Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
FACTS: Catalina Pascua, Caridad Pascua, Adelaida Estomo, Erlinda Meriales, Mercedes
Lorenzo, Alejandro Morales and Zenaida Parejas boarded the jeepney owned by spouses
Isidro Mangune and Guillerma Carreon and driven by Tranquilino Manalo at Dau, Mabalacat,
Pampanga bound for Carmen, Rosales, Pangasinan to spend Christmas at their respective
homes. Their contract with Manalo was for them to pay P24.00 for the trip. As a result of the
collision, three passengers of the jeepney, died while the other jeepney passengers
sustained physical injuries.
ISSUE: Whether or not the common carrier is liable to the death of the passengers of the
jeepney.
HELD: The trial court was therefore right in finding that Manalo and spouses Mangune and
Carreon were negligent. However, its ruling that spouses Mangune and Carreon are jointly
and severally liable with Manalo is erroneous The driver cannot be held jointly and severally
liable with the carrier in case of breach of the contract of carriage. The rationale behind this
is readily discernible. Firstly, the contract of carriage is between the carrier and the
passenger, and in the event of contractual liability, the carrier is exclusively responsible
therefore to the passenger, even if such breach be due to the negligence of his driver (see
Viluan v. The Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. Nos. L-21477-81, April 29, 1966, 16 SCRA 742). In
other words, the carrier can neither shift his liability on the contract to his driver nor share it
with him, for his driver's negligence is his. 4 Secondly, if We make the driver jointly and
severally liable with the carrier, that would make the carrier's liability personal instead of
merely vicarious and consequently, entitled to recover only the share which corresponds to
the driver, 5 contradictory to the explicit provision of Article 2181 of the New Civil Code. 6
FACTS: The deceased was an inspector of the Bureau of Forestry stationed in Davao with an
annual salary of P1,800. The defendant is engaged in the business of exporting logs from his
lumber concession in Cotabato. Lara went to said concession. In the morning of January 9,
1954, Lara who then in a hurry to return to Davao asked defendant if he could take him in
his pick-up as there was then no other means of transportation, to which defendant agreed,
Upon reaching Km. 96, barrio Catidtuan, Lara accidentally fell from the pick-up and as a
result he suffered serious injuries. they took him to St. Joseph's Clinic of Kidapawan. But
when Lara arrived he was already dead.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT DEFENDAT IS LIABLE DESPITE THE FACT APPELLANT IS A MERE
ACCOMODATION PASSENGER.
HELD: It therefore appears that the deceased, as well his companions who rode in the pick-up of defendant, were
merely accommodation passengers who paid nothing for the service and so they can be considered as invited guests
within the meaning of the law. As accommodation passengers or invited guests, defendant as owner and driver of the
pick-up owes to them merely the duty to exercise reasonable care so that they may be transported safely to their
destination. ). Defendant, therefore, is only required to observe ordinary care, and is not in duty bound to exercise
extraordinary diligence as required of a common carrier by our law. There is every reason to believe that
the unfortunate happening was only due to an unforeseen accident accused by the fact that
at the time the deceased was half asleep and must have fallen from the pick-up when it ran
into some stones causing it to jerk considering that the road was then bumpy, rough and full
of stones.
knowledge or could not have prevented, the presumption is rebutted and the carrier is not
and ought not to be held liable.
it is to be noted that when the violation of the contract is due to the willful acts of strangers,
as in the instant case, the degree of care essential to be exercised by the common carrier for
the protection of its passenger is only that of a good father of a family.
Under the first, which is the minority view, the carrier is liable only when the act
of the employee is within the scope of his authority and duty. It is not sufficient
that the act be within the course of employment only.4
Under the second view, upheld by the majority and also by the later cases, it is
enough that the assault happens within the course of the employee's duty. It is no
defense for the carrier that the act was done in excess of authority or in
disobedience of the carrier's orders.5 The carrier's liability here is absolute in the
sense that it practically secures the passengers from assaults committed by its
own employees.6
As can be gleaned from Art. 1759, the Civil Code of the Philippines evidently follows the rule based on the
second view.