserted was that the CA "gravely erred" in the evaluation and assessment of the
evidence presented by the parties. Certainly, what he questioned was the purported
errors of judgment or those involving misappreciation of evidence or errors of law, which,
as aforesaid, cannot be raised and be reviewed in a Rule 65 petition. To repeat, a writ of
certiorari can only correct errors of jurisdiction or those involving the commission of grave
abuse of discretion, not those which call for the evaluation of evidence and factual
findings.
x x x Any error committed in the evaluation of evidence is merely an error of judgment
that cannot be remedied by certiorari. An error of judgment is one in which the court may
commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction. An error of jurisdiction is one where the act
complained of was issued by the court without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion which is tantamount to lack or in excess of jurisdiction and which
error is correctible only by the extraordinary writ of certiorari. Certiorari will not be issued
to cure errors by the trial court in its appreciation of the evidence of the parties, and its
conclusions anchored on the said findings and its conclusions of law. Since no error of
jurisdiction can be attributed to public respondent in her assessment of the evidence,
certiorari will not lie.
32

Upon perusal of the records, it is Our considered view that the conclusions arrived at by
the CA cannot, by any measure, be characterized as capricious, whimsical or arbitrary.
While it may be argued that there have been instances where the appreciation of facts

23
might have resulted from possible lapses in the evaluation of the evidence, nothing
herein detracts from the fact that relevant and material evidence was scrutinized,
considered and evaluated as proven by the CAs lengthy discussion of its opinion. We
note that the petition basically raises issues pertaining to alleged errors of judgment not
errors of jurisdiction which is tantamount to an appeal contrary to the express injunction
of the Constitution the Rules of Court and prevailing jurisprudence. Conformably then we
need not embark upon review of the factual and evidentiary issues raised by petitioner as
these are obviously not within the realm of Our jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The acquittal of
herein respondent Consuelo C. Aliga by the Court of Appeals in its April 27, 2004
Decision and August 10, 2004 Resolution in CA-G.R. CR No. 25581 entitled People of
the Philippines v. Consuelo Cruz Aliga is AFFIRMED.
No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 167710
June 5, 2009
PEOPLE vs. JOVEN DE GRANO, ARMANDO DE GRANO, DOMINGO LANDICHO
and ESTANISLAO LACABA
This is a petition for review on certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to
annul and set aside the Resolutions1 dated January 25, 2005 and April 5, 2005, issued
by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 88160.
The antecedents are as follows:
On November 28, 1991, an Information for murder committed against Emmanuel
Mendoza was filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 6, Tanauan, Batangas,
against Joven de Grano (Joven), Armando de Grano (Armando), and Estanislao Lacaba
(Estanislao), together with their co-accused Leonides Landicho (Leonides), Domingo
Landicho (Domingo), and Leonardo Genil (Leonardo), who were at-large. 2 It was
docketed as Criminal Case No. 2730, the pertinent portion of which reads:
That on April 21, 1991, between 9:00 oclock and 10:00 oclock in the evening, in
Barangay Balakilong, [M]unicipality of Laurel, [P]rovince of Batangas, and within the
jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, all the above named accused, conspiring,
confederating, and helping one another, motivated by common design and intent to kill,
did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, and by means of treachery and
with evident premeditation, shoot EMMANUEL MENDOZA with firearms, inflicting upon
him eight gunshot wounds and causing his death thereby, thus committing the crime of

MURDER to the damage and prejudice of his heirs in the amount as the Honorable Court
shall determine.3
Duly arraigned, Joven, Armando, and Estanislao pleaded "not guilty" to the crime as
charged; while their co-accused Leonides, Leonardo, and Domingo remained at-large.
Thereafter, respondents filed a motion for bail contending that the prosecutions evidence
was not strong.4
Meanwhile, considering that one of the accused was the incumbent Mayor of Laurel,
Batangas at the time when the crime was committed, Senior State Prosecutor Hernani T.
Barrios moved that the venue be transferred from the RTC, Branch 6, Tanauan,
Batangas to any RTC in Manila. Consequently, the case was transferred to the RTC
Manila for re-raffling amongst its Branches. The case was re-docketed as Criminal Case
No. 93-129988 and was initially re-raffled to Branches 6, 9, and 11 before being finally
raffled to Branch 27, RTC, Manila.5
Before transferring the case to the RTC, Branch 27, Manila, the trial court deferred the
resolution of respondents motion for bail and allowed the prosecution to present
evidence. Thereafter, the hearing of the application for bail ensued, wherein the
prosecution presented Teresita and Dr. Leonardo Salvador. After finding that the
prosecutions evidence to prove treachery and evident premeditation was not strong, the
RTC, Branch 11, Manila, granted respondents motion for bail. A motion for
reconsideration was filed, but it was denied.6
The prosecution then filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP
No. 41110, which was denied. Aggrieved, they sought recourse before this Court in G.R.
No. 129604. In a Resolution dated July 12, 1999, this Court granted the petition and set
aside the decision of the CA together with the Order of the RTC granting bail to the
respondents. The RTC was also ordered to immediately issue a warrant of arrest against
the accused. The resolution was also qualified to be immediately executory.7 As a result,
Estanislao was re-arrested, but Joven and Armando were not. 8
However, upon respondents motion for reconsideration, this Court, in a Resolution dated
September 4, 2001, resolved to remand the case to the RTC. We noted that, in view of
the transmittal of the records of the case to this Court in connection with the petition, the
trial court deferred the rendition of its decision. Consequently, the case was remanded to
the RTC for further proceedings, including the rendition of its decision on the merits.

24
After the presentation of the parties respective sets of evidence, the RTC rendered a
Decision9 dated April 25, 2002, finding several accused guilty of the offense as charged,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, CONSIDERING ALL THE FOREGOING, this Court finds the accused
JOVEN DE GRANO, ARMANDO DE GRANO, DOMINGO LANDICHO and
ESTANISLAO LACABA, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER,
qualified by treachery, and there being no modifying circumstance attendant, hereby
sentences them to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, and to indemnify the heirs of
Emmanuel Mendoza the sum of P50,000.00 and to pay the costs.
The case as against accused Leonides Landicho and Leonardo Genil is hereby sent to
the files or archived cases to be revived as soon as said accused are apprehended.
Let alias warrants of arrest be issued against accused Leonardo Genil and Leonides
Landicho.

In its Opposition, the prosecution pointed out that while the accused jointly moved for the
reconsideration of the decision, all of them, except Estanislao, were at-large. Having
opted to become fugitives and be beyond the judicial ambit, they lost their right to file
such motion for reconsideration and to ask for whatever relief from the court. 11
Acting on respondents motion for reconsideration, the RTC issued an Order 12 dated April
15, 2004 modifying its earlier decision by acquitting Joven and Armando, and
downgrading the conviction of Domingo and Estanislao from murder to homicide. The
decretal portion of the Order reads:
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court modifies its decision and
finds accused DOMINGO LANDICHO and ESTANISLAO LACABA, "GUILTY" beyond
reasonable doubt, as principal of the crime of Homicide, and in default of any modifying
circumstance, sentences them to an indeterminate prison term of SIX (6) YEARS and
ONE (1) DAY of Prision Mayor, as minimum, to TWELVE YEARS [and] ONE DAY of
Reclusion Temporal, as maximum. Said accused shall be credited with the full period of
their preventive imprisonment pursuant to B.P. Blg. 85.
1avvphi1

Only Estanislao was present at the promulgation despite due notice to the other
respondents.
Respondents, thru counsel, then filed a Joint Motion for Reconsideration dated May 8,
2002, praying that the Decision dated April 25, 2002 be reconsidered and set aside and a
new one be entered acquitting them based on the following grounds, to wit:

Accused ARMANDO DE GRANO and JOVEN DE GRANO are hereby ACQUITTED on

the basis of reasonable doubt. They are likewise declared free of any civil liability.
To the extent herein altered or modified, the Decision dated April 25, 2002 stands.
SO ORDERED.13

1. The Honorable Court erred in basing the decision of conviction of all accused
solely on the biased, uncorroborated and baseless testimony of Teresita Duran,
the common-law wife of the victim;
2. The Honorable Court erred in not giving exculpatory weight to the evidence
adduced by the defense, which was amply corroborated on material points;
3. The Honorable Court erred in not finding that the failure of the prosecution to
present rebuttal evidence renders the position of the defense unrebutted;
4. The Honorable Court erred in adopting conditional or preliminary finding of
treachery of the Supreme Court in its Resolution dated July 12, 1999; and
5. The Honorable Court erred in rendering a verdict [sic] of conviction despite the
fact that the guilt of all the accused were not proven beyond reasonable doubt. 10

Estanislao filed a Notice of Appeal, while the prosecution sought reconsideration of the
Order arguing that:
1. There was absolutely no basis for this Court to have taken cognizance of the
"Joint Motion for Reconsideration" dated May 8, 2002, citing Sec. 6, Rule 120 of
the Rules of Court.
2. The testimony of Teresita Duran deserves credence. The delay in the taking of
Ms. Durans written statement of the events she witnessed is understandable
considering that Joven de Grano was the mayor of the municipality where the
crime was committed and that another accused, Estanislao Lacaba, was a
policeman in the same municipality.
3. The crime committed is murder.

25
4. Accused Armando de Grano and Joven de Grano participated in the
conspiracy.
On September 28, 2004, the RTC issued an Order14 denying the motion and giving due
course to Estanislaos notice of appeal.
Petitioner, thru Assistant City Prosecutor Cesar Glorioso of the Office of the Manila City
Prosecutor, with the assistance of private prosecutor Atty. Michael E. David, filed a
Petition15 for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the CA arguing that:
(a) the private respondents, having deliberately evaded arrest after being denied
bail and deliberately failing to attend the promulgation of the Decision despite
due notice, lost the right to move for reconsideration of their conviction; and
(b) the grounds relied upon by respondent RTC in modifying its Decision are
utterly erroneous.16
Petitioner alleged that it had no other plain, adequate, and speedy remedy, considering
that the State could not appeal a judgment of acquittal. However, by way of exception, a
judgment of acquittal in a criminal case may be assailed in a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court upon a showing by the petitioner that the lower court, in
acquitting the accused, committed not only reversible errors of judgment, but also grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, or a denial of due
process, thus rendering the assailed judgment void. Consequently, the accused cannot
be considered at risk of double jeopardy.17
Respondent De Grano filed a Motion to Dismiss,18 arguing that the verification and
certification portion of the petition was flawed, since it was signed only by counsel and
not by the aggrieved party. Also, the petition did not contain the conformity of the Solicitor
General.19
On January 31, 2005, petitioner, through the private prosecutor, filed an Opposition to
Motion to Dismiss.20Petitioner explained that, for lack of material time, it failed to secure
the conformity of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) when it filed the petition, but it
would nevertheless obtain it. A day after filing the petition, the private prosecutor sought
the OSGs conformity in a letter21 dated January 12, 2005. The OSG, in turn, informed
the private prosecutor that rather than affixing its belated conformity, it would rather await
the initial resolution of the CA.22 Also, so as not to preempt the action of the Department
of Justice (DOJ) on the case, the OSG instructed the private prosecutor to secure the
necessary endorsement from the DOJ for it to pursue the case. Anent the verification and

certification of the petition having been signed by the private prosecutor, petitioner
explained that private complainant Teresita was in fear for her life as a result of the
acquittal of former Mayor Joven de Grano, but she was willing to certify the petition
should she be given ample time to travel to Manila. 23
However, in a Resolution24 dated January 25, 2005, which was received by the petitioner
on the same day it filed its Opposition or on January 31, 2005, the petition was dismissed
outright by the CA on the grounds that it was not filed by the OSG and that the assailed
Orders were only photocopies and not certified true copies. The dispositive portion of the
Resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this petition is hereby OUTRIGHTLY DISMISSED.
Petitioner timely filed a Motion for Reconsideration.25 In addition to the justifications it
raised in its earlier Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss, petitioner argued that the petition
was not only signed by the private prosecutor, it was also signed by the prosecutor who
represented the petitioner in the criminal proceedings before the trial court. Petitioner
also maintains that the certified true copies of the assailed Orders were accidentally
attached to its file copy instead of the one it submitted. To rectify the mistake, it attached
the certified true copies of the assailed Orders.26 This was opposed by the respondents in
their Comment/Opposition to Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.27
lawphi1

Meanwhile, in its 1st Indorsement28 dated March 15, 2005, DOJ Secretary Raul M.
Gonzalez, endorsed the petition filed by the Assistant City Prosecutor, with the
assistance of the private prosecutor, to the Solicitor General for his conformity.
On April 5, 2005, the CA issued a Resolution29 denying the motion, thus:
WHEREFORE, petitioners motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED.
In denying the motion, the CA opined that the rule on double jeopardy prohibits the state
from appealing or filing a petition for review of a judgment of acquittal that was based on
the merits of the case. If there is an acquittal, an appeal therefrom, if it will not put the
accused in double jeopardy, on the criminal aspect, may be undertaken only by the State
through the Solicitor General. It added that a special civil action for certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court may be filed by the person aggrieved. In such case, the
aggrieved parties are the State and the private offended party or complainant. Moreover,
the records reveal that the petition was not filed in the name of the offended party; and
worse, the verification and certification of non-forum shopping attached to the petition
was signed not by the private offended party, but by her counsel. Notwithstanding the

26
efforts exerted by the petitioner to secure the confirmation of the OSG and the
endorsement of the DOJ, there is no showing of any subsequent participation of the
OSG in the case.
Hence, the petition raising the following issues:
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR AND
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION WHEN IT DISMISSED THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI ON THE
GROUND OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY.
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR AND
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION WHEN IT DISMISSED THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI FOR NOT
HAVING BEEN FILED BY THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL NOR IN THE
NAME OF THE OFFENDED PARTY.
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR AND
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT DISMISSED THE PETITION FOR
CERTIORARI ON THE GROUND THAT THE VERIFICATION AND CERTIFICATION
ATTACHED TO THE PETITION WAS SIGNED BY THE PRIVATE COUNSEL AND NOT
BY THE OFFENDED PARTY.30
Petitioner, through the Solicitor General, argues that, except for Estanislao, none of the
respondents appeared at the promulgation of the Decision. Neither did they surrender
after promulgation of the judgment of conviction, nor filed a motion for leave to avail
themselves of the judicial remedies against the decision, stating the reasons for their
absence. The trial court thus had no authority to take cognizance of the joint motion for
reconsideration filed by the respondents as stated in Section 6, Rule 120 of the 2000
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. As such, the RTC committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Having been issued without
jurisdiction, the Order dated April 15, 2004 is void. Consequently, no double jeopardy
attached to such void Order. The CA, therefore, committed reversible error when it
dismissed the petition for certiorari on the ground of double jeopardy.31
Petitioner also contends that, with the endorsement of the DOJ and the letter of the OSG
manifesting its intention to pursue the petition, the OSG had in fact conformed to the
filing of the petition and agreed to pursue the same. Had the CA given the OSG ample
time to file the necessary pleading, the petition would not have been dismissed for the
reason that it was filed by the said office.32

With respect to the verification and certification of non-forum shopping, petitioner invokes
a liberal application of the Rules for private complainants failure to personally sign it.
Petitioner maintains that out of extreme fear arising from the unexpected acquittal of
Joven, private complainant was reluctant to travel to Manila. After she was taken out of
the witness protection program, she took refuge in the Visayas and she was there at the
time her signature was required. Since the period for filing the petition for certiorari was
about to lapse, and it could not be filed without the verification and certification of nonforum shopping, the private prosecutor was left with no option but so sign it, instead of
allowing the deadline to pass without filing the petition.33
Moreover, petitioner maintains that the OSG has the authority to sign the verification and
certification of the present petition, because the real party-in-interest is the OSG itself as
the representative of the State.34
On their part, respondents contend that the petition for certiorari questioning the order of
acquittal is not allowed and is contrary to the principle of double jeopardy. Respondents
argue that, contrary to the OSGs contention, respondents Joven and Domingos
absence during the promulgation of the Decision dated April 25, 2002 did not deprive the
trial court of its authority to resolve their Joint Motion for Reconsideration, considering
that one of the accused, Estanislao, was present during the promulgation. 35
Joven, Armando, and Domingo maintain that while they were not present during the
promulgation of the RTC Decision, Estanislao, who was under police custody, attended
the promulgation of the said Decision. Thus, when they filed their Joint Motion for
Reconsideration, which included that of Estanislao, the RTC was not deprived of its
authority to resolve the joint motion.36
Respondents insist that the CA properly dismissed the petition for certiorari, as it was not
instituted by the OSG on behalf of the People of the Philippines, and that the verification
and certification portion thereof was not signed by private complainant Teresita. 37
Respondents also argue that the petition for certiorari before this Court should be
dismissed, since the verification and certification thereof were signed by a solicitor of the
OSG, not private complainant.
The petition is meritorious.
Before considering the merits of the petition, we will first address the technical objections
raised by respondents.

27
As regards the issue of the signatory of the verification and certification of non-forum
shopping, a liberal application of the Rules should be applied to the present case.
The purpose of requiring a verification is to secure an assurance that the allegations in
the petition have been made in good faith; or are true and correct, not merely
speculative. This requirement is simply a condition affecting the form of pleadings, and
noncompliance therewith does not necessarily render it fatally defective. 38 Truly,
verification is only a formal, not a jurisdictional, requirement. Hence, it was sufficient that
the private prosecutor signed the verification.
With respect to the certification of non-forum shopping, it has been held that the
certification requirement is rooted in the principle that a party-litigant shall not be allowed
to pursue simultaneous remedies in different fora, as this practice is detrimental to an
orderly judicial procedure.39 However, this Court has relaxed, under justifiable
circumstances, the rule requiring the submission of such certification considering that
although it is obligatory, it is not jurisdictional.40 Not being jurisdictional, it can be relaxed
under the rule of substantial compliance.
In Donato v. Court of Appeals41 and Wee v. Galvez,42 the Court noted that the petitioners
were already in the United States; thus, the signing of the certification by their authorized
representatives was deemed sufficient compliance with the Rules. In Sy Chin v. Court of
Appeals,43 the Court upheld substantial justice and ruled that the failure of the parties to
sign the certification may be overlooked, as the parties case was meritorious. In Torres v.
Specialized Packaging and Development Corporation, 44 the Court also found, among
other reasons, that the extreme difficulty to secure all the required signatures and the
apparent merits of the substantive aspects of the case constitute compelling reasons for
allowing the petition.
In Ortiz v. Court of Appeals45 and similar rulings, the following has always been pointed
out:
The attestation contained in the certification on non-forum shopping requires personal
knowledge by the party who executed the same. To merit the Courts consideration,
petitioners here must show reasonable cause for failure to personally sign the
certification. The petitioners must convince the court that the outright dismissal of the
petition would defeat the administration of justice.
Thus, petitioners need only show that there was reasonable cause for the failure to sign
the certification against forum shopping, and that the outright dismissal of the petition
would defeat the administration of justice.46

We find that the particular circumstances of this case advance valid reasons for private
complainants failure to sign the certification. As pointed out in the petition, it was out of
extreme fear that private complainant failed to personally sign the certification. It is to be
noted that when Armando and Joven were acquitted, Teresita was already out of the
witness protection program and was in hiding in the Visayas. As such, she could not
travel to Manila to personally sign the petition. Moreover, as maintained by the petitioner,
since the period for filing the petition for certiorari was about to lapse, the private
prosecutor was left with no option but to sign the verification and certification, instead of
allowing the period to file the petition to pass without it being filed. A relaxation of the
procedural rules, considering the particular circumstances, is justified. The requirement
was thus substantially complied with.
As summarized in Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Court of Appeals,47 when a strict and
literal application of the rules on non-forum shopping and verification would result in a
patent denial of substantial justice, they may be liberally construed. An unforgiving
application of the pertinent provisions of the Rules will not be given premium if it would
impede rather than serve the best interests of justice in the light of the prevailing
circumstances in the case under consideration.
We reiterate our holding in City Warden of the Manila City Jail v. Estrella,48 that the
signature of the Solicitor General on the verification and certification of non-forum
shopping in a petition before the CA or with this Court is substantial compliance with the
requirement under the Rules, considering that the OSG is the legal representative of the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines and its agencies and instrumentalities;
more so, in a criminal case where the People or the State is the real party-in-interest and
is the aggrieved party.49
Also, respondents contention that there is no showing of any subsequent participation of
the OSG in the petition before the CA does not hold water. In the letter dated January 18,
2004, the OSG instructed the private prosecutor to secure the necessary endorsement
from the DOJ for it to pursue the case. In its 1st Indorsement dated March 15, 2005, DOJ
Secretary Raul M. Gonzalez, endorsed the petition to the Solicitor General for his
conformity. When the CA denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration for its outright
dismissal of the petition, the OSG filed motions50 for extension of time to file the present
petition. Moreover, the OSG filed a Comment51 on respondents Motion for
Reconsideration.52 Thus, any doubt regarding the endorsement, conformity, and
participation of the OSG in the petitions is dispelled.
Now on the substantive aspect.

28
A peculiar situation exists in the instant case. Petitioner has sought recourse before the
CA, via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, from an Order of the trial court drastically
modifying its earlier findings convicting the respondents of the crime of murder, by
acquitting Joven and Armando, and downgrading the convictions of their co-accused
from murder to homicide; this, notwithstanding that all the accused, except Estanislao
Lacaba, failed to personally appear at the promulgation of the Decision despite due
notice thereof.
Petitioner contends that its petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with
the CA was the proper remedy, since the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it entertained the Joint Motion for
Reconsideration with respect to Armando and Joven despite the fact that they had not
regained their standing in court.
Petitioners recourse to the CA was correct.
A writ of certiorari is warranted when (1) any tribunal, board or officer has acted without
or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction; and (2) there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law.53 An act of a court or tribunal may be considered as
grave abuse of discretion when the same was performed in a capricious or whimsical
exercise of judgment amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be
so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty, or to a virtual refusal
to perform a duty enjoined by law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and
despotic manner because of passion or hostility.54

Although this Court does not absolutely preclude the availment of the remedy
of certiorari to correct an erroneous acquittal, the petitioner must clearly and convincingly
demonstrate that the lower court blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave and so
severe as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice.57
Under English common law, exceptions to the pleas of prior conviction or acquittal
existed where the trial court lacked jurisdiction, the theory being that a defendant before
such a court was not actually placed in jeopardy.58Hence, any acquittal or conviction
before a court having no jurisdiction would not violate the principle of double jeopardy
since it failed to attach in the first place.
Section 14(2),59 Article III of the Constitution, authorizing trials in absentia, allows the
accused to be absent at the trial but not at certain stages of the proceedings, to wit: (a) at
arraignment and plea, whether of innocence or of guilt; (b) during trial, whenever
necessary for identification purposes; and (c) at the promulgation of sentence, unless it is
for a light offense, in which case, the accused may appear by counsel or representative.
At such stages of the proceedings, his presence is required and cannot be waived. 60
Section 6, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Rules applicable at
the time the Decision was promulgated, provides:
Section 6. Promulgation of judgment. The judgment is promulgated by reading it in the
presence of the accused and any judge of the court in which it was rendered. However,
if the conviction is for a light offense the judgment may be pronounced in the presence of
his counsel or representative. When the judge is absent or outside the province or city,
the judgment may be promulgated by the clerk of court.

By way of exception, a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case may be assailed in a

petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, but only upon a clear showing
by the petitioner that the lower court, in acquitting the accused, committed not merely
reversible errors of judgment but also grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, or to a denial of due process, thus rendering the assailed judgment
void.55 In which event, the accused cannot be considered at risk of double jeopardy
the revered constitutional safeguard against exposing the accused to the risk of
answering twice for the same offense.

If the accused is confined or detained in another province or city, the judgment may be
promulgated by the executive judge of the Regional Trial Court having jurisdiction over
the place of confinement or detention upon request of the court which rendered the
judgment. The court promulgating the judgment shall have authority to accept the notice
of appeal and to approve the bail bond pending appeal; provided, that if the decision of
the trial court convicting the accused changed the nature of the offense from non-bailable
to bailable, the application for bail can only be filed and resolved by the appellate court.

Double jeopardy has the following essential elements: (1) the accused is charged under
a complaint or an information sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction; (2)
the court has jurisdiction; (3) the accused has been arraigned and he has pleaded; and
(4) he is convicted or acquitted, or the case is dismissed without his express consent. 56

The proper clerk of court shall give notice to the accused, personally or through his
bondsman or warden and counsel, requiring him to be present at the promulgation of the
decision. If the accused was tried in absentiabecause he jumped bail or escaped from
prison, the notice to him shall be served at his last known address.

29
In case the accused fails to appear at the scheduled date of promulgation of judgment
despite notice, the promulgation shall be made by recording the judgment in the criminal
docket and serving him a copy thereof at his last known address or thru his counsel.
If the judgment is for conviction and the failure of the accused to appear was without
justifiable cause, he shall lose the remedies available in these Rules against the
judgment and the court shall order his arrest. Within fifteen (15)days from promulgation
of judgment however, the accused may surrender and file a motion for leave of court to
avail of these remedies. He shall state the reasons for his absence at the scheduled
promulgation and if he proves that his absence was for a justifiable cause, he shall be
allowed to avail of said remedies within fifteen (15) days from notice. 61
Thus, the accused who failed to appear without justifiable cause shall lose the remedies
available in the Rules against the judgment. However, within 15 days from promulgation
of judgment, the accused may surrender and file a motion for leave of court to avail of
these remedies. He shall state in his motion the reasons for his absence at the
scheduled promulgation, and if he proves that his absence was for a justifiable cause, he
shall be allowed to avail of said remedies within 15 days from notice.62
When the Decision dated April 25, 2002 was promulgated, only Estanislao Lacaba was
present. Subsequently thereafter, without surrendering and explaining the reasons for
their absence, Joven, Armando, and Domingo joined Estanislao in their Joint Motion for
Reconsideration. In blatant disregard of the Rules, the RTC not only failed to cause the
arrest of the respondents who were at large, it also took cognizance of the joint motion.
The RTC clearly exceeded its jurisdiction when it entertained the joint Motion for
Reconsideration with respect to the respondents who were at large. It should have
considered the joint motion as a motion for reconsideration that was solely filed by
Estanislao. Being at large, Joven and Domingo have not regained their standing in court.
Once an accused jumps bail or flees to a foreign country, or escapes from prison or
confinement, he loses his standing in court; and unless he surrenders or submits to the
jurisdiction of the court, he is deemed to have waived any right to seek relief from the
court.63
Thus, Joven, Armando, and Domingo, were not placed in double jeopardy because, from
the very beginning, the lower tribunal had acted without jurisdiction. Verily, any ruling
issued without jurisdiction is, in legal contemplation, necessarily null and void and does
not exist. In criminal cases, it cannot be the source of an acquittal. 64

However, with respect to Estanislao, the RTC committed no reversible error when it
entertained the Motion for Reconsideration. He was in custody and was present at the
promulgation of the judgment. Hence, the RTC never lost jurisdiction over his person.
Consequently, the RTCs ruling downgrading his conviction from murder to homicide
stands. For Estanislao, and for him alone, the proscription against double jeopardy
applies.
Factual matters cannot be inquired into by this Court in a certiorari proceeding. We can
no longer be tasked to go over the proofs presented by the parties and analyze, assess
and weigh them again to ascertain if the trial court was correct in according superior
credit to this or that piece of evidence of one party or the other.65 The sole office of a writ
of certiorari is the correction of errors of jurisdiction, including the commission of grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, and does not include a review of the
RTCs evaluation of the evidence and the factual findings based thereon. 66
True, were it not for the procedural lapses of the RTC and its blatant disregard of the
Rules, the finality of respondents acquittal and their co-accuseds conviction of homicide
instead of murder would have been barred by the rule on double jeopardy.
We may tolerate an erroneous acquittal borne from an attempt to protect the innocent or
from an attempt to uphold the accuseds treasured right to a fair trial, but when these
concerns are not evident, an erroneous acquittal is a source of substantial dismay and
warrants this Courts corrective action via a special writ of error.
Moreover, although the CA dismissed the appeal filed before it, the RTC Judge cannot
hide behind such fact considering that the dismissal of the appeal was not based on the
validity of the assailed Order of the RTC, but was based on technical rules and the rule
against double jeopardy.
It is to be stressed that judges are dutybound to have more than a cursory acquaintance
with laws and jurisprudence. Failure to follow basic legal commands constitutes gross
ignorance of the law from which no one may be excused, not even a judge. 67 The Code
of Judicial Conduct mandates that "a judge shall be faithful to the law and maintain
professional competence."68 It bears stressing that competence is one of the marks of a
good judge. When a judge displays an utter lack of familiarity with the Rules, he erodes
the publics confidence in the competence of our courts. Such is gross ignorance of the
law. Having accepted the exalted position of a judge, he/she owes the public and the
court the duty to be proficient in the law.69

30
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated January 25, 2005 and
April 5, 2005, issued by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 88160, are REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The pertinent portions of the Order dated April 15, 2004 issued by the
Regional Trial Court, convicting Domingo Landicho of the crime of Homicide and
acquitting Armando de Grano and Joven de Grano, are ANNULLED and DELETED. In all
other aspects, the Order stands.
To the extent herein altered or modified, the pertinent portions of the Decision dated April
25, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court are REINSTATED.
The Office of the Court Administrator is DIRECTED to INVESTIGATE Judge Teresa P.
Soriaso for possible violation/s of the law and/or the Code of Judicial Conduct in issuing
the Order dated April 15, 2004 in Criminal Case No. 93-129988. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 172716
November 17, 2010
IVLER vs. HON. MARIA ROWENA MODESTO-SAN PEDRO, Judge of the
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 71, Pasig City, and EVANGELINE PONCE
The Case
The petition seeks the review1 of the Orders2 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City
affirming sub-silencio a lower courts ruling finding inapplicable the Double Jeopardy
Clause to bar a second prosecution for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and
Damage to Property. This, despite the accuseds previous conviction for Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries arising from the same incident grounding
the second prosecution.
The Facts
Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler (petitioner) was
charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 71 (MeTC), with two
separate offenses: (1) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries
(Criminal Case No. 82367) for injuries sustained by respondent Evangeline L. Ponce
(respondent Ponce); and (2) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage
to Property (Criminal Case No. 82366) for the death of respondent Ponces husband
Nestor C. Ponce and damage to the spouses Ponces vehicle. Petitioner posted bail for
his temporary release in both cases.
On 7 September 2004, petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge in Criminal Case No.
82367 and was meted out the penalty of public censure. Invoking this conviction,

petitioner moved to quash the Information in Criminal Case No. 82366 for placing him in
jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense of reckless imprudence.
The MeTC refused quashal, finding no identity of offenses in the two cases. 3
After unsuccessfully seeking reconsideration, petitioner elevated the matter to the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 157 (RTC), in a petition for certiorari (S.C.A.
No. 2803). Meanwhile, petitioner sought from the MeTC the suspension of proceedings
in Criminal Case No. 82366, including the arraignment on 17 May 2005, invoking S.C.A.
No. 2803 as a prejudicial question. Without acting on petitioners motion, the MeTC
proceeded with the arraignment and, because of petitioners absence, cancelled his bail
and ordered his arrest.4 Seven days later, the MeTC issued a resolution denying
petitioners motion to suspend proceedings and postponing his arraignment until after his
arrest.5 Petitioner sought reconsideration but as of the filing of this petition, the motion
remained unresolved.
Relying on the arrest order against petitioner, respondent Ponce sought in the RTC the
dismissal of S.C.A. No. 2803 for petitioners loss of standing to maintain the suit.
Petitioner contested the motion.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
In an Order dated 2 February 2006, the RTC dismissed S.C.A. No. 2803, narrowly
grounding its ruling on petitioners forfeiture of standing to maintain S.C.A. No. 2803
arising from the MeTCs order to arrest petitioner for his non-appearance at the
arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366. Thus, without reaching the merits of S.C.A. No.
2803, the RTC effectively affirmed the MeTC. Petitioner sought reconsideration but this
proved unavailing.6
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner denies absconding. He explains that his petition in S.C.A. No. 2803
constrained him to forego participation in the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366.
Petitioner distinguishes his case from the line of jurisprudence sanctioning dismissal of
appeals for absconding appellants because his appeal before the RTC was a special civil
action seeking a pre-trial relief, not a post-trial appeal of a judgment of conviction. 7
Petitioner laments the RTCs failure to reach the merits of his petition in S.C.A. 2803.
Invoking jurisprudence, petitioner argues that his constitutional right not to be placed
twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense bars his prosecution in Criminal

31
Case No. 82366, having been previously convicted in Criminal Case No. 82367 for the
same offense of reckless imprudence charged in Criminal Case No. 82366. Petitioner
submits that the multiple consequences of such crime are material only to determine his
penalty.

authorizing this Court or the Court of Appeals to "also, upon motion of the appellee or
motu proprio, dismiss the appeal if the appellant escapes from prison or confinement,
jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during the pendency of the appeal." The "appeal"
contemplated in Section 8 of Rule 124 is a suit to review judgments of convictions.

Respondent Ponce finds no reason for the Court to disturb the RTCs decision forfeiting
petitioners standing to maintain his petition in S.C.A. 2803. On the merits, respondent
Ponce calls the Courts attention to jurisprudence holding that light offenses (e.g. slight
physical injuries) cannot be complexed under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code with
grave or less grave felonies (e.g. homicide). Hence, the prosecution was obliged to
separate the charge in Criminal Case No. 82366 for the slight physical injuries from
Criminal Case No. 82367 for the homicide and damage to property.

The RTCs dismissal of petitioners special civil action for certiorari to review a prearraignment ancillary question on the applicability of the Due Process Clause to bar
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366 finds no basis under procedural rules and
jurisprudence. The RTCs reliance on People v. Esparas9 undercuts the cogency of its
ruling because Esparas stands for a proposition contrary to the RTCs ruling. There, the
Court granted review to an appeal by an accused who was sentenced to death for
importing prohibited drugs even though she jumped bail pending trial and was thus tried
and convicted in absentia. The Court in Esparas treated the mandatory review of death
sentences under Republic Act No. 7659 as an exception to Section 8 of Rule 124. 10

In the Resolution of 6 June 2007, we granted the Office of the Solicitor Generals motion
not to file a comment to the petition as the public respondent judge is merely a nominal
party and private respondent is represented by counsel.
The Issues
Two questions are presented for resolution: (1) whether petitioner forfeited his standing
to seek relief in S.C.A. 2803 when the MeTC ordered his arrest following his nonappearance at the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366; and (2) if in the negative,
whether petitioners constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause bars further
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366.
The Ruling of the Court
We hold that (1) petitioners non-appearance at the arraignment in Criminal Case No.
82366 did not divest him of personality to maintain the petition in S.C.A. 2803; and (2)
the protection afforded by the Constitution shielding petitioner from prosecutions placing
him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense bars further proceedings in
Criminal Case No. 82366.
Petitioners Non-appearance at the Arraignment in
Criminal Case No. 82366 did not Divest him of Standing
to Maintain the Petition in S.C.A. 2803
Dismissals of appeals grounded on the appellants escape from custody or violation of
the terms of his bail bond are governed by the second paragraph of Section 8, Rule
124,8 in relation to Section 1, Rule 125, of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure

The mischief in the RTCs treatment of petitioners non-appearance at his arraignment in

Criminal Case No. 82366 as proof of his loss of standing becomes more evident when
one considers the Rules of Courts treatment of a defendant who absents himself from
post-arraignment hearings. Under Section 21, Rule 11411 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, the defendants absence merely renders his bondsman potentially
liable on its bond (subject to cancellation should the bondsman fail to produce the
accused within 30 days); the defendant retains his standing and, should he fail to
surrender, will be tried in absentia and could be convicted or acquitted. Indeed, the 30day period granted to the bondsman to produce the accused underscores the fact that
mere non-appearance does not ipso facto convert the accuseds status to that of a
fugitive without standing.
Further, the RTCs observation that petitioner provided "no explanation why he failed to
attend the scheduled proceeding"12 at the MeTC is belied by the records. Days before the
arraignment, petitioner sought the suspension of the MeTCs proceedings in Criminal
Case No. 82366 in light of his petition with the RTC in S.C.A. No. 2803. Following the
MeTCs refusal to defer arraignment (the order for which was released days after the
MeTC ordered petitioners arrest), petitioner sought reconsideration. His motion
remained unresolved as of the filing of this petition.
Petitioners Conviction in Criminal Case No. 82367
Bars his Prosecution in Criminal Case No. 82366
The accuseds negative constitutional right not to be "twice put in jeopardy of punishment
for the same offense"13protects him from, among others, post-conviction prosecution for

32
the same offense, with the prior verdict rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction
upon a valid information.14 It is not disputed that petitioners conviction in Criminal Case
No. 82367 was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid charge. Thus,
the case turns on the question whether Criminal Case No. 82366 and Criminal Case No.
82367 involve the "same offense." Petitioner adopts the affirmative view, submitting that
the two cases concern the same offense of reckless imprudence. The MeTC ruled
otherwise, finding that Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries is an
entirely separate offense from Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage
to Property "as the [latter] requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not." 15
We find for petitioner.
Reckless Imprudence is a Single Crime,
its Consequences on Persons and
Property are Material Only to Determine
the Penalty
The two charges against petitioner, arising from the same facts, were prosecuted under
the same provision of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, namely, Article 365 defining
and penalizing quasi-offenses. The text of the provision reads:
Imprudence and negligence. Any person who, by reckless imprudence, shall commit
any act which, had it been intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the
penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its medium
period; if it would have constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its
minimum and medium periods shall be imposed; if it would have constituted a light
felony, the penalty of arresto menor in its maximum period shall be imposed.
Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which would
otherwise constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its
medium and maximum periods; if it would have constituted a less serious felony, the
penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed.
When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted in damage
to the property of another, the offender shall be punished by a fine ranging from an
amount equal to the value of said damages to three times such value, but which shall in
no case be less than twenty-five pesos.

A fine not exceeding two hundred pesos and censure shall be imposed upon any person
who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall cause some wrong which, if done
maliciously, would have constituted a light felony.
In the imposition of these penalties, the court shall exercise their sound discretion,
without regard to the rules prescribed in Article sixty-four.
The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable:
1. When the penalty provided for the offense is equal to or lower than those
provided in the first two paragraphs of this article, in which case the court shall
impose the penalty next lower in degree than that which should be imposed in
the period which they may deem proper to apply.
2. When, by imprudence or negligence and with violation of the Automobile Law,
to death of a person shall be caused, in which case the defendant shall be
punished by prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods.
Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but without malice, doing or failing to do an
act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on
the part of the person performing or failing to perform such act, taking into consideration
his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition and other
circumstances regarding persons, time and place.
Simple imprudence consists in the lack of precaution displayed in those cases in which
the damage impending to be caused is not immediate nor the danger clearly manifest.
The penalty next higher in degree to those provided for in this article shall be imposed
upon the offender who fails to lend on the spot to the injured parties such help as may be
in this hand to give.
Structurally, these nine paragraphs are collapsible into four sub-groupings relating to (1)
the penalties attached to the quasi-offenses of "imprudence" and "negligence"
(paragraphs 1-2); (2) a modified penalty scheme for either or both quasi-offenses
(paragraphs 3-4, 6 and 9); (3) a generic rule for trial courts in imposing penalties
(paragraph 5); and (4) the definition of "reckless imprudence" and "simple imprudence"
(paragraphs 7-8). Conceptually, quasi-offenses penalize "the mental attitude or condition
behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the imprudencia
punible,"16 unlike willful offenses which punish the intentional criminal act. These
structural and conceptual features of quasi-offenses set them apart from the mass of

33
intentional crimes under the first 13 Titles of Book II of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended.
Indeed, the notion that quasi-offenses, whether reckless or simple, are distinct species of
crime, separately defined and penalized under the framework of our penal laws, is
nothing new. As early as the middle of the last century, we already sought to bring clarity
to this field by rejecting in Quizon v. Justice of the Peace of Pampanga the proposition
that "reckless imprudence is not a crime in itself but simply a way of committing it x x
x"17 on three points of analysis: (1) the object of punishment in quasi-crimes (as opposed
to intentional crimes); (2) the legislative intent to treat quasi-crimes as distinct offenses
(as opposed to subsuming them under the mitigating circumstance of minimal intent)
and; (3) the different penalty structures for quasi-crimes and intentional crimes:
The proposition (inferred from Art. 3 of the Revised Penal Code) that "reckless
imprudence" is not a crime in itself but simply a way of committing it and merely
determines a lower degree of criminal liability is too broad to deserve unqualified assent.
There are crimes that by their structure cannot be committed through imprudence:
murder, treason, robbery, malicious mischief, etc. In truth, criminal negligence in our
Revised Penal Code is treated as a mere quasi offense, and dealt with separately from
willful offenses. It is not a mere question of classification or terminology. In intentional
crimes, the act itself is punished; in negligence or imprudence, what is principally
penalized is the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerous recklessness,
lack of care or foresight, the imprudencia punible. x x x x
Were criminal negligence but a modality in the commission of felonies, operating only to
reduce the penalty therefor, then it would be absorbed in the mitigating circumstances of
Art. 13, specially the lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as the one actually
committed. Furthermore, the theory would require that the corresponding penalty should
be fixed in proportion to the penalty prescribed for each crime when committed willfully.
For each penalty for the willful offense, there would then be a corresponding penalty for
the negligent variety. But instead, our Revised Penal Code (Art. 365) fixes the penalty for
reckless imprudence at arresto mayor maximum, to prision correccional [medium], if the
willful act would constitute a grave felony, notwithstanding that the penalty for the latter
could range all the way from prision mayor to death, according to the case. It can be
seen that the actual penalty for criminal negligence bears no relation to the individual
willful crime, but is set in relation to a whole class, or series, of crimes. 18 (Emphasis
supplied)
This explains why the technically correct way to allege quasi-crimes is to state that their
commission results in damage, either to person or property.19

Accordingly, we found the Justice of the Peace in Quizon without jurisdiction to hear a
case for "Damage to Property through Reckless Imprudence," its jurisdiction being
limited to trying charges for Malicious Mischief, an intentional crime conceptually
incompatible with the element of imprudence obtaining in quasi-crimes.
Quizon, rooted in Spanish law20 (the normative ancestry of our present day penal code)
and since repeatedly reiterated,21 stands on solid conceptual foundation. The contrary
doctrinal pronouncement in People v. Faller22that "[r]eckless impudence is not a crime in
itself x x x [but] simply a way of committing it x x x,"23 has long been abandoned when the
Court en banc promulgated Quizon in 1955 nearly two decades after the Court decided
Faller in 1939. Quizon rejected Fallers conceptualization of quasi-crimes by holding that
quasi-crimes under Article 365 are distinct species of crimes and not merely methods of
committing crimes. Faller found expression in post-Quizon jurisprudence 24 only by dint of
lingering doctrinal confusion arising from an indiscriminate fusion of criminal law rules
defining Article 365 crimes and the complexing of intentional crimes under Article 48 of
the Revised Penal Code which, as will be shown shortly, rests on erroneous conception
of quasi-crimes. Indeed, the Quizonian conception of quasi-crimes undergirded a related
branch of jurisprudence applying the Double Jeopardy Clause to quasi-offenses, barring
second prosecutions for a quasi-offense alleging one resulting act after a prior conviction
or acquittal of a quasi-offense alleging another resulting act but arising from the same
reckless act or omission upon which the second prosecution was based.
Prior Conviction or Acquittal of
Reckless Imprudence Bars
Subsequent Prosecution for the Same
Quasi-Offense
The doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a single quasi-offense by itself
and not merely a means to commit other crimes such that conviction or acquittal of such
quasi-offense bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless of its
various resulting acts, undergirded this Courts unbroken chain of jurisprudence on
double jeopardy as applied to Article 365 starting with People v. Diaz,25 decided in 1954.
There, a full Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Montemayor, ordered the dismissal of a
case for "damage to property thru reckless imprudence" because a prior case against the
same accused for "reckless driving," arising from the same act upon which the first
prosecution was based, had been dismissed earlier. Since then, whenever the same
legal question was brought before the Court, that is, whether prior conviction or acquittal
of reckless imprudence bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense,
regardless of the consequences alleged for both charges, the Court unfailingly and
consistently answered in the affirmative in People v. Belga26 (promulgated in 1957 by the

34
Court en banc, per Reyes, J.), Yap v. Lutero27 (promulgated in 1959, unreported, per
Concepcion, J.), People v. Narvas28 (promulgated in 1960 by the Court en banc, per
Bengzon J.), People v. Silva29 (promulgated in 1962 by the Court en banc, per Paredes,
J.), People v. Macabuhay30 (promulgated in 1966 by the Court en banc, per Makalintal,
J.), People v. Buan31 (promulgated in 1968 by the Court en banc, per Reyes, J.B.L.,
acting C. J.), Buerano v. Court of Appeals32 (promulgated in 1982 by the Court en banc,
per Relova, J.), and People v. City Court of Manila33 (promulgated in 1983 by the First
Division, per Relova, J.). These cases uniformly barred the second prosecutions as
constitutionally impermissible under the Double Jeopardy Clause.

imprudence" despite his prior conviction for "slight and less serious physical injuries thru
reckless imprudence," arising from the same act upon which the second charge was
based. The Court of Appeals had relied on Estipona. We reversed on the strength of
Buan:38

The reason for this consistent stance of extending the constitutional protection under the
Double Jeopardy Clause to quasi-offenses was best articulated by Mr. Justice J.B.L.
Reyes in Buan, where, in barring a subsequent prosecution for "serious physical injuries
and damage to property thru reckless imprudence" because of the accuseds prior
acquittal of "slight physical injuries thru reckless imprudence," with both charges
grounded on the same act, the Court explained:34

Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or acquitted of a specific act
of reckless imprudence, the accused may not be prosecuted again for that same act. For
the essence of the quasi offense of criminal negligence under Article 365 of the Revised
Penal Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally
done, would be punishable as a felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless
act, not the result thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to
determine the penalty, it does not qualify the substance of the offense. And, as the
careless act is single, whether the injurious result should affect one person or several
persons, the offense (criminal negligence) remains one and the same, and can not be
split into different crimes and prosecutions.

Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or acquitted of a specific act
of reckless imprudence, the accused may not be prosecuted again for that same act. For
the essence of the quasi offense of criminal negligence under article 365 of the Revised
Penal Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally
done, would be punishable as a felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless
act, not the result thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to
determine the penalty, it does not qualify the substance of the offense. And, as the
careless act is single, whether the injurious result should affect one person or several
persons, the offense (criminal negligence) remains one and the same, and can not be
split into different crimes and prosecutions.35 x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Evidently, the Diaz line of jurisprudence on double jeopardy merely extended to its logical
conclusion the reasoning of Quizon.
There is in our jurisprudence only one ruling going against this unbroken line of authority.
Preceding Diaz by more than a decade, El Pueblo de Filipinas v. Estipona, 36 decided by
the pre-war colonial Court in November 1940, allowed the subsequent prosecution of an
accused for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property despite his previous
conviction for multiple physical injuries arising from the same reckless operation of a
motor vehicle upon which the second prosecution was based. Estiponas inconsistency
with the post-war Diaz chain of jurisprudence suffices to impliedly overrule it. At any rate,
all doubts on this matter were laid to rest in 1982 in Buerano. 37 There, we reviewed the
Court of Appeals conviction of an accused for "damage to property for reckless

Th[e] view of the Court of Appeals was inspired by the ruling of this Court in the pre-war
case of People vs. Estipona decided on November 14, 1940. However, in the case of
People vs. Buan, 22 SCRA 1383 (March 29, 1968), this Court, speaking thru Justice J. B.
L. Reyes, held that

xxxx
. . . the exoneration of this appellant, Jose Buan, by the Justice of the Peace (now
Municipal) Court of Guiguinto, Bulacan, of the charge of slight physical injuries through
reckless imprudence, prevents his being prosecuted for serious physical injuries through
reckless imprudence in the Court of First Instance of the province, where both charges
are derived from the consequences of one and the same vehicular accident, because the
second accusation places the appellant in second jeopardy for the same
offense.39 (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, for all intents and purposes, Buerano had effectively overruled Estipona.
It is noteworthy that the Solicitor General in Buerano, in a reversal of his earlier stance in
Silva, joined causes with the accused, a fact which did not escape the Courts attention:
Then Solicitor General, now Justice Felix V. Makasiar, in his MANIFESTATION dated
December 12, 1969 (page 82 of the Rollo) admits that the Court of Appeals erred in not
sustaining petitioners plea of double jeopardy and submits that "its affirmatory decision
dated January 28, 1969, in Criminal Case No. 05123-CR finding petitioner guilty of

35
damage to property through reckless imprudence should be set aside, without costs." He
stressed that "if double jeopardy exists where the reckless act resulted into homicide and
physical injuries. then the same consequence must perforce follow where the same
reckless act caused merely damage to property-not death-and physical injuries. Verily,
the value of a human life lost as a result of a vehicular collision cannot be equated with
any amount of damages caused to a motors vehicle arising from the same
mishap."40 (Emphasis supplied)
Hence, we find merit in petitioners submission that the lower courts erred in refusing to
extend in his favor the mantle of protection afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clause. A
more fitting jurisprudence could not be tailored to petitioners case than People v.
Silva, 41 a Diaz progeny. There, the accused, who was also involved in a vehicular
collision, was charged in two separate Informations with "Slight Physical Injuries thru
Reckless Imprudence" and "Homicide with Serious Physical Injuries thru Reckless
Imprudence." Following his acquittal of the former, the accused sought the quashal of the
latter, invoking the Double Jeopardy Clause. The trial court initially denied relief, but, on
reconsideration, found merit in the accuseds claim and dismissed the second case. In
affirming the trial court, we quoted with approval its analysis of the issue following Diaz
and its progeny People v. Belga:42
On June 26, 1959, the lower court reconsidered its Order of May 2, 1959 and dismissed
the case, holding:
[T]he Court believes that the case falls squarely within the doctrine of double jeopardy
enunciated in People v. Belga, x x x In the case cited, Ciriaco Belga and Jose Belga
were charged in the Justice of the Peace Court of Malilipot, Albay, with the crime of
physical injuries through reckless imprudence arising from a collision between the two
automobiles driven by them (Crim. Case No. 88). Without the aforesaid complaint having
been dismissed or otherwise disposed of, two other criminal complaints were filed in the
same justice of the peace court, in connection with the same collision one for damage to
property through reckless imprudence (Crim. Case No. 95) signed by the owner of one of
the vehicles involved in the collision, and another for multiple physical injuries through
reckless imprudence (Crim. Case No. 96) signed by the passengers injured in the
accident. Both of these two complaints were filed against Jose Belga only. After trial, both
defendants were acquitted of the charge against them in Crim. Case No. 88. Following
his acquittal, Jose Belga moved to quash the complaint for multiple physical injuries
through reckless imprudence filed against him by the injured passengers, contending
that the case was just a duplication of the one filed by the Chief of Police wherein he had
just been acquitted. The motion to quash was denied and after trial Jose Belga was
convicted, whereupon he appealed to the Court of First Instance of Albay. In the

meantime, the case for damage to property through reckless imprudence filed by one of
the owners of the vehicles involved in the collision had been remanded to the Court of
First Instance of Albay after Jose Belga had waived the second stage of the preliminary
investigation. After such remand, the Provincial Fiscal filed in the Court of First Instance
two informations against Jose Belga, one for physical injuries through reckless
imprudence, and another for damage to property through reckless imprudence. Both
cases were dismissed by the Court of First Instance, upon motion of the defendant Jose
Belga who alleged double jeopardy in a motion to quash. On appeal by the Prov. Fiscal,
the order of dismissal was affirmed by the Supreme Court in the following language: .
The question for determination is whether the acquittal of Jose Belga in the case filed by
the chief of police constitutes a bar to his subsequent prosecution for multiple physical
injuries and damage to property through reckless imprudence.
In the case of Peo[ple] v. F. Diaz, G. R. No. L-6518, prom. March 30, 1954, the accused
was charged in the municipal court of Pasay City with reckless driving under sec. 52 of
the Revised Motor Vehicle Law, for having driven an automobile in a fast and reckless
manner ... thereby causing an accident. After the accused had pleaded not guilty the
case was dismissed in that court for failure of the Government to prosecute. But some
time thereafter the city attorney filed an information in the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
charging the same accused with damage to property thru reckless imprudence. The
amount of the damage was alleged to be P249.50. Pleading double jeopardy, the
accused filed a motion, and on appeal by the Government we affirmed the ruling. Among
other things we there said through Mr. Justice Montemayor
The next question to determine is the relation between the first offense of violation of the
Motor Vehicle Law prosecuted before the Pasay City Municipal Court and the offense of
damage to property thru reckless imprudence charged in the Rizal Court of First
Instance. One of the tests of double jeopardy is whether or not the second offense
charged necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the
former complaint or information (Rule 113, Sec. 9). Another test is whether the evidence
which proves one would prove the other that is to say whether the facts alleged in the
first charge if proven, would have been sufficient to support the second charge and vice
versa; or whether one crime is an ingredient of the other. x x x
xxxx
The foregoing language of the Supreme Court also disposes of the contention of the
prosecuting attorney that the charge for slight physical injuries through reckless
imprudence could not have been joined with the charge for homicide with serious

36
physical injuries through reckless imprudence in this case, in view of the provisions of
Art. 48 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. The prosecutions contention might be
true. But neither was the prosecution obliged to first prosecute the accused for slight
physical injuries through reckless imprudence before pressing the more serious charge
of homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence. Having first
prosecuted the defendant for the lesser offense in the Justice of the Peace Court of
Meycauayan, Bulacan, which acquitted the defendant, the prosecuting attorney is not
now in a position to press in this case the more serious charge of homicide with serious
physical injuries through reckless imprudence which arose out of the same alleged
reckless imprudence of which the defendant have been previously cleared by the inferior
court.43
Significantly, the Solicitor General had urged us in Silva to reexamine Belga (and hence,
Diaz) "for the purpose of delimiting or clarifying its application."44 We declined the
invitation, thus:
The State in its appeal claims that the lower court erred in dismissing the case, on the
ground of double jeopardy, upon the basis of the acquittal of the accused in the JP court
for Slight Physical Injuries, thru Reckless Imprudence. In the same breath said State,
thru the Solicitor General, admits that the facts of the case at bar, fall squarely on the
ruling of the Belga case x x x, upon which the order of dismissal of the lower court was
anchored. The Solicitor General, however, urges a re-examination of said ruling, upon
certain considerations for the purpose of delimiting or clarifying its application. We find,
nevertheless, that further elucidation or disquisition on the ruling in the Belga case, the
facts of which are analogous or similar to those in the present case, will yield no practical
advantage to the government. On one hand, there is nothing which would warrant a
delimitation or clarification of the applicability of the Belga case. It was clear. On the
other, this Court has reiterated the views expressed in the Belga case, in the identical
case of Yap v. Hon. Lutero, etc., L-12669, April 30, 1959.45 (Emphasis supplied)
Article 48 Does not Apply to Acts Penalized
Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code
The confusion bedeviling the question posed in this petition, to which the MeTC
succumbed, stems from persistent but awkward attempts to harmonize conceptually
incompatible substantive and procedural rules in criminal law, namely, Article 365
defining and penalizing quasi-offenses and Article 48 on complexing of crimes, both
under the Revised Penal Code. Article 48 is a procedural device allowing single
prosecution of multiple felonies falling under either of two categories: (1) when a single
act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies (thus excluding from its

operation light felonies46); and (2) when an offense is a necessary means for committing
the other. The legislature crafted this procedural tool to benefit the accused who, in lieu
of serving multiple penalties, will only serve the maximum of the penalty for the most
serious crime.
In contrast, Article 365 is a substantive rule penalizing not an act defined as a felony but
"the mental attitude x x x behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or
foresight x x x,"47 a single mental attitude regardless of the resulting consequences.
Thus, Article 365 was crafted as one quasi-crime resulting in one or more consequences.
Ordinarily, these two provisions will operate smoothly. Article 48 works to combine in a
single prosecution multiple intentional crimes falling under Titles 1-13, Book II of the
Revised Penal Code, when proper; Article 365 governs the prosecution of imprudent acts
and their consequences. However, the complexities of human interaction can produce a
hybrid quasi-offense not falling under either models that of a single criminal negligence
resulting in multiple non-crime damages to persons and property with varying penalties
corresponding to light, less grave or grave offenses. The ensuing prosecutorial dilemma
is obvious: how should such a quasi-crime be prosecuted? Should Article 48s framework
apply to "complex" the single quasi-offense with its multiple (non-criminal) consequences
(excluding those amounting to light offenses which will be tried separately)? Or should
the prosecution proceed under a single charge, collectively alleging all the consequences
of the single quasi-crime, to be penalized separately following the scheme of penalties
under Article 365?
Jurisprudence adopts both approaches. Thus, one line of rulings (none of which involved
the issue of double jeopardy) applied Article 48 by "complexing" one quasi-crime with its
multiple consequences48 unless one consequence amounts to a light felony, in which
case charges were split by grouping, on the one hand, resulting acts amounting to grave
or less grave felonies and filing the charge with the second level courts and, on the other
hand, resulting acts amounting to light felonies and filing the charge with the first level
courts.49 Expectedly, this is the approach the MeTC impliedly sanctioned (and respondent
Ponce invokes), even though under Republic Act No. 7691,50 the MeTC has now
exclusive original jurisdiction to impose the most serious penalty under Article 365 which
is prision correccional in its medium period.
Under this approach, the issue of double jeopardy will not arise if the "complexing" of
acts penalized under Article 365 involves only resulting acts penalized as grave or less
grave felonies because there will be a single prosecution of all the resulting acts. The
issue of double jeopardy arises if one of the resulting acts is penalized as a light offense
and the other acts are penalized as grave or less grave offenses, in which case Article 48

37
is not deemed to apply and the act penalized as a light offense is tried separately from
the resulting acts penalized as grave or less grave offenses.
The second jurisprudential path nixes Article 48 and sanctions a single prosecution of all
the effects of the quasi-crime collectively alleged in one charge, regardless of their
number or severity,51 penalizing each consequence separately. Thus, in Angeles v.
Jose,52 we interpreted paragraph three of Article 365, in relation to a charge alleging
"reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property and less serious physical injuries,"
as follows:
[T]he third paragraph of said article, x x x reads as follows:
When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted in damage
to the property of another, the offender shall be punished by a fine ranging from an
amount equal to the value of said damage to three times such value, but which shall in
no case be less than 25 pesos.
The above-quoted provision simply means that if there is only damage to property the
amount fixed therein shall be imposed, but if there are also physical injuries there should
be an additional penalty for the latter. The information cannot be split into two; one for
the physical injuries, and another for the damage to property, x x x. 53(Emphasis supplied)
By "additional penalty," the Court meant, logically, the penalty scheme under Article 365.
Evidently, these approaches, while parallel, are irreconcilable. Coherence in this field
demands choosing one framework over the other. Either (1) we allow the "complexing" of
a single quasi-crime by breaking its resulting acts into separate offenses (except for light
felonies), thus re-conceptualize a quasi-crime, abandon its present framing under Article
365, discard its conception under the Quizon and Diaz lines of cases, and treat the
multiple consequences of a quasi-crime as separate intentional felonies defined under
Titles 1-13, Book II under the penal code; or (2) we forbid the application of Article 48 in
the prosecution and sentencing of quasi-crimes, require single prosecution of all the
resulting acts regardless of their number and severity, separately penalize each as
provided in Article 365, and thus maintain the distinct concept of quasi-crimes as crafted
under Article 365, articulated in Quizon and applied to double jeopardy adjudication in
the Diaz line of cases.
1avvphi1

A becoming regard of this Courts place in our scheme of government denying it the
power to make laws constrains us to keep inviolate the conceptual distinction between
quasi-crimes and intentional felonies under our penal code. Article 48 is incongruent to

the notion of quasi-crimes under Article 365. It is conceptually impossible for a quasioffense to stand for (1) a single act constituting two or more grave or less grave felonies;
or (2) anoffense which is a necessary means for committing another. This is why, way
back in 1968 in Buan, we rejected the Solicitor Generals argument that double jeopardy
does not bar a second prosecution for slight physical injuries through reckless
imprudence allegedly because the charge for that offense could not be joined with the
other charge for serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence following Article
48 of the Revised Penal Code:
The Solicitor General stresses in his brief that the charge for slight physical injuries
through reckless imprudence could not be joined with the accusation for serious physical
injuries through reckless imprudence, because Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code
allows only the complexing of grave or less grave felonies. This same argument was
considered and rejected by this Court in the case of People vs. [Silva] x x x:
[T]he prosecutions contention might be true. But neither was the prosecution obliged to
first prosecute the accused for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence
before pressing the more serious charge of homicide with serious physical injuries
through reckless imprudence. Having first prosecuted the defendant for the lesser
offense in the Justice of the Peace Court of Meycauayan, Bulacan, which acquitted the
defendant, the prosecuting attorney is not now in a position to press in this case the
more serious charge of homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence which arose out of the same alleged reckless imprudence of which the
defendant has been previously cleared by the inferior court.
[W]e must perforce rule that the exoneration of this appellant x x x by the Justice of the
Peace x x x of the charge of slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence,
prevents his being prosecuted for serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence
in the Court of First Instance of the province, where both charges are derived from the
consequences of one and the same vehicular accident, because the second accusation
places the appellant in second jeopardy for the same offense.54 (Emphasis supplied)
Indeed, this is a constitutionally compelled choice. By prohibiting the splitting of charges
under Article 365, irrespective of the number and severity of the resulting acts, rampant
occasions of constitutionally impermissible second prosecutions are avoided, not to
mention that scarce state resources are conserved and diverted to proper use.
Hence, we hold that prosecutions under Article 365 should proceed from a single charge
regardless of the number or severity of the consequences. In imposing penalties, the
judge will do no more than apply the penalties under Article 365 for each consequence

38
alleged and proven. In short, there shall be no splitting of charges under Article 365, and
only one information shall be filed in the same first level court. 55
Our ruling today secures for the accused facing an Article 365 charge a stronger and
simpler protection of their constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause. True,
they are thereby denied the beneficent effect of the favorable sentencing formula under
Article 48, but any disadvantage thus caused is more than compensated by the certainty
of non-prosecution for quasi-crime effects qualifying as "light offenses" (or, as here, for
the more serious consequence prosecuted belatedly). If it is so minded, Congress can
re-craft Article 365 by extending to quasi-crimes the sentencing formula of Article 48 so
that only the most severe penalty shall be imposed under a single prosecution of all
resulting acts, whether penalized as grave, less grave or light offenses. This will still keep
intact the distinct concept of quasi-offenses. Meanwhile, the lenient schedule of penalties
under Article 365, befitting crimes occupying a lower rung of culpability, should cushion
the effect of this ruling.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We REVERSE the Orders dated 2 February
2006 and 2 May 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 157.
We DISMISS the Information in Criminal Case No. 82366 against petitioner Jason Ivler y
Aguilar pending with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 71 on the ground
of double jeopardy.
Let a copy of this ruling be served on the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the
House of Representatives. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 195032
February 20, 2013
BRAZA vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
This is a petition for certiorari filed by petitioner Isabelo Braza (Braza) seeking to reverse
and set aside the October 12, 2009 Resolution 1 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case
No. SB-08-CRM-0275, entitled People v. Robert G.Lala, et al., as well as its October 22,
2010 Resolution,2 denying his motion for reconsideration.

The Philippines was assigned the hosting rights for the 12th Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN)Leaders Summit scheduled in December 2006. In preparation for
this international diplomatic event with the province of Cebu as the designated venue,
the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) identified projects relative to the
improvement and rehabilitation of roads and installation of traffic safety devices and
lighting facilities. The then Acting Secretary of the DPWH, Hermogenes E. Ebdane,
approved the resort to alternative modes of procurement for the implementation of these
projects due to the proximity of the ASEAN Summit.
One of the ASEAN Summit-related projects to be undertaken was the installation of
street lighting systems along the perimeters of the Cebu International Convention Center
in Mandaue City and the ceremonial routes of the Summit to upgrade the appearance of
the convention areas and to improve night-time visibility for security purposes. Four (4)
out of eleven (11) street lighting projects were awarded to FABMIK Construction and
Equipment Supply Company, Inc. (FABMIK) and these were covered by Contract I.D.
Nos. 06H0021, 06H00049, 06H00050, and 06H00052. Contract I.D. No. 06H00050, the
subject transaction of this case, involved the supply and installation of street lighting
facilities along the stretch of Mandaue-Mactan Bridge 1 to Punta Engao Section in
Lapu-Lapu City, with an estimated project cost of P83,950,000.00.
With the exception of the street lighting project covered by Contract I.D. No. 06H0021,
the three other projects were bidded out only on November 28, 2006 or less than two (2)
weeks before the scheduled start of the Summit. Thereafter, the DPWH and FABMIK
executed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) whereby FABMIK obliged itself to
implement the projects at its own expense and the DPWH to guarantee the payment of
the work accomplished. FABMIK was able to complete the projects within the deadline of
ten (10) days utilizing its own resources and credit facilities. The schedule of the
international event, however, was moved by the national organizers to January 9-15,
2007 due to typhoon Seniang which struck Cebu for several days.
After the summit, a letter-complaint was filed before the Public Assistance and Corruption
Prevention Office(PACPO), Ombudsman Visayas, alleging that the ASEAN Summit
street lighting projects were overpriced. A panel composing of three investigators
conducted a fact-finding investigation to determine the veracity of the accusation. Braza,
being the president of FABMIK, was impleaded as one of the respondents. On March 16,
2007, the Ombudsman directed the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) and
the DPWH to cease and desist from releasing or disbursing funds for the projects in
question.3

39
On March 23, 2007, the fact-finding body issued its Evaluation Report 4 recommending
the filing of charges for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practice Act, against the DPWH officials
and employees in Region VII and the cities of Mandaue and Lapu-lapu, and private
contractors FABMIK and GAMPIK Construction and Development, Inc. (GAMPIK). This
report was filed before the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas (OMBVisayas) for the
conduct of a preliminary investigation and was docketed therein as OMB-V-C-07-124-C,
entitled PACPO-OMB-Visayas v. Lala, et. al.
After the preliminary investigation, the OMB-Visayas issued its Resolution, 5 dated
January 24, 2008, finding probable cause to indict the concerned respondents for
violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019. It was found that the lampposts and other
lighting facilities installed were indeed highly overpriced after a comparison of the costs
of the materials indicated in the Program of Works and Estimates (POWE) with those in
the Bureau of Customs(BOC) documents; and that the contracts entered into between
the government officials and the private contractors were manifestly and grossly
disadvantageous to the government.
Subsequently, the OMB-Visayas filed several informations before the Sandiganbayan for
violation of Sec. 3(g) of R.A. 3019 against the officials of DPWH Region VII, the officials
of the cities of Mandaue and Lapu-lapu and private contractors, FABMIK President Braza
and GAMPIK Board Chairman Gerardo S. Surla (Surla). The Information docketed as
SB-08- CRM-02756 (first information) which involved the street lighting project covered by
Contract I.D. No. 06H00050 with FABMIK, was raffled to the First Division of the
Sandiganbayan. It was alleged therein that Braza acted in conspiracy with the public
officials and employees in the commission of the crime charged.
On June 6, 2008, Braza was arraigned as a precondition to his authorization to travel
abroad. He entered a plea of "not guilty."

On August 14, 2008, the motions for reinvestigation filed by Arturo Radaza (Radaza), the
Mayor of Lapu-lapu City, and the DPWH officials were denied by the Sandiganbayan for
lack of merit. Consequently, they moved for the reconsideration of said resolution. 7 On
August 27, 2008, Braza filed a motion for reinvestigation8 anchored on the following
grounds: (1) the import documents relied upon by the OMB-Visayas were spurious and
falsified; (2) constituted new evidence, if considered, would overturn the finding of
probable cause; and (3) the finding of overpricing was bereft of factual and legal basis as
the same was not substantiated by any independent canvass of prevailing market prices
of the subject lampposts. He prayed for the suspension of the proceedings of the case
pending such reinvestigation. The Sandiganbayan treated Braza's motion as his motion
for reconsideration of its August 14, 2008 Resolution.
On November 13, 2008, Braza filed a manifestation9 to make of record that he was
maintaining his previous plea of "not guilty" without any condition.
During the proceedings held on November 3, 2008, the Sandiganbayan reconsidered its
August 14, 2008 resolution and directed a reinvestigation of the case. 10 According to the
anti-graft court, the allegations to the effect that no independent canvass was conducted
and that the charge of overpricing was based on falsified documents were serious
reasons enough to merit a reinvestigation of the case. The Sandiganbayan said that it
could be reasonably inferred from the July 30, 2008 Order of the Ombudsman in OMB-VC-07-0124-C that the latter would not object to the conduct of a reinvestigation of all the
cases against the accused.
Braza filed his Manifestation,11 dated February 2, 2009, informing the Sandiganbayan of
his intention to abandon his previous motion for reinvestigation. He opined that the
prosecution would merely use the reinvestigation proceedings as a means to engage in a
second unbridled fishing expedition to cure the lack of probable cause.
On March 23, 2009, Braza filed a motion12 in support of the abandonment of
reinvestigation with a plea to vacate Information, insisting that the further reinvestigation
of the case would only afford the prosecution a second round of preliminary investigation
which would be vexatious, oppressive and violative of his constitutional right to a speedy
disposition of his case, warranting its dismissal with prejudice.
After concluding its reinvestigation of the case, the OMB-Visayas issued its
Resolution,13 dated May 4, 2009,(Supplemental Resolution) which upheld the finding of
probable cause but modified the charge from violation of Sec. 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019 14 to
violation of Sec. 3(e)15 of the same law. Accordingly, the prosecution filed its
Manifestation and Motion to Admit Amended Information16 on May 8, 2009.

40
On July 1, 2009, Braza filed his Comment (to the motion to admit amended information)
with Plea for Discharge and/or Dismissal of the Case.17 He claimed that the first
information had been rendered ineffective or had been deemed vacated by the issuance
of the Supplemental Resolution and, hence, his discharge from the first information was
in order. By way of an alternative prayer, Braza sought the dismissal of the case with
prejudice claiming that his right to a speedy disposition of the case had been violated
and that the Supplemental Resolution failed to cure the fatal infirmities of the January 24,
2008 Resolution since proof to support the allegation of overpricing remained wanting.
Braza averred that he could not be arraigned under the second information without
violating the constitutional proscription against double jeopardy.
On October 12, 2009, the Sandiganbayan issued the first assailed resolution admitting
the Amended Information,18 dated May 4, 2009, (second Information) and denying
Braza's plea for dismissal of the criminal case. The Sandiganbayan ruled that Braza
would not be placed in double jeopardy should he be arraigned anew under the second
information because his previous arraignment was conditional. It continued that even if
he was regularly arraigned, double jeopardy would still not set in because the second
information charged an offense different from, and which did not include or was
necessarily included in, the original offense charged. Lastly, it found that the delay in the
reinvestigation proceedings could not be characterized as vexatious, capricious or
oppressive and that it could not be attributed to the prosecution. The dispositive portion
of the said resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion to Admit Attached Amended
Information filed by the prosecution is hereby GRANTED. The Amended Information
charging all the accused therein with violation of Sec. 3 (e) of R.A. 3019, being the
proper offense, is hereby ADMITTED.
Consequently, accused Braza's Alternative Relief for Dismissal of the Case is
hereby DENIED.
Let the arraignment of all the accused in the Amended Information be set on November
18, 2009, at 8:30 in the morning.
SO ORDERED.19
On November 6, 2009, Braza moved for reconsideration with alternative motion to quash
the information20reiterating his arguments that his right against double jeopardy and his
right to a speedy disposition of the case were violated warranting the dismissal of the
criminal case with prejudice. In the alternative, Braza moved for the quashal of the

second information vigorously asserting that the same was fatally defective for failure to
allege any actual, specified and quantifiable injury sustained by the government as
required by law for indictment under Sec. 3(e) of R.A. 3019, and that the charge of
overpricing was unfounded.
On October 22, 2010, the Sandiganbayan issued the second assailed resolution stating,
among others, the denial of Braza's Motion to Quash the information. The anti-graft court
ruled that the Amended Information was sufficient in substance as to inform the accused
of the nature and causes of accusations against them. Further, it held that the specifics
sought to be alleged in the Amended Information were evidentiary in nature which could
be properly presented during the trial on the merits. The Sandiganbayan also stated that
it was possible to establish the fact of overpricing if it would be proven that the contract
price was excessive compared to the price for which FABMIK purchased the street
lighting facilities from its supplier. Braza was effectively discharged from the first
Information upon the filing of the second Information but said discharge was without
prejudice to, and would not preclude, his prosecution for violation of Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No.
3019. It added that his right to speedy disposition of the case was not violated inasmuch
as the length of time spent for the proceedings was in compliance with the procedural
requirements of due process. The Sandiganbayan, however, deemed it proper that a
new preliminary investigation be conducted under the new charge. Accordingly, the
Sandiganbayan disposed:
WHEREFORE, in the light of all the foregoing, the separate omnibus motions of
accused-movant Radaza and accused-movants Bernido, Manggis and Ojeda, insofar as
the sought preliminary investigation is concerned isGRANTED.
Accordingly, this case is hereby remanded to the Office of the Ombudsman/Special
Prosecutor for preliminary investigation of violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019. The said
office/s are hereby ordered to complete the said preliminary investigation and to submit
to the Court the result of the said investigation within sixty (60) days from notice.
However, the Motion for Bill of Particulars of accusedmovants Lala, Dindin Alvizo,
Fernandez, Bagolor, Galang and Diano, the Motion for Quashal of Information of
accused-movants Bernido, Manggis and Ojeda, and accused-movant Braza's Motion to
Quash, are hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.21
ISSUES

41
Undaunted, Braza filed this petition for certiorari ascribing grave abuse of discretion on
the Sandiganbayan for issuing the Resolutions, dated October 12, 2009 and October 22,
2010, respectively. Braza raised the following issues:
A) The Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in sustaining
the withdrawal of the Information in violation of the constitutional
guarantee against double jeopardy, the petitioner having entered a valid
plea and vigorously objected to any further conduct of reinvestigation and
amendment of Information.
B) The Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion in allowing the
withdrawal and amendment of the Information without prejudice, the
proceedings being fraught with flip-flopping, prolonged and vexatious
determination of probable cause, thereby violating petitioner's
constitutional right to speedy disposition of his case, warranting his
discharge with prejudice regardless of the nature of his previous
arraignment.
C) The Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying the
motion to quash Amended Information, there being no allegation of actual,
specified, or quantifiable injury sustained by the government as required
by law (in cases involving Sec. 3 (e) of RA 3019) with the Reinvestigation
Report itself admitting on record that the government has not paid a single
centavo for the fully-implemented project.
D) The Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion in sustaining
the new indictment under Sec. 3(e) of R.A. 3019 without threshing out the
fatal infirmities that hounded the previous finding of overpricing the
erroneous reliance on spurious import documents and lack of price
canvass to establish prevailing market price thereby rendering the new
Resolution fatally defective.22
Essentially, Braza posits that double jeopardy has already set in on the basis of his "not
guilty" plea in the first Information and, thus, he can no longer be prosecuted under the
second Information. He claims that his arraignment was unconditional because the
conditions in the plea were ineffective for not being unmistakable and categorical. He
theorizes that the waiver of his constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy was not
absolute as the same was qualified by the phrase "as a result of the pending incidents."
He argues that even granting that his arraignment was indeed conditional, the same had
become simple and regular when he validated and confirmed his plea of "not guilty" by

means of a written manifestation which removed any further condition attached to his
previous plea.
Braza submits that the prolonged, vexatious and flip-flopping determination of probable
cause violated his right to a speedy disposition of the case which would justify the
dismissal of the case with prejudice. Further, he assails the sufficiency of the allegation
of facts in the second Information for failure to assert any actual and quantifiable injury
suffered by the government in relation to the subject transaction. He points out that the
admission in the Reinvestigation Report to the effect that the government had not paid a
single centavo to FABMIK for the fully implemented project, had rendered as invalid,
baseless and frivolous any indictment or prosecution for violation of Sec. 3(e) of R.A.
3019. Braza insists that the Supplemental Resolution of the OMB-Visayas was fatally
defective considering that the Ombudsman did not conduct an independent price
canvass of the prevailing market price of the subject lampposts and merely relied on the
spurious and false BOC documents to support its conclusion of overpricing.
By way of comment,23 the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) retorts that the
withdrawal of the first information and the subsequent filing of the second information did
not place Braza in double jeopardy or violate his right to speedy disposition of the case.
The OSP reasons that Braza waived his right to invoke double jeopardy when he agreed
to be conditionally arraigned. It further argues that even granting that the arraignment
was unconditional, still double jeopardy would not lie because the charge of violation of
Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 in the second information is a different offense with different
elements from that of the charge of violation of Sec. 3(g) in the first Information. The
OSP posits that his right to a speedy disposition of the case was not violated as the
delay in the proceedings cannot be considered as oppressive, vexatious or capricious.
According to the OSP, such delay was precipitated by the many pleadings filed by the
accused, including Braza, and was in fact incurred to give all the accused the
opportunities to dispute the accusation against them in the interest of fairness and due
process.
The OSP also submits that proof of the actual injury suffered by the government and that
of overpricing, are superfluous and immaterial for the determination of probable cause
because the alleged mode for committing the offense charged in the second Information
was by giving any private party unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference. The
second Information sufficiently alleges all the elements of the offense for which the
accused were indicted.
The Courts Ruling

42
Simply put, the pivotal issue in this case is whether the Sandiganbayan acted with grave
abuse of discretion in denying Braza's plea for the dismissal of Case No. SB-08-CRM0275 and his subsequent motion to quash the second Information, particularly on the
grounds of double jeopardy, violation of his right to a speedy disposition of the case, and
failure of the Information to state every single fact to constitute all the elements of the
offense charged.
The petition is devoid of merit.
It is Brazas stance that his constitutional right under the double jeopardy clause bars
further proceedings in Case No. SB-08-CRM-0275. He asserts that his arraignment
under the first information was simple and unconditional and, thus, an arraignment under
the second information would put him in double jeopardy.
The Court is not persuaded. His argument cannot stand scrutiny.
The June 6, 2008 Order24 of the Sandiganbayan reads:
This morning, accused Isabelo A. Braza was summoned to arraignment as a
precondition in authorizing his travel. The arraignment of the accused
was conditional in the sense that if the present Information will be amended as a
result of the pending incidents herein, he cannot invoke his right against double
jeopardy and he shall submit himself to arraignment anew under such Amended
Information. On the other hand, his conditional arraignment shall not prejudice his right
to question such Amended Information, if one shall be filed. These conditions were
thoroughly explained to the accused and his counsel. After consultation with his counsel,
the accused willingly submitted himself to such conditional arraignment.
Thereafter, the accused, with the assistance of counsel, was arraigned by reading the
Information to him in English, a language understood by him. Thereafter, he pleaded Not
Guilty to the charge against him. [Emphases supplied]
While it is true that the practice of the Sandiganbayan of conducting "provisional" or
"conditional" arraignment of the accused is not specifically sanctioned by the Revised
Internal Rules of the Procedure of the Sandiganbayan or by the regular Rules of
Procedure, this Court had tangentially recognized such practice in People v.
Espinosa,25provided that the alleged conditions attached to the arraignment should be
"unmistakable, express, informed and enlightened." The Court further required that the
conditions must be expressly stated in the order disposing of arraignment, otherwise, it
should be deemed simple and unconditional.26

A careful perusal of the record in the case at bench would reveal that the arraignment of
Braza under the first information was conditional in nature as it was a mere
accommodation in his favor to enable him to travel abroad without the Sandiganbayan
losing its ability to conduct trial in absentia in case he would abscond. The
Sandiganbayan's June 6, 2008 Order clearly and unequivocally states that the conditions
for Braza's arraignment as well as his travel abroad, that is, that if the Information would
be amended, he shall waive his constitutional right to be protected against double
jeopardy and shall allow himself to be arraigned on the amended information without
losing his right to question the same. It appeared that these conditions were duly
explained to Braza and his lawyer by the anti-graft court. He was afforded time to confer
and consult his lawyer. Thereafter, he voluntarily submitted himself to such conditional
arraignment and entered a plea of "not guilty" to the offense of violation of Sec. 3(g) of
R.A. No. 3019.
Verily, the relinquishment of his right to invoke double jeopardy had been convincingly
laid out. Such waiver was clear, categorical and intelligent. It may not be amiss to state
that on the day of said arraignment, one of the incidents pending for the consideration of
the Sandiganbayan was an omnibus motion for determination of probable cause and for
quashal of information or for reinvestigation filed by accused Radaza. Accordingly, there
was a real possibility that the first information would be amended if said motion was
granted. Although the omnibus motion was initially denied, it was subsequently granted
upon motion for reconsideration, and a reinvestigation was ordered to be conducted in
the criminal case.
Having given his conformity and accepted the conditional arraignment and its legal
consequences, Braza is now estopped from assailing its conditional nature just to
conveniently avoid being arraigned and prosecuted of the new charge under the second
information. Besides, in consonance with the ruling in Cabo v. Sandiganbayan,27this
Court cannot now allow Braza to renege and turn his back on the above conditions on
the mere pretext that he affirmed his conditional arraignment through a pleading
denominated as Manifestation filed before the Sandiganbayan on November 13, 2008.
After all, there is no showing that the anti-graft court had acted on, much less noted, his
written manifestation.
Assuming, in gratia argumenti, that there was a valid and unconditional plea, Braza
cannot plausibly rely on the principle of double jeopardy to avoid arraignment under the
second information because the offense charged therein is different and not included in
the offense charged under the first information. The right against double jeopardy is
enshrined in Section 21 of Article III of the Constitution, which reads:

43
No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is
punished by a law and an ordinance conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a
bar to another prosecution for the same act.

1. The offender is a public officer;

This constitutionally mandated right is procedurally buttressed by Section 17 of Rule

11728 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. To substantiate a claim for double
jeopardy, the accused has the burden of demonstrating the following requisites: (1) a first
jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have been
validly terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense as in the
first.29 As to the first requisite, the first jeopardy attaches only (a) after a valid indictment;
(b) before a competent court; (c) after arraignment, (d) when a valid plea has been
entered; and (e) when the accused was acquitted or convicted, or the case was
dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.30 The test for the third
element is whether one offense is identical with the other or is an attempt to commit it or
a frustration thereof; or whether the second offense includes or is necessarily included in
the offense charged in the first information.

3. The contract or transaction is manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the

government.34

Braza, however, contends that double jeopardy would still attach even if the first
information charged an offense different from that charged in the second information
since both charges arose from the same transaction or set of facts. Relying on the
antiquated ruling of People v. Del Carmen,31 Braza claims that an accused should be
shielded against being prosecuted for several offenses made out from a single act.
It appears that Braza has obviously lost sight, if he is not altogether aware, of the ruling
in Suero v. People32 where it was held that the same criminal act may give rise to two or
more separate and distinct offenses; and that no double jeopardy attaches as long as
there is variance between the elements of the two offenses charged. The doctrine of
double jeopardy is a revered constitutional safeguard against exposing the accused from
the risk of being prosecuted twice for the same offense, and not a different one.
There is simply no double jeopardy when the subsequent information charges another
and different offense, although arising from the same act or set of acts.33 Prosecution for
the same act is not prohibited. What is forbidden is the prosecution for the same offense.
In the case at bench, there is no dispute that the two charges stemmed from the same
transaction. A comparison of the elements of violation of Sec. 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019 and
those of violation of Sec. 3(e) of the same law, however, will disclose that there is neither
identity nor exclusive inclusion between the two offenses. For conviction of violation of
Sec. 3(g), the prosecution must establish the following elements:

2. He entered into a contract or transaction in behalf of the government; and

On the other hand, an accused may be held criminally liable of violation of Section 3(e)
of R.A. No. 3019, provided that the following elements are present:
1. The accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or
official functions;
2. The accused must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or
gross inexcusable negligence; and
3. His action caused undue injury to any party, including the government or gave
any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge
of his functions.35
Although violation of Sec. 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019 and violation of Sec. 3(e) of the same
law share a common element, the accused being a public officer, the latter is not
inclusive of the former. The essential elements of each are not included among or do not
form part of those enumerated in the other. For double jeopardy to exist, the elements of
one offense should ideally encompass or include those of the other. What the rule on
double jeopardy prohibits refers to identity of elements in the two offenses. 36
Next, Braza contends that the long delay that characterized the proceedings for the
determination of probable cause has resulted in the transgression of his constitutional
right to a speedy disposition of the case. According to him, the proceedings have
unquestionably been marred with vexatious, capricious and oppressive delay meriting
the dismissal of Case No. SB-08-CRM-0275. Braza claims that it took the OMB more
than two (2) years to charge him and his co-accused with violation of Section 3(e) in the
second information.
The petitioner's contention is untenable.
Section 16, Article III of the Constitution declares in no uncertain terms that "[A]ll persons
shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial,
or administrative bodies." The right to a speedy disposition of a case is deemed violated

44
only when the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive
delays, or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or
when without cause or justifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed to elapse
without the party having his case tried.37 The constitutional guarantee to a speedy
disposition of cases is a relative or flexible concept. 38 It is consistent with delays and
depends upon the circumstances. What the Constitution prohibits are unreasonable,
arbitrary and oppressive delays which render rights nugatory.39
In Dela Pea v. Sandiganbayan,40 the Court laid down certain guidelines to determine
whether the right to a speedy disposition has been violated, as follows:
The concept of speedy disposition is relative or flexible. A mere mathematical reckoning
of the time involved is not sufficient. Particular regard must be taken of the facts and
circumstances peculiar to each case. Hence, the doctrinal rule is that in the
determination of whether that right has been violated, the factors that may be considered
and balanced are as follows: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3)
the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused; and (4) the prejudice caused
by the delay.
Using the foregoing yardstick, the Court finds that Brazas right to speedy disposition of
the case has not been infringed.
Record shows that the complaint against Braza and twenty-three (23) other respondents
was filed in January 2007 before the PACPO-Visayas. After the extensive inquiries and
data-gathering, the PACPO-Visayas came out with an evaluation report on March 23,
2007 concluding that the installed lampposts and lighting facilities were highly
overpriced.41 PACPO-Visayas recommended that the respondents be charged with
violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. Thereafter, the investigatory process was set
in motion before the OMB-Visayas where the respondents filed their respective counteraffidavits and submitted voluminous documentary evidence to refute the allegations
against them. Owing to the fact that the controversy involved several transactions and
varying modes of participation by the 24 respondents and that their respective
responsibilities had to be established, the OMB-Visayas resolved the complaint only on
January 24, 2008 with the recommendation that the respondents be indicted for violation
of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019. The Court notes that Braza never decried the time spent for
the preliminary investigation. There was no showing either that there were unreasonable
delays in the proceedings or that the case was kept in idle slumber.
After the filing of the information, the succeeding events appeared to be part of a valid
and regular course of the judicial proceedings not attended by capricious, oppressive

and vexatious delays. On November 3, 2008, Sandiganbayan ordered the reinvestigation

of the case upon motion of accused Radaza, petitioner Braza and other accused DPWH
officials. In the course of the reinvestigation, the OMB-Visayas furnished the respondents
with the additional documents/papers it secured, especially the Commission on Audit
Report, for their verification, comment and submission of countervailing
evidence.42 Thereafter, the OMB-Visayas issued its Supplemental Resolution, dated May
4, 2009, finding probable cause against the accused for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A.
3019.
Indeed, the delay can hardly be considered as "vexatious, capricious and oppressive."
The complexity of the factual and legal issues, the number of persons charged, the
various pleadings filed, and the volume of documents submitted, prevent this Court from
yielding to the petitioners claim of violation of his right to a speedy disposition of his
case. Rather, it appears that Braza and the other accused were merely afforded
sufficient opportunities to ventilate their respective defenses in the interest of justice, due
process and fair investigation. The re-investigation may have inadvertently contributed to
the further delay of the proceedings but this process cannot be dispensed with because it
was done for the protection of the rights of the accused. Albeit the conduct of
investigation may hold back the progress of the case, the same was essential so that the
rights of the accused will not be compromised or sacrificed at the altar of
expediency.43 The bare allegation that it took the OMB more than two (2) years to
terminate the investigation and file the necessary information would not suffice. 44 As
earlier stated, mere mathematical reckoning of the time spent for the investigation is not
a sufficient basis to conclude that there was arbitrary and inordinate delay.
The delay in the determination of probable cause in this case should not be cause for an
unfettered abdication by the anti-graft court of its duty to try and determine the
controversy in Case No. SB-08-CRM-0275. The protection under the right to a speedy
disposition of cases should not operate to deprive the government of its inherent
prerogative in prosecuting criminal cases.
Finally, Braza challenges the sufficiency of the allegations in the second information
because there is no indication of any actual and quantifiable injury suffered by the
government. He then argues that the facts under the second information are inadequate
to support a valid indictment for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019.
The petitioner's simple syllogism must fail.
Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 states:

45
Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers In addition to acts or omission of public
officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices
of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any
private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his
official administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or
gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of
offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other
concessions.
In a catena of cases, this Court has held that there are two (2) ways by which a public
official violates Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 in the performance of his functions,
namely: (1) by causing undue injury to any party, including the Government; or (2) by
giving any private party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference. 45 The
accused may be charged under either mode or under both. The disjunctive term "or"
connotes that either act qualifies as a violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. 46 In other
words, the presence of one would suffice for conviction.
1wphi1

It must be emphasized that Braza was indicted for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No.
3019 under the second mode. "To be found guilty under the second mode, it suffices that
the accused has given unjustified favor or benefit to another, in the exercise of his
official, administrative and judicial functions."47 The element of damage is not required for
violation of Section 3(e) under the second mode.48
In the case at bench, the second information alleged, in substance, that accused public
officers and employees, discharging official or administrative function, together with

Braza, confederated and conspired to give F ABMIK unwarranted benefit or preference

by awarding to it Contract I.D. No. 06H00050 through manifest partiality or evident bad
faith, without the conduct of a public bidding and compliance with the requirement for
qualification contrary to the provisions of R.A. No. 9184 or the Government Procurement
Reform Act. Settled is the rule that private persons, when acting in conspiracy with public
officers, may be indicted and, if found guilty, held liable for the pertinent offenses under
Section 3 of R.A. No. 3 019.49 Considering that all the elements of the offense of violation
of Sec. 3(e) were alleged in the second information, the Court finds the same to be
sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction.
At any rate, the presence or absence of the elements of the crime is evidentiary in nature
and is a matter of defense that may be passed upon after a full-blown trial on the
merits.50 It is not proper, therefore, to resolve the issue right at the outset without the
benefit of a full-blown trial. This issue requires a fuller ventilation and examination.
All told, this Court finds that the Sandiganbayan did not commit grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, much less did it gravely err, in denying
Braza's motion to quash the information/dismiss Case No. SB-08-CRM-0275. This ruling,
however, is without prejudice to the actual merits of this criminal case as may be shown
during the trial before the court a quo.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DENIED. The Sandiganbayan is
hereby DIRECTED to dispose of Case No. SB-08-CRM- 0275 with reasonable dispatch.
SO ORDERED.