Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
On Aristotle
Physics 1.3-4
Translated by
Pamela Huby and C.C.W. Taylor
Acknowledgements
The present translations have been made possible by generous and
imaginative funding from the following sources: the National Endowment for the Humanities, Division of Research Programs, an
independent federal agency of the USA; the Leverhulme Trust; the
British Academy; the Jowett Copyright Trustees; the Royal Society
(UK); Centro Internazionale A Beltrame di Storia dello Spazio e del
Tempo (Padua); Mario Mignucci; Liverpool University; the Leventis
Foundation; the Arts and Humanities Research Council; Gresham
College; the Esmee Fairbairn Charitable Trust; the Henry Brown
Trust; Mr and Mrs N. Egon; the Netherlands Organisation for
Scientific Research (NWO/GW); the Ashdown Trust; Dr Victoria
Solomonides, the Cultural Attache of the Greek Embassy in London. The editor wishes to thank Mossman Roueche and Catherine
Osborne for their comments, Era Gavrielides for preparing the
volume for press, and Deborah Blake at Duckworth, who has been
the publisher responsible for every volume since the first.
Typeset by Ray Davies
Printed and bound in Great Britain by the
MPG Books Group
www.bloomsburyacademic.com
Contents
Conventions
Abbreviations
Textual Emendations
Introduction
Vl
Vll
Vlll
1
13
15
Translation
1.3
1.4
58
Notes
Bibliography
English-Greek Glossary
Greek-English Index
Subject Index
Index of Passages
89
112
113
123
145
147
Conventions
[... ] Square brackets indicate additions to the translation to complete
the sense.
< > Angle brackets indicate additions to the Greek text.
vi
Abbreviations
DK =H. Diels, rev. W. Kranz, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, 6th edn,
Berlin, 1951, 3 vols.
FHSG = W.W. Fortenbaugh, P.M. Huby, R.W. Sharples and D. Gutas,
ed. and tr., Theophrastus of Eresus. Sources for his Life, Writings,
Thought and Influence, Leiden, New York, Koln, 1992, 2 vols (Philosophia Antiqua liv.1-2).
Guthrie = W.K.C. Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy, Cambridge,
1962-81, 6 vols.
KRS = G.S. Kirk, J.E. Raven and M. Schofield, The Presocratic Philosophers: A Critical History with a Selection of Texts, 2nd edn, Cambridge, 1984.
LSJ =H. G. Liddell and R. Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, 9th edn, rev.
H.J. Jones and R. McKenzie, with a revised supplement, Oxford,
1996.
RUSCH = Rutgers ..i(Jniversity Studies in Classical Humanities, Eudemus of Rhodes, ed. W.W. Fortenbaugh and I. Bodnar, 2002.
Wehrli= F. Wehrli, Eudemos von Rhodos, Basel, 1955 (Die Schule des
Aristoteles viii).
Vll
Textual Emendations
106,20-4
108,24
116,1
134,19
150,32
152,24
157,7
158,5
158,13
158,18
159,2
159,15
161,7
162,25-6
178,34
viii
Introduction
Simplicius
Simplicius came from Cilicia and spent some time in Alexandria, but
eventually went to Athens and was one of the Neoplatonist pagans still
flourishing there in 529, when Justinian II decided to do something
about it and, perhaps, prevented them from continuing to teach in the
Academy. Seven, including Simplicius, went off to Persia, at the invitation of the ruler Chosroes. But it didn't work out, and they left Persia in
532. It is still uncertain where each of them went, but it is clear from
his later writings that Simplicius at least still had access to a large
library. He remained a pagan, and was hostile to the Alexandrian
commentator Philoponus, who was a Christian, and frequently wrote
against him.
In his commentary on Aristotle's Physics Simplicius preserves a large
amount of material from the works of the Presocratics, much of which
is not available to us anywhere else, and also from previous writers like
Eudemus and Adrastus, which are also largely lost. He even quotes from
a lost work of Alexander of Aphrodisias, much of whose other writings has
survived. Simplicius is a careful scholar, and took considerable care to
transcribe the words as he found them in his sources. He was able to record
material from Presocratics like Melissus and Zeno partly from their own
works and partly from Plato, Aristotle, and later commentators.
He is frequently repetitious, and can be obscure, but is also inquisitive, and enquires, for example, whether the dichotomy argument really
belongs to Zeno, or to Parmenides, as Porphyry claimed. At times he
dons a Neoplatonist hat and tries to interpret Plato and Parmenides
through Neoplatonist concepts, but usually he expounds standard Aristotelian metaphysics, including the ten categories and the four causes,
although he also makes play with the alien notion of hypostasis. He uses
the system of logic of his time, which includes both Aristotelian and
Stoic elements.
In places his methods are puzzling: thus he raises questions about
Zeno in connexion with what other writers have said, but then says that
he has Zeno's own words to hand, and he is erratic in his quotations from
Parmenides. All this could be explained on the hypothesis that his
studies were intermittent and conducted in various places.
Introduction
Simplicius On Aristotle Physics 1.3
PamelaHuby
Introduction
itself without void, like water in a vessel. Since things can be one by
being in the same species, Simplicius considers how this might be. He
suggests that it might be by relation to their matter, but dismisses it,
bringing in Aristotle's four causes.
Then he notes that being is infinite for Melissus, but finite for
Parmenides. But both say that being is one, and he quotes from Alexander the short statements of both Theophrastus and Eudemus of
Parmenides' argument, admitting that he himself may not have full
knowledge ofEudemus' work. He then argues that, just as many things
may be beautiful, so "many things may be said to be, and still be many.
He excuses Parmenides on the grounds that the later refinements of
language had not then been worked out. He then quotes from Porphyry,
implying that the latter is not being true to Parmenides in his elaborations, and returns to Aristotle. There follows a brief quotation from an
early part of Parmenides' poem and then Aristotle's objection that
Parmenides is treating 'being' as having only one meaning, when in fact
many words have more than one meaning. So being can apply in each of
the categories; further even if it applied only to substance, Eudemus
showed with the example of beautiful that even if 'beautiful' had only
one meaning there could still be many beautiful things, and the same
would apply to 'being', using a similar argument to that of Aristotle
regarding 'white'. Again, with genus and species, things that are one in
genus or species are still many in number. Further, something may be one
by continuity, but what is continuous can still be several. Even within
'white' one can distinguish between the colour and the coloured object, both
of which are called white. A further distinction is made with 'hypostasis'
which is distinguished from both 'substrate' (hupokeimenon) and 'substance' (ousia) (it could be thought of as 'thing').
The Megarians are then cited as an extreme example of philosophising, for thinking that for each word there is a separate entity. Unlike
them, Parmenides was able to describe his One by several terms, still
regarding it as one. Simplicius tries to explain this kind of unity in
Neoplatonist terms, and goes on to refine further by distinguishing
between 'white' and 'whiteness', and later between accident and that of
which it is an accident. He then quotes, from Porphyry, an extract from
the commentator Adrastus, who says that substrates are the primary
substances of the Categories, and develops this view at length, going on
to analyse sentences and definitions. Simplicius goes on to bring in the
just-existent (Aristotle's to hoper on) and argue that being is substance
and its substrate, referring to the Categories. Simplicius interprets
Aristotle as saying that Parmenides actually brings in not-being, and
refers to the great kinds of Plato's Sophist, which set being apart from
the rest.
The text then turns to Aristotle's argument that being cannot have
size, attacking both Parmenides and Melissus, and Simplicius quotes
Parmenides statement that being is a sphere. Simplicius thinks that
Introduction
Introduction
from it, but thinking that they are aimed at doing away with the many
not supporting the one.
Simplicius then introduces the distinction between actual and possible
infinity, and quotes an important passage from Porphyry on this subject.
Xenocrates may have wanted only to say that actual slicing to infinity was
impossible, so that something unsliced would always remain.
Simplicius returns to Parmenides, quoting at length from his poem
and arguing that he had a being that was uncreated and indestructible,
incorporeal, unmoving and the first cause, interpreting it in Neoplatonist terms as at the highest level in which all is united. He also defends
Parmenides' language as being poetic, and applies some of his terms to
the soul and the intellect. Finally he tries to show that both Plato and
Aristotle were sympathetic to Parmenides.
Simplicius On Aristotle Physics 1.4
C.C.W. Taylor
In chapter 4 Aristotle begins his discussion of previous views of the
principles of nature, beginning with those who think that there is a
single physical principle. The opening section of the chapter, down to
187a21, is devoted to these physical monists. Aristotle distinguishes two
forms of monism, one identifying the physical principle with either fire,
air, or water or with some other stuff intermediate between one or other
of those three elements on a scale of rarity and density, the other
identifying the principle as a mixture of opposites (probably undifferentiated between properties and stuffs); in the former theory non-basic
stuffs are formed from the basic by the processes of condensation and
rarefaction, in the latter they are separated out from the primal mixture. Density and rarity being opposites, mention of them allows Aristotle to digress in comparing physical monism with Plato's theory that
the elements of reality are unity and the opposition of the great and the
small, the difference being that for Plato the great and small plays the
role of matter which is given form by unity, whereas for the physical
monists the opposites are differentiae which give specific form to the
primitive matter.
Simplicius' commentary on this section follows the order of Aristotle's
exposition, his chief contributions being the addition of factual detail on
earlier philosophers and criticism of rival commentators. He provides
names (omitted by Aristotle) of theorists who maintained the primacy
of each of the three elements (149, 7-8), and then engages in a debate
with other commentators on the identity of the proponent or proponents
of the intermediate theory. Alexander attributes it to Anaximander
(149,11-13), Porphyry, following Nicolaus of Damascus, to Diogenes of
Apollonia (149,13-18). Simplicius disagrees with both; Anaximander
held the mixture theory (150,22-3), while Diogenes identified the principle with air (149, 7-8). In passing Simplicius criticises Porphyry for
Introduction
describing Anaximander as treating the basic substrate not as a mixture, but 'in an undifferentiated way' as a simple stuff, i.e. presumably
treating it as something simple without saying what kind of thing it is.
That is incompatible with Aristotle's testimony that Anaximander generated the non-basic things by extraction (149,13-27). Simplicius does
not himself (any more than Aristotle) name any proponent of the
intermediate theory (nor has subsequent scholarship identified any
particular candidate for that honour, see the relevant note in Ross 1936,
pp. 482-3). In the digression on Plato, in addition to elucidating Aristotle's remark that Plato treated the great and small opposition as
matter (150,4-11), Simplicius offers his own suggestion that Plato may
have meant that in itself matter has no size, and is therefore small, but
is also the cause of all dimensions, and is therefore large (150, 15-18). He
takes the opportunity of adding some further information on Plato's
views, including the information from Alexander and others that the
great and small, otherwise known as the indefinite dyad, and the one
were the principles of the Forms (151,6-11), but urges in his own person
that Plato could not have treated the great and small as matter, on the
ground that in the 'l'imaeus space, which Simplicius identifies, wrongly,
with matter, belongs to the physical world, whereas the great and small
are principles of the intelligible Forms (151,12-19).
The debate mentioned above on the nature of the theory to be
ascribed to Diogenes of Apollonia provides Simplicius with the pretext
to quote extensively from the latter's On Nature (151,31-153,22). These
passages establish beyond doubt that Diogenes followed Anaximenes in
identifying the basic stuff as air.
At 187a21 Aristotle moves on to consider those who say that the
principles are both one and many, citing Anaxagoras and Empedocles by
name. The section on both is a mere five lines (187a21-6), in which Aristotle
says only that while both separate things out from a mixture, they differ
in that (a) Empedocles places that process in an eternal cycle of mixing and
separation, whereas Anaxagoras believes in a single original separation,
and (b) Anaxagoras' elements are an infinite number of natural stuffs and
opposites, Empedocles' are the four elements, earth, air, fire and water.
With this preamble Aristotle then goes on to the examination and critique
of Anaxagoras which occupies the remainder of the chapter.
Simplicius elaborates this preamble in several ways. He raises questions about the sense in which the principles of Empedocles and
Anaxagoras are one and many. Is it the elements which are many, and the
organising principle (Mind for Anaxagoras, Love and Strife for Empedocles) one, or is it rather in each case the mixture of elements which is one?
(154,9-14). He quotes Theophrastus in support of the latter suggestion in
the case of Anaxagoras (154, 14-23), and takes up a hint in a comment of
Alexander's to suggest that Empedocles' theory affords a place for opposites no less central than does that of Anaxagoras (155,1-20). He quotes
extensively, chiefly from Anaxagoras (155-7) but also from Empedocles
Introduction
(158-61), partly to support his own suggestion that both accept a Platonic account of reality in which the physical world is a representation
of an eternal, intelligible world of archetypes (157,5-24, 160,22-6).
Aristotle prefaces his critique of An.axagoras with an account of the
principles underlying his theory (187a26-b7). These are (a) nothing
comes into being from not-being (which Aristotle describes as a belief
common to [sc. all] natural philosophers), and (b) opposites come into
being from their opposites. Further, he says, Anaxagoras observed that
everything comes into being from everything (which must presumably
be understood as 'anything comes into being from anything'). On the
basis of these principles Anaxagoras concluded that everything must
already be present in everything; i.e. every portion of any stuff contains
portions of every stuff, imperceptible because of their smallness. Aristotle adds that according to Anaxagoras things derived their perceptible
character from their predominant microscopic ingredients. (It has to be
said that Aristotle's identification of Anaxagoras' principles is too schematic to show why his conclusion might seem to follow. Thus from
'Nothing comes into being from not-being' and 'Opposites come into
being from their opposites' all that seems to follow is that if something
F comes to be, it must have come to be from something not-F.
Anaxagoras' principle is the stronger one that if something F comes to
be (e.g. something hot) it must have come to be from something which
was itself F. And that is certainly not a principle common to all natural
philosophers.) Sim.plicius does not offer any criticism of Aristotle's
statement of Anaxagoras' principles, accepting his account of 'nothing
comes into being from not-being' as a common axiom, and illustrating it
by citations from Parmenides and Melissus (161,23-163,8). Regarding
the second principle, that opposites come into being from their opposites, Sim.plicius seems to suggest that rather than concluding, as
Anaxagoras is reported by Aristotle as having done, that all opposites
are already present in their opposites, he should have said that opposites are present together with their opposites, either by juxtaposition
or by mixture (163,35-164,2). In this instance, unusually, instead of
expanding on Aristotle's elucidation, he seems to be objecting to the
doctrine which Aristotle is elucidating.
The rest of Aristotle's chapter, 187b7-188al8, is taken up with seven
arguments against Anaxagoras' theory, with a final sentence comparing
Anaxagoras unfavourably with Empedocles on grounds of redundancy.
I provide a paraphrase of each argument (in italics) in order, followed in
each case by a summary of Simplicius' comment.
I (187b7-13) The infinite is as such unknowable, both quantita-
Introduction
Simplicius first gives a brief summary of Anaxagoras' principal doctrines, illustrated by quotations (164,11-165,5), before turning to Aristotle's criticisms. He begins by reporting a disagreement between
Porphyry and Alexander on the identification of Aristotle's target:
Porphyry says the argument is directed against all those, including the
atomists, who say that the elements are infinite in any respect, whether
in number (as the atomists hold that there are infinitely many atoms),
size (they hold that the void is infinite in extent) or in diversity
(Anaxagoras says that the homoiomeries are infinitely diverse in kind),
while Alexander says that it is aimed at Anaxagoras alone (165,8166,6). Simplicius sides with Alexander (166, 7-12), on the ground that
his interpretation gives a better argument; since the atomists, unlike
Anaxagoras, hold that the atoms are all of the same kind, they are not
vulnerable to the argument that the elements, and hence the things
composed of them are unknowable both quantitatively (it is impossible
to say how many there are) and qualitatively (it is impossible to say, i.e.
to specify completely, what kinds of things they are).
Simplicius argues that since Anaxagoras holds that Mind knows all
the elements, his thesis that the elements are infinite in number and
diversity must mean that they are beyond the capacity of human beings
to count and describe, not that they are literally infinite in number and
diversity (165,30-166,2). He does not discuss the possibility that an
infinite mind could comprehend an infinite number of things of infinitely diverse kinds.
II (187b 13-21) If the parts of a thing can be arbitrarily big or small,
the thing of which they are parts can be arbitrarily big or small.
But since it is impossible for a plant or animal to be arbitrarily big
or small, it is impossible for their parts, such as flesh or bone or
fruit, to be arbitrarily big or small.
Introduction
II, and then rebuts the defence (168,25-169,2). Both defence and rebuttal are obscure; for a suggested interpretation see the translation, n. 73.
10
Introduction
V (188a2-5) Each natural body would have to contain infinite
separate amounts of natural stuffs such as flesh, blood and brain,
which is absurd.
10
Introduction
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Simplicius
On Aristotle Physics 1.3-4
Translation
Simplicius On Aristotle
Physics 1.3-4
1.3, translated by Pamela Huby
186a4-13 To those .who follow this way it seems impossible that
existing things should be one, and from what they [i.e. Parmenides and Melissus] add in support of their conclusion it is
not difficult to refute, for both argue sophistically, both Melissus
and Parmenides, for they adopt false !"premises] and their arguments are invalid; but Melissus is more tedious and
unprovoking; having started with a single absurdity the rest
follow. That is not difficult. It is clear then that Melissus argues
illogically, for he thinks that it has been accepted that if everything that comes to be has a starting-point, 1 then also what does
not come to be does not have one.2
Aiming at the complete destruction of the hypothesis, so that it may
not seem that it is refuted [just] through the feebleness of its supporting arguments, he [i.e. Aristotle] goes on further to refute also the
arguments on which those who argued that BeingS is one relied, not
guaranteeing that belie:4 by these means, but persuading those determined by his arguments to feel uncertain about that hypothesis.
For if, both, he overturns the belief, and, the arguments which
supported it are refuted, it remains unquestionably [true] that the
opposing view will be strengthened. For if there be a primary demolition of [some of] the opposing views, this becomes per accidens the
defence of their opposites; hence when the statement that Being is
one is destroyed, [the position] that it is many is established. And in
this way it did not escape the notice of Socrates that Zeno's argument,
through showing that many absurd things follow those who say that
the things that exist are many, helps Parmenides, who says that
Being is one.5 But he [i.e. Aristotle) says that it is not di:flicult to refute
the arguments, because he will show both that the premises are false
and that the figures used in the combinations are not valid. He finds
more fault with the argument of Melissus, as has been said earlier,
either because, as well as the rest, he also says that Being is infinite,
or because he too both seems to adopt false premises, and to put them
together invalidly, when he says that if what comes to be has a
starting-point, what does not come to be does not have a starting
point, when in negating the consequent he ought to say 'what does
not have a starting-point has not come to be'. For in this way the
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Being or from not-Being, deduced that Being does not have a starting-point. But someone may perhaps say that often the conversion
from the antecedent is true, when the antecedent is equivalent to the
consequent. For if man is a rational mortal animal, and if it is not a
man, [then] it is not a rational mortal animal. But with what Melissus
assumed, there does not seem to be equivalence; for even ifeverything
that comes to be has a starting-point which is limited as to the thing,
yet not everything that is limited has come to be, like the sun and the
moon and the heaven.
Eudemus, 17 however, says that even through these premises 18
nothing else is proved except what was there originally, that Being is
uncreated, 19 for the valid conversion is: 'what does not have a starting-point is uncreated, and Being does not have a starting-point'. But
it is said [by him] like this: 'it is not the case that if what has come to
be has a starting-point, what has not come to be does not have a
starting-point; rather, what does not have a starting-point is uncreated. For it is in this way that the sequence of the negations comes
about. So Being becomes uncreated for him. For it does not have a
starting-point.'
186a13-16 Then this too is absurd, that there is a starting-point
of everything, as a thing, and not merely of time, and of comingto-be not simply, but also of qualitative change, 20 as if change
does not [ever] happen instantaneously.
Having shown that the combination is invalid, he [i.e. Aristotle] then
attacks the premises as being false, criticising the hypothetical
fpremise] 'what has come to be has a starting-point', assuming it as
true with regard to time, but changing it [to being false] with regard
to a starting-point of the thing, and (charging it with] being a sophistry from the homonymy. For it is necessary, if one takes the startingpoint with regard to time as belonging to everything that comes to be,
about which Melissus made his argument, to keep this in the proof;
but he took the starting-point with regard to the thing instead of that
[with regard to time], as is clear :from his adding to 'what does not
have a starting-point' that it is infinite. For one kind of starting-point
is spoken of as equivalent to cause. like what acts, i.e. the source of
alteration, 21 and the 'from which', i.e. matter, and as the form, i.e. the
account of substance, and in addition to these the 'for the sake of
which', i.e. the purpose.22 In another sense starting-point is spoken of
as of size, and this we also call limit. And if anything has this we call
it limited. But if anything were supposed not to have it, we say it is
infinite. And in this sense the point is the starting-point of the line,
the line of the plane, and this of the solid. And [it is also spoken of as]
the parts first in order,like heart or head or root. For it is limited also
by these. In another sense the starting-point is spoken of as that of
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19
the coming-to-be of each thing in time, being the time itself at which
it first began to come to be, which is not easy to define because of the
infinite divisibility of time. There are other senses in which 'startingpoint' is used. But these are enough for the present.23
With regard to what is commonly said to have come to be, everything has its starting-point from which it began to come about in time,
which is also the starting-point of its coming to be, but not everything
has its starting-point regarding the thing, but some come about as
substance, and their coming to be, is said to be simple because they
come about in themselves, whereas things that come about in the
other categories are not said to come to be simply. Thus Socrates is
said to come to be himself in himself, but heat is not said to come to
be in itself, rather it is a body that becomes hot, and air that becomes
illuminated. The things that come to be as substance and their
coming to be have, not only a starting-point in time but also a
starting-point from some part of the object, like that of animals from
the navel or the heart, that of plants from the roots, and of the house
from its foundations. And since changing things are also said to have
a starting-point and their coming-to-be is change24 (for white comes
to be from black and hot from cold), with these it is not true that
everything that comes to be has a starting-point with regard to the
thing, but some things all together and their parts as a whole begin
to change, as do the things that freeze, 25 in which it is not in any
particular part that the change with regard to freezing begins, but as
a whole and at once, and everything advances in it [the freezing] at
once; and the fact that it happens all at once, as I think, does not show
that it is timeless, as Porphyry26 understood it; he tries to argue that
alteration27 is timeless; but that all the parts [change) simultaneously. For freezing and illumination of the air do not happen
timelessly, but they have their beginning in time, at this special part
of time, but all the parts undergo the effect together. Or some part is
altered28 at once and is divisible to infinity itself, and is not affected
:first in a part, as Aristotle himself too in Book Z of this work will
show, when he says 'nor is there any part of the thing that has
changed29 which has changed earlier', 30 and he has written this still
more clearly in the last book31 : 'also with any kind of change32; for
even if the thing to be changed is divisible to infinity, the change itself
is not for that reason likewise [divisible to infinity], but often it
happens all at once, as with freezing.'
And Theophrastus too, in the first book of his On Motion, 33 is
clearly thinking the same on this point. 34 He says this: 'About the
motion35 of the moving thing and the [passive] motion of the thing
that has been moved, one ought to sayS& - and this also applies to
bodies and their alteration37 - that not always is the half first but
sometimes [it happens] all together.' For all these reasons it does not
seem to have been a satisfactory assumption that everything that
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to alteration. And that which does not come to be in this sense of the
term has truly been said not to have a starting-point, being without
dimension and without parts. For the heaven and this universe have
many and wonderful things from the Creator,46 but it has also at least
a share of body. Hence it has parts, and a starting-point and an end.
But Aristotle also agrees that Being had not come to be, and welcomes
the teaching itself, and Melissus' proof about this teaching. And
Eudemus agrees that what simply exists has not come to be, saying:
'It is well to agree that the whole of what there is47 did not come to be
all at once, since it is "not possible for it to come to be out of what does
not exist; but it is of course reasonable that many things come to be
and pass away in parts, and we see that'. And in this way the
premises have been taken truly and the conversion of equivalents is
not prevented from occurring with the antecedent; as when we say 'If
it is a man, it is also a rational animal and mortal', and 'if it is not a
man, neither is it a rational mortal animal'.
H then being created is equally true with having a starting-point
and an end, it is no different from the conversion of the antecedent. 48
For being uncreated is also equivalent to not having a starting-point,
and the example of the heaven and in general the eternal bodies does
not impede us. For these are uncreated not as partless, but as not
having come to be from the starting-point oftime.49
And Melissus is criticised for the fact that, since arkhe&J has
several senses, he takes, instead of beginning with regard to time,
which is appropriate to what has come to be, that with regard to the
thing, which does not also belong to the things which alte:r5 1 all at
once. But52 it seems that he, even before Aristotle, 53 made the fine
suggestion that every body, even that which is eternal, being limited,
has a limited beginning in time. But because of the continuous
guiding motion of the ControllerM it is always at the beginning, and
exists forever, so that what has a beginning and an end in size has
these things also in time, and vice versa. For what has a beginning
and end in time does not all exist at one time. So he bases his proof
from its beginning and end in time. He does not say that what is not
all, that is, what is not whole at the same time, is without beginning
in this way and without end. That belongs to the things that have no
parts and are truly infinite, that is, to what exists absolutely and
most perfectly. For all that belongs to Being. And Melissus speaks of
these matters in this way: 'When therefore it did not come to be, but
exists, it always was and always will be and does not have a beginning
or an end, but is infinite. For if it had come to be, it would have had
a beginning (for it would have begun, if it came to be at some time)
and an end (for it would have had an end if it came to be at some
time)55: but if it did not have either a beginning or an end, and has
always been and always will be, it has neither a beginning nor an end;
for it is not possible for what is not all to exist for ever.' And it is clear
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that the word 'pout (at some time) has a chronological sense; and that
with coming to be he meant 'has come to be' in relation to substance.
which until it exists is coming to be, and not Being, is clear from 'it
would have had an end at some time if it came to be existing' and from
'it is not possible for what is not all to exist for ever', since what
always exists, which is also all, is contrary to what has come to be.
And that just as he says the 'came to be at some time' is limited as to
substance, so he also means that what always exists is infinite in
substance, he made clear when he said 'but just as it always exists,
so also its size must always be infinite'. But he does not call what has
dimension size. For he himself shows that Being is not divisible: 'For
if Being is divisible, it changes. 56 But what changes would not be all
altogether'. And he calls the extent (diarma) 57 of the substrate size.
For that he wants Being to be incorporeal he showed when he said 'If
it were Being, it ought to be one. But being one it ought not to have a
body'. And next he attached being infinite with regard to substance
to the eternal, when he said 'nothing that has a beginning and an end
is either eternal oc infinite, so that what does not have them is
infinite.'58 Then from the infinite he argued also to the One, from the
words 'if it were not one, it would be limited towards something
else'. 59 But Eudemus criticised this as being stated imprecisely, when
he [i.e. Eudemus] writes like this: 'If anyone were to agree that Being
is infinite, why will it also be one? It is not because they are several
that they limit one another in some way. For it seems that past time
is infinite, although it is brought to an end at the present. So perhaps
things that were several would not be infinite in every way, but it
seems that they could be towards one another. One ought then to
define in what way they would not be infinite, if they were also
several.'
186al6-18 Then why is it motionless, if it is one? Or just as this
actual part, as a unit, like this water, moves within itself, why
not also the all? Then why would there not be alteration
(alloiosis)?
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and [said] that Melissus did away only with spatial motion, and not
other kinds of alteration.62 He gives this account because of Aristotle's
remark: 'then why would there not be alteration?'63 But it seems to
me that Melissus is completing what he had said about Being, that it
has not come to be and is eternal and infinite and one and like itself,
[and] through these taking away from Being all the other changes
connected with coming to be, and showing first that neither as being
destroyed nor as growing nor as getting smaller nor as being altered
is Being changed, or made different as a whole, which would be
common to growth ana alteration. For it would be neither eternal nor
infinite nor one nor like itself if it underwent these things. Then also
[he said] that there is no void. For the void, not that [empty] of body
but [that] empty of Being, is nothing. Assuming first then that Being
is more, 64 that is, the same as full, and, showing that void does not
exist, he concludes that it would not move in space as into another
place beside itself, for there is nothing empty of Being into which it
could move, nor into itself. For it was necessary that it would have
become denser from rarer. But it would not be dense and rare. For the
rare has some void, and the void does not exist, neither as a whole nor
especially in it [i.e. Being], because it is more [i.e. full]. And that Being
is more he shows from the fact that it receives nothing else into itself;
for if it did receive [something), there would be a void in Being, and
void does not exist.
But that it is not as Alexander understood, 65 the proof proceeds in
this way, from the fact that the moving thing must move either
through what is full or through void; but that Being itself ought to be
full Eudemus also shows when he says, 'In what way is it immobile?
Because it is full; and it is full because what is infinite has no part in
void.' But since it may be archaically, 66 but not unclearly, that Melissus actually wrote this, let us set out his archaic words in order that
readers can be more accurate judges of quite relevant explanations.
So Melissus says this, completing what he had said earlier. and
bringing in, in this way, the things about motion. 'Thus therefore it
is eternal and infinite and one and all alike. And it would neither be
destroyed nor become larger nor would it change its shape nor feel
pain or grief. For if it were to undergo any of these things it would not
still be one. For if it were altered, it would be necessary that Being be
not alike, but that the previous Being be destroyed and for what is
not to come to be. If again67 by one hair in a thousand years the all68
were changed. it would be destroyed in the whole of time. But it is
also not possible for it to be disarranged. For the arrangement that
existed before is not destroyed, and what was not does not come to be.
When nothing can be added, nor destroyed, nor altered, 69 how could
any bit of what exists be rearranged? For if anything became different, it would at once also be rearranged. Nor does it suffer pain; for it
would not all be in pain. For there could not always be a thing in pain,
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and it would not have equal power to a thing in health; nor would it
be like itself, if it were in pain. For it would be in pain if something
were removed or added, and it would not be like itself. Nor could the
healthy be affected by pain; for the healthy and the existent would be
destroyed, and the non-existent would come into being. And about
grief it is the same story as about pain. Nor is there any void; for the
void is nothing. Therefore the nothing would not exist. Nor does it
move; for it has nowhere into which to move; but it is full. For if there
were void, it would move into the void. But since there is no void it
10 does not have anywhere to go to. And it would not be dense and rare;
for it is not possible for the rare to be full like the dense, for the rare
is already emptier than the dense. One must decide in this way about
the full and what is not full: if it has room for or receives anything, it
is not full; but if it has no room and does not receive [anything], it is
full. It is necessary therefore for it to be full, if there is no void. H
15 therefore it is full, it does not move.' These then are the words of
Melissus.
But Aristotle finds fault, first [asking] why it is necessary, if it is
one, for it not to move spatially, 70 if even whole things can move 71
staying in one and the same place through the interchange of their
parts, 72 not needing any void, like this water staying in one and the
20 same vessel and being shaken. 73 What then prevents the all, too, from
moving but neither losing74 space nor adding to it, with the parts in
it moving with their mutual interchange, just as the whole sphere
also is seen to be moving around its poles and its axis which stay still,
and [so too] every sphere and cone and cylinder; for a thing can move
in its place and not change from place to place, as has been said. And
25 just as he says a portion of water 'moves within itsel, 75 so what
prevents the whole Being also [doing likewise]? But since Melissus
removed alteration76 also from being one, 'why', he [i.e. Aristotle]
says, 'would there not be alteration'77 of what is one, if it is possible
for that one, staying the same in substance, to exchange one quality
for another at different times, like becoming cold from hot or black
from white, or being ill from being healthy? But it seems that Aris30 totle's terseness 78 has often caused the commentators to go wrong.
For when he said, 'then why would there not be alteration?'79 Alexander explained it like this: 'as Melissus, through showing that Being
cannot move in a spatial motion, ascribing to it complete immobility'
113,1 (for these are Alexander's exact words) although Melissus had earlier
done away with the other types of motion even before that of spatial
motion, as the quotation given before shows. As [Aristotle did] about
the One being able to change and alterSO and stay still one in substance, so now Aristotle met [the difficulty] by taking the 'one'
5 generally according to common usage (for we say that Socrates staying one and the same feels pain in his leg and gets relief) and Melissus
takes One more strictly and not more generally, as the other things
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he said show, and not least81: 'If again by one hair in a thousand years
the all were changed, it would be destroyed in the whole of time', with
its being necessary, if it is one, to be like itself and eternal in the strict
sense. So that if it stayed the same in everything it would not have
anything by which it would receive change.82 For it was necessary for
what was changing and altering in any way to change from one state
to another. And if it were to move spatially by whirling around like
water, if there were no void it must have a circular shape like one that
is spherical or conical or cylindrical. For the other figures 83 when
whirled around touclt different places at different times. And what
has a shape would be limited and not infinite. If something that was
unmoved before were to move in the same place, of necessity the
starting-point of the motion would be some part getting denser or
rarer. And in general revolution is a movement of bodies. And Melissus has shown that Being is bodiless.
186a19-22 But it is not possible for [the contents of the universe] to be one even in species except in their matterM (some of
the natural philosophers also speak of the one in the latter way,
but not in the former) for man is different from horse in species,
and the opposites from one another.
In the universal85 words there are three separate meanings of the
word 'one', that by continuity, that as undivided, and that [as having]
the [same] account, and having shown that by none of these meanings
can Being be one, and having also replied to Melissus' actual words,
in my opinion he [i.e. Aristotle] brings in this common argument that
in general it is not possible for being to be one in species, except in its
'from which', that is, except by its material cause. 'For by this', as
Alexander explains, 'it is possible for being to be one in species,86 as
some other of the natural philosophers also said, '!'hales and Hippo87
speaking of water, Anaximenes of air, and Heraclitus of fire. It is
however absurd to say that for that reason these things are one in
species. For if anyone were to say this, that things are one in so far
as all things have come from some one thing and one principle,88 he
would be giving an account that had also been given by some of the
said natural philosophers; for according to those for whom the origin
of things is one, all things would be one in account, as from one
[origin], but not as they [now] are. For according to this, having
different accounts, and some even opposite [accounts], how would
they be the same as one another? As man and horse, or rational
animal and irrational, would be the same in matter, but not the same
in species. It is clear that it is more absurd than that the differences
should be the same that the opposites should be the same.'
It is worthwhile to concentrate on what Alexander is looking at
when he says that it is possible to say that things are one in species
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Both in the theory and in the defence of the theory some things are
common to Parmenides and to Melissus, but others are special [to one
or the other]. Common in the theory is that Being is one and immobile, special are that Melissus [says that] it is infinite, and Parmenides that it is finite. Common to their positive arguments are
again that they argue invalidly and that they adopt false premises.
But specific are the actual premises which each of them used. For it
was not through the same premises that they both produced their
proofs. And so some parts of the counter-argument against them will
be produced in the same way, but others in one or another way. For
whatever has been said to destroy generally the claim that Being is
one, these have equally been said against both, as also with both that
the argument is faulty and that each assumes false premises and that
the conclusion is not valid. For this too is brought in common towards
a refutation. About the things which are said in reply to the special
premises of each of them, these he [i.e. Aristotle] meets individually
to each, and as they differ in their opinions, the one saying that Being
is infinite and the other [that it is] finite, it is also for this reason
necessary for the opposing arguments to differ.
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Of this account Aristotle first shows the falsity of the premises, and
then the invalidity of the argument. And the falsity comes from the
fact that he [i.e. Parmenides} takes 'being' in only one way, when it is
used in many ways, as many ways as he [i.e. Aristotle] has shown it
is used in the Categories. For the statement: 'if anything exists other
than Being, that is non-existent', if 'Being' were spoken of in only one
way, it would perhaps have been rightly said. But not with the things
that are said in many ways. Just as if someone were to say: 'If
something exists other than the crab, that is not a crab.' For we will
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ask about a crab of a different kind. For the crab in the heaven is other
than the crab that lives in water, or the crab of the smith. 110 And there
:is no impediment to there being a species of crab other than the one
in the heaven. Likewise if there is anything other than what is, i.e.
other than substance, that is not substance, but there is no impediment to its being quality or quantity, and if there is anything other
than quality, it is not quality, but may be quantity or substance. And
so nothing prevents there being many existing things and even Being
itself not to be, but not the opposites. 111 For Socrates is a man, but not
a horse, and a substance, but not a quality. And the lemma112 is
absurd for other reasons. For with 'If anything other than Being
exists, it is not Being' at the same time they grant that the same thing
may possibly be and not be; but this in the case of what is said to be
'in itself is absurd. If anyone were to produce the first premise 113 with
'being' spoken of in many ways, this will be true, but the one following
it will not be true, the one which says that what is not being is
nothing; for this is equivalent to 'what is other than substance is
nothing' although there are many things which are not substances.
So in this way the premises given by Theophrastus are rejected as
being false, and their combination as invalid, because the following
conclusion drawn was 'what is other than Being is nothing'. But he
[i.e. Theophrastus] added: 'Being then is one'. And if one supposes
that 'what is' is spoken of in only one way, as Eudemus records, he
also takes it as false. For 'being' is not [spoken of] as one, at least if
[it is spoken of] in ten ways. 114 And then also it is not in this way that
the conclusion is reached that Being is one. And if someone supposes
there is nothing other than substance, nothing prevents there being
substances alone, but that these are many, which Eudemus also
showed through his saying: 'Nor if anyone were to agree with him
that being was spoken of in only one way', and the following: 'Just as
if all beings were beautiful and there were nothing to be found that
was not beautiful, all things would be beautiful, and yet the beautiful
will not be one but many, (for a colour will be beautiful and an activity
and whatever else)', 115 and Aristotle showed the same thing with the
case of white116: 'in this way all things will exist, but they will not be
one and the same'. And the conclusion that says 'Being therefore is
one' is false, and is not deduced from the assumptions. For even if
'being' [is spoken of] in only one way, it is not immediately true that
Being is one. For it is spoken of in one way both in genus and in
species. And many things [are spoken of] in either way. And it will
happen in the case of Eudemus' example of beautiful, where he says:
'because all things will be beautiful, still the beautiful will not be one'
in number. For the things that are one in account are not immediately
also one in number. But Aristotle brought together the same [i.e.
white] things under white. And if anyone were to say that it is not in
number that being is brought together as one, but in species and in
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186b14-186b35 It is also clear by reasoning that the just-existent is divided into some other just-existents, just as, if man is
some just-existent, it is necessary that animal also is some
just-existent, and two-footed. For if they were not some just-existent, they would be accidents. Either then they would be
accidents to man, or to some other substrate. But that is impossible. For this is said to be an accident, either what can belong
or not belong, or that of which that to which it is an accident,
belongs in its definition [or in which the definition exists to which
it is an accident] (like sitting is a separate thing, but in 'snub' the
account ofthe nose is included, to which [nose] we say that 'snub'
is an accident); again the things that are in the defining account or
out of which it [i.e. the defining account] is, in their account is not
included the account of the whole, as in the account of two-footed
that of man, or in that of white that of white man. Iftherefore these
things are like this and two-footed is an accident of man, it must
be separable, so that it would be possible for man not to be
two-footed, or else in the account of two-footed is the account of
man. But that is impossible; for that [i.e. the accident] is in the
account of that [i.e. the subject]. If two-footed and animal are
accidents of another thing, and neither is some just-existent, man
also would be one of the accidents to something else. But let the
just-existent be an accident to nothing, and let both terms and
what comes from them be said of it.
Alexander says that 'having shown that the accidents are brought
together with the just-existent, he {i.e. Aristotle] now shows that even
if it were granted to them [i.e. Parmenides and Melissus) that the
just-existent alone exists, by the fact that this is strictly Being, and
that accidents exist in a different way, even so Being itself will not be
one, but many just-existents; for the division, as of size, which he
recorded, will be into just-existents. And it is also necessary to divide
according to the account into several just-existents, that is, according
to the definition. Having shown then according to size and its division
into parts that being becomes many and dissimilar, if each of the
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either were said, or each of the parts, of this also that [made] from the
parts should be said. A consequence of this would be: 'and also man
would be [one] ofthe accidents'. Among these things he put in: 'but
let the just-existent be an accident to nothing' .188 In these matters this
too must be added: it is clear that the just-existent being divided now
should be divided neither as genus nor as species, from the fact that
man is divided not into atoms, but into the definition. 189
But since Alexander brought together the formal arguments on
this topic with great care, 190 let us too set them out in the approved
way, like this, from the beginning of his account: 191 [1] 'those who say
that being is one say that being is spoken of either in many ways or
in only one way. But if in many ways, they agree that existing things
are many (for they are substance and quantity and quality and the
rest into which being is divided), but not one. So [it is] not [spoken of]
in many ways. In one way then, according to what is called the fifth
indemonstrable. 192 [2] Then the second argument, with the assumption that being said in one way is itself disjunctive like this: the one
being is either substance or accident, according to the twofold division
that occurs in the division of things that exist, into that which is in a
substrate and that which is not in a substrate. But it is not an
accident: it is therefore substance, and this too is deduced according
to the fifth indemonstrable. [3] And that the one being is not accident
the third argument shows like this: 'if being is accident its substrate
exists and does not exist at the same time. But this is impossible.
Therefore being is not accident' by the second indemonstrable. 193 He
proved the consequent from the fact that the substrate to the one and
only being does not exist, because, first, there does not exist another
thing other than it (for there was not anything else other than Being)
and, secondly, because being belongs to it, and it itself becomes being.
[4] And also, that substance is not what is strictly being, or as he
himself says, the just-existent, he shows again like this: 'if substance
is the just-existent, the just-existent signifies no more being than
not-being. 1M So that the just-existent will be alike being and not
being. And 'being' signifies several things, when it was supposed that
it was one only. But these things are impossible. Therefore substance
is not the just-existent'. [5] And that the just-existent is no more being
than not-being he shows like this: 'If the just-existent is substance
and substrate, and accidents belong to substance, and they are notbeing because they are other than being, and that to which not-being
belongs is not existent, substance and the substrate will be not-being,
and not just any not-being, but wholly not-being. For such was the
not-being of the accident that belonged to it [sc. substance]'. [6] And
that the just-existent signifies several things he shows like this: 'if
the just-existent is substrate, it is possible to name it from an
accident, like white. So that it will also be said to be white, and to be
one, and the just-existent (for there is nothing else other than this),
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and thus what is will be many.' [7] And also, that the one being will
not have size, he shows like this: 'The just-existent itself as only
substrate is not many, and does not have quantity: what has size is
many: therefore the just-existent will not have size'. [8] And that
131,1 what has size is many he shows in this way: 'Size has parts: what has
parts has things that are other in account: what has things that are
other in account has many things in itself and is many.' [9] And at the
end, finally, that the just-existent is divided into just-existents and
things that differ in account, he shows with one [case of] the just-ex5 istent, taking its definition and concluding that its parts are
themselves just-existents. He concludes like this: 'They must be
either substances or accidents: but they are not accidents: substance,l95 therefore'. This too in accordance with the fifth
indemonstrable. H therefore the one, as has been said earlier, 196 is one
as being continuous, or as things of which the account is the same, or
as indivisible, and it has been shown that the one being is not able to
10 have size, nor a definition, and is not indivisible, it is clear that
according to none of the meanings of 'one' would Being be one.
But since throughout all my exegesis I myself too have treated the
just-existent as substance, and substance as individual and one in
number, but some of the commentators on Aristotle. among whom is
Aspasius, 197 take the just-existent as the genus of existing things, and
15 since Alexander of Aphrodisias has spoken adequately against them,
let there be set out in shortened form the things said by him:
'For some', he [i.e. Alexander] says, 'understood his words as if he
[i.e. Aristotle] were saying that it is necessary for those who say that
being is spoken of in only one way to suppose a common genus for all
existing things, to which all the things existing belong as parts, and
20 to say that this is being and so one, since taking none of the things
under being can they still say that being is one by bringing together
with the supposed [one] the others too. For the accidents are brought
together with the substance, and substance with the accidents, as he
showed. 198 He [i.e. Alexander] confirmed this account from the [statement] in the Topics that places the just-existent above the genus,
saying 'man is what animal is' 199 instead of 'in the animal genus'. But
25 that he [i.e. Aristotle] is not speaking like this now of the just-existent, but [indicates that it] signifies substance, he shows from what
was said before. For even if it is necessary to speak out against this
hypothesis, 200 he has already spoken in the words he used: 'if there
are going to be substance and quantity and quality, and whether
these are separated from one another or not, existing things are
many'.201 For the one who speaks of being as genus supposes that all
30 these things exist. So that it has been said202 against this opinion also,
if indeed it needed any refutation. For he [i.e. Aristotle) seems to
despise an open refutation. For the man who wanted there to be one
thing only as being one in number, would not say that this [kind of
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one] was genus, because genus at once brings in with itself a quantity
of species and individuals. But from what is it clear, someone might
say, that Parmenides spoke of it as one in number?203 It is also clear
from that man [i.e. Aristotle] that he does not speak of the just- 35
existent as genus, but as substance. [1]24For he shows that it [i.e. the
just-existent] is not accident, from the fact that accident is spoken of 132,1
as in a substrate, so that it itself is not in a substrate, but is a
substrate which is a substance standing by itself and not needing
anything itself for existing.205 But206 genus, it too, is [one] of the things
that are in a substrate. So that the just-existent would not be genus, 5
if what is in a substrate is clearly distinguished from it. [2] Again,
after a little time he [i.e. Aristotle] says: 'Who understands being
itself except as some just-existent?'207 If then being itself is related not
to genus but to substance, the just-existent would be substance. In
connexion with this it should be said that Plato uses 'itself of the
genera and not of the subgenera, but of what move through all by one 10
common nature. 208 [3] Again, if he [i.e. Aristotle] takes the opposite of
the accident, as is clear from [the words] 'but let the just-existent be
an accident to nothing',209 the opposite of accident is not genus but
substance, and this would be the just-existent. [4) Again, by a division
he made a contrast, and divided it between accident and the just-existent.210 For it was not a necessary211 question: what do they call 15
being, accident or genus? For there is something other than these; so
that [it can be divided to include] substance. The just-existent then is
substance. [5] Again, dividing how 'one' is spoken of: he selected one
in number. He did not make mention of one in genus or in species, as
obviously bringing in number. [6] Again, genus has two [divisions],
the substantial212 and the common, but substance has to be substance
alone. If then he nowhere speaks against what is common, but only 20
against substance, the just-existent is not genus but substance. [7)
Again, further on, he himself says: 'If then the just-existent is an
accident of nothing' ,213 and some genera are accidents, even if not of
those things of which they are genera, but genera of the accidents are
said to belong to substance, like a colour to a man, 214 if then in the
genus there is actually some accident, but in substance there is
nothing like that, and he himself places the just-existent in opposition 25
to accident, he would call the just-existent the substance, not the
genus, which is attached also to the nature of accident. [8] Again,
advancing, he says: 'If therefore the just-existent is an accident of
nothing, but [other things are accidents] of that'. 215 If then that to
which accidents occur is substance, but not genus, the just-existent
would be substance, not genus. [9] Again, dividing the just-existent, 30
he does not divide it into species and individuals, which is the way
genus is divided, but into definition and what are in that, that is, into
genus and differentiae, which would be the way substance is divided,
but not genus. Hence there is a genus of substance, but there is no
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genus above the very highest genus of all. [10] Again, he shows that
genus and differentiae are just-existents because they are parts of the
just-existent. If then genus is the just-existent through something
else, it would not be the just-existent itself, but substance [would be
that], through which the genus of substance is substantiated, as the
[genus of] accident is accident. [11) Again, this216 would have appeared neither to be a mere suggestion nor a paradoxical proposal; for
it seems to many of the philosophers that being is one as genus. [12]
Again, if the just-existent were supposed to be a genus, how is it that
he said that white or any other of the accidents did not exist? For
these are species of what is just as substance is as well. But he
himself, taking them as not existing, brought in as also not existing
in the same way the just-existent, to which these belong, and not
existing not as some thing not existing, but as absolutely not existing.
And yet how would the accident be absolutely not existing, if its genus
is the just-existent? [13] Again, if the just-existent is a genus, why
will all the things under it be either not existent or just-existents? For
it is not the case that everything under the genus is a genus itself.
[14] Again, 'For if, he says, 'the just-existent is, <the same as>
white'. 217 And yet nobody would call the genus white, but we do say
that the substance which shares in it is white. From this it is clear
that he speaks of substance at the individual level, but not at that of
genus. [15} Again, it was very easy to show that existing things are
many by setting out the definition of genus; for the genus is of several
things. But he nowhere refers to this clearly when he shows that
there are many existing things, and it is clear that he takes the
just-existent as not being a genus. And if anyone thinks it right for
this reason to say that the just-existent is genus, because in other
works he calls the just-existent the genus, 218 it is time for him to call
the just-existent also the differentia. For there he also calls that [sc.
the differentia] the just-existent as completive219 of the just-existent.
And in those works, however, in which he calls the genus the just-existent, as substantially predicated and making that of which it is
predicated what it is, in this way he calls it the just-existent. And
Eudemus, following Aristotle in everything, did not accept that the
just-existent is genus. At any rate speaking about Parmenides in the
first [book] of his Physics he wrote this (as Alexander says; for I have
not found this statement in my Eudemus material):220 'He would not
mean the common. 221 For neither were these matters enquired into
yet, but later on, from the arguments, there was an advance, nor
would there be accepted what he [i.e. Parmenides] says about Being.
For how will this be "equally extending from the centre" and similar
points. But to the heaven, they say, nearly all such arguments are
appropriate.' 222
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187al-11 And some yielded to both points, 223 to the one [point],
that all things are one, if being signifies one, by saying that
not-being exists, and to the other, from the dichotomy, by creating indivisible lines. It is obvious that it is not true, if being
signifies one, and it is not possible for both parts of the contradiction to be true at the same time, that there will not be
anything non-existent; for nothing prevents not-being, not from
simply existing, but from being something which is not. To say
that if there is nothing else apart from the one, all things will be
one, is absurd. For who understands being itself except as some
just-existent? And if that is so, nothing prevents existing things
from being many, as has been said. So it is clear that it is
impossible for being to be one in this way.
He [i.e. Aristotle] himself, having refuted Parmenides' argument both
as adopting false premises (the premise was that being is spoken of
in one way only -either 'There is nothing other than what is' or 'What
is not is nothing'- for these are equivalent) and as putting them
together in a non-syllogistic way (for the conclusion asserted does not
follow) he says that some yield to both arguments, both that stated
by Parmenides and that stated by Zeno, who wanted to help the
argument of Parmenides against those who tried to mock him on the
grounds that if one is many he will be saying224 things both laughable
to reason and self-contradictory. Zeno shows that their hypothesis,
which says that there are many things, involves still more laughable
things than the one [which says] that there is [only] one, if anyone
were to attack it properly. For Zeno himsel( in Plato's Parmenides, 225
seems to be a witness to this account. And the statement of Parmenides is this, that all things are the one Being, if being means one.
For other than it there will be nothing. And as Theophrastus proposed: 'What is other than being is not. What is not is nothing'. 226 And
he [i.e. Aristotle] says that some give in to this argument. And to give
in to an argument is to agree to the premises which establish it, or to
the combination. They say that Plato gave in to the premise that says
that what is other than being is not. (For indeed he says in the
Sophist227 that motion and rest and same and other are different from
being) but he still does not agree that what is not is nothing. For he
also says that what are different from being, even if they are not
beings, still however exist, and by this he brings in what is not.
And Alexander says that he [i.e. Plato] agrees on the one hand that
Being is one, but he still does not on the other agree that all things
are one, when he assumes that among all things are not only Being
but also not-being. 'And it is not', he says, 'in this way that he [i.e.
Plato) said that not-being existed, as being some tbing among the
things that are under being. For he was not saying that there was
something not existing and something existing, nor that [it is that] 228
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which is included in what is assumed to be, but [it is] that which has
another nature other than what was agreed and postulated, when he
accepted that Being was one and was spoken of in only one way. But
agreeing to the premise that other than Being there is nothing, but
saying that there is something other than the being assumed in the
premise, he [i.e. Plato] says that there is a contradiction. 229 For,
granting that what is other than being does not exist, he says that on
the contrary what is other than being does exist and falls into the
contradiction by saying that not-being exists simply. H however
someone were to say that not-being exists, but not the simple not-being, but some not-being, he does not fall into the contradiction. For
30 that which is something other is not other. For it was shown that
being was not one in number through its being taken that it was
spoken of in one way.' These then are the words of Alexander.
But Porphyry says that Plato says that not-being also exists, but
135, 1
in this way, as not being. For he [i.e. Plato] declared that what truly
exists is form, and that is really substance, and that the highest, first,
shapeless and formless matter, 230 from which all things come, exists,
but is none o:f the things that exist. For it, thought of in itself, is
5 potentially all things, but actually nothing. But the thing completed
from the form and the matter, in as far as it partakes of form, to this
extent it is something and is named after the form, but in as far as it
[shares in) the matter, and through this finds itself in continuous flow
and change, on the contrary exists neither simply nor :firmly. At any
rate Plato divides them up in the Timaeus23 1 and says: 'What always
10 exists, and does not have an origin, and what comes into being, but
never exists'. And when he said that not-being exists, he did not [say
that] Being was not-being, nor that not-being was Being. [These are]
not contraries according to the antithesis. For man cannot also at the
same time be not-man, but it is true that he [can be] not a horse.
But in reply to Alexander it is enough to set out the words of
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Plato, 232 to which Alexander himself referred, which show clearly, I
think, that Plato was bringing in not the absolute not-being, but some
not-being. These words go like this: 'Do you know then that we have
had doubts about Parmenides' statement and gone far away from his
prohibition? In what way? Going further than he forbade us to look,
20 by searching forwards we have taught him something. How? Because
he says somewhere:
25
For never shall this prevail that what are not, are, but you, keep
your thought away from this path233 when enquiring.
25
Yes, he does say this. But we have shown not only that what are not
are, but have also revealed what kind of thing <not-being~ is. For
having revealed the nature of Other as existing and being scattered
out over all the things there are in relation to one another, opposing
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the part of each thing related to being to it, 285 we have been bold
enough to say that this itself is what is genuinely not-being. Let no
one therefore tell us that, having revealed that not-being is the
opposite of being, we dare to say that it is. For we long ago said
goodbye to the question whether there is an opposite to it, whether it
is or is not, having an account or being entirely without an account.
But about what we have said about not-being existing, let someone
persuade us by a refutation that we have not argued well, or, to the
extent he cannot, he must also say as we say, that the genera are
mixed with one anot;her, and Being and Other, going through all
things and one another, and on the one hand the Other, sharing in
Being, has existence through this sharing, not however being that in
which it shares, but other, and being other than Being, necessarily
most clearly can be not-being. On the other hand not-being again
sharing in the Other, would be other than the remaining genera. And
being other than all of those it is not each of them, nor all the others
except itself, so that indisputably Being again is not thousands upon
thousands, and the others individually, like this, both in many ways
are everything and in many ways are not'. 236
From these words Alexander thought that Plato was introducing
the absolute not-being, taking absolute not-being as being genus. It
was enough to hear Plato himself saying: 'Let no one therefore say of
us, that having revealed that not-being is the opposite of being, we
are bold enough to say [that it is], 287 and that 'each thing exists
through its sharing in Being, but it is not Being'. And before these
words he showed clearly what kind of not-being he was introducing
by saying: 'whenever we speak of not-being, as it seems, we do not
speak of something opposite to being, but of [what is] different
only.'238 It was enough to hear also the words spoken about what was
absolutely not-being and opposed to Being, as Plato dismissed any
argument about it whatsoever. For neither the one saying that it is,
nor the one saying that it is not, is free from censure. Nor is saying
anything about it safe. So then these things that I said were sufficient. It is necessary to comprehend that the Being assumed by Plato
is what is studied in accordance with the bare peculiarity of Being
itself, which is set in the division against both the other genera and
not-being. For he says that this too is a genus, but not complete being,
which contains all the genera in itself. To that, complete not-being would
be opposed, if it is possible to speak of opposing with regard to it. This
kind ofbeing would not be a genus, if genera are opposed to one another
in a division. And these are circumscribed by one peculiarity, and
distinguished from the intellectual289 union, in which all were one, as
Parm.enides said, and descending :first into the mental section, divided
undividedly, and then into the sensible portion, and between these into
the psychical conjunction. So that it is far from true that Plato introduced the absolute not-being which is opposed to absolute Being.
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And Porphyry observed well that Plato did not introduce absolute
not-being, but that he taught in the Sophist that the created being
was not Being about which he says in the Timaeus, 'and what is
coming to be, 240 but never Being', this seems to me to be worthy of
examination. For it is not in the division containing the sensible but
in that of the mental forms that Plato appears to find not-being, for
at some time he would say these things about the enmattered and
sensible: 'What, by Zeus? Shall we easily be persuaded that motion
and life and soul and thought are truly not present in the entirely
existent, and that it does not live or think, but, solemn and holy, not
having mind, it exists staying unmoved?'241 I reply in common to
Alexander and Porphyry that Plato did not as clearly say that some
not-being, which he introduced, existed, as Aristotle alleged in accusing him of introducing absolute not-being. And still, however, he [i.e.
Aristotle] would not in these words be objecting to Plato, that he
feared in vain, that if what is other than Being is not, all things are
one, and brought in not-being for this reason. For Plato did not show
that there are many things by bringing in not-being, but he showed
that, after having demonstrated that One is one thing, and Being
another, and from its wholeness to be like the mass of a sphere
well-rounded from every direction, and equal from the middle, 242 and
<demonstrating >243 not-being and calling the sophist a maker of
images, 244 and [saying that] the image has something false, but that
falsity does not exist unless not-being exists. For the liar either says
that what is is not, or that what is not is.
These then are about one way out of the difficulty, with Aristotle
neither agreeing that being is spoken of in only one way, nor accepting the proposition saying that what is other than being is not; unless
someone were to say of not-being that it is not substance, but is not
prevented from being something else. And, before Aristotle, Plato also
proclaimed that. And it is clear that Aristotle also saw that not-being
is included with plurality. For nothing, he says prevents not-being,
not to be absolutely, but to be some particular not-being. 245 Next,
however, he says246 that even if the proposition were true, which says
that what is other than being is not, it is not immediately necessary
that all things are one in number. For Being itsel, 247 which they
postulate, nobody would understand as other than what is spoken of as
the just-existent, that is, strictly being, that is, substance. And this being
so, it has been shown earlier that whether the just-existent shares in
accident, existing things are many, or whether it does not share [in it],
things in themselves, which are what beings are, are also many, through
the things substantially included in the definition of the just-existent. It
is worthwhile to understand that the just-existent has also been called
Being itself, according to the Platonic custom.
Alexander says that the second argument, the one from dichotomy,
is by Zeno, who says that if being had size and were divided, both
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Being and not-being would still be many; and through this shows that
the One is none of the things that exist. But about this argument, and
through what came before, he says that Aristotle spoke when he said:
'The later of the ancients were disturbed too', 248 and he provided the
solution with the words: 'as it is not possible for the same thing to be
one and many, at least not as opposites, Being is one both potentially
and actually'. 249 'To this argument', he [i.e. Alexander] says, 'the one
about the dichotomy, Xenocrates of Chalcedon yielded, having accepted that the all, when divided, is many (for the part is different
from the whole), and that the same thing cannot be one and many at
the same time, because the (parts of the] contradiction cannot be true
together, but yet did not agree that every magnitude is divisible and
has parts; for there are some indivisible lines, of which it is not true
that these are many. In this way he thought to find the nature of'one'
and escape the contradiction through the fact that neither is what is
divided one but many, nor are the indivisible lines many but only one.'
It is worthwhile to consider these remarks of Alexander, first
[asking] if this is Zeno's own saying, that One is nothing of the things
that exist. 250 At any rate he wrote many arguments to the contrary.
doing away with the view that there are many things, so that by the
destruction of the many he would strengthen the view that all things
are one, which Parmenides also wanted. Next it was necessary to
explain the usefulness of the mention ofZeno's argument and of the
ineffectual concessions to him, since for those who gave in to Parmenides' argument, but introduced not-being, its usefuJness was
clear; for it was to show that existing things are many, which Parmenides did not want. But if Zeno himself destroyed the One by
showing that there are many things, the argument did not need any
support, unless someone should say that he mentioned it because this
argument was opposed to the one saying that existing things were
only many.
But it seems that Alexander took from the words of Eudemus the
opinion that Zeno did away with the One. For Eudemus says in his
Physics: 'is it then that One is not this, but it is something?251 For
there was a question about this. And they say that Zeno said that if
anyone were to give him whatever One is, he would have the power
to say what the things that exist are. 252 And there was a question, it
seems, because each of the sensibles was said to be many both by the
categories and by division, but the point was supposed to be nothing.
For what would neither increase something when added to it, nor
diminish it when taken away, was not thought to be among the things
that exist'. And it is likely that Zeno was arguing on both sides with
exercises (for which he was also called 'double-tongued'),253 and when
wondering about the One (was likely] to produce arguments of this
kind. In his book, however, which has many attempts at argument,
he shows in detail that the man who says there are many things finds
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fissile with regard to quantity and having parts, but individual and
primary in form, supposing that there are certain primary indivisible
lines, and the planes from these and primary solids. Xenocrates
thinks that he can solve the problem meeting us from the dichotomy
and, simply, the cutting and division to infinity, by bringing in the
indivisible lines and making absolutely indivisible magnitudes, es~
caping the difficulty that if Being is one it will be dissolved into
not-being and be expended, since the indivisible lines from which
existing things are made remain unsliced and undivided.'
If, in these words uttered by Porphyry, there is a verbatim record
of the argument from dichotomy through absurdity consequent on the
division, bringing in that Being is undivided and one, that would be
fine. But it is worthwhile to consider whether the argument is indeed
by Parmenides260 and not by Zeno, as it actually seemed to be to
Alexander. For nothing like this is to be seen in the works ofParmenides, and the broadest enquiry assigns the problem of the
dichotomy to Zeno. And mention is also made of it in the arguments
about motion, as being by Zeno.
And why should I say any more, for it also exists in the treatise of
Zeno? For again, showing that if there are many, the same things will
be limited and unlimited, Zeno writes thus verbatim: 'If there are
many, necessarily they are as many as they are, and neither more of
them nor fewer. But if they are as many as they are, they would be
limited. If they are many, existing things will be unlimited. For there
are always other things in between existing things, and again other
things in between them. And in this way existing things will be
unlimited.' And in this way he demonstrated the unlimited in quantity from the dichotomy, but [the unlimited] in magnitude he
[demonstrated] earlier by the same argument. For having shown first
that 'If Being did not have size it would also not exist', he adds: 'but
if it exists, it is necessary for each thing to have some size and
thickness and be apart from it the one from the other. And about that
which projects there is the same argument. For that also will have
size and part of it will [again] project.261 It is the same to utter this
once and to say it always. For nothing of it like this will be last, nor
will there not be another related to another. In this way if they are
many it is necessary for them to be small and large, small so as not
to have magnitude, and large so as to be unlimited.' Perhaps then the
argument from dichotomy is indeed Zeno's, as Alexander wants, but
not however doing away with the One, but rather [doing away with]
the many by the fact that those who support them are affected by the
same contradictions, and in this way supporting the argument of
Parmenides which says that Being is one. So that both the present
reference to the argument from dichotomy is reasonable, and that to
those who unjustifiably yielded to it, [saying) that if there did not
exist some indivisible magnitudes, existing things would necessarily
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be unlimited in both number and size, and for this reason postulating
indivisible lines, so that both existing things may be many, and the
number and the size should not advance to infinity. And yet they
appear to have fallen into a contradiction in speaking of sizeless size.
Hence Aristotle does not accept this solution. For it is not the case
that if magnitude were divisible to infinity, immediately its parts
would also be actually infinite, but [they would be] actually one,
potentially many. Hence Aristotle did not do well in bringing in the
20 contradiction, or the solution of those who said that the one and the
many were the same. For those, however, who show that they are
infinite it is not true to say that the parts of the continuum are
potentially infinite. For they would at some time have become actually infinite, unless the potential was useless. But it must be remarked that Porphyry said that 'it is one thing for the continuum to
25 be divisible to infinity, and another for it to have been divided to
infinity.' For division can always come about, and that is for it to be
to infinity, but it never can have come about and have ceased, since
in stopping at least it has been given a limit. For there is a difference
between something having been divided to infinity and dividing
something to infinity. Fm" the one thing would never come about and
30 have been completed, whereas the other would never cease continually happening. For through the one always coming about and not
being able to cease, the other would never be completed. Let therefore
no one worry about how what is divisible to infinity, having the
potential to be divided (for what is divisible is what is capable of being
divided), will never, even so, be divided to infinity. For it will appear
that the potential which will never end up in actuality is irrelevant.
35 Let this therefore not disturb you; for what is divisible to infinity has
not been potentially divided to infinity, but is being divided to infi.n142,1 ity. This always holds in actuality, if every given thing is divisible,
and is divided, at least if nothing prevents it, if not by us, by nature,
which is continually being applied and dividing it. And it is clear that
with everything continuous being divided to infinity the view that
5 there is no magnitude and that it is being divided neither into
indivisible magnitudes nor into non-magnitudes is strengthened. For
of every given continuum there is some part which is itself also
continuous, even to infinity. And if every division is into magnitudes,
it is clear that [this] division will be to infinity. And that it is into
magnitudes is clear, if points can neither touch one another nor
create a distance between them. For a point put next to a point
makes a point, but not a magnitude. Therefore it is neither formed
10 from points nor divided into points; but neither will it ever be
divided into infinite magnitudes since it is finite. For from those
into which it is divided, from them it is formed; but what was
[made up] of magnitudes infinite in quantity, would itself be infinite in magnitude. For if it were finite, it would receive an addition
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of something else like what made it up; and thus those things were
not infinite in quantity.
But since Xenocrates was also a clever man, how did he come to
suggest the indivisible lines? For he was not ignorant of the nature of
magnitude, but neither did he say that it was divisible in species.262
For not only do the smallest lines have that, but also the largest
bodies. Perhaps then Xenocrates opposes, not the slicing to infinity
(for as a geometer he would not do away with a geometrical principle),
but, the being divided into infinity when there were always some
undivided magnitudes; these are not by nature strong enough in
themselves, because of their smallness, to be divided, but united back
with other bodies, with the whole divided like this, in themselves they
accept the division to which by themselves alone they would not have
stood up. So just as Plato said that the first and smallest bodies were
plane surfaces, so Xenocrates said [they were] lines indivisible because of their smallness, but these too being divisible in nature.
But since we have already arrived at the end of the arguments
against Parmenides, it would be well to search out Parmenides' own
opinion about the one Being, 263 as agreeing with what has been said,
and to examine what the disagreements are about. That Parmenides
supposes that the one Being is not part of the things that come to be
and pass away, is shown by his indication which says that the
uncreated and unending is one, in which he says:
There remains a single account of a journey, that it is. On this
way there are very many signs, that being uncreated, it is also
indestructible. 264
Moreover he certainly does not want the one Being to be corporeal,
since he says that it is indivisible, in the words:
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So that the things he has said are not connected with the heaven, as
Eudemus says that some suppose, hearing of66 [the words]:
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since mental substance, according to the Eleatics, does involve movement. And he says also that Being is all together:
since all is now together, 270
And with regard to the same things and being similar:
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It is the same thing to think and that for which the thought
exists, for you will not find thinking without the existing thing,
(that is the object ofthought), 274 in which it is expressed. 275
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But he does not want the one Being to be [1] 279 any commonness, 280
neither that which is generated later and arises from abstraction in
our thoughts, for that is neither uncreated nor indestructible, but also
not [2] the commonness in things, for that is sensible and among the
things of opinion, and deceptive, about which he speaks later, and
there is another {3] from the differentiae, as having already undergone otherness and not-being. How with this sense would it be true
that all would be everywhere now, or that there were joined together
in itself the thinker and the thought? But is it that he does not say
that the one Being is indivisible substance, or is this further [from the
truth)? For the indivisible substance is created and separated by
otherness, and enmattered and sensible and other than the accident.
And also it is divided and in motion. It remains, therefore, that the
thought, the cause of everything, and through which are both the
thinker and thinking, in which all things by one union are taken
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been received into it, but as distinguished, and, as appears from the
account of them, have come forth from it after it.
And it seems to have been treated as the first cause by Parmenides,
if 'the all together' and 'final limit' are one. But if he did not simply
call it one, but one Being, and if 'unique', and if the limit is 'perfected', 295 perhaps he shows that the ineffable cause of all things is
established beyond it. 296 How then is it that both Plato and Aristotle
are clearly speaking against Parmenides? Or, [that] Plato opposed
him in two ways, both with regard to saying that Being is one, and
with regard to completely doing away with not-being, and made his
opposition from the universe that is mental297 and contains distinctions, in which both, Being has been distinguished from the One, and
the two did not remain one, and the parts [have been distinguished]
from the whole. For it was from these [arguments] that Plato showed
that existing things are not one but more than one. And [that] the
not-being [is something] he showed from the otherness in the forms
that had been distinguished, through which there the being, taken
according to one special feature, is being, but is not change or staying
the same. And each of the others is what it is, and is not the others.
And it is clear that this (not-being) is entirely there where distinction
and otherness have also been revealed, by the forms in the mental298
area, and by separation in that of the senses. And that this is
not-being Parmenides himself clearly agrees in his part about opinion, when he calls deceptive the beauty of his verses, which are about
the opinions of mortals. Where there is deceit, there there is not-being. For he who considers not-being to be, or Being not to be, is
deceived. As to what is entirely non-existent, not only does Parmenides do away with it, but also Plato, who evades enquiry into it
by saying: 'Let no one therefore tell us that having revealed that
not-being is the opposite of being we dare to say that it is. For we long
ago said goodbye to the question whether there is an opposite to it,
whether it is or is not, having an account or being entirely without an
account. But about what we have said about not-being existing, let
someone persuade us by a refutation that we have not argued well,
or, to the extent that he cannot, he must say as we say.'299 And there
is nothing surprising in the fact that he showed this kind of not-being
to be defined like this by one special feature, with such not-being
having no place for the Being which is perfect and intelligible and all
things in union with being before all things. But Aristotle, bringing
in his opposition by a division, says:800 either 'being' has many meanings, and in this way will be many, or only one, and will be either
substance or accident. And it is clear that none of these are relevant
to the intelligible, since this division appeared in [the world of]
coming to be, and was assumed, if at all, for some reason in the
intellectual distinction. 301
But let no one blame Plato and Aristotle for speaking against other
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but some of them say that it is one of the three elements, Thales and
Hippon that it is water, 4 Anaximenes and Diogenes5 air, 6 and Heraclitus and Hippasus fire 7 (no-one thought it appropriate to postulate
earth because it is hard to alter),8 while some postulated something
other than the three elements, which is denser than fire and finer
than air, 9 or, as he says elsewhere, 10 denser than air and finer than
water. 11 Alexander12 thinks that it wasAnaximander who postulated
as the principle some kind of body other than the elements, but
Porphyry, assuming that Aristotle is opposing those who say in an
undifferentiated way that the underlying substrate is a body to those
who say either that it is one of the three elements or something else,
intermediate between fire and air, says that Anaxim.ander said in an
undifferentiated way that the substrate was an unlimited body without differentiating its nature as fire or water or air. He himself [i.e.
Porphyry] attributed the intermediate theory to Diogenes of Apollonia, 13 as did Nicolaus of Damascus. 14 It seems to me that it is more
natural to interpret the words [of 187a13-15] not as opposing body to
the elements and the intermediate, but as dividing it into the three
and the intermediate; for he [i.e. Aristotle] speaks of 'the substrate'
[as] 'a body, either one of the three or something else which is denser
than fire and finer than air' (187a13-15); nevertheless he made the
general observation about all the above-mentioned theories that 'they
generate the rest by rarity and density' (187a15), though Anaximander, as he himself [i.e. Aristotle] says (187a20-21), does not generate
them in that way, but by extraction from the unlimited. How then, if
he [i.e. Aristotle] was speaking of him [i.e. Anaximander] as positing
body in an undifferentiated way, did he make the general observation
about generation by alteration?15 All of these people are agreed in
speaking of the principle as one, but they divide into two classes with
regard to the ways in which things come to be. From the material one
some generate the other things by rarity and density, for instance
Anaxim.enes says that when air is refined it becomes fire, and when
it is condensed it becomes wind, then cloud, then when further
condensed water, then earth, then stones, and the rest from these. 16
In his Enquiry 17 Theophrastus mentions rarefaction and condensation only in the case of Anaximenes, but it is clear that the others too
[who belong to this first class] made use of rarity and density, since
Aristotle says in general about all that 'they generate the rest by
density and rarity, making many things' (187a15-16) out ofthe one
matter. And if rarefaction and condensation are opposite (as there is
a more general opposition between greater and lesser quantity, as for
instance Plato spoke of the great and small) (187a17-18), it is clear
that all of these people were no longer speaking of the principle as
one, but as three, and were making use of opposition, as he himself
[i.e. Aristotle] will do. 18 Except that Plato spoke of great and small as
the matter of things (187al8), 19 attesting that all the oppositions are
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from this principle, which is air. These are his words [DK 64B4]: 'In
addition we have these important indications; humans and the other
animals live by breathing air. This is soul and thought for them, as
will be manifestly shown in this treatise, and if it is removed, they die
and their thought gives out.' A little later he added plainly [DK 64B5]:
And it seems to me that what possesses thought is what people
call air, and that they are all directed by this and that it controls
everything. For this very thing seems to me to be a god, 31 and it
reaches as far as everything and arranges everything and is in
everything. There is no single thing which does not have a share
of it, but nothing shares in it in the same way as anything else,
but there are many forms both of air itself and of thought. It is
multiform, warmer, colder, dryer, wetter, more static, in quicker
motion, with infinitely many other variations of taste and colour. The soul of all animals is the same thing, air which is
warmer than the air which surrounds us. but much colder than
the air in the sun. This warmth is not alike for each animal (nor
indeed for different people), but the difference is not great, so
that they are similar. Yet it is not possible for any of the things
which are differentiated one from the other to become absolutely
alike, without becoming the same thing.32 Since the di:fferentiation between them is multiform the animals too are multiform
and many, and they are not like one another in appearance or
habits or intelligence, because of the multitude of differentiations. Yet they all live and see and hear by the same thing, and
all have the other aspects of thought33 from the same source.
Next he shows that the seed of animals is breathy, and that thoughts
come about when air occupies the whole body along with blood
through the veins, and in so doing he gives an accurate anatomical
description of the veins. In this he plainly states that the principle is
what people call air. It is surprising that, while saying that the other
things come to be by differentiation from it. he nonetheless says that
it is eternal, in these words [DK 64B7]: 'This very thing is an eternal
and immortal body, and by it things come to be and pass away', and
elsewhere [DK 64B8]: 'But this seems clear to me, that it is great and
strong and eternal and immortal and multiple in form'. This additional infonnation about Diogenes may suffice. Next Aristotle moves
on from those who say that the principle is one to those who say that
it is one and many.
187a21-6 ... and those who say that it is one and many, as
Empedocles and Anaxagoras do. For they too separate out the
other things from the mixture, but they differ from one another
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64
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shapes and colours and flavours. Before they were separated from one
another, when all were together not even any colour was perceptible;
for the mixture of all things prevented it, the wet and the dry and the
hot and the cold and the bright and the dark and the great amount of
earth which was in it and the seeds infinite in quantity, none resembling one another. For none of the other things was like any other' .40
That none of the homoiomerous things comes-to-be nor perishes, but
that they are always the same, he makes clear in the following words
[DK 59B5]: 'Once these things have been separated in this way one
must realise that they are all in no way fewer or more; for it is not
possible for there to be more than all, but all are always equal'. That
is about the mixture and the homoiomeries. About Mind he wrote as
follows [DK 59B12]:
And Mind is something unlimited and self-controlling, and it is
mixed with nothing, but alone is itself by itself. For if it were not
by itself, but had been mixed with anything else, it would have
had a share in all things, if it had been mixed with any. For in
everything there is a portion of everything, as I said previously,
and the things mixed in with it would have hindered it from
controlling anything as it can do being alone itself by itself. For
of all things it is the finest and purest, and it has all thought
about everything and the greatest power, and as many things,
both greater and lesser, as have soul, all ofthem Mind controls.
And Mind controlled the entire rotation, so that it began to
rotate. It first began to rotate in a small part, and later it is
rotating more, and it will rotate yet more. And the things that
are mixed together and separated off and separated apart, all of
them Mind knew. And such as were to be, and such as were, and
as many things as now are, and such as will be, 41 all of them
Mind set in order, as well as the present rotation of the stars and
the sun and the moon and the air and aither which are separated
off. It is this rotation which caused them to be separated off. And
the dense is separated off from the rare and the hot from the cold
and the bright from the dark and the dry from the wet. There
are many portions of many things. Nothing is totally separated
off or separated apart from anything else except Mind. Mind is
all alike, the greater and the lesser. Nothing else is like anything else, but each single thing most perceptibly is and was
what predominates in it.
He posits a twofold world order, one intellectual, the other perceptible, derived from the former; that is clear both from what has previously been said, and from the following [DK 59Bl4): 'Mind indeed
is, now as ever, where the other things are, 42 in the great amount that
surrounds them, and in things which have been combined and in
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things which have been separated'.43 Further, after 'in all the things
that are combined there are many things of all kinds and seeds of all
things with all kinds of shapes and colours and flavours, and people
have been constructed and the other animals which have soul' [DK 59
B4, 2-5], he goes on, [DK 59B4, 5-10]: 'and the people have built cities
and devised works, as we do, and they have a sun and a moon and the
rest, as we do, and the earth brings forth for them many things of all
kinds, the most useful of which they collect in their dwellings and
use'. 44 That he is hinting at a different world order from ours is made
clear by the phrase 'as we do', which he uses more than once. That he
thinks that it is not a perceptible world, preceding this world in time,
is made clear by 'the most useful of which they collect in their
dwellings and use'. For he does not say 'used', but 'use'. But he is not
talking about a civilisation similar to ours located elsewhere. He does
not say 'They have the sun and the moon as we do' but 'a sun and a
moon, as we do', speaking of different ones. 46 Whether that is so or not
is worth investigating.
Empedocles sets out his account of the One and the limited plurality and the periodic reconstitution and generation and destruction
through combination and separation in the following words in the
first book ofhis Physics [DK 31B17]:
I shall tell a double tale. At one time one thing grew to be alone
from many, at another many grew apart again from one. Twofold is the generation of mortal things, and two-fold their
passing away. One the coming together of all things brings to
birth and destroys, the other flew asunder, nourished as they
grew apart. 46 And they never cease these continuous changes, at
one time all coming together in one through Love, at another all
being driven apart again through the hatred of Strife;" And
again as the one thing grows apart many spring forth; in that
way they come to be and their life is not stable. But in so far as
they never cease these continuous changes, in that way they are
forever immovable in their cycle. But come, listen to my words;
for learning'S will increase your mind. Declaring what I previously said as the limits of my words, I shall tell a double tale.
At one time one thing grew to be alone from many, at another
many grew apart from one, fire and water and earth and the
limitless height of air, and destructive Strife apart from them,
like in every way, 49 and Love in them, equal in size and breadth.
Perceive her with your mind, but do not sit staring with
astonished eyes; she is believed to be infused in mortal limbs,
and through her they think kindly thoughts and do friendly
deeds, calling her by name Joy and Aphrodite. Her no mortal
man has seen weaving her way among them. But you listen to
the order of my speech. which is not deceitful. All these are equal
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and of the same age, but each wields a separate power, and each
has its own nature, and they rule in turn through the cycle of
time. And in addition to these nothing comes to be or ceases. For
if they were continuously destroyed they would no longer exist;
for what would increase this totality, and where could it have
come from? And how could they be completely destroyed, 50 since
nothing is without them? But again, these things exist, and
running through one another they become now one thing, now
another, ever continuously alike.
In this passage he says that the one is what comes from the plurality
of the four elements, and shows Love as in control at one time and
Strife at another. That neither of these completely disappears is
shown by their all being equal and of the same age, and by the fact
that nothing comes to be nor ceases. The many are the plurality from
which the One comes to be; for Love is not the One, and even Strife is
completed in the One.51 In other descriptions of the plurality he adds
the characteristics of each, calling fire the sun, air bright and the
heaven, and water rain and sea.52 He writes as follows [DK 31B21]:
But come, perceive the things that witness to those earlier
words, in case anything of what I said earlier was deficient in
form: the sun, bright to behold and everywhere hot, and those
things immortal in kind, bathed in the bright rays, and the rain,
dark and cold in everything, and from earth there flow out dense
and solid things. In Strife all are diverse in form and separate,
but in Love they come together and long for one another. From
these are all that was and is and will be; trees grew, and men and
women and animals and birds and fish that are nourished in water
and long-lived gods, highest in honours. 58 For those things are
themselves, but they come to be of different kinds as they penetrate one another; such change does their mixture effect.
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As when painters decorate offerings, men who are knowledgeable about their craft through their skill, when they take in their
hands pigments of many colours, mixing in proportion more of
some and less of others, from these they fashion likenesses of all
sorts of things, creating trees and men and women and animals
and birds and fish that are nourished in water and long-lived
gods, highest in honours; so do not you deceive your mind,
thinking that the source of all the limitless number of mortal
things that visibly come to be is anything other. But know this
clearly, having heard the tale from a god.
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And that he is thinking of these many things in the world which has
come to be, and not merely of Strife and Love, is clear from his saying
that trees and men and women and animals have come to be from
them. And he shows that they change into one another when he says
[DK 31B26, 1-2]: 'And they rule in turn through the cycle of time, and
they perish into one another and increase in their portion of fate'. And
he shows that even things which come to be and are destroyed attain
eternity through their succession when he says [DK 31B26, 11-12 (=
31B17, 12-13)]: 'But in so far as they never cease these continual
changes, in that way they are forever immovable in their cycle.' That
he too is hinting at a twofold world-order, one intelligible and one
perceptible, one divine and one perishable, one containing these
things as paradigm, the other as image, is clear from his saying that
not merely generated and perishable things consist of these, but the
gods too, unless one were to interpret this as merely his customary
usage. 54 One might also think that he is hinting at the twofold
world-order in the following [DK 31B22]:
For these, bright sun and earth and heaven and sea, are all
united with their own parts, such as wandered off and came to
be in mortal beings. Similarly such as enter into a more sufficient mixture have loved one another, made like by Aphrodite.
Hostile things keep furthest apart from one another in their
generation and their mixture and their moulded forms, in every
way inappropriate to unite and very grim in their births in
strife, since their births are in anger. 55
For he has also shown that these things have been fitted together in
mortal beings, but it is rather in intelligible things that they have
been made one and 'have loved one another, made like by Aphrodite',
and even though [this takes place] everywhere, it is [especially]
intelligible things which are united by love, but perceptible things,
which are controlled by strife and torn further apart in their generative mixture, in their moulded and image-like forms constitute things
born in strife and inappropriate to unite with one another. 56 And that
Empedocles too postulated coming-to-be through combination and
separation is shown by what is set out right at the beginning [DK
31B17, 1-2]: 'At one time one thing grew to be alone from many, at
another many grew apart again from one', and also by the fact that
coming-to-be and destruction are nothing 'but only mixture and
separation of what had been mixed' [DK 31B8, 3], and that coming
together and unfolding come to be through fate.
187a26-31 Anaxagoras seems to have thought them [i.e. the
principles] infinite in this way because he accepted as true the
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to be from what is not (that is why they say 'All things were
together', and that coming to be such and such amounts to
alteration, though some say combination and separation).
In this section Aristotle, rivalling Plato's generosity, is not seeking to
undertake an examination of long-dead nonentities whose views are
in every way irrational, nor to ignore them, as condemned by default;
instead he sets out some arguments by which they were led to their
apparently absurd vi.ews. First he puts Anaxagoras on the stand, 57
since he proposes, having dealt with those who say that what there
is is one, to examine those who postulate infinitely many things. For
the view of those who say that the principle is one and unchanging
appears more absurd, since it abolishes both principle and nature,
and next comes the view of those who posit infinitely many principles,
since it makes them indefinable and unknowable. Once these have
been examined there is left for consideration the view which posits a
finite plurality. So he says that Anaxagoras was led to his theory of
the homoiomeries by two reasons, one ofwhich was his thinking that
'the common opinion of the natural philosophers is true', viz. 'that
nothing comes to be from what is not' (187a27-9), but that everything
which comes to be has its coming-to-be from what there is. And indeed
Parmenides showed that what really is is ungenerated by arguing
that it comes to be neither from what is (for there was nothing in
being prior to it) nor from what is not; for it must come to be from
something, but what is not is nothing. The additional reason why
what comes to be must always come to be from what is was wonderfully stated by Parmenides. For in general, he says, if it comes to be
from what is not, what chance determined it to come to be then, at
the time it came to be, but not earlier or later? He writes as follows
[DK 28B8, 6-10]:
For what generation do you seek for it? In what way and whence
did it arise? I shall not allow you to say or to think 'from what is
not'; for that it is not is neither sayable nor thinkable. And what
need would have urged it to grow later or earlier, beginning from
nothing?
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also be unknowable. 'For we think that we know each thing, whenever we recognise its causes and first principles' (184a12-14). The
upshot is that people who try to gain some knowledge of reality from
these suppositions achieve its opposite, ignorance. The critical argument, which Aristotle has set out concisely, is virtually this: the
homoiomeries are infinite in kind and in number, the infinite is
unknowable qua infinite, so the homoiomeries are unknowable. If you
add that the homoiomeries are principles of the things that there are,
you will draw the conclusion that the things that there are have
principles which are 1mknowable. And if you further add that things
whose principles are unknowable are themselves unknowable, you
will draw the conclusion that the things that there are are unknowable, since their principles are infinite. He showed that things whose
principles are unknowable are themselves unknowable in the words
'We think we know the compound when we know what and how many
things it is composed of (187bll-13). Now Anaxagoras said that the
number of kinds which are principles is infinite in this way, namely
incomprehensible by us, not infinite by nature, as he makes clear in
the following words [DK 59B12, 15-19]:
Mind knew all the things which are mixed together and separated off and separated apart. And such as were to be and such
as were and as many things as now are and such as will be,65 all
of them Mind set in order.
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actual constituent), and if it is impossible that an animal or
plant can be of any size you please, large or small, it is clear that
neither can any part whatever; for [in that case] the whole will
be so too. Flesh and bone and things like that are parts of an
animal, and the fruits [parts] of plants. Now it is clear that it is
impossible for flesh or bone or anything else to be whatever size
you please, large or small.
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(v. supr.], nor in the animal is the seed, from which it comes into
being, preserved as one of the parts into which the animal is divided.
It appears that the majority of copies which contain the words 'and
the fruits [parts] of plants' are correct. For just like shoots and leaves,
the fruit and pericarp are parts of fruit-bearing plants, and the whole
is divided into those parts, which are present in it and capable of
being separated. That may suffice on the question of textual error.
Perhaps someone might say, on behalf of Anaxagoras, that if each
animal or plant contained a single constructive homoiomery out of the
different kinds of homoiomeries, e.g. one for flesh and one for bone
and one for blood, to the increase and decrease of the homoiomeries
there would necessarily correspond the differences in size of the
animals and plants. But if they contain a number of each sort of
homoiomery, e.g. many little bits of flesh, where would be the absurdity in purging away flesh to infinity, but leaving the animal?73 But if
there are many little bits of flesh, they are either finite in number or
infinite. And if they are finite, e.g. three or four or ten thousand, the
size of the smallest and the largest would be finite, but if they are
infinite in number, a magnitude composed of an infinite number of
magnitudes must be infinite. For what is finite is divided into finite
parts, as Aristotle himself argues. 74
187b22-34 Further, if all such things are present in one another, and do not come into being but are there and are
extracted, and things are named according to their predominant
element, and anything comes to be from anything (e.g. water
being extracted from flesh and flesh from water), and every
finite body is exhausted by a finite body, it is clear then that it
is impossible for everything to be in everything. For once flesh
has been extracted from the water, and again more flesh from
the remainder by separation, even if what is extracted is smaller
every time, all the same it will not exceed a certain magnitude in
smallness.75 So if the extraction comes to an end, not everything
will be in everything (for in the remaining water no flesh will be
present), and if it does not come to an end, but will always have
[further] subtraction, in a finite magnitude there will be an infinite
number of :finite equal magnitudes. But that is impossible.
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extracted the smallest amount of flesh from water, it having been shown
that there is a defined smallest size, 77 and again another smallest, and
went on doing this, either the extraction will come to an end, since it has
been defined that there is a smallest, and the water which is left will not
contain any more flesh and so it is not the case that everything will be
in everything nor will everything be extracted from everything, or, if
it does not come to an end, this water from which the flesh was
extracted will have a certain definite magnitude, and if that is so, there
will be in it infinitely many amounts of flesh equal to one another; for
there will be in it infinitely many smallest amounts of flesh, equal to
one another in magnitude. But that is impossible because it was
specified that there is a smallest amount of flesh, than which a smaller
amount could not be extracted. For it was demonstrated in the previous
section that the smallest amount of flesh has been specified,78 and that
being so it is impossible that flesh should be extracted ad infinitum from
this amount of water, but it must come to an end; so that it is not the case
that everything will be extracted from everything. But, he says, if it were
always possible to take a smaller amount from whatever had been extracted, the extraction would not have come to an end, as in the case ofthe
largest. That is the interpretation of Alexander and Themistius.
But it may be possible to establish the .present argument even
without the previously demonstrated conclusion, 79 if Aristotle is now
perhaps agreeing in a way to their positing what he there showed to
be impossible, that there can be a magnitude of any size you like, 80
when he says 'even if what is extracted is always smaller, all the same
it will not exceed a certain magnitude in smallness' (187b29-30). And
I think that Aristotle is not showing without qualification that the
extraction comes to an end,81 but that both from its coming to an end
and from its not coming to an end there follows an absurd consequence for those who say that everything is in everything and that
everything is extracted from everything, and who maintain that
'comes to be' says the same thing. 82 For both these assertions are
refuted by extraction's coming to an end. For if the extraction of flesh
from this amount of water comes to an end, it is not the case that
everything will be in everything nor that everything will be extracted
from everything. For in the water that is left no flesh will be present.
But if they were to say that it does not come to an end, but it is always
possible to take away more, in this finite magnitude of water there
will be infinitely many magnitudes, which is impossible. It seems to
me that Alexander's interpretation relies on the expressions 'equal
finite magnitudes' (187b33-4) and 'it will not exceed a certain magnitude in smallness' (187b30). For in each extraction, he says, a certain
number of smallest magnitudes will be extracted, and so the things
that are removed will always be in a way equal, since they are all
smallest. What would be the absurdity in there being many smallest
things, which are yet not equal, rather than just magnitudes?BS For,
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he says 'even if what is extracted were always smaller, all the same
it will not exceed a certain magnitude in smallness' (187b29-30). This
is to say that even if one concedes to them that you can always get
15 smaller magnitudes from the smaller, it would never get beyond
being a magnitude in smallness. For the division of magnitudes to
infinity results in magnitudes. But the person who says that everything is in everything says that it is in it actually, not potentially, as
in the case of things which are divided to infinity. It is possible to
understand 'equal' applied to 'finite magnitudes' as equivalent to
20 'similar finite magnitudes'. And if being finite is a property of quantity, it is more proper to speak of equal finite than similar finite
magnitudes.84 So the whole argument refutes the theses that everything is in everything and that everything comes to be or is extracted
from everything by relying on the premiss that every finite body is
measured and exhausted by a finite body (187b25-6), which he himself [i.e. Aristotle] expressed by 'is done away with' in the correct
25 texts. 85 For if you continually subtract from a finite cubit a finite
quantity, the cubit will cease to exist. And let the subtraction be not
theoretical, which will never come to an end, but the subtraction of
parts actuaD.y present in it, however smalL Having assumed that, he
demonstrates that it is not possible for each to be in each, that is for
30 everything to be in everything, or everything to be extracted from
everything, as follows: if there were extracted from the water an
amount of flesh, and again another, even if the one that is extracted
is always smaller, all the same it will have some magnitude. One
must also assume the following as a premiss of the demonstration;
either the extraction will stop or it will not stop. But if it stops, it is
not the case that everything will be in everything (for no flesh will be
left in the water which remains); and if it does not stop, but there will
35 always be further subtraction, in a finite magnitude there will be an
171,1 infinite number of similarly finite magnitudes, which is impossible.
For according to the premiss the finite magnitude will itself cease to
exist through the finitely repeated removal of one of the finite magnitudes contained in it. So there will not be an infinite number of
finite magnitudes in a finite magnitude. It is clear that, as I said, the
5 subtraction is not to be done in accordance with theoretical division
to infinity; in that sense it would not come to an end, nor is the
conclusion absurd, that something finite is composed of things
divided to infinity. In those cases the infinity is potential, not
actual. But Anaxagoras' extraction is that of an infinity of actually
present (parts].
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extracted from the smallest amount of flesh. For [in that case]
there will be something smaller than the smallest.
He assails the theses that everything is in everything and that
everything is extracted from everything by this further argument. He
assumes here too the evident premiss that every body must become
smaller when something is subtracted, since it becomes larger when
something is added, and in addition to this premiss uses here the
previously demonstrated thesis that there is no amount of flesh of any
size you like, but the smallest is a definite amount, just as the largest.
Given these assumptions, one can reason as follows: if something is
extracted from the smallest amount of flesh, there will be some
amount of flesh from which an amount smaller than the smallest was
extracted. But that is impossible; for the smallest was that than
which there is no smaller amount of flesh. So no body whatever will
be extracted from the smallest amount of flesh. And the conclusion is
true because of the premiss. And the additional assumption is evident. And if from the smallest amount of flesh it is impossible for any
body to be extracted, it will not be the case that everything is in
everything or that everything is extracted from everything. And
another absurdity follows from the assumption that something will
be extracted from the smallest amount of flesh; there will no longer
be any flesh after the extraction, for what is smaller than the smallest
amount of flesh will not be flesh. So it has been destroyed qua flesh.
So the homoiomeries are destructible, which he [i.e. Anaxagoras} does
not admit. 86 So it is not the case that everything is in everything or
comes to be from everything. B7
188a2-5 Further, in the infinite bodies there would be present
infinite flesh and blood and brain, separate from one another, 88
but being no less real, and each infinite. This is absurd.
The fifth criticism, expressed in these words, is I think the most
serious to which Anaxagoras' theory is subject, if one takes it at face
value;89 the attack is directed against the entire supposition that the
principles are homoiomeries infinite in quantity and that everything
is mixed in everything. Anaxagoras states that right at the beginning
of his treatise, saying [DK 59Bl.l-2]: 'All things were together,
infinite in quantity and in smallness'. For the small too was infinite.
And he often says that 1n everything there is a portion of everything
except Mind' [DK 59Bll]. So if the homoiomeries are infinite and
everything is in each, there would actually exist infinite flesh and
blood and brain. For the infinite quantity of amounts of flesh which
are in the infinite homoiomeries make the whole of flesh infinite in
size, and similarly blood and brain, and obviously gold and each of the
others. So there will be a numerical plurality of infinite magnitudes,
15
20
25
30
172,1
80
10
Translation
Translation
81
neither perceptible at the beginning, nor do they even exist in themselves, since it is not possible for them to be separated off. But
someone who says this does nothing more than transfer the objection
to the compounds. For if each of the perceptible things is a mixture of
everything, which appears such and such according to what predominates in the mixing, and if everything in the compounds too is
characterised differently according to the predominance of each of the
infinite homoiomeries, and all such things are extracted, since everything comes from everything; hence the perceptible things too will be
infinite. So if each of them is a mixture of everything, flesh would be
infinite both in quantity and in size. And similarly each of the other
kinds will be infinite. For in what is extracted everything will once
again be present and will be extracted. And the same will be said
about those things that are extracted. And so on to infinity; for the
things that are extracted are perceptible mixtures, since things that
were unmixed at the beginning cannot be extracted'. This is how
Alexander adduces what purports to help the theory but then refutes
that too. 91
Perhaps Anaxagoras' theory would be more plausible if it did not
say that from a single perceptible thing some perceptible thing will
be extracted, e.g. from this amount of flesh alone perceptible bone and
from that again some other perceptible thing, but that everything is
in each perceptible thing but is imperceptible, and everything will be
extracted from each of the perceptible things, but will remain imperceptible, until from more perceptible things more things of the same
kind are extracted and combined, and so become perceptible, in that
while everything is once again present in each of the compounds, each
is characterised by what predominates in it. But even if they [i.e. the
adherents of the theory] were to say that, first of all either it will not
be the case that every perceptible thing will come from every perceptible thing, as they maintain, or the 'infinitely many times infinite'
conclusion92 will follow as before. Further, though it were true to say
of the elements that they are infinite in quantity, if in a finite
perceptible thing there are present an infinite quantity of homoiomeries, it would be absurd as before. If, however, in describing
the elements as infinite Anaxagoras did not mean that they are in
reality infinite and innumerable, but merely incomprehensible to us,
though in themselves finite and bounded in nature and in number (if,
as he says 'Mind knew all the things that were mixed together and
separated off and separated apart, and such as were to be and such
as were and as many things as now are and such as will be, 98 all of
them Mind set in order'. Yet if the elements and the compounds of the
elements were in kind actually infinite in quantity [i.e. were of
infinitely many kinds], not even Mind would have known them or set
them in order. For setting in order is a certain arrangement, but
arrangement does not apply to infinites, and knowledge is a definite
15
20
25
30
35
174,1
10
82
Translation
10
Translation
83
84
10
Translation
Translation
85
phy. Indeed, in the Timaeus Plato himself first gives his general
description of the productive cause of everything, and then in his
detailed account cites differences of sizes and shapes as the causes of
heat, cold and the rest. 102 But Socrates, wishing to set out his account
in terms of the final cause, cited Anaxagoras as making use of the
material cause rather than the final. Let us proceed.
15
20
25
30
178,1
10
86
Translation
188a17-18 Better to have fewer and finite, as Empedocles does.
15
20
25
30
179,1
The dense and dry and cold and the dark came together here
where now the earth is, and the rare and the hot and the dry
went out to the extremity of the aither.
He says that these most simple things which have the character of
principles are separated off, and that other things of a more compound nature are in some cases coagulated as compounds, in others
separated off, e.g. the earth. He says [DK 59B16]:
From these things which are separated off earth is coagulated;
Translation
87
for water is separated off from the clouds, and from the water
earth, and from the earth stones are coagulated by the cold.
10
15
Notes
Notes to 1.3
1. The word arkhe is used in a number of senses. Here and in many contexts
the words 'starting-point', with the implication that time is involved seem.s
appropriate, but later on time is not relevant and 'principle' seems a better
rendering.
2. This error of Melissus is featured several times in Aristotle's Topics. See
also n. 72.
3. Throughout this work it is difficult to be consistent in the treatment of the
verb 'to be'. Simplicius is writing about the views of philosophers who lived up
to a thousand years before him, and who had metaphysical approaches that
iBvolved what some people would regard as a misuse of language. I have used
'Being' where there appears to be the idea of an entity such as that described by
Parmenides, but 'being' when there is more emphasis on the verbal nature of
what is being referred to. It seems best to write 'Being' in this particular context,
but then 'not-being' and 'not being' as the occasion seems to require. As we also
have 'exist', and 'is/are' available in English these will also be used. Where I
have seen fit to emphasise the metaphysical aspect of the thought of the Eleatics
by using 'Being', Christopher Taylor has preferred to use 'what is' for his section
(148,25-179,39).
4. This seems wrong. Aristotle should have been attacking that belief; but I
have kept the text as it stands.
5. Pormenides 128A-B.
6. H the first, then the second; but not the second: therefore not the first.
7. Here it seems better to have 'not Being' without the hyphen.
8. Melissus' arguments, as given by Simplicius, are studied in detail by
Barnes, 1979, who changed his mind on some important points in his revised
edition, 1989, pp. 180-1. While Simplicius is our sole source for exact quotations,
the pseudo-Aristotelian on Melissus Xnophanes and Gorgias is also useful
9. In this extract the language used is standard Greek, whereas later on
Simplicius states that he will use Melissus' own archaic language. Presumably
the present passage is not a precise account of Melissus' argument. Barnes,
1982, p. xix describes it as a paraphrase, but a valuable one.
10. Diels suggests inserting ara and translating it as therefure. That gives a
smoother reading, but there is no support in the manuscripts.
11. The Greek is 'tunkhaner."', which is commonly translated 'happens to be', but
that is not suitable here. An anonymous reader suggests 'is as a consequence'.
12. There are three words commonly used for changing. 'Kinesis' can often be
seen to mean 'moving spatially', and sometimes to mean 'changiBg' in a more
general way. Furthermore, sometimes it is not clear how it is being used.
'AlloiOsis' and 'metabole' are also general words for changing. 'Alteration' here
renders kinesis, but 'change' is fur 'metaballei'.
90
91
40. At Metaph. 986b19-20 Aristotle says that Melissus was concerned with
the material One. Ross ad loc. thinks this disproves Simplicius' view that Being
was incorporeal.
41. Timaeus 28B.
42. Timaeus 27D.
43. The word 'oligos' can mean 'little' as well as 'few'. Possibly Eudemus
was referring to some very small things, but the above interpretation seems
better.
44. The rare word 'akolouthesis', here translated 'sequence', is used by
Aristotle at Soph. El. 181a23, where the example of the relevant fallacy is
precisely that committed by Melissus here. Simplicius may be assuming that
his readers will be familiar with Aristotle's passage, on which Eudemus' otherwise obscure remark is presumably based.
45. AlloiOsis.
46. In view of Simplicius' Neoplatonist background, and the high-flown
language he is using here, a capital letter seems appropriate.
4 7. I think this means everything that exists, both Being itseH and mundane
things.
48. That is, what has just been discussed above.
49. Compare 108,22 where Simplicius distinguishes the heaven and this
universe, which have a share of body and therefore have parts and a beginning
and an end, from Being. Simplicius is aware of a problem, and continues to
wrestle with it in what follows.
50. At this point only two senses of arkhe are recognised, that of a beginning
in time and that of the beginning of a thing. Here 'beginning' seems the most
appropriate translation.
51. Metaballein.
52. I have taken the de (but) here to introduce a reply to the charge which
has just been made against Melissus. Part of the reply is couched in Neoplatonist terms, so that we cannot be sure about what Melissus actually said.
Eudemus' remarks at 110,8-9 are also relevant.
53. cf. Phys. 204a34-205bl.
54. See note 49. The idea of physical things existing forever suggests a theory
of circular motion, so that no point can be seen as the starting or the ending
point, as with the stars.
55. This sentence is repeated at 109,27, but there the word 'on' Cexisting'), is
added at the end. The MSS vary about that addition here too: I have followed
Diels in keeping it at 27 but omitting it here.
56.Kinein.
57. 'Diarma' is a rare word and its meaning is uncertain in this context. An
anonymous reader suggests it is a corruption of diastema. Furley, 1967, pp. 60-1
prefers 'sublimity', and rejects any implication of magnitude. He goes on to
discuss three suggested interpretations of the matter. It seems to me, however,
that there is a different problem here. Simplicius is concerned about Melissus'
use, in this context, of the word megethos, which normally means 'size', and I
suggest that it is he who uses diarrna tis hupostaseos. Hupostasis is an unlikely
word for Melissus to have used, and there is nothing of this kind in any
quotation from him.
58. Diels thinks that the quotation from Melissus may extend to here, and I
accept that suggestion.
59. Furley, 1967, p. 59 points out that this is extended at Simpl in De Caelo
556,16: 'If it were infinite it would be one, for if it were two they could not both
be infinite, but would have boundaries with respect to each other.'
92
93
the matter', and it is not entirely clear what Simplicius is getting at. In any case
he goes on to give his own interpretation of Aristotle.
90. This is an exact translation of the Greek.
91. i.e. matter.
92. [FHSG 234]. Sharples, RUSCH III, 1988, P- 48 n. 92, argues that this is
a doxographical work.
93. 115,21-5 = 118,11-13 = 121,13-16. These are all passages from Eudemus,
quoted almost exactly alike by Si.mplicius. The first and the third are extended
to include a further sentence. The differences are minor, and we can be sure that
they give us essentially Eudemus' own words. From what he says at 115,13-15
above, and later at 133,2.4-5, it is clear that Simplicius accepted that he did not
have access to all Eudemus' works, and was happy to use Alexander as well.
94. 115,25-116,4 = 120,8-12. The only significant difference is that 116,2 has
the verb to sullogizesthai, while 120, 11 has to sullogistikon.
95. Baltussen, 2002, p. 144, observes that this word, anaxiopistos, is rare and
is found also at 120,7. He suggests that it may be Eudemus' own.
96. This could be thought to be a reference to the anonymous Dissoi logoi, a
sophistic work of Plato's time, for a summary of which see Barnes, 1982, PP516-22. But it seems better to see it as marking a period of thought about the
senses of words, between the view that each word had only one sense, and the
view that it could have several senses. Eudemus, even only two generations
later, may have believed that the Dissoi logoi was by Plato, but in many places
Sim.plicius refers to his account of Plato's own approach, e.g. at 238,23 where he
mentions Sophist 2580 f[ as evidence that Plato knew that non-being had dual
meaning, and 243,1-3. At 243,1-3 he says that Eudemus said that Plato introduced to disson, but again the passage is not very helpful
97. These were among Aristotle's innovations.
98. The MSS have te (and) here, but the parallel passage at 120,10 has de
(but), which I prefer here also.
99. These remarks must app]y to the methods ofEudemus and his contemporaries, using Aristotelian logic.
100. Again presumably in his work on Aristotle's Physics.
101. This is obscure: the most likely meaning is that Parmenides was like
Thales and the others who believed that there was only one basic entity- At
238,23-239,3 Simplicius says that Plato knew the two-fold meaning of not-being
in the Sophist 2580, but that passage does not help very much.
102. The word einai has been rendered 'being' by one translator and 'what is'
by the other.
103. Parmenides uses three words apparently for the same thing, atarpos,
keleuthos and hodos. In English 'way', path', and 'journey' can be used, as the
context demands. Here the word is keleuthos.
104. This is as Oiels gives the text. Others would have: 'For she accompanies
truth'.
105. Atarpos.
106. For a full and difficult discussion of the three paths see Barnes, 1982,
PP- 157-72.
107.Hodos.
108. This represents the verb found in the MSS as plattontai, which scholars
have accepted as Parmenides' form ofplazein.
109. Keleuthos.
110. The pincers of a smith were also known as crabs.
111. That is, the opposites cannot be true together.
112. This presumably refers to Theophrastus' account at 115,11-13.
94
95
137. Ross, 1936, prints 'hol&' but Simplicius at 126,11 has 'haplOs' 'simply'.
138. In this context this word can hardly have a very precise meaning.
139. Phys. 185a20-3.
140. The Greek has a succession of forms of 'being'. The capital B here may
help to clarify the sense.
141. These words had technical senses in Aristotle, but I am not sure that
those can apply here.
142. That is, the autoon.
143. The expression, to hoper on, is difficult. I have adopted from Ross, 1936,
'the just-existent'.
144. One of the earliest commentators on Aristotle. This is our only fragment
from him.
96
167. This refers to 186b13-14, but misquotes it with 'each' (hekastOi) where
Aristotle has 'either' (hekateroi). Below, however, at 127,1-2, there are the
correct words, though in a different order.
168. This seems to be a simple argument that things that are different are
spatially different.
169. Phys. 186b12-13.
170. Phys. 186bl3-14.
171. Alexander has a different, more speculative, approach to this statement.
172. The reading here is uncertain. I follow Diels' choice, which seems the
only possible one, but the uncertainty among the copyists shows that they were
aware of a problem here.
173. 186b23-7. This is the part of the Physics on which Alexander is commenting.
174. Phys. 186b13-14.
175. This resembles the quotation at 126,22-3 and else'\Vhere, but the word
order is different. Possibly Simplicius here is faithfully quoting Alexander's own
misquotation.
176. This is quite complicated; the implied argument is: Being is divided and
therefore has size and therefore is not one.
177. Phys. 186bl4-15.
178. The subject of phesi 'he says' is not clear. If it is Aristotle, it seems
unnecessary, so perhaps it is Alexander. The first printed text cuts the knot
with eipein 'saying', to give: 'through saying .. .'. In any case what follows seems
to be by Simplicius himself. Further, the quotation here is not an exact report
of Aristotle's text. We can only guess at its origin.
179. The Greek is 1wper tina, which gives roughly 'what things are'.
180. e.g. 183b19.
181. This resembles 127,36. The argument form is: If the first, the second:
but not the second: therefore not-the first.
182. Ross, 1936, comments that this, Simplicius' first attempt at explaining
Aristotle's 186b35, is very obscure, but Si.m.plicius seems to want to treat it as
a reductio ad absurdum ofParmenides' position.
183. 186b35. This sentence has puzzled the commentators. Ross wants to
treat it as a question. For a survey of the views of commentators see his
Aristotle's Physics, 1936, pp. 477-9.
184. This appears to finish Simplicius' report of Alexander's view about the
meaning of Aristotle's argument, but the next section, about the words, down to
129,31 is likely also to be based on Alexander, after which Simplicius refers to
Alexander again and indicates that he will now give his own views.
185. Phys. 186b23.
186. Phys. 186b34-5. Aristotle's text here is uncertain and the commentators
have taken it in various ways. In view of the peculiarity of the following
sentence one might suspect a deep corruption.
187. That is, Simplicius had found this version in his material
188.Phys. 186b33~
189. This is obscure. A standard definition would be composed of genus and
differentia. But how is man divided into those?
190. Sometimes the wordphilopon6s is clearly used by Simplicius as a pun
on the name of his rival the Christian Philoponus. See Baltussen, 2008, pp.
188-9.
191. Simplicius appears to be reporting Alexander's arguments, but not
claiming to repeat his words. Simplicius is being formal here, and I propose to
add numbers to distinguish his arguments. They are not in his text. We have
97
the double difficulty that Alexander was commenting on Aristotle, but it is not
always easy to be sure what he was commenting on, and he may have developed
his own arguments freely.
192. The Stoics produced the original set of indemonstrables, but by Simplicius' time they were in general use. The fifth was originally: either the first
or the second: but not the second, therefore the first, but a later list has: either
the first or the second: but not the first, therefore the second. See Speca, 2001,
pp. 36-66 for a discussion of the history of later Greek logic, with the suggestion
that Alexander was responsible for some later developments. We cannot be sure
whether this remark is from Alexander himself: or added by Simplicius.
193. If the first, the second; but not the second: therefore not the first.
194. See item 5 below.
195. The noun here is in the singular.
196. Phys. 185b7.
197. Aspasius was an early commentator on Aristotle, but his only surviving
commentary is part of the one on the Nicomachean Ethics. Golitsis, 2008, p. 70
argues that Simplicius got his information about him from Alexander.
198. It is not easy to sort out where Alexander's remarks end, and who the
subject of 'showed' is, though it is likely to be Aristotle.
199. Diels refers to Topics 3.1, 116a23, but points out that the example is
from Posterior Analytics 1.22, 83a30. It is difficult to find any passage in
Aristotle which backs up Simplicius' claim. The Topics passage is in a discussion
of what things are preferable, and only indirectly relates to the relationship
between to hoper on and genus. It does not even contain the words 'to hoper on'.
But the following reference to Eudemus, Aristotle's immediate pupil, shows that
Simplicius believed that there were grounds in Aristotle himself for the claim
that he regarded to hoper on as equivalent to genus.
200. That Being is a genus.
201. Phys. 185a27-9.
202. The text is uncertain, and the MSS vary greatly. Diels suggests inserting to before, and arkei after, eiremenan to give: 'What has been said is enough
against .. .'.
203. This seems to be a passing comment on the preceding sentence.
204. This seems to be the beginning of another series of argument from
Alexander, to which again I have added numbers.
205. cf. Phys. 186a34-b2.
206. What follows must be Alexander's own comment.
207. Phys. 187aS-9. This is not about the just-existent, but about a particular
case of that, with the word 'ti' (some).
208. This might be an interpolation by Simplicius, following a sentence by
Alexander. The reference is to Sophist 259A4-6.
209. Phys. 186b33. The same thought has been given in a conditional at
186b4.
210. Phys. 186b1'i.
211. It offered only two alternatives, but there was a third possibility.
212. The word is 'ousWdes', which must be connected with ousia, 'substance'.
It occurs again at 133,20 and 137,33. The thought may be that genus can be used
to classify either substances, or, as a universal, covering all kinds of aspects of
things.
213. Phys. 186b4. The same quotation is given, with an extension, at 132,27-8
below.
214. At this point Diels ends the sentence, but I prefer to put a comma and
continue with the next few lines.
98
215. Phys. 186b4. Aristotle's own text here is difficult. I adopt Ross's solution
of inserting ta alla after all' in Aristotle's text. Compare Sim.plicius at 125,1819, which shows him uncertain about Aristotle, as were the other commentators
also. Sim.plicius must have read the corrupted text.
216. That being is genus.
217. 186b6. There are textual problems both in Aristotle and in Sim.plicius.
Tauto, 'the same', is found in all Aristotle's MSS, but Ross, 1936, removes it on
the grounds that it is not found in passages of Philoponus and Sim.plicius. I
conclude that the word was there in Aristotle's MSS, but Sim.plicius and
Philoponus found it difficult. Carteron keeps it in his Bude edition. Further, the
sentence needs an apodosis, but possibly Simplicius thought the quotation by
itself was enough to make his point.
218. cf. following note.
219. This word, sumplerotikos, 'completive', is not Aristotelian. Either Alexander is rewriting Aristotle, or he is referring to some works which are not by
Aristotle. He has made a distinction above between works in which Aristotle
clearly does not treat the just-existent as genus, and others, which appear to be
logical ones, which do. The use of a later logical term suggests that he was
mistaken about the latter. The word is used by Adrastus as quoted by Simplicius
at 123,13 and by S:implicius himself at 128,19.
22&. Baltussen, 2002, discusses the nature of Simplicius' copy ofEudemus at
pp.135-6.
221. Compare 132,18-19.
222. This is difficult. Perhaps Eudemus is making a contrast between Being
and the heavens, and quoting something. That he did make some such connection is indicated by 143,4 below.
223. This is the last lemma until148,25, where the lemma is from 187a12.
In the intm-vening pages Simplicius roams widely, giving the views of Alexander, Porphyry and others, and taking up questions like whether the argument
from dichotomy is by Zeno or Parmenides.
224. These lines are based on Plato's Parmenides 128C7-D2 except here,
where Plato's MSS have paskhein but those ofSimplicius have legein. The latter
makes more sense and I therefore keep it.
225. Parmenides 12805-6
226. [FHSG 234] app.
227. Sophist 250.Aft".
228. The text here is uncertain, but there is no obvious improvement. I have
tried to give the sense.
229. cf. Phys. 187a5.
230. Timaeus 27D.
231. Timaeus 27D.
232. Sophist 258C-59B.
233.Hodos.
234. The text of Simplicius has ontos, 'being', but Plato has me ontos, 'not
being', which seems preferable here.
236. 'It' here refers to 'the nature of Other'.
236. This is part of a conversation between Theaetetus and the Eleatic
Stranger.
237. The quotation here is incomplete. At 135,29 Simplicius repeats Plato's
words at Sophist 258E6-7 which end with hOs estin 'that it is'.
238. Sophist 257B3-4.
239. At this point Sim.plicius introduces a number of terms used by the
Neoplatonists, noetos, noeros, aisthetos and psukhikos, which were used to
99
denote different levels of being. He seems to be stating his own views. Parmenides himself can hardly have uttered anything like this. It is likely that
Porphyry was the origin of such thinking.
240. Timaeus 27D-28A. Most of Plato's MSS add aei 'always', to give 'what is
always coming to be'.
241. Sophist 248E6-249A2.
242. It is difficult to understand the train of thought here. Diels has put a
crux in the next line and perhaps something is seriously wrong. Otherwise we
must suppose that Si.mplicius is using Parmenides' words to illustrate Plato's
position.
243. To mend a falJlt Diels suggests deims, 'demonstrating', but that is
hardly enough.
244. Sophist 23903.
246. Physics 187a5-6.
246. What follows is only a paraphrase of the following lines of Aristotle.
247. Plato's autoon.
248. Physics 185b25-6.
249. Physics 186a2-3. But Aristotle's text differs, opening with gar, 'for', but
saying only that 'one' can be both potential and actual. Our reading, from
Alexander, may be preferable.
260. cf. 138,5-6.
251. Or, possibly, 'Is it then that this is not, but One is something?'.
262. cf. 144.15, but there the word for being is in the singular. Barnes, 1989,
p. 235 says that the word for one here might refer either to Parmenides' One or
to a unit. But the context of 144,15 suggests that Simplicius understood it as
being of Parmenides' One.
263. Timon at Diogenes Laertius 9 .25. Melissus is also named there.
254. Hermann Frankel reconstituted Zeno's argument from its scattered
parts in Simplicius. It is given and discussed in Furley, 1967, pp. 64-9.
255. The words pakhos and onkos have similar meanings in ordinary Greek.
I suggest that here the first may have a two-dimensional sense, and the second
a three dimensional one. The argument would apply to both equally well.
256. KRS adds the comma here.
207. Adopting Frankers apeiron for apeiron (pl).
258. 122,14 Diels.
259. The Greek has 'those around Xenocrates' but, as so often in similar
cases, this seems to refer sole)y to Xenocrates. In line 15 only Xenocrates is
mentioned.
260. As Porphyry said.
261. This is puzzling. The sentence before already provides thickness; and
we can hardly bring in a fourth dimension. Ingenious interpretations have been
given for what proukhein means, and somehow there must be an infinite
progression. Owen points out that at Physics 239b17 Aristotle uses the word
proekhein of an argument ofZeno, but it is of Achilles and the tortoise, and what
projects is the small distance remaining at every stage between the pursuer and
the pursued. Possibly here Simplicius is referring obscurely to the Achilles
argument.
262. This is obscure. Perhaps it means that a) magnitude does not have
species, and b) all things, from small lines to large bodies have it, i.e. magnitude.
263. From this point Simplicius starts using the language of the Neoplatonists in his attempt to explain Parmenides. See Golitsis, 2008, pp. 104-7 for a
detailed study of the following digression, and his French translation. 1982, pp.
225-31.
100
264. This is part of fr. 8, already given at 78,5 and to be repeated with context
at 145,1-2. The combination muthos hodoio is unusual, giving 'account of a journey'.
266. This is repeated, in context. at 145,23.
266. Or 'understanding [in this way]'.
267. This text is repeated several times by Simplicius. It is given in a longer
context at 147,15-17, and is part offr. 8 ofParmenides.
268. The text at 146,11 has houlon, whole, and that is part ofParmenides'
poem. If the hoion of Simplicius' MSS is correct, it must be part of Simplicius'
comment.
269. This is also quoted, more or less, at 146,11 (and 87,1). cf. 186,4. The
context is given at 146,11, but both reading and sense are uncertain, and even
the point of the end of the remark is unclear. Presumably Eudemus quoted it
first, and Simplicius here copied him.
270. This is difficult to relate to the long quotation on pp. 145-6. Since there
is a problem with the text at 146,11, this may have fallen out in that area.
271. The word epekeina used here is uncommon, and there may be a
reminiscence of Plato's Republic 509B, where Plato speaks of the Good as being
'beyond Being'.
272. The word is noeros, connected with nous and here contrasted with
noetos, parts of the standard Neoplatonist vocabulary. It seems best to use
'thinker' and related words here, because neither 'mental' nor 'intellectual' have
the grammatical flexibility required.
273. The word is epistrophe. It played an important part in one of the triads
of late Neoplatonism, but Simplicius does not involve those here.
274. The last words are Simplicius' own explanation.
276. Repeated in context at 146,7-9.
276. The word here is again noeron. A precise way of putting it could be 'the
thinking thing' In this sentence there is a contrast between the active noeron
and the passive noeton, and the point is that the divisions in the one are related
to the divisions in the other.
277. This whole sentence is expressed in Neoplatonic terms.
278. These words are found in Plato's Sophist 242A, and quoted by Simplicius at 135,21-2.
279. I have added these numerals for clarity.
280. That is, a universal.
281. cf. 138,32-3,but there the word here translated 'Being' is in the plural
282. The MSS reading, which I have kept, is perati. But Diels suggests peras
ti, which would give 'as a limit to all things'.
283. There are many problems with the text of Parmenides. I do not intend
to make a thorough survey of them here.
284. Or, with KRS, 'that being uncreated and imperishable, it is,'
286. The reading of Simplicius is ateleston, which is awkward. I have
accepted the emendation teleion of Owen. Owen has a long note on the text at
Owen 1986, pp. 23-4, Additional Note A
286. Some scholars accept the emendation of Reinhardt 'from what is' for
'from what is not'. But Simplicius has 'what is not'.
287. Diels prints this sentence as a remark by Simplicius, but that seems
unnecessary.
288.Hodos.
289. i.e. here and not there.
290. This is veey uncertain. KRS reject the reference to time, and have: 'For
there neither is nor will be anything else besides what is'. Golitsis, 2008, p. 228
and n. 13 does the same.
101
Notes to 1.4
1. i.e. air, water, fire.
2. Eleatic monism, which was the topic of the preceding two chapters, belongs
to metaphysics rather than to the philosophy of nature, since it is the task of
the latter to account for change, the possibility of which is denied by the
Eleatics. 'Natural philosophers' here renders 'phusikoi', lit. 'Those concerned
with nature (phusis)', including the basic constituents and processes in it,
especially change. Elsewhere (e.g. 151,25) the phrase renders 'phusiologor, lit.
'Those who gave accounts (logoi) of nature'.
3. According to Simplicius, Aristotle's comments on the Eleatics are charitable (a) in acknowledging that in speaking of the one being they are not speaking
about nature (for if they were to say e.g. that nature is one and unchangeable
they would be saying something obviously false), (b) in asserting that they
nevertheless share with the natural philosophers the fundamental notion of a
principle and undertake a common investigation whether the principles of
things are one (as the Eleatics say) or many [38,6-9, quoting Phys. 184b22-4]. It
may be queried whether in fact the notion of a principle applies univocally to
the Eleatic One and to the primal stuff of the natural philosophers, and whether
102
Notes to page 59
the Eleatics really believed that there were things for the One to be the principle
of. (I am grateful to Stephen Menn for his suggested interpretation of this
difficult comment, and for the reference to the passage cited.)
4. cf. 23,21-9.
5. Of Apollonia (see below).
6. cf. 24,26-25,8.
7. cf. 23,33-24.12.
8. cf. 25,11-12.
9. Metaph. 988a30; GC 328b35, 332a21.
10. Metaph. 989a14; Gael. 303b12; GC 332a20; Phys. 203a18, 205a27. At
Phys. 189b3 Aristotle refers to a substance intermediate between water and
fire.
11. It is clear from Aristotle's text (187a12-26) that the two forms of view
maintained by the natural philosophers are the following: (I) The cosmos is
composed of a single primal stuff (either water, air, fire or some other simple
stuff intermediate between two of the three above on a scale of rarity and
density), from which non-basic entities are formed by processes of condensation
and rarefaction. (II) The basic material of the cosmos is not a single stuff, but a
mixture of opposites (probably undiferentiated between properties such as hot
and cold and stuffs such as water and air), which are extracted from the primal
mixture and then combined to make further things. Aristotle does not name any
proponent ofl, but names Anaximander, Empedocles andAnaxagoras as having
held diferent versions ofll. (On either version the basic stuff or mixture is what
underlies change; it is referred to by Simplicius as the hupokeimenon, lit. 'the
underlying thing', rendered 'substrate' in this translation.) Simplicius sets out
this distinction plainly below (150,9-25), but at this point(149,4-11) his exposition is somewhat confusing. The fact that he postpones exposition of alternative
II to 150,20-4, focusing at this point on the distinction between the views on the
one hand that the basic stuff is water, air or fire and on the other that it is
something intermediate between air and fire, or between water and air, might
be taken to suggest that he takes Aristotle's 'two forms' to be the terms of the
latter distinction, not I and II above. But, as is clear from 149,21-2, both the
view that the basic stuff is one of the three elements and the view that it is
something intermediate assume that non-basic things are generated in the
same way, namely by condensation and rarefaction. Hence in saying that those
who say that there is one element think that things come from it in either of two
ways, he clearly has in mind the distinction in between I and II. (Simplicius'
'two ways' (duo tropous, 149,5) echoes Aristotle's statement that the views of
the natural philosophers take two forms (duo tropoi).)
12. The works of Alexander, Porphyry and Nicolaus of Damascus to which
Simplicius here refers are not extant. It is therefore impossible to determine
whether Simplicius represents their views correctly.
13. It appears from the fragments ofDiogenes cited later in this chapter (see
below) that in fact Diogenes' view was that the primal stuff was air, as
Simplicius says at 149,7-8.
14. cf. 23,14-16 (with n. 131) and 25,8-9.
15. Simplicius is plainly correct in his interpretation of 187a13-15, and in his
statement that Aristotle takes Anaximander's account of the generation of
things to have been by extraction from an original mixture, not by condensation
and rarefaction. Hence if Porphyry interpreted Aristotle as Simplicius says he
did, he was wrong.
16. cf. 24,29-31.
17. 'Enquiry' renders 'Historia'. Simplicius refers to what is presumably the
103
same work under the title 'Enquiry into Nature (Phusike HistoriaJ at 115,17
and 154,17. The list of titles of Theophrastus' works preserved by Diogenes
Laertius in his Life includes several titles dealing with nature and natural
philosophers (V.46 and 48), but does not include this precise title, which may be
an alternative title of one of the works listed.
18. At Phys. 1.5-7, where natural change is analysed as the transition of an
underlying subject from one of a pair of opposite states to the other, e.g. a
material's becoming structured in a certain way from having been unstructured
in that way.
19. See Ar. Metaph. 987b14-988a15, with discussion by Ross, 1953, ch.12.
20. The thought seems to be that as the matter of which something is
composed has the potential to develop or be shaped in various ways, so the
fundamental opposition of large and small has the potentiality to give rise to
various specific oppositions, and so to become something e.g. hot or cold.
21. At 24,13-16 Simplicius says that Anaximander said that the principle
(arkhe) and element (stoikheion) of things was the unlimited (to apeiron), protos
touto tounoma komisas tes arkhes. While the most probable sense of the latter
phrase is 'being the first to provide this name (viz. 'the unlimited') for 'the
principle', it is also possible to take it as 'being the first to provide this name of
principle' (i.e. to apply the name 'principle'). In that case Simplicius says the
same thing in the earlier passage as here. For that reason some scholars favour
reading the earlier passage in that sense, despite the linguistic awkwardness of
so doing. The alternative (favoured e.g. by Guthrie, vol. 1, p. 77) is that in the
two passages Sim.plicius attributes to Anaxim.ander two distinct terminological
innovations, viz. the introduction ofboth 'the unlimited' and 'principle'.
22. For Aristotle density (puknotes) consists in a thing's having its parts close
together, rarity (manotes) in having parts more widely separated (Cat. 10a20-2),
while coarseness (pakhos) consists in having large parts and fineness (leptotes)
in having small parts (Gael. 303b26-7). At Cael. 303b22ff. he says that explaining generation in terms of density and rarity is no different from explaining it
in terms of coarseness and fineness.
23. I translate Diels' suggested emendation dio kai duskinetotera hoion gen.
Eti puknotera phesi. The MSS text dio kai duskinetoteron ou men eti puknotera
phesi is ungrammatical.
24. See n. 22.
25. Against Aristotle's theses that density and coarseness, and rarity and
fineness, always accompany one another, Simplicius maintains that things with
large parts (coarse things) must have those parts widely spaced, and must
therefore be rare, whereas things with small parts (fine things) must have those
parts close together, and must therefore be dense. While both theses are false,
it is clearly possible that things may have large parts widely spaced, and
equally that things may have small parts densely packed together. Hence
the cOl"relations between density and coarseness, and between rarity and
fineness, cannot be universal as Aristotle, according to Simplicius, alleges,
but allow for exceptions.
26. A paraphrase of Alex. in Metaph. 56,33-5.
27. For evidence on Plato's lecture on the Good see Ross, 1955, pp. 111-20.
with translation in Barnes, 1984, vol 2, pp. 2397-9.
28. Simplicius cites Tim. 52B2, which refers, not to matter. but to space.
Things which come to be and cease to be (i.e. material things) are perceptible.
and are 'comprehended by belief together with perception' (52A5-7), while
space, which is the receptacle within which material things come to be and cease
to be, is imperceptible, but 'without perception is grasped by a kind of bastard
104
105
41. Simplicius quotes this sentence four times in this chapter, here, at
165,33, at 174,8-9 and at 177,4-5. Each citation begins 'and such as were to be
and such as were,' but the next clause, down to 'will be' appears in a different
version: 165,33 is close to the present passage with 'and as many as now are and
will be', while 174,8-9 and 177,4-5 have 'as many as now are not and such as
will be'. I take it that Anaxagoras' claim is that Mind knows everything past,
present and future. In that case the present passage and 165,33 are verbal
variants of one another, while the version in 174,8-9 and 177,4-5is deviant. On
the assumption that the differences are due to variation in the MSS, rather than
attributable to Simplicius' citing from memory, I emend the text of the three
later passages to confonv. to that of the present one.
42. The MS text reads ho de nous hosa esti te karta kai nun estin hina kai ta
alla panta. I translate DK's emendation ho de nous, hos aei esti, to karta ...
panta.
43. This Neoplatonic interpretation is set out in greater detail at 34,18-35,21.
It is hard to reconcile with the passages of Anaxagoras cited by Simplicius, from
which it is perfectly clear that the universe over which Mind presides, whether
or not including a plurality of distinct kosmoi (world orders (see n. 45)) is
physical. While Anaxagoras' system does indeed allow for a distinction between
Mind's intellectual representation of the physical world and that world itself,
and treats Mind's representation as the model for the physical world, it does not
allow for the suggestion that the civilisations contrasted with ours, and the
different sun and moon which they have, belong to an intellectual world distinct
from the physical world.
44. At 34,29-35, 12 'This being so [156,2] ... colours and flavours, and people
... use' is quoted as a single continuous passage [DK 59B4, 1-10].
45. This passage has prompted a variety of interpretations, some scholars
favouring the suggestion rejected by Simplicius here (and at 35,9-13), that
Anaxagoras is envisaging distinct civilisations in remote areas of the earth,
others that he is positing a plurality of distinct world-orders distributed spatially within the physical universe, as the atomists held. A variant of the latter
is the suggestion that the plural worlds are not spatially separated, but are
microscopic worlds nested within our perceptible world, in virtue of the
Anaxagorean principles that everything is in everything and that there is no
smallest thing. For a lucid and judicious survey and assessment of the competing views see Curd, 2007, pp. 212-22.
46. The first part of the sentence (line 4) describes the generation of things
by the combination of previously separate elements, the second (line 5) the
converse process, in which things are generated by the dispersal of a homogeneous mixture into its separated elemental components. The homogeneous
mixture 'flies asunder' and 'is nourished' (i.e. develops into an articulated world
order) as the elements 'grow apart'. In line 5 I follow DK and others in reading
threphtheisa ('nourished') instead of the MSS' thruphtheisa ('shattered').
47. '[A]t one time ... Strife': quoted at 25,29-30.
48. Reading with DK and other editors mathe for the MSS' methe, 'drink' or
"drunkenness'.
49. Reading atalanton hapantei, a reading preserved by Sextus M. 9.10,
instead of the MSS' atalanton hekaston. '[A.]t another ... breadth': quoted at
26,1-4.
50. Reading with DK and others pii de ke kexapoloito instead of the MSS' pei
de ke kai kerux apoloito.
51. The Greek is eis to hen telei. It is not quite clear what Simplicius means.
The supremacy of Strife is at its maximum when the elements are totally
106
separated from one another in four distinct world masses (Ar. Metaph. 985a247; DK 31A37). Perhaps Simplicius' point is the same as Aristotle's in that
passage, that in separating out the elements from one another Strife thereby
unifies each into a single mass. Or perhaps the point is that the four separate
world masses are contained within a single (spherical) whole.
52. cf. 32,3-4 'He calls fire "Hephaistos'', "sun", and "flame", and water "rain''
and air "aither".
53. Lines 3-10 'the sun ... honours' quoted at 33,10-17.
54. The Neoplatonic interpretation (cf. 31,18-26; 34,812) is as implausible
for Empedocles as for Anaxagoras (cf. n. 43). B21 quoted above makes it clear
that the long-lived gods are, like humans, plants and animals, part of the
natural world, compounds of elements, and thereby subject to eventual dissolution. It is noticeable that they are described, not as immortal, but as long-lived,
unlike the elements and Love and Strife, which are immortal (DK 31B16). The
point of 'unless ... usage' may be to suggest that the only alternative to the
Neoplatonic interpretation is to treat Empedocles' references to the gods as
some kind of figure of speech.
55. Adopting M.R. Wright's tentative emendation hoti sphisi gennai en orgi
for the MSS' corrupt hoti sphisi gennan orga.
56. See n. 54. The suggestion that union through Love is somehow primarily
a feature of the intelligible world, while separation through Strife occurs only
(or primarily) in the material world (cf. 31,21-3), is at odds with Empedocles'
fundamental thesis that Love and Strife are equipollent forces, in their eternal
opposition shapiD.g the elements into a world order whose stability consists in
the instantiation of a constantly recurring pattern of change.
57. In this mtrod.uction to the discussion of Anaxagoras Simplicius uses a
number of legal terms. Anaxagoras is treated as a litigant whose case is not to
go by default. Instead he is to put the best case he can, and then be subject to
cross-examination. Aristotle is thus treating him charitably (cf. 148,28, with n.
2). The reference to Plato's generosity is perhaps a reference back to 148,11-16.
where Sim.plicius mentions Plato's respectful treatment of Parmenides in the
Theaetetus and the Parmenides.
58. The two principal MSS have ei tukhoi nun meden en and ei tukhe nun
meden en, neither of which is grammatical. Emendation of en to on, or of tukhe
to tukhei, gives grammatically correct clauses, ei tukhoi nun meden on, or ei
tukhei nun meden en, but each requires nun to have temporal reference, which
gives an unsatisfactory sense: Melissus' claim is not that if now (i.e. at the time
of writing) there happened to be nothing, in no way could anything come from
nothing, but that if ever there was nothing, in no way could anything come from
nothing. I therefore translate DK's emendation ei toinun meden en, where the
force of toinun (rendered 'now') is sequential, not temporal
59. Simplicius assumes, in common with ancient theorists generally, that
when wasps swarm in a decaying corpse (in his example, the corpse of a horse),
some of the matter of the corpse has turned into the wasps, as boiling water
turns to steam.
60. Having said at 187a27-9 that the reason Anaxagoras posited an infinity
of elements was his acceptance of the common principle that nothing can come
from nothing, Aristotle adds parenthetically {187a29-32) 'That is why they say
"All things were together", and he said that coming to be such and such
amounted to alteration, though some say combination and separation.' 'All
things were together' quotes Anaxagoras [DK 59B1] and 'he' clearly refers to
him, since Aristotle attributes to him the view that coming to be amounts to
alteration at GC 314a13-15 (the wording is virtually identical to the Phys.
107
passage). '(S]ome say combination and separation' then contrasts that view of
Anaxagoras' with that of others who say that coming-to-be and perishing are
combination and separation, despite the fact that that is attested as
Anaxagoras' own view by DK 59B17. Aristotle's view seems thus to have been
that in saying that coming-to-be is combination and perishing separation
Anaxagoras really meant that they are kinds of alteration, but was not aware
ofthe appropriate term for the process (so Themistius in Phys. 14,1-3). Others,
by contrast (perhaps Aristotle had Empedocles in mind) really did think that
coming-to-be is combination and combination perishing. This interpretation of
Anaxagoras (with the concomitant contrast between him and 'others') is not
supported by any of the {J:'agments.
61. Simplicius' thought seems to be that opposites cannot come to be from
their opposites, in the sense that one opposite cannot turn into its opposite, e.g.
hot cannot turn into or become cold. Rather, hot is already mixed in with cold,
and emerges from it.
62. Simplicius appears to suggest that strictly speaking we should not say
that opposites are in one another, but rather that they are mixed up with one
another, either by juxtaposition, as when a mixture of sugar and salt consists of
grains of sugar mixed up with grains of salt, or by mixture, as when flour and
eggs are mixed to form batter. In these cases we do not say that the sugar is in
the salt or vice versa, or that the flour is in the eggs or vice versa (though when
a spoonful of sugar is dissolved in a gallon of water we do say that the sugar is
in the water). Clearly, Anaxagoras, who maintains that everything is in everything, sees no absurdity in the claim that opposites are present in one another.
Rather than elucidating Anaxagoras' thought, which is what Aristotle is doing
in the passage presently under discussion, Simplicius appears then to be raising
objections to Anaxagoras.
63. Seen. 57.
64. The MSS text is to gar eon ouk esti to me ouk einai, which has seemed to
some scholars to require emendation. On the textual problem and the various
proposals for emendation see Curd. 2007, pp. 39-40; she argues persuasively
that the MSS text can express the sense given in the translation, which is what
Anaxagoras' argument requires. The thought is that since there is no minimum
quantity of anything, there can be no process of diminution by which a magnitude could be reduced to nothing.
65. Seen. 41.
66. '[E]xcept' is difficult; perhaps the sequence of thought is 'If the principles
are knowable by Mind, they are not infinite in themselves; all the same, what
Aristotle says is true ... '.
67. The argument is of the form P-+ Q, -,Q, therefore -,P, i.e. modus tollendo
tollens, the second of the five Stoic indemonstrables.
68. The crucial premiss in this argument of Aristotle's and in the succeeding
two (187bl2-188a2) is that, while any magnitude may potentially be divided to
infinity, there is a minimum magnitude for any actual member of a natural
kind, e.g. a quantity of .flesh. Anaxagoras' thesis that: 'Neither of the smaller is
there a least, but always a smaller' amounts to the rejection of that premiss.
69. Simplicius treats 'sar:i ('flesh'), as a count-noun. Here he says (literally)
that the whole is divided into fleshes, bones etc., and throughout he speaks of
fleshes being divided into smaller flesh.es. Since 'flesh' is only a mass-noun, and
never a count-noun (unlike e.g. 'bone', which is sometimes one and sometimes
the other) I render 'sar:i in these instances as 'amount of flesh'.
70. The passages cited by Alexander are not found in any of the MSS of
Aristotle. They are an alternative version of 187b16-21, presumably rejected
108
by the final redactor of the text, but preserved in some copy which does not
survive.
71. In Simplicius' text of the Physics, which is the same as ours, Aristotle's
argument at 187b13-21 is that U: as Anaxagoras holds, the parts of a natural
substance can be of any size you like (hopelikonoun), i.e. arbitrarily large or
small, then the substance can be of any size you like, which is impossible. In the
text which Alexander read Aristotle says that if the substances cannot be
[arbitrarily] large or small (pelika) nor composed of [arbitrarily] many parts
(posa), then the parts cannot be arbitrarily large or small. Simplicius objects
that Aristotle's argument concerns only the size of the parts, not their number,
but that is merely to report what was in his text, not to show Aristotle did not
write what appears in Alexander's (different) text.
72. Simplicius further objects that in the argument given in the text cited by
Alexander the premiss contains the word pelika, 'so large', instead of hopelikaoun, 'as large as you like', which is what is required for validity. He seems to
be suggesting that since the argument would be invalid given that text, that
cannot have been what Aristotle in fact wrote. The obvious reply is that pelika
in the premiss is to be read, as determined by the context, as equivalent to
hopelikaoun. (I make that assumption in inserting '[arbitrarily]' in the precedingnote.)
73. Simplicius puts forward on behalf of Anaxagoras a defence against the
Aristotelian argument which has just been set out, and then rebuts the defence.
The argument was that Anaxagoras is committed to holding that the parts of
any natural object may be large or small without limit, from which it follows
that the object composed of those parts may be large or small without limit,
which is impossible. The defence seems to concede that that argument holds
provided that each of the organic constituents of the whole (flesh, bone, etc.) is
a single lump, but to maintain that it does not hold if each such constituent is
a combination of several numerically distinct bits. The reason why the argument is supposed not to hold on that hypothesis is obscure; perhaps the thought
is that even the subtraction of an infinite number of bits will leave an amount
of the stuff exceeding the minimum amount of that stuff. But, as Simplicius
proceeds to point out, that presupposes an infinite number of bits of the stuft:
from which it follows that the total amount of the stuff is infinite, contrary to
the original hypothesis. Any defence ofAnaxagoras must challenge the principle
that a magnitude composed of an infinite number of magnitudes must be
infinite.
74. Phys. 187b25-6.
75. i.e. there is some minimum size, such that no body can be smaller than
that size.
76. Strictly speaking, the present argument uses a premiss of the previous one,
viz. that there is a minimum actual amount of any natural stuff (187b29-30).
77. The argument does not assume that any particular finite size, e.g. 1
mikron, has been defined as the minimum size, but merely that it has been
specified that there is some particular size which is the minimum size.
78. See previous note.
79. See n. 76.
80. Simplicius appears to suggest that in 187b29-30 Aristotle is conceding to
Anaxagoras what he has maintained above (at 187b13-21) to be impossible,
namely that there is no minimum quantity of any natural stuff, in order to show
that even given that concession it is impossible that everything should be in
everything. The argument would then be that given that there is no minimum
quantity of any stuff, any stuff must be divisible ad infinitum; but then any
109
finite amount of any stuff would contain infinitely many parts, which is in
Aristotle's view impossible. On that interpretation 'even if what is extracted is
always smaller, all the same it will not exceed a certain magnitude in smallness'
does not mean 'however small the extracted amount, there is some given
magnitude than which it will not be smaller', [i.e. some minimum magnitude],
but 'however small the extracted amount, there is some magnitude than which
it is not smaller' [i.e. some magnitude equal to or smaller than the extracted
amount]. There is, however, no indication in Aristotle's text that 18'ib29-30
withdraws the earlier assertion that there is a minimum amount of any natural
stuff. Rather, the argument from 187b27 relies on that premiss, since Aristotle
there argues that, give~ that there is a minimum amount of any stuff: then
either the process of extraction comes to an end when all of stuff A has been
extracted from stuff B, which violates the principle that everything is in
everything, or it goes on indefinitely to produce an infinite number of minimum
(and hence equal) amounts of stuff A from a finite amount of stuff B, which is
impossible. Since Aristotle goes on to reaffirm at 187b35-6 the principle that
there is a maximum and minimum amount of any natural stuff, it is clear that,
contrary to Simplicius' suggestion, the entire section from 187b13-188a2 relies
on that principle.
81. It is unclear whether Simplicius is responding to what he takes Alexander and Themistius to have said, (viz. that Aristotle was seeking to show that
the extraction does come to an end), or making an observation on his own
account. H the former, neither his own summary nor Themistius' text (in Phys.
16) confirms his interpretation.
82. The Greek is tois pan en panti legousi kai pan ek pantos ekkrinesthai,
tauton de eipein ginesthai axiousi. I understand the last five words as 'and who
claim to say the same by "ginestha?", and take their claim to be that 'everything
is extracted from everything' is synonymous with 'everything comes to be from
everything'. In that construction, in which the word 'ginesthai' is quoted, one
would expect the quoted word to be preceded by the definite article (in the dative
case in this particular instance). I do not know whether the absence of the article
is a decisive objection to my interpretation. Hit is, I have no better suggestion
to offer.
83. Simplicius seems to criticise Alexander for describing the results of
extraction ad infinitum as not merely finite but as equal magnitudes. He
appears to be pursuing his suggestion discussed inn. 80 above, and objecting to
Alexander that the specification of the results of extraction ad infinitum as
equal magnitudes conflicts with that suggestion. But since Alexander is explicitly following Aristotle (see 187b33-4) on this point, Simplicius finds himself
criticising Aristotle for in effect misrepresenting his own [i.e. Aristotle's] position.
84. An obscure comment. Simplicius is perhaps suggesting, in support of his
own interpretation (see above), that, when applied to finite magnitudes, 'equal'
may be understood, not in the strict sense, but in the weaker sense 'similar'.
85. Simplicius cites the principle as pan soma peperasmenon hupo samatos
peperasmenou katametreitai kai dapanatai' (translated above), and then notes
that in the correct text (lit. 'in the things [i.e. copies] which are correctly set
down') Aristotle has anaireitai ('is done away with') instead of katametreitai kai
dapanatai ('is measured and exhausted'). While all the extant MSS have
anaireitai, Simplicius is presumably recording a variant reading, or perhaps
citing a popular version of the principle, rather than quoting Aristotle.
86. The Greek is hoper ou boulontai. I take the understood subject to be hoi
peri Ana.mgoran. Another possibility is that the subject is hai homoiomereiai,
110
giving the sense 'rrJhe homoiomeries are destructible, which they are not
supposed to be'.
87. For 'comes to be' as equivalent to 'is extracted' seen. 82.
88. This is the reading of all the MSS. Ross, 1936, inserts 'not' before
'separate', but it is clear from Simplicius' comments that his text of Aristotle did
not contain the insertion.
89. This seems the most plausible construal of ei tis auton ekdekhoito kata to
phainomenon (lit. 'if one were to take it according to what appears'). I take it
that the reference of auton is Aristotle's criticism (elenkhos).
90. This stresses the absurdity that infinitely many times infinitely many
finite magnitudes are contained in any finite magnitude not merely potentially,
but actually.
91. Alexander suggests that Anaxagoras might hope to escape the above
objections by weakening his theory from 'Everything in everything' to 'Everything in every perceptible body'. He then blocks this escape route. Since
according to Anaxagoras nothing is completely separable from anything else,
the components of the perceptible bodies will themselves turn out to be mixtures
of all components, and so on ad infinitum, reinstating the objection.
92. See above, 172,27-9.
93. Seen. 41.
94. i.e. finitely m.any, as opposed to infinitely many. I translate 'definite' to
capture the repetition of 'Mrismene from the description of knowledge. The
inference seems to be that since knowledge is determinate, what is known must
be determinate, and if determinate, then finite in quantity.
95. Simplicius cites instances of processes, the expansion of water when
turned to steam and the organisation of organic stuffs into individual substances, which cannot be accounted for by extraction.
96. The thought seems to be 'Quantitatively, because you will never reach
the smallest part; for if you did reach it the extraction would come to an end
[contrary to Anaxagoras' hypothesis]'. 'The smallest part will not turn up'
renders ou phthasei to elakhiston. Phthana has the basic sense 'be first, do
something before someone (or something) else'; hence, assuming that 'to elakhiston' is the subject of the verb, the sense ought to be that the smallest part
will in some sense not come before something else, but it is hard to see what
that other thing might be. There is a rare absolute use of the verb, applied to
time expressions, meaning 'arrive' (v. LSJ s.v. ll.2); I suggest that Simplicius
may be extending this use to a non-temporal subject, giving roughly the sense
'the smallest part will not be reached, come along'. But I am not at all confident
that this suggestion is correct.
97. This sentence is a literal translation of the Greek. I suggest, tentatively,
that the meaning is 'Quantitative separation occurs when and only when there
is a smallest thing', or perhaps 'Quantitative separation is what gives rise to the
smallest thing'.
98. A difficult passage. I suggest (again tentatively) that what Simplicius
means is that the reason the process will not come to an end is not that division
as such goes on ad infinitum, as Alexander held (following Aristotle), but that
Anaxagoras' principle that everything is in everything implies that the process
of extracting one stuff from another can never come to an end.
99. See n. 41.
100. Another Neoplatonic thought.
101. Phaedo 98B-C.
102. Tim. 61D-62B. The general account of causation which precedes extends
from 27C to 53C.
111
Bibliography
Baltussen, H., Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius, London, 2008.
Barnes, J., ed., The Complete Works of Aristotle. The Revised Oxford Translation, Princeton, 1984, 2 vols.
Barnes, J., The Presocratic Philosophers, London and New York, 1982.
Bodnar, I. and Fortenbaugh, W.W., eds, Eudemus of Rhodes, New Brunswick,
2002 (RUSCH XI).
Charlton, W., Aristotle, Physics, Books i and ii, translated with introduction and
notes, Oxford, 1970.
Curd, P., Anaxagoras of Clazomenae. Fragments and Testimonia, text and
translation with notes and essays, Toronto, 2007.
Denniston, J.D.. The Greek Particles, Oxford, 1934.
Golitsis, P., Les commentaires de Simplicius et de Jean Philopon d la Physique
d~tote, Berlin and New York, 2008.
Guthrie, W.K.C., A History of Greek Philosophy, Cambridge, 1962-81, 6 vols.
Ruby, P.M., Theophrastus of Eresus: Sources for his Life, Writing, Thought and
Influence, vol. 2: Logic (PhilosophiaAntiqua), Leiden, 2007.
Kirk, G.S., Raven, J.E and Schofield, M., The Presocratic Philosophers: A
Critical History with a Selection of Texts, 2nd edn, Cambridge, 1984.
Ross, W.D., Aristotle's Physics, a revised text with introduction and commentary, Oxford, 1936.
Ross, W.D, Plato's Theory of Ideas, Oxford, 1953.
Ross, W.D., Aristotelis Fragmenta Selecta, Oxford, 1955.
Speca, A., Hypothetical Syllogistic and Stoic Logic, Leiden, 2001.
West, M.L., The Orphic Poems, Oxford, 1983
Wright, M.R., Empedocles: The Extant Fragments, 2nd edn, London, Indianapolis and Cambridge. 1995.
English-Greek Glossary
absolutely: haplOs
abstraction: aphairesis
absurd: atopos
absurdity, arbitrariness, randomness,
chance: apoklerosis
accept: apodekhesthai, dekhesthai,
endidonai
accident: sumbebekos
accompany: opazein
account: exegesis, logos, muthos,
apodosis
accuracy: akribeia
accurate: akribes
acquire: prolambanein
act:poiein
activity: energeia, epitedeuma
actual: energeiai (dative of energeia)
actuality: energeia
actually: energeiai, entelekheiai
add: epagein, epididonai,
epilambanein, epipherein,
paragraphein, proslambanein,
prostithenai, suntithenai,
sunagein; be added to:
prosginesthai
addition: prostheke
additional assumption: proslepsis
adopt: lambanein
advance: prokhOrein, prokoptein
affection: pathos
affirmation: kataphasis
agree: homologein
agreeing with: summetros
aim at: prolambanein, stokhazesthai
air: aer
alike: homoios
all at once, together (adj.): athroos;
(adv.): athro6s
allow: anienai
alone: monos
alter: kinein, alloioun, heteroioun
114
English-Greek Glossary
English-Greek Glossary
confirm: pistoun
confused: akritos
conical: konikos
conjunction of two: sunamphoteros
conjunction: alleloukhia
connected with, be: epharmottein
connectedly: prosekhOs
consequent: akolouthos, hepomenos
consider: hegousthai
constructive: suntitheis
contain: sunairein
continually changing: aeikinetos
continuity: sunekheia
continuous (opp. discrete): sunekhes
continuum: parallage
contract: sustellein
contradiction: antiphasis, antistrophe
contradictory: enantios
contrary to, be: antikeisthai
contribute to: sunteloun
control (n.): epistasia; (v.): ithunein,
kratein
converse (v.): dialegesthai
converse: antistrophe
conversion: antistrophe
convert: antistrephein
corporeal: samatikos
counterargument: antilogia
crab: karkinos
created: genetos
criticise: aitiasthai, elenkhein,
enkalein, euthunein, memphesthai
curvedness: koilotes
cutting: tome
cylinder: kulindros
cylindrical: kulindrikos
dare: tolman
dazed, be: thaptein
deaf: kOphos
deceit: apate
deceitful: apatelos
deceive: apatan, diapseudein
deceptive: apatelos
decide: krinein
decision: krisis
declare: phrazein
decrease (n.): meiOsis
deduce: sunagein
deducible from, be: hepesthai
defence: kataskeue
define: aphorizein, horizein, diorizein
defining: horistikos
115
116
English-Greek Glossary
divided: diairetos
divine: theios, theologikos
divisible: diairetos, meristos
division: diairesis, diakrisis,
dialepsis, merismos
double-tongued: amphoteroglOssos
doubts about, have: apisteuein
draw (conclusion): epagein
drifting: planktos
drive: ornunai
earth: ge
easy: prokheiros
edge:peras
effect: pathos
egg: Cieon, 8on
element: stoikheion
elemental: stoikhei.Odes
elsewhere: allakhou; elsewhere, go:
ekbainein
embrace: periekhein
empty: kenos
end (n.): peras, teleute, telos; (v.):
pauein, perainein
end up: ekbainein
end, have an: teleutan
end, without: ateleutetos
enmattered: enulos
enough, be: arkein
enquire into: utein
enquiry: diz&ios, historia, utesis
entirely: pantelOs
equally: isopales; be equally true:
e:risazein
equivalent: isakh&, isos; be
equivalent: exisazein, isodunamein
escape notice of dialanthanein
escape: pheugein
establish: hidrusthai, kataskeuazein
eternal: aidios
evade: apopheugein
even: isos
every direction, from: pantothen
everywhere: homou
examination: epistasis
examine: episkeptesthai
example: paradeigma
exchange: metalambanein
exclude: emrizein
exercises, with: gumnastiMs
exist in: enuparkhein, pherein
exist: huphistanai
expend: analiskein
explain: exegeisthai
explanation: exegesis
express: phanai, phatizein
extent: diarma
external:exathen
extinguish:aposbennunai
extract: ekkrinein
extraction: ekkrisis
extremity: huperbole
English-Greek Glossary
garment: himation
generable:~~
117
hypothetical: hupothetikos,
sunemmenon
idea: ennoia
ignorance: agnoia
ignorant, be: agnoein
illuminated: phOteinos
illumination: phOtismos
image: eioolon
image-like: eikonikos
images, maker of: ei.dOlopoios
immediately: autothen
immobile: akinetos
immortal: athanatos
impact: epereisis
impede: enokhlein; be an impecfu:nent:
kOluein
imperishable: aphthartos
impossibility: amekhanie
imprecisely: adioristOs
in itself: eilikrin.Os, eph' heauwi, kath'
hauto
in their own right: kath' hauta
include: paralambanein; included, be:
suneiserkhesthai
incomplete: ateleutetos
incomprehensible: aperileptas
incorporeal: asamatos
increase (n.): auxesis
increase (v.): auxein
indefinable: aperioristos
indefinite, undifferentiated: ooristos,
adioristos; indefinite dyad:
aoristos duos
indemonstrable: anapodeiktos
indestructible: an6lethros, aphthartos
indication: semeion
indicative: delOtikos
indisputably: anamphisbetetOs
indistinguishable: adiaphoros
individual: atomos
individually: idiai
indivisible: adiairetos, atmetos,
atomos
ineffable: aphatos, arretos
ineffectual: maten
inescapable: aphuktos
infinite, unlimited. limitless: apeiros,
apeiron
inseparable: akhOristos
intellect, thought, intelligence,
understanding: nous, noesis
intellectual: noeros
118
English-Greek Glossary
intelligible: noetos
interchange of parts: antiperistasis
intermediate: metaxu
introduce: eisagein, suneisagein
invalid(ly): asullogistos, -as
invalid: asumperantos
inviolate: asulos
irrational: alogos
irrelevant: maten
join together: sunairein
judge (v.): krinein; (n.): krites
judgement: krisis
just-existent: hoper on
justice: dike
juxtaposition: parathesis
keep: phulassein
keep away: eirgein
kindly (i.e. in a kindly way):
philanthropas
know: eidenai, gnoein
knowable: gnastos
knowledge: episteme
last: eskhatos, pumatos
laughable: geloios
laughing: gelastikos
lawful: themis
lead aside: paragein
leap:pedan.
learn: manthanein
learned: grammatikos
learning: grammatike
leg: skelos
lemma: lemma
letters, knowledge of: grammatike
life: zoe
like (itself): homoios
like: enalinkios
likely: eikos
limit (n.): peiras, peras; (v.): perainein
line: epos, gramme
live: zen
lofty: akros
look at: apoblepein, blepein,
episkeptesthai
look: skopein
lose: apolimpanein
made, be: huphistanai
magnitude, size: megethos, to pelikon
maintain: diateinesthai
English-Greek Glossary
number, quantity: arithmos, plethos,
toposon
object (v.): apoteinein
objection: enklema
observe: theasthai, theOrein
obvious: enarges
obviously: prophan6s
obviousness: enargeia
omit: parekein
one sense (way), in: moTIIJkhOs
one's own: oikeiOs
open: prophan6s
opinion: doxa; thing of opinion:
doxastos
oppose: antilegein; opposed to:
antithetos
opposite (adj.): antistrophos, enantios;
be opposite to: antikeisthai,
antitithesthai, enistanai, hupantan
opposition: enantiots
order (v.): an6gein; (n.): taxis
organise: dioikein
origin, with a single: mounogenes
other: heteros
otherness: heterotes
overturn: anatrepein
own words: lexis
pain, feel, suffer: algein, odunasthai
paradoxical: paradoXXJs
part: meros, morion; have part in:
metekhein
partake: metekhein
partaking: methexis
pass (of time): parelthein
pass away: phtheiresthai
passing away: phthora
path: hodos, keleuthos
peculiar: idios
peculiarity: idiots
perceived: aisthtos
perceptible: aisthtos
perfect: atelestos, holoteles
perishable: epikbos, phthartos
persuade: paramuthousthai, peithein
persuasion: peithos
persuasively: pithan6s
philosopher: philosophos
physics: (Ta) phusika
place in relation to (v.): antidiastellein
place: khOra, topos
plane: epipedon
119
plant: phuton
plurality: plethos
poetry: poiesis
point: semeion, stigma
pole: poZos
portion: diaspasmos, meros
positive argument: kataskeue
possibility: dunamis
possible: anustos
postulate: hupotitlresthai
potential (n.): dunamis
potentiality: dunamis
potentially: dunamei
power: dunamis
precede: prolambanein
precise, be: akribologeistooi
predicate of kategorein
predominate: epikratein
premise: lemma, protasis
present, be: pareinai
prevail: damazein
prevent: eirgein, kOluein,
proanastellein
primary: proegoumenos
principle: arkhe; having the character
of a principle: arkhoeides
problem: aporia
proceed: proerkhesthai
proclaim: anumnein, boan
produce: ekpherein, proplrerein
productive: poitikos
project: proekhein
proof: apodeixis; proo( give:
apodeiknunai; proof, without:
anapodeiktOs
properly: hikan6s
proposal: hupolepsis
propose: proagein, protithenai
prove: deiknunai
proverb: paroimia
psychical: psukhikos
purpose: telos
push aside: apothein
put together: suntithenai
put: epemballein
putting together: sunthesis
qualified: poios; quality: poiotes, to
poion; qualitiless: apoios
quantity, number: plethos, posotes, to
poson
question: erotesis
question, be a: aporein
120
English-Greek Glossary
quotation: rhesis
rare (in texture): araios, manos;
become rarer: araiousthai
rarefaction: man6sis
rarity: manotes
rational: logikos
rationality: logikotes
reach to: kurein
reader, be a: entunkhanein
rearranged, be: metakosmeisthai
reason: logos
reasonable: eikos, eulogos
reasoning: logismos
recall: apomnemoneuein
receive: anadekhesthai, eisdekhesthai,
hupodekhesthai, prolambanein
record (n.): hupomnema, mneme; (v.):
mnemoneuein
refer to: mnemoneuein
reference: mneme
refine: araioun
refutation: antilogia, antirresis,
elenkhos, enantiologos, lusis
refute: antilegein, dialuein,
dielenkhein, elenkhein, luein
reject: dielenkhein
relax: khalazein
relevant: prosphues
relevant to, be: prosekein
reliable: pistos
relief, get: anapauesthai
rely on: pisteuein
remain: menein
remind: hupomimneskein
remove: anairein; be removed:
apogenesthai
reply to: hupantan
reply with: apodidonai
report: historein, paradidonai
reproach: enkalein
research: historia
resolve: apoluein
rest: stasis
reveal: apodeiknunai, apophainein,
ekphainein
reverse of, the: anapalin
revolution: peridinesis
revolving:peripheres
rightly: ortiWs
have room for: kiWrein
root: rhiza
rotate (intr.): perikhOrein
rotation: perikiWresis
rule (n.): kan6n
safe: asphales
sake of which, for the: hou heneka
same, the: homoios; of the same form:
homoioskhem6n
say: erein, legein, phanai
say about: epilegein
scarcity: spanis
scatter: katakermatizein
search: epizetein
search out: anikhneuein
section: diakrisis
see:horan,sunoran
seek: dizenai
seem: dokein
self-controlling: autokrates
sense: tropos; have a sense: semainein
sensible: aisthetos
sentence: logos
separate (v.), discriminate,
distinguish: apoluein,
dialambanein, diakrinein,
kiWrizen; (adj.): idios, kiWristos;
(adv.): kiWris
separate off: apokrinein
separate out, extract: ekkrinein
separation: diallaxis
separation, by: diastatikiis
sequence: akolouthesis, akolouthia
set out: ektithenai; be set out:
parakeisthai
several: pleiOn
several senses, with: pollak/Ws
shake: donein
shape: skhema; have a shape:
skhematizein
share in: metekhein; have a share in:
koin6nein
shorten: epitemnein
shout out: anaboan
show: deiknunai, deloun, elenkhein,
epideiknunai
show before: prodeiknunai
sidestep: parexerkhesthai
sight: apsis
sign:sema
signify: semainein
silvery: argupheos
similar: paraplesios
simple: haplos
sit: kathezesthai
English-Greek Glossary
size: megethos, to pelilwun; of any
size you like: hopelilwsoun
sizeless: amegethes
sleep: lwimasthai
small: baios
smaller, get: meioun
smallest: elakhistos
smallness: smikrotes
smith: khalkeus
snow: khion
snub-nosed: simos
solemn: semnos
solid: stereon
solution: endosis, lusis
solve: dialuein
sophist: sophistes; be a sophistry:
sophizein
sort out: diakrinein
soul: psukhe; having a soul: psukhikos
sound: phOne
space: topos
speak against: antilegein
speak out against: anteipein
special: idios, oikeios
special feature: idiotes
species: eidos
sphere: sphaira
spherical: sphairilws
stand: histanai
stand aside: parakhOrein
stand up to: hupomenein
starting: menein
state: diathesis, hexis
stay the same: hupomenein
staying the same: stasis
stop: katalegein, pauein
stone: lithos
story: logos
strength: iskhus
strengthen: bebaioun
strict)y: kurws
strong: krateros
strong, be: iskhuein
study: theOrein
style: plasma
subcontrary: hupenantios
subgenus: husterogenes
subject: hupokeimenon, mathema,
pragmateia
subsequent: alwlouthOs
subsist: huphistanai
substance:ousia
121
substantial: ousi⩽ be
substantiated: ousiounai
substrate, underlying thing:
hupokeimenon, hupostasis
suggest: hupotithesthai, tithenai
suggestion: thesis
sun: helios
superiority: huperokhe
support (v.): bebaioun, kataskeuazein,
paristanai; (n.): sunegoria
suppose: hupotithesthai, lambanein,
tithenai
surface: epiphaneia
surprised, be: thaumazein
surprising: thaumastos
swan: kuknos
syllogism: sullogismos
syllogistic: sullogistikos
syllogise: sullogizesthai
synonymous: suoonumos
system of rules: kanonikos
take: lambanein, paralambanein
take away: aphairein
take up: paralambanein
taste: hedone
teach: apodeiknunai
teacher:di~kaLos
teaching: dogma
ten ways, in: dekakhiis
hupolambanein
terseness: brakhulogia
test: basanos
theory: do:x:a
there: ekei
thickness: pakhos
thing: pragma, khrema
think: doxazein, ennoein, huponoein,
noein, nomizein, phronein
think of: epinoein
think right: axioun
thinker: noeros, nous
thinking: noein, noema, noeros
thought: dianoia, ennoia, noema,
noetos, phronesis
time: khronos; with regard to time:
khronikos; it is time: Mra; at some
time:pote
timeless: akhronos
together: homou
touch: epilambanein, haptein
touch upon: paraptein
touchable: haptos
122
English-Greek Glossary
transposition: metathesis
treat: ekdekhesthai, paradidonai
treatise: sungramma
trench, dig: skaptein
tribe: phulon
true: alethes, etetumos
true, be: aletheuein; be true at the
same time: sunaletheuein
trustworthy: pistos
truth: aletheie
try: epikheirein, peiran
turn back: epistrephein
turning back: epistrophe
turning back on itself: palintropos
two, in: dikha
twofold: dikhei
two-footed: dipous
two-headed: dikranos
two together: sunamphoteros
two ways: dissos; in two ways: dikhOs
unceasing: apaustos
uncertain,feel:aporein
unchanging: akinetos
unclearly: asaphOs
unconvincing: panapeuthes
uncreated: agenetos
undergo: paskhein
under]ying thing (see substrate)
understand: akouein, ephistanai
understanding (see thought)
undifferentiated (see indefinite); in
an undifferentiated way: adioristOs
undivided: adiairetos, adiakritos,
atmetos
undividedly: amerist6s
unending: aphthartos
ungenerated: agenetos
unheard of: apustos
unification: henOsis
union, by way of: hen6men6s
unique: monogenes, mounogenes
unite: henoun
unity: hen6sis
universal: katholou
universe: diakosmos, kosmos
unlimited: apeiros
unmoving: atremes
unquestionably: anantirret6s
unshaken: atremes
unsliced: atmetos
unthinkable: anoetos
untrustworthy: anaxiopistos
useless: maten
vain, in: maten
valid: hugies
valued, highly: polutimetos
variation: heteroiOsis
verb: rhema
verbatim: kata lexin
verse: epos
vessel: angeion
vice versa: anapalin
view:dom
visible: horatos
vocabulary, limited: brakhulogia
void:kenon,kenos,keneos
walk: peripatein
wander: plazein
want: axioun, epithumein
water: hud.Or; in the water: enudros
way: atarpos, hodos, keleuthos.
tropos; in how many ways:
posakhOs
way out: endosis
welcome: asmenizein
well-rounded: eukuklos
whirl around: peridinein
white: leukos
white lead: psimuthion
whiten: leukoun
whiteness: leukotes
whole: holos, oulon
wholeness: holomeles
winged: ptenos
witness, bear witness: marturein
wonderful: makarios, thaumastos
word: epos, gramma, logos
work: pragmateia
world, world order: kosmos
worry: tarassein
worthwhile, worthy: axios
write: graphein
writing: sungramma
wrong,go:sphallein
year: etos
yield: endidonai
Greek-English Index
aboulein, be unwilling, 127,11
adiairetos, indivisible, undivided,
108,1; 109,32; 113,23; 119,13;
120,24bis; 121,22.23.25; 127,11;
128,35.37; 129,1.3; 139,21.27;
140,5.8bis.18; 142,4.26; 143,1.7;
144,21
adiakritos, undivided, 120,24
adiaphoros, indistinguishable,
116,14
adiastatos, without dimension,
108.22
adie%ititos, inexhaustible, 174,14
adiorist6s, imprecisely, 110,6;
without differentiation,
149,14-16.26
adun.atos, impossible, 149,2; 162,29;
169,18-20. 27; 170,7; 171,1.19;
176,2.3.12-15; 177,6
aeikin.itos, continually changing,
109,12
aer, air, 106,24; 107,3; 113,30;
149,8-11.15-17.22.30; 150,28-30;
151,21-2; 152,1.12.17-23;
153,1.4-5.14-17; 155,29-31; 156,28;
158,17; 159,11; 174,30; 178,5-6.32
agasthai, be amazed, 115,25; 120.6
agen.etos, what has not come to be,
uncreated, ungenerated 105,22.23;
107,23.25; 108,5.21.25.27;
109,3.16; 110,24; 114,17; 116,18;
120,23; 142,32.36; 144,3.17; 145,3;
147,3.6; 162,12.23; 175,4
agnoein., be ignorant, 120,21; 122,24;
127,10; 142,17
agn.oia, ignorance, 120,13
agn6sia, inability to be known, 165,21
agn6stos, unknowable, 162,6;
165,16-28; 166,3-12; 174,27
aidios, eternal, existing forever,
everlasting, 109,4.11.13:
124
Greek-English Index
Greek-English Index
anir, man, 107,30; 122,24; 142,16.21;
148,14
125
126
Greek-English Index
Greek-English Index
106,15.19.31; 109,22.23; 122,5;
145,10; 146,29
arkhoeides, having the character of
a principle, 178,31; 179,6.11
arritos, ineffable, 147,16
arteria, artery, 175,7
asapheia, lack of clarity, 126,11
asaph6s, unclearly, 111,15
asmenizein, welcome, 108,26
asamatos, incorporeal, bodiless,
non-bodily, 110,1; 113,19;
114,19;150,16
127
128
Greek-English Index
Greek-English Index
129
128,6.7.13.19
dissos, two [ways], 115,27; 120,9
dittos, twofold, 154, 1; 160,22-7
dizenai, seek, 145,6
dizesios, enquiry, 117,7 0; 135,22;
144,1; 148,6
dogma, belief, teaching, 102,23.24;
108,25.26
dokein, seem, 102,20; 121, 12; 130, 1;
148,22
donein, shake, 112, 19'
do%a, view, theory, opinion, belief,
doctrine, 102,26; 114,25bis; 115, 7;
116,8; 131,30; 138,29; 142,29;
146,24; 147,29; 148,26-7; 151,11;
155,9-12; 162,2-4.8-10; 164,11
do%astos, thing of opinion, about
opinion, 144,5; 146,27; 14 7,28
do%azein, think, 107,13
dunamei, potentially, virtually,
165,22; 167,26; 170.18; 171,7;
172,12; 172,27
dunamis, power, potentiality,
possibility, 109,11; 112,2; 135,5;
138, 10; 141, 19.22.23.24.32.34;
143,16; 148,21
dunatos, possible, 169,25; 170,19;
175,23; 178,20
130
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Greek-English Index
epileipsis, disappearance, 158,3
epinoein, think of, 135,15
epipedon., plane, 106,12; 140,13;
142,25
131
132
Greek-English Index
112,1
104,3.19; 116,14.15.17;
120,14bis.15.19; 121,17;
122,4.10.11.17.31; 125,1.4;
126,26.27.28; 127,2; 134,16bis.17:
135,25; 136,2.4.6; 137,21; 138,12;
139,25; 140,32.33; 141,3bis.24;
143,28.29; 144,18; 152,2.26; 153,9:
156,9; 157,2-3: 165,14-15;
172,18-19; 175,11-12; 176,24-6
heterotis, otherness, 143,27;
144,7.10; 147,23.26
heuriskein, find, 116,27; 133,24:
138,16; 143,25; 146,9
h~. state, 175,18
hidrusthai, establish, 147,16
hikan6s, properly, 134,8
hikneisthai, arrive at, 146,19
himation, garment, 123,25bis
hippos, horse, 114,5.13; 117,27;
128,36; 135,13
histanai, stay, stand, 137,7; 144,22
historein, report, state, relate,
115,11; 151,22
historia, research, enquiry, account,
115,12; 140,24; 151,20; 154,17
hodos, way, path, 117,6; 135,22:
142,34; 144,1; 145,1; 145,18
holik6s, in general, 177, 13
holokliros, perfect, 144,18
holomeles, wholeness, 137,15
holos, whole, 105,5.8; 106,30; 109,17;
112,17; 124,25.32.33: 126,20:
127,12; 128,19.27.34; 129,6.16.21;
138,12; 139,30; 142,24; 147,21:
166,22-6; 167,18.22.28; 168,18;
175,5; 177.27
hol6s, in general, 109,4; 113,26
holoskheros, general, 113,5.7; 147,2
holotelis, perfect, 148,5
Greek-English Index
homoioeides, of the same kind,
173,34; 177,25-7
homoiomereia, homoiomerous
thing, homoiomery, 154,3; 155
passim; 156,9-13; 162,8.31; 163,32;
165,2.14.22-5; 167,13; 168,14.26;
171,27.33; 172,5-10.24; 173,18;
174,18; 176,1.17
homoiomeres, homoiomerous (i.e.
having parts of the same kind as
the whole), 154,11; 167,2.9.19;
168,28-30; 172,17.21-2; 175,6;
178,9-11
homoios, like (itself), the same,
alike, similar, 103,31bis; 110,25;
111,1.20.22; 112,4; 113,10;
116,13.14bis; 140,1; 141,5; 142,14;
143,3; 143, 7; 145,23; 157,3; 165,15;
170,19-21; 172, 19; 174,3; 177,23.32
homoioskhim0n., of the same form,
105,11
homoioun., make similar, 161,10
homologein, agree, 118,22; 130,3;
134,23
homi)n.umia, homonymy, 106,2
homi)n.umos, homonymous, 121, 19;
122,20
homou, together, everywhere, 107,2;
143,12.13.17; 144,8; 144,19; 145,5;
like 146,20; 147,13; 155,26-8; 156,4
homou panta khremata, all things
together, 163,8.16.24; 164,15.30;
172,2; 174,20; 175,23.30
hopelikosoun, as large as you like,
166,23-6; 167,4-9.33; 168,5.12;
169,27; 171,16
hoper on, just-existent,
122,27.30bis.33; 125,2-126,2;
126,29.30;
127, 18bis.20.21.22.26.33.34;
128,24.25bis.29.31;
129, 13bis.23.24.30;
130, 18-131,5passim;
131,12-133,22passim;
137,30.31.32.33; 138,1
Mra, it is time, 133,18
horan, see, 108,30; 153,12
horatos, visible, 108,4
horikos, involving a definition,
124,31
Mrismenos, finite, 127,6
horismos, definition, 114,15;
133
127,22.25.34; 128,2.5bis.19.30.34;
129,18.31; 131,5; 132,3
horistikos, defining, 128,6
horizein, define, demarcate, 106, 16;
121,7; 124,27; 128,6.20.21; 151,1;
166,8.24; 167,5-6.11; 168,33;
169,12-13.16-20; 171,16; 174,6.13
horos, definition, 123,13bis;
124,24.26.29.30
hou heneka, for the sake of which,
106,9; 128,7.25; 128,25bis; 137,33
hudOr, water, 112,19.25; 113,13.29;
115,24; 121,17; 149,7.11.17.31;
152,1; 155,22-3; 158,17; 159,12;
169,11-21; 170,3-6.31.35;
174,25.30; 177,30; 178,5-6.32;
179,8-9
hugiainein, be healthy, 112,29
hugies, valid, 104,30; 105,3.22;
healthy, 112,3.4.5
hugros, wet, 150,24; 153,2; 155,8;
175,27
hugrotis, wetness, 155, 17
hule, matter, 106,8;
114,6.10.11.20.21.22; 135,4.6;
140,11; 150,4.10.13-16.20;
151,15-19; 167,28; 176,10-12;
179,14-18
hulikos, material (adj.), 113,27;
114,19; 149,29; 154,18; 177,11-16
hupantan, oppose, reply to, meet
(difficulty), 103,13; 107,30;
113,4.24; 115,7; 126,17.29; 140,14
huparkhein, belong to, be
appropriate, 106,3; 109,8.9.18;
115,19; 123,3; 124,10;
128,17.18.28bis; 130,16.23.24;
133.7; 140,1.9; 147,10
hupeinai, hold, 140,7
hupenantios, subcontrary, 122,2.25
huperbainein, go beyond, 170,16
huperballein, exceed, 169,9-10.29;
170,7.14
huperbole, extremity, 144,25;
greater quantity, 150,5.14
huperkhesthai, descend, 136,29
huperokhi, superiority, 148,18
huphistanai, exist, subsist, be
made, arise, 122,3.28.32; 140, 18;
143,19; 144,3
huphistanein, constitute, 150,19
huphistasthai, exist, 172,13; 175,20
hupodekhesthai, receive, 113,11
134
Greek-English Index
hupoheimenon, substrate,subject,
underlying thing,
119, 19.22.23.24.29bis;
120, 18.31bis; 121, 1.3.4:
122,4.12.19.22; 123,2,3,8,12,17,18;
125,10; 128,9bis,30;
130,9, 12, 14,22,25,27; 149.14-15.21;
150,10.21-4; 152,9; 153,26;
154,2-7.16; 175,20-1
hupoheisthai, be a substrate,
underlie, 123,3,6,8; 125,9; 126,1;
128,30; 152,11
hupohhorein, go to, move into.
104,6; 112,8,9bis
hupolambanein, suppose, 143,4
hupolepsis, proposal, 133,2
hupomenein, stay the same, stand
up to, 112,28; 139,29; 140,3.4;
142,25
hupomimneshein, remind, 119,11
hupomnema, record, 144,27
huponoein, think, 148,16
hupostasis, substrate, hypostasis,
109,34; 119,29.30; 120,2.30;
121,10; 143,18
hupothesis, hypothesis, assumption
102,20; 122,9; 126,6; 127,28;
131,26; 134,7; 165,20; 171,33;
172,28
hupothetikos, hypothetical, 103,7
hupotithesthai, assume, suppose,
postulate, suggest, 106,1.11;
116,16; 117,6; 118,7; 121,19.21.24;
122,7 .25.30; 125,30; 126,5.30;
127,28; 130,6; 132,4; 137,29;
140,12; 141,10; 142,17; 146,27;
149,6.9-10.13.26; 150, 19; 154,33;
155,2; 157,5; 166,4.7.11; 167,17;
169,27; 172,27; 178,23.32-4;
179,14-16
husterogenes, subgenus, generated
later, 132,9: 144,2
Greek-English Index
generally, 102,24; 113,22; 115,3;
129,20
keisthai, be assumed, lie, 118, 16;
119,15; 134,22.24; 143,15; 146,2
kekhorismenos, separate (adj.),
172,13-17.31-3; 173,1-6
keleuthos, way, path, 116.29: 117,13
keneos, void, 112,6.7.8.11
kenos, empty, void, 104,4.5.6.9bis;
110,15.17bis; 111,2-12passi.m.14;
112,9.14.18; 113,13;.165,13
kentron, centre, 150,31
kephale, head, 106,13
kerannusthai, mix (intr.), 175,27
khairein, say goodbye, 135,29; 147,34
khalan, relax, 145,14
khalkeus, smith, 117.21
kharakterizein, characterise, 165,3;
173,36
khwn, snow, 119,16
kh6ra, place, 144,20; 148,6
khorein, have room for, 112,13bis;
131,19; 132,12
kh6ris, separate, apart (adv.), 164,27
khorismos, separation, 176,11
kh6ristos, separate (adj.), 119,29:
120,1; 128,11; 177,7
kh6rizein, separate (trans. vb.),
119,31; 120,15bis,17: 129,9;
164,29; 167,1; 168,23; 172,20:
175,22.25; 176,29
khreia, usefulness, 138,22.24
khrema, thing, 112,2; 118,13.17
khre6n, necessary, 116,300; 145,11;
146.18
khreos, need, 145,9
khresimos, useful, 122,34
khresthai, use, 103,14: 114,30
khroa, colour, 146,14
khroU, colour, 153,3; 156,4.5; 157,11
khroma, colour, 115,23; 118,13;
119,20.25; 121,5.8.15; 123,9.23.26;
132,24; 155,18; 175.18
khronikos, with regard to time,
having a chronological sense,
106, 1; 109,25
khronos, time, 106,3-24passi.m;
109,6.8.12.14.15.16; 110,9; 111,24;
113,9; 146,9
kinein, undergo (alteration), alter.
change, move (trans.),
104,2.4.5.13.14; 107,13bis.14bis;
109,33.34; 110,15.16.27:
135
111,4.6.12;
112, 7.15.17.18.21.23.24.33;
113,13.17; 176.19
kineisthai, change (intr.), 154,24
kinesis, alteration, motion, change,
movement, being mobile. 104,2;
106,7: 107,12; 108,2; 110,15.21.25:
111,19; 112,33; 113,2.18.19; 126,9:
134,15; 137,5; 140,21.25; 143,11:
144,11; 144,21; 147,8.24; 153,3;
154,18
kleinos, famous, 122,24
koilotis, curvedness, 123,30;
124,16.17; 128,16
koimasthai, sleep, 124,9
koinonein, have a share in, 108,24:
be in agreement, 149,27; 154,26
koinos, common, 113,25; 114,25.26;
121,10.18.20bis; 123,5; 131,18:
132,10.19; 133,25; 152,9; 162,9;
165,8; 166,3
koinos, generally, in general,
149,23.26
koin6tes, common feature, 114,11:
121, 12; 132,20; commonness,
144,2.5
koluein, prevent, be impediment.
108,31; 112,20.25; 117,22.24;
118,8; 137,24.26; 142,2
komoidein, mock, 134,5
kOnikos, conical, 113,14; 114,11
konos, cone, 112,23
kophos, deaf, 117,11
kosmos, universe, arrangement,
world, world order, beauty, 107,23;
108,23; 111,25; 146,25 147,27;
151,16; 152,1-2; 154,14.30; 160,12;
176,29; 177,7-8; 178,23-5
kouphos, light, 155,8
krasis, mixture, 161,2-5.11-12; 164,2
kratein, control, 152,23; 156,18-22;
161,11; 177,2-3
krateros, strong, 146,3
krinein,judge, decide, 104,10; 145,17
krisis, decision, judgment, 112, 12;
145,16
kritis, judge, 111,17
kubernan, steer, direct, 152,23
kuknos, swan, 119, 16.23; 123,22
kulindrikos, cylindrical, 113,14
kulindros, cylinder, 112,23
kurein, reaching to, 146,22
kuri6s, strictly, 109,19; 113,7.10:
136
Greek-English Index
Greek-English Index
melas, black, 106,28; 112,29
memphesthai, criticise, blame,
117,3; 148,11
137
138
Greek-English Index
intelligence, understanding,
151,18.30; 152,12-13.17-22;
153,1.11-14
noitos, mental, thought, object of
thought, intelligible, 108,5; 136,28;
143, 19.20; 143,23; 143,26;
144,8.12.23bis.25; 145,8; 147,7;
148,5.9; 148,21; 160,22; 161,9;
162,20
nomizein, think, 171, 12; 122,28
nosein, be ill, 112,29
nous, mind, thinker, intellect,
117,10; 137,7; 143,20; 144,8.12.24;
147,4.5.6.9; 148,21; 154,6.22.31;
156,13-157,4; 157,7; 164,23-4;
165,4.32; 166, 1; 172,4;
174,8.11.15-16; 176,1-3.14-21.32;
177,2-3.6.11
Greek-English Index
177,21; (hekaston en hekastai)
170.29
pantelos, complete, entirely.
136,24.26; 137,6; 147,31
pantoioi, of all kinds, 156,2-3;
157,9-10
pantothen, from every direction,
137,16; 143,6; 146,16
paradeigma, example, 109,5; 118,18
paradeigmatikos, by way of
paradigm, 160,18
paradidonai, treat, report, 136,34;
147,13; 148,16.18
parado::JWs, paradoxical, 133,2
paradramein, pass by, 123,1
paragein, guide, lead aside, 109,12;
147,7
paragraphein, add, 144,27
paraiteisthai, avoid, dismiss,
121,18; 136,19
parakeisthai, be set out, 111,16
parakhOrein, stand aside, 108,12
parakoe, misunderstanding, 148,13
paralambanein, take, take
up,include, 108,3; 123,14:
124,12.24.30; 128.16.19.20.21.30;
129,28; 137,33
parallagi, continuum, 167,1
paramuthousthai, persuade, 102,24
paraphainein, appear beside, 143,28
paraplisios, similar, 124,30
paraptein, touch upon, 147,1
parathesis, juxtaposition, 164,2
paratithesthai, mention, 168,14
pareinai, be present, 110,9; 124,7;
137.6
parekein, omit, 121,24
parelthein, pass, 110,8
parezerkhesthai, sidestep, 122,33
paristanai, support, 102,21
paroimia, proverb, 148,23
paronumazein, name derivatively,
124,5.6
paronum6s, called derivatively,
122,20; 124,5
paskhein, undergo, 104,2; 107,6:
111,2.21; 134,7; 144,6
pathos, effect, property (of
something), 107,5; 170,20;
175,17.22-3; 176,10
pauein, stop check, end, 141,27;
146.19; 146,23
pedan, bind, 146.10
139
140
Greek-English Index
Greek-English Index
141
132,18
135, 7; 146,29
142
Greek-English Index
Greek-English Index
143
119,12.14.16.17.18; 121,22.23;
135,8; 139,20; 141,23.25; 142,3.5.6;
145,6.26; 168,3
sunekhesthai, bold together, 145,24
sunemmenon, hypothetical,
conditional (proposition), 104,30;
105,32; 128,2; 130,14; 166,27;
171,21
sunerkhesthai, come together,
104,17; 129,3
sunetheia, common (usage), 106,18;
113,5; 138,2; 140,28
sunginesthai, come together,
combine, 161,6
sungramma, writing, book, treatise,
103,15; 104,24; 139,5; 140,28;
151,25; 172,2
sungraphe, treatise, 152,20
sunistanai, come together, 139,32;
140,3.4
sunistasthai, be constituted, 152,6
sunkeisthai, be formed, be made out
of: 127,5; 129,20; 142,12
sunkMrein, agree, reach agreement,
come together, 103,21; 104,26;
108,27.28; 110,7; 115,17; 116,3;
118,10.27; 119,17.18; 120,11;
134,13.17.19.20.25; 137,22; 140,7;
147,28; 179,4
sunkhusis, confusion, 177,9
sunkrima, mixture, 173,11.16.35;
174,11.17
sunkrinein, mix together, 154,12;
156,3; 163,20; 167,3; 173,12.34
sunkrisis, mixture, combination,
154,26.32; 157,26; 161,14.22;
163,11-28; 178,15
sun8numos, synonymous, 123,16
sunoran, see 121,9; 137,25
sun8thein, assimilate, 154,15
suntassein, attach, 110,3
sunteloun, contribute to, 120,5
sunthesis, putting together,
composition, 165,2; 166,30; 167,31;
177,22; 178,2-5
sunthetos, compound, 114,15bis;
165,28; 177,22; 178,34; 179,7-8
suntithenai, put together, add,
make up, compose, 103,4; 108,8;
127,5; 129,2; 142,14; 165,17;
166,28; 167,3.9.19; 168,1.9.27;
177,25; 178,33
144
Greek-English Index
Subject Index
accident 33, 34, 36
Adrastus
on substrate and accidents 34-6
Alexander 5, 8, 10, 11, 23, 24, 27, 38,
39,40,41,44,46,47,48,59, 64,
70,73,75,76, 77,80,85, 102,
104, 107-8, 109, 110, 111
attacks hypothesis that Being is
one 15
attacks Melissus for bad logic and
false premises 15
on starting-points 18
on change and time 19
on species and matter 25-6
analysis of the all 40
formal arguments about being 41-2
on being as genus 42-3
on Plato on Being 45-6
Anaxagoras 6-11, 63-6, 69-70,71-87,
102, 104, 105, 106, 107, 109, 110
Mind 8, 10-11, 63-4, 65, 72, 81-2,
83-4, 105, 107
homoiomeries 63-4, 65, 69, 70, 71-3,
74-6, 79-80, 83-4, 104, 106, 109-10
plural worlds 66, 105
Anaximander 5-6, 59, 102, 103
to apeiron 103
Anaximenes 6, 59, 61, 70
spoke of air 25
Aristotle
attacks view that Being is one 15,
17,30
criticises Melissus' argument 15
gives Melissus' arguments 16
on starting-points 18-19
on movement on the spot 24
on being as one in species 25
criticises Parmenides 28
being does not have size 37-8
in other works takes the
just-existent as genus 44
146
Subject Index
on coming to be 21
on what is infinite 22
on Parmenides 27, 29, 53
on Zeno on the One 49
Forms, Platonic 6
genus 42, 43, 44, 47
great and small 5-6, 59-60
Heraclitus 59
spoke of fire 25
Hippasus 59
Hippon59
spoke of water 25
Hypostasis 31, 32
indefinite dyad 6, 60
infinity, the infinite 9-10, 63, 69,
71-3, 76-8, 79-80, 81-2, 86, 110
just-existent 36, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43,
44,48
Leucippus 72-3
Thales 59
spoke of water 25
Themistius 77, 109
onZeno50
Theophrastus 19, 27, 29, 45, 59, 63,
102-3
on time and change 19
on Parmenides 27, 29, 45
Xenocrates 60
indivisible lines 51-3
Zeno 15,45,48,49
helps Parmenides 48
on the One 49-50, 55
Index of Passages
References to the pages of this book are in bold type.
ADRASTUS
sole fragment, 3U
ALEXANDER
Index of Passages
148
PARMENIDES
PORPHYRY
Phys.?, 27-8
SEXTUS
M. 9.10,105
SIMPLICIUS
In De Caelo 556,16, 91
In Phys. 23,14-16,102; 23,21-9, 102;
23,33-24,12, 102; 24,13-16, 103;
24,26-25,8, 102; 24,29-31, 102;
25,8-9, 102; 25,11-12, 102;
25,29-30, 105; 27,17-23, 104;
31,2-3, 106; 31,8-12, 106;
31,18-26, 106; 32,3-4, 106;
33,10-17, 106; 34,18-35,21, 105;
34,20, 104; 34,21-5, 104;
34,29-35,3, 104; 34,29-35,12, 105;
35,22-3, 111; 38,6-9, 101; 78,5,
100; 108,22, 91; 112,32-113,2, 92:
113,23-4, 94; 113,27-8, 92:
115,11-13, 93; 115,17, 103;
115,21-5, 93, 95; 115,25-116,4,
94; 116,2, 94; 118,11-13, 93;
120,3-4, 94; 120,27-8, 94; 120,10,
93; 121,13-16, 94; 122,14, 99:
123,13, 98; 123,23-6, 94; 126,11.
95; 126,22-3, 96; 127,1-2, 96:
127,36, 96; 128,19, 98; 129,31.
96; 132,18-19, 98; 132,27-8, 97;
133,20, 97; 133,24-5, 93;
135,27-136,2, 101; 135,29, 98;
137,33, 97; 138,5-6, 99; 138,32-3,
100; 143,4, 98; 143,26-7, 101;
144,15, 99; 145,1-2, 100; 145,23,
100; 146,7-9, 100; 146,11, 100;
147,13, 101; 147,15-17, 95, 100;
147,16, 101; 148,9-11, 101;
148,11-16, 106; 148,28, 106;
149,4-11, 102; 149,5, 102;
149,7-8, 5, 102; 149,11-13, 5:
149,13-18, 5; 149,13-27, 6;
149,21-2, 102; 150,4-11, 6;
150,9-25, 102; 150,15-18, 6;
150,20-4, 102; 150,22-3, 5:
151,6-11, 6; 151,12-19, 6; 151,25,
101; 151,31-153,22, 6; 154,9-14,
6; 154,14-23, 6; 154,17, 103;
155,1-20, 6; 155,7-9, 104;
155,10-13, 104; 155,13-18, 104;
155,18-20, 104; 155-7, 6; 156,26,
105; 157,5-24, 7; 158-61, 7;
160,22-6, 7; 161,23-163,8, 7;
Index of Passages
163,35-164,2, 7; 164,11-165,8, 8;
165,8-166,6, 8; 165,30-166,2, 8,
111; 165,33, 105; 166,7-12, 8;
167,12-26, 8; 167,30-168,1, 8;
168,25-169,2, 9; 169,5-24, 9;
169,25-170,7, 9; 170,7-13, 9;
171,12-28, 9; 172,11-14, 10;
172,13-20, 10; 172,14-16, 10;
172,20-31, 10; 172,27-9, 110;
172,31-173,3, 10; 173,8-28, 10;
173,29-174,8, 10; 17A,4-18, 111;
174,8-9, 105; 174,19-175,5, 10;
174,30-1, 111; 175,11-21, 11;
175,21-33, 11; 175,33-177,8, 11;
177,4-5, 105; 177,20-178,8, 11;
149
DK29, 51