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testator signed the will and every page thereof, or caused some other person to write his name,
under his express direction, in the presence of three witnesses, and the latter witnessed and
signed the will and all pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of each other.
Requisites of a Will under the Code of Civil Procedure
Under Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the requisites of a will are the following:
(1) The will must be written in the language or dialect known by the testator;
(2) The will must be signed by the testator, or by the testators name written by some other
person in his presence, and by his express direction;
(3) The will must be attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the
presence of the testator and of each other;
(4) The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental
witnesses of the will must sign each and every page of the will on the left margin;
(5) The pages of the will must be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part
of each sheet;
(6) The attestation shall state the number of sheets or pages used, upon which the will is
written, and the fact that the testator signed the will and every page of the will, or
caused some other person to write his name, under his express direction, in the presence
of three witnesses, and the witnesses witnessed and signed the will and all pages of the
will in the presence of the testator and of each other.
Caponong-Noble asserts that the will of Abada does not indicate that it is written in a language or
dialect known to the testator. Further, she maintains that the will is not acknowledged before a
notary public. She cites in particular Articles 804 and 805 of the Old Civil Code, thus:
Art. 804. Every will must be in writing and executed in [a] language or dialect known to the
testator.
Art. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the
witnesses. xxx[18]
Caponong-Noble actually cited Articles 804 and 806 of the New Civil Code.[19] Article 804 of the
Old Civil Code is about the rights and obligations of administrators of the property of an
absentee, while Article 806 of the Old Civil Code defines a legitime.
Articles 804 and 806 of the New Civil Code are new provisions. Article 804 of the New Civil
Code is taken from Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure.[20] Article 806 of the New Civil
Code is taken from Article 685 of the Old Civil Code[21] which provides:
Art. 685. The notary and two of the witnesses who authenticate the will must be acquainted with
the testator, or, should they not know him, he shall be identified by two witnesses who are
acquainted with him and are known to the notary and to the attesting witnesses. The notary and
the witnesses shall also endeavor to assure themselves that the testator has, in their judgment, the
legal capacity required to make a will.
Witnesses authenticating a will without the attendance of a notary, in cases falling under Articles
700 and 701, are also required to know the testator.
However, the Code of Civil Procedure[22] repealed Article 685 of the Old Civil Code. Under the
Code of Civil Procedure, the intervention of a notary is not necessary in the execution of any
will.[23] Therefore, Abadas will does not require acknowledgment before a notary public.
Caponong-Noble points out that nowhere in the will can one discern that Abada knew the
Spanish language. She alleges that such defect is fatal and must result in the disallowance of the
will. On this issue, the Court of Appeals held that the matter was not raised in the motion to
dismiss, and that it is now too late to raise the issue on appeal. We agree with Caponong-Noble
that the doctrine of estoppel does not apply in probate proceedings.[24] In addition, the language
used in the will is part of the requisites under Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the
Court deems it proper to pass upon this issue.
Nevertheless, Caponong-Nobles contention must still fail. There is no statutory requirement to
state in the will itself that the testator knew the language or dialect used in the will.[25] This is a
matter that a party may establish by proof aliunde.[26] Caponong-Noble further argues that Alipio,
in his testimony, has failed, among others, to show that Abada knew or understood the contents
of the will and the Spanish language used in the will. However, Alipio testified that Abada used
to gather Spanish-speaking people in their place. In these gatherings, Abada and his companions
would talk in the Spanish language.[27] This sufficiently proves that Abada speaks the Spanish
language.
The Attestation Clause of Abadas Will
A scrutiny of Abadas will shows that it has an attestation clause. The attestation clause of Abadas
will reads:
Suscrito y declarado por el testador Alipio Abada como su ultima voluntad y testamento en
presencia de nosotros, habiendo tambien el testador firmado en nuestra presencia en el margen
izquierdo de todas y cada una de las hojas del mismo. Y en testimonio de ello, cada uno de
nosotros lo firmamos en presencia de nosotros y del testador al pie de este documento y en el
margen izquierdo de todas y cada una de las dos hojas de que esta compuesto el mismo, las
cuales estan paginadas correlativamente con las letras UNO y DOS en la parte superior de la
carrilla.[28]
Caponong-Noble proceeds to point out several defects in the attestation clause. Caponong-Noble
alleges that the attestation clause fails to state the number of pages on which the will is written.
The allegation has no merit. The phrase en el margen izquierdo de todas y cada una de las dos
hojas de que esta compuesto el mismo which means in the left margin of each and every one of
the two pages consisting of the same shows that the will consists of two pages. The pages are
numbered correlatively with the letters ONE and TWO as can be gleaned from the phrase las
cuales estan paginadas correlativamente con las letras UNO y DOS.
Caponong-Noble further alleges that the attestation clause fails to state expressly that the testator
signed the will and its every page in the presence of three witnesses. She then faults the Court of
Appeals for applying to the present case the rule on substantial compliance found in Article 809
of the New Civil Code.[29]
The first sentence of the attestation clause reads: Suscrito y declarado por el testador Alipio
Abada como su ultima voluntad y testamento en presencia de nosotros, habiendo tambien el
testador firmado en nuestra presencia en el margen izquierdo de todas y cada una de las hojas
del mismo. The English translation is: Subscribed and professed by the testator Alipio Abada as
his last will and testament in our presence, the testator having also signed it in our presence on
the left margin of each and every one of the pages of the same. The attestation clause clearly
states that Abada signed the will and its every page in the presence of the witnesses.
However, Caponong-Noble is correct in saying that the attestation clause does not indicate the
number of witnesses. On this point, the Court agrees with the appellate court in applying the rule
on substantial compliance in determining the number of witnesses. While the attestation clause
does not state the number of witnesses, a close inspection of the will shows that three witnesses
signed it.
This Court has applied the rule on substantial compliance even before the effectivity of the New
Civil Code. In Dichoso de Ticson v. De Gorostiza,[30] the Court recognized that there are two
divergent tendencies in the law on wills, one being based on strict construction and the other on
liberal construction. In Dichoso, the Court noted that Abangan v. Abangan,[31] the basic case on
the liberal construction, is cited with approval in later decisions of the Court.
In Adeva vda. De Leynez v. Leynez,[32] the petitioner, arguing for liberal construction of
applicable laws, enumerated a long line of cases to support her argument while the respondent,
contending that the rule on strict construction should apply, also cited a long series of cases to
support his view. The Court, after examining the cases invoked by the parties, held:
x x x It is, of course, not possible to lay down a general rule, rigid and inflexible, which would be
applicable to all cases. More than anything else, the facts and circumstances of record are to be
considered in the application of any given rule. If the surrounding circumstances point to a
regular execution of the will, and the instrument appears to have been executed substantially in
accordance with the requirements of the law, the inclination should, in the absence of any
suggestion of bad faith, forgery or fraud, lean towards its admission to probate, although the
document may suffer from some imperfection of language, or other non-essential defect. x x x.
An attestation clause is made for the purpose of preserving, in permanent form, a record of the
facts attending the execution of the will, so that in case of failure of the memory of the
subscribing witnesses, or other casualty, they may still be proved. (Thompson on Wills, 2d ed.,
sec. 132.) A will, therefore, should not be rejected where its attestation clause serves the purpose
of the law. x x x [33]
We rule to apply the liberal construction in the probate of Abadas will. Abadas will clearly shows
four signatures: that of Abada and of three other persons. It is reasonable to conclude that there
are three witnesses to the will. The question on the number of the witnesses is answered by an
examination of the will itself and without the need for presentation of evidence aliunde. The
Court explained the extent and limits of the rule on liberal construction, thus:
[T]he so-called liberal rule does not offer any puzzle or difficulty, nor does it open the door to
serious consequences. The later decisions do tell us when and where to stop; they draw the
dividing line with precision. They do not allow evidence aliunde to fill a void in any part of
the document or supply missing details that should appear in the will itself. They only
permit a probe into the will, an exploration within its confines, to ascertain its meaning or
to determine the existence or absence of the requisite formalities of law. This clear, sharp
limitation eliminates uncertainty and ought to banish any fear of dire results.[34] (Emphasis
supplied)
The phrase en presencia de nosotros or in our presence coupled with the signatures appearing on
the will itself and after the attestation clause could only mean that: (1) Abada subscribed to and
professed before the three witnesses that the document was his last will, and (2) Abada signed
the will and the left margin of each page of the will in the presence of these three witnesses.
Finally, Caponong-Noble alleges that the attestation clause does not expressly state the
circumstances that the witnesses witnessed and signed the will and all its pages in the presence
of the testator and of each other. This Court has ruled:
Precision of language in the drafting of an attestation clause is desirable. However, it is not
imperative that a parrot-like copy of the words of the statute be made. It is sufficient if from the
language employed it can reasonably be deduced that the attestation clause fulfills what the law
expects of it.[35]
The last part of the attestation clause states en testimonio de ello, cada uno de nosotros lo
firmamos en presencia de nosotros y del testador. In English, this means in its witness, every one
of us also signed in our presence and of the testator. This clearly shows that the attesting
witnesses witnessed the signing of the will of the testator, and that each witness signed the will in
the presence of one another and of the testator.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the Decision of the Court of Appeals of 12 January 2001 in CAG.R. CV No. 47644.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 149926. February 23, 2005]
UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. EDMUND SANTIBAEZ and
FLORENCE SANTIBAEZ ARIOLA, respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court
which seeks the reversal of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals dated May 30, 2001 in CAG.R. CV No. 48831 affirming the dismissal[2] of the petitioners complaint in Civil Case No.
18909 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 63.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
On May 31, 1980, the First Countryside Credit Corporation (FCCC) and Efraim M. Santibaez
entered into a loan agreement[3] in the amount of P128,000.00. The amount was intended for the
payment of the purchase price of one (1) unit Ford 6600 Agricultural All-Purpose Diesel Tractor.
In view thereof, Efraim and his son, Edmund, executed a promissory note in favor of the FCCC,
the principal sum payable in five equal annual amortizations of P43,745.96 due on May 31, 1981
and every May 31st thereafter up to May 31, 1985.
On December 13, 1980, the FCCC and Efraim entered into another loan agreement,[4] this time
in the amount of P123,156.00. It was intended to pay the balance of the purchase price of another
unit of Ford 6600 Agricultural All-Purpose Diesel Tractor, with accessories, and one (1) unit
Howard Rotamotor Model AR 60K. Again, Efraim and his son, Edmund, executed a promissory
note for the said amount in favor of the FCCC. Aside from such promissory note, they also
signed a Continuing Guaranty Agreement[5] for the loan dated December 13, 1980.
Sometime in February 1981, Efraim died, leaving a holographic will.[6] Subsequently in March
1981, testate proceedings commenced before the RTC of Iloilo City, Branch 7, docketed as
Special Proceedings No. 2706. On April 9, 1981, Edmund, as one of the heirs, was appointed as
the special administrator of the estate of the decedent.[7] During the pendency of the testate
proceedings, the surviving heirs, Edmund and his sister Florence Santibaez Ariola, executed a
Joint Agreement[8] dated July 22, 1981, wherein they agreed to divide between themselves and
take possession of the three (3) tractors; that is, two (2) tractors for Edmund and one (1) tractor
for Florence. Each of them was to assume the indebtedness of their late father to FCCC,
corresponding to the tractor respectively taken by them.
On August 20, 1981, a Deed of Assignment with Assumption of Liabilities[9] was executed by
and between FCCC and Union Savings and Mortgage Bank, wherein the FCCC as the assignor,
among others, assigned all its assets and liabilities to Union Savings and Mortgage Bank.
Demand letters[10] for the settlement of his account were sent by petitioner Union Bank of the
Philippines (UBP) to Edmund, but the latter failed to heed the same and refused to pay. Thus, on
February 5, 1988, the petitioner filed a Complaint[11] for sum of money against the heirs of
Efraim Santibaez, Edmund and Florence, before the RTC of Makati City, Branch 150, docketed
as Civil Case No. 18909. Summonses were issued against both, but the one intended for Edmund
was not served since he was in the United States and there was no information on his address or
the date of his return to the Philippines.[12] Accordingly, the complaint was narrowed down to
respondent Florence S. Ariola.
On December 7, 1988, respondent Florence S. Ariola filed her Answer[13] and alleged that the
loan documents did not bind her since she was not a party thereto. Considering that the joint
agreement signed by her and her brother Edmund was not approved by the probate court, it was
null and void; hence, she was not liable to the petitioner under the joint agreement.
On January 29, 1990, the case was unloaded and re-raffled to the RTC of Makati City, Branch
63.[14] Consequently, trial on the merits ensued and a decision was subsequently rendered by the
court dismissing the complaint for lack of merit. The decretal portion of the RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the complaint for lack of merit.[15]
The trial court found that the claim of the petitioner should have been filed with the probate court
before which the testate estate of the late Efraim Santibaez was pending, as the sum of money
being claimed was an obligation incurred by the said decedent. The trial court also found that the
Joint Agreement apparently executed by his heirs, Edmund and Florence, on July 22, 1981, was,
in effect, a partition of the estate of the decedent. However, the said agreement was void,
considering that it had not been approved by the probate court, and that there can be no valid
partition until after the will has been probated. The trial court further declared that petitioner
failed to prove that it was the now defunct Union Savings and Mortgage Bank to which the
FCCC had assigned its assets and liabilities. The court also agreed to the contention of
respondent Florence S. Ariola that the list of assets and liabilities of the FCCC assigned to Union
Savings and Mortgage Bank did not clearly refer to the decedents account. Ruling that the joint
agreement executed by the heirs was null and void, the trial court held that the petitioners cause
of action against respondent Florence S. Ariola must necessarily fail.
The petitioner appealed from the RTC decision and elevated its case to the Court of Appeals
(CA), assigning the following as errors of the trial court:
1. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE JOINT AGREEMENT (EXHIBIT
A) SHOULD BE APPROVED BY THE PROBATE COURT.
2. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE CAN BE NO VALID
PARTITION AMONG THE HEIRS UNTIL AFTER THE WILL HAS BEEN PROBATED.
3. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE DEFENDANT HAD WAIVED
HER RIGHT TO HAVE THE CLAIM RE-LITIGATED IN THE ESTATE PROCEEDING.[16]
The petitioner asserted before the CA that the obligation of the deceased had passed to his
legitimate children and heirs, in this case, Edmund and Florence; the unconditional signing of the
joint agreement marked as Exhibit A estopped respondent Florence S. Ariola, and that she cannot
deny her liability under the said document; as the agreement had been signed by both heirs in
their personal capacity, it was no longer necessary to present the same before the probate court
for approval; the property partitioned in the agreement was not one of those enumerated in the
holographic will made by the deceased; and the active participation of the heirs, particularly
respondent Florence S. Ariola, in the present ordinary civil action was tantamount to a waiver to
re-litigate the claim in the estate proceedings.
On the other hand, respondent Florence S. Ariola maintained that the money claim of the
petitioner should have been presented before the probate court.[17]
The appellate court found that the appeal was not meritorious and held that the petitioner should
have filed its claim with the probate court as provided under Sections 1 and 5, Rule 86 of the
Rules of Court. It further held that the partition made in the agreement was null and void, since
no valid partition may be had until after the will has been probated. According to the CA, page 2,
paragraph (e) of the holographic will covered the subject properties (tractors) in generic terms
when the deceased referred to them as all other properties. Moreover, the active participation of
respondent Florence S. Ariola in the case did not amount to a waiver. Thus, the CA affirmed the
RTC decision, viz.:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City, Branch 63, is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.[18]
In the present recourse, the petitioner ascribes the following errors to the CA:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE JOINT
AGREEMENT SHOULD BE APPROVED BY THE PROBATE COURT.
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE CAN BE NO VALID
PARTITION AMONG THE HEIRS OF THE LATE EFRAIM SANTIBAEZ UNTIL AFTER
THE WILL HAS BEEN PROBATED.
III.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE RESPONDENT HAD
WAIVED HER RIGHT TO HAVE THE CLAIM RE-LITIGATED IN THE ESTATE
PROCEEDING.
IV.
RESPONDENTS CAN, IN FACT, BE HELD JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE WITH
THE PRINCIPAL DEBTOR THE LATE EFRAIM SANTIBAEZ ON THE STRENGTH OF
THE CONTINUING GUARANTY AGREEMENT EXECUTED IN FAVOR OF PETITIONERAPPELLANT UNION BANK.
V.
THE PROMISSORY NOTES DATED MAY 31, 1980 IN THE SUM OF P128,000.00 AND
DECEMBER 13, 1980 IN THE AMOUNT OF P123,000.00 CATEGORICALLY
ESTABLISHED THE FACT THAT THE RESPONDENTS BOUND THEMSELVES JOINTLY
AND SEVERALLY LIABLE WITH THE LATE DEBTOR EFRAIM SANTIBAEZ IN FAVOR
OF PETITIONER UNION BANK.[19]
The petitioner claims that the obligations of the deceased were transmitted to the heirs as
provided in Article 774 of the Civil Code; there was thus no need for the probate court to
approve the joint agreement where the heirs partitioned the tractors owned by the deceased and
assumed the obligations related thereto. Since respondent Florence S. Ariola signed the joint
agreement without any condition, she is now estopped from asserting any position contrary
thereto. The petitioner also points out that the holographic will of the deceased did not include
nor mention any of the tractors subject of the complaint, and, as such was beyond the ambit of
the said will. The active participation and resistance of respondent Florence S. Ariola in the
ordinary civil action against the petitioners claim amounts to a waiver of the right to have the
claim presented in the probate proceedings, and to allow any one of the heirs who executed the
joint agreement to escape liability to pay the value of the tractors under consideration would be
equivalent to allowing the said heirs to enrich themselves to the damage and prejudice of the
petitioner.
The petitioner, likewise, avers that the decisions of both the trial and appellate courts failed to
consider the fact that respondent Florence S. Ariola and her brother Edmund executed loan
documents, all establishing the vinculum juris or the legal bond between the late Efraim
Santibaez and his heirs to be in the nature of a solidary obligation. Furthermore, the Promissory
Notes dated May 31, 1980 and December 13, 1980 executed by the late Efraim Santibaez,
together with his heirs, Edmund and respondent Florence, made the obligation solidary as far as
the said heirs are concerned. The petitioner also proffers that, considering the express provisions
of the continuing guaranty agreement and the promissory notes executed by the named
respondents, the latter must be held liable jointly and severally liable thereon. Thus, there was no
need for the petitioner to file its money claim before the probate court. Finally, the petitioner
stresses that both surviving heirs are being sued in their respective personal capacities, not as
heirs of the deceased.
In her comment to the petition, respondent Florence S. Ariola maintains that the petitioner is
trying to recover a sum of money from the deceased Efraim Santibaez; thus the claim should
have been filed with the probate court. She points out that at the time of the execution of the joint
agreement there was already an existing probate proceedings of which the petitioner knew about.
However, to avoid a claim in the probate court which might delay payment of the obligation, the
petitioner opted to require them to execute the said agreement.
According to the respondent, the trial court and the CA did not err in declaring that the
agreement was null and void. She asserts that even if the agreement was voluntarily executed by
her and her brother Edmund, it should still have been subjected to the approval of the court as it
may prejudice the estate, the heirs or third parties. Furthermore, she had not waived any rights, as
she even stated in her answer in the court a quo that the claim should be filed with the probate
court. Thus, the petitioner could not invoke or claim that she is in estoppel.
Respondent Florence S. Ariola further asserts that she had not signed any continuing guaranty
agreement, nor was there any document presented as evidence to show that she had caused
herself to be bound by the obligation of her late father.
The petition is bereft of merit.
The Court is posed to resolve the following issues: a) whether or not the partition in the
Agreement executed by the heirs is valid; b) whether or not the heirs assumption of the
indebtedness of the deceased is valid; and c) whether the petitioner can hold the heirs liable on
the obligation of the deceased.
At the outset, well-settled is the rule that a probate court has the jurisdiction to determine all the
properties of the deceased, to determine whether they should or should not be included in the
inventory or list of properties to be administered.[20] The said court is primarily concerned with
the administration, liquidation and distribution of the estate.[21]
In our jurisdiction, the rule is that there can be no valid partition among the heirs until after the
will has been probated:
In testate succession, there can be no valid partition among the heirs until after the will has been
probated. The law enjoins the probate of a will and the public requires it, because unless a will is
probated and notice thereof given to the whole world, the right of a person to dispose of his
property by will may be rendered nugatory. The authentication of a will decides no other
question than such as touch upon the capacity of the testator and the compliance with those
requirements or solemnities which the law prescribes for the validity of a will.[22]
This, of course, presupposes that the properties to be partitioned are the same properties
embraced in the will.[23] In the present case, the deceased, Efraim Santibaez, left a holographic
will[24] which contained, inter alia, the provision which reads as follows:
(e) All other properties, real or personal, which I own and may be discovered later after my
demise, shall be distributed in the proportion indicated in the immediately preceding paragraph
in favor of Edmund and Florence, my children.
We agree with the appellate court that the above-quoted is an all-encompassing provision
embracing all the properties left by the decedent which might have escaped his mind at that time
he was making his will, and other properties he may acquire thereafter. Included therein are the
three (3) subject tractors. This being so, any partition involving the said tractors among the heirs
is not valid. The joint agreement[25] executed by Edmund and Florence, partitioning the tractors
among themselves, is invalid, specially so since at the time of its execution, there was already a
pending proceeding for the probate of their late fathers holographic will covering the said
tractors.
It must be stressed that the probate proceeding had already acquired jurisdiction over all the
properties of the deceased, including the three (3) tractors. To dispose of them in any way
without the probate courts approval is tantamount to divesting it with jurisdiction which the
Court cannot allow.[26] Every act intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs and
legatees or devisees is deemed to be a partition, although it should purport to be a sale, an
exchange, a compromise, or any other transaction.[27] Thus, in executing any joint agreement
which appears to be in the nature of an extra-judicial partition, as in the case at bar, court
approval is imperative, and the heirs cannot just divest the court of its jurisdiction over that part
of the estate. Moreover, it is within the jurisdiction of the probate court to determine the identity
of the heirs of the decedent.[28] In the instant case, there is no showing that the signatories in the
joint agreement were the only heirs of the decedent. When it was executed, the probate of the
will was still pending before the court and the latter had yet to determine who the heirs of the
decedent were. Thus, for Edmund and respondent Florence S. Ariola to adjudicate unto
themselves the three (3) tractors was a premature act, and prejudicial to the other possible heirs
and creditors who may have a valid claim against the estate of the deceased.
The question that now comes to fore is whether the heirs assumption of the indebtedness of the
decedent is binding. We rule in the negative. Perusing the joint agreement, it provides that the
heirs as parties thereto have agreed to divide between themselves and take possession and use
the above-described chattel and each of them to assume the indebtedness corresponding to the
chattel taken as herein after stated which is in favor of First Countryside Credit Corp.[29] The
assumption of liability was conditioned upon the happening of an event, that is, that each heir
shall take possession and use of their respective share under the agreement. It was made
dependent on the validity of the partition, and that they were to assume the indebtedness
corresponding to the chattel that they were each to receive. The partition being invalid as earlier
discussed, the heirs in effect did not receive any such tractor. It follows then that the assumption
of liability cannot be given any force and effect.
The Court notes that the loan was contracted by the decedent. The petitioner, purportedly a
creditor of the late Efraim Santibaez, should have thus filed its money claim with the probate
court in accordance with Section 5, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides:
Section 5. Claims which must be filed under the notice. If not filed barred; exceptions. All claims
for money against the decedent, arising from contract, express or implied, whether the same be
due, not due, or contingent, all claims for funeral expenses for the last sickness of the decedent,
and judgment for money against the decedent, must be filed within the time limited in the notice;
otherwise they are barred forever, except that they may be set forth as counterclaims in any
action that the executor or administrator may bring against the claimants. Where an executor or
administrator commences an action, or prosecutes an action already commenced by the deceased
in his lifetime, the debtor may set forth by answer the claims he has against the decedent, instead
of presenting them independently to the court as herein provided, and mutual claims may be set
off against each other in such action; and if final judgment is rendered in favor of the defendant,
the amount so determined shall be considered the true balance against the estate, as though the
claim had been presented directly before the court in the administration proceedings. Claims not
yet due, or contingent, may be approved at their present value.
The filing of a money claim against the decedents estate in the probate court is mandatory.[30]
As we held in the vintage case of Py Eng Chong v. Herrera:[31]
This requirement is for the purpose of protecting the estate of the deceased by informing the
executor or administrator of the claims against it, thus enabling him to examine each claim and
to determine whether it is a proper one which should be allowed. The plain and obvious design
of the rule is the speedy settlement of the affairs of the deceased and the early delivery of the
property to the distributees, legatees, or heirs. `The law strictly requires the prompt presentation
and disposition of the claims against the decedent's estate in order to settle the affairs of the
estate as soon as possible, pay off its debts and distribute the residue.[32]
Perusing the records of the case, nothing therein could hold private respondent Florence S. Ariola
accountable for any liability incurred by her late father. The documentary evidence presented,
particularly the promissory notes and the continuing guaranty agreement, were executed and
signed only by the late Efraim Santibaez and his son Edmund. As the petitioner failed to file its
money claim with the probate court, at most, it may only go after Edmund as co-maker of the
decedent under the said promissory notes and continuing guaranty, of course, subject to any
defenses Edmund may have as against the petitioner. As the court had not acquired jurisdiction
over the person of Edmund, we find it unnecessary to delve into the matter further.
We agree with the finding of the trial court that the petitioner had not sufficiently shown that it is
the successor-in-interest of the Union Savings and Mortgage Bank to which the FCCC assigned
its assets and liabilities.[33] The petitioner in its complaint alleged that by virtue of the Deed of
Assignment dated August 20, 1981 executed by and between First Countryside Credit
Corporation and Union Bank of the Philippines[34] However, the documentary evidence[35]
clearly reflects that the parties in the deed of assignment with assumption of liabilities were the
FCCC, and the Union Savings and Mortgage Bank, with the conformity of Bancom Philippine
Holdings, Inc. Nowhere can the petitioners participation therein as a party be found.
Furthermore, no documentary or testimonial evidence was presented during trial to show that
Union Savings and Mortgage Bank is now, in fact, petitioner Union Bank of the Philippines. As
the trial court declared in its decision:
[T]he court also finds merit to the contention of defendant that plaintiff failed to prove or did not
present evidence to prove that Union Savings and Mortgage Bank is now the Union Bank of the
Philippines. Judicial notice does not apply here. The power to take judicial notice is to [be]
exercised by the courts with caution; care must be taken that the requisite notoriety exists; and
every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be promptly resolved in the negative. (Republic
vs. Court of Appeals, 107 SCRA 504).[36]
This being the case, the petitioners personality to file the complaint is wanting. Consequently, it
failed to establish its cause of action. Thus, the trial court did not err in dismissing the complaint,
and the CA in affirming the same.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is hereby DENIED. The assailed Court
of Appeals Decision is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Tinga, and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
----------
THIRD DIVISION
Respondent.
December 16, 2005
x -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- x
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
T
he law favors the probate of a will. Upon those who oppose it rests the burden of showing why it
should not be allowed. In the present case, petitioner has failed to discharge this burden
satisfactorily. For this reason, the Court cannot attribute any reversible error on the part of the
appellate tribunal that allowed the probate of the will.
The Case
Before the Court is a Petition for Review [1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
seeking to reverse and set aside the December 12, 2002 Decision [2] and the March 7, 2003
Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 44296. The assailed Decision
disposed as follows:
The Facts
The facts were summarized in the assailed Decision of the CA, as follows:
a.
2.
3.
4.
attache case after his death. It was only then that she learned that
the testator bequeathed to her his properties and she was named
the executrix in the said will. To her estimate, the value of property
both real and personal left by the testator is worth more or less
P100,000.00. Josefina declared too that the testator never suffered
mental infirmity because despite his old age he went alone to the
market which is two to three kilometers from their home cooked and
cleaned the kitchen and sometimes if she could not accompany him,
even traveled to Manila alone to claim his monthly pension. Josefina
also asserts that her husband was in good health and that he was
hospitalized only because of a cold but which eventually resulted in
his death.
Notary Public Floro Sarmiento, the notary public who
notarized the testators will, testified that it was in the first week of
June 1983 when the testator together with the three witnesses of the
will went to his house cum law office and requested him to prepare
his last will and testament. After the testator instructed him on the
terms and dispositions he wanted on the will, the notary public told
them to come back on June 15, 1983 to give him time to prepare it.
After he had prepared the will the notary public kept it safely hidden
and locked in his drawer. The testator and his witnesses returned on
the appointed date but the notary public was out of town so they
were instructed by his wife to come back on August 9, 1983, and
which they did. Before the testator and his witnesses signed the
prepared will, the notary public explained to them each and every
term thereof in Ilocano, a dialect which the testator spoke and
understood. He likewise explained that though it appears that the will
was signed by the testator and his witnesses on June 15, 1983, the
day when it should have been executed had he not gone out of
town, the formal execution was actually on August 9, 1983. He
reasoned that he no longer changed the typewritten date of June 15,
1983 because he did not like the document to appear dirty. The
notary public also testified that to his observation the testator was
physically and mentally capable at the time he affixed his signature
on the will.
The attesting witnesses to the will corroborated the testimony
of the notary public, and testified that the testator went alone to the
house of spouses Eugenio and Feliza Gomez at GSIS Village,
Quezon City and requested them to accompany him to the house of
Atty. Floro Sarmiento purposely for his intended will; that after giving
his instructions to Atty. Floro Sarmiento, they were told to return on
June 15, 1983; that they returned on June 15, 1983 for the execution
of the will but were asked to come back instead on August 9, 1983
because of the absence of the notary public; that the testator
executed the will in question in their presence while he was of sound
and disposing mind and that he was strong and in good health; that
the contents of the will was explained by the notary public in the
Ilocano and Tagalog dialect and that all of them as witnesses
attested and signed the will in the presence of the testator and of
each other. And that during the execution, the testators wife,
Josefina was not with them.
The oppositor Leticia declared that Josefina should not inherit
alone because aside from her there are other children from the
siblings of Placido who are just as entitled to inherit from him. She
attacked the mental capacity of the testator, declaring that at the
time of the execution of the notarial will the testator was already 83
years old and was no longer of sound mind. She knew whereof she
spoke because in 1983 Placido lived in the Makati residence and
asked Leticias family to live with him and they took care of him.
During that time, the testators physical and mental condition showed
deterioration, aberrations and senility. This was corroborated by her
daughter Mary Jane Ortega for whom Placido took a fancy and
wanted to marry.
Sifting through the evidence, the court a quo held that [t]he
evidence adduced, reduces the opposition to two grounds, namely:
1. Non-compliance with the legal solemnities and formalities
in the execution and attestation of the will; and
2.
Reversing the trial court, the appellate court admitted the will of Placido Valmonte to probate.
The CA upheld the credibility of the notary public and the subscribing witnesses who had
acknowledged the due execution of the will. Moreover, it held that the testator had testamentary
capacity at the time of the execution of the will. It added that his sexual exhibitionism and
unhygienic, crude and impolite ways[6] did not make him a person of unsound mind.
Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues for our consideration:
I.
Whether or not the findings of the probate court are entitled to great
respect.
II.
Whether or not the signature of Placido Valmonte in the subject will
was procured by fraud or trickery, and that Placido Valmonte never
intended that the instrument should be his last will and testament.
III.
Whether or not Placido Valmonte has testamentary capacity at the
time he allegedly executed the subject will.[8]
In short, petitioner assails the CAs allowance of the probate of the will of Placido
Valmonte.
Main Issue:
Probate of a Will
At the outset, we stress that only questions of law may be raised in a Petition for Review
under Section 1 of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. As an exception, however, the evidence
presented during the trial may be examined and the factual matters resolved by this Court when,
as in the instant case, the findings of fact of the appellate court differ from those of the trial court.
[9]
The fact that public policy favors the probate of a will does not necessarily mean that
every will presented for probate should be allowed. The law lays down the procedures and
requisites that must be satisfied for the probate of a will. [10] Verily, Article 839 of the Civil
Code states the instances when a will may be disallowed, as follows:
with;
(2)
If the testator was insane, or otherwise mentally
incapable of making a will, at the time of its execution;
(5)
(6) If the testator acted by mistake or did not intend that the
instrument he signed should be his will at the time of affixing his
signature thereto.
In the present case, petitioner assails the validity of Placido Valmontes will by imputing fraud in
its execution and challenging the testators state of mind at the time.
Petitioner does not dispute the due observance of the formalities in the execution of the will, but
maintains that the circumstances surrounding it are indicative of the existence of fraud.
Particularly, she alleges that respondent, who is the testators wife and sole beneficiary, conspired
with the notary public and the three attesting witnesses in deceiving Placido to sign it. Deception
is allegedly reflected in the varying dates of the execution and the attestation of the will.
Petitioner contends that it was highly dubious for a woman at the prime of her young life
[to] almost immediately plunge into marriage with a man who [was] thrice her age x x x and who
happened to be [a] Fil-American pensionado, [11] thus casting doubt on the intention of
respondent in seeking the probate of the will. Moreover, it supposedly defies human reason, logic
and common experience[12] for an old man with a severe psychological condition to have
willingly signed a last will and testament.
We are not convinced. Fraud is a trick, secret device, false statement, or pretense, by which the
subject of it is cheated. It may be of such character that the testator is misled or deceived as to
the nature or contents of the document which he executes, or it may relate to some extrinsic fact,
in consequence of the deception regarding which the testator is led to make a certain will which,
but for the fraud, he would not have made.[13]
We stress that the party challenging the will bears the burden of proving the existence of
fraud at the time of its execution. [14] The burden to show otherwise shifts to the proponent of
the will only upon a showing of credible evidence of fraud. [15] Unfortunately in this case,
other than the self-serving allegations of petitioner, no evidence of fraud was ever presented.
It is a settled doctrine that the omission of some relatives does not affect the due execution
of a will.[16] That the testator was tricked into signing it was not sufficiently established by the
fact that he had instituted his wife, who was more than fifty years his junior, as the sole
beneficiary; and disregarded petitioner and her family, who were the ones who had taken the
cudgels of taking care of [the testator] in his twilight years.[17]
Moreover, as correctly ruled by the appellate court, the conflict between the dates
appearing on the will does not invalidate the document, because the law does not even require
that a [notarial] will x x x be executed and acknowledged on the same occasion. [18] More
important, the will must be subscribed by the testator, as well as by three or more credible
witnesses who must also attest to it in the presence of the testator and of one another. [19]
Furthermore, the testator and the witnesses must acknowledge the will before a notary public.
[20] In any event, we agree with the CA that the variance in the dates of the will as to its
supposed execution and attestation was satisfactorily and persuasively explained by the notary
public and the instrumental witnesses.[21]
The pertinent transcript of stenographic notes taken on June 11, 1985, November 25,
1985, October 13, 1986, and October 21, 1987 -- as quoted by the CA -- are reproduced
respectively as follows:
Q Why did you not make the necessary correction on the date
appearing on the body of the document as well as the
attestation clause?
A Because I do not like anymore to make some alterations so I put it
in my own handwriting August 9, 1983 on the
acknowledgement. (tsn, June 11, 1985, pp. 8-10)
Eugenio Gomez:
Q It appears on the first page Mr. Witness that it is dated June 15,
1983, whereas in the acknowledgement it is dated August 9,
1983, will you look at this document and tell us this
discrepancy in the date?
A We went to Atty. Sarmiento together with Placido Valmonte and
the two witnesses; that was first week of June and Atty.
Sarmiento told us to return on the 15th of June but when we
returned, Atty. Sarmiento was not there.
Q When you did not find Atty. Sarmiento on June 15, 1983, did you
again go back?
A We returned on the 9th of August and there we signed.
Q This August 9, 1983 where you said it is there where you signed,
who were your companions?
A The two witnesses, me and Placido Valmonte. (tsn, November 25,
1985, pp. 7-8)
Felisa Gomez on cross-examination:
Q Why did you have to go to the office of Atty. Floro Sarmiento, three
times?
xxxxxxxxx
A The reason why we went there three times is that, the first week of
June was out first time. We went there to talk to Atty.
Sarmiento and Placido Valmonte about the last will and
testament. After that what they have talked what will be placed
in the testament, what Atty. Sarmiento said was that he will go
back on the 15th of June. When we returned on June 15, Atty.
Sarmiento was not there so we were not able to sign it, the
will. That is why, for the third time we went there on August 9
and that was the time we affixed our signature. (tsn, October
13, 1986, pp. 4-6)
Josie Collado:
Q When you did not find Atty. Sarmiento in his house on June 15,
1983, what transpired?
A The wife of Atty. Sarmiento told us that we will be back on August
9, 1983.
Q And on August 9, 1983 did you go back to the house of Atty.
Sarmiento?
A Yes, Sir.
Q For what purpose?
A Our purpose is just to sign the will.
Q Were you able to sign the will you mentioned?
A Yes sir. (tsn, October 21, 1987, pp. 4-5)[22]
Notably, petitioner failed to substantiate her claim of a grand conspiracy in the
commission of a fraud. There was no showing that the witnesses of the proponent stood to
receive any benefit from the allowance of the will. The testimonies of the three subscribing
witnesses and the notary are credible evidence of its due execution. [23] Their testimony
favoring it and the finding that it was executed in accordance with the formalities required by
law should be affirmed, absent any showing of ill motives.[24]
In determining the capacity of the testator to make a will, the Civil Code gives the following
guidelines:
According to Article 799, the three things that the testator must have the ability to know
to be considered of sound mind are as follows: (1) the nature of the estate to be disposed of, (2)
the proper objects of the testators bounty, and (3) the character of the testamentary act. Applying
this test to the present case, we find that the appellate court was correct in holding that Placido
had testamentary capacity at the time of the execution of his will.
It must be noted that despite his advanced age, he was still able to identify accurately the
kinds of property he owned, the extent of his shares in them and even their locations. As regards
the proper objects of his bounty, it was sufficient that he identified his wife as sole beneficiary.
As we have stated earlier, the omission of some relatives from the will did not affect its formal
validity. There being no showing of fraud in its execution, intent in its disposition becomes
irrelevant.
Worth reiterating in determining soundness of mind is Alsua-Betts v. CA,[25] which
held thus:
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED, and the assailed Decision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 155733
respondents, are the lawful heirs of the decedents. However, it is attended by several collateral
issues that complicate its resolution.
The claimants to the estates of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado may be divided into two
groups: (1) the alleged heirs of Josefa Delgado, consisting of her half- and full-blood siblings,
nephews and nieces, and grandnephews and grandnieces, and (2) the alleged heirs of Guillermo
Rustia, particularly, his sisters,7 his nephews and nieces,8 his illegitimate child,9 and the de facto
adopted child10 (ampun-ampunan) of the decedents.
The alleged heirs of Josefa Delgado
The deceased Josefa Delgado was the daughter of Felisa11 Delgado by one Lucio Campo. Aside
from Josefa, five other children were born to the couple, namely, Nazario, Edilberta, Jose,
Jacoba, and Gorgonio, all surnamed Delgado. Felisa Delgado was never married to Lucio
Campo, hence, Josefa and her full-blood siblings were all natural children of Felisa Delgado.
However, Lucio Campo was not the first and only man in Felisa Delgados life. Before him was
Ramon Osorio12 with whom Felisa had a son, Luis Delgado. But, unlike her relationship with
Lucio Campo which was admittedly one without the benefit of marriage, the legal status of
Ramon Osorios and Felisa Delgados union is in dispute.
The question of whether Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio ever got married is crucial to the
claimants because the answer will determine whether their successional rights fall within the
ambit of the rule against reciprocal intestate succession between legitimate and illegitimate
relatives.13 If Ramon Osorio and Felisa Delgado had been validly married, then their only child
Luis Delgado was a legitimate half-blood brother of Josefa Delgado and therefore excluded from
the latters intestate estate. He and his heirs would be barred by the principle of absolute
separation between the legitimate and illegitimate families. Conversely, if the couple were never
married, Luis Delgado and his heirs would be entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgados intestate
estate, as they would all be within the illegitimate line.
Petitioners allege that Ramon Osorio and Felisa Delgado were never married. In support thereof,
they assert that no evidence was ever presented to establish it, not even so much as an allegation
of the date or place of the alleged marriage. What is clear, however, is that Felisa retained the
surname Delgado. So did Luis, her son with Ramon Osorio. Later on, when Luis got married, his
Partida de Casamiento14 stated that he was "hijo natural de Felisa Delgado" (the natural child of
Felisa Delgado),15 significantly omitting any mention of the name and other circumstances of his
father.16 Nevertheless, oppositors (now respondents) insist that the absence of a record of the
alleged marriage did not necessarily mean that no marriage ever took place.
Josefa Delgado died on September 8, 1972 without a will. She was survived by Guillermo Rustia
and some collateral relatives, the petitioners herein. Several months later, on June 15, 1973,
Guillermo Rustia executed an affidavit of selfadjudication of the remaining properties comprising her estate.
The marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado
Sometime in 1917, Guillermo Rustia proposed marriage to Josefa Delgado17 but whether a
marriage in fact took place is disputed. According to petitioners, the two eventually lived
together as husband and wife but were never married. To prove their assertion, petitioners point
out that no record of the contested marriage existed in the civil registry. Moreover, a baptismal
certificate naming Josefa Delgado as one of the sponsors referred to her as "Seorita" or
unmarried woman.
The oppositors (respondents here), on the other hand, insist that the absence of a marriage
certificate did not of necessity mean that no marriage transpired. They maintain that Guillermo
Rustia and Josefa Delgado were married on June 3, 1919 and from then on lived together as
husband and wife until the death of Josefa on September 8, 1972. During this period spanning
more than half a century, they were known among their relatives and friends to have in fact been
married. To support their proposition, oppositors presented the following pieces of evidence:
1. Certificate of Identity No. 9592 dated [December 1, 1944] issued to Mrs. Guillermo J.
Rustia by Carlos P. Romulo, then Resident Commissioner to the United States of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines;
2. Philippine Passport No. 4767 issued to Josefa D. Rustia on June 25, 1947;
3. Veterans Application for Pension or Compensation for Disability Resulting from
Service in the Active Military or Naval Forces of the United States- Claim No. C-4, 004,
503 (VA Form 526) filed with the Veterans Administration of the United States of
America by Dr. Guillermo J. Rustia wherein Dr. Guillermo J. Rustia himself [swore] to
his marriage to Josefa Delgado in Manila on 3 June 1919;18
4. Titles to real properties in the name of Guillermo Rustia indicated that he was married
to Josefa Delgado.
The alleged heirs of Guillermo Rustia
Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado never had any children. With no children of their own, they
took into their home the youngsters Guillermina Rustia Rustia and Nanie Rustia. These children,
never legally adopted by the couple, were what was known in the local dialect as ampunampunan.
During his life with Josefa, however, Guillermo Rustia did manage to father an illegitimate
child,19 the intervenor-respondent Guillerma Rustia, with one Amparo Sagarbarria. According to
Guillerma, Guillermo Rustia treated her as his daughter, his own flesh and blood, and she
enjoyed open and continuous possession of that status from her birth in 1920 until her fathers
demise. In fact, Josefa Delgados obituary which was prepared by Guillermo Rustia, named the
intervenor-respondent as one of their children. Also, her report card from the University of Santo
Tomas identified Guillermo Rustia as her parent/guardian.20
Oppositors (respondents here) nonetheless posit that Guillerma Rustia has no interest in the
intestate estate of Guillermo Rustia as she was never duly acknowledged as an illegitimate child.
They contend that her right to compulsory acknowledgement prescribed when Guillermo died in
1974 and that she cannot claim voluntary acknowledgement since the documents she presented
were not the authentic writings prescribed by the new Civil Code.21
On January 7, 1974, more than a year after the death of Josefa Delgado, Guillermo Rustia filed a
petition for the adoption22 of their ampun-ampunan Guillermina Rustia. He stated under oath
"[t]hat he ha[d] no legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children or natural children by
legal fiction."23 The petition was overtaken by his death on February 28, 1974.
Like Josefa Delgado, Guillermo Rustia died without a will. He was survived by his sisters
Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia Rustia-Cruz, and by the children of his
predeceased brother Roman Rustia Sr., namely, Josefina Rustia Albano, Virginia Rustia Paraiso,
Roman Rustia, Jr., Sergio Rustia, Francisco Rustia and Leticia Rustia Miranda.24
ANTECEDENT PROCEEDINGS
On May 8, 1975, Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao, the daughter of Luis Delgado, filed the original
petition for letters of administration of the intestate estates of the "spouses Josefa Delgado and
Guillermo Rustia" with the RTC of Manila, Branch 55.25 This petition was opposed by the
following: (1) the sisters of Guillermo Rustia, namely, Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and
Hortencia Rustia-Cruz;26 (2) the heirs of Guillermo Rustias late brother, Roman Rustia, Sr., and
(3) the ampun-ampunan Guillermina Rustia Rustia. The opposition was grounded on the theory
that Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao and the other claimants were barred under the law from
inheriting from their illegitimate half-blood relative Josefa Delgado.
In November of 1975, Guillerma Rustia filed a motion to intervene in the proceedings, claiming
she was the only surviving descendant in the direct line of Guillermo Rustia. Despite the
objections of the oppositors (respondents herein), the motion was granted.
On April 3, 1978, the original petition for letters of administration was amended to state that
Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia were never married but had merely lived together as
husband and wife.
On January 24, 1980, oppositors (respondents herein) filed a motion to dismiss the petition in the
RTC insofar as the estate of Guillermo Rustia was concerned. The motion was denied on the
ground that the interests of the petitioners and the other claimants remained in issue and should
be properly threshed out upon submission of evidence.
On March 14, 1988, Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa substituted for her sister, Luisa Delgado
vda. de Danao, who had died on May 18, 1987.
On May 11, 1990, the RTC appointed Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa as administratrix of
both estates.27 The dispositive portion of the decision read:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, petitioner and her co-claimants to the estate of the
late Josefa Delgado listed in the Petitions, and enumerated elsewhere in this Decision, are hereby
declared as the only legal heirs of the said Josefa Delgado who died intestate in the City of
Manila on September 8, 1972, and entitled to partition the same among themselves in accordance
with the proportions referred to in this Decision.
Similarly, the intervenor Guillerma S. Rustia is hereby declared as the sole and only surviving
heir of the late Dr. Guillermo Rustia, and thus, entitled to the entire estate of the said decedent, to
the exclusion of the oppositors and the other parties hereto.
The Affidavit of Self-Adjudication of the estate of Josefa Delgado executed by the late
Guillermo J. Rustia on June 15, 1973 is hereby SET ASIDE and declared of no force and effect.
As the estates of both dece[d]ents have not as yet been settled, and their settlement [is]
considered consolidated in this proceeding in accordance with law, a single administrator
therefor is both proper and necessary, and, as the petitioner Carlota Delgado Vda. de dela Rosa
has established her right to the appointment as administratrix of the estates, the Court hereby
APPOINTS her as the ADMINISTRATRIX of the intestate estate of the decedent JOSEFA
DELGADO in relation to the estate of DR. GUILLERMO J. RUSTIA.
Accordingly, let the corresponding LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION issue to the petitioner
CARLOTA DELGADO VDA. DE DE LA ROSA upon her filing of the requisite bond in the sum
of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00).
Finally, oppositor GUILLERMINA RUSTIA RUSTIA is hereby ordered to cease and desist from
her acts of administration of the subject estates, and is likewise ordered to turn over to the
appointed administratix all her collections of the rentals and income due on the assets of the
estates in question, including all documents, papers, records and titles pertaining to such estates
to the petitioner and appointed administratix CARLOTA DELGADO VDA. DE DE LA ROSA,
immediately upon receipt of this Decision. The same oppositor is hereby required to render an
accounting of her actual administration of the estates in controversy within a period of sixty (60)
days from receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.28
On May 20, 1990, oppositors filed an appeal which was denied on the ground that the record on
appeal was not filed on time.29 They then filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus30 which
was dismissed by the Court of Appeals.31 However, on motion for reconsideration and after
hearing the parties oral arguments, the Court of Appeals reversed itself and gave due course to
oppositors appeal in the interest of substantial justice.32
In a petition for review to this Court, petitioners assailed the resolution of the Court of Appeals,
on the ground that oppositors failure to file the record on appeal within the reglementary period
was a jurisdictional defect which nullified the appeal. On October 10, 1997, this Court allowed
the continuance of the appeal. The pertinent portion of our decision33 read:
As a rule, periods prescribed to do certain acts must be followed. However, under exceptional
circumstances, a delay in the filing of an appeal may be excused on grounds of substantial
justice.
xxx xxx xxx
The respondent court likewise pointed out the trial courts pronouncements as to certain matters
of substance, relating to the determination of the heirs of the decedents and the party entitled to
the administration of their estate, which were to be raised in the appeal, but were barred
absolutely by the denial of the record on appeal upon too technical ground of late filing.
xxx xxx xxx
In this instance, private respondents intention to raise valid issues in the appeal is apparent and
should not have been construed as an attempt to delay or prolong the administration proceedings.
xxx xxx xxx
A review of the trial courts decision is needed.
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the Court hereby AFFIRMS the
Resolution dated November 27, 1991 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 23415, for the
APPROVAL of the private respondents Record on Appeal and the CONTINUANCE of the
appeal from the Manila, Branch LV Regional Trial Courts May 11, 1990 decision.
SO ORDERED.
Acting on the appeal, the Court of Appeals34 partially set aside the trial courts decision. Upon
motion for reconsideration,35 the Court of Appeals amended its earlier decision.36 The dispositive
portion of the amended decision read:
With the further modification, our assailed decision is RECONSIDERED and VACATED.
Consequently, the decision of the trial court is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new one is
hereby RENDERED declaring: 1.) Dr. Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado Rustia to have
been legally married; 2.) the intestate estate of Dr. Guillermo Rustia, Jacoba Delgado-Encinas
and the children of Gorgonio Delgado (Campo) entitled to partition among themselves the
intestate estate of Josefa D. Rustia in accordance with the proportion referred to in this decision;
3.) the oppositors-appellants as the legal heirs of the late Dr. Guillermo Rustia and thereby
entitled to partition his estate in accordance with the proportion referred to herein; and 4.) the
intervenor-appellee Guillerma S. Rustia as ineligible to inherit from the late Dr. Guillermo
Rustia; thus revoking her appointment as administratrix of his estate.
The letters of administration of the intestate estate of Dr. Guillermo Rustia in relation to the
intestate estate of Josefa Delgado shall issue to the nominee of the oppositors-appellants upon his
or her qualification and filing of the requisite bond in the sum of FIVE HUNDRED
THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00).
Oppositor-appellant Guillermina Rustia Rustia is hereby ordered to cease and desist from her
acts of administration of the subject estates and to turn over to the appointed administrator all her
collections of the rentals and incomes due on the assets of the estates in question, including all
documents, papers, records and titles pertaining to such estates to the appointed administrator,
immediately upon notice of his qualification and posting of the requisite bond, and to render an
accounting of her (Guillermina Rustia Rustia) actual administration of the estates in controversy
within a period of sixty (60) days from notice of the administrators qualification and posting of
the bond.
The issue of the validity of the affidavit of self-adjudication executed by Dr. Guillermo Rustia on
June 15, 1973 is REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings to determine the extent
of the shares of Jacoba Delgado-Encinas and the children of Gorgonio Delgado (Campo) affected
by the said adjudication.
First, although a marriage contract is considered a primary evidence of marriage, its absence is
not always proof that no marriage in fact took place.40 Once the presumption of marriage arises,
other evidence may be presented in support thereof. The evidence need not necessarily or
directly establish the marriage but must at least be enough to strengthen the presumption of
marriage. Here, the certificate of identity issued to Josefa Delgado as Mrs. Guillermo Rustia,41
the passport issued to her as Josefa D. Rustia,42 the declaration under oath of no less than
Guillermo Rustia that he was married to Josefa Delgado43 and the titles to the properties in the
name of "Guillermo Rustia married to Josefa Delgado," more than adequately support the
presumption of marriage. These are public documents which are prima facie evidence of the
facts stated therein.44 No clear and convincing evidence sufficient to overcome the presumption
of the truth of the recitals therein was presented by petitioners.
Second, Elisa vda. de Anson, petitioners own witness whose testimony they primarily relied
upon to support their position, confirmed that Guillermo Rustia had proposed marriage to Josefa
Delgado and that eventually, the two had "lived together as husband and wife." This again could
not but strengthen the presumption of marriage.
Third, the baptismal certificate45 was conclusive proof only of the baptism administered by the
priest who baptized the child. It was no proof of the veracity of the declarations and statements
contained therein,46 such as the alleged single or unmarried ("Seorita") civil status of Josefa
Delgado who had no hand in its preparation.
Petitioners failed to rebut the presumption of marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado.
In this jurisdiction, every intendment of the law leans toward legitimizing matrimony. Persons
dwelling together apparently in marriage are presumed to be in fact married. This is the usual
order of things in society and, if the parties are not what they hold themselves out to be, they
would be living in constant violation of the common rules of law and propriety. Semper
praesumitur pro matrimonio. Always presume marriage.47
The Lawful Heirs Of Josefa Delgado
To determine who the lawful heirs of Josefa Delgado are, the questioned status of the
cohabitation of her mother Felisa Delgado with Ramon Osorio must first be addressed.
As mentioned earlier, presumptions of law are either conclusive or disputable. Conclusive
presumptions are inferences which the law makes so peremptory that no contrary proof, no
matter how strong, may overturn them.48 On the other hand, disputable presumptions, one of
which is the presumption of marriage, can be relied on only in the absence of sufficient evidence
to the contrary.
Little was said of the cohabitation or alleged marriage of Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio. The
oppositors (now respondents) chose merely to rely on the disputable presumption of marriage
even in the face of such countervailing evidence as (1) the continued use by Felisa and Luis (her
son with Ramon Osorio) of the surname Delgado and (2) Luis Delgados and Caridad
Concepcions Partida de Casamiento49 identifying Luis as "hijo natural de Felisa Delgado" (the
natural child of Felisa Delgado).50
All things considered, we rule that these factors sufficiently overcame the rebuttable presumption
of marriage. Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio were never married. Hence, all the children born
to Felisa Delgado out of her relations with Ramon Osorio and Lucio Campo, namely, Luis and
his half-blood siblings Nazario, Edilberta, Jose, Jacoba, Gorgonio and the decedent Josefa, all
surnamed Delgado,51 were her natural children.52
Pertinent to this matter is the following observation:
Suppose, however, that A begets X with B, and Y with another woman, C; then X and Y would
be natural brothers and sisters, but of half-blood relationship. Can they succeed each other
reciprocally?
The law prohibits reciprocal succession between illegitimate children and legitimate children of
the same parent, even though there is unquestionably a tie of blood between them. It seems that
to allow an illegitimate child to succeed ab intestato (from) another illegitimate child begotten
with a parent different from that of the former, would be allowing the illegitimate child greater
rights than a legitimate child. Notwithstanding this, however, we submit that
succession should be allowed, even when the illegitimate brothers and sisters are only of the
half-blood. The reason impelling the prohibition on reciprocal successions between legitimate
and illegitimate families does not apply to the case under consideration. That prohibition has for
its basis the difference in category between illegitimate and legitimate relatives. There is no such
difference when all the children are illegitimate children of the same parent, even if begotten
with different persons. They all stand on the same footing before the law, just like legitimate
children of half-blood relation. We submit, therefore, that the rules regarding succession of
legitimate brothers and sisters should be applicable to them. Full blood illegitimate brothers and
sisters should receive double the portion of half-blood brothers and sisters; and if all are either of
the full blood or of the half-blood, they shall share equally.53
Here, the above-named siblings of Josefa Delgado were related to her by full-blood, except Luis
Delgado, her half-brother. Nonetheless, since they were all illegitimate, they may inherit from
each other. Accordingly, all of them are entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgado.
We note, however, that the petitioners before us are already the nephews, nieces, grandnephews
and grandnieces of Josefa Delgado. Under Article 972 of the new Civil Code, the right of
representation in the collateral line takes place only in favor of the children of brothers and
sisters (nephews and nieces). Consequently, it cannot be exercised by grandnephews and
grandnieces.54 Therefore, the only collateral relatives of Josefa Delgado who are entitled to
partake of her intestate estate are her brothers and sisters, or their children who were still alive
at the time of her death on September 8, 1972. They have a vested right to participate in the
inheritance.55 The records not being clear on this matter, it is now for the trial court to determine
who were the surviving brothers and sisters (or their children) of Josefa Delgado at the time of
her death. Together with Guillermo Rustia,56 they are entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgado in
accordance with Article 1001 of the new Civil Code:57
Art. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or widower, the
latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children
to the other one-half.
Since Josefa Delgado had heirs other than Guillermo Rustia, Guillermo could not have validly
adjudicated Josefas estate all to himself. Rule 74, Section 1 of the Rules of Court is clear.
Adjudication by an heir of the decedents entire estate to himself by means of an affidavit is
allowed only if he is the sole heir to the estate:
SECTION 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. If the decedent left no will
and no debts and the heirs are all of age, or the minors are represented by their judicial or legal
representatives duly authorized for the purpose, the parties may, without securing letters of
administration, divide the estate among themselves as they see fit by means of a public
instrument filed in the office of the register of deeds, and should they disagree, they may do so in
an ordinary action of partition. If there is only one heir, he may adjudicate to himself the
estate by means of an affidavit filed in the office of the register of deeds. x x x (emphasis
supplied)
The Lawful Heirs Of Guillermo Rustia
Intervenor (now co-respondent) Guillerma Rustia is an illegitimate child58 of Guillermo Rustia.
As such, she may be entitled to successional rights only upon proof of an admission or
recognition of paternity.59 She, however, claimed the status of an acknowledged illegitimate child
of Guillermo Rustia only after the death of the latter on February 28, 1974 at which time it was
already the new Civil Code that was in effect.
Under the old Civil Code (which was in force till August 29, 1950), illegitimate children
absolutely had no hereditary rights. This draconian edict was, however, later relaxed in the new
Civil Code which granted certain successional rights to illegitimate children but only on
condition that they were first recognized or acknowledged by the parent.
Under the new law, recognition may be compulsory or voluntary.60 Recognition is compulsory in
any of the following cases:
(1) in cases of rape, abduction or seduction, when the period of the offense coincides
more or less with that of the conception;
(2) when the child is in continuous possession of status of a child of the alleged father (or
mother)61 by the direct acts of the latter or of his family;
(3) when the child was conceived during the time when the mother cohabited with the
supposed father;
(4) when the child has in his favor any evidence or proof that the defendant is his father.
62
On the other hand, voluntary recognition may be made in the record of birth, a will, a statement
before a court of record or in any authentic writing.63
Intervenor Guillerma sought recognition on two grounds: first, compulsory recognition through
the open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child and second, voluntary
recognition through authentic writing.
There was apparently no doubt that she possessed the status of an illegitimate child from her
birth until the death of her putative father Guillermo Rustia. However, this did not constitute
acknowledgment but a mere ground by which she could have compelled acknowledgment
through the courts.64 Furthermore, any (judicial) action for compulsory acknowledgment has a
dual limitation: the lifetime of the child and the lifetime of the putative parent.65 On the death of
either, the action for compulsory recognition can no longer be filed.66 In this case, intervenor
Guillermas right to claim compulsory acknowledgment prescribed upon the death of Guillermo
Rustia on February 28, 1974.
The claim of voluntary recognition (Guillermas second ground) must likewise fail. An authentic
writing, for purposes of voluntary recognition, is understood as a genuine or indubitable writing
of the parent (in this case, Guillermo Rustia). This includes a public instrument or a private
writing admitted by the father to be his.67 Did intervenors report card from the University of
Santo Tomas and Josefa Delgados obituary prepared by Guillermo Rustia qualify as authentic
writings under the new Civil Code? Unfortunately not. The report card of intervenor Guillerma
did not bear the signature of Guillermo Rustia. The fact that his name appears there as
intervenors parent/guardian holds no weight since he had no participation in its preparation.
Similarly, while witnesses testified that it was Guillermo Rustia himself who drafted the notice
of death of Josefa Delgado which was published in the Sunday Times on September 10, 1972,
that published obituary was not the authentic writing contemplated by the law. What could have
been admitted as an authentic writing was the original manuscript of the notice, in the
handwriting of Guillermo Rustia himself and signed by him, not the newspaper clipping of the
obituary. The failure to present the original signed manuscript was fatal to intervenors claim.
The same misfortune befalls the ampun-ampunan, Guillermina Rustia Rustia, who was never
adopted in accordance with law. Although a petition for her adoption was filed by Guillermo
Rustia, it never came to fruition and was dismissed upon the latters death. We affirm the ruling
of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals holding her a legal stranger to the deceased
spouses and therefore not entitled to inherit from them ab intestato. We quote:
Adoption is a juridical act, a proceeding in rem, which [created] between two persons a
relationship similar to that which results from legitimate paternity and filiation. Only an adoption
made through the court, or in pursuance with the procedure laid down under Rule 99 of the Rules
of Court is valid in this jurisdiction. It is not of natural law at all, but is wholly and entirely
artificial. To establish the relation, the statutory requirements must be strictly carried out,
otherwise, the adoption is an absolute nullity. The fact of adoption is never presumed, but must
be affirmatively [proven] by the person claiming its existence.68
Premises considered, we rule that two of the claimants to the estate of Guillermo Rustia, namely,
intervenor Guillerma Rustia and the ampun-ampunan Guillermina Rustia Rustia, are not lawful
heirs of the decedent. Under Article 1002 of the new Civil Code, if there are no descendants,
ascendants, illegitimate children, or surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the
entire estate of the deceased. Therefore, the lawful heirs of Guillermo Rustia are the remaining
claimants, consisting of his sisters,69 nieces and nephews.70
Entitlement To Letters Of Administration
An administrator is a person appointed by the court to administer the intestate estate of the
decedent. Rule 78, Section 6 of the Rules of Court prescribes an order of preference in the
appointment of an administrator:
Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. If no executor is named in the
will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give a bond, or a
person dies intestate, administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the
discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of
kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person
selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow or next of kin,
neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for administration or to
request that the administration be granted to some other person, it may be granted to one
or more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such
other person as the court may select.
In the appointment of an administrator, the principal consideration is the interest in the estate of
the one to be appointed.71 The order of preference does not rule out the appointment of coadministrators, specially in cases where
justice and equity demand that opposing parties or factions be represented in the management of
the estates,72 a situation which obtains here.
It is in this light that we see fit to appoint joint administrators, in the persons of Carlota Delgado
vda. de de la Rosa and a nominee of the nephews and nieces of Guillermo Rustia. They are the
next of kin of the deceased spouses Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia, respectively.
WHEREFORE, the petition (which seeks to reinstate the May 11, 1990 decision of the RTC
Manila, Branch 55) is hereby DENIED. The assailed October 24, 2002 decision of the Court of
Appeals is AFFIRMED with the following modifications:
1. Guillermo Rustias June 15, 1973 affidavit of self-adjudication is hereby
ANNULLED.
2. the intestate estate of Guillermo Rustia shall inherit half of the intestate estate of Josefa
Delgado. The remaining half shall pertain to (a) the full and half-siblings of Josefa
Delgado who survived her and (b) the children of any of Josefa Delgados full- or halfsiblings who may have predeceased her, also surviving at the time of her death. Josefa
Delgados grandnephews and grandnieces are excluded from her estate. In this
connection, the trial court is hereby ordered to determine the identities of the relatives of
Josefa Delgado who are entitled to share in her estate.
3. Guillermo Rustias estate (including its one-half share of Josefa Delgados estate) shall
be inherited by Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia Rustia Cruz (whose
respective shares shall be per capita) and the children of the late Roman Rustia, Sr. (who
survived Guillermo Rustia and whose respective shares shall be per stirpes). Considering
that Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia Rustia Cruz are now deceased, their
respective shares shall pertain to their estates.
4. Letters of administration over the still unsettled intestate estates of Guillermo Rustia
and Josefa Delgado shall issue to Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa and to a nominee
from among the heirs of Guillermo Rustia, as joint administrators, upon their
qualification and filing of the requisite bond in such amount as may be determined by the
trial court.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
Petitioners,
Present:
- versus -
TINGA, and
FORTUNATA ELBAMBUENA
Respondents.
Promulgated:
November 30, 2006
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
1
2
Petitioners, on the other hand, claiming that they have been in possession of
the lot since 1960, presented a Waiver of Rights 4[4] executed by Olar wherein he
renounced in their favor his rights and participation over the lot; a Sinumpaang
Salaysay5[5] wherein Olar acknowledged that he co-possessed the lot with
petitioner Capitle since 1960; and a Pinagsamang Patunay6[6] from the Barangay
Agrarian Reform Committee (BARC) Chairman and barangay chairman of Valle
certifying that they (petitioners) are the actual tillers and possessors of the lot.
Petitioners further claim that since 1959, respondent Fortunata was already
separated from Olar and she even remarried, thus giving her no right to inherit
from Olar.
3
4
5
6
While respondents petition in DARAB Case No. 5987'NNE'96 was pending before
the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD), petitioners filed before the
Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) of Talavera, Nueva Ecija a petition
for cancellation of the CLOA issued to Olar, docketed as DARAB Case No.
6261'NNE'97, claiming that they are the new farmer-beneficiaries as shown by,
among other things, the Waiver of Rights executed by Olar.
By Decision7[7] dated August 20, 1997 which jointly resolved DARAB Case
Nos. 5987'NNE'96 and 6261NNE97, the PARAD ruled in favor of petitioners, the
decretal portion of which reads:
4. The Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija to cancel TCT No. CLOA-03514 adverted to if the same is already registered and cause the
registration of a new CLOA in the name of Iluminada Capitle married
to C[i]rilo Capitle; and
5.
Respondents appealed the decision to the DARAB, arguing that the PARAD
erred in holding that:
I.
. . . PETITIONERS FORTUNATA ELBAMBUENA AND ROSALINDA OLAR
CAN NO LONGER RECOVER POSSESSION OVER THE SUBJECT FARM
LOT, MUCH LESS DEMAND PAYMENT OF LEASE RENTALS FROM THE
RESPONDENTS.
II.
. . . THE PETITION FOR RECALL/CANCELLATION OF TCT NO. CLOA-03514 PREVIOUSLY ISSUED TO THE LATE CRISTOBAL OLAR WOULD
PROSPER.9[9]
By Decision10[10] of December 29, 2003, the DARAB set aside the PARADs
decision, disposing as follows:
8
9
10
3.
4. The demand for back lease rentals by [respondents] is denied for lack
of merit.11[11]
Petitioners elevated the case to the Court of Appeals via petition for review,
arguing that the DARAB erred:
11
1.
2.
3.
4.
5. IN CONCLUDING THAT THE CANCELLATION OF TCT No. CLOA-03514 DOES NOT BIND FORTUNATA ELBAMBUENA AND
ROSALINDA OLAR BECAUSE THEY WERE NOT MADE PARTY TO
DARAB CASE NO. 6261NNE97.12[12]
interest in and over the subject property to his legal heirs by operation of law. In
the case at bench, to herein respondents-appellees: to Fortunata Elbambuena,
being his surviving wife, and to Rosalinda Olar, his sons surviving spouse, acting
for and in behalf of her children with Nemesio Olar. This is as it should,
considering that rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of death
of the decedent. And since Fortunata Elbambuena and Rosalinda Olars
relationship with Cristobal Olar was in this case never put in issue, their being
legal heirs of the deceased gave them unqualified right to participate in all
proceedings affecting the subject property.
What is more, as shown in the records, the respondent in DARAB Case
No. 6261NN[]97 was the MARO OF TALAVERA, N.E. Private respondentsappellees were not impleaded therein. But as heirs of Cristobal Olar, private
respondents-appellees ought to have been so impleaded. The Rules mandate that
the full names of all the real parties in interest whether natural or juridical persons
or entities authorized by law shall be stated in the caption of the complaint or
petition. Who is a real party in interest? He is that party who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails
of the suit. Tested by this criterion, Fortunata Elbambuenas legitime and
Rosalinda Olar stood to be injured by the glaringly erroneous decision of the
PARAD, Talavera, Nueva Ecija. Hence, that decision must be vacated, it having
transgressed substantive rights protected by law.14[14] (Emphasis and italics in the
original; underscoring supplied)
Although the CLOA was issued to Olar, petitioners contend that their
preferential right over the lot should be recognized, they being the transferees
pursuant to the Waiver of Rights and the actual tillers thereof.
Petitioners concede that although Olars death passed all his rights and interest
over the lot to his legal heirs, his intent of not bequeathing them to his estranged
wife but to a relative, who helped him in tilling the lot and who took care of him,
should be accorded respect over the intent of the law on hereditary succession.
Finally, petitioners claim that respondents are not qualified to become farmerbeneficiaries under the CARP as they did not till or cultivate the property nor help
Olar in his farming activities.
Petitioners argument that [i]t would be absurd for [Olar] to bequeath his
property to his estranged wife not to a relative who had indeed helped him in tilling
the property and [took] good care of his needs,15[15] is a virtual admission that their
15
possession was not in the concept of owners, they having merely helped in tilling
the lot, thereby acknowledging that Olar was the actual possessor and tiller.
Absent evidence to the contrary, the presumption that the public officers who issued
the CLOA to Olar regularly performed their duties, including adhering to the
provisions of Section 22 of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL)
which provides:
x x x x,
thus stands.
Even assuming arguendo that petitioners were indeed the actual tillers of the
lot, their petition for the cancellation of the CLOA issued in favor of Olar would not
bind respondents as they were not impleaded.
Although estranged from Olar, respondent Fortunata remained his wife and
legal heir, mere estrangement not being a legal ground for the disqualification of a
surviving spouse as an heir of the deceased spouse. 16[16] Rosalinda, on the other
hand, is the surviving spouse of Olars son. The two are thus real parties-in-interest
who stand to be injured or benefited by the judgment on the cancellation of the
CLOA issued in Olars name.17[17]
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. Nos. 140371-72
Petitioners Dy Yieng, Barbara and Virginia, all surnamed Seangio, opposed the petition. They
contended that: 1) Dy Yieng is still very healthy and in full command of her faculties; 2) the
deceased Segundo executed a general power of attorney in favor of Virginia giving her the power
to manage and exercise control and supervision over his business in the Philippines; 3) Virginia
is the most competent and qualified to serve as the administrator of the estate of Segundo
because she is a certified public accountant; and, 4) Segundo left a holographic will, dated
September 20, 1995, disinheriting one of the private respondents, Alfredo Seangio, for cause. In
view of the purported holographic will, petitioners averred that in the event the decedent is found
to have left a will, the intestate proceedings are to be automatically suspended and replaced by
the proceedings for the probate of the will.
On April 7, 1999, a petition for the probate of the holographic will of Segundo, docketed as SP.
Proc. No. 9993396, was filed by petitioners before the RTC. They likewise reiterated that the
probate proceedings should take precedence over SP. Proc. No. 9890870 because testate
proceedings take precedence and enjoy priority over intestate proceedings.2
The document that petitioners refer to as Segundos holographic will is quoted, as follows:
Kasulatan sa pag-aalis ng mana
Tantunin ng sinuman
Ako si Segundo Seangio Filipino may asawa naninirahan sa 465-A Flores St., Ermita, Manila at
nagtatalay ng maiwanag na pag-iisip at disposisyon ay tahasan at hayagang inaalisan ko ng lahat
at anumang mana ang paganay kong anak na si Alfredo Seangio dahil siya ay naging lapastangan
sa akin at isan beses siya ng sasalita ng masama harapan ko at mga kapatid niya na si Virginia
Seangio labis kong kinasama ng loob ko at sasabe rin ni Alfredo sa akin na ako nasa ibabaw
gayon gunit daratin ang araw na ako nasa ilalim siya at siya nasa ibabaw.
Labis kong ikinasama ng loob ko ang gamit ni Alfredo ng akin pagalan para makapagutang na
kuarta siya at kanya asawa na si Merna de los Reyes sa China Bangking Corporation na millon
pesos at hindi ng babayad at hindi ng babayad ito ay nagdulot sa aking ng malaking kahihiya sa
mga may-ari at stockholders ng China Banking.
At ikinagalit ko pa rin ang pagkuha ni Alfredo at ng kanyang asawa na mga custome[r] ng Travel
Center of the Philippines na pinagasiwaan ko at ng anak ko si Virginia.
Dito ako nagalit din kaya gayon ayoko na bilanin si Alfredo ng anak ko at hayanan kong
inaalisan ng lahat at anoman mana na si Alfredo at si Alfredo Seangio ay hindi ko siya anak at
hindi siya makoha mana.
On August 10, 1999, the RTC issued its assailed order, dismissing the petition for probate
proceedings:
A perusal of the document termed as "will" by oppositors/petitioners Dy Yieng Seangio, et al.,
clearly shows that there is preterition, as the only heirs mentioned thereat are Alfredo and
Virginia. [T]he other heirs being omitted, Article 854 of the New Civil Code thus applies.
However, insofar as the widow Dy Yieng Seangio is concerned, Article 854 does not apply, she
not being a compulsory heir in the direct line.
As such, this Court is bound to dismiss this petition, for to do otherwise would amount to an
abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court in the case of Acain v. Intermediate Appellate Court [155
SCRA 100 (1987)] has made its position clear: "for respondents to have tolerated the probate
of the will and allowed the case to progress when, on its face, the will appears to be intrinsically
void would have been an exercise in futility. It would have meant a waste of time, effort,
expense, plus added futility. The trial court could have denied its probate outright or could have
passed upon the intrinsic validity of the testamentary provisions before the extrinsic validity of
the will was resolved (underscoring supplied).
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion to Suspend Proceedings is hereby DENIED for
lack of merit. Special Proceedings No. 9993396 is hereby DISMISSED without pronouncement
as to costs.
SO ORDERED.7
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied by the RTC in its order dated October 14,
1999.
Petitioners contend that:
THE RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED IN EXCESS OF HER JURISDICTION OR WITH
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION AND DECIDED A QUESTION OF LAW NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW
AND JURISPRUDENCE IN ISSUING THE QUESTIONED ORDERS, DATED 10 AUGUST
1999 AND 14 OCTOBER 1999 (ATTACHMENTS "A" AND "B" HEREOF) CONSIDERING
THAT:
I
THE RESPONDENT JUDGE, WITHOUT EVEN COMPLYING WITH SECTIONS 3 AND 4
OF RULE 76 OF THE RULES OF COURT ON THE PROPER PROCEDURE FOR SETTING
THE CASE FOR INITIAL HEARING FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE
JURISDICTIONAL FACTS, DISMISSED THE TESTATE CASE ON THE ALLEGED
Fourth, inasmuch as it clearly appears from the face of the holographic will that it is both
intrinsically and extrinsically valid, respondent judge was mandated to proceed with the hearing
of the testate case; and,
Lastly, the continuation of the proceedings in the intestate case will work injustice to petitioners,
and will render nugatory the disinheritance of Alfredo.
The purported holographic will of Segundo that was presented by petitioners was dated, signed
and written by him in his own handwriting. Except on the ground of preterition, private
respondents did not raise any issue as regards the authenticity of the document.
The document, entitled Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana, unmistakably showed Segundos
intention of excluding his eldest son, Alfredo, as an heir to his estate for the reasons that he cited
therein. In effect, Alfredo was disinherited by Segundo.
For disinheritance to be valid, Article 916 of the Civil Code requires that the same must be
effected through a will wherein the legal cause therefor shall be specified. With regard to the
reasons for the disinheritance that were stated by Segundo in his document, the Court believes
that the incidents, taken as a whole, can be considered a form of maltreatment of Segundo by his
son, Alfredo, and that the matter presents a sufficient cause for the disinheritance of a child or
descendant under Article 919 of the Civil Code:
Article 919. The following shall be sufficient causes for the disinheritance of children and
descendants, legitimate as well as illegitimate:
(1) When a child or descendant has been found guilty of an attempt against the life of the
testator, his or her spouse, descendants, or ascendants;
(2) When a child or descendant has accused the testator of a crime for which the law
prescribes imprisonment for six years or more, if the accusation has been found
groundless;
(3) When a child or descendant has been convicted of adultery or concubinage with the
spouse of the testator;
(4) When a child or descendant by fraud, violence, intimidation, or undue influence
causes the testator to make a will or to change one already made;
(5) A refusal without justifiable cause to support the parents or ascendant who disinherit
such child or descendant;
(6) Maltreatment of the testator by word or deed, by the child or descendant;8
Considering that the questioned document is Segundos holographic will, and that the law favors
testacy over intestacy, the probate of the will cannot be dispensed with. Article 838 of the Civil
Code provides that no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and
allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court. Thus, unless the will is probated, the right of a
person to dispose of his property may be rendered nugatory.17
In view of the foregoing, the trial court, therefore, should have allowed the holographic will to be
probated. It is settled that testate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the decedent take
precedence over intestate proceedings for the same purpose.18
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 21, dated August 10, 1999 and October 14, 1999, are set aside. Respondent judge is
directed to reinstate and hear SP Proc. No. 99-93396 for the allowance of the holographic will of
Segundo Seangio. The intestate case or SP. Proc. No. 98-90870 is hereby suspended until the
termination of the aforesaid testate proceedings.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 122880
The core of this petition is a highly defective notarial will, purportedly executed by Eugenia E.
Igsolo (decedent), who died on 16 December 1982 at the age of 80. In refusing to give legal
recognition to the due execution of this document, the Court is provided the opportunity to assert
a few important doctrinal rules in the execution of notarial wills, all self-evident in view of
Articles 805 and 806 of the Civil Code.
A will whose attestation clause does not contain the number of pages on which the will is
written is fatally defective. A will whose attestation clause is not signed by the instrumental
witnesses is fatally defective. And perhaps most importantly, a will which does not contain
an acknowledgment, but a mere jurat, is fatally defective. Any one of these defects is
sufficient to deny probate. A notarial will with all three defects is just aching for judicial
rejection.
There is a distinct and consequential reason the Civil Code provides a comprehensive catalog of
imperatives for the proper execution of a notarial will. Full and faithful compliance with all the
detailed requisites under Article 805 of the Code leave little room for doubt as to the validity in
the due execution of the notarial will. Article 806 likewise imposes another safeguard to the
validity of notarial wills that they be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and
the witnesses. A notarial will executed with indifference to these two codal provisions opens
itself to nagging questions as to its legitimacy.
The case stems from a petition for probate filed on 10 April 1984 with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Manila. The petition filed by petitioner Felix Azuela sought to admit to probate the
notarial will of Eugenia E. Igsolo, which was notarized on 10 June 1981. Petitioner is the son of
the cousin of the decedent.
The will, consisting of two (2) pages and written in the vernacular Pilipino, read in full:
HULING HABILIN NI EUGENIA E. IGSOLO
SA NGALAN NG MAYKAPAL, AMEN:
AKO, si EUGENIA E. IGSOLO, nakatira sa 500 San Diego St., Sampaloc, Manila, pitongput
siyam (79) na gulang, nasa hustong pagi-isip, pag-unawa at memoria ay nag-hahayag na ito na
ang aking huling habilin at testamento, at binabali wala ko lahat ang naunang ginawang habilin o
testamento:
Una-Hinihiling ko na ako ay mailibing sa Sementerio del Norte, La Loma sang-ayong sa
kaugalian at patakaran ng simbahang katoliko at ang taga-pag-ingat (Executor) ng habiling ito ay
magtatayo ng bantayog upang silbing ala-ala sa akin ng aking pamilya at kaibigan;
JUANITO ESTRERA
address: City Court Compound,
City of Manila Res. Cert. No. A574829
Issued at Manila on March 2, 1981.
Nilagdaan ko at ninotario ko ngayong 10 ng Hunyo 10, 1981 dito sa Lungsod ng Maynila.
(Sgd.)
PETRONIO Y. BAUTISTA
Doc. No. 1232 ; NOTARIO PUBLIKO
Page No. 86 ; Until Dec. 31, 1981
Book No. 43 ; PTR-152041-1/2/81-Manila
Series of 1981 TAN # 1437-977-81
The three named witnesses to the will affixed their signatures on the left-hand margin of both
pages of the will, but not at the bottom of the attestation clause.
The probate petition adverted to only two (2) heirs, legatees and devisees of the decedent,
namely: petitioner himself, and one Irene Lynn Igsolo, who was alleged to have resided abroad.
Petitioner prayed that the will be allowed, and that letters testamentary be issued to the
designated executor, Vart Prague.
The petition was opposed by Geralda Aida Castillo (Geralda Castillo), who represented herself as
the attorney-in-fact of "the 12 legitimate heirs" of the decedent.2 Geralda Castillo claimed that
the will is a forgery, and that the true purpose of its emergence was so it could be utilized as a
defense in several court cases filed by oppositor against petitioner, particularly for forcible entry
and usurpation of real property, all centering on petitioners right to occupy the properties of the
decedent.3 It also asserted that contrary to the representations of petitioner, the decedent was
actually survived by 12 legitimate heirs, namely her grandchildren, who were then residing
abroad. Per records, it was subsequently alleged that decedent was the widow of Bonifacio
Igsolo, who died in 1965,4 and the mother of a legitimate child, Asuncion E. Igsolo, who
predeceased her mother by three (3) months.5
Oppositor Geralda Castillo also argued that the will was not executed and attested to in
accordance with law. She pointed out that decedents signature did not appear on the second page
of the will, and the will was not properly acknowledged. These twin arguments are among the
central matters to this petition.
After due trial, the RTC admitted the will to probate, in an Order dated 10 August 1992.6 The
RTC favorably took into account the testimony of the three (3) witnesses to the will, Quirino
Agrava, Lamberto Leano, and Juanito Estrada. The RTC also called to fore "the modern
tendency in respect to the formalities in the execution of a will x x x with the end in view of
giving the testator more freedom in expressing his last wishes;"7 and from this perspective,
rebutted oppositors arguments that the will was not properly executed and attested to in
accordance with law.
After a careful examination of the will and consideration of the testimonies of the subscribing
and attesting witnesses, and having in mind the modern tendency in respect to the formalities in
the execution of a will, i.e., the liberalization of the interpretation of the law on the formal
requirements of a will with the end in view of giving the testator more freedom in expressing his
last wishes, this Court is persuaded to rule that the will in question is authentic and had been
executed by the testatrix in accordance with law.
On the issue of lack of acknowledgement, this Court has noted that at the end of the will after the
signature of the testatrix, the following statement is made under the sub-title, "Patunay Ng Mga
Saksi":
"Ang kasulatang ito, na binubuo ng _____ dahon pati ang huling dahong ito, na ipinahayag sa
amin ni Eugenia N. Igsolo, tagapagmana na siya niyang Huling Habilin, ngayong ika-10 ng
Hunyo 1981, ay nilagdaan ng nasabing tagapagmana sa ilalim ng kasulatang nabanggit at sa
kaliwang panig ng lahat at bawat dahon, sa harap ng lahat at bawat sa amin, at kami namang
mga saksi ay lumagda sa harap ng nasabing tagapagmana at sa harap ng lahat at bawat isa sa
amin, sa ilalim ng nasabing kasulatan at sa kaliwang panig ng lahat at bawat dahon ng kasulatan
ito."
The aforequoted declaration comprises the attestation clause and the acknowledgement and is
considered by this Court as a substantial compliance with the requirements of the law.
On the oppositors contention that the attestation clause was not signed by the subscribing
witnesses at the bottom thereof, this Court is of the view that the signing by the subscribing
witnesses on the left margin of the second page of the will containing the attestation clause and
acknowledgment, instead of at the bottom thereof, substantially satisfies the purpose of
identification and attestation of the will.
With regard to the oppositors argument that the will was not numbered correlatively in letters
placed on upper part of each page and that the attestation did not state the number of pages
thereof, it is worthy to note that the will is composed of only two pages. The first page contains
the entire text of the testamentary dispositions, and the second page contains the last portion of
the attestation clause and acknowledgement. Such being so, the defects are not of a serious
nature as to invalidate the will. For the same reason, the failure of the testatrix to affix her
signature on the left margin of the second page, which contains only the last portion of the
attestation clause and acknowledgment is not a fatal defect.
As regards the oppositors assertion that the signature of the testatrix on the will is a forgery, the
testimonies of the three subscribing witnesses to the will are convincing enough to establish the
genuineness of the signature of the testatrix and the due execution of the will.8
The Order was appealed to the Court of Appeals by Ernesto Castillo, who had substituted his
since deceased mother-in-law, Geralda Castillo. In a Decision dated 17 August 1995, the Court of
Appeals reversed the trial court and ordered the dismissal of the petition for probate.9 The Court
of Appeals noted that the attestation clause failed to state the number of pages used in the will,
thus rendering the will void and undeserving of probate.10
Hence, the present petition.
Petitioner argues that the requirement under Article 805 of the Civil Code that "the number of
pages used in a notarial will be stated in the attestation clause" is merely directory, rather than
mandatory, and thus susceptible to what he termed as "the substantial compliance rule."11
The solution to this case calls for the application of Articles 805 and 806 of the Civil Code,
which we replicate in full.
Art. 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end thereof by the
testator himself or by the testator's name written by some other person in his presence, and by his
express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence
of the testator and of one another.
The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental witnesses of
the will, shall also sign, as aforesaid, each and every page thereof, except the last, on the left
margin, and all the pages shall be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of
each page.
The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon which the will is written, and the fact
that the testator signed the will and every page thereof, or caused some other person to write his
name, under his express direction, in the presence of the instrumental witnesses, and that the
latter witnessed and signed the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of
one another.
If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the witnesses, it shall be interpreted to
them.
Art. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the
witnesses. The notary public shall not be required to retain a copy of the will, or file another with
the office of the Clerk of Court.
The appellate court, in its Decision, considered only one defect, the failure of the attestation
clause to state the number of pages of the will. But an examination of the will itself reveals
several more deficiencies.
As admitted by petitioner himself, the attestation clause fails to state the number of pages of the
will.12 There was an incomplete attempt to comply with this requisite, a space having been
allotted for the insertion of the number of pages in the attestation clause. Yet the blank was never
filled in; hence, the requisite was left uncomplied with.
The Court of Appeals pounced on this defect in reversing the trial court, citing in the process Uy
Coque v. Navas L. Sioca13 and In re: Will of Andrada.14 In Uy Coque, the Court noted that among
the defects of the will in question was the failure of the attestation clause to state the number of
pages contained in the will.15 In ruling that the will could not be admitted to probate, the Court
made the following consideration which remains highly relevant to this day: "The purpose of
requiring the number of sheets to be stated in the attestation clause is obvious; the document
might easily be so prepared that the removal of a sheet would completely change the
testamentary dispositions of the will and in the absence of a statement of the total number
of sheets such removal might be effected by taking out the sheet and changing the numbers
at the top of the following sheets or pages. If, on the other hand, the total number of sheets is
stated in the attestation clause the falsification of the document will involve the inserting of new
pages and the forging of the signatures of the testator and witnesses in the margin, a matter
attended with much greater difficulty."16
The case of In re Will of Andrada concerned a will the attestation clause of which failed to state
the number of sheets or pages used. This consideration alone was sufficient for the Court to
declare "unanim[ity] upon the point that the defect pointed out in the attesting clause is fatal."17 It
was further observed that "it cannot be denied that the x x x requirement affords additional
security against the danger that the will may be tampered with; and as the Legislature has seen fit
to prescribe this requirement, it must be considered material."18
Against these cited cases, petitioner cites Singson v. Florentino19 and Taboada v. Hon. Rosal,20
wherein the Court allowed probate to the wills concerned therein despite the fact that the
attestation clause did not state the number of pages of the will. Yet the appellate court itself
considered the import of these two cases, and made the following distinction which petitioner is
unable to rebut, and which we adopt with approval:
Even a cursory examination of the Will (Exhibit "D"), will readily show that the attestation does
not state the number of pages used upon which the will is written. Hence, the Will is void and
undeserving of probate.
We are not impervious of the Decisions of the Supreme Court in "Manuel Singson versus Emilia
Florentino, et al., 92 Phil. 161 and Apolonio [Taboada] versus Hon. Avelino Rosal, et al., 118
SCRA 195," to the effect that a will may still be valid even if the attestation does not contain the
number of pages used upon which the Will is written. However, the Decisions of the Supreme
Court are not applicable in the aforementioned appeal at bench. This is so because, in the case of
"Manuel Singson versus Emilia Florentino, et al., supra," although the attestation in the subject
Will did not state the number of pages used in the will, however, the same was found in the last
part of the body of the Will:
"x x x
The law referred to is article 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2645,
which requires that the attestation clause shall state the number of pages or sheets upon which
the will is written, which requirement has been held to be mandatory as an effective safeguard
against the possibility of interpolation or omission of some of the pages of the will to the
prejudice of the heirs to whom the property is intended to be bequeathed (In re Will of Andrada,
42 Phil. 180; Uy Coque vs. Navas L. Sioca, 43 Phil., 405; Gumban vs. Gorcho, 50 Phil. 30;
Quinto vs. Morata, 54 Phil. 481; Echevarria vs. Sarmiento, 66 Phil. 611). The ratio decidendi of
these cases seems to be that the attestation clause must contain a statement of the number of
sheets or pages composing the will and that if this is missing or is omitted, it will have the effect
of invalidating the will if the deficiency cannot be supplied, not by evidence aliunde, but by a
consideration or examination of the will itself. But here the situation is different. While the
attestation clause does not state the number of sheets or pages upon which the will is written,
however, the last part of the body of the will contains a statement that it is composed of eight
pages, which circumstance in our opinion takes this case out of the rigid rule of construction and
places it within the realm of similar cases where a broad and more liberal view has been adopted
to prevent the will of the testator from being defeated by purely technical considerations." (page
165-165, supra) (Underscoring supplied)
In "Apolonio Tabaoda versus Hon. Avelino Rosal, et al." supra, the notarial acknowledgement in
the Will states the number of pages used in the:
"x x x
We have examined the will in question and noticed that the attestation clause failed to state the
number of pages used in writing the will. This would have been a fatal defect were it not for the
fact that, in this case, it is discernible from the entire will that it is really and actually composed
of only two pages duly signed by the testatrix and her instrumental witnesses. As earlier stated,
the first page which contains the entirety of the testamentary dispositions is signed by the
testatrix at the end or at the bottom while the instrumental witnesses signed at the left margin.
The other page which is marked as "Pagina dos" comprises the attestation clause and the
acknowledgment. The acknowledgment itself states that "this Last Will and Testament consists of
two pages including this page" (pages 200-201, supra) (Underscoring supplied).
However, in the appeal at bench, the number of pages used in the will is not stated in any part of
the Will. The will does not even contain any notarial acknowledgment wherein the number of
pages of the will should be stated.21
Both Uy Coque and Andrada were decided prior to the enactment of the Civil Code in 1950, at a
time when the statutory provision governing the formal requirement of wills was Section
618 of the Code of Civil Procedure.22 Reliance on these cases remains apropos, considering that
the requirement that the attestation state the number of pages of the will is extant from Section
618.23 However, the enactment of the Civil Code in 1950 did put in force a rule of interpretation
of the requirements of wills, at least insofar as the attestation clause is concerned, that may vary
from the philosophy that governed these two cases. Article 809 of the Civil Code states: "In the
absence of bad faith, forgery, or fraud, or undue and improper pressure and influence, defects and
imperfections in the form of attestation or in the language used therein shall not render the will
invalid if it is proved that the will was in fact executed and attested in substantial compliance
with all the requirements of article 805."
In the same vein, petitioner cites the report of the Civil Code Commission, which stated that "the
underlying and fundamental objective permeating the provisions on the [law] on [wills] in this
project consists in the [liberalization] of the manner of their execution with the end in view of
giving the testator more [freedom] in [expressing] his last wishes. This objective is in accord
with the [modern tendency] in respect to the formalities in the execution of wills."24 However,
petitioner conveniently omits the qualification offered by the Code Commission in the very same
paragraph he cites from their report, that such liberalization be "but with sufficient safeguards
and restrictions to prevent the commission of fraud and the exercise of undue and improper
pressure and influence upon the testator."25
Caneda v. Court of Appeals26 features an extensive discussion made by Justice Regalado,
speaking for the Court on the conflicting views on the manner of interpretation of the legal
formalities required in the execution of the attestation clause in wills.27 Uy Coque and Andrada
are cited therein, along with several other cases, as examples of the application of the rule of
strict construction.28 However, the Code Commission opted to recommend a more liberal
construction through the "substantial compliance rule" under Article 809. A cautionary note was
struck though by Justice J.B.L. Reyes as to how Article 809 should be applied:
x x x The rule must be limited to disregarding those defects that can be supplied by an
examination of the will itself: whether all the pages are consecutively numbered; whether the
signatures appear in each and every page; whether the subscribing witnesses are three or the will
was notarized. All these are facts that the will itself can reveal, and defects or even omissions
concerning them in the attestation clause can be safely disregarded. But the total number of
pages, and whether all persons required to sign did so in the presence of each other must
substantially appear in the attestation clause, being the only check against perjury in the
probate proceedings.29 (Emphasis supplied.)
The Court of Appeals did cite these comments by Justice J.B.L. Reyes in its assailed decision,
considering that the failure to state the number of pages of the will in the attestation clause is one
of the defects which cannot be simply disregarded. In Caneda itself, the Court refused to allow
the probate of a will whose attestation clause failed to state that the witnesses subscribed their
respective signatures to the will in the presence of the testator and of each other,30 the other
omission cited by Justice J.B.L. Reyes which to his estimation cannot be lightly disregarded.
Caneda suggested: "[I]t may thus be stated that the rule, as it now stands, is that omission which
can be supplied by an examination of the will itself, without the need of resorting to extrinsic
evidence, will not be fatal and, correspondingly, would not obstruct the allowance to probate of
the will being assailed. However, those omissions which cannot be supplied except by evidence
aliunde would result in the invalidation of the attestation clause and ultimately, of the will
itself."31 Thus, a failure by the attestation clause to state that the testator signed every page can be
liberally construed, since that fact can be checked by a visual examination; while a failure by the
attestation clause to state that the witnesses signed in one anothers presence should be
considered a fatal flaw since the attestation is the only textual guarantee of compliance.32
The failure of the attestation clause to state the number of pages on which the will was written
remains a fatal flaw, despite Article 809. The purpose of the law in requiring the clause to state
the number of pages on which the will is written is to safeguard against possible interpolation or
omission of one or some of its pages and to prevent any increase or decrease in the pages.33 The
failure to state the number of pages equates with the absence of an averment on the part of the
instrumental witnesses as to how many pages consisted the will, the execution of which they had
ostensibly just witnessed and subscribed to. Following Caneda, there is substantial compliance
with this requirement if the will states elsewhere in it how many pages it is comprised of, as was
the situation in Singson and Taboada. However, in this case, there could have been no substantial
compliance with the requirements under Article 805 since there is no statement in the attestation
clause or anywhere in the will itself as to the number of pages which comprise the will.
At the same time, Article 809 should not deviate from the need to comply with the formal
requirements as enumerated under Article 805. Whatever the inclinations of the members of the
Code Commission in incorporating Article 805, the fact remains that they saw fit to prescribe
substantially the same formal requisites as enumerated in Section 618 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, convinced that these remained effective safeguards against the forgery or
intercalation of notarial wills.34 Compliance with these requirements, however picayune in
impression, affords the public a high degree of comfort that the testator himself or herself had
decided to convey property post mortem in the manner established in the will.35 The
transcendent legislative intent, even as expressed in the cited comments of the Code
Commission, is for the fruition of the testators incontestable desires, and not for the
indulgent admission of wills to probate.
The Court could thus end here and affirm the Court of Appeals. However, an examination of the
will itself reveals a couple of even more critical defects that should necessarily lead to its
rejection.
For one, the attestation clause was not signed by the instrumental witnesses. While the
signatures of the instrumental witnesses appear on the left-hand margin of the will, they do not
appear at the bottom of the attestation clause which after all consists of their averments before
the notary public.
Cagro v. Cagro36 is material on this point. As in this case, "the signatures of the three witnesses
to the will do not appear at the bottom of the attestation clause, although the page containing the
same is signed by the witnesses on the left-hand margin."37 While three (3) Justices38 considered
the signature requirement had been substantially complied with, a majority of six (6), speaking
through Chief Justice Paras, ruled that the attestation clause had not been duly signed, rendering
the will fatally defective.
There is no question that the signatures of the three witnesses to the will do not appear at the
bottom of the attestation clause, although the page containing the same is signed by the witnesses
on the left-hand margin.
We are of the opinion that the position taken by the appellant is correct. The attestation clause is
"a memorandum of the facts attending the execution of the will" required by law to be made by
the attesting witnesses, and it must necessarily bear their signatures. An unsigned attestation
clause cannot be considered as an act of the witnesses, since the omission of their signatures at
the bottom thereof negatives their participation.
The petitioner and appellee contends that signatures of the three witnesses on the left-hand
margin conform substantially to the law and may be deemed as their signatures to the attestation
clause. This is untenable, because said signatures are in compliance with the legal mandate that
the will be signed on the left-hand margin of all its pages. If an attestation clause not signed by
the three witnesses at the bottom thereof, be admitted as sufficient, it would be easy to add such
clause to a will on a subsequent occasion and in the absence of the testator and any or all of the
witnesses.39
The Court today reiterates the continued efficacy of Cagro. Article 805 particularly segregates
the requirement that the instrumental witnesses sign each page of the will, from the requisite that
the will be "attested and subscribed by [the instrumental witnesses]." The respective intents
behind these two classes of signature are distinct from each other. The signatures on the left-hand
corner of every page signify, among others, that the witnesses are aware that the page they are
signing forms part of the will. On the other hand, the signatures to the attestation clause establish
that the witnesses are referring to the statements contained in the attestation clause itself. Indeed,
the attestation clause is separate and apart from the disposition of the will. An unsigned
attestation clause results in an unattested will. Even if the instrumental witnesses signed the lefthand margin of the page containing the unsigned attestation clause, such signatures cannot
demonstrate these witnesses undertakings in the clause, since the signatures that do appear on
the page were directed towards a wholly different avowal.
The Court may be more charitably disposed had the witnesses in this case signed the attestation
clause itself, but not the left-hand margin of the page containing such clause. Without
diminishing the value of the instrumental witnesses signatures on each and every page, the fact
must be noted that it is the attestation clause which contains the utterances reduced into writing
of the testamentary witnesses themselves. It is the witnesses, and not the testator, who are
required under Article 805 to state the number of pages used upon which the will is written; the
fact that the testator had signed the will and every page thereof; and that they witnessed and
signed the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another. The
only proof in the will that the witnesses have stated these elemental facts would be their
signatures on the attestation clause.
Thus, the subject will cannot be considered to have been validly attested to by the instrumental
witnesses, as they failed to sign the attestation clause.
Yet, there is another fatal defect to the will on which the denial of this petition should also hinge.
The requirement under Article 806 that "every will must be acknowledged before a notary public
by the testator and the witnesses" has also not been complied with. The importance of this
requirement is highlighted by the fact that it had been segregated from the other requirements
under Article 805 and entrusted into a separate provision, Article 806. The non-observance of
Article 806 in this case is equally as critical as the other cited flaws in compliance with Article
805, and should be treated as of equivalent import.
In lieu of an acknowledgment, the notary public, Petronio Y. Bautista, wrote "Nilagdaan ko at
ninotario ko ngayong 10 ng Hunyo 10 (sic), 1981 dito sa Lungsod ng Maynila."40 By no manner
of contemplation can those words be construed as an acknowledgment. An acknowledgment is
the act of one who has executed a deed in going before some competent officer or court and
declaring it to be his act or deed.41 It involves an extra step undertaken whereby the signor
actually declares to the notary that the executor of a document has attested to the notary that the
same is his/her own free act and deed.
It might be possible to construe the averment as a jurat, even though it does not hew to the usual
language thereof. A jurat is that part of an affidavit where the notary certifies that before him/her,
the document was subscribed and sworn to by the executor.42 Ordinarily, the language of the
jurat should avow that the document was subscribed and sworn before the notary public, while in
this case, the notary public averred that he himself "signed and notarized" the document.
Possibly though, the word "ninotario" or "notarized" encompasses the signing of and swearing in
of the executors of the document, which in this case would involve the decedent and the
instrumental witnesses.
Yet even if we consider what was affixed by the notary public as a jurat, the will would
nonetheless remain invalid, as the express requirement of Article 806 is that the will be
"acknowledged", and not merely subscribed and sworn to. The will does not present any textual
proof, much less one under oath, that the decedent and the instrumental witnesses executed or
signed the will as their own free act or deed. The acknowledgment made in a will provides for
another all-important legal safeguard against spurious wills or those made beyond the free
consent of the testator. An acknowledgement is not an empty meaningless act.43 The
acknowledgment coerces the testator and the instrumental witnesses to declare before an officer
of the law that they had executed and subscribed to the will as their own free act or deed. Such
declaration is under oath and under pain of perjury, thus allowing for the criminal prosecution of
persons who participate in the execution of spurious wills, or those executed without the free
consent of the testator. It also provides a further degree of assurance that the testator is of certain
mindset in making the testamentary dispositions to those persons he/she had designated in the
will.
It may not have been said before, but we can assert the rule, self-evident as it is under Article
806. A notarial will that is not acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the
witnesses is fatally defective, even if it is subscribed and sworn to before a notary public.
There are two other requirements under Article 805 which were not fully satisfied by the will in
question. We need not discuss them at length, as they are no longer material to the
disposition of this case. The provision requires that the testator and the instrumental witnesses
sign each and every page of the will on the left margin, except the last; and that all the pages
shall be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each page. In this case, the
decedent, unlike the witnesses, failed to sign both pages of the will on the left margin, her only
signature appearing at the so-called "logical end"44 of the will on its first page. Also, the will
itself is not numbered correlatively in letters on each page, but instead numbered with Arabic
numerals. There is a line of thought that has disabused the notion that these two requirements be
construed as mandatory.45 Taken in isolation, these omissions, by themselves, may not be
sufficient to deny probate to a will. Yet even as these omissions are not decisive to the
adjudication of this case, they need not be dwelt on, though indicative as they may be of a
general lack of due regard for the requirements under Article 805 by whoever executed the will.
All told, the string of mortal defects which the will in question suffers from makes the probate
denial inexorable.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
FIRST DIVISION
x
x
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Court
of
Appeals
which
denied
petitioners
motion
for
reconsideration.
The instant ejectment suit stemmed from the parties dispute over
Lot 7226 and the house built thereon, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 8842,[5] registered in the name of the late
Dominador Adlawan and located at Barrio Lipata, Municipality of
Minglanilla, Cebu. In his complaint, petitioner claimed that he is
an acknowledged illegitimate child[6] of Dominador who died on
May 28, 1987 without any other issue. Claiming to be the sole heir
of Dominador, he executed an affidavit adjudicating to himself Lot
7226 and the house built thereon.[7] Out of respect and
generosity to respondents who are the siblings of his father, he
granted their plea to occupy the subject property provided they
would vacate the same should his need for the property arise.
Sometime in January 1999, he verbally requested respondents to
vacate the house and lot, but they refused and filed instead an
action for quieting of title[8] with the RTC. Finally, upon
respondents refusal to heed the last demand letter to vacate
dated August 2, 2000, petitioner filed the instant case on August
9, 2000.[9]
the property until they died on May 28, 1987 and May 6, 1997,
respectively.
SO ORDERED.[17]
So ordered.[18]
SO ORDERED.[23]
Petitioner contends that even granting that he has coowners over Lot 7226, he can on his own file the instant case
pursuant to Article 487 of the Civil Code which provides:
The
explained
renowned
civilist,
Professor
Arturo
M.
Tolentino,
of the lot and benefit from the proceeds of the award of damages
to the exclusion of the heirs of Graciana. Hence, petitioner cannot
successfully capitalize on the alleged benefit to his co-owners.
Incidentally, it should be pointed out that in default of the said
heirs of Graciana, whom petitioner labeled as fictitious heirs, the
State will inherit her share[31] and will thus be petitioners coowner entitled to possession and enjoyment of the property.
Similarly
in
Vencilao
v.
Camarenta,[36]
the
3. The plaintiff was the only son (illegitimate) and sole heir of
the late DOMINADOR ADLAWAN who died intestate on 28 May 1987
without any other descendant nor ascendant x x x.
xxxx
of
co-ownership
and
not
in
representation
or
SO ORDERED.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
Today is Tuesday, October 25, 2016
Susim).
Private respondents alleged that they are the duly acknowledged illegitimate children of Sima Wei, who died intestate in
Makati City on October 29, 1992, leaving an estate valued at P10,000,000.00 consisting of real and personal properties. His
known heirs are his surviving spouse Shirley Guy and children, Emy, Jeanne, Cristina, George and Michael, all surnamed
Guy. Private respondents prayed for the appointment of a regular administrator for the orderly settlement of Sima Wei's
estate. They likewise prayed that, in the meantime, petitioner Michael C. Guy, son of the decedent, be appointed as Special
Administrator of the estate. Attached to private respondents' petition was a Certification Against Forum Shopping6 signed by
their counsel, Atty. Sedfrey A. Ordoez.
In his Comment/Opposition,7 petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the petition. He asserted that his deceased father left no
debts and that his estate can be settled without securing letters of administration pursuant to Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules
of Court. He further argued that private respondents should have established their status as illegitimate children during the
lifetime of Sima Wei pursuant to Article 175 of the Family Code.
The other heirs of Sima Wei filed a Joint Motion to Dismiss8 on the ground that the certification against forum shopping
should have been signed by private respondents and not their counsel. They contended that Remedios should have executed
the certification on behalf of her minor daughters as mandated by Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court.
In a Manifestation/Motion as Supplement to the Joint Motion to Dismiss,9 petitioner and his co-heirs alleged that private
respondents' claim had been paid, waived, abandoned or otherwise extinguished by reason of Remedios' June 7, 1993
Release and Waiver of Claim stating that in exchange for the financial and educational assistance received from petitioner,
Remedios and her minor children discharge the estate of Sima Wei from any and all liabilities.
The Regional Trial Court denied the Joint Motion to Dismiss as well as the Supplemental Motion to Dismiss. It ruled that
while the Release and Waiver of Claim was signed by Remedios, it had not been established that she was the duly
constituted guardian of her minor daughters. Thus, no renunciation of right occurred. Applying a liberal application of the
rules, the trial court also rejected petitioner's objections on the certification against forum shopping.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but was denied. He filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals which
affirmed the orders of the Regional Trial Court in its assailed Decision dated January 22, 2004, the dispositive portion of
which states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present petition is hereby DENIED DUE COURSE and accordingly
DISMISSED, for lack of merit. Consequently, the assailed Orders dated July 21, 2000 and July 17, 2003 are
hereby both AFFIRMED. Respondent Judge is hereby DIRECTED to resolve the controversy over the
illegitimate filiation of the private respondents (sic) minors [-] Karen Oanes Wei and Kamille Oanes Wei who
are claiming successional rights in the intestate estate of the deceased Sima Wei, a.k.a. Rufino Guy Susim.
SO ORDERED.10
The Court of Appeals denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration, hence, this petition.
Petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals disregarded existing rules on certification against forum shopping; that the
Release and Waiver of Claim executed by Remedios released and discharged the Guy family and the estate of Sima Wei
from any claims or liabilities; and that private respondents do not have the legal personality to institute the petition for letters
of administration as they failed to prove their filiation during the lifetime of Sima Wei in accordance with Article 175 of the
Family Code.
Private respondents contend that their counsel's certification can be considered substantial compliance with the rules on
certification of non-forum shopping, and that the petition raises no new issues to warrant the reversal of the decisions of the
Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals.
The issues for resolution are: 1) whether private respondents' petition should be dismissed for failure to comply with the
rules on certification of non-forum shopping; 2) whether the Release and Waiver of Claim precludes private respondents
from claiming their successional rights; and 3) whether private respondents are barred by prescription from proving their
filiation.
The petition lacks merit.
Rule 7, Section 5 of the Rules of Court provides that the certification of non-forum shopping should be executed by the
plaintiff or the principal party. Failure to comply with the requirement shall be cause for dismissal of the case. However, a
liberal application of the rules is proper where the higher interest of justice would be served. In Sy Chin v. Court of
Appeals,11 we ruled that while a petition may have been flawed where the certificate of non-forum shopping was signed only
by counsel and not by the party, this procedural lapse may be overlooked in the interest of substantial justice.12 So it is in the
present controversy where the merits13 of the case and the absence of an intention to violate the rules with impunity should
repudiation amounts to an alienation of property16 which must pass the court's scrutiny in order to protect the interest of the
ward. Not having been judicially authorized, the Release and Waiver of Claim in the instant case is void and will not bar
private respondents from asserting their rights as heirs of the deceased.
Furthermore, it must be emphasized that waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right. Where one lacks
knowledge of a right, there is no basis upon which waiver of it can rest. Ignorance of a material fact negates waiver, and
waiver cannot be established by a consent given under a mistake or misapprehension of fact.17
In the present case, private respondents could not have possibly waived their successional rights because they are yet to
prove their status as acknowledged illegitimate children of the deceased. Petitioner himself has consistently denied that
private respondents are his co-heirs. It would thus be inconsistent to rule that they waived their hereditary rights when
petitioner claims that they do not have such right. Hence, petitioner's invocation of waiver on the part of private respondents
must fail.
Anent the issue on private respondents' filiation, we agree with the Court of Appeals that a ruling on the same would be
premature considering that private respondents have yet to present evidence. Before the Family Code took effect, the
governing law on actions for recognition of illegitimate children was Article 285 of the Civil Code, to wit:
ART. 285. The action for the recognition of natural children may be brought only during the lifetime of the
supplied)
We ruled in Bernabe v. Alejo18 that illegitimate children who were still minors at the time the Family Code took effect and
whose putative parent died during their minority are given the right to seek recognition for a period of up to four years from
attaining majority age. This vested right was not impaired or taken away by the passage of the Family Code.19
On the other hand, Articles 172, 173 and 175 of the Family Code, which superseded Article 285 of the Civil Code, provide:
ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed
by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
ART. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or her lifetime and shall be
transmitted to the heirs should the child die during minority or in a state of insanity. In these cases, the heirs
shall have a period of five years within which to institute the action.
The action already commenced by the child shall survive notwithstanding the death of either or both of the
parties.
ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same,
action is based upon open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child, or any other means allowed by the
rules or special laws, it may only be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.
It is clear therefore that the resolution of the issue of prescription depends on the type of evidence to be adduced by private
respondents in proving their filiation. However, it would be impossible to determine the same in this case as there has been
no reception of evidence yet. This Court is not a trier of facts. Such matters may be resolved only by the Regional Trial
Court after a full-blown trial.
While the original action filed by private respondents was a petition for letters of administration, the trial court is not
precluded from receiving evidence on private respondents' filiation. Its jurisdiction extends to matters incidental and
collateral to the exercise of its recognized powers in handling the settlement of the estate, including the determination of the
status of each heir.20 That the two causes of action, one to compel recognition and the other to claim inheritance, may be
joined in one complaint is not new in our jurisprudence.21 As held in Briz v. Briz:22
The question whether a person in the position of the present plaintiff can in any event maintain a complex
action to compel recognition as a natural child and at the same time to obtain ulterior relief in the character of
heir, is one which in the opinion of this court must be answered in the affirmative, provided always that the
conditions justifying the joinder of the two distinct causes of action are present in the particular case. In other
words, there is no absolute necessity requiring that the action to compel acknowledgment should have been
instituted and prosecuted to a successful conclusion prior to the action in which that same plaintiff seeks
additional relief in the character of heir. Certainly, there is nothing so peculiar to the action to compel
acknowledgment as to require that a rule should be here applied different from that generally applicable in
other cases. x x x
The conclusion above stated, though not heretofore explicitly formulated by this court, is undoubtedly to
some extent supported by our prior decisions. Thus, we have held in numerous cases, and the doctrine must
be considered well settled, that a natural child having a right to compel acknowledgment, but who has not
been in fact acknowledged, may maintain partition proceedings for the division of the inheritance against his
coheirs (Siguiong vs. Siguiong, 8 Phil., 5; Tiamson vs. Tiamson, 32 Phil., 62); and the same person may
intervene in proceedings for the distribution of the estate of his deceased natural father, or mother (Capistrano
vs. Fabella, 8 Phil., 135; Conde vs. Abaya, 13 Phil., 249; Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42 Phil., 855). In neither of these
situations has it been thought necessary for the plaintiff to show a prior decree compelling acknowledgment.
The obvious reason is that in partition suits and distribution proceedings the other persons who might take by
inheritance are before the court; and the declaration of heirship is appropriate to such proceedings.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision dated January 22, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 79742 affirming the denial of petitioner's motion to dismiss; and its Resolution dated May 25, 2004 denying
petitioner's motion for reconsideration, are AFFIRMED. Let the records be REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City, Branch 138 for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, C.J., Chairperson, Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., Chico-Nazario, J.J., concur.
Footnotes
1
Rollo, pp. 19-26. Penned by Associate Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr. and concurred in by Associate
Justices Mario L. Guaria III and Jose C. Reyes, Jr.
2
Id. at 53.
Id. at 28.
Id. at 29-31.
Id. at 31.
Id. at 35-36.
Id. at 37-41.
Id. at 42-44.
10
Id. at 25.
11
12
Id. at 454.
13
Twin Towers Condominium Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123552, February 27, 2003, 398
15
Rollo, p. 44.
16
17
D.M. Consunji, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 137873, April 20, 2001, 357 SCRA 249, 266.
18
19
Id. at 944.
20
Borromeo-Herrera v. Borromeo, G.R. Nos. L-41171, L-55000, L-62895, L-63818 and L-65995, July 23,
1987, 152 SCRA 171, 182-183.
21
Tayag v.Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 95229, June 9, 1992, 209 SCRA 665, 672.
22
FIRST DIVISION
REYNALDO RODRIGUEZ
Petitioners,
Present:
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR., and
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
Promulgated:
Respondents.
November 30, 2006
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
18[1] Penned by Associate Justice Emeterio C. Cui (retired), with Associate Justices
Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez (now a member of this Court) and Conrado M. Vasquez,
Jr., concurring, rollo, pp. 32-44.
dated
October
5,
1998
denying
petitioners
motion
for
reconsideration.
Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr. filed with the court a quo a complaint
for cancellation of certificate of title and injunction against the
spouses Rodriguez. In his complaint, Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr. alleged
that his mother, Dominga Goyma,19[2] was the owner of two
parcels of land (subject lots). The first parcel, 20[3] containing an
area of 28,051 square meters, more or less, is situated in the Sitio
of Tulay-Buhangin, Barrio Ilayang Palo, Municipality of Pagbilao,
Province of Quezon. The second parcel,21[4] containing an area of
260,590 sq m, more or less, is situated in the Sitio of Tulay19[2] Also spelled as Dominga Go Ymco Ima or Go Imco Ima.
20[3] It is more particularly described as follows:A parcel of land (Parcel 1, Lot No. 3,
Plan II-5626-C) with improvements thereon, situated in the Sitio of Tulay-Buhangin,
Barrio Ilayang Palo, Municipality of Pagbilao. Bounded on the N., by property of
Fermin Macariola; on the NE., by properties of Fermin Macariola and Zoilo Porio and
the China Sea; on the SE., by property of Evaristo Zoleta; on the SW., by properties of
Ciriaco Aguja and Demetrio Orjalisa; on the NW., by property of Demetrio Orjalisa. x x
x Containing an area of TWENTY-EIGHT THOUSAND AND FIFTY-ONE SQUARE
METERS (28,051), more or less.
Dominga Goyma died on July 19, 1971 and was survived by her
only son, Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr., a spurious son acknowledged and
recognized by her.
subject lots were the conjugal property of Frisco Gudani and his
wife Dominga Goyma. When the latter died, Frisco Gudani was her
sole surviving heir.
of
the
subject
lots
by
themselves
and
their
predecessors-in-interest.
1. that plaintiff Pablo Goyma [Lim], Jr., the plaintiff in this case, is the same person mentioned in
the birth certificate as Pablo Go Yma, xerox copy of which was submitted during the previous
preliminary hearing, marked as Exhibit A;
2. that Pablito Goyma Lim mentioned in the Individual Income Tax Returns of the deceased
Dominga Goyma, xerox copies of which were submitted during the previous preliminary hearing
and marked as Exhibits B, C and D and in the Statement of Assets and Liabilities of the deceased
Dominga Goyma marked as Exhibit E, refers to the plaintiff Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr.;
3. that according to plaintiff Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr., he is an illegitimate child other than natural
of the deceased Dominga Goyma;
4. that the deceased Dominga Goyma died on July 19, 1971 and that at the time of her death, she
was then the registered owner of the two parcels of land mentioned in paragraph 2 of the
complaint covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-2857; that under the aforesaid Transfer
Certificate of Title, said lands are registered in the name of Dominga Goyma, wife of Frisco
Gudani;
5. that at the time of the death of Dominga Goyma, plaintiff Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr., was then
more than thirty-five (35) years of age;
6. that previous to the instant case, there has been no judicial inquiry as to the maternity or
filiation of plaintiff Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr.
x x x x23[6]
23[6] RTC Decision, dated May 17, 1990, pp. 7-8; rollo, pp. 67-68.
son Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr.; and Real Property Tax Receipts from
1955, 1957 up to 1975 (Exhibits H, H-1 up to H-22) covering the
subject property paid by Pablito Goyma Lim, Jr.
x x x From the deposition, it appears that Prisco M. Gudani, a 77 yearold laborer resident of Barrio Binahaan, Pagbilao, Quezon, was married
to Dominga Goyma on March 22, 1922. They lived together for eleven
(11) months and they were separated when Prisco Gudani left the
conjugal dwelling one night without the knowledge of Dominga Goyma,
never returning to the conjugal dwelling since then. He knows that
Dominga Goyma is now dead. He knows too that Pablo Goyma Lim is
the son of the late Dominga Goyma. His statement in his Affidavit,
dated June 25, 1976 (Exhibit C-Deposition) that Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr. is
not the son of Dominga Goyma is not correct. He said that it was Atty.
Alejandro B. Aguilan who prepared said affidavit and told him to sign it
otherwise what property he will receive will be forfeited in favor of the
government. He does not know anything about the two parcels of land
subject of this case. On the affidavit, dated March 15, 1973 (Exhibit DDeposition) adjudicating unto himself the property stated therein,
including the two parcels of land subject of this case, he explained that
said affidavit was prepared by Atty. Alejandro B. Aguilan, who must
have known about the properties left by Dominga Goyma and made
him understand that he is inheriting the three (3) parcels of land left by
Dominga Goyma, the truth being that he had never set foot on these
properties and he does not know anything about these properties.
When he arrived, the prepared affidavit was read to him and he was
told to sign. Atty. Aguilan explained to him that if he will not sign the
document, the properties will go to the government and, because he
did not want these properties to go to the government, he signed the
affidavit in order to get the properties. Had it been explained to him
that these properties will not be forfeited in favor of the government,
he will not sign the affidavit. The first time Atty. Aguilan told him about
the properties of Dominga Goyma was about two years after her death.
Atty. Aguilan went to him in his residence in Pagbilao, Quezon and told
him that if he will not agree to get the property of Dominga Goyma,
those properties will go to the government. Atty. Aguilan told him that
because he had not contributed anything in the acquisition of said
properties, his share is one-fourth. On March 15, 1973, Atty. Aguilan
made him sign a prepared petition for the issuance of a second owners
duplicate copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-2857 (Exhibit EDeposition). On the same date, he was also made to sign an Affidavit
of Loss prepared by Atty. Aguilan (Exhibit E-1, Deposition). He had not
at any time been in possession of the owners copy of Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-2857. He signed both the foregoing documents
on the explanation of Atty. Aguilan that he will use them in order to
look for the title. He does not know Eduardo Victa and had never met
him personally. When shown the DEED OF CONDITIONAL SALE OF REAL
PROPERTY, dated September 10, 1974 (Exhibit F-Deposition), he
admitted he sold the property. Said document was prepared by Atty.
Aguilan who told him that the P20,000.00 constitute his one-fourth
share of the properties of Dominga Goyma, but Atty. Aguilan told him
to receive only P10,000.00 because the P10,000.00 will be used to
cover the expenses of litigation. Of the P10,000.00 left, P5,000.00 was
given to him and the other P5,000.00 was taken by Atty. Aguilan, as
they are share and share alike in the P10,000.00. He explained that
when he signed the deed of sale, he was made to understand that he
was selling only the one-fourth share of the property that he owns and
the price for the one-fourth share is P20,000.00. On the document
entitled DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE OF REAL PROPERTY, dated January
17, 1975 (Exhibit G-Deposition) he claims not to have received the
P60,000.00. Atty. Aguilan, who prepared the document, told him to sign
it and he (Atty. Aguilan) will deliver the money later. Atty. Aguilan did
not mention the P60,000.00, but only P20,000.00. It was only Atty.
Aguilan who was present when he signed the document. He met
defendant Reynaldo Rodriguez once when he went to the office of Atty.
Magadia and Atty. Uy at the Baas Building, Rizal Avenue, Manila, in the
company of Atty. Aguilan. He was invited to a restaurant and told by
Reynaldo Rodriguez that he purchased the properties for a very low
price and he would give Gudani an additional amount of P1,500.00
upon the termination of the case that may be filed by Pablo Goyma
Lim, that is why he was holding the P10,000.00 to be spent for the
expected litigation. After eating, Reynaldo Rodriguez gave him P50.00
for him to buy betel leaves. He said that Atty. Alejandro B. Aguilan is a
lawyer in Pagbilao, Quezon, who persuaded him to agree to recover his
share from the properties of Domingo Goyma. x x x24[7]
MARITAL CONSENT
Under this state of life that we have, living separately, and upon
request that I grant her a marital consent, by these presents I do
hereby give and grant unto my wife, Dominga Go Imco Ima, full power
and authority and consent to do and perform any and every act and
thing whatsoever requisite, necessary or proper to be done in
whatever she may undertake to do in which under the law in force and
in these Island my presence and personal intervention is necessary, as
fully to all intents and purposes as I might or could do if present and
intervening in person, and specially the following acts:
To prosecute and defend any and all suits, actions and other
proceedings in the courts, tribunals, departments and offices of the
Government of the Philippine Islands, and to terminate compromise,
settle and adjust the same.
(SGD) Illegible
Municipality of Pagbilao)
Province of Tayabas ) S.S.
Doc. No. 15
Book No. 11
Page No. 5
Series of 1932.
and
after
they
had
executed
the
instrument
to
himself
the
properties
mentioned
therein,
including the subject lots; (b) a Petition dated March 15, 1973
filed with the Court of First Instance of Quezon for the issuance of
a second owners duplicate copy of TCT No. T-2857; (c) an Affidavit
of Loss dated March 15, 1973 for the loss of the owners duplicate
copy of TCT No. T-2857; and (d) an Affidavit dated June 27, 1976
stating that Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr. was not the son of Dominga
Goyma.
The
notary
public
before
whom
they
supposedly
For
the
said
purported
sale,
Frisco
Gudani
received
Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr. over the subject lots and even anticipated
his filing of the case against them.
28[11] The provision reads:ART. 998. If a widow or widower survives with illegitimate
children, such widow or widower shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance, and the
illegitimate children or their descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate, to the other
half.
the said proceeding or prior thereto, Frisco Gudani could not lay
valid claim, if he had any, over the subject lots as sole heir and he
could not have been the owner thereof who could legally transfer
ownership by means of sale.
a)
b)
c)
d)
e)
SO ORDERED.29[12]
30[13] The provision reads:ART. 777. The rights to the succession are transmitted from
the moment of the death of the decedent.
the
decision
appealed
from is hereby
SO ORDERED.31[14]
II
III
IV
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING
THAT THE VENDEES OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES, PRISCO GUDANI
AND EDUARDO VICTA, NOT BEING INDISPENSABLE PARTIES, THEY
WERE PROPERLY NOT IMPLEADED AS DEFENDANTS IN THE
COMPLAINT.32[15]
Petitioners assail the filiation of Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr. stating that he was not
duly acknowledged or recognized by either of his parents. This contention is
erroneous. It is axiomatic that factual findings of the trial court, especially when
affirmed by the appellate court, are conclusive and binding on the Court. 33[16] In
this case, the court a quo and the appellate court are in agreement that, based on
the evidence presented, Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr. was the illegitimate and
acknowledged son of Dominga Goyma.
The Court has laid down the manner of establishing the filiation of children,
whether legitimate or illegitimate, as follows:
Various documentary evidence were proffered by Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr. to prove that
he was the illegitimate and acknowledged son of Dominga Goyma. Among them
were his certificate of birth (Exhibit B) indicating that his mother was Dominga
Goyma; statement of assets, income and liabilities for 1958 (Exhibit C) of Dominga
Goyma indicating him as her son and; income tax returns for calendar years 1953
33[16] Santos v. Alana, G.R. No. 154942, August 16, 2005, 467 SCRA 176, 181.
34[17] Eceta v. Eceta, G.R. No. 157037, May 20, 2004, 428 SCRA 782, 785-786.
The court a quo, as affirmed by the appellate court, likewise correctly nullified
TCT No. T-128607 in the name of petitioners. In fact, all the transactions relative
to TCT No. T-2857, i.e., affidavit of Frisco Gudani adjudicating to himself the
subject lots and their purported sale by him to Eduardo Victa and by the latter to
petitioners, were declared null and void by the court a quo on the ground that,
as established by evidence, these were all made through the fraudulent
machinations of Atty. Aguilan.
It should be recalled that Atty. Aguilan made Frisco Gudani affix his signature on,
among other documents, a Petition dated March 15, 1973 filed with the Court of
First Instance of the Province of Quezon for the issuance of a second owners
duplicate copy of TCT No. T-2857 and an Affidavit of Loss dated March 15, 1973
for the loss of the owners duplicate copy of TCT No. T-2857. Obviously, these
documents contained falsehoods because TCT No. T-2857 was never lost and, in
fact, had been in the possession of Dominga Goyma during her lifetime and,
when she passed away on July 19, 1971, in the possession of Pablo Goyma Lim,
Jr.
It has been consistently ruled that when the owners duplicate certificate of title
has not been lost, but is in fact in the possession of another person, then the
reconstituted certificate is void, because the court that rendered the decision
had no jurisdiction. Reconstitution can validly be made only in case of loss of the
original certificate.35[18] In such a case, the decision authorizing the issuance of
a new owners duplicate certificate of title may be attacked any time. 36[19]
Applying this rule, it is apparent that the second owners duplicate copy of TCT
No. T-2857 issued upon the petition of Frisco Gudani was void. Further, the
certificates of title (TCT No. T-128605 in the name of Frisco Gudani, TCT No. T35[18] Eastworld Motor Industries Corp. v. Skunac Corporation, G.R. No. 163994,
December 16, 2005, 478 SCRA 420, 426-427.
36[19] New Durawood Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 324 Phil. 109 (1996), citing
Serra Serra v. Court of Appeals, 195 SCRA 482 (1991).
128606 in the name of Eduardo Victa and TCT No. T-128607 in the names of
petitioners) that were subsequently issued covering the subject lots may be
nullified because they all emanated from a void document, i.e., the second
owners duplicate copy of TCT No. T-2857 that was procured by Frisco Gudani, or
more particularly by Atty. Aguilan, in behalf of Frisco Gudani, through fraud.
Transfer certificates of title may be annulled if issued based on void
documents.37[20]
To recall, TCT No. T-2857 was cancelled and, in lieu thereof, TCT No. T-128605
was issued in the name of Frisco Gudani, on February 10, 1975. The latter was
thereafter cancelled by TCT No. T-128606 issued in the name of Eduardo Victa also
on February 10, 1975. The latter certificate of title, in turn, was cancelled by TCT
No. T-128607 issued in the name of the spouses Rodriguez also on February 10,
1975. These highly irregular transfers of ownership, i.e., cancellation and/or
issuance of certificates of title, involving the subject lots all transpiring on the
same date eloquently betray the fraud that attended the transactions, including
37[20] Bongalon v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 142441, November 10, 2004, 441
SCRA 553, 572.
38[21] Sacdalan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128967, May 20, 2004, 428 SCRA 586,
600.
Petitioners claim of being purchasers in good faith and for value was
debunked by the court a quo, thus:
Defendant spouses, under the premises, cannot avail of the protective
mantle of law protecting a purchaser for value and in good faith, as
they are not purchasers for value and neither have they acted in good
faith. Defendants cannot successfully put up a picture of innocence as
to the fraud that characterized the transactions relative to their
ultimate acquisition of the properties subject of this litigation.
Defendant Reynaldo Rodriguez was well aware that on his acquisition
of the properties, Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr. will file suit against him that is
why he retained P10,000.00 of the purchase price, which amount is
intended to be used in the expected litigation. In fact, defendant
Reynaldo Rodriguez admitted to Frisco Gudani that he purchased the
properties at a very low price because of which he promised to give
Frisco Gudani an additional amount of P1,500.00 upon the termination
of the case.39[22]
On this point, the appellate court succinctly stated that as to the contention
that appellants (referring to petitioners) purchased the properties in good faith and
for value, the record is replete with evidence negating such contention and the
issue had been thoroughly discussed in the appealed decision which would render
any further discussion a superfluity. 40[23]
Contrary to the petitioners contention, Eduardo Victa and Frisco Gudani are
not indispensable parties. The complaint filed by Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr. was for the
cancellation of TCT No. T-128607 in the name of petitioners and to enjoin them from
Having established that petitioners TCT No. T-128607 emanated from a void
document, i.e. the second owners duplicate copy of TCT No. T-2857 procured by
Frisco Gudani and/or Atty. Aguilan through fraud and when Domingas owners
duplicate certificate of title had not been lost, and that petitioners were not
purchasers in good faith and for value, the Court concludes that the nullification of
petitioners TCT No. T-128607 is warranted under the circumstances. The appellate
court therefore committed no reversible error in affirming the decision of the court a
quo which, among others, declared as null and void TCT No. T-128607 in the name
41[24] Philippine National Bank v. Heirs of Estanislao Militar and Deogracias Militar,
G.R. No. 164801, August 18, 2005, 467 SCRA 377, 384.
of petitioners and, instead, reinstated TCT No. T-2857 in the name of Dominga
Goyma, mother of Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr. (now substituted by his spouse and children)
respondents Concordia Ong Lim, Eurestes and Elmer Lim.
[25]
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated July 18, 1995 and
Resolution dated October 5, 1998 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 27440
are AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
WE CONCUR:
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
Chairperson
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
December 6, 2006
HEIRS OF ROSENDO LASAM, Represented by Rogelio Lasam and Atty. Edward P. Llonillo, petitioners,
vs.
VICENTA UMENGAN, respondent.
DECISION
1975, appearing as Doc. No. 88, Page No. 36, Book No. XIV, series of 1975 of the notarial book of Atty. Pedro Lagui.
Prior thereto, Rufo already sold his 1/6 share in the subject lot to Vicenta Umengan and her husband as evidenced by the
Deed of Sale dated June 14, 1961, appearing as Doc. No. 539, Page No. 41, Book No. V, series of 1961 of the notarial book
of Atty. Pedro Lagui. Also on June 14, 1961, Abdon donated his 1/6 share in the subject lot to her daughter Vicenta
Umengan as evidenced by the Deed of Donation appearing as Doc. No. 538, Page No. 41, Book No. V, series of 1961 of the
notarial book of the same notary public.
According to Vicenta Umengan, the children of Isabel Cuntapay by her second husband (Rosendo and Trinidad Lasam) own
only 2/6 portion of the subject lot. She thus prayed that the complaint for ejectment be dismissed and that the heirs of
Rosendo Lasam be ordered to pay her damages.
The MTCC rendered judgment in favor of the heirs of Rosendo Lasam and directed the ejectment of Vicenta Umengan. In
so ruling, the MTCC gave credence to the newly discovered last will and testament (entitled Testamento Abierto)
purportedly executed by Isabel Cuntapay where she bequeathed the subject lot to her son, Rosendo Lasam, thus:
x x x my share 1/5th (one-fifth) of the Cuntapay heirs, bordered on the North by Sr. Elia Canapi; to the South,
by Calle Aguinaldo; to the East, by Calle P. Burgos and the West, by the late Don Luis Alonso; on the
property which is my share stands a house of light materials where I presently reside; this 1/5th (one-fifth)
share of my inheritance from the Cuntapays I leave to my son Rosendo Lasam and also the aforementioned
house of light material x x x2
The MTCC reasoned that the heirs of Rosendo Lasam anchored their claim over the subject lot on the last will and testament
of Isabel Cuntapay while Vicenta Umengan hinged hers on intestate succession and legal conveyances. Citing jurisprudence3
and Article 10804 of the Civil Code, the MTCC opined that testacy was favored and that intestacy should be avoided and the
wishes of the testator should prevail. It observed that the last will and testament of Isabel Cuntapay was not yet probated as
required by law; nonetheless, the institution of a probate proceeding was not barred by prescription.
With the finding that the subject lot was already bequeathed by Isabel Cuntapay to Rosendo Lasam, the MTCC held that the
siblings Abdon, Sado, Rufo and Maria Turingan no longer had any share therein. Consequently, they could not convey to
Vicenta Umengan what they did not own. On the issue then of who was entitled to possession of the subject lot, the MTCC
ruled in favor of the heirs of Rosendo Lasam as it found that Vicenta Umengans possession thereof was by mere tolerance.
The dispositive portion of the MTCC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, this Court Resolve[d] to order the EJECTMENT
of VICENTA T. UMENGAN and in her place INSTITUTE THE HEIRS OF ROSENDO LASAM.
It is further ordered the defendant shall pay the Heirs of Rosendo Lasam the sum of P500.00 pesos
representing the monthly rental of the land from August 2000 to the time this case shall have been terminated.
Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiffs the amount of P20,000.00 attorneys fees plus cost of this
litigation.
So Ordered.5
On appeal, the RTC affirmed in toto the decision of the MTCC. The RTC echoed the reasoning of the MTCC that the
FIRST DIVISION
JOVITA BARBOSA,
Petitioners,
Present:
CORONA,
AZCUNA and
GARCIA, JJ.
Promulgated:
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
On August 11, 1983, Pilar Hernandez bought a 100 sq. m. lot in Capitol
Hills, Barangay Kumintang Ibaba, Batangas City from subdivision owner Felix
Villanueva through his wife and attorney-in-fact, Leticia Hughes. Hernandez,
however, did not take physical possession of the property immediately as she was
working overseas in Saudi Arabia at the time. When she visited her property in
November 1987 with plans of building a house thereon, she discovered it in the
possession of petitioners, the spouses Sergio and Jovita Barbosa, who were using it
as the site of their motor repair shop.
The 100 sq. m. lot in question, however, came into their possession only in or after
1979, when they were requested by the subdivision developer, Natividad
Sangalang, to transfer their motor repair shop there to give way to the paving of a
subdivision road that would cut across the shops original location. On November
16, 1983, Hughes sold petitioners a 200 sq. m. portion of the land they were
occupying. This portion did not include the 100 sq. m. lot on which their shop
stood, which Hernandez had bought some three months earlier.
Hernandez demanded that petitioners vacate her lot but they refused. Efforts
to resolve the dispute at the barangay level failed. Thus, on February 14, 1988,
Hernandez filed a complaint for recovery of possession and damages43[1] against
petitioners in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Batangas City. This was
superseded by an amended complaint44[2] in which Hernandez alleged, in
substance, that she was the owner of the lot and petitioners were unlawfully
depriving her of its possession.
43[1] Docketed as Civil Case No. 2900 and raffled to Branch II, RTC, Batangas City.
Records, pp. 1-3.
44[2] Dated September 26, 1988. Id., pp. 12-14.
In a decision48[6] dated February 24, 1993, the RTC ruled that petitioners
failed to prove that there was a definite and complete agreement between them and
Villanueva, Hughes or Sangalang with respect to the disputed lot. It dismissed the
third-party complaint and ordered petitioners to: (1) vacate the lot and restore
possession thereof to Hernandez; (2) remove at their own expense the
improvements they erected on the lot; (3) pay Hernandez P200 a month until
possession of the lot would have been returned to her and (4) pay the costs of suit
and P10,000 in attorneys fees.
Petitioners elevated the case to the Court of Appeals (CA). In their appeal,
docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 41492, petitioners argued that the RTC had no
jurisdiction to try the case inasmuch as it was really an unlawful detainer case
within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) and
that, since the lot had been promised to be sold to them, Hernandez should have
48[6] Penned by Judge Irineo V. Mendoza. Rollo, pp. 36- 40.
been ordered to reconvey it or, in the alternative, to reimburse them for the
improvements they made on the property.
Petitioners contend that the action for recovery of possession, which the
evidence showed to have been initiated within less than a year from the demand to
vacate, was actually an unlawful detainer case which should have been filed in the
MTC.
Petitioners argument runs counter to one of the most fundamental and oftrepeated doctrines of remedial law. The nature of the action on which depends the
question of whether a suit is within the jurisdiction of the court is determined
solely by the allegations in the complaint.51[9] Only facts alleged in the complaint
can be the basis for determining the nature of the action and the courts competence
to take cognizance of it.52[10] One cannot advert to anything not set forth in the
51[9] Dimo Realty & Development, Inc. v. Dimaculangan, G.R. No. 130991, 11 March
2004, 425 SCRA 376; Ching v. Malaya, No. L-56449, 31 August 1987, 153 SCRA 413.
52[10] D.C. Crystal v. Laya, G.R. No. 53597, 28 February 1989, 170 SCRA 734.
complaint, such as evidence adduced at the trial, to determine the nature of the
action thereby initiated.
53[11] Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides, in part, that a lessor,
vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any land or
building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold
possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the legal
representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person,
may, at any time within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding
of possession, bring an action in the proper Municipal Trial Court against the person
or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such possession, together
with damages and costs.
54[12] Melliza v. Towle and Mueller, 34 Phil. 345 (1916).
In this case, the only material allegations in the amended complaint were
that the plaintiff (Hernandez) was the registered owner of the lot in dispute and that
the defendants (petitioners) were unlawfully depriving her of its possession. It
contained no averment that possession of the lot was unlawfully withheld under the
circumstances contemplated in Section 1, Rule 70 and that the action to eject the
defendants was being brought within a year from the time their possession became
unlawful. Clearly, the allegations in the complaint were nowhere near enough to
make out a case of unlawful detainer and we are certain that, had it been filed in
the MTC, it would have been dismissed for having been filed in a court which, at
the time, had no jurisdiction over cases involving possession of real property other
than those for forcible entry and unlawful detainer.55[13] Thus, we find no
difficulty in ruling that it was but proper for the RTC to assume jurisdiction over
the case and the CA committed no error in upholding it.
55
When the case was filed in 1988, jurisdiction over actions involving title to or
possession of real property, except those for forcible entry and unlawful detainer, was by
law (BP 129, the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980) vested exclusively in the RTCs.
Thus, to decide whether an action involving possession of real property had been filed in
the proper court, all that had to be done was to determine the type of action filed: if the
action was for forcible entry or unlawful detainer, the MTC was the proper court in which
to file it; any suit for recovery of possession of real property other than forcible entry and
unlawful detainer, however, had to be filed in the RTC. On March 25, 1994, however,
Congress approved RA 7691 (An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, Amending for
the Purpose Batas Pambansa Blg. 129) which expanded the MTCs jurisdiction to include
other actions involving title to or possession of real property where the assessed value of
the property does not exceed P20,000 (or P50,000, for actions filed in Metro Manila).
Because of this amendment, the test of whether an action involving possession of real
property has been filed in the proper court now no longer depends solely on the type of
action filed, i.e., forcible entry and unlawful detainer, accion publiciana, or accion
reinvindicatoria, but also on the assessed value of the property involved. More
specifically, since MTCs now have jurisdiction over accion publiciana and accion
reinvindicatoria (depending, of course, on the assessed value of the property involved,
jurisdiction over such actions has to be determined on the basis of the assessed value of
the property.
[13]
Petitioners insist that, since Villanueva and Sangalang promised to sell them
the lot, Hernandez should either allow them to keep it in exchange for the price she
paid when she bought it from Villanueva or reimburse them for the improvements
they put up on the property. They take issue with the CAs ruling that the alleged
promise to sell was unenforceable under the statute of frauds and was not, in any
event, supported by the evidence on record.
x x x the parcel of land under litigation was given by the third party defendants
[Villanueva, Hughes, and Sangalang] to the third party plaintiffs [petitioners] in
lieu of the portion of the land originally being occupied under lease by the latter
in order to give way to the development of the said big portion of the tract of land
being undertaken by the third party defendant Natividad Sangalang with the
understanding that in the event the third party defendant Villanueva should
sell the subdivided lots being developed by the defendant Sanggalang, as
developer, the third party plaintiffs shall have the priority and preferential
right to purchase the same; x x x (emphasis supplied)56[14]
This Court has held that a right of first refusal is different and distinct from a
contract of sale of real property. 57[15] As such, it is not among those listed as
unenforceable under the statute of frauds.58[16] Thus, the CAs ruling that the
alleged promise was covered by the statute of frauds was erroneous. Nonetheless,
in view of its finding one with which we are in complete accord that petitioners
57
Rosencor Development Corporation v. Inquing, G.R. No. 140479, 8 March 2001, 354
SCRA 119. The statute of frauds is contained in Article 1403 (2) of the Civil Code which
provides:
Art. 1403. The following contracts are unenforceable, unless they
are ratified:
[15]
xxx
xxx
xxx
(2) Those that do not comply with the Statute of Frauds as set forth in this
number. In the following cases an agreement hereafter made shall be unenforceable by
action, unless the same, or some note or memorandum thereof, be in writing, and
subscribed by the party charged, or by his agent; evidence, therefore, of the agreement
cannot be received without the writing, or a secondary evidence of its contents:
a) An agreement that by its terms is not to be performed within a year from the
making thereof;
b) A special promise to answer for the debt, default, or miscarriage of another;
c) An agreement made in consideration of marriage, other than a mutual promise
to marry;
d) An agreement for the sale of goods, chattels or things in action, at a price not
less than five hundred pesos, unless the buyer accept and receive part of such goods and
chattels, or the evidences, or some of them, or such things in action, or pay at the time
some part of the purchase money; but when a sale is made by auction and entry is made
by the auctioneer in his sales book, at the time of the sale, of the amount and kind of
property sold, terms of sale, price, names of purchasers and person on whose account the
sale is made, it is a sufficient memorandum;
e) An agreement for the leasing of a longer period than one year, or for the sale of
real property or of an interest therein;
failed to present preponderant evidence that such a promise or right had in fact
been given, it was a harmless error that would not warrant a reversal of the
judgment appealed from.
RIGHT TO REIMBURSEMENT
The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or planted in good
faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting,
after payment of the indemnity provided for in articles 546 and 548, or to oblige
the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who sowed,
the proper rent. x x x
58[16] Id.
SO ORDERED.
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Chairperson
(On Leave)
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the
conclusions in the above decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
THIRD DIVISION
ERMINDA F. FLORENTINO,
Petitioner,
Present:
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
Chairperson,
- versus -
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
NACHURA, and
REYES, JJ.
SUPERVALUE, INC.,
Respondent.
Promulgated:
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
61[2] Id. at 9.
with
outlets
in
different
malls
and
business
2000,
petitioner
received
two
letters
from
the
64[5] Id.
65[6] Id. at 55-56.
66[7] Id. at 58.
67[8] Id.
68[9] Id.
69[10] Id.
70[11] Id.
seized from the SM Megamall store space and return the security
deposits, in the sum of P192,000.00, turned over by the petitioner
upon signing of the Contracts of Lease. On 15 June 2000,
petitioner sent respondent another letter reiterating her previous
demands, but the latter failed or refused to comply therewith.
[15]
74
alleged
that
the
respondent
made
verbal
as
Petitioner
also
moral damages;
asked for
the award of
P50,000.00 as
exemplary
77[18] Id.
78[19] Id.
79[20] Id.
Considering
that
petitioner
already
committed
several
The other damages claimed by the plaintiff are denied for lack of
merit.
modified
the
RTC
Judgment
and
found
that
the
I.
II.
III.
[27]
xxxx
demand the return of the security deposits for the same are
deemed forfeited by reason of evident contractual violations.
Art. 1229. The judge shall equitably reduce the penalty when the
principal obligation has been partly or irregularly complied with by the
debtor. Even if there has been no performance, the penalty may also
be reduced by the courts if it is iniquitous or unconscionable. 90[31]
The Court ruled that the stipulation of the parties in their lease
contract to be renewable at the option of both parties stresses that the
faculty to renew was given not to the lessee alone nor to the lessor by
himself but to the two simultaneously; hence, both must agree to
renew if a new contract is to come about.
92[33] G.R. No. L-80231, 18 October 1988, 166 SCRA 577, 587-588.
93[34]Josefa v. San Buenaventura, G.R. No. 163429, 3 March 2006, 484 SCRA 49, 60.
to
attract
customers.
Certainly,
no
inducement
or
should be read together with Article 448 and Article 546 of the
same statute, which provide:
Art. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been
built, sown or planted in good faith, shall have the right to appropriate
as his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the
indemnity provided for in articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one
who built or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who
sowed, the proper rent. However, the builder or planter cannot be
obliged to buy the land if its value is considerably more than that of
the building or trees. In such case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the
owner of the land does not choose to appropriate the building or trees
after proper indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms of the
lease and in case of disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof.
xxxx
In a plethora of cases, this Court has held that Article 448 of the
Civil Code, in relation to Article 546 of the same Code, which allows full
reimbursement of useful improvements and retention of the premises
until reimbursement is made, applies only to a possessor in good faith,
i.e., one who builds on land with the belief that he is the owner thereof.
It does not apply where one's only interest is that of a lessee
under a rental contract; otherwise, it would always be in the
94[35] Lopez v. Sarabia, G.R. No. 140357, 24 September 2004, 439 SCRA 35, 49.
95[36] 328 Phil. 682, 689-690 (1996).
SO ORDERED.
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
of spouses Ernesto T. Matugas and Filomena U. Matugas. Its co-petitioner, Miguela Jimenez-Javier, is the registered owner
of the adjacent lot under TCT No. T-330688.
On the other hand, ARB is the owner and developer of Soldiers Hills Subdivision in Bacoor, Cavite, which is composed of
four phases. Phase I of the subdivision was already accessible from the Marcos Alvarez Avenue. To provide the same
accessibility to the residents of Phase II of the subdivision, ARB constructed the disputed road to link the two phases.
As found by the appellate court, petitioners' properties sit right in the middle of several estates: Phase I of Soldiers Hills
Subdivision in the north, a creek in the east and Green Valley Subdivision the farther east, a road within Soldiers Hills
Subdivision IV which leads to the Marcos Alvarez Avenue in the west and Phase III of Soldiers Hills Subdivision in the
south.
Initially, petitioners offered to pay ARB P50,000 as indemnity for the use of the road. Adamant, ARB refused the offer and
fenced the perimeter of the road fronting the properties of petitioners. By doing so, ARB effectively cut off petitioners'
access to and from the public highway.
After failing to settle the matter amicably, petitioners jointly filed a complaint4 in the RTC of Imus, Cavite to enjoin ARB
from depriving them of the use of the disputed subdivision road and to seek a compulsory right of way after payment of
proper indemnity. On November 24, 1995, the trial court rendered its decision in favor of petitioners:
The reasons why this case is not one for a right of way as an easement are not difficult to discern.
The questioned road is part and parcel of the road network of Soldiers Hills IV, Phase II. This road was constructed pursuant
to the approved subdivision plan of Soldiers Hills IV, Phase II. As such, the road has already been withdrawn from the
commerce of men as the ownership of which was automatically vested in the government without need of any
compensation, although it is still registered in the name of the [ARB], the moment the subdivision plan was approved. While
it is not yet donated to the government [,] [it] is of no moment for donating this road to the government is a mere formality.
Differently stated, the government automatically becomes the owner of the subdivisions' roads the moment the subdivision
plan is approved. From that time on, the roads are withdrawn from the commerce of men even [if] the titles are still
registered in the name of the subdivision owners and the roads are not yet donated to the government. Thus, the subdivision
owner can no longer sell or alienate the roads for they are already owned by the government; thus, even if [petitioners] want
to buy this road, and the [ARB] wants to sell the same, this transaction cannot materialize for the above-stated reasons.
Accordingly, [ARB] cannot prevent/prohibit plaintiffs from using the road as the same belongs to the government.
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, [ARB] is ordered to cease and desist from preventing [petitioners] in using the subject road or any other
road in the subdivision.
xxx xxx xxx
SO ORDERED. 5 (citations omitted)
ARB elevated the case to the Court of Appeals.6 Finding merit in the appeal, the appellate court reversed the decision of the
lower court. It explained that the 1991 case of White Plains Subdivision[7] did not apply to the present case which was
decided under a different factual milieu:
In the assailed Decision, the Court below relied on the ruling of the Supreme Court in White Plains Association, Inc. vs.
Legaspi (193 SCRA 765). The ruling is not applicable. In the White Plains case, the disputed area was specifically set aside
by the Quezon City Government, with the concurrence of the owner and developer of the White Plains Subdivision in
Quezon City, for the purpose of constructing a major thoroughfare open to the general public. The case was filed by the
association of homeowners of White Plains in Quezon City when the owner-developer sought to convert the disputed lot
to residential lots. The Supreme Court initially held that the disputed lot was not longer within the commerce of men, it
having been segregated for a particular purpose, that of being used as "part of a mandatory open space reserved for public
use to be improved into the widened Katipunan Road". It was within this context that the Supreme Court held that
"ownership was automatically vested in the Quezon City government and/or the Republic of the Philippines, without need of
paying any compensation".8
The appellate court went on to rule that a compulsory right of way exists in favor of petitioners as "[t]here is no other
existing adequate outlet to and from [petitioners'] properties to the Marcos Alvarez Avenue other than the subject existing
road lot designated as Lot No. 5827-F-1 belonging to [ARB]."9 In addition, it awarded P500,000 to ARB as reasonable
indemnity for the use of the road lot.
Acting on petitioners' motion for reconsideration, the appellate court justified the monetary award in this manner:
In [o]ur Decision, [w]e awarded the amount of P500,000.00 merely as reasonable indemnity for the use of the road lot, not
the alienation thereof. The amount was based on equitable considerations foremost of which is that, while there is no
alienation to speak of, the easement is of long-standing, that is, until a shorter and adequate outlet is established. Moreover,
[ARB] should be compensated for the wear and tear that [petitioners'] use of the road would contribute to; it is [ARB] which
is solely to be credited for the completion of the road lot. Going by the conservative valuation of the Municipality of Bacoor,
Cavite presented by [petitioners], the 4,760 sq. m. road lot would cost P1,904,000 but as stated what is compensated is the
use of the road lot not its alienation.
[Petitioners'] original offer cannot be considered a reasonable indemnity, there being a knotty legal question involved and it
is not [ARB's] fault that the parties had to resort to the courts for a resolution.10
Unsatisfied with the ruling of the appellate court, petitioners filed this petition for review on certiorari insisting that ARB is
not entitled to be paid any indemnity.
Petitioners argue that the contested road lot is a property of public dominion pursuant to Article 42011 of the Civil Code.
Specifically, petitioners point out that the disputed road lot falls under the category "others of similar character" which is the
last clause of Article 420 (1).12 Hence, it is a property of public dominion which can be used by the general public without
need for compensation. Consequently, it is wrong for ARB to exclude petitioners from using the road lot or to make them
pay for the use of the same.
We disagree.
In the case of Abellana, Sr. v. Court of Appeals,13 the Court held that "the road lots in a private subdivision are private
property, hence, the local government should first acquire them by donation, purchase, or expropriation, if they are to be
utilized as a public road."14 Otherwise, they remain to be private properties of the owner-developer.
Contrary to the position of petitioners, the use of the subdivision roads by the general public does not strip it of its private
character. The road is not converted into public property by mere tolerance of the subdivision owner of the public's passage
through it. To repeat, "the local government should first acquire them by donation, purchase, or expropriation, if they are to
be utilized as a public road."15
Likewise, we hold the trial court in error when it ruled that the subject road is public property pursuant to Section 2 of
Presidential Decree No. 1216.16 The pertinent portion of the provision reads:
Section 2. xxx xxx xxx
Upon their completion as certified to by the Authority, the roads, alleys, sidewalks and playgrounds shall be donated by the
owner or developer to the city or municipality and it shall be mandatory for the local governments to accept them provided,
however, that the parks and playgrounds may be donated to the Homeowners Association of the project with the consent of
the city or municipality concerned
The law is clear. The transfer of ownership from the subdivision owner-developer to the local government is not automatic
but requires a positive act from the owner-developer before the city or municipality can acquire dominion over the
subdivision roads. Therefore, until and unless the roads are donated,17 ownership remains with the owner-developer.18
Since no donation has been made in favor of any local government and the title to the road lot is still registered in the name
of ARB, the disputed property remains private.
This is not to say that ARB may readily exclude petitioners from passing through the property. As correctly pointed out by
the Court of Appeals, the circumstances clearly make out a case of legal easement of right of way. It is an easement which
has been imposed by law and not by the parties and it has "for (its) object either public use or the interest of private
persons."19
To be entitled to a legal easement of right of way, the following requisites must concur: (1) the dominant estate is
surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) payment of proper indemnity; (3) the
isolation was not due to acts of the proprietor of the dominant estate and (4) the right of way claimed is at the point least
prejudicial to the servient estate.20
The appellate and trial courts found that the properties of petitioners are enclosed by other estates without any adequate
access to a public highway except the subject road lot which leads to Marcos Alvarez Avenue.21 Although it was shown that
the shortest distance from the properties to the highway is toward the east across a creek, this alternative route does not
provide an adequate outlet for the students of the proposed school. This route becomes marshy as the creek overflows during
the rainy season and will endanger the students attending the school.
All told, the only requisite left unsatisfied is the payment of proper indemnity.
Petitioners assert that their initial offer of P50,000 should be sufficient compensation for the right of way. Further, they
should not be held accountable for the increase in the value of the property since the delay was attributable to the stubborn
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Chairperson
(No Part)
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ *
Associate Justice
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Asscociate Justice
CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice
C E R T I F I C AT I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above decision had been reached
in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Footnotes
*
No part. Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez inhibited herself from participating in the deliberations of this case.
Penned by Associate Justice Portia Alio-Hormachuelos and concurred in by Associate Justices Elvi John S.
Asuncion and Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr. of the Tenth Division of the Court of Appeals; rollo, pp. 46-56.
2
Penned by Associate Justice Portia Alio-Hormachuelos and concurred in by Associate Justices Elvi John S.
Asuncion and Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr. of the Tenth Division of the Court of Appeals; id., pp. 58-60.
3
RTC Decision dated November 24, 1995, rollo, pp. 73, 77-78.
White Plains Association, Inc v. Legaspi, G.R. No. 95522, 7 February 1991, 193 SCRA 765.
Id., at 55.
10
11
12
13
14
Id., at 319.
15
Id.
16
17
Note that subdivision roads may also be purchased or expropriated by the local government unit, thereby
converting them into public property.
18
White Plains Association v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128131, 8 October 1998, 297 SCRA 547.
19
20
Costabella Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 80511, 25 January 1991, 193 SCRA 333, 339.
21
22
23
AB Leasing and Finance Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 453 Phil. 297 (2003).
March 6, 2007
constructors despite the several instructions, memoranda issued by the Municipal Mayor and the negotiations made by this
body they insisted to erect the building pedestals on the site [that] pleases them and not on the site identified by this duly
constituted body who has direct administration of the municipal ground;
WHEREFORE, on motion duly seconded be it
RESOLVED, as it is hereby done to adopt this resolution manifesting this bodys decision to uphold and maintain the trust
and confidence of the people upon this body;
RESOLVED, finally that this body agrees, and decides to demolish the erected structures for the purpose of erecting the
Public Market building as identified and decided by this body; and further resolved as it is hereby done that this be a
precedent for other future leaders.5
On that same day, Tayaban and his co-petitioners, together with some men, proceeded to the construction site and
demolished the structures and improvements introduced thereon. As a result, Pugong filed an Affidavit-Complaint6 against
herein petitioners.
Subsequently, in an Information dated June 26, 1992, herein petitioners were charged with violation of Section 3(e) of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The accusatory portion of the
Information reads:
That on August 17, 1989 and for sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the Municipality of Tinoc, Ifugao, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused Robert Tayaban, Municipal Mayor of Tinoc,
Francisco Maddawat, Artemio Balangue, Francisco Mayumis and Quirino Pana, are all public officers being Municipal
Councilors of Tinoc, Ifugao and in the performance of their official functions acting in evident bad faith and conspiring with
each other, did then and there, willfully and unlawfully pass and unanimously approve Resolution No. 20, thereby vesting
upon themselves powers and authority to demolish the half-finished Tinoc Public Market construction whereby respondents
themselves personally and actually demolish [sic] it, to the damage and prejudice of the government particularly the
Cordillera Executive Board, being the owner of the project.7
Upon arraignment on December 14, 1992, herein petitioners pleaded not guilty.8
After trial, the Sandiganbayan promulgated the presently assailed Decision,9 the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered convicting all the accused ROBERT TAYABAN Y
CALIPLIP, FRANCISCO MADDAWAT Y TAYOBAN, ARTEMIO BALANGUE Y LANGA, FRANCISCO MAYUMIS Y
BAHEL and QUIRINO PANA Y CUYAHEN of the crime of Violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019 as
amended, and in the absence of mitigating and aggravating circumstances and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
herein accused are hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) month
as minimum to eight (8) years as maximum and are hereby ordered jointly and severally to pay the government the amount
of P134,632.80 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
SO ORDERED.10
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the Sandiganbayan denied it in a Resolution11 dated September 28, 2001.
Hence, herein petition for review with the following assignment of errors:
I
WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE ACTS
ALLEGEDLY COMMITTED BY THE ACCUSED CONSTITUTED A VIOLATION OF SECTION 3(E) OF R.A. NO.
3019 AS AMENDED, AND THEREFORE ACCUSED SHOULD HAVE BEEN ACQUITTED BY THE RESPONDENT
COURT.
II
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT RESOLUTION NO. 20 IS A VALID
LEGISLATION AND THAT THE DEMOLITION OF THE FIVE POSTS WAS AN IMPLEMENTATION OF LOI NO. 19
AND AN EXERCISE OF THE POLICE POWER VESTED IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNIT.
III
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, IN VIOLATION OF THE RULES OF EVIDENCE, LAWS AND
JURISPRUDENCE ERRED IN CONSIDERING FACTS WITHOUT REFERRING TO THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD. 12
In their first assigned error, petitioners argue that one of the elements of the offense which constitutes a violation of Section
3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 is that the government or any private party suffers undue injury by reason of the prohibited acts
committed by the public officer being charged. Petitioners argue that this element was not proved because the CEB, which
was supposed to be the injured party as alleged in the Information, did not complain or participate in the trial of the case.
Petitioners go on to conclude that the existence of undue injury cannot be proven without the alleged injured party testifying.
Petitioners further contend that the itemized list of expenses submitted in evidence by Pugong should not have been made a
basis of the presently assailed Decision because such list is not supported by receipts and, therefore, self-serving. Moreover,
Pugong was never mentioned in the Information as one of the injured parties. Petitioners assert that undue injury could only
mean actual injury or damage which must be established by evidence.
Petitioners also contend that the element of bad faith on their part was not proved. On the contrary, they argue that their act
of exerting efforts to communicate with the contractor and his foreman, by sending three letters in order to remind them of
the proper site of construction, only shows that they were acting in good faith; that the eventual passage of Resolution No.
20 is also an additional evidence of good faith on their part because it was adopted by the Sangguniang Bayan as a collective
body acting within the scope of its authority. Petitioners further contend that the CEB saw the propriety of the Sangguniang
Bayans action to stop the construction of the market that was why it issued an order suspending the said construction; and
that the CEB, realizing its mistake in not coordinating with petitioners, did not pursue any action against them.
In their second assigned error, petitioners argue that the Sandiganbayan erred in applying Sections 5613 and 59(a)14 of the
Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991, which provide, respectively, for the review by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
component city and municipal ordinances and resolutions approving local development plans and public investment
programs and for the posting in conspicuous places in the local government unit concerned of the said resolutions and
ordinances.
They argue that the applicable law at the time of the passage of Resolution No. 20 is Batas Pambansa Bilang (B.P. Blg.) 337
or the Local Government Code of 1983. Claiming that Pugong failed to obtain the requisite building permit pursuant to
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1096,15 petitioners assert that their act of demolishing the structures erected on the
construction site is an implementation of the provisions of the Letter of Instruction (LOI) No. 1916 which empowers certain
public officials, like the municipal mayor, to remove illegal constructions which were built, either in public places or private
property, without permit. Petitioners further contend that the demolition is a valid exercise of police power and that their act
is justified by the general welfare clause under the LGC which empowers them to enact and implement measures for the
general well-being of their constituents.
In their third assigned error, petitioners argue that the Sandiganbayan erred in relying on the testimony of prosecution
witness Abe Belingan considering that he is not a disinterested witness because he is given the contract of cementing the
supposed second floor of the public market. Moreover, petitioners contend that the testimony of Belingan regarding the
reason why Mayor Tayaban demolished the structures is mere hearsay and as such should not be given any probative value.
Petitioners assert that the complaint was filed against them for purposes of political harassment considering that Pugongs
political allies who also signed Resolution No. 20 were not included in the said complaint.
In its Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contends that, as properly held by the Sandiganbayan, undue
injury has been caused to the Government and that it is immaterial whether the CEB filed a complaint against herein
petitioners because the real party-in-interest is the Government of the Republic of the Philippines. The OSG also argues that
private complainant Pugong also suffered undue injury because he already incurred expenses for labor, tools, equipment,
and materials for the construction project. As to the issue of credibility of witnesses, the OSG asserts that the matter of
assigning values to declarations on the witness stand is a function most competently performed by the trial judge who had
the opportunity to observe the witnesses and assess their credibility by the various indicia available but not reflected on
record.
The Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) also filed its Comment, contending that it is not necessary for the CEB to initiate
a complaint against herein petitioners because the real party-in-interest is the Government of the Republic of the Philippines;
that there is actual injury on the part of the Government as shown by the fact that construction was commenced and that
petitioners did not deny that they demolished the structures which were erected; and that the list of expenses presented by
Pugong cannot be considered self-serving because the latter testified thereon.
The OSP further claims that petitioners were guilty of bad faith when they demolished the erected structures as evidenced by
various acts committed by herein petitioners prior to and during the construction of the public market; and that the fact that
witness Belingan has contracted the cementing of the second floor of the supposed public market is not sufficient evidence
of his bias against herein petitioners.
As to petitioners contention that the criminal complaint filed against them was merely a political harassment considering
that the other members of the Sangguniang Bayan who signed the questioned Resolution but who are allies of Pugong were
not included in the complaint, the OSP avers that, while the said members of the Sangguniang Bayan signed Resolution No.
20, they were not included in the complaint because they did not take part in the demolition of the public market.
The Court finds the petition without merit.
Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 reads:
Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. - In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing
law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality,
evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or
government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.
The following indispensable elements must be established to constitute a violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as
amended:
1. The accused is a public officer discharging administrative or official functions or private persons charged
in conspiracy with them;
2. The public officer committed the prohibited act during the performance of his official duty in relation to
his public position;
3. The public officer acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence; and
4. His action caused undue injury to the government or any private party, or gave any party any unwarranted
benefit, advantage or preference to such parties.17
Herein petitioners contention that the Sandiganbayan erred in ruling that they are guilty of bad faith and that they caused
undue injury to the Government is not plausible.
With respect to the element of bad faith, the Court, in a number of cases, held:
Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it imputes a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and
conscious doing of a wrong; a breach of sworn duty through some motive or intent or ill will; it partakes of the nature of
fraud. (Spiegel v. Beacon Participations, 8 NE 2nd Series, 895, 1007). It contemplates a state of mind affirmatively
operating with furtive design or with some motive of self-interest or ill will for ulterior purposes. (Air France v. Carrascoso,
18 SCRA 155, 166-167). Evident bad faith connotes a manifest deliberate intent on the part of the accused to do wrong or
cause damage.18
The Court agrees with the findings of the Sandiganbayan that petitioners were guilty of bad faith in causing the demolition.
Evidence of this is the fact that Resolution No. 20 was implemented on the same day that it was adopted without due notice
of the planned demolition given to the CEB and the private contractor. In fact, Raymundo Madani, one of the Municipal
Councilors who signed Resolution No. 20, testified that the said Resolution was passed only in the afternoon of August 15,
1989, after the subject demolition was conducted in the morning of the same day.19
Proof of petitioners bad faith is also shown by Pugongs testimony, which was given credence by the Sandiganbayan, that
the site where his laborers began construction of the demolished public market was pointed out by petitioner Tayaban
himself when the former asked the latter where they were going to erect the said market.20
Tayabans letter and memorandum dated July 31, 198921 and August 3, 1989,22 respectively, addressed to the laborers of
Pugong directing them to stop construction may not be considered as evidence of good faith on the part of petitioners
considering that they know fully well that it is the CEB which implements the said project and any grievance or complaint
on their part should have been addressed to the said Board. No evidence was presented to show that petitioners made their
objections known to the CEB. At the least, petitioners should have furnished the CEB or the Governor, in his capacity as a
regular member of the CEB,23 a copy of the above-mentioned letter and memorandum. But they never did. The letter and
memorandum were not even addressed to Pugong and there is no proof to show that he was informed of the contents thereof.
Moreover, even if Pugongs men had received the letter and memorandum, they may not be totally blamed for ignoring the
letter and the memorandum because under their contract, the owner of the project is the CEB and there is nothing therein
which requires them to comply with whatever directive the Mayor or the Sangguniang Bayan of Tinoc may issue. In fact,
the contract signed on March 1, 1989 specifically states that the contractor shall construct the Tinoc Public Market as per
plan and specification provided by the CEB technical staff.24 In consonance with the said provision in the contract, Pugong
testified that the CEB sent a representative to supervise the construction.25
The following admissions made by petitioners bolster Sandiganbayans finding of bad faith on their part:
First, petitioner Tayaban admitted that when he submitted the project proposal for the construction of the Tinoc Public
Market, he did not indicate the exact location where the market should be put up saying that he shall specify the location
when the budget for the project shall have been approved.26 However, despite meeting the Governor twice in 1989, and
being informed by the latter that the project had already been approved and funded, Tayaban still did not suggest to the
Governor nor mention to him the specific place where he and the Sangguniang Bayan desire to have the public market
erected.27 Worse, when the construction was commenced and petitioners discovered that the public market was being built
allegedly in a place where it should not be, petitioner Tayaban even admits that he still did not inform the Governor of such
fact.28
Second, Tayaban admits that they never bothered to check with the CEB where the latter intended to put up the public
market.29 There is no evidence to show that, when the construction was commenced, petitioners informed the CEB of the
alleged mistake in the location of the project. In fact, petitioner Tayaban testified that it was only in the first or second week
of August, 1989 that he informed the CEB regarding the supposed error,30 even when he came to know the exact site where
Pugong intended to build the market as early as April 1989.31 Moreover, when the Sangguniang Bayan convened on August
15, 1989 and passed Resolution No. 20, they did not invite any representative from the CEB.32
Third, while petitioners aver that they have come up with a Site Development Plan wherein the exact location of the public
market was specified, Tayaban admits that the blue print of the said development plan was completed only in August 1989.33
However, the construction of the public market was commenced as early as June 1989.
From the foregoing, it is evident that petitioners were moved by a manifest and deliberate intent to cause damage.
It is clear from the Information filed that the injured party in the instant case is the Government, as represented by the CEB.
The fact that the CEB did not initiate the filing of the instant criminal action is of no moment considering that a complaint
for purposes of preliminary investigation by the fiscal need not be filed by the "offended party".34 The rule has been that,
unless the subject of the complaint is one that cannot be prosecuted de oficio, the same may be filed, for preliminary
investigation purposes, by any competent person.35 In the present case, it is sufficient that private contractor Pugong was the
one who filed an affidavit-complaint for purposes of preliminary investigation by the OSP. Moreover, the failure of the CEB
THIRD DIVISION
LORDITO ARROGANTE,
JOHNSTON ARROGANTE, ARME
ARROGANTE, and FE D.
ARROGANTE,
Petitioners,
Present:
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
- versus -
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO, and
NACHURA, JJ.
Promulgated:
Respondents.
July 24, 2007
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Beethoven
Deliarte
and
petitioner
Fe
Deliarte
97[1] Penned by Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr., with Associate Justices Cancio C.
Garcia (now Associate Justice of the Supreme Court) and Hilarion L. Aquino,
concurring; rollo, pp. 27-39.
98[2] Rollo, pp. 43-47.
that the lot is a devise from his grandfather. 103[7] Allegedly, the
bequeathal was made in Bernabes last will and testament which
was, unfortunately, torn up and destroyed by Beethoven. 104[8]
103[7] Exhibits E to E-14, id. at 143-147; TSN, March 19, 1996, pp. 17-23.
104[8] TSN, March 19, 1996, pp. 17-19.
As
regards
the
damaging
placards,
the
petitioners
that
petitioner
Fe
signed
the
document
and
defamation
and
opprobrium
of
Beethoven
with
their
was
appropriate,
given
the
humiliation
and
rulings.
They
maintain
that
the
1978
sale
did
not
In this appeal, the issues for the resolution of this Court are:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE PRIVATE DEED OF SALE EXECUTED IN 1978 IS A
VALID CONVEYANCE OF THE ENTIRE LOT 472-A TO PETITIONER
BEETHOVEN DELIARTE.
II.
III.
IV.
At the outset, we note that both the lower and the appellate
courts failed to identify the applicable law.
106[10] Civil Code, Article 1347:All things which are not outside the commerce of men,
including future things, may be the object of a contract. All rights which are not intransmissible
may also be the object of contracts.
No contract may be entered into upon future inheritance except in cases expressly
authorized by law.
All services which are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public
policy may likewise be the object of a contract.
True,
the
prohibition
on
contracts
respecting
future
109[13] See Civil Code, Article 1079 and J.L.T. Agro v. Balansag, supra note 12, at
226.
and
wife,
Beethovens
and
Fes
brother
and
mother,
We
take
judicial
notice
of
this
collective
sense
of
113[17] One-half of the subject lot as his share in the conjugal partnership, plus 1/10 of one-half,
his wifes share. See Civil Code, Article 892, par. 2. The share of the surviving spouse is equal to
that of one child.
remittance to her parents of her salary for two years so they could
redeem the subject lot.115[19]
act
is
coupled
with
an
onerous
cause
equal
thereof
presupposes
the
existence
of
valid
Third. We agree with both the lower and the appellate courts
that the Statute of Frauds is not applicable to the instant case.
In
fact,
the
agreement
clearly
contemplated
One other thing militates against Fes claim of ownership silence and palpable failure to object to the execution of the
agreement. Fe insists that she only intended to sell her share of
121[25] Averia v. Averia, G.R. No. 141877, August 13, 2004, 436 SCRA 459, 466;
Swedish Match, AB v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128120, October 20, 2004, 441
SCRA 1, 22; Ainza v. Padua, G.R. No. 165420, June 30, 2005, 462 SCRA 614, 619;
Sps. Dela Cerna v. Sps. Briones, G.R. No. 160805, November 24, 2006.
122[26] Civil Code, Article 1405:Contracts infringing the Statute of Frauds, referred to in
No. 2 of Article 1403, are ratified by the failure to object to the presentation of oral evidence to
prove the same, or by the acceptance of benefits under them.
the lot inherited from her mothers estate, exclusive of her fathers
share therein.
We
are
not
persuaded
by
the
belated
claim.
This
Lorditos claim,
therefore,
is only subordinate to
Corollary
thereto,
Lordito
admits
and
claims
sole
not
obtain
in
this
instance.
The
other
petitioners
WHEREFORE,
premises
considered,
the
petition
is
of
Appeals
is
hereby
MODIFIED.
Petitioner
Lordito
SO ORDERED.
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
MINITA V. CHICONAZARIO
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
FIRST DIVISION
RITO CABALES,
Petitioners,
Present:
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
- versus -
CORONA,
AZCUNA, and
GARCIA, JJ.
COURT OF APPEALS,
Promulgated:
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
PUNO, C.J.:
The facts as found by the trial court and the appellate court are well
established.
Rufino Cabales died on July 4, 1966 and left a 5,714-square meter parcel of
land located in Brgy. Rizal, Sogod, Southern Leyte, covered by Tax Declaration No.
17270 to his surviving wife Saturnina and children Bonifacio, Albino, Francisco,
Leonora, Alberto and petitioner Rito.
On July 26, 1971, brothers and co-owners Bonifacio, Albino and Alberto sold
the subject property to Dr. Cayetano Corrompido for P2,000.00, with right to
repurchase within eight (8) years. The three (3) siblings divided the proceeds of the
sale among themselves, each getting a share of P666.66.
The following month or on August 18, 1971, Alberto secured a note (vale)
from Dr. Corrompido in the amount of P300.00.
129[1] Penned by Associate Justice Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr. and concurred in by
Associate Justices Roberto A. Barrios and Arsenio J. Magpale.
130[2] Penned by Judge Romeo M. Gomez.
In 1972, Alberto died leaving his wife and son, petitioner Nelson.
On even date, Saturnina and her four (4) children Bonifacio, Albino, Francisco
and Leonora sold the subject parcel of land to respondents-spouses Jesus and
Anunciacion Feliano for P8,000.00. The Deed of Sale provided in its last paragraph,
thus:
in trust by the VENDEE and to be paid and delivered only to them upon
reaching the age of 21.
On December 30, 1985, Saturnina and her four (4) children executed an
affidavit to the effect that petitioner Nelson would only receive the amount of
P176.34 from respondents-spouses when he reaches the age of 21 considering that
Saturnina paid Dr. Corrompido P966.66 for the obligation of petitioner Nelsons late
father Alberto, i.e., P666.66 for his share in the redemption of the sale with pacto de
retro as well as his vale of P300.00.
On July 24, 1986, 24-year old petitioner Rito Cabales acknowledged receipt of
the sum of P1,143.00 from respondent Jesus Feliano, representing the formers share
in the proceeds of the sale of subject property.
In 1988, Saturnina died. Petitioner Nelson, then residing in Manila, went back
to his fathers hometown in Southern Leyte. That same year, he learned from his
uncle, petitioner Rito, of the sale of subject property. In 1993, he signified his
intention to redeem the subject land during a barangay conciliation process that he
initiated.
On January 12, 1995, contending that they could not have sold their
respective shares in subject property when they were minors, petitioners filed
before the Regional Trial Court of Maasin, Southern Leyte, a complaint for
redemption of the subject land plus damages.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals modified the decision of the trial court. It
held that the sale by Saturnina of petitioner Ritos undivided share to the property
was unenforceable for lack of authority or legal representation but that the contract
was effectively ratified by petitioner Ritos receipt of the proceeds on July 24, 1986.
The appellate court also ruled that petitioner Nelson is co-owner to the extent of
one-seventh (1/7) of subject property as Saturnina was not subrogated to Albertos
rights when she repurchased his share to the property. It further directed petitioner
Nelson to pay the estate of the late Saturnina Cabales the amount of P966.66,
representing the amount which the latter paid for the obligation of petitioner
Nelsons late father Alberto. Finally, however, it denied petitioner Nelsons claim for
redemption for his failure to tender or consign in court the redemption money within
the period prescribed by law.
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners contend that the Court of
Appeals erred in (1) recognizing petitioner Nelson Cabales as co-owner of subject
land but denied him the right of legal redemption, and (2) not recognizing petitioner
Rito Cabales as co-owner of subject land with similar right of legal redemption.
When Rufino Cabales died intestate, his wife Saturnina and his six (6)
children, Bonifacio, Albino, Francisco, Leonora, Alberto and petitioner Rito, survived
and succeeded him. Article 996 of the New Civil Code provides that [i]f a widow or
widower and legitimate children or descendants are left, the surviving spouse has in
the succession the same share as that of each of the children. Verily, the seven (7)
heirs inherited equally on subject property. Petitioner Rito and Alberto, petitioner
Nelsons father, inherited in their own rights and with equal shares as the others.
But before partition of subject land was effected, Alberto died. By operation
of law, his rights and obligations to one-seventh of subject land were transferred to
his legal heirs his wife and his son petitioner Nelson.
We shall now discuss the effects of the two (2) sales of subject land to the
rights of the parties.
The first sale with pacto de retro to Dr. Corrompido by the brothers and coowners Bonifacio, Albino and Alberto was valid but only as to their pro-indiviso
shares to the land. When Alberto died prior to repurchasing his share, his rights and
obligations were transferred to and assumed by his heirs, namely his wife and his
son, petitioner Nelson. But the records show that it was Saturnina, Albertos mother,
and not his heirs, who repurchased for him. As correctly ruled by the Court of
Appeals, Saturnina was not subrogated to Albertos or his heirs rights to the property
when she repurchased the share.
Art. 326. When the property of the child is worth more than two
thousand pesos, the father or mother shall be considered a guardian of
the childs property, subject to the duties and obligations of guardians
under the Rules of Court.
In other words, the father, or, in his absence, the mother, is considered legal
administrator of the property pertaining to the child under his or her parental
authority without need of giving a bond in case the amount of the property of the
child does not exceed two thousand pesos. 135[7] Corollary to this, Rule 93, Section
7 of the Revised Rules of Court of 1964, applicable to this case, automatically
designates the parent as legal guardian of the child without need of any judicial
appointment in case the latters property does not exceed two thousand pesos, 136
[8] thus:
Sec. 7. Parents as guardians. When the property of the child
under parental authority is worth two thousand pesos or less, the
father or the mother, without the necessity of court appointment, shall
be his legal guardian x x x x137[9]
135[7] See Badillo v. Ferrer, No. L-51369, July 29, 1987, 152 SCRA 407.
136[8] Id.
137[9] The New Rules on Guardianship of Minors, adapted in the May 1, 2003 Resolution of the
Court in A.M. No. 03-02-05-SC, provide, inter alia:
Section 1. Applicability of the Rule. This Rule shall apply to petitions for
guardianship over the person or property, or both, of a minor.
The father and the mother shall jointly exercise legal guardianship over
the person and property of their unemancipated common child without the
necessity of a court appointment. In such case, this Rule shall be suppletory to
the provisions of the Family Code on guardianship.
Indeed, the legal guardian only has the plenary power of administration of
the minors property. It does not include the power of alienation which needs judicial
authority.139[11] Thus, when Saturnina, as legal guardian of petitioner Rito, sold
the latters pro-indiviso share in subject land, she did not have the legal authority to
do so.
xxxx
Clearly, legal redemption may only be exercised by the co-owner or coowners who did not part with his or their pro-indiviso share in the property held in
common. As demonstrated, the sale as to the undivided share of petitioner Rito
became valid and binding upon his ratification on July 24, 1986. As a result, he lost
his right to redeem subject property.
In the face of the established facts, petitioner Nelson cannot feign ignorance
of the sale of subject property in 1978. To require strict proof of written notice of the
sale would be to countenance an obvious false claim of lack of knowledge thereof,
thus commending the letter of the law over its purpose, i.e., the notification of
redemptioners.
The Court is satisfied that there was sufficient notice of the sale to petitioner
Nelson. The thirty-day redemption period commenced in 1993, after petitioner
Nelson sought the barangay conciliation process to redeem his property. By January
12, 1995, when petitioner Nelson filed a complaint for legal redemption and
damages, it is clear that the thirty-day period had already expired.
As in Alonzo, the Court, after due consideration of the facts of the instant
case, hereby interprets the law in a way that will render justice. 143[15]
SO ORDERED.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Associate Justice
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice
CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
THIRD DIVISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR.,*
** On leave.
- versus -
CHICO-NAZARIO, and
NACHURA, JJ.
Promulgated:
Respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
annul and set aside the Decision 144[1] and Resolution145[2] of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 60450 entitled, Spouses Jose
Lumbao and Proserfina Lumbao v. Spouses Virgilio F. Santos and
Esperanza Lati, Spouses Victorino F. Santos and Lagrimas F.
Santos, Ernesto F. Santos and Tadeo F. Santos, dated 8 June 2005
and 29 July 2005, respectively, which granted the appeal filed by
herein respondents Spouses Jose Lumbao and Proserfina Lumbao
(Spouses Lumbao) and ordered herein petitioners Spouses Virgilio
F. Santos and Esperanza Lati, Spouses Victorino F. Santos and
Lagrimas F. Santos, Ernesto F. Santos and Tadeo F. Santos to
reconvey to respondents Spouses Lumbao the subject property
and to pay the latter attorneys fees and litigation expenses, thus,
reversing the Decision146[3] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Pasig City, dated 17 June 1998 which dismissed the Complaint for
Reconveyance with Damages filed by respondents Spouses
Lumbao for lack of merit.
insofar
as
the
subject
property
is
concerned.
On
May
1986,
the
Spouses
Lumbao
claimed
that
heirs, the estate left by Maria, which included the subject property
already sold to respondents Spouses Lumbao and now covered by
TCT No. 81729150[7] of the Registry of Deeds of Pasig City.
1991,
which
repealed
Presidential
Decree
No.
1508 153[10]
with
the
mandate
of
the
Revised
Katarungang
No pronouncement as to costs.155[12]
I.
THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED A
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL
COURT, THEREBY CREATING A VARIANCE ON THE FINDINGS OF
FACTS OF TWO COURTS.
II.
THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED A
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN ORDERING THE PETITIONERS TO
RECONVEY THE SUBJECT [PROPERTY] TO THE RESPONDENTS
[SPOUSES LUMBAO] AND IN NOT RULING THAT THEY ARE GUILTY
OF LACHES, HENCE THEY CANNOT RECOVER THE LOT
ALLEGEDLY SOLD TO THEM.
III.
THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED A
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT FINDING HEREIN PETITIONER[S] TO
BE IN GOOD FAITH IN EXECUTING THE DEED OF EXTRAJUDICIAL
SETTLEMENT DATED [2 MAY 1986].
IV.
THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED A
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT FINDING THAT PETITIONERS ARE
V.
THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED A
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT FINDING THAT RESPONDENTS
[SPOUSES LUMBAOS] ACTION FOR RECONVEYANCE WITH
DAMAGES CANNOT BE SUPPORTED WITH AN UNENFORCEABLE
DOCUMENTS, SUCH AS THE BILIHAN NG LUPA DATED [17
AUGUST 1979] AND [9 JANUARY 1981].
VI.
THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED A
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT FINDING THAT RESPONDENTS
[SPOUSES LUMBAOS] COMPLAINT FOR RECONVEYANCE IS
DISMISSABLE (SIC) FOR NON COMPLIANCE OF THE MANDATE OF
[P.D. NO.] 1508, AS AMENDED BY Republic Act No. 7160.
VII.
THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED A
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT FINDING THAT RESPONDENTS
[SPOUSES LUMBAO] SHOULD BE HELD LIABLE FOR PETITIONERS
CLAIM FOR DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY[]S FEES.
Petitioners
ask
this
Court
to
scrutinize
the
evidence
Finally,
petitioners
claim
that
the
Complaint
for
I.
Whether or not the Complaint for Reconveyance
with Damages filed by respondents spouses Lumbao is
dismissible for their failure to comply with the mandate of the
Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law under R.A. No. 7160.
II.
Whether or not the documents known as Bilihan ng
Lupa are valid and enforceable, thus, they can be the bases of
the respondents spouses Lumbaos action for reconveyance with
damages.
III.
Whether or not herein petitioners are legally bound
to comply with the Bilihan ng Lupa dated 17 August 1979 and 9
January 1981 and consequently, reconvey the subject property
to herein respondents spouses Lumbao.
as
mandated
by
the
Revised
Katarungang
157[14] Recognized exceptions to this rule are: (1) when the findings are grounded
entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is
manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of
discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; (5) when
the finding of facts are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court of
Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the
admissions of both the appellee and the appellant; (7) when the findings are
contrary to the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of
specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the
petition as well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by the
respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of
evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; or (11) when the Court of
Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties,
which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion [Langkaan Realty
Development, Inc. v. United Coconut Planters Bank, G.R. No. 139437, 8 December
2000, 347 SCRA 542; Nokom v. National Labor Relations Commissions, 390 Phil.
1228, 1243 (2000); Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Embroidery and Garments
Industries (Phils.), Inc., 364 Phil. 541, 546-547 (1999); Sta. Maria v. Court of
Appeals, 349 Phil. 275, 282-283 (1998); Almendrala v. Ngo, G.R. No. 142408, 30
September 2005, 471 SCRA 311, 322].
the
said
condition
precedent,
their
Complaint
for
condition
precedent
cannot
be
considered
fatal.
in
motion
to
dismiss. 161[18]
Hence,
herein
160[17] Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation v. Amante, G.R. No. 112526, 16 March
2005, 453 SCRA 432, 477.
161[18] Baares II v. Balising, G.R. No. 132624, 13 March 2000, 328 SCRA 36, 50-51.
had
passed.
Noticeably,
petitioner
Virgilio
did
not
ATTY. CHIU:
Q.
Now, you said, Mr. WitnessVirgilio Santos, that you dont know
about this document which was marked as Exhibit A for the
[respondents spouses Lumbao]?
ATTY. BUGARING:
ATTY. CHIU:
Q.
Being you are one of the witnesses of this document? [I]s it not?
WITNESS:
A.
No, sir.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
I dont remember.163[20]
before
this
notary
public
Apolinario
and
due
execution.169[26]
To
overcome
this
division. In any case, the mere fact that the deed purports to
transfer a concrete portion does not per se render the sale void.
The sale is valid, but only with respect to the aliquot share of the
selling co-owner. Furthermore, the sale is subject to the results of
the partition upon the termination of the co-ownership. 172[29]
In the case at bar, when the estate left by Maria had been
partitioned on 2 May 1986 by virtue of a Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement, the 107- square meter lot sold by the mother of the
petitioners to respondents Spouses Lumbao should be deducted
from the total lot, inherited by them in representation of their
deceased mother, which in this case measures 467 square
meters. The 107-square meter lot already sold to respondents
Spouses Lumbao can no longer be inherited by the petitioners
because the same was no longer part of their inheritance as it
was already sold during the lifetime of their mother.
173[30] Heirs of Pomposa Saludares v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128254, 16 January 2004, 420 SCRA 51, 5658.
Under the above premises, this Court holds that the Bilihan
ng Lupa documents dated 17 August 1979 and 9 January 1981
are valid and enforceable and can be made the basis of the
respondents Spouses Lumbaos action for reconveyance. The
failure of respondents Spouses Lumbao to have the said
documents
registered
does
not
affect
its
validity
and
representatives
of
the
deceased.
Similarly,
175[32] Art. 1311. Contracts take effect only between the parties, their assigns and
heirs, except in case where the rights and obligations arising from the contract are
not transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law. The heir is
not liable beyond the value of the property he received from the decedent.
176[33] Tanay Recreation Center and Development Corp. v. Fausto, G.R. No.
140182, 12 April 2005, 455 SCRA 436, 446
177[34] DKC Holdings Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118248, 5 April 2000, 329
SCRA 666, 674-675.
SO ORDERED.
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
On leave
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
THE ESTATE OF THE LATE FELISA TAMIO DE BUENA VENTURA, herein represented by RESURRECION A.
BIHIS, RHEA A. BIHIS and REGINA A. BIHIS, and RESURRECION A. BIHIS, RHEA A. BIHIS and REGINA A.
BIHIS, in their personal capacities, Respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in these consolidated1 petitions for review on certiorari2 are the Decision3 dated December 19, 2013 and the
Resolution4 dated April 1, 2014 rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 96697, which modified the
Decision5 dated June 8, 2009 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 224 (RTC) in Civil Case No. Q-97-32515,
and thereby ordered: (a) the nullification of the Deed of Sale dated January 23, 1997 in favor of Wilson Go (Wilson) and
Peter Go (Peter), petitioners in G.R. No. 211972; (b) the reconveyance of the disputed property to the Estate of Felisa
Tamio; and (c) the cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. N-1704 75, as well as the issuance of a new title in
the name of the Estate of Felisa Tamio by the Register of Deeds.
The Facts
On March 17, 1959, the late Felisa Tamio de Buenaventura (Felisa) purchased from Carmen Zaragosa, Inc. a parcel of land
with an area of 533 square meters, more or less, situated at Retiro corner Kanlaon Streets, Sta. Mesa Heights, Quezon City
(subject property) and, thus, TCT No. 45951/T-233 was issued in her name. Thereafter, she constructed a three-storey
building thereon, called D'Lourds Building, where she resided until her death on February 19, 1994.6 On February 10, 1960,
Felisa supposedly sold the subject property to one of her daughters, Bella Guerrero (Bella), the latter's husband, Delfin
Guerrero, Sr. (Delfin, Sr.), and Felimon Buenaventura, Sr. (Felimon, Sr.), Felisa's common-law husband.7 Bella, copetitioner in G.R. No. 212045, and Delfin, Sr. paid P15,000.00 as consideration therefor.8 Thus, TCT No. 45951/T-233 in
the name of Felisa was cancelled and TCT No. 498699 was issued in the names of Felimon, Sr. and Bella, married to Delfin,
Sr..
Sometime in 1968, Resurrecion A. Bihis10 (Resurrecion), the other daughter of Felisa, sister of Bella, and respondent in
both G.R. Nos. 211972 a nd 212045, began to occupy the second floor of the D'Lourds Building and stayed therein until her
death in 2007.11
As it appears that TCT No. 49869 in the names of Felimon, Sr. and Bella, married to Delfin, Sr., was irretrievably destroyed
in the interim, Bella caused its reconstitution and was issued TCT No. RT-74910 (49869),12 again registered in their names.
When Felisa died on February 19, 1994, she allegedly bequeathed, in a disputed last will and testament, half of the subject
property to Resurrecion and her daughters, Rhea A. Bihis (Rhea) and Regina A. Bihis (Regina), corespondents in both G.R.
Nos. 211972 and 212045 (collectively, the Bihis Family). Thus, on April 19, 1994, the Bihis Family caused the annotation of
an adverse claim on TCT No. RT-74910 (49869). Felisa's purported will likewise declared Bella as the administrator of the
subject property.13
On the strength of such appointment, Bella filed, on May 24, 1994, a petition for the probate of Felisa's will. She was
eventually appointed as the administratrix of the Estate of Felisa and, in an inventory of Felisa's properties, Bella included
the subject property as part of said estate.14
On January 22, 1997, the adverse claim of the Bihis Family was cancelled. The following day, January 23, 1997, Felimon
Buenaventura, Jr. (Felimon, Jr.) and Teresita Robles, a.k.a. Rosalina Buenaventura Mariano15 (Teresita), apparently the
heirs of Felimon, Sr. (Heirs of Felimon, Sr.), executed a purported Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of Felimon
Buenaventura, Sr., and caused its annotation on TCT No. RT-74910 (49869). By virtue thereof, TCT No. RT-74910 (49869)
was cancelled and TCT No. N-170416 was issued in the names of the Heirs of Felimon, Sr., Bella, and her co-petitioners in
G.R. No. 212045, Delfin A. Guerrero, Jr. (Delfin, Jr.) and Lester Alvin A. Guerrero (Lester) (collectively, Bella, et al.).16
On the very same day, January 23, 1997, through a Deed of Sale of even date, the subject property was sold to Wilson and
Peter by Bella, et al. for the amount of P4,500,000.00, a transaction completely unknown to Felisa's other heirs, the Bihis
Family. Thus, TCT No. N-170416 was cancelled and, in lieu thereof, TCT No. 170475 was issued in the names of Wilson
and Peter. Thereafter, Wilson and Peter filed ejectment cases against the occupants and/or lessees of the subject property.17
In July 1997, the probate court revoked the appointment of Bella as administratrix of the Estate of Felisa and eventually,
granted letters of administration to Resurrecion.18 Hence, on October 17, 1997, herein respondents, the Estate of Felisa, as
represented by the Bihis Family, and the Bihis Family, in their personal capacities (collectively, respondents), filed a
complaint for reconveyance and damages before the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-97-32515, against Bella, et al.,
Wilson, Peter, and the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, alleging that Felisa, during her lifetime, merely entrusted the
subject property to Felimon, Sr., Bella, and Delfin, Sr. for the purpose of assisting Bella and Delfin, Sr. to obtain a loan and
mortgage from the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS). To facilitate the transaction, Felisa agreed to have the title
over the subject property transferred to Bella and Felimon, Sr. However, Felisa never divested herself of her ownership over
the subject property, as evidenced by her continuous residence thereon, as well as her act of leasing several units to various
tenants. In fact, in a letter19 dated September 21, 1970 (September 21, 1970 letter) addressed to Delfin, Sr., Felisa reminded
Bella, Delfin, Sr., and Felimon, Sr. that the subject property was merely entrusted to them for Bella and Delfin, Sr. to
procure a loan from the GSIS.20 At the bottom of the letter, Bella's and Delfin, Sr.' s signatures appear beside their names.21
Likewise, respondents alleged that Wilson and Peter were buyers in bad faith, as they were aware of the facts and
circumstances that would have warranted further inquiry into the validity of the title of the sellers, Bella, et al. They averred
that Wilson and Peter knew that the building was occupied by individuals other than the sellers, as in fact, the Bihis Family
was residing therein.22
In their defense, Bella and Felimon, Jr. claimed that the subject property was owned by Bella and (the late) Felimon, Sr., as
evidenced by TCT No. RT-74910 (49869), which title was issued to them as early as February 10, 1960. Such title has
therefore subsisted for almost thirty seven (37) years without having been voided or nullified by a court decree. Moreover,
they have exercised acts of ownership over the subject property, such as m01igaging the same and leasing the building to
third parties. Finally, they asserted that Bella's act of including the subject property in the inventory of properties of the
Estate of Felisa was merely because of inadvertence.23
For his part, Wilson claimed that when he and his brother, Peter, purchased the subject property from Bella, et al. on January
23, 1997, he was not aware of the judicial settlement of the Estate of Felisa. He testified that before they acquired the subject
property, he verified the validity of the title covering the same with the Registry of Deeds, and that a period of two (2)
months had lapsed before the sale was consummated because his lawyer advised him to request Bella to cancel the
encumbrance annotated on the title over the subject property. However, he asserted that .his lawyer merely advised him to
ask for the cancellation of the annotation but he was not aware of the details surrounding the same. Eventually, the
annotation was cancelled and that he only knew that the subject property was included in the Estate of Felisa when herein
respondents' complaint before the RTC was filed. As such, he maintained that he and Peter were purchasers in good faith.24
Moreover, the CA ruled that the issuance of TCT No. 49869 in the names of Bella, Delfin, Sr., and Felimon, Sr. did not
operate to vest ownership of the subject property upon them, as a certificate of title is not equivalent to title. Hence, the
presentation of TCT No. 49869 does not conclusively prove their claim of ownership over the subject property.35
With respect to the issue of whether or not the action for reconveyance based on an implied trust had already prescribed, the
CA found that prescription has not set in. Citing jurisprudence, it held that an action for reconveyance based on an implied
trust prescribes in ten ( 10) years, to be counted from the date of issuance of the Torrens title over the property. However, the
rule applies only when the claimant or the person enforcing the trust is not in possession of the property. When the claimant
is in actual possession of the property, the action for reconveyance, which is effectively an action for quieting of title, is
imprescriptible. In this case, it has been indubitably established that the Bihis Family have been in actual possession of the
subject property; hence, their action for reconveyance is imprescriptible.36
Finally, with regard to the question of whether or not Wilson and Peter are purchasers in good faith, the CA ruled in the
negative. It took into consideration the admission made by Wilson that he has knowledge of the adverse claim of the Bihis
Family annotated on the title of the subject property but denied knowledge of its contents. Likewise, he admitted that he
directed his lawyer to have the said annotation cancelled before purchasing the subject property. Records also show that he
knew that the Bihis Family have been occupying the second floor of the D'Lourds Building. However, despite knowledge of
the foregoing facts, he and his brother failed to make the necessary inquiries as to the validity of the title of the sellers, Bella,
et al. Consequently, he and Peter cannot be considered as buyers in good faith.37
Wilson and Peter, Bella, Delfin, Jr., and Lester, Felimon, Jr., and the Estate of Rosalinda Buenaventura Mariano filed
separate motions for reconsideration,38 which were all denied in the Resolution39 dated April 1, 2014; hence, these
petitions.
The Issues Before the Court
The issues advanced for the Court's consideration are: (a) whether or not the CA erred in ruling that there was an implied
trust created between Felisa, on one hand, and Bella, Delfin, Sr., and Felimon, Sr., on the other; (b) whether or not the action
for reconveyance had not yet prescribed; and (c) whether or not Wilson and Peter are purchasers in good faith.
The Court's Ruling
The petitions are bereft of merit.
The following facts are undisputed: in 1960, Felisa, as owner of the subject property, transferred the same to her daughter
Bella, married to Delfin, Sr., and Felimon, Sr. to assist them in procuring a loan from the GSIS. In view thereof, her title
over the property, TCT No. 45951/T-233, was cancelled and a new one, TCT No. 49869, was issued in the names of Bella,
married to Delfin, Sr., and Felimon, Sr. After it was lost, TCT No. 49869 was reconstituted and TCT No. RT-74910 (49869)
was issued in their names.
Upon Felisa's death in 1994, the Bihis Family, Felisa's other heirs who have long been occupying the subject property,
caused the annotation of their adverse claim over the same on TCT No. RT-74910 (49869). Subsequently, however, or on
January 22, 1997, the said annotation was cancelled, and the next day, the Heirs of Felimon, Sr. executed an Extrajudicial
Settlement of his estate and caused its annotation on said title. TCT No. RT-74910 (49869) was then cancelled and TCT No.
N-170416 was issued in the names of Bella, et al. Finally, by virtue of a Deed of Sale dated January 23, 1997, the subject
property was sold to Wilson and Peter, in whose names TCT No. 170475 currently exists. Months later, or on October 17,
1997,40 the complaint for reconveyance and damages, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-97-32515, was instituted.
From the foregoing factual milieu, the Court holds that: one, a trust was established between Felisa, on the one hand, and
Bella, Delfin, Sr., and Felimon, Sr., on the other, albeit not an implied trust as concluded by the RTC and the CA but an
express one; two, the present action for reconveyance has not yet prescribed; and, three, Wilson and Peter are not purchasers
in good faith.
I.
Trust is the right to the beneficial enjoyment of property, the legal title to which is vested in another. It is a fiduciary
relationship that obliges the trustee to deal with the property for the benefit of the beneficiary.1wphi1 Trust relations
between parties may either be express or implied. An express trust is created by the intention of the trustor or of the parties,
while an implied trust comes into being by operation of law.41
Express trusts are created by direct and positive acts of the parties, by some writing or deed, or will, or by words either
expressly or impliedly evincing an intention to create a trust. Under Article 1444 of the Civil Code, "[n]o particular words
are required for the creation of an express trust, it being sufficient that a trust is clearly intended." It is possible to create a
trust without using the word "trust" or "trustee." Conversely, the mere fact that these words are used does not necessarily
indicate an intention to create a trust. The question in each case is whether the trustor manifested an intention to create the
kind of relationship which to lawyers is known as trust. It is immaterial whether or not he knows that the relationship which
he intends to create is called a trust, and whether or not he knows the precise characteristics of the relationship which is
called a trust.42
Further, in the case of Tamayo v. Callejo,43 the Court recognized that a trust may have a constructive or implied nature in
the beginning, but the registered owner's subsequent express acknowledgement in a public document of a previous sale of
the property to another party effectively converted the same into an express trust.44
In the present case, both the R TC and the CA found that an implied trust was established, heavily giving credence, among
others, to the September 21, 1970 letter executed by Felisa during her lifetime, which partly reads:
Dear Delfin,
Ipinaaabot ko sa iyo ang sulat kong ito upang malaman mo ang aking nagiging damdamin. Hinihiling ko sa iyo at
ipinakikiusap sa iyo tungkol doon sa late at building ng D 'lourds.
Hindi naman kaila sa ivo kung papaano ko ito naisalin sa inyong pangalan nina Filemon C. Buenaventura Sr., Bella Alvarez
Guerrero at Delfin Guerrero Sr. Ang dahilan nito ay dahil sa pag-utang sa GSIS.
Kaya gusto kong malaman mo na ito ay nagpapatotoo na ito ay sarili kong pag-aari at walang sinumang nagbigay o
tumulong sa akin sa lupang ito. At maski si Ka Fe ling mo ay walang naibigay na pera dito.
Kaya hinihiling ko ang gusto kong mangyari sa ngayon ay maging kaparehong-kapareho ang paghahati ng bawat isa sa
anumang aking kabuhayan.
Kaya hinihiling ko sa iyo Delfin na kung maaari lamang ay ang lahat ng nakatala dito ay pirmahan ninyo.
x x x x45 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Beneath the letter appear the signatures of Bella and Delfin, and the signature of Felisa signing as "MOMMY" as well.46
Taking the contents of the foregoing letter into consideration the validity and due execution of which were never put in
issue, hence, indubitably established - the Court therefore differs from the finding of the courts a quo that an implied trust
was established; instead, the Court rules that an express trust was duly proved in this case.
The words of Felisa in the above-quoted letter unequivocally and absolutely declared her intention of transferring the title
over the subject property to Bella, Delfin, Sr., and Felimon, Sr. in order to merely accommodate them in securing a loan
from the GSIS. She likewise stated clearly that she was retaining her ownership over the subject property and articulated her
wish to have her heirs share equally therein. Hence, while in the beginning, an implied trust was merely created between
Felisa, as trustor, and Bella, Delfin, Sr., and Felimon, Sr., as both trustees and beneficiaries, the execution of the September
21, 1970 letter settled, once and for all, the nature of the trust established between them as an express one, their true
intention irrefutably extant thereon.
Bella's attempt to thwart the express trust established in this case by claiming that she affixed her signature on the September
21, 1970 letter only "to appease" her mother, Felisa, and that she could afford to sign the letter since the title covering the
subject property was in their name as owners anyway,47 does not hold water. As correctly ruled by the CA, citing Lee Tek
Sheng v. CA,48 the "[m]ere issuance of the certificate of title in the name of any person does not foreclose the possibility
that the real property may be under co-ownership with persons not named in the ce1iificate or that the registrant may only be
a trustee or that other parties may have acquired interest subsequent to the issuance of the certificate of title,"49 as in this
case.50 Registration does not vest title; it is merely the evidence of such title.51 Moreover, the Court notes that even during
the proceedings before the RTC, Bella never denied the purpose for which the sale to them of the subject property was
effected. Instead, they relied heavily and anchored their defense on the existence of their certificate of title covering the
subject property, which, to reiterate, was insufficient to prove their ownership over the same independent of the express
trust.
In light of the foregoing, while the Court agrees with the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, that Bella, Delfin, Sr., and Felimon,
Sr. only hold the subject property in trust for Felisa, the Court however finds that an express trust, not an implied one, was
established in this case.
II.
Anent the issue of prescription, the Court finds that the action for reconveyance instituted by respondents has not yet
prescribed, following the jurisprudential rule that express trusts prescribe in ten (10) years from the time the trust is
repudiated.52
In this case, there was a repudiation of the express trust when Bella, as the remaining trustee, sold the subject property to
Wilson and Peter on January 23, 1997.53 As the complaint for reconveyance and damages was filed by respondents on
October 17, 1997,54 or only a few months after the sale of the subject property to Wilson and Peter, it cannot be said that the
same has prescribed.
III.
Finally, with regard to the question of whether or not Wilson and Peter are purchasers of the subject property in good faith,
the Court concurs with the CA' s finding that they are not.
A purchaser in good faith is one who buys the property of another without notice that some other person has a right to, or an
interest in, such property and pays a full and fair price for the same at the time of such purchase, or before he has notice of
some other person's claim or interest in the property.55 Corollary thereto, when a piece of land is in the actual possession of
persons other than the seller, the buyer must be wary and should investigate the rights of those in possession. Without
making such inquiry, one cannot claim that he is a buyer in good faith. When a man proposes to buy or deal with realty, his
duty is to read the public manuscript, that is, to look and see who is there upon it and what his rights are. A want of caution
and diligence, which an honest man of ordinary prudence is accustomed to exercise in making purchases, is in
contemplation of law, a want of good faith. The buyer who has failed to know or discover that the land sold to him is in
adverse possession of another is a buyer in bad faith.56
In his testimony57 before the R TC, Wilson claimed to have verified the validity of the title covering the subject property
before the Registry of Deeds. However, he also admitted that two (2) months had lapsed before the sale could be
consummated because his lawyer advised him to request Bella, one of the sellers, to cancel the encumbrance annotated on
the title of the subject property. He also claimed that he had no knowledge about the details of such annotation, and that he
was aware that individuals other than the sellers were in possession of the subject property.
As aptly concluded by the CA, such knowledge of the existence of an annotation on the title covering the subject property
and of the occupation thereof by individuals other than the sellers negates any presumption of good faith on the part of
Wilson and Peter when they purchased the subject property. A person who deliberately ignores a significant fact which
would create suspicion in an otherwise reasonable man is not an innocent purchaser for value,58 as in this case.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DENIED. The Decision dated December 19, 2013 and the Resolution dated April 1, 2014
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 96697 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.*
Associate Justice
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN**
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson
AT T E S T AT I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the cases were assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson, First Division
C E R T I F I C AT I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Acting Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the cases were assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court's Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Acting Chief Justice
Footnotes
* Designated Acting Member per Special Order No. 2114 dated July 22, 2015.
** Per Special Order No. 2102 dated July 13, 2015.
*** Designated Acting Member per Special Order No. 2108 dated July 13, 2015.
1 See Court's Resolution dated June 2, 2014; rollo (G.R. No. 211972), pp. 36-49 and rollo, (G.R. No.
212045), pp. 36-49.
2 Rollo (G.R. No. 211972), pp. 8-30; rollo, (G.R. No. 212045), pp. 11-29.
3 Rollo (G.R. No. 211972), pp. 36-49; rollo, (G.R. No. 212045), pp. 36-49. Penned by Associate Justice
Socorro B. lnting with Associate Justices Jose C. Reyes, Jr. and Myra V. Garcia-Fernandez concurring.
4 Rollo (G.R. No. 211972), pp. 51-54; rollo (G.R. No. 212045), pp. 51-54.
5 Rollo (G.R. No. 211972), pp. 61-67. Penned by Presiding Judge Tita Marilyn Payoyo-Villordon.
6 See rollo (G.R. No. 211972), pp. 61-62.
7 Id. at 64.
8 Id. at 61.
32 Rollo (G.R. No. 211972), pp. 36-49; rollo, (G.R. No. 212045), pp. 36-49.
33 Rollo (G.R. No. 211972), p. 48; rollo (G.R. No. 212045), p. 48.
34 See rollo (G.R. No. 211972), pp. 43-45; rollo (G.R. No. 212045), pp. 43-45.
35 See rollo (G.R. No. 211972), pp. 45-46; rollo (G.R. No. 212045), pp. 45-46.
36 See rollo (G.R. No. 211972), pp. 46-47; rollo, (G.R. No. 212045), pp. 46-47.
37 See Rollo (G.R. No. 211972), pp. 47-48; rollo, (G.R. No. 212045), pp. 47-48.
38 Not attached to the rollos.
39 Rollo (G.R. No. 211972), pp. 51-54; rollo (G.R. No. 212045), pp. 51-54.
40 Rollo (G.R. No. 211972), p. 61.
41 Heirs of Tranquilino Labiste v. Heirs of Jose Labiste, 605 Phil. 495, 503 (2009).
42 Torbela v. Spouses Rosario, 678 Phil. I, 38-39 (2011 ); emphasis and underscoring supplied.
43 150-B Phil. 31 (1972).
44 See id. at 37-38.
45 Rollo (G.R. No. 212045), p. 100.
46 Id.
47 See id. at 20-21 and 132.
48 354 Phil. 556 (1998).
49 Id. at 561-562.
50 Rollo (G.R. No. 211972), pp. 45-46; rollo (G.R. No. 212045), pp. 45-46.
51 Heirs of Rosa and Cirila Dumaliang v. Serban, 545 Phil. 243, 256 (2007).
52 See Torbela v. Rosario, supra note 42, at 40, citing Heirs of Maximo Labanon v. Heirs of Constancio
Labanon, 556 Phil. 750, 762-763 (2007), further citing Escay v. CA, 158 Phil. I 008, 1031 (1974) and Secuya
v. De Selma, 383 Phil. 126, 137.
On June 28, 1959, the Land Tenure Administration (LTA) awarded to Margarita Herrera several portions of land which are
part of the Tunasan Estate in San Pedro, Laguna. The award is evidenced by an Agreement to Sell No. 3787.1 By virtue of
Republic Act No. 3488, the LTA was succeeded by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). On July 31, 1975, the DAR
was succeeded by the NHA by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 757.2 NHA as the successor agency of LTA is the petitioner
in this case.
The records show that Margarita Herrera had two children: Beatriz Herrera-Mercado (the mother of private respondent) and
Francisca Herrera. Beatriz Herrera-Mercado predeceased her mother and left heirs.
Margarita Herrera passed away on October 27, 1971.3
On August 22, 1974, Francisca Herrera, the remaining child of the late Margarita Herrera executed a Deed of SelfAdjudication claiming that she is the only remaining relative, being the sole surviving daughter of the deceased. She also
claimed to be the exclusive legal heir of the late Margarita Herrera.
The Deed of Self-Adjudication was based on a Sinumpaang Salaysay dated October 7, 1960, allegedly executed by
Margarita Herrera. The pertinent portions of which are as follows:
SINUMPAANG SALAYSAY
SA SINO MAN KINAUUKULAN;
Akong si MARGARITA HERRERA, Filipina, may 83 taong gulang, balo, kasalukuyang naninirahan at
tumatanggap ng sulat sa Nayon ng San Vicente, San Pedro Laguna, sa ilalim ng panunumpa ay malaya at
kusang loob kong isinasaysay at pinagtitibay itong mga sumusunod:
1. Na ako ay may tinatangkilik na isang lagay na lupang tirikan (SOLAR), tumatayo sa Nayon ng San
Vicente, San Pedro, Laguna, mayroong PITONG DAAN AT PITUMPU'T ISANG (771) METRONG
PARISUKAT ang laki, humigit kumulang, at makikilala sa tawag na Lote 17, Bloke 55, at pag-aari ng Land
Tenure Administration;
2. Na ang nasabing lote ay aking binibile, sa pamamagitan ng paghuhulog sa Land Tenure Administration, at
noong ika 30 ng Julio, 1959, ang Kasunduang sa Pagbibile (AGREEMENT TO SELL No. 3787) ay ginawa at
pinagtibay sa Lungsod ng Maynila, sa harap ng Notario Publico na si G. Jose C. Tolosa, at lumalabas sa
kaniyang Libro Notarial bilang Documento No. 13, Pagina No. 4; Libro No. IV, Serie ng 1959;
3. Na dahilan sa ako'y matanda na at walang ano mang hanap buhay, ako ay nakatira at pinagsisilbihan nang
aking anak na si Francisca Herrera, at ang tinitirikan o solar na nasasabi sa unahan ay binabayaran ng
kaniyang sariling cuarta sa Land Tenure Administration;
4. Na alang-alang sa nasasaysay sa unahan nito, sakaling ako'y bawian na ng Dios ng aking buhay, ang
lupang nasasabi sa unahan ay aking ipinagkakaloob sa nasabi kong anak na FRANCISCA HERRERA,
Filipina, nasa katamtamang gulang, kasal kay Macario Berroya, kasalukuyang naninirahan at tumatanggap ng
sulat sa Nayong ng San Vicente, San Pedro Laguna, o sa kaniyang mga tagapagmana at;
5. Na HINIHILING KO sa sino man kinauukulan, na sakaling ako nga ay bawian na ng Dios ng aking buhay
ay KILALANIN, IGALANG at PAGTIBAYIN ang nilalaman sa pangalan ng aking anak na si Francisca
Herrera ang loteng nasasabi sa unahan.
SA KATUNAYAN NG LAHAT, ako ay nag-didiit ng hinlalaki ng kanan kong kamay sa ibaba nito at sa
kaliwang gilid ng unang dahon, dito sa Lungsod ng Maynila, ngayong ika 7 ng Octubre, 1960.4
The said document was signed by two witnesses and notarized. The witnesses signed at the left-hand side of both pages of
the document with the said document having 2 pages in total. Margarita Herrera placed her thumbmark5 above her name in
the second page and at the left-hand margin of the first page of the document.
The surviving heirs of Beatriz Herrera-Mercado filed a case for annulment of the Deed of Self-Adjudication before the then
Court of First Instance of Laguna, Branch 1 in Binan, Laguna (now, Regional Trial Court Branch 25). The case for
annulment was docketed as Civil Case No. B-1263.6
On December 29, 1980, a Decision in Civil Case No. B-1263 (questioning the Deed of Self-Adjudication) was rendered and
the deed was declared null and void.7
During trial on the merits of the case assailing the Deed of Self-Adjudication, Francisca Herrera filed an application with the
NHA to purchase the same lots submitting therewith a copy of the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" executed by her mother. Private
respondent Almeida, as heir of Beatriz Herrera-Mercado, protested the application.
In a Resolution8 dated February 5, 1986, the NHA granted the application made by Francisca Herrera, holding that:
From the evidence of the parties and the records of the lots in question, we gathered the following facts: the
lots in question are portions of the lot awarded and sold to the late Margarita Herrera on July 28, 1959 by the
defunct Land Tenure Administration; protestant is the daughter of the late Beatriz Herrera Mercado who was
the sister of the protestee; protestee and Beatriz are children of the late Margarita Herrera; Beatriz was the
transferee from Margarita of Lot Nos. 45, 46, 47, 48 and 49, Block 50; one of the lots transferred to Beatriz,
e.g. Lot 47, with an area of 148 square meters is in the name of the protestant; protestant occupied the lots in
question with the permission of the protestee; protestee is a resident of the Tunasan Homesite since birth;
protestee was born on the lots in question; protestee left the place only after marriage but resided in a lot
situated in the same Tunasan Homesite; her (protestee) son Roberto Herrera has been occupying the lots in
question; he has been there even before the death of the late Margarita Herrera; on October 7, 1960,
Margarita Herrera executed a "Sinumpaang Salaysay" whereby she waived or transferred all her rights
and interest over the lots in question in favor of the protestee; and protestee had paid the lots in question in
full on March 8, 1966 with the defunct Land Tenure Administration.
This Office finds that protestee has a better preferential right to purchase the lots in question.9
Private respondent Almeida appealed to the Office of the President.10 The NHA Resolution was affirmed by the Office of the
President in a Decision dated January 23, 1987.11
On February 1, 1987, Francisca Herrera died. Her heirs executed an extrajudicial settlement of her estate which they
submitted to the NHA. Said transfer of rights was approved by the NHA.12 The NHA executed several deeds of sale in favor
of the heirs of Francisca Herrera and titles were issued in their favor.13 Thereafter, the heirs of Francisca Herrera directed
Segunda Mercado-Almeida to leave the premises that she was occupying.
Feeling aggrieved by the decision of the Office of the President and the resolution of the NHA, private respondent Segunda
Mercado-Almeida sought the cancellation of the titles issued in favor of the heirs of Francisca. She filed a Complaint on
February 8, 1988, for "Nullification of Government Lot's Award," with the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna,
Branch 31.
In her complaint, private respondent Almeida invoked her forty-year occupation of the disputed properties, and re-raised the
fact that Francisca Herrera's declaration of self-adjudication has been adjudged as a nullity because the other heirs were
disregarded. The defendant heirs of Francisca Herrera alleged that the complaint was barred by laches and that the decision
of the Office of the President was already final and executory.14 They also contended that the transfer of purchase of the
subject lots is perfectly valid as the same was supported by a consideration and that Francisca Herrera paid for the property
with the use of her own money.15 Further, they argued that plaintiff's occupation of the property was by mere tolerance and
that they had been paying taxes thereon.16
The Regional Trial Court issued an Order dated June 14, 1988 dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction.17 The Court of
Appeals in a Decision dated June 26, 1989 reversed and held that the Regional Trial Court had jurisdiction to hear and
decide the case involving "title and possession to real property within its jurisdiction."18 The case was then remanded for
further proceedings on the merits.
A pre-trial was set after which trial ensued.
On March 9, 1998, the Regional Trial Court rendered a Decision setting aside the resolution of the NHA and the decision of
the Office of the President awarding the subject lots in favor of Francisca Herrera. It declared the deeds of sale executed by
NHA in favor of Herrera's heirs null and void. The Register of Deeds of Laguna, Calamba Branch was ordered to cancel the
Transfer Certificate of Title issued. Attorney's fees were also awarded to private respondent.
The Regional Trial Court ruled that the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" was not an assignment of rights but a disposition of property
which shall take effect upon death. It then held that the said document must first be submitted to probate before it can
transfer property.
Both the NHA and the heirs of Francisca Herrera filed their respective motions for reconsideration which were both denied
on July 21, 1998 for lack of merit. They both appealed to the Court of Appeals. The brief for the heirs of Francisca Herrera
was denied admission by the appellate court in a Resolution dated June 14, 2002 for being a "carbon copy" of the brief
submitted by the NHA and for being filed seventy-nine (79) days late.
On August 28, 2003, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court, viz:
There is no dispute that the right to repurchase the subject lots was awarded to Margarita Herrera in 1959.
There is also no dispute that Margarita executed a "Sinumpaang Salaysay" on October 7, 1960. Defendant
NHA claims that the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" is, in effect, a waiver or transfer of rights and interest over the
subject lots in favor of Francisca Herrera. This Court is disposed to believe otherwise. After a perusal of the
"Sinumpaang Salaysay" of Margarita Herrera, it can be ascertained from its wordings taken in their ordinary
and grammatical sense that the document is a simple disposition of her estate to take effect after her death.
Clearly the Court finds that the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" is a will of Margarita Herrera. Evidently, if the
intention of Margarita Herrera was to merely assign her right over the lots to her daughter Francisca Herrera,
she should have given her "Sinumpaang Salaysay" to the defendant NHA or to Francisca Herrera for
submission to the defendant NHA after the full payment of the purchase price of the lots or even prior thereto
but she did not. Hence it is apparent that she intended the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" to be her last will and not
an assignment of rights as what the NHA in its resolution would want to make it appear. The intention of
Margarita Herrera was shared no less by Francisca Herrera who after the former's demise executed on August
22, 1974 a Deed of Self-Adjudication claiming that she is her sole and legal heir. It was only when said deed
was questioned in court by the surviving heirs of Margarita Herrera's other daughter, Beatriz Mercado, that
Francisca Herrera filed an application to purchase the subject lots and presented the "Sinumpaang Salaysay"
stating that it is a deed of assignment of rights.19
The Court of Appeals ruled that the NHA acted arbitrarily in awarding the lots to the heirs of Francisca Herrera. It upheld
the trial court ruling that the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" was not an assignment of rights but one that involved disposition of
property which shall take effect upon death. The issue of whether it was a valid will must first be determined by probate.
Petitioner NHA elevated the case to this Court.
Petitioner NHA raised the following issues:
A. WHETHER OR NOT THE RESOLUTION OF THE NHA AND THE DECISION OF THE OFFICE OF
THE PRESIDENT HAVE ATTAINED FINALITY, AND IF SO, WHETHER OR NOT THE PRINCIPLE OF
ADMINISTRATIVE RES JUDICATA BARS THE COURT FROM FURTHER DETERMINING WHO
BETWEEN THE PARTIES HAS PREFERENTIAL RIGHTS FOR AWARD OVER THE SUBJECT LOTS;
B. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT HAS JURISDICTION TO MAKE THE AWARD ON THE
SUBJECT LOTS; AND
C. WHETHER OR NOT THE AWARD OF THE SUBJECT LOTS BY THE NHA IS ARBITRARY.
We rule for the respondents.
Res judicata is a concept applied in review of lower court decisions in accordance with the hierarchy of courts. But
jurisprudence has also recognized the rule of administrative res judicata: "the rule which forbids the reopening of a matter
once judicially determined by competent authority applies as well to the judicial and quasi-judicial facts of public, executive
or administrative officers and boards acting within their jurisdiction as to the judgments of courts having general judicial
powers . . . It has been declared that whenever final adjudication of persons invested with power to decide on the property
and rights of the citizen is examinable by the Supreme Court, upon a writ of error or a certiorari, such final adjudication may
be pleaded as res judicata."20 To be sure, early jurisprudence were already mindful that the doctrine of res judicata cannot be
said to apply exclusively to decisions rendered by what are usually understood as courts without unreasonably
circumscribing the scope thereof and that the more equitable attitude is to allow extension of the defense to decisions of
bodies upon whom judicial powers have been conferred.
In Ipekdjian Merchandising Co., Inc. v. Court of Tax Appeals,21 the Court held that the rule prescribing that
"administrative orders cannot be enforced in the courts in the absence of an express statutory provision for that purpose" was
Art. 774. Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights and obligations to the
extent of the value of the inheritance, of a person are transmitted through his death to another or others
either by his will or by operation of law.33
By considering the document, petitioner NHA should have noted that the original applicant has already passed away.
Margarita Herrera passed away on October 27, 1971.34 The NHA issued its resolution35 on February 5, 1986. The NHA gave
due course to the application made by Francisca Herrera without considering that the initial applicant's death would transfer
all her property, rights and obligations to the estate including whatever interest she has or may have had over the disputed
properties. To the extent of the interest that the original owner had over the property, the same should go to her estate.
Margarita Herrera had an interest in the property and that interest should go to her estate upon her demise so as to be able to
properly distribute them later to her heirsin accordance with a will or by operation of law.
The death of Margarita Herrera does not extinguish her interest over the property. Margarita Herrera had an existing
Contract to Sell36 with NHA as the seller. Upon Margarita Herrera's demise, this Contract to Sell was neither nullified nor
revoked. This Contract to Sell was an obligation on both partiesMargarita Herrera and NHA. Obligations are
transmissible.37 Margarita Herrera's obligation to pay became transmissible at the time of her death either by will or by
operation of law.
If we sustain the position of the NHA that this document is not a will, then the interests of the decedent should transfer by
virtue of an operation of law and not by virtue of a resolution by the NHA. For as it stands, NHA cannot make another
contract to sell to other parties of a property already initially paid for by the decedent. Such would be an act contrary to the
law on succession and the law on sales and obligations.38
When the original buyer died, the NHA should have considered the estate of the decedent as the next "person"39 likely to
stand in to fulfill the obligation to pay the rest of the purchase price. The opposition of other heirs to the repurchase by
Francisca Herrera should have put the NHA on guard as to the award of the lots. Further, the Decision in the said Civil Case
No. B-1263 (questioning the Deed of Self-Adjudication) which rendered the deed therein null and void40 should have alerted
the NHA that there are other heirs to the interests and properties of the decedent who may claim the property after a testate
or intestate proceeding is concluded. The NHA therefore acted arbitrarily in the award of the lots.
We need not delve into the validity of the will. The issue is for the probate court to determine. We affirm the Court of
Appeals and the Regional Trial Court which noted that it has an element of testamentary disposition where (1) it devolved
and transferred property; (2) the effect of which shall transpire upon the death of the instrument maker.41
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition of the National Housing Authority is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. No. 68370 dated August 28, 2003, affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna in Civil
Case No. B-2780 dated March 9, 1998, is hereby AFFIRMED.
No cost.
SO ORDERED.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, Azcuna, Garcia, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
Rollo, at 8.
A Decree Creating the National Housing Authority and Dissolving the Existing Housing Agencies, Defining
Its Powers and Functions, Providing Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes, Presidential Decree No. 757,
promulgated July 31, 1975.
3
Rollo, at 70.
Id.
It should be noted that a thumbmark is considered a valid signature. As held in Payad v. Tolentino, 62 Phil.
848 (1936): "The testator's thumbprint is always valid and sufficient signature for the purpose of complying
with the requirement of the article. While in most of these cases, the testator was suffering from some
infirmity which made the writing of the testator's name difficult or impossible, there seems to be no basis for
limiting the validity of thumbprints only to cases of illness or infirmity."
6
Rollo, at 49.
Rollo, at 39-43.
10
Id., at 9.
11
Id., at 9, 44-47.
12
Id., at 9.
13
Id., at 25-26. Francisca Herrera left behind her husband, Macario Berroya, and children: Ramon, Antonio,
Alberto, Rosita, Pacita, Bernabe, Gregorio, Josefina and Rustica. In the extra judicial settlement made by the
said heirs, Rosita, Pacita, Bernabe, Gregorio, Josefina and Rustica waived all their rights, interest and
participation therein in favor of their siblings Macario, Alberto, Ramon and Antonio. Deeds of sale involving
the subject lots were executed by the NHA in favor of Alberto, Antonio and Macario. Hence, TCT Nos. T173557, T-173579, T-173578 and T-183166 were issued to Macario, Alberto and Antonio, respectively.
14
Id., at 27.
15
Id., at 27-28.
16
Id., at 28.
17
Id., at 5.
18
19
Id., at 71-72.
20
21
22
Administrative Code of 1987, Executive Order No. 292, Bk. VIII, ch. 1, 2(9).
23
Midland Insurance Corp. v. IAC, G.R. No. L-71905, August 13, 1986, 143 SCRA 458, 462.
24
1987 Phil. Const., art. VIII, 1 as explained in United Residents of Dominical Hills, Inc. v. Commission on
Settlement of Land Problems, G.R. No. 135945, March 7, 2001, 353 SCRA 783, 797-798.
25
26
An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating Funds Therefor and for Other Purposes, Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129, promulgated August 14, 1981.
27
Id. 9 (3).
28
29
30
Ayala Corp. v. Rosa-Diana Realty and Dev't. Corp., 400 Phil. 511 (2000).
31
Rollo, at 17.
32
Id.
33
34
Rollo, at 70.
35
Id., at 39-43.
36
Id., at 24; C.A. G.R. No. 68370 citing Agreement No. 3787, dated July 28, 1959.
37
38
Civil Code, arts. 1544 (which prohibit double sales) and 1165 (which established the obligation of the seller
to the buyer respecting a thing which is determinate in nature).
39
Because the estate acquires juridical personality to continue the transmissible obligations and rights of the
decedent.
40
41
Rollo, at 34.
THIRD DIVISION
CRESENCIANA TUBO
Present:
Ynares-Santiago, J. (Chairperson),
- versus -
Austria-Martinez,
Chico-Nazario,
Nachura, and
Reyes, JJ.
EVANGELINE RODRIGUEZ,
Promulgated:
BUENAVENTURA RODRIGUEZ,
Respondents.
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
179[1] Rollo, pp. 39-49. Penned by Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr. and concurred
in by Associate Justices Rosalinda Asuncion-Vicente and Sesinando E. Villon.
at
Testamento
giving
petitioner
Cresenciana
Tubo
Benjamin
Rodriguez
(the
deceased
husband
of
SO ORDERED.186[8]
SO ORDERED.187[9]
SO ORDERED.188[10]
I.
II.
190[12] Racaza v. Gozum, G.R. No. 148759, June 8, 2006, 490 SCRA 302, 312.
191[13] Domalsin v. Valenciano, G.R. No. 158687, January 25, 2006, 480 SCRA 114,
131.
192[14] Id.
196[18] Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. III (1979), pp. 151-152.
We are, thus, left with the deed of sale and the certificate of title
over the property to consider.
matter of Civil Case No. 01-1641. Our ruling that petitioner has a
better right of possession was arrived at on the basis of evidence
without prejudice to the eventual outcome of the annulment case,
where the issue as to who has title to the property in question is
fully threshed out. As the law now stands, in an ejectment suit,
the question of ownership may be provisionally ruled upon for the
sole purpose of determining who is entitled to possession de
facto.
SO ORDERED.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
Associate Justice
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
ESTATE OF THE LATE ENCARNACION VDA. DE PANLILIO, represented by GEORGE LIZARES, Petitioner,
vs.
GONZALO DIZON, RICARDO GUINTU, ROGELIO MUNOZ, ELISEO GUINTU, ROBERTO DIZON,
Severino Santiago, Regional Director of Region III, San Fernando, Pampanga, "to distribute all land transfer certificates, in
view of the desire of Encarnacion Vda. de Panlilio to place her property under the Land Transfer Program of the
government."
On the basis of the action of the DAR Secretary, the CAR, on March 17, 1978, issued an Order dismissing the complaint of
Paulina Mercado (lessee) in CAR Case No. 1649-P74, thus:
With this development, the resolution of the principal issue in the instant case has become moot and academic, it being
already settled in the DAR proceedings the placement of the land in question under the land transfer program of the
government. Therefore, the instant case should be dismissed. Necessarily, all pending incidents should be deemed disposed
of. 17
On December 29, 1986, Panlilio died.
Thereafter, sometime in 1993, the DAR issued Emancipation Patents (EPs) to the following tenants of Panlilio:
EP Nos.
Hermenegildo Flores
690774
143627
Celestino Dizon
690960
683355
45390
Gonzalo Dizon
680524
Roberto Dizon
690758
Cipriano Dizon
45260
45256
Antonio Dizon
681072
Teodulo Dizon
45326
Juanario Maniago
143207
Celestino Esguerra
45265
45219
Florentino Lapuz
690759
45259
Gorgonio Canlas
143508
Carlos Pineda
197097
45254
Renato Gozun
143208
Romeo Pangilinan
475341
Jose Serrano
475340
Wenceslao Pangilinan
476572
475339
Candido Timbang
143931
45262
45257
Arsenio Legaspi
4526618
Subsequently, in June 1994, the Bacolod City Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 49 appointed petitioner George Lizares as
executor of the estate of Panlilio.19 Records show that petitioner Lizares is the son of the late Jesus Lizares, Panlilios
administrator of Hacienda Masamat during her lifetime.
On February 28, 1994, petitioner Lizares filed his first complaint with the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator
(PARAD), Region III, San Fernando, Pampanga, docketed as DARAB Case No. 638 P94,20 for annulment of coverage of
landholdings under PD 27 and ejectment against Reynaldo Villanueva, et al. who filed their Answer with Counterclaim21 on
April 12, 1994.
On April 10, 1995, petitioner filed with the PARAD three more complaints for cancellation of EPs, docketed as DARAB
Case Nos. 933-P95,22 934-P95,23 and 935-P95,24 against the rest of respondents who filed their motions to dismiss25 on
grounds of lack of cause of action and lack of jurisdiction. On July 13, 1995, the PARAD denied the motions.26 Respondents
then filed their Answer with Counterclaim.27
Upon petitioners motion, all the cases were consolidated. The PARAD then directed the parties to submit their respective
position papers,28 and, thereafter, considered the cases submitted for decision.
The three (3) complaints filed in 1995 for cancellation of EPs have the following defendants: (1) in DARAB Case No. 933P95, Herminigildo Flores and the Regional Director, DAR, Region III; (2) in DARAB Case No. 934-P95, Celestino Dizon,
Gonzalo Dizon, Roberto Dizon, and the Regional Director, DAR, Region III; and (3) in DARAB Case No. 935-P95,
Cipriano Dizon, Antonio Dizon, Teodulo Dizon, Juanario Maniago, Celestino Esguerra, Florentino Lapuz, Gorgonio Canlas,
Antonio Lising, Carlos Pineda, Renato Gozun, Alfredo Mercado, Romeo Pangilinan, Jose Serrano, Wenceslao Pangilinan,
Guillermo del Rosario, Candido Timbang, Bienvenido Mechada, and Arsenio Legaspi, and the Regional Director, DAR,
Region III.
Thus, aside from public respondent DAR Regional Director, Region III, DARAB Case No. 638-P94 had 15 defendants,
DARAB Case No. 933-P95 had a sole defendant, DARAB Case No. 934-P95 had three defendants, and DARAB Case No.
935-P95 had 18 defendants. All the four (4) consolidated cases were against 37 defendants.
The Ruling of the PARAD in DARAB Case
Nos. 638-P94, 933-P95, 934-P95 and 935-P95
On November 14, 1995, the PARAD rendered a Joint Decision29 dismissing petitioner Lizares complaint on the ground that
the subject landholdings have been properly placed under the coverage of PD 27 through the January 12, 1977 Affidavit30 of
Panlilio, unequivocally placing her entire property within the coverage of the OLT. In addition, the PARAD relied on the
report of the DAR and the Bureau of Lands personnel that the subject landholding is devoted to palay. And, finally, the
PARAD applied the equitable remedy of laches, in that Panlilio failed during her lifetime to bring to the attention of the
DAR and CAR her February 3, 1977 Affidavit31 ostensibly revoking her previous January 12, 1977 Affidavit.
The Ruling of the DARAB in DARAB Case Nos. 4558-4561
(DARAB Case Nos. 638-P94, 933-P95, 934-P95 and 935-P95)
Aggrieved, petitioner Lizares appealed the PARAD decision before the DARAB, which, on August 7, 1997, rendered a
Decision32 affirming the PARAD decision.
The DARAB likewise disregarded petitioner Lizares Motion for Reconsideration33 of the August 7, 1997 Decision.
Prior to the issuance of the August 7, 1997 DARAB Decision, petitioner Lizares and defendant-appellees Wenceslao
Pangilinan, Romeo Pangilinan, Jose Serrano, and Guillermo del Rosario filed their February 10, 1997 Joint Partial Motion to
Dismiss34 with the DARAB, seeking dismissal of their respective claims in DARAB Case No. 4561 (DARAB Case No. 935P95) based on an Affidavit of Cancellation of Lis Pendens Annotation of TCT Nos. 14321, 14322, 14323, and 14324, all of
the Pampanga Register of Deeds,35 which was executed by petitioner Lizares. Apparently, petitioner Lizares received from a
certain Ms. Petronila Catap the amount of PhP 1,356,619 for the settlement of DARAB Case No. 4561 (DARAB Case No.
935-P95) against the abovementioned defendant-appellees.36
Earlier on, petitioner Lizares filed his April 19, 1996 Motion to Withdraw Appeal in favor of defendant-appellees Reynaldo
Villanueva, Cenon Guinto, Carmelita Vda. de David, Oscar Santiago, Celestino Dizon, Fortunato Timbang, and Florentino
Lapuz in DARAB Case No. 4558 (DARAB Case No. 638-P94); defendant-appellee Celestino Dizon in DARAB Case No.
4559 (DARAB Case No. 933-P95); and defendant-appellees Antonio Dizon, Teodulo Dizon, Celestino Esguerra, Florentino
Lapuz, and Candido Timbang in DARAB Case No. 4561 (DARAB Case No. 935-P95), as said defendant-appellees agreed
to settle and compromise with petitioner Lizares. The motion was however resisted by other defendant-appellees through a
May 27, 1996 Counter-Motion to the Plaintiff-Appellant Motion to Withdraw Appeal,37 on the ground that a piece-meal
withdrawal is not proper as the matter in controversy is common and the same to all.
Unfortunately, the Motion to Withdraw Appeal was not resolved as petitioner Lizares did not attend the DARAB scheduled
hearings. Thus, the August 7, 1997 Decision was subsequently promulgated in favor of all defendant-appellees.
Petitioner Lizares elevated the DARAB consolidated cases to the CA for review in CA-G.R. SP No. 47502 under Rule 43 of
the Rules of Court.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The April 11, 2000 CA Decision
At the outset, the CA saw it differently.
On April 11, 2000, the CA rendered a Decision sustaining petitioners position and granted relief, thus:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
affirming the decision of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board, Region III, San Fernando, Pampanga is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Certificates of Land Transfer issued to private respondents insofar as they pertain to
sugarlands are hereby declared NULL and VOID.38
The CA primarily anchored its ruling on Panlilios February 3, 1977 Affidavit ostensibly revoking her January 12, 1977
Affidavit and ascribed error to both the PARAD and DARAB in ignoring Panlilios second affidavit. Moreover, it relied on
the November 26, 1973 letter-complaint of Paulina Mercado to the DAR Secretary and the CAR Resolution in CAR Case
No. 1649-P74, that the subject landholding in question is principally devoted to the production of sugar cane as buttressed
by the report and findings of Atty. Gregorio D. Sapera, Legal Officer III of the DAR Central Office.
The November 29, 2000 CA Amended Decision
Unconvinced, Reynaldo Villanueva, et al. interposed a Motion for Reconsideration or in the alternative, Motion to Remand
for New Trial39 of said Decision, where they contended that:
1. Petitioners complaints should have been dismissed for his failure to implead therein indispensable parties,
namely the Land Bank of the Philippines which paid Panlilio the amortizations on the land and the third
persons who purchased the landholdings from the tenants;
2. [The CA] disturbed and reversed the findings of fact by the PARAD and the DARAB supported by
substantial evidence. x x x
3. It is not the job of the appellate court to sieve through the evidence considered by the administrative
agency in adjudicating the case before it, following the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. x x x
4. [The CA] violated the principle of res judicata in reversing the CAR resolution dismissing the complaint in
Case No. 1649-P74 rendered twenty-two years ago. Likewise, estoppel and laches bar the instant actions. x x
x
5. Lastly, the petition should be dismissed in favor of Romeo Pangilinan, Wenceslao Pangilinan, Jose Serrano
and Guillermo del Rosario in view of the compromise agreement in DARAB Case No. 4561 between them
and petitioner herein. They submitted, as proof, their joint motion to dismiss the complaint executed on
February 10, 1997 and petitioner Lizares receipt from them of P1,356,619.00 as consideration for the
dismissal of his complaints against them.40
After considering the above contentions together with petitioner Lizares Comment on the Motion for Reconsideration dated
May 2, 2000 with Motion for Correction of the Dispositive Portion of the Decision,41 respondents Reply42 to said comment,
and petitioners Rejoinder,43 the appellate court rendered on November 29, 2000 the assailed Amended Decision on a vote of
3-2, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, respondents motion for reconsideration of Our Decision is hereby GRANTED. The petition is ordered
DISMISSED and the challenged DARAB decision is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.44
In reversing its earlier April 11, 2000 Decision, the CA concluded that the February 3, 1977 Affidavit was not executed by
Panlilio, ratiocinating that if she indeed made the second affidavit which purportedly repudiated her earlier January 12, 1977
Affidavit, the natural course of action to take was for her to submit the second affidavit to the DAR to exclude the majority
of her landholdings planted with sugar cane from the coverage of the OLT under PD 27. Her failure to effectuate the
removal of her land from the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) coverage for nine (9) years until her death
on December 29, 1986 led the court a quo to believe that the second affidavit was not genuine. Moreover, Jesus Lizares,
Panlilios administrator and father of petitioner Lizares, likewise did not take any action, in accordance with the second
affidavit showing that he was not aware of such affidavit of revocation. The CA even doubted petitioner Lizares contention
that the second affidavit was submitted to the DAR and CAR but was not acted upon for such averment was not
substantiated.
The appellate court also found Panlilio and her successors-in-interest guilty of laches, pointing out that aside from the
alleged second affidavit of revocation, there was no indication of Panlilios intention to recover the disputed landholdings.
On the issue of fraud and collusion on the part of the DAR personnel, the CA found that no preponderance of evidence was
evinced to prove the accusation.
In fine, the CA recognized and applied the principle of res judicata to the March 17, 1978 CAR Order rendered more than
20 years ago, holding that the resolution of said court placing the entire landholdings in question under the coverage of PD
27 had long become final and executory.
Petitioner Lizares plea for recall of the assailed Amended Decision was rejected through the assailed June 26, 2001 CA
Resolution.45
Petition for review on certiorari under G.R. No. 148777
Thus, we have this Petition for Review on Certiorari against only 15 private respondents from the original defendants below,
namely: Gonzalo Dizon, Ricardo Guintu, Rogelio Munoz, Eliseo Guintu, Roberto Dizon, Edilberto Catu, Herminigildo
Flores, Cipriano Dizon, Juanario Maniago, Gorgonio Canlas, Antonio Lising, Carlos Pineda, Renato Gozun, Alfredo
Mercado, and Bienvenido Machada.
Petition for certiorari under G.R. No. 157598
Consequent to the filing of the Petition for Review on Certiorari by petitioner Lizares, on January 28, 2002, the other
original defendants in the consolidated cases before the PARAD and DARAB, who were not made respondents in G.R. No.
148777, namely: Reynaldo Villanueva, Cenon Guinto, Celestino Dizon, Carmelita Vda. de David, Florentino Lapuz,
Fortunato Timbang, Oscar Santiago, Candido Timbang, Celestino Esguerra, Antonio Dizon, and Teodulo Dizon, filed before
the CA a Motion for Entry of Judgment46 of the November 29, 2000 Amended Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 47502 based on
the out-of-court settlement during the pendency of the case. On July 4, 2002, a second Motion for Entry of Judgment47 with
the same averments was filed reiterating their plea for execution.
The November 14, 2002 CA Resolution48 denied their motions for entry of judgment. A Motion for Reconsideration49 having
been turned down through the January 24, 2003 CA Resolution,50 petitioners now register the instant Petition for Certiorari
and Mandamus in G.R. No. 157598, assailing the aforesaid Resolutions for grave abuse of discretion.
The Issues
In G.R. No. 148777, petitioner Lizares presents the following issues for our consideration:
1. Whether or not in its 29 November 2000 Amended Decision, the Court of Appeals erred gravely in
reversing its ruling in the 11 April 2000 Decision on the import and significance of the second affidavit
executed by Encarnacion L. Vda. de Panlilio revoking or repudiating her first affidavit (by which she
purportedly agreed to have her land at Hacienda Masamat, which was dedicated to sugarcane, placed under
the coverage of P.D. No. 27);
2. Whether or not in its 29 November 2000 Amended Decision, the Court of Appeals erred gravely in setting
aside the 11 April 2000 Decisions ruling that the land in question being planted with sugarcane is not
covered by P.D. No. 27, by instead declaring that "the fact that land is sugarland has become inconsequential
to the coverage under P.D. No. 27 in the light of the affidavit dated January 12, 1977";
3. Whether or not in its 29 November 2000 Amended Decision, the Court of Appeals erred gravely in finding
Encarnacion L. Vda. de Panlilio and petitioner guilty of laches or estoppel;
4. Whether or not res judicata applies in the instant case;
5. Whether or not in its 29 November 2000 Amended Decision, the Court of Appeals erred gravely in failing
to rule that there was fraud and collusion on the part of the respondents in the coverage of the subject parcels
of land;
6. Whether or not the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion in declaring the transfer made by
the private respondents to third persons valid;
7. Whether or not forum-shopping or a false certification of non-forum shopping [is present] here; and
8. Whether or not the instant petition complies with the nature and requisites of an appeal by certiorari under
Rule 45.51
In G.R. No. 157598, petitioners raise the sole issue of "whether the petitioners are entitled to an entry of judgment."52
The Courts Ruling
G.R. No. 148777
Before we go to the substantial issues, we tackle first the procedural issues raised in the last two issues in G.R. No. 148777
on whether the instant petition complies with the requirements of Rule 45 and whether forum shopping is present.
Petition complied with requisites for review on certiorari
Private respondents contend that the grounds relied upon by petitioner are factual in nature and thus outside the purview of a
review on certiorari by this Court. Petitioner disagrees and posits that the petition raises issues of both fact and law which
are so intimately intertwined and that issues of law permeate the controversy between the parties.
We find for petitioner. The rule is clearquestions of facts are proscribed by Rule 45. A question of law exists when the
doubt or controversy concerns the correct application of law or jurisprudence to a certain set of facts; or when the issue does
not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of facts being admitted. A
question of fact exists when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts or when the query invites
calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of the witnesses, the existence and relevancy of specific
surrounding circumstances, as well as their relation to each other and to the whole, and the probability of the situation.53
The rule is subject to exceptions. One such exception exists in this case. Mixed questions of law and facts are raised
pertaining to the applicability of PD 27 on a large portion of subject landholdings that were planted with sugar cane, which
would have been otherwise exempt, but were voluntary waived through an affidavit by the lot owner to be placed under the
OLT pursuant to said law; the import and significance of the purported affidavit of revocation; and, the interpretation of
Executive Order No. (EO) 22854 in relation to subsequent land transfer made by the farmer-beneficiaries.
At the very least, the instant petition complies with the requisites of Rule 45, particularly Section 6, as we have given the
instant petition due course.55
No forum shopping
Private respondents argue that petitioner Lizares is guilty of forum shopping for having pursued other civil cases allegedly
involving the same subject matter and on the same grounds raised in this petition. Petitioner Lizares counters that there is no
forum shopping, first, as the instant petition is a mere continuation of a pending action, that is, the consolidated cases filed
with the PARAD; second, the causes of action and issues raised in the other civil cases lodged with the RTC were different.
Respondents postulation cannot be entertained.
Private respondents failed to furnish us copies of portions of the relevant records of the other civil cases instituted by
petitioner Lizares needed to determine the existence of forum shopping. Absent such necessary pleadings, we are
constrained to take petitioners assertion at face value that the other cases, particularly Civil Case Nos. 11342, 11344, 11345,
11346 and 11347, filed before the RTC differ from the instant case as to the issues raised, the reliefs prayed for, and the
parties impleaded.
Time and again, the court has reminded prospective petitioners and lawyers alike that it is necessary that they attach to the
petition under Rule 45 all the material portions of the case records of the lower courts or quasi-judicial bodies which at one
time or another had adjudicated the case or complaint. These documents are required to support the grounds presented in the
petition under Rule 45.56 Any decision, order, pleading, or document forming parts of the records that is relevant or
important to the petition should be appended to it so that the court, in reviewing the petition, will have easy access to these
papers. More importantly, the submission will obviate delay as the court can readily decide the petition without need of the
elevation of the records of the court or quasi-judicial body a quo.
Now we move on to the substantive issues.
Main Issue: Genuineness and authenticity
of the February 3, 1977 Affidavit
The pith of the dispute is whether or not the February 3, 1977 affidavit of the lot owner, the late Encarnacion Vda. de
Panlilio, is genuine or authentic.
Petitioner alleged in his position paper that the same affidavit of revocation was submitted to the DAR and the CAR, but
they were not acted upon because of the dismissal of the cases for cancellation of CLTs filed by Paulina Mercado.
Petitioners claim is a mere allegation. It has not been substantiated. Again, if it were true, why did Panlilio and Paulina fail
to pursue any further action?59
We respect and accord finality to the aforequoted findings of facts of the CA, being the tribunal tasked to undertake a final
review of the facts of the case subject of course to certain tolerated exceptional situations. Once again we reiterate the
prevailing rule that the findings of fact of the trial court, particularly when affirmed by the Court of Appeals are binding
upon this Court.60
Second Issue: There is valid waiver through
the January 12, 1977 Affidavit
The CA likewise did not err in reversing its April 11, 2000 Decision that the subject land was properly covered by PD 27
since Panlilio surrendered said lot to the DAR for coverage under PD 27 pursuant to her January 12, 1977 Affidavit. The
non-existence of the February 3, 1977 Affidavit supports the inclusion of the entire lot in the CARP of the Government.
On the other hand, petitioner Lizares argues that there was no valid waiver under PD 27.
We are not convinced.
Considering the non-revocation of the January 12, 1977 Panlilio Affidavit,, the CA considered the land of Panlilio planted
with sugar cane as falling under the coverage of PD 27, thus:
[W]hile the proceedings in the CAR tend to establish the land as principally sugarland, hence outside the coverage of P.D.
27, still, Panlilios consent to have the entire land covered by the said law as alleged in her first affidavit, cannot be
construed as a violation of its provisions. In fact, in executing the said affidavit, she did not defeat, nor contravene the
express intent of the law to emancipate her tenants from the bondage of the soil. In doing so, she even supported its
implementation.
In Our challenged Decision We found that the subject land was principally planted [with] sugar and therefore outside the
pale of P.D. 27. But We overlooked the fact that Panlilio in her first affidavit, which was not validly revoked, expressed her
desire to have her entire landholdings placed within the coverage of Operation Land Transfer. To be sure, the fact that
Panlilios land is sugarland has become inconsequential in the light of her first affidavit.61
We agree with the CA.
While PD 27 clearly applies to private agricultural lands primarily devoted to rice and corn under a system of sharecrop or
lease-tenancy, whether classified as landed estate or not, it does not preclude nor prohibit the disposition of landholdings
planted with other crops to the tenants by express will of the landowner under PD 27.
In the instant case, a large portion of Hacienda Masamat with an aggregate area of 115.41 hectares was planted with sugar
cane. It is undisputed, as was duly shown in the January 12, 1977 Panlilio Affidavit, that only 50.22 hectares were planted
with palay. Thus, approximately 65.19 hectares of the subject landholdings were planted with sugar cane aside from the
portions used for the residences of the tenants and planted with crops for their daily sustenance. Needless to say, with the
January 12, 1977 Panlilio Affidavit, she expressed her intent to include the 65.19 hectares to be placed under the OLT
pursuant to PD 27 in favor of her tenants which otherwise would have been exempt. Indeed, waiver or an intentional and
voluntary surrender of a right can give rise to a valid title or ownership of a property in favor of another under Article 6 of
the Civil Code. Thus, such disposition through the OLT pursuant to PD 27 is indeed legal and proper and no irregularity can
be attributed to the DAR which merely relied on the January 12, 1977 Panlilio Affidavit.
Third Issue: Equitable remedy of laches
The court a quo correctly ruled that Panlilio and her successors-in-interest are bound by the coverage of the lot under PD 27
by reason of laches.
Even granting arguendo that the February 3, 1977 Affidavit of revocation is genuine and was furnished both the DAR and
the CAR, still, no relief can be accorded petitioner Lizares on account of laches.
Laches and its elements
Delay for a prolonged period of time can result in loss of rights and actions. The equitable defense of laches does not even
concern itself with the character of the defendants title, but only with plaintiffs long inaction or inexcusable neglect to bar
the latters action as it would be inequitable and unjust to the defendant.
According to settled jurisprudence, "laches" means "the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of
time, to do that whichby the exercise of due diligencecould or should have been done earlier."62 Verily, laches serves to
deprive a party guilty of it of any judicial remedies. Its elements are: (1) conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one
under whom the defendant claims, giving rise to the situation which the complaint seeks a remedy; (2) delay in asserting the
complainants rights, the complainant having had knowledge or notice of the defendants conduct as having been afforded an
opportunity to institute a suit; (3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the complainant would assert
the right in which the defendant bases the suit; and (4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to
the complainant, or the suit is not held barred.63
In Santiago v. Court of Appeals, we explained that there is "no absolute rule as to what constitutes laches or staleness of
demand; each case is to be determined according to its particular circumstances."64
Laches has set in
The records demonstrate clear signs of laches. The first element is undisputed. Panlilios erstwhile tenants were issued CLTs
sometime in 1973 and subsequently EPs in 1993. CAR Case No. 1649-P74 filed by Panlilios lessee, Paulina Mercado, was
dismissed with finality on March 17, 1978 as no appeal was pursued. Since then, Panlilio and her administrator for the
subject landholdings in Hacienda Masamat, Jesus Lizares, did not take any action to revoke the CLTs. With the dismissal of
the land case in 1978, with finality, the possession of the tenants of Panlilio was fully recognized by her and her successorsin-interest.
It cannot be disputed that Panlilios tenants, the private respondents, occupied portions of the subject landholdings in an
open, continuous, and adverse manner in the concept of owners from 1978 until 1994 and 1995 when the subject cases were
instituted by petitioner Lizares or for more than sixteen (16) years. Private respondents possession of said portions for a
lengthy period of time gave cause to petitioner to complain and take legal steps to protect Panlilios rights of ownership and
new action or suit involving the same cause of action either before the same or any other tribunal; and 2) Any right, fact, or
matter in issue directly adjudicated or necessarily involved in the determination of an action before a competent court in
which a judgment or decree is rendered on the merits is conclusively settled by the judgment therein and cannot again be
litigated between the parties and their privies whether or not the claim or demand, purpose or subject matter of the two suits
is the same. These two main rules mark the distinction between the principles governing the two typical cases in which a
judgment may operate as evidence. In speaking of these cases, the first general rule above stated, and which corresponds to
the aforequoted paragraph (b) of Section 49, is referred to as "bar by former judgment" while the second general rule, which
is embodied in paragraph (c) of the same section, is known as "conclusiveness of judgment."
Stated otherwise, when we speak of res judicata in its concept as a "bar by former judgment," the judgment rendered in the
first case is an absolute bar to the subsequent action since said judgment is conclusive not only as to the matters offered and
received to sustain that judgment but also as to any other matter which might have been offered for that purpose and which
could have been adjudged therein. This is the concept in which the term res judicata is more commonly and generally used
and in which it is understood as the bar by prior judgment constituting a ground for a motion to dismiss in civil cases.
On the other hand, the less familiar concept or less terminological usage of res judicata as a rule on conclusiveness of
judgment refers to the situation where the judgment in the prior action operates as an estoppel only as to the matters actually
determined therein or which were necessarily included therein. Consequently, since other admissible and relevant matters
which the parties in the second action could properly offer are not concluded by the said judgment, the same is not a bar to
or a ground for dismissal of the second action.
At bottom, the other elements being virtually the same, the fundamental difference between the rule of res judicata as a bar
by former judgment and as merely a rule on the conclusiveness of judgment is that, in the first, there is an identity in the
cause of action in both cases involved whereas, in the second, the cause of action in the first case is different from that in the
second case.65
Premised on the foregoing disquisition, the principle of res judicata requires the concurrence of the following requisites:
a) The former judgment or order must be final;
b) It must be a judgment or order on the merits, that is, it was rendered after a consideration of the evidence
or stipulations submitted by the parties at the trial of the case;
c) It must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; and
d) There must be, between the first and second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter and of cause of
action. This requisite is satisfied if the two actions are substantially between the same parties.66
For want of the fourth requisite that there must be, between the first and second actions, identity of parties, subject matter,
and cause of action, the instant case is thus removed from the operation of the principle of res judicata. Stated differently,
there is no identity of parties and issues in CAR Case No. 1649-P74 and the instant case.
Nevertheless, while res judicata is not applicable in the instant case, still, it will not accord legal relief to petitioner with
respect to his claim of ownership over the lots in dispute.
transfer to anybody since the lot is still owned by the Government. The prohibition against transfers to persons other than the
heirs of other qualified beneficiaries stems from the policy of the Government to develop generations of farmers to attain its
avowed goal to have an adequate and sustained agricultural production. With certitude, such objective will not see the light
of day if lands covered by agrarian reform can easily be converted for non-agricultural purposes.
On the other hand, Sec. 6 of EO 228 provides, thus:
Sec. 6 The total cost of the land including interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum with a two percent (2%) interest
rebate for amortizations paid on times, shall be paid by the farmer-beneficiary or his heirs to the Land Bank over a period of
up to twenty (20) years in twenty (20) equal annual amortizations. Lands already valued and financed by Land Bank are
likewise extended a 20-year period of payment of twenty (20) equal annual amortizations. However, the farmer-beneficiary
if he so elects, may pay in full before the twentieth year or may request the Land Bank to structure a repayment period of
less than twenty (20) years if the amount to amount to be financed and the corresponding annual obligations are well within
the farmers capacity to meet. Ownership of lands acquired by farmer-beneficiary may be transferred after full payment of
amortizations. (Emphasis supplied.)
The CA highlighted and made much of the last sentence of Sec. 6 which authorizes the transfer of the ownership of the lands
acquired by the farmer-beneficiary after full payment of amortizations. It construed said provision to mean that the farmerbeneficiary can sell the land even to a non-qualified person.
This is incorrect.
First of all, the provision in question is silent as to who can be the transferees of the land acquired through the CARP. The
rule in statutory construction is that statutes in pari materia should be construed together and harmonized.69 Since there
appears to be no irreconcilable conflict between PD 27 and Sec. 6 of EO 228, then the two (2) provisions can be made
compatible by maintaining the rule in PD 27 that lands acquired under said decree can only be transferred to the heirs of the
original beneficiary or to the Government. Second, PD 27 is the specific law on agrarian reform while EO 228 was issued
principally to implement PD 27. This can easily be inferred from EO 228 which provided for the mode of valuation of lands
subject of PD 27 and the manner of payment by the farmer-beneficiary and mode of compensation to the land owner. Third,
implied repeals are not favored. A perusal of the aforequoted Sec. 6 of EO 228 readily reveals that it confers upon the
beneficiary the privilege of paying the value of the land on a twenty (20)-year annual amortization plan at six percent (6%)
interest per annum. He may elect to pay in full the installments or have the payment plan restructured. Said provision
concludes by saying that after full payment, ownership of the land may already be transferred. Thus, it is plain to see that
Sec. 6 principally deals with payment of amortization and not on who qualify as legal transferees of lands acquired under
PD 27. Since there is no incompatibility between PD 27 and EO 228 on the qualified transferees of land acquired under PD
27, ergo, the lands acquired under said law can only be transferred to the heirs of the beneficiary or to the Government for
eventual transfer to qualified beneficiaries by the DAR pursuant to the explicit proscription in PD 27.
Thus, the alleged transfers made by private respondents in G.R. No. 148777 of lands acquired under PD 27 to non-qualified
persons are illegal and null and void.70
The ruling in Victorino Torres v. Leon Ventura sheds light on the policy behind the prohibition, thus:
The law is clear and leaves no room for doubt. Upon the promulgation of Presidential Decree No. 27 on October 21, 1972,
petitioner was DEEMED OWNER of the land in question. As of that date, he was declared emancipated from the bondage
of the soil. As such, he gained the rights to possess, cultivate, and enjoy the landholding for himself. Those rights over that
particular property were granted by the government to him and to no other. To insure his continued possession and
enjoyment of the property, he could not, under the law, make any valid form of transfer except to the government or by
hereditary succession, to his successors.71
In addition, the prohibition was expanded not only to cover the title issued to the tenant-farmer but also the rights and
interests of the farmer in the land while he is still paying the amortizations on it. A contrary ruling would make the farmer an
"easy prey to those who would like to tempt [him/her] with cash in exchange for inchoate title over the same," and PD 27
could be easily circumvented and the title shall eventually be acquired by non-tillers of the soil.72
Anent the contravention of the prohibition under PD 27, we ruled in Siacor v. Gigantana73 and more recently in CaliwagCarmona v. Court of Appeals,74 that sales or transfers of lands made in violation of PD 27 and EO 228 in favor of persons
other than the Government by other legal means or to the farmers successor by hereditary succession are null and void. The
prohibition even extends to the surrender of the land to the former landowner. The sales or transfers are void ab initio, being
contrary to law and public policy under Art. 5 of the Civil Code that "acts executed against the provisions of mandatory or
prohibiting laws shall be void x x x." In this regard, the DAR is duty-bound to take appropriate measures to annul the illegal
transfers and recover the land unlawfully conveyed to non-qualified persons for disposition to qualified beneficiaries. In the
case at bar, the alleged transfers made by some if not all of respondents Gonzalo Dizon, et al. (G.R. No. 148777) of lands
covered by PD 27 to non-qualified persons are illegal and null and void.
G.R. No. 157598
Finally, we resolve the sole issue raised in G.R. No. 157598 on whether petitioners Reynaldo Villanueva, et al. are entitled to
a partial entry of judgment of the Amended Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 47502.
Petitioners in G.R. No. 157598 are not entitled to a partial entry of judgment in CA-G.R. SP No. 47502
Petitioners contend that they are entitled to a partial entry of judgment in CA-G.R. SP No. 47502 as respondent George
Lizares in G.R. No. 148777 deliberately excluded them on account of the amicable settlement concluded between them.
Thus, they contend that any judgment rendered by the Court in G.R. No. 148777 will not affect them. In gist, petitioners
strongly assert that the Amended Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 47502 is already final and executory with respect to them.
Respondent Lizares, on the other hand, has continually affirmed that he deliberately excluded petitioners in his petition for
review under G.R. No. 148777 as they had amicably settled with him; and that he has released, discharged, and waived any
and all claims against petitioners on account of the petition. Thus, respondent Lizares interposes no objection for the
issuance of a partial entry of judgment in CA-G.R. SP No. 47502 insofar as petitioners are concerned, as the issues and
reliefs he is seeking in G.R. No. 148777 do not concern nor prejudice petitioners.
We disagree.
It is clear that petitioners, though they settled with respondent Lizares out-of-court, were not able to get a favorable ruling
from the DARAB approving the motion to withdraw appeal filed by respondent Lizares in DARAB Case Nos. 4558, 4559,
and 4561. This motion for the recall of the appeal remained unacted upon until the August 7, 1997 DARAB Decision was
rendered in favor of all the defendants and appellees.
Subsequently, the DARAB cases were elevated for review to the CA and docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 47502.
In its November 29, 2000 Amended Decision, the CA upheld the DARAB Decision.
On January 28, 2002, petitioners Reynaldo Villanueva, et al. filed a Motion for Entry of Judgment based on their out-ofcourt settlement with petitioner Lizares while the DARAB case was pending. On July 4, 2002, a second motion for entry of
judgment was filed which was denied together with the first motion by the CA on November 14, 2002.
The reason for the denial by the CA of the aforementioned prayers for entry of judgment is as follows:
Our Amended Decision in this case had long been elevated to the Supreme Court by a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45. As held by the Supreme Court in Heirs of the Late Justice Jose B. L. Reyes vs. Court of Appeals, by the mere fact of
the filing of the petition, the finality of the Court of Appeals decision was stayed, and there could be no entry of judgment
therein, and hence, no premature execution could be had. In that case, the High Court emphatically declared that when this
Court adopted a resolution granting execution pending appeal after the petition for review was already filed in the Supreme
Court, the Court of Appeals encroached on the hallowed grounds of the Supreme Court. Thus, We find no legal basis or
justification to allow [the] motions for partial entry of judgment even on the ground that private [respondent]-movants were
not impleaded in G.R. No. 148777 and in the absence of opposition from herein petitioner who had allegedly concluded an
out-of-court settlement with private [respondent]-movants.75
We fully agree with the CA that there should be no partial entry of judgment for petitioners Reynaldo Villanueva, et al. since
their motion to withdraw was not acted upon by the DARAB nor by the CA. Thus, there is nothing to record in the Book of
Entry of Judgments.
More importantly, it appears that the transfers made by some or all of petitioners Reynaldo Villanueva, et al. (G.R. No.
157598) to non-qualified persons are proscribed under PD 27. Such finding necessarily preludes the entry of judgment in
favor of said petitioners. Consequently, the alleged transfers made by petitioners Villanueva, et al., being in contravention of
a prohibitory provision of PD 27, are null and void, and the titles issued to non-qualified individuals have to be cancelled
and new ones issued to the Government.1wphi1
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 148777 is partly granted. The November 29, 2000 Amended Decision of the CA in
CA-G.R. SP No. 47502 is affirmed with the modification that the transfers made by private respondents to non-qualified
persons, if any, under PD 27 are illegal and declared NULL and VOID, and the titles issued based on the transfers are
likewise NULL and VOID. The DAR is ORDERED to investigate the transfers covering the subject landholdings and, based
on the findings of illegal transfers for violations of PD 27 and EO 228, to coordinate with the Register of Deeds of
Pampanga for the cancellation of the titles registered in the names of the transferees or to their subsequent transferees and to
issue new titles to the Government for disposition to qualified beneficiaries. The November 14, 1995 PARAD Joint Decision
in DARAB Cases Nos. 638-P94, 933-P95, 934-P95, and 935-P95, as affirmed by the August 7, 1997 DARAB Decision
in DARAB Case Nos. 4558, 4559, 4560, and 4561, is accordingly MODIFIED.
The petition in G.R. No. 157598 is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The transfers made by petitioners Reynaldo, et al. to nonqualified persons, if any, under PD 27 are likewise declared NULL and VOID. Similarly, the DAR is ORDERED to
investigate the transfers covering the subject landholdings and, based on the findings of illegal transfers for violations of PD
27 and EO 228, to coordinate with the Register of Deeds of Pampanga for the cancellation of the titles concerned registered
in the names of the transferees or to their subsequent transferees and to issue new titles to the Government for disposition to
qualified beneficiaries.
SO ORDERED.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
C E R T I F I C AT I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion
of the Courts Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Footnotes
1
"Decreeing the Emancipation of Tenants from the Bondage of the Soil, Transferring to them the Ownership
of the Land They Till and Providing the Instruments and Mechanism Therefor" (1972).
Id. at 24-52. The Amended Decision was penned by Associate Justice Angelina Sandoval Gutierrez
(Chairperson, now a Member of this Court) and concurred in by Associate Justices Martin S. Villarama, Jr.
and Perlita J. Tria Tiron; with Associate Justice Remedios Salazar-Fernando dissenting, id. at 53-70,
concurred in by Associate Justice Salvador J. Valdez, Jr.
4
Id. at 71-82.
Id. at 26-28.
Id. at 100-103.
10
Id. at 30.
11
Id. at 110-117.
12
13
CA rollo, pp. 283-285, 286, 287-289, 290-292, 256-258, 273, 293-294, 298-300, 259-261, 277-279, 274276, 262-264, 295-297, 265-269, 270-272, & 280-282, respectively.
14
Id. at 195-200.
15
Id. at 307-312.
16
Id. at 156.
17
Id. at 229-232.
18
20
21
22
Id. at 95-99.
23
24
Id. at 287-294.
25
Id. at 118-123.
26
Id. at 133-134.
27
Id. at 135-139.
28
Id. at 159-160.
29
30
31
32
Supra note 4.
33
34
Id. at 402-404.
35
Id. at 400.
36
37
Id. at 441-442.
38
Id. at 356-376, at 375. The Decision was penned by Associate Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando and
concurred in by Associate Justices Angelina Sandoval Gutierrez (Chairperson, now a Member of this Court)
and Salvador J. Valdez, Jr.
39
Id. at 377-399.
40
Id. at 514-516.
41
Id. at 408-416.
42
Id. at 417-421.
43
Id. at 431-440.
44
45
Supra note 5.
46
Supra note 9.
47
48
Supra note 8.
49
50
51
52
53
Heirs of Cipriano Reyes v. Calumpang, G.R. No. 138463, October 30, 2006, 506 SCRA 56, 70; citations
omitted.
54
"Declaring Full Land Ownership to Qualified Farmer Beneficiaries Covered by Presidential Decree No. 27;
Determining the Value of Remaining Unvalued Rice and Corn Lands Subject to P.D. No. 27; and Providing
for the Manner of Payment by the Farmer Beneficiary and Mode of Compensation to the Landowner" (1987).
55
Rollo (G.R. No. 148777), pp. 307-308, April 10, 2002 Resolution of the Third Division.
56
Sec. 4.
57
See Union Motor Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 159738, December 9,
2004, 445 SCRA 683; citing Superlines Transportation Company, Inc. and Manolet Lavides v. ICC Leasing
and Financing Corporation, G.R. No. 150673, February 28, 2003, 398 SCRA 508.
58
See Fujitsu Computer Products Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 158232, March 31, 2005, 454
SCRA 737; citing Globe Telecom, Inc. v. Florendo-Flores, G.R. No. 150092, September 27, 2002, 390 SCRA
201.
59
60
Xentrex Automotive, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 121559, June 18, 1998, 291 SCRA 66, 71; citations
omitted.
61
62
Soliva v. The Intestate Estate of Marcelo M. Villalba, G.R. No. 154017, December 8, 2003, 417 SCRA 277,
286; citing Ramos v. Heirs of Ramos, Sr., G.R. No. 140848, April 25, 2002, 381 SCRA 594, 605; Westmont
Bank v. Ong, G.R. No. 132560, January 30, 2002, 375 SCRA 212, 222.
63
Felix Gochan and Sons Realty Corporation v. Heirs of Baba, G.R. No. 138945, August 19, 2003, 409
SCRA 306, 315; citing Santos v. Santos, G.R. No. 133895, 2 October 2, 2001, 366 SCRA 395, 405-406.
64
G.R. No. 103959, August 21, 1997, 278 SCRA 98, 112.
65
G.R. Nos. 75109-10, June 28, 1989, 174 SCRA 330, 338-339.
66
67
68
69
Rodriguez, Statutory Construction 250 (2nd ed., 1998); citing 82 C.J.S. Statutes, 367.
70
On transfers of lots acquired under RA 6657 which took effect on June 10, 1998, Section 27 provides:
Section 27. Transferability of Awarded Lands.Land acquired by beneficiaries under this Act may
not be sold, transferred or conveyed except through hereditary succession, or to the government, or to
the LBP, or to other qualified beneficiaries for a period of ten (10) years: Provided, however, That the
children or the spouse of the transferor, shall have a right to repurchase the land from the government
or LBP within a period of two (2) years. Due notice of the availability of the land shall be given by
the LBP to the Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee (BARC) of the barangay where the land is
situated. The Provincial Agrarian Reform Coordinating Committee (PARCCOM), as herein provided,
shall in turn, be given due notice thereof by the BARC. (Emphasis supplied.)
If the land has not yet been fully paid by the beneficiary, the rights to the land may be transferred or
conveyed, with prior approval of the DAR, to any heir of the beneficiary or to any other beneficiary
who, as a condition for such transfer or conveyance, shall cultivate the land himself. Failing
compliance herewith, the land shall be transferred to the LBP which shall give due notice of the
availability of the land in the manner specified in the immediately preceding paragraph.
In the event of such transfer to the LBP, the latter shall compensate the beneficiary in one lump sum
for the amounts the latter has already paid, together with the value of improvements he has made on
the land.
Unlike in PD 27, RA 6657 now authorizes the transfer of the rights to the land to any heir of the
beneficiary or other qualified beneficiary who shall personally cultivate the land even if the
amortizations have not yet been paid. It is clear however that the land will continuously be devoted to
agricultural production.
If the amortizations have been fully paid, the land can only be sold, transferred, or conveyed through
hereditary succession or to the government, the LBP, or other qualified beneficiaries within a period
of ten (10) years from date of acquisition. After the ten (10)-year period had elapsed, then the land can
be sold to anybody even if the transferee is not a qualified beneficiary. If the land has been the subject
of conversion under Article 65 of RA 6657, it can be transferred to anybody after the lapse of five (5)
years from date of acquisition.
71
72
Id. at 105.
73
74
G.R. No. 148157, July 27, 2006, 496 SCRA 723, 734.
75
FIRST DIVISION
On 25 March 1991, Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. then 73 years old, suffered a stroke and
lapsed into comatose condition. To date, his condition has not materially improved.
On 06 June 1991, petitioner commenced with the Regional Trial Court, Iloilo City
Special Proceedings No. 45689, a petition for appointment of judicial guardian over the
person and property of Dr. Jardeleza, Sr. and prayed for the issuance of letters of
guardianship to his mother, Gilda L. Jardeleza. ii[2]
On 19 June 1991, the trial court issued an order setting the petition for hearing so that
all persons concerned may appear and show cause if any why the petition should not
be granted.iii[3]
On 3 July 1991, petitioner filed with the trial court a motion for the issuance of letters of
guardianship to him, rather than to his mother, on the ground that she considered the
property acquired by Dr. Jardeleza as her own and did not want to be appointed
guardian.iv[4]
On 09 August 1991, respondents filed with the trial court an opposition to the petition for
guardianship and the motion for issuance of letters of guardianship to petitioner.v[5]
On 20 August 1993, the trial court issued an order dismissing the petition for
guardianship.vi[6] The trial court concluded, without explanation, that the petition is
superfluous and would only serve to duplicate the powers of the wife under the explicit
provisions of Article 124, second paragraph, of the Family Code.
On 17 September 1993, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration pointing out that the
Court of Appeals held in a case under Article 124 of the Family Code where the
incapacitated spouse is incapable of being notified or unable to answer the petition, the
procedural recourse is guardianship of the incapacitated spouse. vii[7]
On 24 September 1993, the trial court denied the motion for reconsideration finding it
unmeritorious.viii[8]
Hence, this petition.ix[9]
The petition raises a pure legal question, to wit: whether Article 124 of the Family Code
renders superfluous the appointment of a judicial guardian over the person and estate
of an incompetent married person.
Very recently, in a related case, we ruled that Article 124 of the Family Code was not
applicable to the situation of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. and that the proper procedure
was an application for appointment of judicial guardian under Rule 93 of the 1964
Revised Rules of Court.x[10]
WHEREFORE, the Court grants the petition, reverses and sets aside the resolutions of
the Regional Trial Court, Iloilo City, in Special Proceedings No. 4689.
The Court remands the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this
decision.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 191031, October 05, 2015
DOLORES L. HACBANG AND BERNARDO J. HACBANG, Petitioners, v. ATTY.
BASILIO H. ALO, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:*
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse the 13 October 2009 Decision and the 21
January 2010 resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R CV No. 83137.1 The CA
affirmed the Quezon City Regional Trial Court's (RTC) dismissal of the petitioners' complaint in
Civil Case No. Q 99-366602 for lack of cause of action.
ANTECEDENTS
On 3 April 1937, Bishop Sofronio Hacbang (Bishop Sofronio) died leaving several properties
behind. Among these was Lot No. 8-A of subdivision Plan Psd-6227 located at Espaa Street,
San Juan, Rizal,3 covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. (19896) 227644 (the
subject lot).
Bishop Sofronio was survived by his parents, Basilio and Maria Hacbang, and his siblings:
Perfecto Hacbang, Joaquin Hacbang, Lucia Teresita Hacbang, and Dolores Hacbang Alo.
Petitioner Dolores L. Hacbang is the grandchild of Perfecto while petitioner Bernardo Hacbang
(Bernardo) is a son of Joaquin. The respondent Basilio Alo is the son of Dolores.
Bishop Sofronio left a will denominated as Ultima Voluntad y Testamento. He left one-half of his
properties to his parents and devised the other half - including the subject lot - to his sister
Dolores. The pertinent portions of his will read:
cral awlawlibrary
FOURTH: By these presents I give, name, declare and institute as heirs my parents BASILIO
HACBANG and MARIA GABORNY DE HACBANG of one-half of all my properties, whether
real, personal or mixed, in whatever place they may be found, whether they were acquired before
or after the execution of this testament, including all the properties that at the time of my death I
may have the power to dispose of by will, and which properties consist of the following:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Fifty (50) percent of the shares of stock that I own in the "SAMAR NAVIGATION CO. INC."
A parcel of land with its camarin situated in the Municipality of Carigara, Province of Leyte.
A parcel of land in the Barrio of Pinamopuan, of the Municipality of Capoocan, Province of
Leyte.
A parcel of land with house and planted to coconuts in the Barrio of Sorsogon, Municipality of
Sta. Margarita, Province of Samar.
FIFTH: The other remaining half of my properties wherever they may be located, by these
presents I give, cede and hand over to my sister Dolores Hacbang, which properties are more
particularly described as follows:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
On 16 April 1937, a petition for the probate of Bishop Sofronio's will and the settlement of his
estate was filed before the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila. The petition was
docketed as SP. PROC. No. 51199.
On 21 May 1937, the CFI admitted Bishop Sofronio's will to probate.5
The records are bare with respect to what happened next. They show, however, that the CFI
ordered the proceedings to be archived on 2 November 1957.
On 24 September 1971, the Register of Deeds of Quezon City appears to have issued TCT No.
169342 over the subject lot in the name of respondent Basilio H. Alo. TCT No. 169342 cancelled
TCT No. 117322/T-500. However, this Court cannot determine the circumstances surrounding
the issuance of TCT No. 169342 or the relationship between TCT No. 117322/T-500 and TCT
No. (19896) 227644 due to the inadequacy of the documents on record.
On 17 March 1975, Dolores Hacbang Alo moved to revive the settlement proceedings because
the CFI had not yet completed adjudicating the properties.
On 23 May 1975, the CFI denied the motion for revival because the order to archive "had long
become final and executory."6
On 1 February 1999, petitioners Dolores L. Hacbang and Bernardo filed a petition to cancel TCT
No. 169342 on the ground that it was fraudulently secured. In support of their allegations, they
submitted the 5 March 1997 Investigation Report of Land Registration Authority (LRA)
Investigator Rodrigo I. Del Rosario. The report concluded that TCT No. 117322 was of "doubtful
authenticity" and was neither derived from TCT No. 117322 nor issued by the Registry of Deeds
of Quezon City on 24 September 1971 at 2:30 PM.
In his Answer dated 18 August 1999, Basilio denied all allegations of irregularity and
wrongdoing. He also moved to dismiss the petition because the petitioners were neither heirs nor
devisees of Bishop Sofronio and had no legal interest in the subject lot.
On 7 January 2003, the RTC dismissed the petition because the petitioners had no right to
prosecute the case on the subject lot. The RTC noted that Bishop Sofronio's will had already
been admitted into probate in 1937; thus, the intrinsic validity of the will is no longer in question.
Though the settlement proceedings were archived, Bishop Sofronio already designated his heirs:
Bishop Sofronio's parents were compulsory heirs entitled to half of his estate while the
respondent's mother, Dolores Hacbang Alo, was devised the remaining half (the free portion).
Thus, the petitioners, who are neither compulsory nor testamentary heirs, are not real parties in
interest.
The petitioners moved for reconsideration which the RTC denied on 19 August 2003.
The petitioners appealed to the CA, arguing that: (1) Bishop Sofronio's will did not validly
transfer the subject property to Dolores Hacbang Alo; (2) the probate of the will is not conclusive
as to the validity of its intrinsic provisions; and (3) only a final decree of distribution of the estate
vests title on the properties from the estate on the distributees.7 The appeal was docketed as CAG.R CV No. 83137.
They further argued that the distribution of the estate should be governed by intestate succession
because: (1) the subject property was not adjudicated; and (2) the settlement proceedings were
archived and dismissed. Thus, all the properties passed on to and became part of the estate of
Bishop Sofronio's parents. The petitioners concluded that they had legal interest in the subject lot
as representatives of their ascendants, the other children of Bishop Sofronio's parents.
In his appeal brief, the respondent insisted that the petitioners do not have a clear legal right to
maintain the suit because: (1) as collateral relatives, they cannot invoke the right of
representation to the estate of Bishop Sofronio; and (2) they are not real parties in interest and
have no right of action over the subject lot.
On 13 October 2009, the CA affirmed the RTC's order of dismissal. The CA held that the
admission of Bishop Sofronio's will to probate precluded intestate succession unless the will was
intrinsically invalid or failed to completely dispose of his estate. Contrary to the petitioners'
contention, the settlement proceedings were not dismissed but archived; the will did not lose its
validity merely because the proceedings were archived. Undoubtedly, Bishop Sofronio did not
die intestate.
The CA denied the petitioners' claim to a right of inheritance by representation. It held that the
presence of Bishop Sofronio's parents during his death excluded his brothers and sisters from
being compulsory heirs; the petitioners cannot represent those who are hot entitled to succeed.
Considering that they are neither compulsory nor testamentary heirs, petitioners have no legal
interest in the subject property.
The petitioners moved for reconsideration which the CA denied on 21 January 2010. The denial
paved the way for the petitioners to file the present petition for review on certiorari.
THE PETITION
The petitioners argue: (1) that the CA erred when it failed to rule on the validity of TCT No.
169342; (2) that the probate proceedings of the estate was dismissed, not archived; and (3) that
the CA erred when it used Bishop Sofronio's will as basis to declare that they are not real parties
in interest.
In his Comment, the respondent maintained that the petitioners had no right over the property
and moved to dismiss the present petition.
OUR RULING
At the outset, this Court observes that the parties and even the lower courts erroneously applied
the provisions of the present Civil Code to the will and the estate of Bishop Sofronio. The law in
force at the time of the decedent's death determines the applicable law over the settlement of his
estate.8 Bishop Sofronio died in 1937 before the enactment of the Civil Code in 1949. Therefore,
the correct applicable laws to the settlement of his estate are the 1889 Spanish Civil Code and the
1901 Code of Civil Procedure.
In any case, under both the Spanish Code and our Civil Code, successional rights are vested at
the precise moment of the death of the decedent. Section 657 of the Spanish code provides:
cral awlawlibrary
Art. 657. Los derechos a la sucesion de una persona se transmiten desde el momento de su
muerte.9
chanrobleslaw
The inheritance vests immediately upon the decedent's death without a moment's interruption.
This provision was later on translated and adopted as Article 777 of our Civil Code.10
As a consequence of this principle, ownership over the inheritance passes to the heirs at the
precise moment of death - not at the time the heirs are declared, nor at the time of the partition,
nor at the distribution of the properties. There is no interruption between the end of the
decedent's ownership and the start of the heir/legatee/devisee's ownership.
For intestate heirs, this means that they are immediately entitled to their hereditary shares in the
estate even though they may not be entitled to any particular properties yet. For legatees and
devisees granted specific properties, this means that they acquire ownership over the legacies and
devises at that immediate moment without prejudice to the legitimes of compulsory heirs.
Undoubtedly, Bishop Sofronio did not die intestate. He left a will that was probated in 1937. He
left half of his properties to his parents and the remaining half to his sister Dolores Hacbang Alo.
The admission of his will to probate is conclusive with respect to its due execution and extrinsic
validity.11
Unfortunately, the settlement proceedings were never concluded; the case was archived without
any pronouncement as to the intrinsic validity of the will or an adjudication of the properties.
Because of this, the petitioners posit that intestate succession should govern. They maintain that
the entire inheritance should have gone to Bishop Sofronio's parents, the petitioners' ascendants.
Thus, they claim to have a legal interest in the subject lot as representatives of the other children
of Bishop Sofronio's parents.
We do not find the petitioners' argument meritorious.
Our jurisdiction has always respected a decedent's freedom to dispose of his estate, whether
under the Spanish Civil Code or under the present Civil Code. Article 763 of the Spanish Code
provides:
cral awlawlibrary
Art. 763. El que no tuviere herederos forzosos puede disponer por testamento de todos sus bienes
o de parte de ellos en favor de cualquiera persona que tenga capacidad para adquirirlos. El que
tuviere herederos forzosos solo podra disponer de sus bienes en la forma y con las limitaciones
que se establecen en la section quinta de este capitulo.
chanrobl eslaw
This provision states that a person without compulsory heirs may dispose of his estate, either in
part or in its entirety, in favor of anyone capacitated to succeed him; if the testator has
compulsory heirs, he can dispose of his property provided he does not impair their legitimes.
This provision was later translated and adopted as Article 842 of our Civil Code.12
Our jurisdiction accords great respect to the testator's freedom of disposition. Hence, testate
succession has always been preferred over intestacy.13 As much as possible, a testator's will is
treated and interpreted in a way that would render all of its provisions operative.14 Hence, there is
no basis to apply the provisions on intestacy when testate succession evidently applies.
Even though the CFI archived the settlement proceedings, there is no indication that it declared
any of the dispositions in the will invalid. The records are understandably bare considering the
probate proceedings were initiated as early as 1937. Nonetheless, we find no reason to doubt the
intrinsic validity of the will.
Bishop Sofronio was free to dispose of his estate without prejudice to the legitimes of his
compulsory heirs. Bishop Sofronio's only compulsory heirs were his parents.15 Their legitime
was one-half of Bishop Sofronio's estate.16 Considering that Bishop Sofronio gave his parents
half of his estate, then he was free to dispose of the free portion of his estate in favor of his sister,
Dolores Hacbang Alo. Thus, his will was intrinsically valid.
The CFPs failure to adjudicate the specific properties is irrelevant because Bishop Sofronio did
not just name his heirs; he also identified the specific properties forming part of their inheritance.
The dispositions in the will rendered court adjudication and distribution unnecessary.
The petitioners' contention that only a final decree of distribution of the estate vests title to the
land of the estate in the distributees is also incorrect. Again, ownership over the inheritance vests
upon the heirs, legatees, and devisees immediately upon the death of the decedent.
At the precise moment of death, the heirs become owners of the estate pro-indiviso. They
become absolute owners of their undivided aliquot share but with respect to the individual
properties of the estate, they become co-owners. This co-ownership remains until partition and
distribution. Until then, the individual heirs cannot claim any rights over a specific property from
the estate. This is because the heirs do not know which properties will be adjudicated to them
yet. Hence, there is a need for a partition before title over particular properties vest in the
distributee-heirs.
However, heirs, legatees, and devisees bequeathed specific properties do not require Court
adjudication to identify which particular properties become theirs; the testator had already
identified these. From the very moment of the testator's death, title over these particular
properties vests on the heir, legatee, or devisee.
On 3 April 1937, title over the subject lot passed on to the respondent's mother, Dolores Hacbang
Alo, at the exact moment of her brother's death. From that moment on, she was free to dispose of
the subject lot as a consequence of her ownership.
On the other hand, Bishop Sofronio's parents, Basilio and Maria Gaborny Hacbang, never
acquired the title over the subject lot. Thus, it never became part of their estate. Clearly, the
petitioners - who claim to represent the children of Basilio and Maria Gaborny in the spouses'
estate -have no legal right or interest over the subject lot.
Every ordinary civil action must be based on a cause of action - an act or omission that violates
the rights of the plaintiff.17 A cause of action requires:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
ChanRoblesVirtual awlibrary
(2) a correlative duty of the defendant to respect the plaintiffs right; and
(3) an act or omission of the defendant in violation of the plaintiffs right.18
Every action must also be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest: the
party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment.19 These fundamental requirements
are not merely technical matters; they go into the very substance of every suit.
The petitioners came to the courts praying for the annulment of the respondent's title yet they
failed to show that they are entitled to even ask for such relief. They have no right over the
subject lot and the respondent has no legal obligation to them with respect to the subject lot.
Even if we assume that the respondent fraudulently or irregularly secured his certificate of title,
the bottom-line is that the petitioners have no legal standing to sue for the cancellation of this
title. This right only belongs to the rightful owner of the subject lot.
Judicial power is the duty of the courts to settle actual controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable.20 Courts settle real legal disputes involving the rights
and obligations between parties. If either of the parties is not the real party in interest, the Court
cannot grant the reliefs prayed for because that party has no legal right or duty with respect to his
opponent. Further litigation becomes an academic exercise in legal theory that eventually settles
nothing - a waste of time that could have been spent resolving actual justiciable controversies.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against
the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
THIRD DIVISION
CELESTINO BALUS,
Petitioner,
Present:
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
PERALTA, and
MENDOZA, JJ.
SATURNINO
BALUS
and
LEONARDA BALUS VDA. DE
CALUNOD,
Promulgated:
Respondents.
January 15, 2010
x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Rufo
and
Sebastiana
Balus.
Sebastiana
died
on
also
contained
provisions
wherein
the
parties
Three
years
after
the
execution
of
the
Extrajudicial
Transfer
39,484(a.f.)205[7]
was
Certificate
issued
in
the
of
Title
name
(TCT)
of
No.
T-
respondents.
of
Possession
and
Damages
against
petitioner,
The RTC held that the right of petitioner to purchase from the
respondents his share in the disputed property was recognized by
the provisions of the Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate, which the
parties had executed before the respondents bought the subject
lot from the Bank.
Aggrieved by the Decision of the RTC, herein respondents
filed an appeal with the CA.
208[10]Id. at 139-140.
Settlement,
209[11]Rollo, p. 21.
having
in
mind
the
intention
of
have
accrued
thereto
since
the
opening
of
the
Petitioner
and
respondents,
therefore,
were
wrong
in
has
been
expressly
stipulated
but
also
to
all
the
Settlement
would
not,
in
any
way,
support
is
determined
from
the
express
terms
of
their
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
Chairperson
Associate Justice
JOSE C. MENDOZA
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
FIRST DIVISION
CORAZON M. GREGORIO, as
administratrix of the estate
litigated in the case below,
RAMIRO T. MADARANG, and
the heirs of CASIMIRO R.
MADARANG,
JR.,
namely:
Estrelita L. Madarang, Consuelo P.
Madarang, Casimiro Madarang
IV, and Jane Margaret MadarangCrabtree,
Present:
Promulgated:
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.
Casimiro V. Madarang, Sr. (Casimiro, Sr. or the decedent) died intestate on
June 3, 1995, leaving real and personal properties with an estimated value of
P200,000.00.220[1] He was survived by his wife Dolores and their five children,
namely Casimiro, Jr., Jose, Ramiro, Vicente and Corazon.
In the intestate proceedings filed by the couples son Jose which was lodged
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 57, Dolores was
appointed as administratrix of the intestate estate of Casimiro, Sr.221[2]
A hearing was thus conducted to determine whether the six lots formed part
of the estate of the decedent. By Order of April 5, 2002,
222
following:
x x x The said properties appear to have been acquired by the spouses after [their
marriage on] December 27, 1931 and during their marriage or coverture. Article
160 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines (which is the governing law in this
particular case) is very explicit in providing that all properties of the marriage are
presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership. This presumption, to the mind of
the Court, has not been sufficiently rebutted by the special administratrix.
[Dolores] This presumption applies and holds even if the land is registered under
the wifes name as long as it was acquired during marriage (De Guinoo vs. Court
of Appeals. G.R. No. L-5541, June 26, 1955) or even if the wife purchased the
land alone (Flores, et.al. Vs. Escudero, et.al., G.R. No. L-5302, March 11,
1953).223[4] (underscoring supplied),
instructed Dolores to revise her Inventory Report to include the six lots.
Dolores and her children, except Jose who suggested that the former be
referred to as oppositors,224[5] questioned the RTC order of inclusion of the six lots
via motion for reconsideration during the pendency of which motion the court
appointed herein petitioner Corazon as co-administratrix of her mother Dolores.
As Dolores and her co-oppositors alleged that the six lots had been
transferred during the lifetime of the decedent, they were ordered to submit their
affidavits, in lieu of oral testimony, to support the allegation. Only herein
respondent Vicente complied. In his Affidavit, Vicente declared that one of the six
lots, Lot 829-B-4-B, was conveyed to him by a Deed of Donation executed in
August 1992 by his parents Dolores and Casimiro, Sr.225[6]
It appears that petitioners later manifested that they no longer oppose the
provisional inclusion of the six lots, except Lot 829-B-4-B.
The RTC, by Order of January 20, 2003,226[7] thus modified its April 5, 2002
Order as follows:
Of the six lots directed included in the inventory, Lot 829 B-4-B should be
excluded. The administratrix is directed within sixty (60) days: (1) to submit a
revised inventory in accordance with the Order dated April 5, 2002, as here
modified; and (2) to render an accounting of her administration of the estate of
Casimiro V. Madarang. (underscoring supplied),
Jose moved to reconsider the RTC January 20, 2003 Order, arguing that
since the title to Lot 829-B-4-B remained registered in the name of his parents, it
should not be excluded from the Inventory; and that the Deed of Donation in
Vicentes favor was not notarized nor registered with the Register of Deeds. Joses
motion for reconsideration having been denied by Order of February 5, 2003, he
filed a Notice of Appeal.
In his Brief filed before the Court of Appeals, Jose claimed that the RTC
erred in excluding Lot 829-B-4-B from the Inventory as what the lower court
should have done was to . . . maintain the order including said lot in the inventory
of the estate so Vicente can file an ordinary action where its ownership can be
threshed out.
Jose later filed before the appellate court a Motion to Withdraw Petition
which his co-heirs-oppositors-herein petitioners opposed on the ground that, inter
alia, a grant thereof would end the administration proceedings. The appellate court,
by Resolution of January 18, 2008,227[8] granted the withdrawal on the ground that
it would not prejudice the rights of the oppositors.
xxxx
In the instant case, the Probate Court found that the parties of the case
interposed no objection to the non-inclusion of Lot No. 829-B-4-B in the
inventory of the estate of Casimiro V. Madarang, in effect, they have consented
thereto. x x x
xxxx
Moreover, [herein petitioners] in their appeal brief, ha[ve] extensively
argued that . . . Vicente Madarang [to whom the questioned lot was donated]
and his family have been in continuous, actual and physical possession of the
donated lot for over twenty (20) years, even before the execution of the so called
donation inter vivos in 1992. . . . Vicente Madarang has his residential house
thereon and that his ownership over the donated lot has been fully recognized by
the entire Madarang Clan, including all his brothers and sisters, except the much
belated objection by the appellant (Jose), allegedly resorted to as an act of
harassment. 229[10] (emphasis and underscoring supplied),
Petitioners contend that since the only issue for consideration by the
appellate court was the merit of Joses Motion to Withdraw Petition, it exceeded its
jurisdiction when it passed upon the merits of Joses appeal from the RTC order
excluding Lot 829-B-4-B from the Inventory.
The appellate court did not thus err in passing on the said issue.
More specifically, petitioners question the appellate courts finding that as the
parties interposed no objection to the non-inclusion of Lot No. 829-B-4-B in the
inventory of the estate of Casimiro V. Madarang, in effect, they have consented
thereto.231[12]
A review of the voluminous records of the case shows that, indeed, there was
no accord among the parties respecting the exclusion of Lot 829-B-4-B.
While a probate court, being of special and limited jurisdiction, cannot act
on questions of title and ownership, it can, for purposes of inclusion or exclusion in
the inventory of properties of a decedent, make a provisional determination of
ownership, without prejudice to a final determination through a separate action in a
court of general jurisdiction.
The facts obtaining in the present case, however, do not call for the probate
court to make a provisional determination of ownership of Lot 829-B-4-B. It bears
stress that the question is one of collation or advancement by the decedent to an
heir over which the question of title and ownership can be passed upon by a
probate court.232[13]
Article 1061. Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs,
must bring into the mass of the estate any property or right which he may have
received from the decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation,
or any other gratuitous title, in order that it may be computed in the determination
of the legitime of each heir and in the account of partition. (underscoring
supplied)
By express provision of law then, Lot 829-B-4-B, which was alleged to have
been donated by the decedent and his wife to their son-respondent Vicente, should
not be excluded from the inventory of the properties of the decedent.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed November 6,
2008 Resolution of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE. Petitioner Corazon M.
Gregorio and her co-administratrix Dolores Madarang are DIRECTED to include
Lot 829-B-4-B in the Inventory of the properties of the intestate estate of Casimiro
V. Madarang, Sr.
Let the records of the case be remanded to the court of origin, the Regional
Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 57, which is DIRECTED to proceed with the
disposition of the case with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Chairperson
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the
conclusions in the above decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
SECOND DIVISION
ATTY.
FERRER,
PEDRO
M.
Petitioner,
Present:
- versus CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
BRION,
SPOUSES ALFREDO DIAZ
ABAD,
REINA
and
PEREZ, JJ.
COMANDANTE
SPOUSES BIENVENIDO
PANGAN and ELIZABETH
PANGAN,
Respondents.
Promulgated:
April 23, 2010
x-------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
Petitioner Atty. Ferrer claimed in his original Complaint238[6] that on May 7, 1999,
the Diazes, as represented by their daughter Comandante, through a Special Power of
Attorney (SPA),239[7] obtained from him a loan of P1,118,228.00. The loan was secured
236[4] Records, pp. 287-291; penned by Judge Emilio L. Leachon, Jr.
237[5] CA rollo, p. 91.
238[6] Records, pp. 3-6.
239[7] Id. at 7.
by a Real Estate Mortgage Contract 240[8] by way of second mortgage over Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. RT-6604241[9] and a Promissory Note242[10] payable
within six months or up to November 7, 1999. Comandante also issued to petitioner
postdated checks to secure payment of said loan.
Petitioner further claimed that prior to this or on May 29, 1998, Comandante, for a
valuable consideration of P600,000.00, which amount formed part of the
abovementioned secured loan, executed in his favor an instrument entitled Waiver of
Hereditary Rights and Interests Over a Real Property (Still Undivided), 243[11] the
pertinent portions of which read:
I, REINA D. COMANDANTE, of legal age, Filipino, married, with residence
and postal address at No. 6, Road 20, Project 8, Quezon City, Metro Manila, Philippines,
for a valuable consideration of SIX HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P600,000.00)
which constitutes my legal obligation/loan to Pedro M. Ferrer, likewise of legal age,
Filipino, married to Erlinda B. Ferrer, with residence and postal address at No. 9, Lot 4,
Puerto Rico Street, Loyola Grand Villas, Quezon City, Metro Manila, Philippines, by
virtue of these presents, do hereby WAIVE, and/or REPUDIATE all my hereditary rights
and interests as a legitimate heir/daughter of Sps. Alfredo T. Diaz and Imelda G. Diaz in
favor of said Pedro M. Ferrer, his heirs and assigns over a certain parcel of land together
with all the improvements found thereon and which property is more particularly
described as follows:
xxxx
and which property is titled and registered in the name of my parents Alfredo T. Diaz and
Imelda G. Diaz, as evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT 6604 (82020) PR18887.
(sgd.)
REINA D. COMANDANTE
Affiant
29, 1999 a Complaint245[13] for Collection of Sum of Money Secured by Real Estate
Mortgage Contract against the Diazes and Comandante docketed as Civil Case No. Q99-38876 and raffled to Branch 224 of RTC, Quezon City.
occasions which totaled P500,000.00. Comandante, however, claimed that these loans
were secured by chattel mortgages over her taxi units in addition to several postdated
checks she issued in favor of petitioner.
As she could not practically comply with her obligation, petitioner and his wife,
presented to Comandante sometime in May 1998 a document denominated as Waiver of
Hereditary Rights and Interests Over a Real Property (Still Undivided) pertaining to a
waiver of her hereditary share over her parents abovementioned property. Purportedly,
the execution of said waiver was to secure Comandantes loan with the couple which at
that time had already ballooned to P600,000.00 due to interests.
A year later, the couple again required Comandante to sign the following
documents: (1) a Real Estate Mortgage Contract over her parents property; and, (2) an
undated Promissory Note, both corresponding to the amount of P1,118,228.00, which
petitioner claimed to be the total amount of Comandantes monetary obligation to him
exclusive of charges and interests. Comandante alleged that she reminded petitioner that
she was not the registered owner of the subject property and that although her parents
granted her SPA, same only pertains to her authority to mortgage the property to banks
and other financial institutions and not to individuals. Petitioner nonetheless assured
Comandante that the SPA was also applicable to their transaction. As Comandante was
still hesitant, petitioner and his wife threatened to foreclose the formers taxi units and
present the postdated checks she issued to the bank for payment. For fear of losing her
taxi units which were the only source of her livelihood, Comandante was thus
constrained to sign the mortgage agreement as well as the promissory note. Petitioner,
however, did not furnish her with copies of said documents on the pretext that they still
have to be notarized, but, as can be gleaned from the records, the documents were never
notarized. Moreover, Comandante claimed that the SPA alluded to by petitioner in his
complaint was not the same SPA under which she thought she derived the authority to
execute the mortgage contract.
Comandante likewise alleged that on September 29, 1999 at 10:00 o clock in the
morning, she executed an Affidavit of Repudiation/Revocation of Waiver of Hereditary
Rights and Interests Over A (Still Undivided) Real Property,248[16] which she caused to
be annotated on the title of the subject property with the Registry of Deeds of Quezon
City on the same day. Interestingly, petitioner filed his complaint later that day too.
250[18] ART. 1347. All things which are not outside the commerce of men, including future
things, may be the object of a contract. All rights which are not intransmissible may also be
the object of contracts.
No contract may be entered into upon future inheritance
except in cases expressly authorized by law.
cannot be the source of any right or obligation in petitioners favor; that the Real Estate
Mortgage was of doubtful validity as she executed the same without valid authority from
her parents; and, that the prayer for collection and/or judicial foreclosure was irregular as
petitioner cannot seek said remedies at the same time.
For their part, the Diazes asserted that petitioner has no cause of action against
them. They claimed that they do not even know petitioner and that they did not execute
any SPA in favor of Comandante authorizing her to mortgage for the second time the
All services which are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public
policy may likewise be the object of a contract.
251[19] Records, p. 1.
252[20] Id. at 93.
subject property. They also contested the due execution of the SPA as it was neither
authenticated before the Philippine Consulate in the United States nor notarized before a
notary public in the State of New York where the Diazes have been residing for 16 years.
They claimed that they do not owe petitioner anything. The Diazes also pointed out that
the complaint merely refers to Comandantes personal obligation to petitioner with which
they had nothing to do. They thus prayed that the complaint against them be dismissed.253
[21]
At the Pangans end, they alleged that they acquired the subject property by
purchase in good faith and for a consideration of P3,000,000.00 on November 11, 1999
from the Diazes through the latters daughter Comandante who was clothed with SPA
acknowledged before the Consul of New York. The Pangans immediately took actual
possession of the property without anyone complaining or protesting. Soon thereafter,
they were issued TCT No. N-209049 in lieu of TCT No. RT-6604 which was cancelled.
254
[22]
However, on December 21, 1999, they were surprised upon being informed by
petitioner that the subject land had been mortgaged to him by the Diazes. Upon inquiry
from Comandante, the latter readily admitted that she has a personal loan with petitioner
for which the mortgage of the property in petitioners favor was executed. She admitted,
though, that her parents were not aware of such mortgage and that they did not authorize
her to enter into such contract. Comandante also informed the Pangans that the signatures
253[21] See Answer with Compulsory Counter-Claim of the Diazes, id. at 231-237.
254[22] See Answer with Compulsory Counter-Claim of the Pangans, id. at 172-183.
of her parents appearing on the SPA are fictitious and that it was petitioner who prepared
such document.
Moreover, the Pangans asserted that the Real Estate Mortgage Contract cannot
bind them nor in any way impair their ownership of subject property because it was not
registered before the Register of Deeds.255[23]
All the respondents interposed their respective counterclaims and prayed for moral
and exemplary damages and attorneys fees in varying amounts.
After the parties have submitted their respective pre-trial briefs, the Diazes filed on
March 29, 2001 a Motion for Summary Judgment256[24] alleging that: first, since the
255[23] Id.
256[24] Id. at 246-257.
documents alluded to by petitioner in his complaint were defective, he was not entitled to
any legal right or relief; and, second, it was clear from the pleadings that it is
Comandante who has an outstanding obligation with petitioner which the latter never
denied. With these, the Diazes believed that there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact against them and, hence, they were entitled to summary judgment.
On May 7, 2001, petitioner also filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, 257[25]
claiming that his suit against the respondents is meritorious and well-founded and that
same is documented and supported by law and jurisprudence. He averred that his adverse
claim annotated at the back of TCT No. RT-6604, which was carried over in TCT No.
209049 under the names of the Pangans, is not merely anchored on the Waiver of
Hereditary Rights and Interests Over a Real Property (Still Undivided) executed by
Comandante, but also on the Real Estate Mortgage likewise executed by her in
representation of her parents and in favor of petitioner. Petitioner insisted that said
adverse claim is not frivolous and invalid and is registrable under Section 70 of
Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529. In fact, the Registrar of Deeds of Quezon City had
already determined the sufficiency and/or validity of such registration by annotating said
claim, and this, respondents failed to question. Petitioner further averred that even before
the sale and transfer to the Pangans of the subject property, the latter were already aware
of the existence of his adverse claim. In view of these, petitioner prayed that his Motion
for Summary Judgment be granted.
After the filing of the parties respective Oppositions to the said motions for
summary judgment, the trial court, in an Order dated May 31, 2001,258[26] deemed both
motions for summary judgment submitted for resolution. Quoting substantially
petitioners allegations in his Motion for Summary Judgment, it thereafter rendered on
June 14, 2001 a Summary Judgment259[27] in favor of petitioner, the dispositive portion
of which reads:
a)
ORDERING all defendants jointly and solidarily to pay plaintiff the sum
of ONE MILLION ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEEN THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED
TWENTY EIGHT PESOS (P1,118,228.00) which is blood money of plaintiff;
b)
ORDERING the Honorable Registrar of Deeds of Quezon City that the
rights and interest of the plaintiff over subject property be annotated at the back of T.C.T.
No. N-209049;
c)
SENTENCING all defendants to pay plaintiffs expenses of TEN
THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00) and to pay the costs of suit.
IT IS SO ORDERED.260[28]
The Pangans, the Diazes, and Comandante appealed to the CA.261[29] The
Pangans faulted the trial court in holding them jointly and severally liable with the Diazes
and Comandante for the satisfaction of the latters personal obligation to petitioner in the
total amount of P1,118,228.00. The Diazes and Comandante, on the other hand, imputed
error upon the trial court in rendering summary judgment in favor of petitioner. They
averred that assuming the summary judgment was proper, the trial court should not have
considered the Real Estate Mortgage Contract and the Promissory Note as they were
defective, as well as petitioners frivolous and non-registrable adverse claim.
As regards the Pangans, the CA ruled that the mortgage contract was not binding
upon them as they were purchasers in good faith and for value. The property was free
from the mortgage encumbrance of petitioner when they acquired it as they only came to
260[28] Id. at 290-291.
261[29] Id. at 295 and 301.
262[30] CA rollo, pp. 140-149.
know of the adverse claim through petitioners phone call which came right after the
formers acquisition of the property. The CA further ruled that as Comandantes waiver of
hereditary rights and interests upon which petitioners adverse claim was based is a
nullity, it could not be a source of any right in his favor. Hence, the Pangans were not
bound to take notice of such claim and are thus not liable to petitioner.
Noticeably, the appellate court did not rule on the propriety of the issuance of the
Summary Judgment as raised by the Diazes and Comandante. In the ultimate, the CA
merely modified the assailed Summary Judgment of the trial court by excluding the
Pangans among those solidarily liable to petitioner, in effect affirming in all other
respects the assailed summary judgment, viz:
SO ORDERED.263[31]
263[31] Id. at 148.
Our Ruling
Petitioner merely reiterates his contentions in the Motion for Summary Judgment
he filed before the trial court. He insists that his Adverse Claim annotated at the back of
TCT No. RT-6604 is not merely anchored on Comandantes Waiver of Hereditary Rights
and Interests Over A Real Property (Still Undivided) but also on her being the attorneyin-fact of the Diazes when she executed the mortgage contract in favor of petitioner. He
avers that his adverse claim is not frivolous or invalid and is registrable as the Registrar of
Deeds of Quezon City even allowed its annotation. He also claims that even prior to the
sale of subject property to the Pangans, the latter already knew of his valid and existing
adverse claim thereon and are, therefore, not purchasers in good faith. Thus, petitioner
264[32] Id. 166-170.
265[33] Id. at 191.
maintains that the Pangans should be held, together with the Diazes and Comandante,
jointly and severally liable to him in the total amount of P1,118,228.00.
xxxx
3. That I am executing this Affidavit in order to attest (to) the truth of the
foregoing facts and to petition the Honorable Registrar of Deeds, Quezon City, to
annotate this Affidavit of Adverse Claim at the back of the said title particularly the
original copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-6604 (82020) PR-18887 which is on
file with the said office, so that my interest as Recipient/Benefactor of the said property
will be protected especially the registered owner/parents, in a fraudulent manner might
dispose (of) and/or encumber the same without my knowledge and consent. (Emphasis
ours)
Clearly, petitioners Affidavit of Adverse Claim was based solely on the waiver of
hereditary interest executed by Comandante. This fact cannot be any clearer especially so
when the inscription of his adverse claim at the back of TCT No. RT-6604 reads as
follows:
P.E. 2468/T-(82020)RT-6604 - - AFFIDAVIT OF ADVERSE CLAIM - Executed under oath by PEDRO M. FERRER, married to Erlinda B. Ferrer, claiming
among others that they have a claim, the interest over said property as
Recipient/Benefactor, by virtue of a waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interest over a
real property x x x266[34] (Emphasis ours)
Therefore, there is no basis for petitioners assertion that the adverse claim was also
anchored on the mortgage contract allegedly executed by Comandante on behalf of her
parents.
We note at the outset that the validity of petitioners adverse claim should have
been determined by the trial court after the petition for cancellation of petitioners adverse
claim filed by Comandante was consolidated with Civil Case No. Q-99-38876. 267[35]
This is in consonance with Section 70 of PD 1529 which provides:
Section 70. Adverse Claim. Whoever claims any part or interest in registered
land adverse to the registered owner, arising subsequent to the date of the original
registration, may, if no other provision is made in this Decree for registering the same,
make a statement in writing setting forth fully his alleged right or interest, and how or
under whom acquired, a reference to the number of the certificate of title of the registered
owner, the name of the registered owner, and a description of the land in which the right
or interest is claimed.
The statement shall be signed and sworn to, and shall state the adverse claimants
residence, and a place at which all notices may be served upon him. This statement shall
be entitled to registration as an adverse claim on the certificate of title. The adverse claim
shall be effective for a period of thirty days from the date of registration. After the lapse
of said period, the annotation of adverse claim may be cancelled upon filing of a
verified petition therefor by the party in interest: Provided, however, That after
cancellation, no second adverse claim based on the same ground shall be registered by
the same claimant.
Before the lapse of thirty days aforesaid, any party in interest may file a petition
in the Court of First Instance where the land is situated for the cancellation of the
adverse claim, and the court shall grant a speedy hearing upon the question of validity
of such adverse claim, and shall render judgment as may be just and equitable. If the
267[35] Records, p. 66.
Pursuant to the third paragraph of the afore-quoted provision, it has been held that
the validity or efficaciousness of an adverse claim may only be determined by the Court
upon petition by an interested party, in which event, the Court shall order the immediate
hearing thereof and make the proper adjudication as justice and equity may warrant. And,
it is only when such claim is found unmeritorious that the registration of the adverse
claim may be cancelled.268[36]
As correctly pointed out by respondents, the records is bereft of any showing that
the trial court conducted any hearing on the matter. Instead, what the trial court did was to
include this material issue among those for which it has rendered its summary judgment
as shown by the following portion of the judgment:
x x x it will be NOTED that subject Adverse Claim annotated at the back of Transfer
Certificate of Title No. RT-6604 (82020) PR-18887, and carried over to defendants-Sps.
Pangans Title No. N-20909, is not merely anchored on defendant Reina Comandantes
Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interest Over a Real Property but also on her being the
Attorney-In-Fact of the previous registered owners/parents/defendants Sps. Alfredo and
Imelda Diaz about the Real Estate Mortgage Contract for a loan of P1,118,228.00 which
268[36] Sajonas v. Court of Apeals, 327 Phil. 689, 712 (1996).
is a blood money of the plaintiff. Moreover, subject Adverse Claim in LRC Case No. Q12009 (99) is NOT frivolous and invalid and consequently, REGISTRABLE by virtue
of Section 110 of the Land Registration Act (now Section 70 of Presidential Decree
No. 1529). 269[37] (Emphasis ours)
It does not escape our attention that the trial court merely echoed the claim of
petitioner that his adverse claim subject of LRC Case No. Q-12009 (99) is not frivolous,
invalid and is consequently registrable. We likewise lament the apparent lack of effort on
the part of said court to make even a short ratiocination as to how it came up with said
conclusion. In fact, what followed the above-quoted portion of the summary judgment
are mere recitals of the arguments raised by petitioner in his motion for summary
judgment. And in the dispositive portion, the trial court merely casually ordered that
petitioners adverse claim be inscribed at the back of the title of the Pangans. What is
worse is that despite this glaring defect, the CA manifestly overlooked the matter even if
respondents vigorously raised the same before it.
Be that as it may, respondents efforts of pointing out this flaw, which we find
significant, have not gone to naught as will be hereinafter discussed.
All the respondents contend that the Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interest
Over a Real Property (Still Undivided) executed by Comandante is null and void for
being violative of Article 1347 of the Civil Code, hence, petitioners adverse claim which
was based upon such waiver is likewise void and cannot confer upon the latter any right
or interest over the property.
269[37] Records, p. 290.
Pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 1347 of the Civil Code, no contract
may be entered into upon a future inheritance except in cases expressly authorized by
law. For the inheritance to be considered future, the succession must not have been
opened at the time of the contract. A contract may be classified as a contract upon future
inheritance, prohibited under the second paragraph of Article 1347, where the following
requisites concur:
(1)
(2)
That the object of the contract forms part of the inheritance; and,
(3)
That the promissor has, with respect to the object, an expectancy of a right which
is purely hereditary in nature.270[38]
considering that the property subject matter of Comandantes waiver concededly forms
part of the properties that she expect to inherit from her parents upon their death and,
such expectancy of a right, as shown by the facts, is undoubtedly purely hereditary in
nature.
From the foregoing, it is clear that Comandante and petitioner entered into a
contract involving the formers future inheritance as embodied in the Waiver of
Hereditary Rights and Interest Over a Real Property (Still Undivided) executed by her in
petitioners favor.
Guided by the above discussions, we similarly declare in this case that the Waiver
of Hereditary Rights and Interest Over a Real Property (Still Undivided) executed by
Comandante in favor of petitioner as not valid and that same cannot be the source of any
right or create any obligation between them for being violative of the second paragraph
of Article 1347 of the Civil Code.
Albeit we have already resolved the issues raised by petitioner, we shall not stop
here as the Diazes and Comandante in their Comment 272[40] call our attention to the
failure of the CA to pass upon the issue of the propriety of the issuance by the trial court
of the Summary Judgment in favor of petitioner despite the fact that they have raised this
issue before the appellate court. They argue that summary judgment is proper only when
there is clearly no genuine issue as to any material fact in the action. Thus, where the
defendant presented defenses tendering factual issue which call for presentation of
evidence, as when he specifically denies the material allegations in the complaint,
summary judgment cannot be rendered.
The Diazes and Comandante then enumerate the genuine issues in the case which
they claim should have precluded the trial court from issuing a summary judgment in
petitioners favor. First, the execution of the SPA in favor of Comandante referred to by
petitioner in his complaint was never admitted by the Diazes. They assert that as such fact
is disputed, trial should have been conducted to determine the truth of the matter, same
272[40] Rollo, pp. 192-210.
being a genuine issue. Despite this, the trial court merely took the word of the plaintiff
and assumed that said document was indeed executed by them. Second, although
Comandante acknowledges that she has a personal obligation with petitioner, she
nevertheless, did not admit that it was in the amount of P1,118,228.00. Instead, she
claims only the amount of P500,000.00 or P600,000.00 (if inclusive of interest) as her
obligation. Moreover, the Diazes deny borrowing any money from petitioner and neither
did the Pangans owe him a single centavo. Thus, the true amount of the obligation due
the petitioner and how each of the respondents are responsible for such amount are
genuine issues which need formal presentation of evidence. Lastly, they aver that the trial
court ignored factual and material issues such as the lack of probative value of
Comandantes waiver of hereditary rights as well as of the SPA; the fact that Comandante
signed the mortgage contract and promissory note in her personal capacity; and, that all
such documents were prepared by petitioner who acted as a lawyer and the creditor of
Comandante at the same time.
Rule 35 of the Rules of Court provides for summary judgment, the pertinent
provisions of which are the following:
Section 2. Summary Judgment for the defending party. A party against whom a
claim, counterclaim or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory relief is sought may, at any
Section 3. Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served at least
ten (10) days before the time specified for the hearing. The adverse party may serve
opposing affidavits, depositions, or admissions at least three (3) days before the hearing.
After the hearing, the judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings,
supporting affidavits, depositions and admissions on file, show that, except as to the
amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
Here, we find the existence of genuine issues which removes the case from the
coverage of summary judgment. The variance in the allegations of the parties in their
pleadings is evident.
273[41] D.M. Consunji, Inc. v. Duvas Corporation, G.R. No. 155174, August 4, 2009.
Petitioner anchors his complaint for sum of money and/or judicial foreclosure on
the alleged real estate mortgage over the subject property allegedly entered into by
Comandante in behalf of her parents to secure payment of a loan amounting to
P1,118,228.00. To support this claim, petitioner attached to his complaint (1) the SPA
alleged to have been executed by the Diazes; (2) the Real Estate Mortgage Contract
pertaining to the amount of P1,118,228.00; and, (3) a Promissory Note.
The Diazes, for their part, also denied that they executed the SPA authorizing their
daughter to mortgage their property to petitioner as well as having any obligation to the
latter.
Clearly, there are genuine issues in this case which require the presentation of
evidence. For one, it is necessary to ascertain in a full blown trial the validity and due
execution of the SPA, the Real Estate Mortgage and the Promissory Notes because the
determination of the following equally significant questions depends on them, to wit: (1)
Are the Diazes obligated to petitioner or is the obligation a purely personal obligation of
Comandante? and, (2) Is the sum of P1,118,228.00 as shown in the Real Estate Mortgage
and the Promissory Note, the amount which is really due the petitioner?
To stress, trial courts have limited authority to render summary judgments and
may do so only when there is clearly no genuine issue as to any material fact. When the
facts as pleaded by the parties are disputed or contested, proceedings for summary
judgment cannot take the place of trial.274[42] From the foregoing, it is apparent that the
trial court should have refrained from issuing the summary judgment but instead
proceeded to conduct a full blown trial of the case. In view of this, the present case
should be remanded to the trial court for further proceedings and proper disposition
according to the rudiments of a regular trial on the merits and not through an abbreviated
termination of the case by summary judgment.
SO ORDERED.
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
CERTIFICATION
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
SECOND DIVISION
Defendants are directed to pay the corresponding docket fees and other required fees, within five
(5) days from receipt of this Order, considering that the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which
took effect on July 1, 1997, must at least in the meantime, be construed liberally.
SO ORDERED.278[4]
On the same date, petitioners paid the subject fees, as evidenced by official receipts279[5] issued
by the RTC of San Mateo to petitioner Erlinda Fundialan. The receipts, all dated October 9,
1997, showed payments for appeal and legal research fees in Civil Case No. 1182, in compliance
with the trial courts order of even date, the details of which are as follows:
PARTICULARS O.R. No. AMOUNT
--------------------- ---------------- ----------------Appeal fee 7403333 P 48.00
Appeal fee 7402555 352.00
Legal Research 1880282 20.00
----------------TOTAL P 420.00
==========
Respondents elevated the case to the Court of Appeals. Upon a review of the records, which
included the proofs of payment of the docket and appeal fees, the appellate court nevertheless
resolved to dismiss the appeal in this wise:
For failure of defendants-appellants to pay the required docket fees, as reported by the Judicial
Records Division (JRD) on February 24, 1999, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED (Section 1 (c),
Rule 50 in relation to Section 4, Rule 41, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure).
SO ORDERED.280[6]
278[4] Rollo, p. 4.
279[5] Id. at 14.
280[6] Id. at 15.
On April 12, 1999, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing resolution,
which the Court of Appeals denied on August 9, 1999. Thus:
THROUGH a motion for reconsideration, defendants-appellants claim having paid the docketing
fees on October 9, 1997, beyond the period for perfecting an appeal.
Any subsequent compliance with the formal requirements for filing an appeal as prescribed by
the Rules will not per se warrant reconsideration of Our Resolution.
ACCORDINGLY, the motion for reconsideration is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.281[7]
Hence, this petition.
Petitioners submit that the sole issue to be resolved is whether the Court of Appeals was correct
in its strict construction of the provisions of Section 1(c), Rule 50 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. Specifically, however, we find two main issues for our resolution: (1) whether or not
the payment of docket and other lawful fees within the period for perfecting an appeal is
mandatory; and (2) whether or not petitioners have shown sufficient reason for the relaxation of
what otherwise should be a stringent application of the rule on the payment of appellate docket
and other lawful fees.
As ground for the dismissal of the appeal, the appellate court cites Section 1 (c), Rule 50, in
relation to Section 4, Rule 41, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Section 1 (c), Rule 50
provides:
SECTION 1. Grounds for dismissal of appeal.- An appeal may be dismissed by the Court of
Appeals, on its own motion or on that of the appellee, on the following grounds:
xxx
(c) Failure of the appellant to pay the docket and other lawful fees as provided in section 5 of
Rule 40 and section 4 of Rule 41;
xxx
Section 4, Rule 41 in turn provides:
SECTION 4. Appellate court docket and other lawful fees. - Within the period for taking an
appeal, the appellant shall pay to the clerk of court which rendered the judgment or final order
appealed from, the full amount of the appellate court docket and other lawful fees. Proof of
payment of said fees shall be transmitted to the appellate court together with the original record
or the record on appeal. (Underscoring supplied.)
281[7] Id. at 11.
Petitioners argue for liberal construction of the Rules,282[8] stating that its delay283[9] in the
payment of the fees, was a trivial technical oversight which was nonetheless cured by the order
of the court a quo directing it to make the payment.284[10] By such payment of the docket and
other lawful fees, the technical deficiency was cured.285[11] Petitioners also cites Section 13, Rule
41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure286[12] and argues that in the case at bar, although the
notice of appeal had been seasonably filed, there was the unintentional and excusable nonpayment of the required fees.287[13] In fact, albeit belatedly, petitioners did pay the required fees
on the very day the trial court ordered its payment. According to petitioners, substantial justice
should not be sacrificed over technicalities.288[14]
On the other hand, respondents aver that under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, perfection of
an appeal requires the payment of the docket and other lawful fees. Since the same were not
seasonably paid, such failure to pay was a fatal defect which an order from the trial court cannot
cure.289[15]
At the outset, it should be stressed that failure to pay the appellate docket and lawful fees is a
serious matter affecting the courts jurisdiction. Time and again, we have consistently held that
the payment of docket fees within the prescribed period is mandatory for the perfection of an
appeal. Without such payment, the appellate court does not acquire jurisdiction over the subject
282[8] Citing Section 6, Rule 1 thereof which provides: SECTION 6. Construction. These rules
shall be liberally construed in order to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and
inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding.
283[9] Rollo, p. 6.
284[10] Id. at 5.
285[11] Id. at 7.
286[12] SECTION 13. Dismissal of appeal. Prior to the transmittal of the original
record or the record on appeal to the appellate court, the trial court may motu
propio or on motion to dismiss the appeal for having been taken out of time.
287[13] Rollo, p. 6.
288[14] Id. at 8.
289[15] Id. at 24.
matter of the action and the decision sought to be appealed from becomes final and executory.290
[16]
Appeal is not a right but a statutory privilege; thus, appeal must be made strictly in accordance
with provisions set by law.291[17] The requirement of the law under Section 4, Rule 41 is clear.
The payment of appellate docket fee is not a mere technicality of law or procedure but an
essential requirement for the perfection of an appeal.292[18]
However, notwithstanding the mandatory nature of such requirement, this Court has also held
that the strict application of the jurisdictional nature of the above rule on payment of appellate
docket fees may be mitigated under exceptional circumstances to better serve the interest of
justice.293[19] Hence, we resolve the second issue. Has petitioners presented any sufficient or
satisfactory reason for the relaxation of the rules?
We note that at the time petitioners filed said notice of appeal on July 17, 1997, the Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure had then very recently taken effect on July 1, 1997.
In the case of Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority vs. Mangubat, 312 SCRA 463, 466467 (1999),294[20] where the notice of appeal was likewise filed only 14 days after the effectivity
of the new rules, this Court has stated:
We find the delay excusable. In the case of Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. vs. Ricafort the court
held that failure to attach to the Answer a written explanation why alternative mode of service of
pleading is availed of, thirty nine (39) days after the effectivity of the new rules, may be excused
as the counsel may not have been fully aware of the new requirements. This Court further
ordered that strictest compliance with the said mandatory requirement is to be enforced one
month from the promulgation of the said decision on August 5, 1998. The intent of the Court is
clear to afford litigants full opportunity to comply with the new rules and to temper enforcement
of sanctions in view of the recency of the changes introduced by the new rules. x x x We also
note that the Solicitor General observed the procedure for perfecting an appeal under the old rule
wherein only the notice of appeal is filed with the trial court and the docket fees were later paid
to the appellate court after notice from the latter court that payment of docket fees are due. x x x .
(Underscoring supplied.)
290[16] Sps. Manalili vs. Sps. De Leon, G.R. No. 140858, November 27, 2001, p. 6.
291[17] Ibid.
292[18] Id. at 7.
293[19] Ayala Land, Inc. vs. Carpo, 345 SCRA 579, 584 (2000).
294[20] Citing Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. vs. Ricafort, 293 SCRA 661 (1998).
Indeed, as averred by petitioners in the present case, at the time of the filing of the notice of
appeal, the changes introduced by the 1997 Rules of Civil procedure were yet novel, and even
judges and lawyers needed time to familiarize themselves with the rules intricacies. The trial
court acknowledged this fact when it resolved to grant the appeal, and favorably considered a
liberal application of the rules in the meantime.
Also material is the fact that petitioners were not assisted by counsel when they filed their notice
of appeal. Indeed, it appears that on August 20, 1997,295[21] petitioners former counsel made
formal the withdrawal of appearance from this case. In the case of Solar Team Entertainment,
Inc. vs. Ricafort, 293 SCRA 661 (1998), this Court even assumed that counsel therein may not
have been fully aware yet of the new requirements, and deemed failure to observe them
excusable. In this case, where petitioners themselves filed the notice of appeal, without
assistance of counsel, there is more reason to relax the application of the new rules.
Respondents reliance on the case of Lazaro vs. Court of Appeals296[22] is not well taken. In
Lazaro, the case in the trial court was decided months after the new rules had already taken
effect. The litigants had the assistance of counsel and payment of fees was made belatedly after
six months from the expiration of the appeal period. This delay was not sufficiently explained.
Thus, this Court saw no compelling reason therein to deviate from the strict application of the
rules. Moreover, the case of Lazaro also admits that the rules may be relaxed in exceptionally
meritorious cases.
We also note that petitioners were not informed by the trial court that the docket fees were
already due at that time. This failure of the trial court might have stemmed from the recency of
the rules. Hence, fairness bids us not to take this circumstance against petitioners.
While it is true, as pointed out by respondents, that the same docket fees were only paid on
October 9, 1997, or more than two months after the period to appeal has lapsed, this matter was
sufficiently explained by petitioners. The records bear out the fact that the notice of appeal was
granted on July 21, 1997. It was only on August 25, 1997 that respondents motion to dismiss was
filed. Hence, following the course of judicial proceedings, including setting the motion for
hearing, filing of an opposition thereto, with a resetting of a hearing also thrown in, the said
motion was only resolved on October 9, 1997. Petitioners demonstrated their willingness to pay
the docket fees, as shown by their immediate compliance with the order of the trial court, on the
very day the motion was resolved. Late payment of docket fees may be admitted when the party
showed willingness to abide by the rules, by immediately paying the required fees.297[23]
295[21] Rollo, p. 37.
296[22] 330 SCRA 208 (2000).
297[23] Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority vs. Mangubat, supra, citing
Teofilo Gensoli and Co. vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 289 SCRA 407
(1998).
WHEREFORE, the assailed resolutions in CA-G.R. CV No. 7450-UDK are SET ASIDE. The
appeal is hereby REINSTATED and the case REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for further
proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Acting C.J., (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.
Mendoza, J., on official leave.
TEEHANKEE, J.:
Appeal from orders of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga approving the Executrix-appellee's project of partition
instead of Oppositors-Appellants' proposed counter-project of partition. 1
On January 28, 1961, the testatrix, Agripina J. Valdez, a widow, died in Angeles, Pampanga, and was survived by seven compulsory
heirs, to wit, six legitimate children named Estela Dizon, Tomas V. Dizon, Bernardita Dizon, Marina Dizon (herein executrix-appellee),
Angelina Dizon and Josefina Dizon, and a legitimate granddaughter named Lilia Dizon, who is the only legitimate child and heir of
Ramon Dizon, a pre-deceased legitimate son of the said decedent. Six of these seven compulsory heirs (except Marina Dizon, the
executrix-appellee) are the oppositors-appellants.
The deceased testatrix left a last will executed on February 2, 1960 and written in the Pampango dialect. Named beneficiaries in her will
were the above-named compulsory heirs, together with seven other legitimate grandchildren, namely Pablo Rivera, Jr., Gilbert D.
Garcia, Cayetano Dizon, Francisco Rivera, Agripina Ayson, Jolly Jimenez and Laureano Tiambon.
In her will, the testatrix divided, distributed and disposed of all her properties appraised at P1,801,960.00 (except two small parcels of
land appraised at P5,849.60, household furniture valued at P2,500.00, a bank deposit in the sum of P409.95 and ten shares of
Pampanga Sugar Development Company valued at P350.00) among her above-named heirs.
Testate proceedings were in due course commenced 2 and by order dated March 13, 1961, the last will and testament of the decedent
was duly allowed and admitted to probate, and the appellee Marina Dizon-Rivera was appointed executrix of the testatrix' estate, and
upon her filing her bond and oath of office, letters testamentary were duly issued to her.
After the executrix filed her inventory of the estate, Dr. Adelaido Bernardo of Angeles, Pampanga was appointed commissioner to
appraise the properties of the estate. He filed in due course his report of appraisal and the same was approved in toto by the lower
court on December 12, 1963 upon joint petition of the parties.
The real and personal properties of the testatrix at the time of her death thus had a total appraised value of P1,811,695.60, and the
legitime of each of the seven compulsory heirs amounted to P129,362.11. 3 (/7 of the half of the estate reserved for the legitime of legitimate children and
4
descendants). In her will, the testatrix "commanded that her property be divided" in accordance with her testamentary disposition,
whereby she devised and bequeathed specific real properties comprising practically the entire bulk of her estate among her six children
and eight grandchildren. The appraised values of the real properties thus respectively devised by the testatrix to the beneficiaries
named in her will, are as follows:
1. Estela Dizon ....................................... P 98,474.80
2. Angelina Dizon .................................. 106,307.06
3. Bernardita Dizon .................................. 51,968.17
4. Josefina Dizon ...................................... 52,056.39
5. Tomas Dizon ....................................... 131,987.41
6. Lilia Dizon .............................................. 72,182.47
7. Marina Dizon ..................................... 1,148,063.71
8. Pablo Rivera, Jr. ...................................... 69,280.00
9. Lilia Dizon, Gilbert Garcia,
Cayetano Dizon, Francisco Rivera,
Agripina Ayson, Dioli or Jolly
Jimenez, Laureano Tiamzon ................. 72,540.00
Total Value ...................... P1,801,960.01
The executrix filed her project of partition dated February 5, 1964, in substance adjudicating the estate as follows:
(1) with the figure of P129,254.96 as legitime for a basis Marina (exacultrix-appellee) and Tomas (appellant)
are admittedly considered to have received in the will more than their respective legitime, while the rest of the
appellants, namely, Estela, Bernardita, Angelina, Josefina and Lilia received less than their respective legitime;
(2) thus, to each of the latter are adjudicated the properties respectively given them in the will, plus cash and/or
properties, to complete their respective legitimes to P129,254.96; (3) on the other hand, Marina and Tomas are
adjudicated the properties that they received in the will less the cash and/or properties necessary to complete
Civil Code, providing that "(S)hould a person make a partition of his estate by an act inter vivos or by will, such partition shall be
respected, insofar as it does not prejudice the legitime of the compulsory heirs." This right of a testator to partition his estate is subject
only to the right of compulsory heirs to their legitime. The Civil Code thus provides the safeguard for the right of such compulsory heirs:
ART. 906. Any compulsory heir to whom the testator has left by any title less than the legitime belonging to him
may demand that the same be fully satisfied.
ART. 907. Testamentary dispositions that impair or diminish the legitime of the compulsory heirs shall be
reduced on petition of the same, insofar as they may be inofficious or excessive.
This was properly complied with in the executrix-appellee's project of partition, wherein the five oppositorsappellants namely Estela, Bernardita, Angelina, Josefina and Lilia, were adjudicated the properties respectively
distributed and assigned to them by the testatrix in her will, and the differential to complete their respective
legitimes of P129,362.11 each were taken from the cash and/or properties of the executrix-appellee, Marina,
and their co-oppositor-appellant, Tomas, who admittedly were favored by the testatrix and received in the
partition by will more than their respective legitimes.
2. This right of a testator to partition his estate by will was recognized even in Article 1056 of the old Civil Code which has been
reproduced now as Article 1080 of the present Civil Code. The only amendment in the provision was that Article 1080 "now permits any
person (not a testator, as under the old law) to partition his estate by act inter vivos." 11 This was intended to repeal the then prevailing
doctrine 12 that for a testator to partition his estate by an act inter vivos, he must first make a will with all the formalities provided by law.
Authoritative commentators doubt the efficacy of the amendment 13 but the question does not here concern us, for this is a clear case of
partition by will, duly admitted to probate, which perforce must be given full validity and effect. Aside from the provisions of Articles 906
and 907 above quoted, other codal provisions support the executrix-appellee's project of partition as approved by the lower court rather
than the counter-project of partition proposed by oppositors-appellants whereby they would reduce the testamentary disposition or
partition made by the testatrix to one-half and limit the same, which they would consider as mere devises or legacies, to one-half of the
estate as the disposable free portion, and apply the other half of the estate to payment of the legitimes of the seven compulsory heirs.
Oppositors' proposal would amount substantially to a distribution by intestacy and pro tanto nullify the testatrix' will, contrary to Article
791 of the Civil Code. It would further run counter to the provisions of Article 1091 of the Civil Code that "(A) partition legally made
confers upon each heir the exclusive ownership of the property adjudicated to him."
3. In Habana vs. Imbo, 14 the Court upheld the distribution made in the will of the deceased testator Pedro Teves of two large coconut
plantations in favor of his daughter, Concepcion, as against adverse claims of other compulsory heirs, as being a partition by will, which
should be respected insofar as it does not prejudice the legitime of the compulsory heirs, in accordance with Article 1080 of the Civil
Code. In upholding the sale made by Concepcion to a stranger of the plantations thus partitioned in her favor in the deceased's will
which was being questioned by the other compulsory heirs, the Court ruled that "Concepcion Teves by operation of law, became the
absolute owner of said lots because 'A partition legally made confers upon each heir the exclusive ownership of the property
adjudicated to him' (Article 1091, New Civil Code), from the death of her ancestors, subject to rights and obligations of the latter, and,
she can not be deprived of her rights thereto except by the methods provided for by law (Arts. 657, 659, and 661, Civil Code). 15
Concepcion Teves could, as she did, sell the lots in question as part of her share of the proposed partition of the properties, especially
when, as in the present case, the sale has been expressly recognized by herself and her co-heirs ..."
4. The burden of oppositors' contention is that the testamentary dispositions in their favor are in the nature of devises of real property,
citing the testatrix' repeated use of the words "I bequeath" in her assignment or distribution of her real properties to the respective heirs.
From this erroneous premise, they proceed to the equally erroneous conclusion that "the legitime of the compulsory heirs passes to
them by operation of law and that the testator can only dispose of the free portion, that is, the remainder of the estate after deducting
the legitime of the compulsory heirs ... and all testamentary dispositions, either in the nature of institution of heirs or of devises or
legacies, have to be taken from the remainder of the testator's estate constituting the free portion." 16
Oppositors err in their premises, for the adjudications and assignments in the testatrix' will of specific properties to specific heirs cannot
be considered all devises, for it clearly appear from the whole context of the will and the disposition by the testatrix of her whole estate
(save for some small properties of little value already noted at the beginning of this opinion) that her clear intention was to partition her
whole estate through her will. The repeated use of the words "I bequeath" in her testamentary dispositions acquire no legal significance,
such as to convert the same into devises to be taken solely from the free one-half disposable portion of the estate. Furthermore, the
testatrix' intent that her testamentary dispositions were by way of adjudications to the beneficiaries as heirs and not as mere devisees,
and that said dispositions were therefore on account of the respective legitimes of the compulsory heirs is expressly borne out in the
fourth paragraph of her will, immediately following her testamentary adjudications in the third paragraph in this wise: "FOURTH: I
likewise command that in case any of those I named as my heirs in this testament any of them shall die before I do, his forced heirs
under the law enforced at the time of my death shall inherit the properties I bequeath to said deceased." 17
Oppositors' conclusions necessarily are in error. The testamentary dispositions of the testatrix, being dispositions in favor of compulsory
heirs, do not have to be taken only from the free portion of the estate, as contended, for the second paragraph of Article 842 of the Civil
Code precisely provides that "(O)ne who has compulsory heirs may dispose of his estate provided he does not contravene the
provisions of this Code with regard to the legitime of said heirs." And even going by oppositors' own theory of bequests, the second
paragraph of Article 912 Civil Code covers precisely the case of the executrix-appellee, who admittedly was favored by the testatrix with
the large bulk of her estate in providing that "(T)he devisee who is entitled to a legitime may retain the entire property, provided its value
does not exceed that of the disposable portion and of the share pertaining to him as legitime." For "diversity of apportionment is the
usual reason for making a testament; otherwise, the decedent might as well die intestate." 18 Fundamentally, of course, the dispositions
by the testatrix constituted a partition by will, which by mandate of Article 1080 of the Civil Code and of the other cited codal provisions
upholding the primacy of the testator's last will and testament, have to be respected insofar as they do not prejudice the legitime of the
other compulsory heirs.
Oppositors' invoking of Article 1063 of the Civil Code that "(P)roperty left by will is not deemed subject to collation, if the testator has not
otherwise provided, but the legitime shall in any case remain unimpaired" and invoking of the construction thereof given by some
authorities that "'not deemed subject to collation' in this article really means not imputable to or chargeable against the legitime", while it
may have some plausibility 19 in an appropriate case, has no application in the present case. Here, we have a case of a distribution and
partition of the entire estate by the testatrix, without her having made any previous donations during her lifetime which would require
collation to determine the legitime of each heir nor having left merely some properties by will which would call for the application of
Articles 1061 to 1063 of the Civil Code on collation. The amount of the legitime of the heirs is here determined and undisputed.
5. With this resolution of the decisive issue raised by oppositors-appellants, the secondary issues are likewise necessarily resolved.
Their right was merely to demand completion of their legitime under Article 906 of the Civil Code and this has been complied with in the
approved project of partition, and they can no longer demand a further share from the remaining portion of the estate, as bequeathed
and partitioned by the testatrix principally to the executrix-appellee.
Neither may the appellants legally insist on their legitime being completed with real properties of the estate instead of being paid in
cash, per the approved project of partition. The properties are not available for the purpose, as the testatrix had specifically partitioned
and distributed them to her heirs, and the heirs are called upon, as far as feasible to comply with and give effect to the intention of the
testatrix as solemnized in her will, by implementing her manifest wish of transmitting the real properties intact to her named
beneficiaries, principally the executrix-appellee. The appraisal report of the properties of the estate as filed by the commissioner
appointed by the lower court was approved in toto upon joint petition of the parties, and hence, there cannot be said to be any question
and none is presented as to fairness of the valuation thereof or that the legitime of the heirs in terms of cash has been
understated. The plaint of oppositors that the purchasing value of the Philippine peso has greatly declined since the testatrix' death in
January, 1961 provides no legal basis or justification for overturning the wishes and intent of the testatrix. The transmission of rights to
the succession are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent (Article 777, Civil Code) and accordingly, the value thereof
must be reckoned as of then, as otherwise, estates would never be settled if there were to be a revaluation with every subsequent
fluctuation in the values of the currency and properties of the estate. There is evidence in the record that prior to November 25, 1964,
one of the oppositors, Bernardita, accepted the sum of P50,000.00 on account of her inheritance, which, per the parties' manifestation,
20
"does not in any way affect the adjudication made to her in the projects of partition of either party as the same is a mere advance of
the cash that she should receive in both projects of partition." The payment in cash by way of making the proper adjustments in order to
meet the requirements of the law on non-impairment of legitimes as well as to give effect to the last will of the testatrix has invariably
been availed of and sanctioned. 21 That her co-oppositors would receive their cash differentials only now when the value of the currency
has declined further, whereas they could have received them earlier, like Bernardita, at the time of approval of the project of partition
and when the peso's purchasing value was higher, is due to their own decision of pursuing the present appeal.
ACCORDINGLY, the orders appealed from are hereby affirmed. Without cost.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Barredo and Villamor, JJ., concur.
# Footnotes
1 Appeal was directed to this Court, as the value of the estate exceeded P200,000.00, in accordance with the then subsisting provisions of Sec. 17,
third paragraph, subsec. 5, now eliminated by Rep. Act 5440 enacted on Sept. 9, 1968.
2 Sp. Proc. No. 1582 of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga.
3 These figures are those of oppositors-appellants which are adopted for purposes of this decision. Per appellee's brief, p. 3, executrix-appellee
sums up the value of the estate P1,809,569.55, and therefore the legitime of each of the seven (7) forced heirs at P129,254.96. While there is thus a
slight difference in the valuation of the estate and legitime of the forced heirs (a difference of P2,126.05 for the whole estate and of P107.15 in each
legitime), the same is of no importance... because the issue involved in this appeal is not the value of the estate but the manner it should be
distributed among the heirs." (Notes in parentheses supplied)
4 Art. 888, Civil Code.
5 Santos vs. Madarang, 27 Phil. 209.
6 L-15737, Feb. 28, 1962; 4 SCRA 550.
7 "SEC. 59. Instrument construed so as to give effect to all provisions. In the construction of an instrument where there are several provisions or
particulars, such a construction is, if possible, to be adopted as will give effect to all." (now Rule 130, sec. 9)
8 Citing in In re Estate of Calderon, 26 Phil. 333.
9 Tribunal Supremo of Spain, sentencia of 20 Marzo 1918.
10 ART. 1079. Partition, in general, is the separation, division and assignment of a thing held in common among those to whom it may belong. The
thing itself may be divided, or its value. (n)
11 Romero vs. Villamor, 102 Phil. 641 (1957).
12 Legasto vs. Versoza, 54 Phil. 766 (1930); Fajardo vs. Fajardo, 54 Phil. 842 (1930).
13 Reyes and Puno, Vol. III, p. 216; Tolentino, Vol. III, pp. 538-540.
14 L-15598 and L-16726, March 31, 1964; 10 SCRA 471.
15 See Arts. 776 and 777 Phil. Civil Code. The latter article provides that "(T)he rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the
death of the decedent."
16 Appellants' brief, pp. 15-16.
17 Rec. on Appeal, p. 20; emphasis supplied.
18 Icasiano vs. Icasiano, L-18979, June 30, 1964; 11 SCRA 422.
19 III Tolentino's Civil Code, 1961 ed., p. 518.
20 Record on Appeal, p. 107.
21 See Arts. 955, 1080 and 1104, Civil Code.
letters of administration issues to Federico. Consequently, Emilio III filed an Opposition-In-Intervention, echoing the
allegations in his grandfathers opposition, alleging that Federico, or in his stead, Emilio III, was better equipped than
respondent to administer and manage the estate of the decedent, Cristina.
On 13 November 2000, Federico died.
Almost a year thereafter or on 9 November 2001, the trial court rendered a decision appointing Emilio III as administrator of
decedent Cristinas intestate estate:
WHEREFORE, the petition of Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay is DENIED and the Opposition-in-Intervention is GRANTED.
Accordingly, the Intervenor, Emilio A.M. Suntay, III (sic) is hereby appointed administrator of the estate of the decedent
Cristina Aguinaldo Suntay, who shall enter upon the execution of his trust upon the filing of a bond in the amount of P
200,000.00, conditioned as follows:
(1) To make and return within three (3) months, a true and complete inventory;
(2) To administer the estate and to pay and discharge all debts, legatees, and charge on the same, or dividends thereon;
(3) To render a true and just account within one (1) year, and at any other time when required by the court, and
(4) To perform all orders of the Court.
Once the said bond is approved by the court, let Letters of Administration be issued in his favor.6
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC, revoked the Letters of Administration issued
to Emilio III, and appointed respondent as administratrix of the subject estate:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the assailed decision dated November 9, 2001 of Branch 78, Regional Trial
Court of Malolos, Bulacan in SPC No. 117-M-95 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the letters of administration issued by
the said court to Emilio A.M. Suntay III, if any, are consequently revoked. Petitioner Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay is hereby
appointed administratrix of the intestate estate of Cristina Aguinaldo Suntay. Let letters of administration be issued in her
favor upon her filing of a bond in the amount of Two Hundred Thousand (P 200,000.00) Pesos.7
As previously adverted to, on appeal by certiorari, we reversed and set aside the ruling of the appellate court. We decided to
include Emilio III as co-administrator of Cristinas estate, giving weight to his interest in Federicos estate. In ruling for coadministration between Emilio III and
Isabel, we considered that:
1. Emilio III was reared from infancy by the decedent, Cristina, and her husband, Federico, who both
acknowledged him as their grandchild;
2. Federico claimed half of the properties included in the estate of the decedent, Cristina, as forming part of
their conjugal partnership of gains during the subsistence of their marriage;
3. Cristinas properties, forming part of her estate, are still commingled with those of her husband, Federico,
because her share in the conjugal partnership remains undetermined and unliquidated; and
4. Emilio III is a legally adopted child of Federico, entitled to share in the distribution of the latters estate as
a direct heir, one degree from Federico, and not simply in representation of his deceased illegitimate father,
Emilio I.
In this motion, Isabel pleads for total affirmance of the Court of Appeals Decision in favor of her sole administratorship
based on her status as a legitimate grandchild of Cristina, whose estate she seeks to administer.
Isabel contends that the explicit provisions of Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court on the order of preference for the
issuance of letters of administration cannot be ignored and that Article 992 of the Civil Code must be followed. Isabel
further asserts that Emilio III had demonstrated adverse interests and disloyalty to the estate, thus, he does not deserve to
become a co-administrator thereof.
Specifically, Isabel bewails that: (1) Emilio III is an illegitimate grandchild and therefore, not an heir of the decedent; (2)
corollary thereto, Emilio III, not being a "next of kin" of the decedent, has no interest in the estate to justify his appointment
as administrator thereof; (3) Emilio IIIs actuations since his appointment as administrator by the RTC on 9 November 2001
emphatically demonstrate the validity and wisdom of the order of preference in Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court; and
(4) there is no basis for joint administration as there are no "opposing parties or factions to be represented."
To begin with, the case at bar reached us on the issue of who, as between Emilio III and Isabel, is better qualified to act as
administrator of the decedents estate. We did not choose. Considering merely his demonstrable interest in the subject estate,
we ruled that Emilio III should likewise administer the estate of his illegitimate grandmother, Cristina, as a co-administrator.
In the context of this case, we have to make a choice and therefore, reconsider our decision of 16 June 2010.
The general rule in the appointment of administrator of the estate of a decedent is laid down in Section 6, Rule 78 of the
Rules of Court:
SEC. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. If no executor is named in the will, or the executor or
executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such
person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person selected by them, be incompetent or
unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for
administration or to request that administration be granted to some other person, it may be granted to one or more of the
principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;
(c) If there is not such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such other person as the court may
select.
Textually, the rule lists a sequence to be observed, an order of preference, in the appointment of an administrator. This order
of preference, which categorically seeks out the surviving spouse, the next of kin and the creditors in the appointment of an
the estate prior to the probate of the will would be unfair to her proprietary interests."20
Hewing closely to the aforementioned cases is our ruling in Ventura v. Ventura21 where we allowed the appointment of the
surviving spouse and legitimate children of the decedent as co-administrators. However, we drew a distinction between the
heirs categorized as next of kin, the nearest of kin in the category being preferred, thus:
In the case at bar, the surviving spouse of the deceased Gregorio Ventura is Juana Cardona while the next of kin are:
Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura and Maria and Miguel Ventura. The "next of kin" has been defined as those persons who are
entitled under the statute of distribution to the decedents property (citations omitted). It is generally said that "the nearest of
kin, whose interest in the estate is more preponderant, is preferred in the choice of administrator. Among members of a
class the strongest ground for preference is the amount or preponderance of interest. As between next of kin, the nearest of
kin is to be preferred." (citations omitted)
As decided by the lower court and sustained by the Supreme Court, Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura are the legitimate
children of Gregorio Ventura and his wife, the late Paulina Simpliciano. Therefore, as the nearest of kin of Gregorio Ventura,
they are entitled to preference over the illegitimate children of Gregorio Ventura, namely: Maria and Miguel Ventura. Hence,
under the aforestated preference provided in Section 6 of Rule 78, the person or persons to be appointed administrator are
Juana Cardona, as the surviving spouse, or Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura as nearest of kin, or Juana Cardona and
Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura in the discretion of the Court, in order to represent both interests.22 (Emphasis supplied)
In Silverio, Sr. v. Court of Appeals,23 we maintained that the order of preference in the appointment of an administrator
depends on the attendant facts and circumstances. In that case, we affirmed the legitimate childs appointment as special
administrator, and eventually as regular administrator, of the decedents estate as against the surviving spouse who the lower
court found unsuitable. Reiterating Sioca v. Garcia24 as good law, we pointed out that unsuitableness for appointment as
administrator may consist in adverse interest of some kind or hostility to those immediately interested in the estate.
In Valarao v. Pascual,25 we see another story with a running theme of heirs squabbling over the estate of a decedent. We
found no reason to set aside the probate courts refusal to appoint as special co-administrator Diaz, even if he had a
demonstrable interest in the estate of the decedent and represented one of the factions of heirs, because the evidence
weighed by the probate court pointed to Diazs being remiss in his previous duty as co-administrator of the estatein the early
part of his administration. Surveying the previously discussed cases of Matias, Corona, and Vda. de Dayrit, we clarified,
thus:
Respondents cannot take comfort in the cases of Matias v. Gonzales, Corona v. Court of Appeals, and Vda. de Dayrit v.
Ramolete, cited in the assailed Decision. Contrary to their claim, these cases do not establish an absolute right demandable
from the probate court to appoint special co-administrators who would represent the respective interests of squabbling heirs.
Rather, the cases constitute precedents for the authority of the probate court to designate not just one but also two or more
special co-administrators for a single estate. Now whether the probate court exercises such prerogative when the heirs are
fighting among themselves is a matter left entirely to its sound discretion.
Furthermore, the cases of Matias, Corona and Vda. de Dayrit hinge upon factual circumstances other than the incompatible
interests of the heirs which are glaringly absent from the instant case. In Matias this Court ordered the appointment of a
special co-administrator because of the applicant's status as the universal heir and executrix designated in the will, which we
considered to be a "special interest" deserving protection during the pendency of the appeal. Quite significantly, since the
lower court in Matias had already deemed it best to appoint more than one special administrator, we found grave abuse of
discretion in the act of the lower court in ignoring the applicant's distinctive status in the selection of another special
administrator.
In Corona we gave "highest consideration" to the "executrix's choice of Special Administrator, considering her own inability
to serve and the wide latitude of discretion given her by the testatrix in her will," for this Court to compel her appointment as
special co-administrator. It is also manifest from the decision in Corona that the presence of conflicting interests among the
heirs therein was not per se the key factor in the designation of a second special administrator as this fact was taken into
account only to disregard or, in the words of Corona, to "overshadow" the objections to the appointment on grounds of
"impracticality and lack of kinship."
Finally in Vda. de Dayrit we justified the designation of the wife of the decedent as special co-administrator because it was
"our considered opinion that inasmuch as petitioner-wife owns one-half of the conjugal properties and that she, too, is a
compulsory heir of her husband, to deprive her of any hand in the administration of the estate prior to the probate of the will
would be unfair to her proprietary interests." The special status of a surviving spouse in the special administration of an
estate was also emphasized in Fule v. Court of Appeals where we held that the widow would have more interest than any
other next of kin in the proper administration of the entire estate since she possesses not only the right of succession over a
portion of the exclusive property of the decedent but also a share in the conjugal partnership for which the good or bad
administration of the estate may affect not just the fruits but more critically the naked ownership thereof. And in Gabriel v.
Court of Appeals we recognized the distinctive status of a surviving spouse applying as regular administrator of the deceased
spouse's estate when we counseled the probate court that "there must be a very strong case to justify the exclusion of the
widow from the administration."
Clearly, the selection of a special co-administrator in Matias, Corona and Vda. de Dayrit was based upon the independent
proprietary interests and moral circumstances of the appointee that were not necessarily related to the demand for
representation being repeatedly urged by respondents.26 (Emphasis supplied)
In Gabriel v. Court of Appeals, we unequivocally declared the mandatory character of the rule on the order of preference for
the issuance of letters of administration:
Evidently, the foregoing provision of the Rules prescribes the order of preference in the issuance of letters of administration,
it categorically seeks out the surviving spouse, the next of kin and the creditors, and requires that sequence to be observed in
appointing an administrator. It would be a grave abuse of discretion for the probate court to imperiously set aside and
insouciantly ignore that directive without any valid and sufficient reason therefor.27
Subsequently, in Angeles v. Angeles-Maglaya,28 we expounded on the legal contemplation of a "next of kin," thus:
Finally, it should be noted that on the matter of appointment of administrator of the estate of the deceased, the surviving
spouse is preferred over the next of kin of the decedent. When the law speaks of "next of kin," the reference is to those who
are entitled, under the statute of distribution, to the decedent's property; one whose relationship is such that he is entitled to
share in the estate as distributed, or, in short, an heir. In resolving, therefore, the issue of whether an applicant for letters of
administration is a next of kin or an heir of the decedent, the probate court perforce has to determine and pass upon the issue
of filiation. A separate action will only result in a multiplicity of suits. Upon this consideration, the trial court acted within
bounds when it looked into and passed upon the claimed relationship of respondent to the late Francisco Angeles.29
Finally, in Uy v. Court of Appeals,30 we took into consideration the size of, and benefits to, the estate should respondent
therein be appointed as co-administrator. We emphasized that where the estate is large or, from any cause, an intricate and
perplexing one to settle, the appointment of co-administrators may be sanctioned by law.
In our Decision under consideration, we zeroed in on Emilio IIIs demonstrable interest in the estate and glossed over the
order of preference set forth in the Rules. We gave weight to Emilio IIIs demonstrable interest in Cristinas estate and
without a closer scrutiny of the attendant facts and circumstances, directed co-administration thereof. We are led to a review
of such position by the foregoing survey of cases.
The collected teaching is that mere demonstration of interest in the estate to be settled does not ipso facto entitle an
interested person to co-administration thereof. Neither does squabbling among the heirs nor adverse interests necessitate the
discounting of the order of preference set forth in Section 6, Rule 78. Indeed, in the appointment of administrator of the
estate of a deceased person, the principal consideration reckoned with is the interest in said estate of the one to be appointed
as administrator.31 Given Isabels unassailable interest in the estate as one of the decedents legitimate grandchildren and
undoubted nearest "next of kin," the appointment of Emilio III as co-administrator of the same estate, cannot be a
demandable right. It is a matter left entirely to the sound discretion of the Court32 and depends on the facts and the attendant
circumstances of the case.33
Thus, we proceed to scrutinize the attendant facts and circumstances of this case even as we reiterate Isabels and her
siblings apparent greater interest in the estate of Cristina.
These considerations do not warrant the setting aside of the order of preference mapped out in Section 6, Rule 78 of the
Rules of Court. They compel that a choice be made of one over the other.
1. The bitter estrangement and long-standing animosity between Isabel, on the one hand, and Emilio III, on
the other, traced back from the time their paternal grandparents were alive, which can be characterized as
adverse interest of some kind by, or hostility of, Emilio III to Isabel who is immediately interested in the
estate;
2. Corollary thereto, the seeming impossibility of Isabel and Emilio III working harmoniously as coadministrators may result in prejudice to the decedents estate, ultimately delaying settlement thereof; and
3. Emilio III, for all his claims of knowledge in the management of Cristinas estate, has not looked after the
estates welfare and has acted to the damage and prejudice thereof.
Contrary to the assumption made in the Decision that Emilio IIIs demonstrable interest in the estate makes him a suitable
co-administrator thereof, the evidence reveals that Emilio III has turned out to be an unsuitable administrator of the estate.
Respondent Isabel points out that after Emilio IIIs appointment as administrator of the subject estate in 2001, he has not
looked after the welfare of the subject estate and has actually acted to the damage and prejudice thereof as evidenced by the
following:
1. Emilio III, despite several orders from the probate court for a complete inventory, omitted in the partial
inventories34 he filed therewith properties of the estate35 including several parcels of land, cash, bank deposits,
jewelry, shares of stock, motor vehicles, and other personal properties, contrary to Section 1,36 paragraph a,
Rule 81 of the Rules of Court.
2. Emilio III did not take action on both occasions against Federicos settlement of the decedents estate
which adjudicated to himself a number of properties properly belonging to said estate (whether wholly or
partially), and which contained a declaration that the decedent did not leave any descendants or heirs, except
for Federico, entitled to succeed to her estate.37
In compliance to our Resolution dated 18 April 2012 requiring Emilio III to respond to the following imputations of Isabel
that:
1. Emilio III did not file an inventory of the assets until November 14, 2002;
2. The inventory Emilio III submitted did not include several properties of the decedent;
3. That properties belonging to the decedent have found their way to different individuals or persons; several properties to
Federico Suntay himself; and
4. While some properties have found their way to Emilio III, by reason of falsified documents;38
Emilio III refutes Isabels imputations that he was lackadaisical in assuming and performing the functions of administrator
of Cristinas estate:
1. From the time of the RTCs Order appointing Emilio III as administrator, Isabel, in her pleadings before
the RTC, had vigorously opposed Emilio IIIs assumption of that office, arguing that "the decision of the RTC
dated 9 November 2001 is not among the judgments authorized by the Rules of Court which may be
immediately implemented or executed;"
2. The delay in Emilio IIIs filing of an inventory was due to Isabels vociferous objections to Emilio IIIs
attempts to act as administrator while the RTC decision was under appeal to the Court of Appeals;
3. The complained partial inventory is only initiatory, inherent in the nature thereof, and one of the first steps
in the lengthy process of settlement of a decedents estate, such that it cannot constitute a complete and total
listing of the decedents properties; and
4. The criminal cases adverted to are trumped-up charges where Isabel, as private complainant, has been
unwilling to appear and testify, leading the Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 44 of Mamburao,
Occidental Mindoro, to warn the prosecutor of a possible motu propio dismissal of the cases.
While we can subscribe to Emilio IIIs counsels explanation for the blamed delay in the filing of an inventory and his
exposition on the nature thereof, partial as opposed to complete, in the course of the settlement of a decedents estate, we do
not find any clarification on Isabels accusation that Emilio III had deliberately omitted properties in the inventory, which
properties of Cristina he knew existed and which he claims to be knowledgeable about.
The general denial made by Emilio III does not erase his unsuitability as administrator rooted in his failure to "make and
return x x x a true and complete inventory" which became proven fact when he actually filed partial inventories before the
probate court and by his inaction on two occasions of Federicos exclusion of Cristinas other compulsory heirs, herein
Isabel and her siblings, from the list of heirs.
As administrator, Emilio III enters into the office, posts a bond and executes an oath to faithfully discharge the duties of
settling the decedents estate with the end in view of distribution to the heirs, if any. This he failed to do. The foregoing
circumstances of Emilio IIIs omission and inaction become even more significant and speak volume of his unsuitability as
administrator as it demonstrates his interest adverse to those immediately interested in the estate of the decedent, Cristina.
In this case, palpable from the evidence on record, the pleadings, and the protracted litigation, is the inescapable fact that
Emilio III and respondent Isabel have a deep aversion for each other.1awp++i1 To our mind, it becomes highly impractical,
nay, improbable, for the two to work as co-administrators of their grandmothers estate. The allegations of Emilio III, the
testimony of Federico and the other witnesses for Federico and Emilio III that Isabel and her siblings were estranged from
their grandparents further drive home the point that Emilio III bears hostility towards Isabel. More importantly, it appears
detrimental to the decedents estate to appoint a co-administrator (Emilio III) who has shown an adverse interest of some
kind or hostility to those, such as herein respondent Isabel, immediately interested in the said estate.
Bearing in mind that the issuance of letters of administration is simply a preliminary order to facilitate the settlement of a
decedents estate, we here point out that Emilio III is not without remedies to protect his interests in the estate of the
decedent. In Hilado v. Court of Appeals,39 we mapped out as among the allowable participation of "any interested persons"
or "any persons interested in the estate" in either testate or intestate proceedings:
xxxx
4. Section 640 of Rule 87, which allows an individual interested in the estate of the deceased "to complain to the court of the
concealment, embezzlement, or conveyance of any asset of the decedent, or of evidence of the decedents title or interest
therein;"
5. Section 1041 of Rule 85, which requires notice of the time and place of the examination and allowance of the
Administrators account "to persons interested;"
6. Section 7(b)42 of Rule 89, which requires the court to give notice "to the persons interested" before it may hear and grant a
petition seeking the disposition or encumbrance of the properties of the estate; and
7. Section 1,43 Rule 90, which allows "any person interested in the estate" to petition for an order for the distribution of the
residue of the estate of the decedent, after all obligations are either satisfied or provided for.44
In addition to the foregoing, Emilio III may likewise avail of the remedy found in Section 2, Rule 82 of the Rules of Court,
to wit:
Sec. 2. Court may remove or accept resignation of executor or administrator. Proceedings upon death, resignation, or
removal. If an executor or administrator neglects to render his account and settle the estate according to law, or to perform
an order or judgment of the court, or a duty expressly provided by these rules, or absconds, or becomes insane, or otherwise
incapable or unsuitable to discharge the trust, the court may remove him, or, in its discretion, may permit him to resign.
When an executor or administrator dies, resigns, or is removed, the remaining executor or administrator may administer the
trust alone, unless the court grants letters to someone to act with him. If there is no remaining executor or administrator,
administration may be granted to any suitable person.
Once again, as we have done in the Decision, we exercise judicial restraint: we uphold that the question of who are the heirs
of the decedent Cristina is not yet upon us. Article 992 of the Civil Code or the curtain bar rule is inapplicable in resolving
the issue of who is better qualified to administer the estate of the decedent.
Thus, our disquisition in the assailed Decision:
Nonetheless, it must be pointed out that judicial restraint impels us to refrain from making a final declaration of heirship and
distributing the presumptive shares of the parties in the estates of Cristina and Federico, considering that the question on
who will administer the properties of the long deceased couple has yet to be settled.
Our holding in Capistrano v. Nadurata on the same issue remains good law:
The declaration of heirs made by the lower court is premature, although the evidence sufficiently shows who are entitled to
succeed the deceased. The estate had hardly been judicially opened, and the proceeding has not as yet reached the stage of
distribution of the estate which must come after the inheritance is liquidated.
Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court does not depart from the foregoing admonition:
Sec. 1. When order for distribution of residue is made. - x x x. If there is a controversy before the court as to who are the
lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the
controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.
No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations above mentioned has been made or provided for, unless
the distributees, or any of them, give a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment of said
obligations within such time as the court directs.45
Lastly, we dispose of a peripheral issue raised in the Supplemental Comment46 of Emilio III questioning the Special Second
Division which issued the 18 April 2012 Resolution. Emilio III asseverates that "the operation of the Special Second
Division in Baguio is unconstitutional and void" as the Second Division in Manila had already promulgated its Decision on
16 June 2010 on the petition filed by him:
7. The question is: who created the Special Second Division in Baguio, acting separately from the Second Division of the
Supreme Court in Manila? There will then be two Second Divisions of the Supreme Court: one acting with the Supreme
Court in Manila, and another Special Second Division acting independently of the Second Division of the Supreme Court in
Manila.47
For Emilio IIIs counsels edification, the Special Second Division in Baguio is not a different division created by the
Supreme Court.
The Second Division which promulgated its Decision on this case on 16 June 2010, penned by Justice Antonio Eduardo B.
Nachura, now has a different composition, with the advent of Justice Nachuras retirement on 13 June 2011. Section 7, Rule
2 of the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court provides:
Sec. 7. Resolutions of motions for reconsideration or clarification of decisions or signed resolutions and all other motions
and incidents subsequently filed; creation of a Special Division. Motions for reconsideration or clarification of a decision
or of a signed resolution and all other motions and incidents subsequently filed in the case shall be acted upon by the
ponente and the other Members of the Division who participated in the rendition of the decision or signed resolution.
If the ponente has retired, is no longer a Member of the Court, is disqualified, or has inhibited himself or herself from acting
on the motion for reconsideration or clarification, he or she shall be replaced through raffle by a new ponente who shall be
chosen among the new Members of the Division who participated in the rendition of the decision or signed resolution and
who concurred therein. If only one Member of the Court who participated and concurred in the rendition of the decision or
signed resolution remains, he or she shall be designated as the new ponente.
If a Member (not the ponente) of the Division which rendered the decision or signed resolution has retired, is no longer a
Member of the Court, is disqualified, or has inhibited himself or herself from acting on the motion for reconsideration or
clarification, he or she shall be replaced through raffle by a replacement Member who shall be chosen from the other
Divisions until a new Justice is appointed as replacement for the retired Justice. Upon the appointment of a new Justice, he
or she shall replace the designated Justice as replacement Member of the Special Division.
Any vacancy or vacancies in the Special Division shall be filled by raffle from among the other Members of the Court to
constitute a Special Division of five (5) Members.
If the ponente and all the Members of the Division that rendered the Decision or signed Resolution are no longer Members
of the Court, the case shall be raffled to any Member of the Court and the motion shall be acted upon by him or her with the
participation of the other Members of the Division to which he or she belongs.
If there are pleadings, motions or incidents subsequent to the denial of the motion for reconsideration or clarification, the
case shall be acted upon by the ponente on record with the participation of the other Members of the Division to which he or
she belongs at the time said pleading, motion or incident is to be taken up by the Court. (Emphasis supplied)
As regards the operation thereof in Baguio City, such is simply a change in venue for the Supreme Court's summer session
held last April.48
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is PARTIALLY GRANTED. Our Decision in G.R. No. 183053 dated 16
June 2010 is MODIFIED. Letters of Administration over the estate of decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay shall solely issue
to respondent Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay upon payment of a bond to be set by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, Malolos,
Bulacan, in Special Proceeding Case No. 117-M-95. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, Malolos, Bulacan is likewise
directed to settle the estate of decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay with dispatch. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
AT T E S T AT I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Special Second Division
C E T I F I C AT I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court's Division.
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Chief Justice
Footnotes
*
The Papal Bull mentioned in our Decision of 16 June 2010 (Suntay III v. Conjuangco-Suntay, G.R. No.
183053, 16 June 2010, 621 SCRA 142, 144).
2
Penned by Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura (now retired) with Associate Justices Antonio T.
Carpio (Chairperson), Diosdado M. Peralta, Roberto A. Abad and Jose Portugal Perez of the Second Division,
concurring. Rollo, pp. 231-246.
3
Id. at 244-245.
Id. at 60.
Id. at 31.
Uy v. Court of Appeals, 519 Phil. 673 (2006); Angeles v. Angeles-Maglaya, 506 Phil. 347 (2005); Valarao v.
Pascual, 441 Phil. 226 (2002); Silverio, Sr. v. Court of Appeals, 364 Phil. 188 (1999).
9
Vda. de Dayrit v. Ramolete, G.R. No. L-59935, 30 September 1982, 117 SCRA 608, 612; Corona v. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. L-59821, 30 August 1982, 116 SCRA 316, 320; Matias v. Gonzales, 101 Phil. 852, 858
(1957).
10
Gonzales v. Aguinaldo, G.R. No. 74769, 28 September 1990, 190 SCRA 112, 117-118.
11
12
13
Matias v. Gonzales; Corona v. Court of Appeals; Vda. de Dayrit v. Ramolete, supra note 9.
14
Uy v. Court of Appeals, supra note 8 at 680; Angeles v. Angeles-Maglaya, supra note 8 at 365;
Valarao v. Pascual, supra note 8 at 234; Silverio, Sr. v. Court of Appeals, supra note 8 at 210-211.
15
16
Uy v. Court of Appeals, supra note 8 at 681; Gabriel v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 101512, 7 August 1992,
212 SCRA 413, 423 citing Copeland v. Shapley, 100 NE. 1080.
17
18
19
Supra note 9.
20
21
22
Id. at 962-963.
23
Supra note 8.
24
25
Supra note 8.
26
Id. at 233-235.
27
28
Supra note 8.
29
Id. at 365.
30
Supra note 8.
31
32
Fernandez v. Maravilla, G.R. No. L-18799, 26 March 1965, 13 SCRA 416, 419-420.
33
34
Annexes "3," "5," and "6," of respondents Motion for Reconsideration. Rollo, pp. 318-331.
35
36
Section 1. Bond to be given issuance of letters. Amount. Conditions. Before an executor or administrator
enters upon the execution of his trust, and letters testamentary or of administration issue, he shall give a bond,
in such sum as the court directs, conditioned as follows:
(a) To make and return to the court, within three (3) months, a true and complete inventory of all
goods, chattels, rights, credits, and estate of the deceased which shall come to his possession or
knowledge or to the possession of any other person for him;
37
Annexes "1," and "2," of respondents Motion for Reconsideration. Rollo, pp. 318-321.
38
Id. at 407.
39
40
prison until he submits to the order of the court. The interrogatories put to any such person, and his
answers thereto, shall be in writing and shall be filed in the clerks office.
41
Section 10. Account to be settled on notice. Before the account of an executor or administrator is allowed,
notice shall be given to persons interested of the time and place of examining and allowing the same; and
such notice may be given personally to such persons interested or by advertisement in a newspaper or
newspapers, or both, as the court directs.
42
Section 7. Regulations for granting authority to sell, mortgage, or otherwise encumber estate. x x x.
(a) x x x
(b) The court shall thereupon fix a time and place for hearing such petition, and cause notice stating
the nature of the petition, the reason for the same, and the time and place of hearing, to be given
personally or by mail to the persons interested, and may cause such further notice to be given, by
publication or otherwise, as it shall deem proper.
43
Section 1. When order for distribution of residue made. When the debts, funeral charges, and expenses of
administration, the allowance to the widow, and inheritance tax, if any, chargeable to the estate in accordance
with law, have been paid, the court, on the application of the executor or administrator, or of a person
interested in the estate, and after hearing upon notice, shall assign the residue of the estate to the persons
entitled to the same, naming them and the proportions, or parts, to which each is entitled, and such persons
may demand and recover their respective shares from the executor or administrator, or any other person
having the same in his possession. If there is a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of
the deceased person or as to he distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the
controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.
No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations above-mentioned has been made
or provided for, unless the distributes, or any of them, give a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the court,
conditioned for the payment of said obligations within such time as the court directs.
44
45
46
Id. at 442-445.
47
Id. at 443.
48
See Resolution dated 9 February 2012, A.M. No. 12-2-7-SC Re: 2012 Summer Session in Baguio City.
THIRD DIVISION
SPOUSES NICANOR
G.R. No. 153736
TUMBOKON (deceased),
substituted by: ROSARIO
SESPEE and their
Children, namely:
NICANOR S.
TUMBOKON, JR., NELIA
S. TUMBOKON, NEMIA
T. SEGOVIA, NOBELLA
S. TUMBOKON,
Present:
NABIGAIL T. TAAY,
NAZARENE T.
MONTALVO, NORGEL S.
TUMBOKON, NEYSA S.
TUMBOKON,
SILVESTRE S.
TUMBOKON, NORA T.
MILCZAREK, NONITA T. CARPIO MORALES, Chairperson
BRION,
CARPIO, NERLYN S.
TUMBOKON, and NINFA BERSAMIN,
ABAD,* and
T. SOLIDUM,
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ
Petitioners,
-versus-
Promulgated:
APOLONIA G. LEGASPI,
and PAULINA S. DE
MAGTANUM,
* and* Additional member per Special Order No. 843 dated May 17, 2010.
Respondents.
August 4, 2010
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Under contention herein are the ownership and possession of that parcel of
land with an area of 12,480 square meters, more or less, situated in Barangay
Buenavista (formerly Barangay San Isidro, in the Municipality of Ibajay, Province
of Aklan. The land planted to rice, corn, and coconuts was originally owned by the
late Alejandra Sespee (Alejandra), who had had two marriages. The first marriage
was to Gaudencio Franco, by whom she bore Ciriaca Franco, whose husband was
Victor Miralles. The second marriage was to Jose Garcia, by whom she bore
respondent Apolonia Garcia (Apolonia), who married Primo Legaspi. Alejandra
died without a will in 1935, and was survived by Apolonia and Crisanto Miralles,
the son of Ciriaca (who had predeceased Alejandra in 1924) and Victor Miralles;
hence, Crisanto Miralles was Alejandras grandson.
298[1] CA Decision, CA-G.R. CV-No. 45672 dated May 15, 2001, penned by Justice
Roberto A. Barrios (deceased), with Justices Ramon Mabutas, Jr. (retired) and
Edgardo P. Cruz (retired), concurring; rollo, pp. 24-32.
299[2] Rollo, p. 25.
After trial, the CFI found the respondents and their co-accused guilty as
charged in its decision dated June 10, 1972. The respondents appealed (C.A.-G.R.
No. 13830-CR), but the CA affirmed their conviction on February 19, 1975,
whereby the CA rejected respondent Apolonias defense of ownership of the land. 300
[3]
On February 17, 1994, the RTC, which meanwhile replaced the CFI
following the implementation of the Judiciary Reorganization Act, 301[4] rendered
its decision in favor of the petitioners herein, holding and disposing thus:
300[3] Id., pp. 65-71 (The ponente was then Associate Justice Ramon C. Fernandez,
and the concurring members were then Associate Justice Efren I. Plana and
Associate Justice Venicio Escolin, all of whom became Members of the Court, but
had since retired).
301[4] Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
After a careful study of the evidence on record, the Court finds that the
plaintiffs were able to establish that plaintiff Rosario Sespee Tumbokon purchased
the land in question from Cresenciana Inog on December 31, 1959 (Exh. C).
Cresenciana Inog, in turn, acquired the land by purchase from Victor Miralles on
June 19, 1957 (Exh. B). Seven (7) years before, on May 8, 1950, the land was
mortgaged by Victor Miralles to Cresenciana Inog as shown by a Deed of Pacto
de Retro (Exh. A), and from 1950 up to 1959, Cresenciana Inog was in continuous
and peaceful possession of the land in question. xxx
xxxx
WHEREFORE, finding preponderance of evidence in favor of the plaintiffs,
judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. The plaintiffs are hereby declared the true and lawful owners, and entitled
to the possession of the parcel of land of 12,480 square meters in area, declared in
the name of plaintiff Rosario S. Tumbokon, under Tax Declaration No. 29220,
situated in Barangay Buenavista (formerly San Isidro), Ibajay, Aklan;
2. The defendants are ordered and directed to vacate the land in question,
and restore and deliver the possession thereof to the plaintiffs; and
3. No pronouncement as to damages, but with costs against the defendants.
SO ORDERED.302[5]
On May 15, 2001, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC and dismissed
the complaint,303[6] opining and ruling thus:
The appellees trace their acquisition of the subject lot to the admitted primal
owner Alejandra Sespee through her supposed sale of it to her son-in-law Victor
Miralles, who sold this to Cresenciana Inog, and who in turn sold it to the
appellees. In the process, they presented the Deed of Absolute Sale (Exh. B, June
19, 1957) executed by Victor Miralles in favor of Cresenciana Inog but wherein it
is provided in the said instrument that:
While Victor Miralles may have been in physical possession of the lot for a while,
this was not as owner but as mere Administrator as was clearly appearing in tax
declaration no. 21714 (Exhs. J, 1).The corroboration in this by Lourdes Macawili
(TSN, June 7, 1973) does not help the appellees (herein petitioners) any for she
never knew the source of the property. Neither does the testimony of Crisanto
Miralles succor the appellees (petitioners). He was the son of Victor Miralles and
the husband of the said Cresenciana Inog, the supposed buyer, owner and
possessor of the land in question from 1950-1957, and yet Crisanto Miralles could
only say:
Q Are there improvements on the land in question?
A I do not know because I did not bother to go to the land in
question.(TSN, p. 4, Aug. 18, 1973; emphasis supplied)]
These strongly suggest that the sales and claim of possession were shams,
and are further demolished by the following testimonies:
Q After the death of Alejandra Sespee who inherited this land in
question?
A Apolonia.
Q At present who is in possession of the land in question?
A Apolonia Legaspi.
Q From the time that Apolonia Legaspi took possession of the land
up to the present do you know if anybody interrupted her
possession?
A No sir. (tsn, Urbana Ta-an Vda. de Franco, p. 7, Nov. 24, 1977)
xxx
Q Now, since when did you know the land in question?
A Since I was at the age of 20 yrs. old. (TSN; Crispina Taladtad, p.
3; Jan. 20, 1977; [she was 74 yrs. old at the time of this
testimony]).
xxx
Q And for how long has Apolonia Garcia Legaspi been in
possession of the land in question?
A Since the time I was at the age of 20 yrs. old when I was been
(sic) invited there to work up to the present she is in possession of
the land.
Q You said that you know Cresenciana Inog, do you know if
Cresenciana Inog has ever possessed the land in question?
A Never.
Q You also said that you know Nicanor Tumbokon and his wife
Rosario Tumbokon, my question is do you know if this Nicanor
Tumbokon and his wife Rosario have ever possessed and
usufructed this land under litigation?
A No, sir.
Q You also stated a while ago that you know Victor Miralles, do
you know if Victor Miralles had ever possessed this under
litigation?
A No, he had not. (p. 9, ibid; emphasis supplied)
Thus neither do We buy the appellees contention that ownership of the
disputed land was acquired by their predecessors-in-interest thru lapse of time.
Acquisitive prescription requires possession in the concept of owner, and they
have not been able to prove even mere possession.
As proponents it was incumbent upon the appellees to prove that they were
the owners of the lot and that they were being unlawfully deprived of their
possession thereof. But this they failed to do. It is a basic rule in evidence that
each party must prove his affirmative allegation. Since the burden of evidence lies
with the party who asserts the affirmative allegation, the plaintiff or complainant
has to prove this affirmative allegations in the complaint and the defendant or the
respondent has to prove the affirmative allegation in his affirmative defenses and
counterclaim.(AKELCO vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 121439, Jan 25,2000)
But this hoary rule also cuts both ways. Appellants too must also prove the
allegations to support their prayer to declare the litigated lot the exclusive
property of the defendants Apolonia G. Legaspi and Paulina S. Magtanum;
(Answer, p. 6, record). Apolonia Legaspi however is only one of the putative
intestate heirs of Alejandra Sespee, the other being Crisanto Miralles who stands
in the stead of Ciriaca, his predeceased mother and other daughter of the
decedent. But then no judgment can be made as to their successional rights for
Crisanto Miralles was never impleaded. Neither is there a proof that can convince
that Paulina S. Magtanum who is merely a niece of the decedent, should also be
declared a co-owner of the inherited lot.
Because of said inadequacies, We cannot rule beyond the holding that the
appellees (petitioners) are not the owners and therefore not entitled to the
recovery of the litigated lot.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and
in its place judgment is rendered DISMISSING the Complaint.
SO ORDERED.304[7]
Issues
Ruling
A
Reversal by the CA was supported
by law and the evidence on record
The CA correctly found that the petitioners claim of ownership could not be
legally and factually sustained.
First of all, the petitioners adduced no competent evidence to establish that
Victor Miralles, the transferor of the land to Cresenciana Inog (the petitioners
immediate predecessor in interest) had any legal right in the first place to transfer
ownership. He was not himself an heir of Alejandra, being only her son-in-law (as
the husband of Ciriaca, one of Alejandras two daughters). Thus, the statement in
the deed of absolute sale (Exhibit B) entered into between Victor Miralles and
Cresenciana Inog, to the effect that the parcel of land was inherited from the
deceased Alejandra Sespee by Victor Miralles being the sole heir of the said
Alejandra Sespee, having no other brothers or sisters, was outrightly false.
Only two forced heirs survived Alejandra upon her death, namely:
respondent Apolonia, her daughter, and Crisanto Miralles, her grandson. The latter
succeeded Alejandra by right of representation because his mother, Ciriaca, had
predeceased Alejandra. Representation is a right created by fiction of law, by virtue
of which the representative is raised to the place and the degree of the person
represented, and acquires the rights which the latter would have if she were living
or if she could have inherited.305[8] Herein, the representative (Crisanto Miralles)
was called to the succession by law and not by the person represented (Ciriaca); he
thus succeeded Alejandra, not Ciriaca.306[9]
Thirdly, Victor Miralles supposed acquisition of the land by oral sale from
Alejandra had no competent factual support in the records. For one, the oral sale
was incompatible with the petitioners anchor claim that he had acquired the land
by inheritance from Alejandra. Also, the evidence that the petitioners adduced on
the oral sale was insufficient and incredible, warranting the CAs rejection of the
oral sale under the following terms:
This also damages and puts to serious doubt their other and contradictory
claim that Victor Miralles instead bought the lot from Alejandra Sespee. This
supposed sale was oral, one that can of course be facilely feigned. And it is
likely to be so for the claim is sweeping, vacuous and devoid of the standard
particulars like what was the price, when and where was the sale made, who
were present, or who knew of it. The record is bereft too of documentary
proof that Victor Miralles exercised the rights and performed the obligations
of an owner for no tax declarations nor tax receipt has been submitted or
even adverted to.307[10]
With Victor Miralles lacking any just and legal right in the land, except as an
heir of Ciriaca, the transfer of the land from him to Cresenciana Inog was
ineffectual. As a consequence, Cresenciana Inog did not legally acquire the land,
and, in turn, did not validly transfer it to the petitioners.
307[10] Supra, at note 1, p. 28.
B
Bar by res judicata is not applicable.
The petitioners submit that the final ruling in the criminal case had already
determined the issue of ownership of the land; and that such ruling in the criminal
case barred the issue of ownership in the civil case under the doctrine of res
judicata.
one and the same cause nemo debet bis vexari pro una et eadem causa. A contrary
doctrine will subject the public peace and quiet to the will and neglect of
individuals and prefer the gratification of the litigious disposition on the part of
suitors to the preservation of the public tranquillity and happiness.309[12]
Under the doctrine of res judicata, a final judgment or decree on the merits
rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the
parties or their privies in all later suits and on all points and matters determined in
the previous suit.310[13] The foundation principle upon which the doctrine rests is
that the parties ought not to be permitted to litigate the same issue more than once;
that when a right or fact has been judicially tried and determined by a court of
competent jurisdiction, so long as it remains unreversed, should be conclusive
upon the parties and those in privity with them in law or estate.311[14]
For res judicata to bar the institution of a subsequent action, the following
requisites must concur: (1) the former judgment must be final; (2) it must have
been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties;
(3) it must be a judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be between the first and
309[12]Allied Banking Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108089, January 10,
1994, 229 SCRA 252.
310[13] Dela Cruz v. Joaquin, G.R. No. 162788, July 28, 2005, 464 SCRA 576.
311[14] Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 101115, August 22, 2002, 387 SCRA
549.
second actions (a) identity of parties, (b) identity of the subject matter, and (c)
identity of cause of action.312[15]
The doctrine of res judicata has two aspects: the first, known as bar by prior
judgment, or estoppel by verdict, is the effect of a judgment as a bar to the
prosecution of a second action upon the same claim, demand, or cause of action;
the second, known as conclusiveness of judgment, also known as the rule of auter
action pendant, ordains that issues actually and directly resolved in a former suit
cannot again be raised in any future case between the same parties involving a
different cause of action and has the effect of preclusion of issues only.313[16]
Based on the foregoing standards, this action is not barred by the doctrine of
res judicata.
First of all, bar by prior judgment, the first aspect of the doctrine, is not
applicable, because the causes of action in the civil and the criminal actions were
different and distinct from each other. The civil action is for the recovery of
ownership of the land filed by the petitioners, while the criminal action was to
determine whether the act of the respondents of taking the coconut fruits from the
trees growing within the disputed land constituted the crime of qualified theft. In
312[15] Custodio v. Corrado, G.R. No. 146082, July 30, 2004, 435 SCRA 500; Suarez
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 83251, January 23, 1991; 193 SCRA 183; Filipinas
Investment and Finance Corporation v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No.
66059-60, December 4, 1989 (July 30 2004).
313[16] Rasdas v. Estenor, G.R. No. 157605, December 13, 2005, 477 SCRA 538,
548.
the former, the main issue is the legal ownership of the land, but in the latter, the
legal ownership of the land was not the main issue. The issue of guilt or innocence
was not dependent on the ownership of the land, inasmuch as a person could be
guilty of theft of the growing fruits even if he were the owner of the land.
314[17] Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato, G.R. No. 118910, July 17, 1995, 246 SCRA 540,
561.
SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
AT T E S TAT I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts
Division.
Chairperson
C E R T I F I C AT I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
SECOND DIVISION
Petitioner,
Present:
CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
- versus -
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,*
ABAD, and
PEREZ,** JJ.
Promulgated:
x --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
executed
document
entitled
Donation
Mortis
322[8] Art. 728. Donations which are to take effect upon the death of the donor partake of
the nature of testamentary provisions, and shall be governed by the rules established in the Title
on Succession.Art. 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end
thereof by the testator himself or by the testator's name written by some other person in his
presence, and by his express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible
witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another.
The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental
witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as aforesaid, each and every page thereof, except the last,
on the left margin, and all the pages shall be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the
upper part of each page.
The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon which the will is written, and the
fact that the testator signed the will and every page thereof, or caused some other person to write
his name, under his express direction, in the presence of the instrumental witnesses, and that the
latter witnessed and signed the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of
one another.
If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the witnesses, it shall be interpreted
to them.
Issue Presented
2.
That before his death, the transfer should be
revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum; but revocability
may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in
the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed; and
3.
That the transfer should be void if the transferor
should survive the transferee.326[12] (Underscoring supplied)
beneficial
[15]
Since the donation in this case was one made inter vivos, it
was immediately operative and final. The reason is that such kind
of donation is deemed perfected from the moment the donor
learned
of
the
donees
acceptance
of
the
donation.
The
332[18] Gochan & Sons Realty Corp. v. Heirs of Raymundo Baba, 456 Phil. 569, 579
(2003).
333[19] Reyes v. Court of Appeals, 346 Phil. 266, 273 (1997).
SO ORDERED.
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
CERTIFICATION
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
AMELIA
P.
ARELLANO,
represented
by
her
duly
appointed guardians, AGNES P.
ARELLANO and NONA P.
ARELLANO,
Present:
Petitioner,
CARPIO MORALES, J., Chairperson,
PERALTA,*
BERSAMIN,
MENDOZA,** and
- versus -
SERENO, JJ.
FRANCISCO PASCUAL
MIGUEL PASCUAL,
and
Respondents
.
Promulgated:
December 15, 2010
x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
** Additional member per raffle dated January 6, 2010.
** and** Additional member per Special Order No. 921 dated December 13. 2010.
Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must
bring into the mass of the estate any property or right which he may have received
from the decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any
other gratuitous title in order that it may be computed in the determination of the
legitime of each heir, and in the account of the partition.
The probate court thereafter partitioned the properties of the intestate estate.
Thus it disposed:
1.
2.
3.
1/3 of the rental receivables due on the property at the mezzanine and the
3rd floor of Unit 1110 Tanay St., Makati City form part of the estate of Angel
N. Pascual;
4.
a.
1/3 share in the House and Lot at 1110 Tanay St., Rizal Village Makati
TCT No. 348341 and 1/3 share in the rental income thereon;
b. 1/3 share in the Vacant Lot with an area of 271 square meters located
at Tanay St., Rizal Village, Makati City, TCT No. 119063;
c.
e.
f.
g.
i.
j.
a.
b.
Before the Court of Appeals, petitioner faulted the trial court in holding that
I
. . . THE PROPERTY DONATED TO APPELLANT AMELIA PASCUAL
ARELLANO IS PART OF THE ESTATE OF ANGEL PASCUAL, JR.
II
. . . THE PROPERTY DONATED TO APPELLANT IS SUBJECT TO
COLLATION UNDER ARTICLE 1061 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE.
III
. . . APPELLEES WHO ARE MERELY COLLATERAL RELATIVES OF
DECEASED ANGEL N. PASCUAL JR. AS HIS COMPULSORY HEIRS
ENTITLED TO LEGITIMES.
xxxx
and
V
. . . IN NOT PARTITIONING THE ESTATE OF ANGEL N. PASCUAL JR.
EQUALLY AMONG HIS LEGAL OR INTESTATE HEIRS. 339[6] (underscoring
supplied)
The appellate court, however, held that, contrary to the ruling of the probate
court, herein petitioner was able to submit prima facie evidence of shares of stocks
owned by the [decedent] which have not been included in the inventory submitted
by the administrator.
340[7] Penned by now Supreme Court Associate Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr., and
concurred in by Associate Justices Jose C. Reyes, Jr. and Normandie B. Pizarro, rollo,
pp. 21-41.
341[8] Id. at 37.
I
. . . THAT THE PROPERTY DONATED BY ANGEL N. PASCUAL, JR. TO
PETITIONER AMELIA PASCUAL ARELLANO IS PART OF HIS ESTATE AT
THE TIME OF HIS DEATH.
II
. . . THAT THE PROPERTY DONATED TO PETITIONER IS SUBJECT TO
COLLATION UNDER ARTICLE 1061 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE.
III
. . . THAT RESPONDENTS ARE COMPULSORY HEIRS OF THEIR
DECEASED BROTHER ANGEL N. PASCUAL JR. AND ARE ENTITLED TO
LEGITIMES.
IV
342[9] Id. at 40-41.
343[10] CA rollo at p. 138.
344[11] Rollo at 43.
Petitioners thus raise the issues of whether the property donated to petitioner
is subject to collation; and whether the property of the estate should have been
ordered equally distributed among the parties.
The term collation has two distinct concepts: first, it is a mere mathematical
operation by the addition of the value of donations made by the testator to the
value of the hereditary estate; and second, it is the return to the hereditary estate of
property disposed of by lucrative title by the testator during his lifetime.346[13]
The purposes of collation are to secure equality among the compulsory heirs
in so far as is possible, and to determine the free portion, after finding the legitime,
so that inofficious donations may be reduced.347[14]
345[12] Id. at 13-14.
346[13] III TOLENTINO, 1992 Edition, p. 332, citing 10 Fabres 295-299 Colin &
Capitant 526-528;2-11 Ruggiero 394; 5 Planiol & Ripert 67; De Buen; 8 Colin &
Capitant 340.
Collation takes place when there are compulsory heirs, one of its purposes
being to determine the legitime and the free portion. If there is no compulsory heir,
there is no legitime to be safeguarded.348[15]
The records do not show that the decedent left any primary, secondary, or
concurring compulsory heirs. He was only survived by his siblings, who are his
collateral relatives and, therefore, are not entitled to any legitime that part of the
testators property which he cannot dispose of because the law has reserved it for
compulsory heirs.349[16]
The compulsory heirs may be classified into (1) primary, (2) secondary, and (3)
concurring. The primary compulsory heirs are those who have precedence over
and exclude other compulsory heirs; legitimate children and descendants are
primary compulsory heirs. The secondary compulsory heirs are those who
succeed only in the absence of the primary heirs; the legitimate parents and
ascendants are secondary compulsory heirs. The concurring compulsory heirs are
those who succeed together with the primary or the secondary compulsory heirs;
the illegitimate children, and the surviving spouse are concurring compulsory
heirs.350[17]
347[14] III TOLENTINO, 1992 Edition, pp. 331-332, citing 6 Manresa 406.
348[15] III TOLENTINO, 1992 Edition, p. 337, citing 6 Manresa 413.
349[16] Article 886, Civil Code.
350[17] III TOLENTINO, 1992 Edition, p.252.
The decedent not having left any compulsory heir who is entitled to any
legitime, he was at liberty to donate all his properties, even if nothing was left for
his siblings-collateral relatives to inherit. His donation to petitioner, assuming that
it was valid,351[18] is deemed as donation made to a stranger, chargeable against
the free portion of the estate.352[19] There being no compulsory heir, however, the
donated property is not subject to collation.
On the second issue:
The decedents remaining estate should thus be partitioned equally among his
heirs-siblings-collateral relatives, herein petitioner and respondents, pursuant to the
provisions of the Civil Code, viz:
Let the records of the case be REMANDED to the court of origin, Branch
135 of the Makati Regional Trial Court, which is ordered to conduct further
proceedings in the case for the purpose of determining what finally forms part of
the estate, and thereafter to divide whatever remains of it equally among the
parties.
SO ORDERED.
WE CONCUR:
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts
Division.
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
SECOND DIVISION
Petitioner,
Present:
CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
- versus -
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,*
ABAD, and
PEREZ,** JJ.
Promulgated:
Respondents.
x --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
Gonzales
executed
document
entitled
Donation
Mortis
360[8] Art. 728. Donations which are to take effect upon the death of the donor partake of
the nature of testamentary provisions, and shall be governed by the rules established in the Title
on Succession.Art. 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end
thereof by the testator himself or by the testator's name written by some other person in his
presence, and by his express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible
Issue Presented
2.
That before his death, the transfer should be
revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum; but revocability
may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in
the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed; and
3.
That the transfer should be void if the transferor
should survive the transferee.364[12] (Underscoring supplied)
beneficial
Since the donation in this case was one made inter vivos, it
was immediately operative and final. The reason is that such kind
of donation is deemed perfected from the moment the donor
learned
of
the
donees
acceptance
of
the
donation.
The
assignment.
SO ORDERED.
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
CERTIFICATION
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
their names. The heirs of Bernardina were claiming back the land, alleging that since it was sold under fraudulent
circumstances, no valid title passed to the buyers. On the other hand, the buyers, who were now title holders of the subject
parcel of land, averred that they were buyers in good faith and sought the protection accorded to them under the law.
THE FACTS
The RTC and the CA have the same findings of fact, but differ in their legal conclusions. There being no factual issues raised
in the Petitions, we adopt the findings of fact of the CA in CA-G.R. No. 85542, as follows:
The subject parcel of land, described as Lot 1679 of the Cadastral Survey of Legaspi, consisting of 8,571 square meters, was
originally covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. (O) 16 and registered in the name of Bernardina Abalon
(Abalon). It appears that a Deed of Absolute Sale was executed over the subject property in favor of Restituto M. Rellama
(Rellama) on June 10, 1975. By virtue of such conveyance OCT No. (O) 16 was cancelled and in lieu thereof Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 42108 was issued in the name of Rellama. The subject property was then subdivided into
three (3) portions: Lot 1679-A, Lot 1679-B, Lot 1679-C. Lot 1679-A was sold to Spouses Dominador P. Peralta, Jr. and
Ofelia M. Peralta (Spouses Peralta) for which reason TCT No. 42254 was issued in their names. Lot 1679-B, on the other
hand, was first sold to Eduardo Lotivio (Lotivio) who thereafter transferred his ownership thereto to Marissa Andal, Arnel
Andal, and Leonil Andal (the Andals) through a Deed of Absolute Sale dated October 9, 1995. On even date, TCT No.
42482 was issued in the name of the Andals. The Andals likewise acquired Lot 1679-C as evidenced by the issuance of TCT
No. 42821 in their favor on December 27, 1995.
Claiming that the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Abalon in favor of Rellama was a forged document, and claiming
further that they acquired the subject property by succession, they being the nephew and niece of Abalon who died without
issue, plaintiff-appellees Mansueta Abalon and Amelia Abalon filed the case below against Rellama, Spouses Peralta, and
the Andals, the herein defendants-appellants and the Bank of the Philippines [sic] Islands which was later dropped as a party
defendant.
It was alleged in their Complaint and subsequent Amended Complaint, under five separate causes of action, that Rellama
was able to cause the cancellation of OCT No. (O) 16, and in lieu thereof the issuance of TCT No. 42108 in his own name
from which the defendants-appellants derived their own titles, upon presentation of a xerox copy of the alleged forged deed
of absolute sale and the order granting the issuance of a second owners duplicate copy of OCT No. (O) 16 in his favor in
Miscellaneous Cadastral Case No. 10648, which he had filed on the pretext that Lot 1679 covered by OCT No. (O) 16 was
sold to him and that the owners duplicate copy of the said title got lost in 1976 after the same was delivered to him. They
averred that the owners duplicate copy of Oct NO. (O) 16 had always been with Abalon and that upon her death, it was
delivered to them. Likewise, they alleged that Abalon had always been in possession of the subject property through her
tenant Pedro Bellen who was thereafter succeeded by his wife, Ruperta Bellen, and then his son, Godofredo Bellen. On the
other hand, they said that Rellama had never set foot on the land he was claiming. They further alleged that after the
ownership over the subject property was transferred to them upon the death of Abalon, they took possession thereof and
retained Godofredo as their own tenant. However, they averred that in 1995 the defendants-appellants were able to wrest
possession of the subject property from Godofredo Bellen. They alleged that the defendants-appellants are not buyers in
good faith as they were aware that the subject land was in the possession of the plaintiffs-appellees at the time they made the
purchase. They thus claim that the titles issued to the defendants-appellants are null and void.
In his answer, Rellama alleged that the deed of absolute sale executed by Abalon is genuine and that the duplicate copy of
OCT No. (O) 16 had been delivered to him upon the execution of the said deed of transfer.
As for Spouses Peralta and the Andals, who filed their separate answers to the complaint, they mainly alleged that they are
buyers in good faith and for value.
During the trial, Rellama passed away. He was substituted by his heirs.
After the plaintiffs-appellees rested their case, instead of presenting their own evidence, the defendants-appellants and the
Heirs of Restituto Rellama, on different occasions, filed a demurrer to evidence.
On April 14, 2005, the court a quo rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs-appellees and ordered the restoration of OCT
No. (O) 16 in the name of Abalon and the cancellation of the titles issued to the defendants-appellants. The fact that only a
xerox copy of the purported deed of sale between Rellama and Abalon was presented before the Register of Deeds for
registration and the absence of such xerox copy on the official files of the said Office made the court a quo conclude that the
said document was a mere forgery. On the other hand, the court a quo noted that the duplicate copy of OCT No. (O) 16 in
the hands of the plaintiffs-appellees bears [sic] the perforated serial number B 221377, which it held is a convincing proof of
its authenticity and genuineness. It thus stated that "Miscellaneous Cadastral Case No. 10648 is a (mere) strategem [sic]
fraudulently concocted ... for the issuance of a fabricated (second) owners duplicate certificate of Oct No. (O) 16" since the
owners duplicate copy of OCT No. (O) 16 has not been lost at all. It said that any subsequent registration procured by the
presentation of such forged instrument is null and void. The dispositive portion of the court a quos decision reads:
WHEREFORE, [p]remises [c]onsidered, judgment is rendered as follows, to wit:
1. Ordering the restoration of Original Certificate of Title No. (O) 16 embracing Lot 1679 in the name of
Bernardina Abalon into the official files of the Registry of Deeds of Legaspi City a copy of the owners
duplicate certificate embodying the technical description of Lot 1679 forming official part of the record as
Exhibit "D" as well as ordering the cancellation of any and all transfer certificates of title succeeding
Original Certificate of title No. (O) 16 including Transfer Certificates (sic) of Title Nos. 42108, 42254,
42255, 42256, 42821 [,] and 42482;
2. Ordering the defendants Marissa Andal, Leonil Andal, Arnel Andal[,] and the spouses Dominador and
Ofelia Peralta to vacate Lot 1679 and to peacefully surrender such lot to the plaintiffs;
3. Ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiffs the amount of P50,000.00 as litigation expenses; and
4. Ordering the defendants to pay the costs of suit.
The counterclaims by [sic] the defendants are all dismissed.
SO ORDERED.
Spouses Peralta and the Andals filed their separate Notices of Appeal and thereafter, upon approval, filed their respective
Defendants-Appellants Briefs. The Heirs of Rellama, on the other hand, opted not to challenge the ruling of the lower
court.3
The Andals and Spouses Peralta appellants in CA-G.R. CV No. 85542 raised several issues, which the CA summarized
as follows:
1. Whether the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Abalon in favor of Rellama was spurious
2. Whether the Andals and Spouses Peralta were buyers in good faith and for value
3. Who among the parties were entitled to their claims for damages.4
THE RULING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
On 30 May 2007, the Seventeenth Division of the Court of Appeals promulgated its assailed judgment setting aside the RTC
Decision. The CA ruled that the circumstances surrounding the sale of the subject property showed badges of fraud or
forgery against Rellama. It found that Abalon had not parted with her ownership over the subject property despite the claim
of Rellama that they both executed a Deed of Absolute Sale. As proof, the CA pointed out the existence of a notarized
contract of leasehold executed by Abalon with Ruperta Bellen on 11 June 1976. The genuineness and due execution of the
said leasehold agreement was uncontroverted by the parties. On this basis, the appellate court concluded that Abalon could
not have leased the subject parcel of land to Bellen if the former had parted with her ownership thereof.5
The CA also found no evidence to show that Rellama exercised dominion over the subject property, because he had not
introduced improvements on the property, despite claiming to have acquired it in 1975.6 Further, the CA noted that he did
not cause the annotation of the Deed of Sale, which he had executed with Abalon, on OCT No. (O) 16. It observed that when
the original copy of OCT No. (O) 16 was allegedly lost in 1976, while Rellama was on his way to Legaspi City to register
the title to his name, it took him almost 20 years to take steps to judicially reconstitute a copy thereof. To the appellate court,
these circumstances cast doubt on the veracity of Rellamas claim of ownership over such a significant property, which was
almost a hectare.7
The CA also ruled that the heirs of Bernardina Abalon had the legal standing to question the sale transaction between
Rellama and their predecessor-in-interest. It concluded that the heirs of Abalon had acquired the subject property by
ordinary acquisitive prescription and thus had every right to attack every document that intended to divest them of
ownership thereof,8 which in this case was the Deed of Sale that Bernardina executed in favor of Rellama. Lastly, the
appellate court considered the Spouses Peralta as buyers in bad faith for relying on a mere photocopy of TCT No. 42108
when they bought the property from Rellama.9 On the other hand, it accorded the Andals the presumption of good faith,
finding no evidence that would rebut this presumption.10
The dispositive portion of the assailed CA Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 85542 is as follows:
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision is SET ASIDE and a new judgment is rendered as follows:
1. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42482 and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42821, both in the names of
Andals, are held legal and valid.
2. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42254 registered in the names of Spouses Peralta is cancelled for being
null and void. Hence, they are ordered to vacate the land covered thereby and to surrender possession thereof
in favor of the plaintiffs-appellees.
SO ORDERED.11
The heirs of Abalon filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the 30 May 2007 Decision, insofar as the CA declared the Andals
to be buyers in good faith of the subject property and, thus, that the land title issued in their favor was valid. Spouses Peralta,
for their part, filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the said CA Decision pertaining to the portion that declared them
as buyers in bad faith which accordingly nullified the title issued to them.
On 10 June 2008, the CA denied the Motions for Partial Reconsideration of the movants for lack of merit.12
On 11 August 2008, Spouses Peralta filed with this Court a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assailing the 30 May 2007 Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 85542.13 On the same day, the heirs of Bernardina Abalon,
represented by Mansueto Abalon, filed a similar Petition questioning the portion of the mentioned CA Decision declaring the
validity of the title issued to the Andals, who were adjudged by the appellate court as buyers in good faith.14 THE ISSUES
The Petition filed by Spouses Peralta, docketed as G.R. No. 183448, lists the following issues:
a) The case for annulment should have been dismissed because the purported Deed of Sale executed by
Abalon and Rellama was not introduced in evidence and thus, forgery was not proven.
b) The heirs of Abalon are notforced heirs of Bernardina Abalon; hence, they do not have the legal
personality to file the action to annul the subject Deed of Sale.
c) The heirs of Abalon failed to prove that they had inherited the subject property.
d) Spouses Peralta are buyers in good faith and, thus title to their portion of the subject property must be
upheld15
As for the heirs of Abalon, their Petition, docketed as G.R. No. 183464, raises the following issues:
a) The Andals cannot be considered as buyers in good faith by simply applying the ordinary presumption in
the absence of evidence showing the contrary.
b) The CA erred in applying in favor of the Andals, the doctrine that a forged instrument may become the root
of a valid title in the hands of an innocent purchaser for value, because Abalon never parted with her
possession of the valid and uncancelled title over the subject property
c) The CA erred in declaring the validity of the title issued in the names of the Andals, because Rellama was
bereft of any transmissible right over the portion of the property he had sold to them.16
THE COURTS RULING
We deny the Petitions and affirm the ruling of the CA.
The main issue to be resolved in this case is whether a forged instrument may become the root of a valid title in the hands of
an innocent purchaser for value, even if the true owner thereof has been in possession of the genuine title, which is valid and
We do acknowledge that the rule thus enunciated is not cast in stone. For, indeed, there are exceptions thereto. Thus, in
Sandoval vs. CA, we made clear the following:
The aforesaid principle admits of an unchallenged exception: that a person dealing with registered land has a right to rely on
the Torrens certificate of title and to dispense with the need of inquiring further except when the party has actual knowledge
of facts and circumstances that would impel a reasonably cautious man to make such inquiry or when the purchaser has
knowledge ofa defect or the lack of title in his vendor or of sufficient facts to induce a reasonably prudent man to inquire
into the status of the title of the property in litigation. The presence of anything which excites or arouses suspicion should
then prompt the vendee to look beyond the certificate and investigate the title of the vendor appearing on the face of said
certificate. One who falls within the exception can neither be denominated an innocent purchaser for value nor a purchaser
in good faith; and hence does not merit the protection of the law.22
Thus, the determination whether one is a buyer in good faith or can be considered an innocent purchaser for value becomes
imperative. Section 55 of the Land Registration Act provides protection to an innocent purchaser for value23 by allowing
him to retain the parcel of land bought and his title is considered valid. Otherwise, the title would be cancelled and the
original owner of the parcel of land is allowed to repossess it.
Jurisprudence has defined an innocent purchaser for value as one who buys the property of another without notice that some
other person has a right to or interest therein and who then pays a full and fair price for it at the time of the purchase or
before receiving a notice of the claim or interest of some other persons in the property. Buyers in good faith buy a property
with the belief that the person from whom they receive the thing is the owner who can convey title to the property. Such
buyers do not close their eyes to facts that should put a reasonable person on guard and still claim that they are acting in
good faith.24
The assailed Decision of the CA held that the Andals were buyers in good faith, while Spouses Peralta were not. Despite its
determination that fraud marred the sale between Bernardina Abalon and Rellama, a fraudulent or forged document of sale
may still give rise to a valid title. The appellate court reasoned that if the certificate of title had already been transferred from
the name of the true owner to that which was indicated by the forger and remained as such, the land is considered to have
been subsequently sold to an innocent purchaser, whose title is thus considered valid.25 The CA concluded that this was the
case for the Andals.
The appellate court cited Fule v. Legare26 as basis for its ruling. In the said case, the Court made an exception to the general
rule that a forged or fraudulent deed is a nullity and conveys no title. A fraudulent document may then become the root of a
valid title, as it held in Fule:
Although the deed of sale in favor of John W. Legare was fraudulent, the fact remains that he was able to secure a registered
title to the house and lot. It was this title which he subsequently conveyed to the herein petitioners. We have indeed ruled
that a forged or fraudulent deed is a nullity and conveys no title (Director of Lands vs. Addison, 49 Phil., 19). However, we
have also laid down the doctrine that there are instances when such a fraudulent document may become the root of a valid
title. One such instance is where the certificate of title was already transferred from the name of the true owner to the forger,
and while it remained that way, the land was subsequently sold to an innocent purchaser. For then, the vendee had the right
to rely upon what appeared in the certificate (Inquimboy vs. Cruz, G.R. No. L-13953, July 28, 1960).
We have been constrained to adopt the conclusion here set forth because under the Torrens system, "registration is the
operative act that gives validity to the transfer or creates a lien upon the land (Secs. 50 and 51, Land Registration Act).
Consequently, where there was nothing in the certificate of title to indicate any cloud or vice in the ownership of the
property, or any encumbrance thereon, the purchaser is not required to explore farther than what the Torrens title upon its
face indicates in quest for any hidden defect or inchoate right that may subsequently defeat his right thereto. If the rule were
otherwise, the efficacy and conclusiveness of the certificate of title which the Torrens system seeks to insure would entirely
be futile and nugatory. (Reynes vs. Barrera, 68 Phil., 656; De Lara and De Guzman vs. Ayroso, 50 O.G. No 10, 4838). The
public shall then be denied of its foremost motivation for respecting and observing the Land Registration Act. In the end, the
business community stands to be inconvenienced and prejudiced immeasurably.
Furthermore, when the Register of Deeds issued a certificate of title in the name of John W. Legare, and thereafter registered
the same, John W. Legare, insofar as third parties were concerned, acquired valid title to the house and lot here disputed.
When, therefore, he transferred this title to the herein petitioners, third persons, the entire transaction fell within the purview
of Article 1434 of the Civil Code. The registration in John W. Legare's name effectively operated to convey the properties to
him.
After executing the Deed of Sale with Bernardina Abalon under fraudulent circumstances, Rellama succeeded in obtaining a
title in his name and selling a portion of the property to the Andals, who had no knowledge of the fraudulent circumstances
involving the transfer from Abalon to Rellama. In fact, the Decisions of the RTC and the CA show no factual findings or
proof that would rebut the presumption in favor of the Andals as buyers in good faith. Thus, the CA correctly considered
them as buyers in good faith and upheld their title.
The Abalons counter this ruling and allege that the CA erred in relying on Fuleto justify its assailed Decision. They argue
that Torres v. Court of Appeals27 is the applicable ruling, because the facts therein are on all fours with the instant case.28
In Torres, the subject property was covered by TCT No. 53628 registered in the name of Mariano Torres. His brother-in-law
Francisco Fernandez, misrepresenting that the copy of the title had been lost, succeeded in obtaining a court Order for the
issuance of another copy of TCT No. 53628. He then forged a simulated deed of sale purportedly showing that Torres had
sold the property to him and caused the cancellation of TCT No. 53628, as well as the issuance of TCT No. 86018 in his
name. Soon, Fernandez mortgaged the property to Mota. Upon learning of the fraud committed by Fernandez, Torres caused
the annotation of an adverse claim on the formers copy and succeeded in having Fernandezs title declared null and void.
Meanwhile, Mota was able to foreclose on Fernandezs real estate mortgage, as well as to cause the cancellation of TCT No.
86018 and the issuance of a new one TCT No. 105953 in her name. The issue to be resolved in Torres was whether Mota
can be considered an innocent mortgagee for value, and whether her title can be deemed valid. Ruling in the negative, the
Court explained:
There is nothing on the records which shows that Torres performed any act or omission which could have jeopardized his
peaceful dominion over his realties. The decision under review, however, in considering Mota an innocent mortgagee
protected under Section 65 of the Land Registration Law, held that Torres was bound by the mortgage. Inevitably, it
pronounced that the foreclosure sale, where Mota was the highest bidder, also bound Torres and concluded that the
certificate of title issued in the name of Mota prevails over that of Torres'. As correctly pointed out by Torres, however, his
properties were sold on execution, and not on foreclosure sale, and hence, the purchaser thereof was bound by his notice of
adverse claim and lis pendens annotated at the back of Fernandez' TCT. Moreover, even if We grant Mota the status of an
innocent mortgagee, the doctrine relied upon by the appellate court that a forged instrument may become the root of a valid
title, cannot be applied where the owner still holds a valid and existing certificate of title covering the same interest in a
realty. The doctrine would apply rather when, as in the cases for example of De la Cruz v. Fabie, 35 Phil. 144 [1916], Fule v.
De Legare, No. L-17951, February 28, 1963, 7 SCRA 351, and Republic v. Umali, G.R. No. 80687, April 10, 1989, the
forger thru insidious means obtains the owners duplicate certificate of title, converts it in his name, and subsequently sells
or otherwise encumbers it to an innocent holder for value, for in such a case the new certificate is binding upon the owner
(Sec.55, Act 496; Sec. 53, P.D. No. 1529). But if the owner holds a valid and existing certificate of title, his would be
indefeasible as against the whole world, and not that of the innocent holder's. "Prior tempore potior jure" as We have said in
Register of Deeds v. Philippine National Bank, No. L-17641, January 30, 1965, 13 SCRA 46, citing Legarda v. Saleeby, 31
Phil.590, Roman Catholic Bishop v. Philippine Railway, 49 Phil. 546, Reyes v. Borbon, 50 Phil. 791.29 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
We do not agree with the contention of the Abalons that the ruling in Torresis controlling in this case. They quoted a portion
in the said case that is clearly an obiter. In Torres, it was shown that Mariano had annotated an adverse claim on the title
procured by Fernandez prior to the execution sale, in which Mota was the highest bidder. This Court declared her as a
mortgagee in bad faith because, at the back of Fernandezs title, Torres made an annotation of the adverse claim and the
notice of lis pendens. The annotation of the adverse claim was made while the forged document was still in the name of the
forger, who in this case is Fernandez. That situation does not obtain in the instant case.
The records of the RTC and the CA have a finding that when Rellama sold the properties to the Andals, it was still in his
name; and there was no annotation that would blight his clean title. To the Andals, there was no doubt that Rellama was the
owner of the property being sold to them, and that he had transmissible rights of ownership over the said property. Thus,
they had every right to rely on the face of his title alone.
The established rule is that a forged deed is generally null and cannot convey title, the exception thereto, pursuant to Section
55 of the Land Registration Act, denotes the registration of titles from the forger to the innocent purchaser for value. Thus,
the qualifying point here is that there must be a complete chain of registered titles.30 This means that all the transfers
starting from the original rightful owner to the innocent holder for value and that includes the transfer to the forger must
be duly registered, and the title must be properly issued to the transferee. Contrary to what the Abalons would like to
impress on us, Fuleand Torresdo not present clashing views. In Fule, the original owner relinquished physical possession of
her title and thus enabled the perpetrator to commit the fraud, which resulted in the cancellation of her title and the issuance
of a new one. The forged instrument eventually became the root of a valid title in the hands of an innocent purchaser for
value. The new title under the name of the forger was registered and relied upon by the innocent purchaser for value. Hence,
it was clear that there was a complete chain of registered titles.
On the other hand in Torres, the original owner retained possession of the title, but through fraud, his brother-in-law secured
a court order for the issuance of a copy thereof. While the title was in the name of the forger, the original owner annotated
the adverse claim on the forged instrument. Thus, before the new title in the name of the forger could be transferred to a
third person, a lien had already been annotated on its back. The chain of registered titles was broken and sullied by the
original owners annotation of the adverse claim. By this act, the mortgagee was shown to be in bad faith.
In the instant case, there is no evidence that the chain of registered titles was broken in the case of the Andals. Neither were
they proven to have knowledge of anything that would make them suspicious of the nature of Rellamas ownership over the
subject parcel of land. Hence, we sustain the CAs ruling that the Andals were buyers in good faith. Consequently, the
validity of their title to the parcel of the land bought from Rellama must be upheld.
As for Spouses Peralta, we sustain the ruling of the CA that they are indeed buyers in bad faith. The appellate court made a
factual finding that in purchasing the subject property, they merely relied on the photocopy of the title provided by Rellama.
The CA concluded that a mere photocopy of the title should have made Spouses Peralta suspicious that there was some flaw
in the title of Rellama, because he was not in possession of the original copy. This factual finding was supported by
evidence.
The CA pointed out Spouses Peraltas Answer to the Complaint of the Abalons in Case No. 9243 in the RTC of Legaspi City,
Branch 5. In their Answer, they specifically alleged as follows:
2- These defendants [Spouses Peralta] acquired lot No. 1679-A by purchase in good faith and for value from
Restituto Rellama under Doc. No. 11212, page No. 26, Book No. 60, Series of 1996 of Notary Public Atty.
Otilio Bongon, Legaspi City on March 2, 1995 copy of which is attached as and made part of this answer as
Exhibit "1;"
3- That these defendants were handed over by Rellama xerox [sic] copy of the Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 42103 issued by the Register of Deed of Legaspi City on the 2nd day of August 1995 copy attached and
made integral part as Exhibit "1-A" and also Original Certificate of Title No. (O) 16 as Exhibit "1-B"31
We have no reason to disturb this factual finding of the CA because it is supported by the evidence on record. Spouses
Peralta filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, which allows only questions of law to be raised. It is a
settled rule that questions of fact are not reviewable in this kind of appeal. Under Rule 45, Section 1, "petitions for review on
certiorari shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth."32 A question of fact arises when there is "as to
the truth or falsehood of facts or when there is a need to calibrate the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of
the witnesses, the existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances, as well as their relation to each other and
to the whole, and the probability of the situation."33 It is further pointed out that "the determination of whether one is a
buyer in good faith is a factual issue, which generally is outside the province of this Court to determine in a petition for
review."34
Whether or not Spouses Peralta are buyers in good faith, is without a doubt, a factual issue. Although this rule admits of
exceptions,35 none of these applies to their case. There is no conflict between the factual findings and legal conclusions of
the RTC and those of the CA, both of which found them to be buyers in bad faith. The fact that they did not participate in the
proceedings before the lower court does not help their case either.
On the issue of the legal standing of the Abalons to file this case, we find that the CA correctly upheld their standing as heirs
of the deceased Bernardina Abalon. The appellate court ruled that during her lifetime, Bernardina Abalon had promised her
heirs - siblings Mansueto and Amelia - that she would give them the subject property. A duplicate copy of OCT No. (0) 16
was delivered to them upon her death. Thus, the CA concluded that the two siblings acquired the subject property by
ordinary prescription. Further, it deduced that the mode of transmission of the property from Bernardina to her nephew and
niece was a form of donation mortis causa, though without the benefit of a will.36 Despite this omission, it still held that
Mansueto and Amelia acquired the subject property through ordinary acquisitive prescription because, since the death of
their aunt Bernardina, they had been in possession of the property for more than 10 years that ripened into full ownership.37
Under Article 97538 of the Civil Code, siblings Mansueto and Amelia Abalon are the legal heirs of Bernardina, the latter
having had no issue during her marriage. As such, they succeeded to her estate when she passed away. While we agree with
the CA that the donation mortis causa was invalid in the absence of a will, it erred in concluding that the heirs acquired the
subject property through ordinary acquisitive prescription. The subject parcel of land is a titled property; thus, acquisitive
prescription is not applicable.39 Upon the death of Bernardina, Mansueto and Amelia, being her legal heirs, acquired the
subject property by virtue of succession, and not by ordinary acquisitive prescription.
WHEREFORE, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 183448 and 183464 are DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision in CA-G.R. CV
No. 85542 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice, Chairperson
WE CONCUR:
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached
in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice
Footnotes
1 Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 85542 dated 30 May 2007 penned by Associate Justice Amelita G. Tolentino
and concurred in by Associate Justices Lucentino N. Tagle and Sixto C. Marella, Jr., rollo (G.R. No. 183448),
pp.70-84.
2 RTC Decision dated 14 April 2005 in Civil Case No. 9243 penned by Judge Pedro R. Soriao, rollo (G.R.
No. 183448), pp. 65-68.
3 Rollo (G.R. No. 183448), pp. 70-74.
4 Id. at 76
5 Id. at 78.
6 Id.
7 Id. at 79.
8 Id.
9 Id. at 82.
10 Id. at 83.
11 Id. at 83-84.
12 Id. at 61-63.
13 Id. at 10-37.
14 Rollo (G.R. No. 183464), pp. 17-45
15 Rollo (G.R. No. 183448), p. 14.
16 Rollo (G.R. No. 183464), pp. 28-29.
17 Pioneer Insurance and Surety Corporation vs. Heirs of Vicente Coronado, G.R. No. 180357, 04 August
2009, 595 SCRA 263, 272.
18 G.R. No. 107967, 01 March 1994, 230 SCRA 550.
19 Heirs of Marcelino Doronio v. Heirs of Fortunato Doronio, G.R. No. 169454, 27 December 2007, 541
SCRA 479, 506.
20 Tiongco v. Dela Merced, 157 Phil. 92 (1972).
21 493 Phil. 119 (2005).
22 Id. at 128.
23 Land Registration Act, Section 55:
The production of the owner's duplicate certificate whenever any voluntary instrument is presented
for registration shall be conclusive authority from the registered owner to the register of deeds to enter
a new certificate or to make a memorandum of registration in accordance with such instrument, and
the new certificate or memorandum shall be binding upon the registered owner and upon all persons
claiming under him, in favor of every purchaser for value and in good faith: Provided, however, That
in all cases of registration procured by fraud the owner may pursue all his legal and equitable
remedies against the parties to such fraud, without prejudice, however, to the rights of any innocent
holder for value of a certificate of title: And provided further, That after the transcription of the decree
of registration on the original application, any subsequent registration under this Act procured by the
presentation of a forged duplicate certificate, or of a forged deed or other instrument, shall be null and
void. In case of the loss or theft of an owner's duplicate certificate, notice shall be sent by the owner
or by someone in his behalf to the register of deeds of the province in which the land lies as soon as
the loss or theft is discovered.
24 Yared v. Tiongco, G.R. No. 161360, 19 October 2011, 659 SCRA 545, 555.
25 Rollo (G.R. No.183448), p. 80.
26 117 Phil. 367 (1963).
27 264 Phil. 1062 (1990).
28 Rollo (G.R. No. 183464), p. 36.
29 Id. at 1067.
30 Noblejas and Noblejas, REGISTRATION OF LAND TITLES AND DEEDS, 416 (2007 Rev. Ed.).
31 RTC records, p. 33.
32 Abalos v. Heirs of Vicente Torio, G.R. No. 175444, 14 December 2011, 662 SCRA 450, 456.
33 Guy v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 165849, 10 December 2007, 539 SCRA 584, 606-667.
34 Orquiola v. Court of Appeals, 435 Phil. 323, 331 (2002).
35 Among the recognized exceptions to the rule are the following:
(a) When the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures;
(b) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible;
(c) When there is grave abuse of discretion;
(d) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
(e) When the findings of facts are conflicting;
(f) When in making its findings the CA went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary
to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee;
(g) When the CA's findings are contrary to those by the trial court;
(h) When the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based;
(i) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not
disputed by the respondent;
(j) When the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by
the evidence on record; or
(k) When the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if
properly considered, would justify a different conclusion. Spouses Andrada v. Pilhino Sales
Corporation, G.R. No. 156448, 23 February 2011 (644 SCRA 1, 10), as cited in Abalos v., Heirs of
Vicente Torio, id.
36 Rollo (G.R. No. 183448), p. 79.
37 Id. at 80.
38 Civil Code of the Philippines, Article 975. When children of one or more brothers or sisters of the
deceased survive, they shall inherit from the latter by representation, if they survive with their uncles or
aunts. But if they alone survive, they shall inherit in equal portions.
39 Reyes v. Court of Appeals, 328 Phil. 171 (1996).
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation
EN BANC
- versus -
CESAR FORTUNA,
Petitioner,
- versus -
Plaintiff-Appellee,
Present:
CORONA, C.J.,
- versus -
CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
Accused-Appellants.
PEREZ,
MENDOZA, and
SERENO, JJ.
Promulgated:
September 7, 2010
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
* On official leave.
For review is the Decision372[1] dated April 1, 2008 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00667 which affirmed with modification the Joint
Decision373[2] dated July 30, 1999 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 103 in Criminal Case Nos. Q-96-66679, Q-96-66680, Q-96-66682, Q-9666683 and Q-96-66684.
The consolidated cases arose in connection with the killing of former Chief
of the Metropolitan Command Intelligence and Security Group of the Philippine
Constabulary, now the Philippine National Police (PNP), Colonel Rolando N.
Abadilla (Abadilla), who was ambushed in broad daylight while driving his car
along Katipunan Avenue, Quezon City.
The Facts
On June 13, 1996, at around 8:00 oclock in the morning, Abadilla left his
house at Soliven I, Loyola Grand Villas, Loyola Heights, Quezon City and drove
his car, a black Honda Accord with Plate No. RNA-777. Soon after he left, his wife
Susan Abadilla received a phone call from him and they briefly talked. Just a few
minutes after their conversation, she received another phone call from Abadillas
tailor who was asking about her husband because, according to him, he heard a
radio broadcast report that Abadilla met an accident.374[3]
372[1]Penned by Associate Justice Agustin S. Dizon and concurred in by Associate Justices
Regalado E. Maambong and Celia C. Librea-Leagogo.
Meanwhile, at about 8:40 a.m., Senior Police Officer (SPO) 2 Arthur Ortiz,
the desk officer on duty at Station 8 of the Central Police District Command
(CPDC) located at P. Tuazon Blvd., Project 4, Quezon City, answered a telephone
call from a male person who reported a shooting incident along Katipunan Avenue.
Station Commander Police Chief Inspector (Insp.) Edward Villena, together with
his investigators SPO2 Wahab Magundacan, Police Officer (PO) 2 Gerardo
Daganta and PO1 Ronald Francisco immediately boarded a PNP marked vehicle
and headed towards Katipunan Avenue.375[4]
Upon reaching the area at 8:45 a.m., they saw several onlookers around and
near a black Honda Accord with Plate No. RNA-777 on a stop position in the
middle lane of Katipunan Avenue facing south going to Libis. They found the
victims bloodied and bullet-riddled body partly slumped onto the pavement at the
cars left door, which was open. The front windshield and sliding glass windows on
the left and right side were shattered; a hole was seen on the glass window of the
left rear door, apparently pierced by a bullet. Glass splinters were scattered inside
the car and on the pavement at both sides of the car. On orders of Chief Insp.
Villena, PO2 Daganta and PO1 Francisco assisted by a certain Cesar Espiritu,
immediately brought the victim to the Quirino Memorial Hospital in Project 4,
Quezon City. SPO2 Magundacan was instructed to stay behind to cordon the area
for the start of the investigation while Chief Insp. Villena went to their station to
get his camera.376[5] After ten (10) minutes, Chief Insp. Villena returned and took
375[4]TSN, August 1, 1996, pp. 14-22; TSN, August 6, 1996, pp. 14-19; TSN, August 7,
1996, pp. 11-13.
376[5]TSN, August 1, 1996, pp. 22-34; TSN, August 6, 1996, pp. 19-23, 35-37; TSN, August
7, 1996, pp. 13-16.
pictures of the crime scene, and also of the victim at the hospital. 377[6] SPO2
Magundacan was able to pick up several spent shells and two (2) slugs, apparently
fired from .45 and 9 mm. pistols.378[7] A sketch was prepared by PO2 Daganta who
also interviewed some of the witnesses present at the crime scene. 379[8] The spot
report and list of recovered items (including a Philippine Military Academy gold
ring on which was engraved the name Rolando N. Abadilla) were later prepared by
SPO2 Magundacan at the police station.380[9]
On the same day, witnesses Cesar F. Espiritu (who was driving his car ahead
of the victim), Aurora Urbano (Metro Aide), Ani C. Icot (house gardener of the
Abadilla family, Freddie Alejo (security guard posted at Eliscon Electrical Supply
store located at 211 Katipunan Avenue) and Minella Alarcon (college professor at
Ateneo de Manila University) gave their respective statements before the Criminal
Investigation Division of the Central Police District Command (CID-CPDC), PNPNational Capital Region (NCR) at Camp Karingal, Sikatuna Village, Quezon City,
while the statement of Merlito Herbas (security guard posted at the Blue Ridge
Realty Corporation located at No. 219 Katipunan Avenue, Quezon City) was taken
at Station No. 8, CPDC at P. Tuazon Blvd., Proj. 4, Quezon City.381[10]
377[6]TSN, August 7, 1996, pp. 17-26; Exhibits A to A-9, folder of exhibits, pp. 6-9. Also
Exhibits 29 to 35 for the Defense, pp. 356-362.
380[9]TSN, August 1, 1996, pp. 55-59; TSN, August 6, 1996, pp. 75-76; Exhibits B and C,
folder of exhibits, pp. 10-12.
Based on their accounts, the black Honda Accord with Plate Number RNA777 was caught in traffic while traversing Katipunan Avenue going to Santolan at
past 8:00 oclock on the morning of June 13, 1996. While on a stop position, four
(4) men armed with handguns surrounded the said car and fired several successive
shots at the man inside it. One (1) of the men who were positioned at the left side
of the car opened its door and took something inside. He grabbed the victim by the
neck and dropped his body down towards the pavement at the left door. When
there were already several people who had come out to see what was happening,
one of the suspects shouted, Walang gagalawDapa!
Minella Alarcon, who was then with her son-in-law on board her white KIA
Pride, was following the victims car (at other side or diagonal line) at the time of
the incident. After the shooting, two (2) of the armed men who fired at the victims
car approached their car and pounded at it saying BabaBaba! Terrified, she and her
son-in-law got off and crawled towards the side of the street. The assailants then
boarded the KIA Pride and went away to the direction of an alley along Katipunan
Avenue. Her car was later recovered, as it was found abandoned along Aguinaldo
Street near the corner of J.P. Rizal Street, Project 4, Quezon City, still with
bloodstains on the car door.382[11]
The victim was pronounced dead on arrival at the hospital. The victims
identity was confirmed by Susan Abadilla who had rushed to the hospital. Chief
Insp. Villena escorted her in bringing the victims body to the PNP Crime
Laboratory in Camp Crame for the autopsy requested by the CPDC, PNP-NCR,
381[10]Records, Vol. I, pp. 27-40.
382[11]Records, Vol. I, pp. 39-40; See also Exhibits 37 to 45-B-1 for the Defense, folder of
exhibits, pp. 363-371.
Camp Karingal.383[12] From the testimony and medico-legal report of Dr. Jesusa N.
Vergara, it was disclosed that the victim died of hemorrhage as a result of multiple
gunshot wounds, mostly in the head and chest, and also sustained abrasions,
contusions, lacerated skin, hematoma and incised wounds or cuts in the skin
caused by glass splinters.384[13]
Records indicate that immediately after the incident, elements of the CPDC,
PNP-NCR at Camp Karingal were already coordinating with investigators of
Station 8-CPDC who had turned over to said office the evidence gathered and
referred the witnesses present at the crime scene. 385[14] As a result of follow-up
operations, Joel de Jesus, alias Tabong, was apprehended on June 19, 1996 at his
house at Dahlia St., Fairview, Quezon City. He executed his Sinumpaang Salaysay
dated June 20, 1996 and Karagdagang Sinumpaang Salaysay dated June 21,
1996.386[15]
In his first statement, Joel de Jesus narrated that on June 13, 1996 at 6:30 in
the morning after parking his tricycle at the corner of Regalado and Camaro
Streets, Fairview, he was fetched by Lorenzo Larry delos Santos who was his
neighbor at Ruby St. Larry was accompanied by his nephew Ogie, and a certain
Tisoy who drove the owner-type jeep. Larry told him they were going to kill a bigtime personality (may titirahin na malaking tao), whose name was Abadilla, and
that they were going to ambush the latter at Katipunan Avenue. The ambush would
383[12]TSN, August 7, 1996, pp. 26-28; TSN, September 18, 1996, pp. 36-37.
384[13]TSN, September 10, 1996, p. 97; Exhibit Q, folder of exhibits, pp. 34-35.
385[14]Testimony of P/Insp. Rogelio Castillo - TSN, August 7, 1996, pp. 54-124.
386[15]Exhibits E and N, folder of exhibits, pp. 14-20, 30.
be carried out by Joel, Larry, Tisoy, Ram (de Jesus), Cesar who was a policeman,
and four (4) others. That same morning, they proceeded to Katipunan Avenue on
board Larrys owner-type jeep without a plate and a Mitsubishi L-300 van. They
carried .45 and 9 mm. pistols; Joel used a .38 caliber revolver. According to Joel,
he only acted as lookout; Lorenzo, Ram and Cesar were the ones who fired shots,
while Tisoy focused on a security guard at a store. After the shooting, they
separated ways: the owner-type jeep he was riding in headed towards Santolan;
Cesars group split so that three (3) of them rode the L-300 van and the three (3)
others boarded a car stolen from a woman driver. Upon reaching Commonwealth
Avenue and Tandang Sora, they stopped at Glori Supermarket where all the
firearms used were returned to the group, including the revolver earlier given to
Joel. It was already dusk when Lorenzo dropped him off at the tricycle parking
area at Camaro St.387[16]
Joel further stated that the ambush-slay of Abadilla was planned by the
group three (3) days before, when they met at the house of Ram de Jesus also in
Fairview near his house. Although he did not know the identity of the person who
masterminded the ambush-slay of Abadilla, he described the mastermind as the one
(1) who opened Abadillas car and pulled Abadilla from the inside of the car, and he
was also the one (1) who drove the L-300 van. Lorenzo told him he should not
worry because Lorenzo would take care that he would be compensated for his
participation. When they reached Katipunan Avenue, they alighted from their
respective vehicles to wait for Abadilla. The L-300 van where the mastermind and
Cesar rode was just behind Abadillas car. There was no more order given to fire
because when traffic stopped the vehicles on the road, those in the L-300 van just
got down, positioned themselves and fired upon Abadilla. The mastermind not only
387[16]Id., at pp. 15-17.
fired at Abadilla from outside the latters car, he even made sure Abadilla was dead,
as half of his body went inside the car, firing again at Abadilla before finally
dropping him to the ground. Joel added that he just remained silent after the
incident, for which he did not earn anything and was threatened by one (1) of those
who were in the L-300 van whose name he did not know.388[17]
In his second statement, Joel pointed to his cohorts in a police line-up inside
the CID-CPDC, PNP-NCR, Camp Karingal, Quezon City where he positively
identified Rameses de Jesus (Ram), Cesar Fortuna, Lenido Lumanog and PO2
Romeo Costibolo as among those who participated in the ambush-slaying of
Abadilla on June 13, 1996.389[18]
The afore-named suspects identified by Joel were apprehended during
further follow-up operations conducted on June 20, 1996 by Task Force Rolly
subsequently formed by the PNP after the lead initially provided by him. As
mentioned in the Joint Affidavit executed by Police Senior Inspector (P/Sr. Insp.)
Ronello N. Navarro, Police Inspector (P/Insp.) Ferdinand A. Marticio, SPO4
Wilfredo G. Galvan and SPO1 Allan dela Cruz dated June 21, 1996, as early as
June 15, 1996, or two (2) days after the ambush-slay of Abadilla, their
investigation already established the identities of a number of suspects through
photo files and forensic sketches of suspects provided by eyewitnesses. 390[19] Said
arresting officers were also able to seize certain firearms and other pieces of
evidence, to wit:
388[17]Id., at pp. 18-19.
389[18]Id., at p. 30.
390[19]Exhibit 1 for the Defense (Fortuna), folder of exhibits, pp. 99-101; Records, Vol. I, pp.
60-62.
4. That after SPO2 cesar Fortuna revealed the whereabouts of the slain
victims stolen cal .45 pistol, we conducted a follow up in a gunsmith located at
Sampaloc, Manila on 21 June 1996, from where we held for investigation, one
DANTE MONTEVIRGEN y VILLANUEVA, 37 years old, married, selfemployed/gunsmith, native of Pula, Oriental Mindoro and with given
address at 1412 Riverside Street, Commonwealth Avenue, Bgy. Holy
Spirit, Quezon City.
5. That upon confrontation said subject person surrendered two (2) cal .45
pistols whom suspect Cesar Fortuna allegedly brought to him for repair/tampering
of serial numbers, to wit:
(a) 1- COLT MARK IV cal .45 pistol Govt Model
SN-66B5574; and
(b) 1-COLT MARK IV cal .45 pistol Series 70
SN-647048.
6. On the same day, 21 June 1996, after SPO2 Cesar Fortuna expressed
willingness to surrender the motorcycle allegedly used in casing and surveillance
upon the deceased victim, we took said motorcycle at Gate 2 of Camp Crame
along Santolan Road (Col Bony Serrano Avenue), Quezon City, to wit:
1- Unit, KAWASAKI motorcycle without
license plate, chassis No. C-5121696, Motor No.
658 122951
7. That the aforenamed subject person together with the property/articles
recovered were turned over to the Police Headquarters for investigation and
appropriate action;
x x x391[20]
if he would not go with them, they would kill his family. He claimed that he
merely acted as a lookout. As similarly recounted by Joel, Lorenzo stated that the
group used an L-300 van, a car and a jeep in going to Katipunan Avenue in the
morning of June 13, 1996. Joel had a .45 cal pistol, Cesar a .38 revolver, Lenido a
9 mm., a certain Manuel dela Rosa who did not get out of the vehicle, carried a .38
cal revolver, and Lorenzo, also a .38 cal revolver. Rameses, Joel, Cesar and Lenido
were the ones who shot Abadilla. After the shooting, the group left him behind and
he just walked on the street before taking a taxi ride to the Bureau of Customs.
Lorenzo maintained that he was not given any money. He was just picked up from
his house at Ruby St., Fairview Subdivision by Rameses, Lenido, Cesar and Joel.
He was made to board Rameses car with a warning that if he did not join the
group, they would throw a hand grenade at his family.392[21]
In his Karagdagang Salaysay dated June 21, 1996, security guard Freddie
Alejo positively identified Joel and Lorenzo during a police line-up. Alejo
confirmed these two (2) as the persons he saw from his guard post walking to and
fro before the shooting incident. They were also the ones who shouted that no one
(1) should interfere at the time the four (4) armed men were firing shots at
Abadilla.393[22]
SPO2 Cesar Fortuna y Abudo, Rameses de Jesus y Calma, Lorenzo delos
Santos y Dela Cruz, Lenido Lumanog y Luistro, Joel de Jesus y Valdez and Arturo
Napolitano y Caburnay were charged in Criminal Case No. Q-96-66679 with theft
of the alleged gun owned by the late Abadilla (Colt Mark IV cal .45 pistol SN66BS574), a gold-plated Omega wristwatch and a wallet containing an
392[21]Exhibit S, folder of exhibits, pp. 37-38.
393[22]Exhibit M, folder of exhibits, p. 29.
undetermined amount of cash plus calling cards and other important papers, all of
which were supposedly stolen by them after killing Abadilla.394[23]
On the other hand, Lorenzo delos Santos y Dela Cruz, SPO2 Cesar Fortuna
y Abudo and Rameses de Jesus y Calma were respectively charged with illegal
possession of firearms (Presidential Decree No. 1866) in Criminal Case Nos. Q-9666680, Q-96-66682 and Q-96-66683.395[24]
All the seven (7) named accused in Criminal Case No. Q-96-66684 were
indicted for Murder under the following Information:
That on or about the 13th day of June, 1996 in Quezon City, Philippines,
the above-named accused, conspiring together, confederating with several other
persons whose true names, identities, whereabouts have not as yet been
ascertained and mutually helping with one another, did then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously with intent to kill, with evident premeditation,
treachery, in consideration of a price, reward or promise, and taking advantage of
superior strength, attack and employ personal violence upon the person of COL.
ROLANDO ABADILLA y NOLASCO by then and there shooting the latter with
the use of different kinds of firearms, hitting him on the different parts of his
body, thereby causing the instant and immediate cause of his death, to the damage
and prejudice of the heirs of the said COL. ROLANDO ABADILLA y
NOLASCO.
Contrary to law.396[25]
When arraigned, all the accused pleaded not guilty to the murder charge.
In view of the dismissal of the criminal cases for illegal possession of
firearms (P.D. No. 1866) and theft (Criminal Case Nos. Q-96-66679, Q-96-66680,
394[23]Records, Vol. I, pp. 2-3.
395[24]Id., at pp. 4-9.
396[25]Id., at pp. 10-12.
conference wherein Joel was presented together with then Secretary Barbers and
General Recaredo Sarmiento, he learned about it only later.398[27]
The witness declared that the constitutional mandate and requirements under
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7438 had been complied with because he secured the
services of a counsel during the interrogation of then suspect Joel de Jesus when
his sworn statement was taken on June 20, 1996. He had informed the said suspect
of his right to counsel in the presence of CID personnel and when he brought him
to the office of Atty. Confesor R. Sansano of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) located at the second floor of the Hall of Justice, Quezon City Hall. Asked
why it occurred to him to bring the suspect to the IBP, the witness replied that he
believed IBP was a private, not a government, institution. He also asked Joel -who was allowed to make a telephone call, although he was not aware if Joel made
any such call -- whether he had his own lawyer. He recalled asking Joel if he was
willing to go with them to the City Hall, because he had asked to secure the
services of counsel. There had been instances when the IBP lawyers assisted some
suspects brought by the CPDC. The CPDC provided the typewriter and papers to
be used and in this case, Atty. Sansano accommodated them in using the facilities
of the IBP Chapter office. Joel executed his statement, with SPO2 Jose L. Garcia,
Jr. propounding the questions. They started taking his statement at 1:10 p.m. of
June 20, 1996 at Room 235, IBP Office, Quezon City Hall of Justice in the
presence of Atty. Sansano and a number of people inside said office. 399[28] He was
apprised for the first time about a suspect (Joel) who was just apprehended when
he called their office upon arriving home on the night of June 19, 1996. The
398[27]TSN, August 15, 1996, pp. 14, 31-39, 57-62.
399[28]Id., at pp. 46, 64-67, 70-83.
information was given to him by the desk sergeant and thereupon he gave
instruction to contact the witness and include that suspect in a line-up. He then
informed their Chief regarding this development. When he asked for the
whereabouts of this suspect, he was given the reply that the suspect was still with
their squad conducting follow-up operations.400[29]
P/Insp. Castillo recounted that he reported to the office at 8:00 oclock in the
morning of June 20, 1996 and Joel was actually presented to him by Lt. Rodolfo at
10:00 oclock that same morning, in the presence of CID men. He told Joel he was
being implicated in the case, to which Joel replied Sir, lookout lang naman ako, sir.
This initial questioning of Joel took place at the investigation room of the CID,
where there were other private complainants talking to investigators, and there
were a number of policemen around who were not in uniform. He advised Joel that
he was free to use the telephone, and although Joel had no relatives present at that
time, he warned Joel that his case was serious and he must seek the services of
counsel. He first thought of the legal assistance provided by the City Attorney, then
that by the Public Attorneys Office (PAO), and lastly by the IBP. Between 12:30
and 1:00 p.m., he and his men, together with Joel in a separate vehicle, left the CID
to go to the Quezon City Hall. They scouted for a lawyer and inquired from the
IBP chapter office. They found Atty. Florimond Rous and the lady counsel at a
hearing in a courtroom. Atty. Rous advised them to wait for Atty. Sansano, who
apparently was the head of the IBP chapter office. He was moving in and out of the
office while the statement of Joel was being taken in the presence of Atty. Sansano.
Before that, Atty. Sansano talked to Joel alone, after which they were called in
again for the taking of the statement at 2:00 p.m. They left City Hall at past 4:00 or
5:00 that afternoon.401[30]
SPO2 Garcia, Jr. testified that he was a member of the CID-CPDC at Camp
Karingal. On June 20, 1996 when he reported for duty, he was assigned by P/Insp.
Castillo to take down the statement of Joel de Jesus. While still inside the office of
P/Insp. Castillo, he asked Joel if his statement was voluntary and what kind of
statement he was going to give. Joel answered that his statement was voluntary and
he wanted to be included as state witness in the Abadilla case. Together with Joel,
SPO2 Tarala and SPO1 Edilberto Nicanor, he took lunch at the back of their office
before proceeding to the Quezon City Hall at around 12:00 oclock noon, with
P/Insp. Castillo who said that Joels statement would be taken infront of a counsel.
At the Hall of Justice lobby, P/Insp. Castillo instructed them to guard Joel as he
would look for a counsel. After more or less 25 to 30 minutes, P/Insp. Castillo
came back and they proceeded to the second floor of the office of the IBP chapter.
They were met by a lady secretary, and afterwards he saw P/Insp. Castillo talking
to a lawyer whom he came to know as Atty. Rous. It seemed Atty. Rous could not
decide on what P/Insp. Castillo told him and said he (Atty. Rous) would first ask
the permission of Atty. Sansano. They waited for Atty. Sansano, who arrived in
about twenty (20) to twenty-five (25) minutes. Atty. Sansano and P/Insp. Castillo
talked for about five (5) minutes and thereafter, Atty. Sansano requested them to
leave, because he would talk personally to Joel. Atty. Sansano and Joel talked
inside the room for five (5) to ten (10) minutes. Thereafter, he, P/Insp. Castillo,
SPO2 Tarala and SPO1 Edilberto Nicanor went inside the room and that was the
time Atty. Sansano announced that Joel was ready for the taking of his statement. 402
[31]
401[30]Id., at pp. 99-122, 125-141, 145-154.
SPO2 Garcia, Jr. further testified that he took down the statement of Joel
using a typewriter in the office of Atty. Sansano. He brought said typewriter near
the table of Atty. Sansano and a chair to sit on beside Joel. Joel was seated infront
of the desk where Atty. Sansano was sitting. After completing the taking down of
the statement, he gave it to Joel and asked the latter to read it. Joel read the
typewritten statement and when he finished reading, he gave the same to Atty.
Sansano. Atty. Sansano read all the contents of the document and asked Joel if he
understood it, to which he answered Yes, sir. Atty. Sansano then asked Joel if he
was willing to sign the statement, to which the latter again replied in the
affirmative. Joel signed the statement in his presence and also that of Atty.
Sansano, who likewise signed it in his presence. SPO2 Garcia, Jr. also identified
his own signature and that of SPO1 Nicanor who signed the statement in his
presence. From the office of Atty. Sansano, they proceeded to the fourth floor in
the office of Prosecutor Ramon Gerona before whom Joel subscribed his statement.
After reading the statement, Fiscal Gerona explained to Joel in Tagalog the
consequences of the statement he executed. Joel was calm and said he was only a
lookout in the crime. Earlier, before propounding questions to Joel at the office of
Atty. Sansano, the latter addressed Joel in Tagalog: Joel naiintindihan mo na ang
mga itinatanong sa iyo ng mga pulis? Ito ba sarili mo o boluntaryo ba tong
statement mo na ito hindi ka ba nila tinakot, sinaktan o anupaman? While Joel was
answering his questions, Atty. Sansano halted him from typing the answer given by
Joel to ask the latter if he could understand the question propounded to him. The
witness was also asked to identify Joel de Jesus inside the courtroom.403[32]
Santos on June 21, 1996. On that day, after lunch, he was instructed by P/Insp.
Castillo to proceed to the Public Assistance and Reaction Against Crime (PARAC),
Dallas Bldg. in Tomas Morato Avenue, because one (1) of the suspects in the
Abadilla slaying was apprehended by the PARAC follow-up team and was
supposed to give his statement. So he went there together with SPO1 Primo Borito
and PO3 Ramil Hatchero. Upon arriving at said office, he met P/Sr. Insp. Macanas,
who called a person he introduced as Lorenzo delos Santos. Before taking down
the statement of Lorenzo, he advised the latter of his rights under the law, warning
that any statement he would make could be used against him in any court of law, so
that he had the right not to answer any question which to his mind would
incriminate him. Lorenzo responded by saying that he wanted to give a statement
and to be a state witness. When Lorenzo asked if he could use a telephone at the
information table, he said yes. Lorenzo then called his office because he was a
customs broker, and also called up a relative who was a certain Col. Sala (Col.
Milagros Sala), a Quezon City police official. He told Lorenzo that he should have
a lawyer of his choice during the taking down of his statement. He prodded
Lorenzo to call the lawyer, whom Lorenzo knew to be always at the City Hall.
They then proceeded to the Quezon City Hall to look for that lawyer at the Office
of the City Attorney. However, Lorenzo was not able to find said lawyer; he asked
somebody (a woman) who referred them to the Hall of Justice. After failing to find
the person Lorenzo was looking for to be his counsel, an old man, a vendor
suggested to them to go upstairs at the IBP Office. The lady secretary of the IBP
chapter office introduced them to Atty. Florimond Rous, who then asked him and
his companions to step out of the room so Atty. Rous could talk to Lorenzo. Atty.
Rous and Lorenzo talked for ten (10) to fifteen (15) minutes, after which they were
called again to enter the office. His two (2) companions were left outside and he
was told by Atty. Rous that he had already apprised Lorenzo of his rights, but
Lorenzo still wanted to give a statement.406[35]
Upon the instruction of Atty. Rous, he took down the statement of Lorenzo,
the three (3) of them in one (1) corner of the room while over at the receiving area
there were the secretary and a lady lawyer. The statement of Lorenzo was in
Tagalog, typewritten in question-and-answer form. Each time after he had asked a
question, Atty. Rous would in turn ask Lorenzo if he wanted to answer it, and
Lorenzo would answer yes. He was at the typewriter, and the two (2) (Atty. Rous
and Lorenzo) were infront of him, seated across each other. The taking of the
statement started at about 3:10 in the afternoon and was finished in more than one
(1) hour. He asked Lorenzo to read first his statement, and then Atty. Rous read it
also. Next, they went up to the office of Fiscal Refuerzo, but was referred by the
secretary to the inquest fiscal on duty, Fiscal Ben dela Cruz. At his office, Fiscal
dela Cruz asked Lorenzo to stand infront of him and asked if the statement was
voluntarily given by him, if what was contained therein was true, and if he was
ready to swear before him. Lorenzo answered yes, and the subscribing of his
statement before Fiscal dela Cruz was also witnessed by Atty. Rous. 407[36] Lorenzo
had earlier told him and his companions at the PARAC office that his participation
in the ambush-slay of Abadilla was that of a lookout, and that he was only forced
to join the group because of the threat to his family.408[37]
406[35]TSN, October 3, 1996, pp. 23-46; TSN, October 8, 1996, pp. 19-20.
407[36]TSN, October 3, 1996, pp. 47-68.
408[37]TSN, October 8, 1996, pp. 38-41.
SPO2 Tarala admitted that the first time he went to the IBP Office at the Hall
of Justice was on June 20, 1996 when SPO2 Garcia, Jr. took the statement of Joel
de Jesus. Since only SPO2 Garcia, Jr. and Joel stayed inside the room, he and his
companion just walked around.409[38]
Atty. Rous testified that he was one (1) of the free legal aid counsels of the
Free Legal Aid Committee of the IBP-Quezon City Chapter. One (1) of their
primary duties was to assist indigents in their cases, and aside from this, they were
also tasked to assist the various suspects during custodial investigations in the
various investigations of different agencies, such as the CIS and PNP. He recalled
handling at least ten (10) to fifteen (15) of such custodial investigations. On June
21, 1996, he assisted a person by the name of Lorenzo delos Santos accompanied
by a police investigator (whose name he could no longer remember) from the
Central Police District, who told him that the said suspect was willing to make a
confession and asked if he could assist him during his custodial investigation. He
identified Lorenzo inside the courtroom.410[39] The police investigator had
informed him of the charge against Lorenzo, which was the killing of Abadilla. 411
[40]
Before the start of the investigation of Lorenzo, Atty. Rous related that he
asked the policeman to leave him and Lorenzo. When the investigators were gone,
he asked Lorenzo to remove his shirt so he could see if there were any tell-tale
marks of any harm or specific mark upon him. Having satisfied himself that there
409[38]TSN, October 9, 1996, pp. 66-67.
410[39]TSN, October 15, 1996, pp. 10-17.
411[40]Id., at pp. 45-48.
were no such mark on the suspects body, Atty. Rous began interviewing him. He
asked Lorenzo if he was willing to execute a confession, and Lorenzo answered he
was willing to do so. He then asked Lorenzo if he was willing to have him as his
counsel. Evidently, Lorenzo wanted him to be his counsel during the custodial
investigation for the taking of his statement. Convinced that Lorenzo was giving
his statement without any pressure or force, they started the investigation proper.
The police investigator who accompanied Lorenzo to their office was the one (1)
who had propounded questions in Tagalog and typed the answers given by Lorenzo
also in Tagalog. He was just within hearing distance and was present during the
entire time of the taking of Lorenzos statement. Afterwards, he let Lorenzo read the
typewritten statement, and he asked Lorenzo if those were the questions given to
him and the answers he had given, to which he replied in the affirmative. He
further asked Lorenzo if he was willing to sign the statement without pressure, and
Lorenzo said he was willing to sign the same. He asked Lorenzo to sign his
statement before the office of Prosecutor Ben dela Cruz. Prosecutor dela Cruz first
read the statement and then asked Lorenzo if he was willing to sign the same, and
he answered in the affirmative. Lorenzo signed the statement in their presence; he
and Prosecutor dela Cruz also signed it.412[41]
Atty. Rous further testified on cross-examination, that after the police
investigator and Lorenzo had left, a few minutes later, some other investigators
arrived at their office, bringing along Joel de Jesus. This Joel de Jesus had given a
statement the previous day, June 20, 1996, and he was told that Joel would be
giving this time a supplemental statement. The investigators apprised Joel of his
constitutional rights before the taking down of his statement. He was not sure if
Lorenzo and the police investigator had actually left already, and he could not
412[41]Id., at pp. 17-39.
remember exactly what transpired at this point. The defense counsel noted the
absence of the word competent to qualify the word counsel in the preliminary
portion of Lorenzos statement. Atty. Rous described the answers given by Lorenzo
as spontaneous, and he did not recall any hesitancy on the part of the latter. He
maintained that he found no contusions or abrasions on Lorenzos body.413[42]
P/Sr. Insp. Macanas testified that he was then assigned at the PARAC as its
operations officer. They were closely coordinating with and sharing evidence for
case build-up operations with the CPDC in the investigation of the killing of
Abadilla. On June 19, 1996, at around 3:00 oclock in the afternoon, they were
directed to proceed to the CPDC headquarters in view of an information that a
certain suspect alias Tabong was already located while repairing his tricycle
somewhere in Fairview, during which he was identified by an eyewitness, security
guard Alejo who went there with CPDC operatives. At the time this radio message
was received, they were within the vicinity of Fairview, and the CPDC gave the
signal for them to accost said suspect. He was present when Tabong, who was later
identified as Joel de Jesus, was arrested by the joint elements of the CPDC and
PARAC. Joel was turned over to the CID-CPDC at about past 4:00 p.m.
Subsequently, their superior, P/Sr. Supt. Bartolome Baluyot, informed them of
revelations given by Joel, for which they were called in again for joint follow-up
operations. They brought Joel to Fairview along Ruby St. where Joels supposed
companions, namely: one alias Ram, Lorenzo delos Santos, Ogie and one (1) alias
Cesar, could be found. Joel first pointed to the house of Ram (Rameses de Jesus),
but they did not find him there; instead they found a man named Cesar Fortuna,
whom Joel pointed to infront of said house. They immediately apprehended
Fortuna and identified themselves. He informed Fortuna that he was being
413[42]Id., at pp. 100-164.
Lorenzo.416[45] He was just at the back of those operatives who actually arrested
Lorenzo.417[46]
The principal witness for the prosecution was Freddie Alejo, who testified
that as a security guard employed by Provider Security Agency, he was then
assigned at 211 Katipunan Avenue, Blue Ridge, Quezon City. On June 13, 1996, he
reported for duty at 7:00 oclock in the morning. By 7:30 a.m., he noticed two (2)
men walking back and forth infront of his post. He was shown by the prosecutor
some photographs taken of the parking area he was then guarding, his guard post
beside the building and the street infront of said building (Exhibits G, H, I and
J418[47]).
Alejo recounted that there was a man riding in a black car who was shot by
four (4) persons infront of the building he was guarding. The car was in the middle
lane of the road, and the cars specific location was found in one (1) of the
photographs (Exhibit H-4419[48]). One (1) of the two (2) persons he earlier saw
walking back and forth in front of him pointed a gun at him (the position of said
man was marked as Exhibit H-5420[49]). That man was holding a short gun and he
told Alejo to come down (Baba!), but he did not budge. He then saw one (1) of the
assailants (No. 1 in Exhibit H421[50]), the one (1) standing on the left side of the car
(left front door), grab the victim by the neck, get the clutch bag of the victim inside
the car, pull said victim out of the car, and drop him on the road. He then heard
another shot coming from said attacker (No. 1). Another man (No. 5 in Exhibit
H422[51]) shouted: Dapawalang makikialam! and the rest of the four (4) men
(marked as Nos. 2, 3 and 4 in Exhibit H423[52]) faced him (witness Alejo). Next,
the companion of No. 5, who was earlier walking back and forth infront of him
(marked as No. 6 in Exhibit H424[53]), pointed a gun at him. This time, he did come
down, lowering his body and bowing his head inside the guardhouse. The witness
identified the suspects inside the courtroom as the persons he saw and marked as
No. 5 (Joel de Jesus) the first one who pointed a gun at him shouting Baba ka!;
No. 1 who grabbed the victim, got his clutch bag and pulled him out of the car
(Lenido Lumanog); No. 2 (Rameses de Jesus); No. 6 the second person who
pointed a gun at him (Lorenzo delos Santos); No. 4 (Augusto Santos) and No. 3
who was positioned at the right front door of the victims car (Cesar Fortuna).
Nos. 1 and 3 (Lumanog and Fortuna) were the ones who shot the victim with short
firearms, while No. 2 (Rameses) was just standing and facing the victim with a gun
in his hand, and No. 4 (Augusto) was also just standing facing the driver and
holding a short gun. It was probably less than a minute when the gunfire stopped,
and he stood up at his guard post. The assailants were no longer in sight and he saw
421[50]Id.
422[51]Id.
423[52]Id.
424[53]Id.
the cars window shattered. He identified the victims black car as shown in
photographs (Exhibits A-1 to A-4425[54]).426[55]
Alejo further testified that he was one (1) of those asked by the policemen
who arrived regarding the incident. He was told to go to Station 8, which was just
near the place. At Station 8, another security guard of an adjacent building was also
being investigated. Thereafter, the police officers brought him to Camp Karingal,
along with the other security guard.427[56]
On cross-examination, Alejo described his guard post as elevated; and two
(2) arms length on the left and right side, there was an alley just beside the guard
post which was at the corner.428[57] The victims car was infront of the building he
was guarding, at a slightly slanted direction from it (Lihis po ng konti). His view
was toward the direction of the front door of the car (rear end). From where he was
at the time, the car was at a distance of more or less ten (10) meters. The first time
one (1) of the suspects pointed a gun at him, he was not scared. He saw four (4)
men standing around the victims car, two (2) on the left side, and two (2) on the
right side. He saw only two (2) of them (the ones at the front left and right sides of
the car) shooting at the car; they were carrying short firearms. One (1) of these two
(2) got the clutch bag (at the left front side of the car), grabbed the victim by the
neck and shot him once before dropping him down the road. Even if he could not
see the gun when that assailant pulled the victim from the car, he knew that the
425[54]Folder of exhibits, p. 23.
426[55]TSN, August 20, 1996, pp. 11-69.
427[56]Id., at pp. 70-75.
428[57]Id., at pp. 114-120.
victim was shot again, because he saw a gun smoke just beside the left side of the
car where the victim was dropped. The second man who pointed a gun at him
shouted Dapa! and thereupon his companions (the ones at the right rear side, left
rear side, and front right side) faced him for less than a minute. Because at that
precise moment the gun was not yet poked at him, he was able to recognize their
faces. When finally the gun was pointed at him, he became nervous and bowed
down his head inside the guard house. The color of the clutch bag taken from the
victim was black. He could see the inside of the car from his guard post because
the cars glass window was not tinted and, besides, his position was elevated or
higher than the height of the car.429[58] He confirmed the contents of his
Sinumpaang Salaysay (Exhibit L) before policeman Edilberto Nicanor on June 13,
1996 taken at the CID-PNP, Camp Karingal at 1:55 p.m. or barely four (4) hours
after the shooting incident.430[59]
Alejo further testified on cross-examination that on June 19, 1996 at around
2:00 oclock in the afternoon, he was fetched by four (4) policemen at his agency in
Monumento and they told him they were going to Fairview. Before this, in the
afternoon of June 18, 1996, they showed him a picture of a man wearing
eyeglasses, but he told them he would not point a man in photographs, but would
like to see the man in person. That was the second time he saw Joel de Jesus since
the shooting incident on June 13, 1996. He executed a supplemental statement on
June 21, 1996 when he identified said suspect in a police line-up.431[60]
429[58]TSN, August 21, 1996, pp. 27-28, 39-43, 45-60, 71-72, 75-87.
430[59]TSN, August 29, 1996, pp. 4-10.
431[60]TSN, September 3, 1996, pp. 10-11, 13-22, 27, 80-82.
On September 26, 1996, the trial court conducted an ocular inspection of the
place where the shooting incident took place, in the presence of the prosecutors,
defense counsel, Alejo and Maj. Villena. Alejo was asked to demonstrate his exact
location, the relative positions of the assailants and the victims car, and the entire
incident he had witnessed in the morning of June 13, 1996. The Presiding Judge
who took the same position of Alejo in the guardhouse made the following
observations:
COURT:
From this position, the Presiding Judge can see the car very clearly even if
the car would be moved back by another segment of the cement or even if
it is forwarded by another segment also, as segment can accommodate one
car of the likes of Honda Accord and the Court observes that from the
guard post the faces of the persons beside the car are very clear.
xxx
COURT:
The Court observed that from where the witness Alejo was he can still see
the whole car as it has been moved back per the directive of Major Villena.
xxx
COURT:
The Court adds that from the position of the witness, Freddie Alejo, the
Court can still see faces behind the car which can accommodate another
car.
xxx
COURT:
The front right window has been rolled down and also the back right
window of the car have been rolled down with the left front door opened,
the Court can observed the two (2) front seats particularly the upper
portion, meaning the head rest and the back rest, half of the back rest, all
the head rest can be seen.
xxx
INTERPRETER:
(measuring the distance from the guardhouse to the black car).
The measurement from the foot of the guardpost up to the right front door
of the black car is fifteen (15) meters.
xxx
INTERPRETER:
(Measuring the distance between the bodega to the black car)
The measurement from the front portion of the bodega (papaya) to
the side of the black car is 11.8 meters.
xxx
INTERPRETER:
The measurementthe distance from where suspect No. 6 was standing to
the guard house when measured is 7.34 meters, your Honor.
xxx
INTERPRETER:
The distance from where suspect No. 5 was standing up to the guard house
is 5.17 meters.
xxx
COURT:
After the demonstration while witness Alejo was demonstrating how
[suspect No. 2] got the clutch bag and how [suspect No. 2] grabbed the
neck of the driver of the black car, the Judge was at the guard post and saw
for himself that [Alejo] clearly saw the taking of the clutch bag even if the
untinted windows were closed and the pulling of the driver of the black
car.432[61]
Atty. Sansano had told Joel not to answer, and advice was given by said counsel.
They left Quezon City Hall at about 5:00 oclock in the afternoon and returned to
the CPDC headquarters. He maintained that all the accused were brought before
the City Prosecutor for inquest proceedings prior to the filing of the information in
court.433[62]
Susan Samonte-Abadilla testified that their family incurred expenses for
the burial of her husband, repair of the Honda Accord and loss of the .45 cal gold
cup pistol and Omega watch during the shooting of her husband. She further
testified that she was very shocked and saddened by the tragic death of her
husband. Because she led a practically sheltered life, it was difficult for her, as it
was the older children who were now taking care of their businesses, which were
attended to by her husband when he was still alive. Three (3) of her eight (8)
children were still studying (Ana, 14; Nico, 13; and BJ, 10), and one had just
graduated last March 1997.434[63]
Merlito Herbas, in his Karagdagang Salaysay dated June 21, 1996,
identified Joel de Jesus in a police line-up at the CID-CPDC, Camp Karingal, as
one (1) of those men who shot the victim on June 13, 1996. 435[64] However, not
having been presented by the prosecution as witness, he testified for the defense
declaring that none of those whom he saw during the shooting incident was present
inside the courtroom. He produced a list of amounts he had received from Mayor
Abadilla, totaling P30,000.00 in support of his claim that Mayor Abadilla did not
433[62]TSN, September 17, 1996, pp. 16-21.
434[63]TSN, September 18, 1996, pp. 28-30, 36-39, 41-55.
435[64]Exhibit EE, folder of exhibits, p. 315.
fulfill his promise to give him exactly the same salary he was receiving as security
guard (P6,000.00 monthly only instead of the P8,000.00 he used to receive as
monthly pay), although he admitted having stayed for free inside the Abadilla
compound from July 11, 1996 up to November 26, 1996. He was later told that he
would no longer be presented as witness because the testimony of Alejo would be
sufficient.436[65]
Defense Evidence
All the accused raised the defense of alibi, highlighted the negative findings
of ballistic and fingerprint examinations, and further alleged torture in the hands of
police officers and denial of constitutional rights during custodial investigation.
P/Insp. Reynaldo D. de Guzman, firearms examiner and Chief of the
Firearms Division of the PNP Crime Laboratory, testified that he conducted an
examination of the slug recovered from the body of Col. Abadilla, as per request of
the CPDC for cross-matching with a bullet also recovered from the body of another
shooting victim, Suseso de Dios, i.e., whether or not they were fired from one (1)
and the same firearm.437[66] The result of their microscopic examination was that
the aforesaid bullets were fired from the same firearm.438[67]
436[65]TSN, February 20, 1998, pp. 58-68, 73-79, 84-85, 91-92, 103-105; Exhibit 48 (U for
Prosecution), folder of exhibits, p. 188.
437[66]Exhibits 2-F-19 and 2-F-20 and 3, folder of exhibits, pp. 106-108, 111; TSN,
December 10, 1997, pp. 15-27.
438[67]TSN, December 10, 1997, pp. 40-42; Exhibits 2 to 2-F-14, folder of exhibits, pp. 102105.
Dr. Jesse Rey Cruel, medico-legal officer of the CHR, testified that he
examined accused Cesar Fortuna, Rameses de Jesus, Lenido Lumanog on June 25,
1996 and Lorenzo delos Santos on July 3, 1996. His findings showed that their
bodies bore the following injuries: (1) Fortuna - abrasions on forearm, elbow and
knee; contusions on chest area; and incised wounds on the waist and legs 439[68];
(2) Rameses - contusions on chest, abdomen, knee and thigh areas 440[69]; (3)
Lumanog - contusions on abdomen and lumbar region, and a horizontal lacerated
wound on the forehead441[70]; and (4) Lorenzo - abrasions on the arms, contusions
in thigh and knee, petechia marks (minute hemorrhages) between chest/abdomen
and the penis, discoloration on right arm, and new scars on left arm, right foot and
second toe.442[71] All said wounds required not more than nine (9) days of medical
attendance. The defense also presented pictures taken at the time of the
examination.443[72] On cross-examination, Dr. Cruel opined that it was possible the
injuries could have been self-inflicted and pointed out that the injury on the
forehead of Lumanog was not complained of.444[73]
Remedios Dedicatoria, a fingerprint examiner at the PNP Crime Laboratory
testified on the results stated in a Dactyloscopy Report No. F-086-96 comparison
439[68]Exhibit 5, folder of exhibits, p. 112.
440[69]Exhibit 6, Id. at p. 113.
441[70]Exhibit 8, Id. at p. 116.
442[71]Exhibit 7, Id. at p. 114.
443[72]Exhibits 7-A, 7-B, 9-a to 9-g, Id. at pp. 115, 117-121; TSN, December 11, 1997, pp.
16-17, 26-149.
of the latent prints lifted from the Honda Accord with Plate No. RNA-777, Kia
Pride PTZ-401 and Mitsubishi Lancer car with the standard fingerprints of the
accused. The only match was found in the specimen fingerprint of Rameses de
Jesus with respect to the fragmentary prints lifted from the Mitsubishi Lancer car.
None of the fingerprints of the accused is identical with the latent prints lifted from
the Honda Accord and Kia Pride.445[74] On cross-examination, the witness stated
that if a person had touched the car and rubbed it, there would be no fingerprint
that could be lifted therefrom. She also admitted that no latent print was taken from
inside the Honda Accord nor was there any fingerprint taken of the late Rolando
Abadilla (only two [2] fingerprints were taken from his car). When asked if a
person opened the car holding only the back portion of the handle, the witness
answered that there would likewise be no fingerprint on the outside of the car.446
[75]
Joel de Jesus testified that on June 19, 1996, at around 3:00 oclock in the
afternoon, he was at their street corner fixing his tricycle and was with Arturo
Napolitano and Felicisimo Herrera. A van stopped and six (6) armed men alighted
from it, among whom he recognized Antonio Rodolfo, Pio Tarala and Dario Aasco
(whom he came to know when they charged him with rape on January 17, 1994,
from which charge he was acquitted on June 19, 1996). He even greeted said cops,
but they forced him into the van, and handcuffed and blindfolded the three (3) of
them. They were brought to a certain house where they were boxed, kicked and
slammed on the wall. When his blindfold was removed, the police officers were
forcing him to admit that he killed Abadilla. Capt. Rodolfo was also there and he
445[74]TSN, January 9, 1998, pp. 12-13, 29-43, 92-98.
446[75]Id., at pp. 119-132.
later identified the rest of those who picked him up as Romulo Sales, Lt. Castillo,
Bartolome Baluyot, Major Reyes and Catalua. After he denied having anything to
do with the killing, PO2 Tarala tried to suffocate him with a plastic bag. He could
not breathe and lost consciousness. Recounting his ordeal in tears, the witness said
that for one (1) hour his captors repeatedly inserted a plastic bag and boxed him. A
younger looking man then slapped him saying that they had ambushed his father.
While detained, he was only given water to drink and not allowed to contact his
relatives. He was asked to sign by Lt. Castillo a seven (7)-page document, torturing
him if he refused to do so. There were already other signatures on the edge and
every page of said document (Sinumpaang Salaysay dated June 20, 1996). He
denied the contents of this statement but admitted that he was brought to the IBP
Office, Quezon City Hall. After signing, he heard Lt. Castillo call somebody
saying, Parating na kami dyan. He was then made to board a vehicle and was
taken to the Quezon City Hall where a man wearing barong tagalog was waiting,
asking if he was Joel de Jesus. When Lt. Castillo answered in the affirmative, the
man just signed the document. He denied having met Atty. Confesor Sansano, nor
was he told of his right to the assistance of counsel; he even told them the name of
his lawyer at that time, but they just said, Mas marunong ka pa sa amin.447[76]
Testifying on cross-examination, Joel insisted that on June 13, 1996, he went
home at around 10:00 oclock in the evening. He started plying his route at 6:00
oclock in the morning; he was hired (inarkila) by a passenger who asked him to
bring her to an albularyo in Roosevelt Avenue, Novaliches. He admitted this was
the first time he mentioned this, as it was not mentioned in his Affidavits 448[77]
447[76]TSN, September 9, 1998, pp. 9-32.
448[77]Exhibits 5 and 6, folder of exhibits, pp. 112-113.
which were prepared by the police. Atty. Lupino Lazaro assisted him in filing
charges against the police officers and Atty. Hector Corpuz before the Department
of Justice (DOJ). He admitted that he did not say anything about the illegality of
his arrest and the torture he suffered prior to his arraignment. 449[78] On re-direct
examination, he denied having executed the Karagdagang Salaysay dated June 21,
1996 before the IBP lawyer, because at this time he was still detained in a
safehouse where he remained until June 25, 1996. He was just forced to sign said
document; after signing it, he heard Lt. Castillo say to one (1) Fiscal Soler, Fiscal,
salamat. Thereafter, he and the other accused were presented in a press conference
as suspects in the Abadilla slaying inside Camp Crame. During this time, he
pointed to Lorenzo delos Santos and Augusto Santos, because they were his
enemies at their place. He only pointed to them out of fear that he might be
salvaged by the police and because of the torture. He really did not know Abadilla
nor was he at any time within the vicinity of Katipunan Avenue on June 13, 1996.
He knew Rameses de Jesus, being his longtime neighbor, and also Lumanog who
ran for councilor in their place. All he knows was that his co-accused were picked
up from their place, and he saw them only during the press conference. He
affirmed the contents of the Sinumpaang Salaysay he executed before Police Major
(Pol. Maj.) Escote with the assistance of Atty. Lazaro.450[79]
Joel admitted that he was the one (1) who pointed out Cesar Fortuna and
Rameses de Jesus to the PARAC investigators. He confirmed that he was known as
Tabong in their locality. He also filed a complaint before the CHR against the same
police officers.451[80]
Cesar Fortuna testified that he was a member of the PNP assigned at
Cagayan de Oro City. He came to Manila on June 7, 1996, as he was ordered by
his superior, Col. Roberto Sacramento, to attend to the documents required for
reassignment of some of their companions (as evidenced by a used Super Ferry
ticket and an unused return ticket for June 20, 1996). On June 11, 1996, he went to
the PNP Directorate for Personnel at the office of Insp. Oscar Alcala. However, on
the night of June 19, 1996, he was arrested by PARAC operatives while he was at
the house of an acquaintance, Rameses de Jesus, in Ruby St., Fairview. He had
brought for repair a Ford Maverick Model 69 registered in the name of Col.
Sacramento. At 11:00 oclock in the evening, his mechanic road-tested the car, but
since he was left alone, he decided to go to the house of Rameses which was near
the shop. Several armed policemen arrived and entered the house of Rameses. Not
finding Rameses there, they asked him instead to go along with them. He was
made to board an owner-type jeep and immediately blindfolded. After one (1) hour,
they arrived at a place which he was told was the office of PARAC. Somebody
approached him and he felt a lighters flame touch his chin. He then identified
himself as a policeman, but was only told: Walang pulis pulis dito. They kept on
asking him where Rameses could be found. Still blindfolded, he led them to
Palmera Subdivision where he knew Rameses had another house. Upon reaching
Palmera, his blindfold was removed, but he was unable to locate the house until
they went home at 5:00 p.m. In the morning of June 20, 1996, the policemen told
him that he was just confusing them (nililito), but he explained that he had been to
that house only once. The driver of the Honda Civic was already angry at him and
451[80]TSN, September 9, 1998, pp. 21-29.
inserted a .45 cal pistol in his mouth. They went back to the PARAC office, and he
was interrogated about the Abadilla killing. He was informed that he was being
implicated as somebody had pointed at him. When he still denied having any
knowledge about the ambush-slay, he was repeatedly suffocated with a plastic bag
placed on his head while he was handcuffed and blindfolded. After one (1) hour
and due to hardship he suffered, he just told them he would admit whatever it was
they wanted him to admit. He said that he acted as a look-out. They had him copy a
prepared sketch and when his blindfold was finally removed, someone introduced
himself as Col. Bartolome Baluyot who told him he just had to obey and he would
not be hurt. Maj. George Reyes arrived, looked at the sketch and said it was not the
place where Col. Abadilla was ambushed. He was blamed for that fiasco even as he
said it was they who prepared the sketch. After an hour, they returned to Palmera
Subdivision, Novaliches and this was already between 2:00 and 3:00 p.m. After
rounding the area, he found the house, but Rameses was not there. He was made to
sit the whole night in the kitchen.452[81]
Fortuna continued to narrate that on June 21, 1996, he was made to lie down
on a bench covered with a GI sheet and was asked where the firearm of Col.
Abadilla was. When he answered that he really did not know about it, they
electrocuted him and poured cold water on his body. He told them that if they
needed a gun, he had a gun in Sampaloc, a .45 cal licensed firearm. Thereupon,
they asked him to go to that place where Dante Montevirgen was the gunsmith.
Only the policemen alighted from the vehicle and talked to Montevirgen. He saw
that Montevirgen gave them two (2) firearms, after which they went back to the
PARAC office. On his licensed firearm, he just brought this for repair on May 10,
1996, saying ayaw mag-automatic, while the other gun belonged to Capt. Regis,
452[81]TSN, September 16, 1998, pp. 4-30; Exhibits 54to 58, folder of exhibits, pp. 205-209.
and these were covered by receipts. Next, they asked him about the Rolex watch of
Col. Abadilla. When he denied having any knowledge about it, he was again
electrocuted. He had filed a complaint before the CHR for the injuries inflicted on
him and the violation of his rights. Aside from this case and the charge of illegal
possession of firearms, he was also charged with an administrative case and a
criminal complaint for carnapping (of the KIA Pride). The carnapping complaint
was dismissed by Assistant Prosecutor Amolin on September 23, 1996. The
Decision issued by P/Sr. Supt. Rodolfo N. Caisip of the PNP Headquarters Traffic
Management Group also dismissed Administrative Case No. 96-09-03. He insisted
that on the morning of June 13, 1996, he was at Camp Crame following up the
reassignment papers of his colleagues, showing the letter-order issued by Col.
Sacramento. He saw PO3 Ramon Manzano at the Office of the Directorate for
Personnel at about 9:00 oclock in the morning. He left said office as soon as he got
the folder, signed their logbook, gave it to SPO4 Mercado of the Office of PNP
Personnel Highway Patrol. Then he went home to eat before proceeding to the
Metro Traffic Force, Central District at the office of Col. Juanito de Guzman at
Roces St., Quezon City, at around 2:00 oclock in the afternoon, for the renewal of
the license of Col. Sacramentos driver.453[82] He also filed with the CHR an
administrative complaint against those police officers who had illegally arrested,
detained and tortured him.
Fortuna further testified that PARAC operatives seized his Kawasaki
motorcycle which he had left inside Camp Crame because it had no fender.
However, the certificate of registration was lost since it had been in custody of the
police; the Land Transportation Office (LTO) registration paper was locked inside,
453[82]TSN, September 16, 1998, pp. 31-74; Exhibits 59 to 70-C, 80, folder of exhibits, pp.
210-228, 245.
and he forgot what its plate number was. He admitted that he was able to use said
motorcycle in June 1996 even with the missing fender. He left the motorcycle at
Gate 2, Camp Crame before leaving for Cagayan de Oro City; as to his car, he left
it at Pier 2. He admitted that he was the same person charged with kidnapping and
serious illegal detention with ransom in Criminal Case No. 96-312, which was
filed on July 15, 1996 in Mabalacat, Pampanga against him, Lumanog and
Rameses by a certain Dr. Jesusa dela Cruz. Said case was transferred to the Quezon
City RTC in the same sala of the presiding judge in this case. The filing of this
case destroyed his reputation as a police officer and affected his children, who
stopped going to school. He admitted though that he had once been dishonorably
discharged from the service as a result of an extortion case filed against him. He
had appealed his case and he was reinstated on August 20, 1983. A memorandum
dated June 25, 1996 was issued by Col. Sacramento to attest to his moral character
and loyalty to the service.454[83] He admitted that he never raised the issue of the
legality of his arrest or the torture he suffered while in detention, during his
arraignment. When confronted with his sworn statement submitted to the CHR, he
admitted that he did not mention therein the pouring of cold water on his body, that
he was asked to make a sketch of Katipunan Avenue, that a .45 cal pistol was
inserted into his mouth and that there was no firearm confiscated from him at the
time of his arrest. When he was apprehended on the night of June 19, 1996 at the
house of Rameses at Ruby St., he was half-naked standing outside at the balcony.
He saw someones hand, but not the whole body of that person to whom he was
shown that night, and he just heard from the policemen he had been positively
identified.455[84]
454[83]TSN, November 17, 1998, pp. 13-18, 24-27, 31-38, 43-69; Exhibits LL and 76, folder
of exhibits, pp. 326, 234-235.
mention it to Fiscal Refuerzo who interviewed him after the press conference, as
they did not ask him about it.459[88] He had brought up such matter with his lawyer
in another case not before the sala of the presiding judge in this case.460[89]
Lorenzo delos Santos testified that on June 13, 1996, he left his house at
Fairview and boarded a bus bound for Quiapo. Upon reaching Quiapo, he heard
mass in Quiapo Church until around 8:30 a.m. He arrived in their office at Binondo
on June 13, 1996 at 9:30 a.m. He remembered going to the office of the Felipe
Santos Brokerage in the same building to check on the date of arrival of a certain
shipment. Thereafter, he went back to his office and stayed there until 2:30 p.m. He
left his place of work about 4:30 in the afternoon and went to a client who invited
him to drink at the house of his brother somewhere in Quezon City. On June 19,
1996, at around 11:00 olock in the evening, several persons suddenly barged into
his house while he and his wife were sleeping. Sgt. Bela introduced himself, and he
was slapped and handcuffed and the house was searched. They took his .38 cal
revolver which was licensed. He was blindfolded, made to board a car and taken to
a safehouse where he was tied and tortured (suffocation with plastic bag and
electrocution). He was told that he was pointed to by Joel, but he explained to them
that Joel was his opponent in a court case (for grave threats, physical injuries and
trespassing).461[90] He also answered their questions regarding his co-accused. He
told them that he used to see Rameses when he brings his children to school and
came to know Lumanog when he ran as city councilor, while he did not know
Fortuna. After the interrogation, he was again subjected to torture and he felt weak;
459[88]TSN, November 25, 1998, pp. 6-13.
460[89]Id., at p. 17.
461[90]Exhibits 6,6-A and 7, folder of exhibits, pp. 381, 382-384, 405, 406-408.
this lasted up to June 21, 1996. On June 21, 1996, he was brought to a field (bukid)
where he was forced to sign a paper. He was then brought to the Quezon City Hall
of Justice at the second floor and instructed that he should just walk along. There
were two (2) women inside aside from policemen, and he was elbowed by a
policeman to sign a document. He signed it out of fear, and the document was
handed by the policemen to a man who entered the room, whom he later came to
know as Atty. Florimond Rous. He was brought to another floor at the Fiscals
Office while he was still limping. Somebody there asked why he was in that
condition, but one (1) of his police companions elbowed him so he just said it was
nothing. A man who was probably the Fiscal signed the document, and they left at
around 5:00 in the afternoon.462[91] Lorenzo admitted he had an owner-type jeep,
which was registered in his own name, but said jeep had been mortgaged to Danilo
Lintag since May 27, 1996.463[92]
Lorenzo presented as witness Edith Lingan, an employee of Felipe M.
Santos, who corroborated his alibi.464[93]
Augusto Santos testified that on June 13, 1996 at around 7:00 oclock in the
morning, he accompanied his brother-in-law Jonas Ayhon whose wife, his sister,
gave birth on June 11, 1996 at the Jose Fabella Hospital at Sta. Cruz, Manila. He
stayed there until 2:00 oclock in the afternoon. On June 26, 1996, five (5) men
suddenly barged into their house. He was hit in the neck with a .45 cal. pistol,
blindfolded and brought outside where he was beaten. They had no warrant of
462[91]TSN, December 2, 1998, pp. 6-27.
463[92]TSN, December 9, 1998, pp. 3-6.
464[93]TSN, January 28, 1999, pp. 5-10.
arrest but were forcing him to admit that Joel de Jesus gave him big money and
that he knew what it was. He told them that he did not know anything, and that Joel
was his enemy, as his Tito Lorenzo had a quarrel with Joel in which he helped his
Tito. He confirmed the contents of the Sinumpaang Salaysay dated July 3, 1996
which he executed at Camp Crame, and also presented a copy of the birth
certificate of the baby delivered by his sister at Fabella Hospital.465[94]
Jonas Padel Ayhon corroborated the foregoing testimony of his brother-inlaw, Augusto Ogie Santos, whose half-sister was his wife.466[95]
Rameses de Jesus testified that on June 12, 1996 at 7:00 oclock in the
evening, he and Lumanog left for Mabalacat, Pampanga on board the latters brand
new Mitsubishi Lancer, together with Romeo Costibollo, Manny dela Rosa and
Boni Mandaro. They arrived in Mabalacat at about 10:00 oclock in the evening and
after resting they started digging infront of the church, inside the compound of the
Tiglao family, Lumanogs in-laws. They dug until 4:00 oclock in the morning of
June 13, 1996. Thereafter, they slept and woke up at around 10:00 oclock in the
morning. They helped in the preparations for the celebration of the wedding
anniversary of the Tiglaos. After eating lunch, they drank liquor. They returned to
Manila only on June 14, 1996 at 7:00 p.m.. On June 19, 1996, they went back to
Pampanga and returned to Manila on June 20, 1996. At around 10:00 p.m., they
proceeded to Fairview, Quezon City to visit the sick child of Romeo Costibollo
who was then confined at Fairview Polymedic Hospital. After Costibollo and
Lumanog alighted from their car and while he was parking infront of the hospital,
465[94]TSN, January 7, 1999, pp. 4-17; Exhibits 1, 2 and 3, folder of exhibits, pp.
398-400.
466[95]TSN, January 28, 1999, pp. 34-38.
several armed men came. Two (2) men approached him from behind and asked him
if Costibollo and Lumanog were his companions. When he replied yes, he was
pushed inside the car; Costibollo and Lumanog were handcuffed. Without any
warrant, they were apprehended, blindfolded and taken to a place where he was
tortured. They were forcing him to admit that he and his companions killed Kabise
who was the ex-governor of Ilocos Norte. Despite his denials they continued to
torture him by electrocution and suffocation with a plastic bag. A policeman
arrived with Fortuna, who was asked how much Ram gave them, to which Fortuna
replied P10,000.00. He got mad at Fortuna and cursed him for telling such a lie.
After two (2) days, he was brought to Camp Karingal still blindfolded. He was
again tortured for two (2) days, the policemen forcing him to admit he participated
in the killing of Col. Abadilla. When he could no longer bear the torture, he finally
admitted to Insp. Castillo that he took part in the Abadilla ambush-slay. When the
one (1) interviewing him asked how he did it, he just said that Fortuna came to his
house with an owner-type jeep and two (2) other persons, and that they rode to
Dau, Pampanga and headed to Tarlac, on their way to Ilocos to kill Abadilla. Insp.
Castillo got angry, saying that he was just fooling them and he was again hit.467[96]
Rameses continued to narrate that after two (2) or three (3) days stay at
Camp Karingal, he and the other accused were presented at a press conference.
During the inquest conducted by Fiscal Refuerzo, he saw Freddie Alejo for the first
time, and also his co-accused Lumanog, Fortuna, Lorenzo, Joel and Augusto. As
far as he knew, they had brought the matter of the torture they suffered in the hands
of policemen to the DOJ.468[97]
467[96]TSN, March 9, 1999, pp. 2-49.
468[97]TSN, March 18, 1999, pp. 3-10.
The trial court was firmly convinced that the prosecution succeeded in
establishing the identities of accused Joel, Rameses, Lumanog, Fortuna and
Augusto as the perpetrators in the fatal shooting of Abadilla in the morning of June
13, 1996. It found that both security guards Alejo and Herbas confirmed the
presence of Joel de Jesus in the crime scene. However, with respect to the positive
identification of all the five (5) accused, namely, Joel de Jesus, Rameses de Jesus,
Cesar Fortuna, Lenido Lumanog and Augusto Santos, the trial court gave more
credence to the testimony of Alejo than the declaration on the witness stand of
470[99]Records, Vol. 3, pp. 1027-1028.
Herbas who had backtracked on his earlier statement dated June 21, 1996 wherein
he pointed to Joel as one (1) of those participants in the shooting incident.
In doubting the credibility of Herbas, the trial court stressed that Herbas was
obviously disgruntled at the Abadilla familys failure to give him the promised
salary, and circumstances showed that his need for job and money colored his
perception and attitude in testifying for the defense. Moreover, despite the
impression he had given to the police and the Abadilla family that he could identify
the four (4) persons who surrounded Col. Abadillas car, Herbas could not have
really been able to recognize the faces of the ambushers for three (3) reasons: (1)
he was on the ground when he turned his head (lumingon) towards where the
gunshots were being fired and quite a lot of vehicles in traffic stopped at the time;
(2) the whole incident, as far as Herbas observed, happened in seconds only; and
(3) Herbas was three (3) Meralco posts away from the ambush site. All these
factors combined, according to the trial court, could not have given Herbas enough
time and opportunity to clearly see those who ambushed Abadilla, and hence he
was really a poor and inadequate witness either for the prosecution or the
defense.471[100]
Compared to Herbas, the trial court found the eyewitness testimony of Alejo
more credible due to his elevated position at his guard post and the fact that the
ambush had taken place before his very eyes, so near that one (1) of the
conspirators had to order him to lie flat (which obviously he could not do because
of the narrow space inside his guard house), and which appeared to be the reason
why a second order came for him to get down from the guard house, to which he
nervously complied. From his vantage point, Alejo sufficiently and in a detailed
471[100]CA rollo, Vol. II, p. 1021.
manner recognized the relative positions and participations of the ambushers, each
of whom he had identified as Rameses, Fortuna, Lumanog, Augusto and Joel, both
in the police line-up and again inside the courtroom during the trial.472[101]
The trial court also found that the statements of Joel, in which he admitted
his participation in the crime assisted by Atty. Sansano and in the presence of the
IBP personnel and police investigators, were not flawed by intimidation or
violence when obtained and sworn to before the fiscal. The common defense of
alibi put up by all the accused was rejected by the trial court, holding that (1) the
alleged treasure-hunting trip made by Lumanog and Rameses was incredible and
unpersuasive, as it was contrary to ordinary human experience; (2) Fortunas claim
was weak, the logbook entry on his supposed transaction in the Office of the
Directorate for Personnel and Recruitment at Camp Crame was a mere photocopy,
and also, as in the case of Rameses, he never mentioned such digging activity in
Pampanga in the sworn complaint he had filed before the CHR; (3) Augustos alibi
was supported only by his brother-in-law, and it was simply not usual for menfolk,
instead of women, in our family culture, to fetch a woman who had just given birth
at the hospital, aside from the observation that Augusto could have gone straight to
Fabella Hospital in Sta. Cruz, Manila instead of going first to Buendia, Makati
before 7:00 a.m. to fetch his brother-in-law. With respect to Lumanog, the trial
court pointed out that his silence and failure to testify in court, despite the evidence
implicating him in the murder of Abadilla, justified an inference that he was not
innocent.473[102]
On January 19, 2000, Fr. Roberto P. Reyes, parish priest of the Parish of the
Holy Sacrifice, University of the Philippines at Diliman, Quezon City, assisted by
Atty. Neri J. Colmenares, filed an Urgent Independent Motion for Leave of Court
to Present Vital Evidence. Fr. Reyes claimed that an ABB personality came to him
confessing that the ABB was responsible for the killing of Abadilla and gave him
478[107]Id., at pp. 1215-1228, 1248-1269.
479[108]Id., at p. 1320.
an object (Omega gold wristwatch) taken from said victim, which can be presented
as evidence in this case to prove the innocence of the accused who were
erroneously convicted by the trial court and save them from the penalty of death. 480
[109]
After due hearing, the trial court denied the said motion of Fr. Reyes,
holding that the latters proposed testimony could not be considered an exception to
the hearsay rule, considering that: (1) it cannot be said that the person who
allegedly approached Fr. Reyes was unable to testify, as said person was simply
unwilling to face in a court of law the legal consequences of whatever admissions
he made to Fr. Reyes; (2) the alleged admission was made long after trial had
ended and long after the court had promulgated its decision, at which time the
public and persons interested in the outcome of the case knew already what were
the courts findings and conclusions of fact; and (3) going by the advertised image
of the ABB as an ideologically motivated group that would shoot to death public
officers and private individuals perceived by its ranking cadres as corrupt, the court
found it hard to believe that ABB gunman would in full view of idealist comrades
and everybody else, would open Abadillas car and steal that watch, and remain
unscathed for his unproletarian act by his peers in the organization. 481[110] The
trial court, however, ordered that the Omega wristwatch allegedly belonging to the
late Col. Abadilla, the copy of the motion for leave to present vital evidence and
the transcript of the proceedings on January 26, 2000 be attached to the records of
the case as part of the offer of proof of the defense.
Two (2) more pleadings were filed by Lumanogs counsel just before the
records of Criminal Case No. Q-96-66684 were transmitted to this Court for
automatic review, namely, a Final Submission to This Court dated February 8,
2000, together with an attached copy of the letter of Lt. Gen Jose M. Calimlim of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Intelligence Service regarding an
unsuccessful operation of the ABB to kill Col. Abadilla, and Final Manifestation to
This Court dated February 9, 2000.482[111]
Lumanog challenged before this Court the validity of the Orders dated
January 25, 26, and 28, 2000 allegedly issued with grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the trial judge who thereby denied the accused the opportunity to introduce
evidence on the alleged role of the ABB in the ambush-slay of Col. Abadilla. On
September 7, 2001, we denied his petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 142065, 483
[112] as we thus held:
A perusal of the pieces of evidence, except the Omega wristwatch, which
are sought to be presented by the petitioners in a new trial are not newly
discovered evidence because they were either available and could have been
presented by the defense during the trial of the case with the exercise of due
diligence, such as the alleged newspaper reports and AFP/PNP intelligence
materials on Col. Abadilla. The wristwatch allegedly belonging to the late Col.
Abadilla is immaterial to the case of murder while the testimony of F. Roberto
Reyes on the turn over of the said wristwatch by an alleged member of the ABB
who purportedly knows certain facts about the killing of Col. Abadilla would be
hearsay without the testimony in court of the said alleged member of the ABB.
The document which granted amnesty to Wilfredo Batongbakal is irrelevant to the
killing of Col. Abadilla inasmuch as Batongbakal does not appear privy to the
actual commission of the crime of murder in the case at bar. If at all, those pieces
of additional evidence will at most be merely corroborative to the defense of alibi
and denial of herein petitioners. Petitioners alternative prayer that this Court itself
conduct hearings and receive evidence on the ABB angle is not well taken for the
reason that the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts.484[113]
482[111]Id., at pp. 1365-1371.
483[112]Lumanog v. Salazar, Jr., 364 SCRA 719.
Lumanog. Hence, it was not physically impossible for them to travel to Quezon
City via the North Expressway at the time the crime took place.
Augusto claims that he was at the Fabella Hospital in Sta. Cruz, Manila,
and his alibi was corroborated by his brother-in-law, Jonas Padel Ayhon, who is
not an impartial witness. Where nothing supports the alibi except the testimony of
a relative, it deserves scant consideration.
xxx
Finally, Cesar Fortuna claims that he was in Camp Crame on the day the
murder took place. But it was not impossible for him to have gone to Katipunan
Road, Blue Ridge, which is relatively near Camp Crame when the shooting
happened around 8:40 in the morning. After the shooting, he could have easily
and quickly transferred to Camp Crame between 9:00 and 9:30 in the morning of
the same day.
In any event, appellants alibis were belied by the positive identification
made by prosecution eyewitness Freddie Alejo.
xxx
Further, appellants allegations that the police authorities maltreated them,
and forcibly extracted their extra-judicial confessions do not exculpate them from
criminal liability. For one, their conviction was not based on their extra-judicial
confessions, but on their positive identification of Freddie Alejo as the authors of
the crime. Such positive identification is totally independent of their extra-judicial
confessions. For another, the Constitutional guarantees contained in the Bill of
Rights cannot be used as a shield whereby a person guilty of a crime may escape
punishment. Thus, the Supreme Court in Draculan vs. Donato, held:
x x x. Pangalawa, ang mga karapatan ng mga mamamayan na
natatala sa Saligang Batas (sa Bill of Rights) ay hindi mga paraan upang
ang isang tunay na may pagkakasala na labag sa batas, ay makaligtas sa
nararapat na pagdurusa. Ang tunay na layunin ng mga tadhanang iyon ng
Saligang Batas ay walang iba kundi tiyakin na sinumang nililitis ay
magkaroon ng sapat na pagkakataon at paraan na maipagtanggol ang
sarili, bukod sa pagbabawal ng pagtanggap ng katibayan (evidence) laban
sa kanya na bunga ng pagpipilit, dahas at iba pang paraang labag sa
kanyang kalooban.
To repeat, assuming that appellants allegations of torture were true, the
same do not exculpate them from liability for the crime which the People had
adequately established by independent evidence, neither was their claim that the
results of the ballistics test purportedly showing that the bullets and bullet shells
found in the crime scene did not match with any of the firearms supposedly in
their possession. But these ballistic results are inconclusive and can never prevail
over appellants positive identification by eyewitness Freddie Alejo as the persons
In its Resolution491[120] dated October 28, 2008, the CA denied the motions
for reconsideration respectively filed by Fortuna and Joel de Jesus.492[121]
Rameses de Jesus and Joel de Jesus filed notices of appeal493[122] (G.R. No.
187745), while Fortuna (G.R. No. 185123), and Lumanog and Augusto Santos
(G.R. No. 182555) filed their respective petitions for review. On August 6, 2009,
G.R. No. 187745 was ordered consolidated with the already consolidated petitions
in G.R. Nos. 182555 and 185123.494[123] In view of the judgment of the CA
imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua, said petitions for review are treated as
appeals, in accordance with A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC (Amendments to the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure to Govern Death Penalty Cases)495[124] which
provides under Rule 124 (c):
(c) In cases where the Court of Appeals imposes reclusion perpetua, life
imprisonment or a lesser penalty, it shall render and enter judgment imposing
such penalty. The judgment may be appealed to the Supreme Court by notice of
appeal filed with the Court of Appeals.
Appellants Arguments
Lenido Lumanog and Augusto Santos set forth the following arguments in
their memorandum, which basically reflect the same issues raised by appellants in
the memorandum filed in G.R. No. 182555:
1. The Court of Appeals did not make a real and honest review of the appealed
case. There was a failure of appellate review, rendering its decision void.
2. The affirmation of the conviction over-relies on the testimony of one alleged
eyewitness, Freddie Alejo.
3. The affirmation of the conviction misappreciates the alibi evidence for the
defense.
4. The affirmation of conviction gravely erred when it unduly disregarded other
pieces of vital evidence.
5. The penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals is unconstitutional.496[125]
maintain that violations of constitutional rights have been held as a ground for
acquittal or dismissal in certain cases. In one (1) case, the long delay in the
termination of preliminary investigation was found to be violative of the accuseds
constitutional rights to procedural due process and speedy disposition of cases and
was cause for the dismissal of the case by this Court as a matter of radical relief.
Finally, the appellants argue that the penalty of reclusion perpetua without
the benefit of parole meted by the CA pursuant to Sec. 3 of R.A. No. 9346 is
unconstitutional. Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution provides that
any death penalty imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua. There is no
mention of without the benefit of parole or shall not be eligible for parole therein.
Appellants contend that the questioned provisions of R.A. No. 9346
constitute encroachments or dilutions of the Presidents broad, if not near absolute,
constitutional power of executive clemency, based not only on Article VII, Sec. 19,
but also on constitutional tradition and jurisprudence. Although the said section
does not explicitly mention parole as a form of executive clemency, constitutional
tradition and jurisprudence indicate it to be such. In Tesoro v. Director of
Prisons,498[127] for instance, it was held that the power to pardon given to the
President by the Constitution includes the power to grant and revoke paroles. The
aforesaid provision of R.A. No. 9346 also inflicts an inhuman punishment, which
is prohibited by the Constitution, and also violates the equal protection clause of
the Bill of Rights.
Our Ruling
Once again, this Court upholds the constitutional mandate protecting the
rights of persons under custodial investigation. But while we strike down the
extrajudicial confession extracted in violation of constitutionally enshrined rights
and declare it inadmissible in evidence, appellants are not entitled to an acquittal
because their conviction was not based on the evidence obtained during such
custodial investigation. Even without the extrajudicial confession of appellant Joel
de Jesus who was the first to have been arrested, the trial courts judgment is
affirmed, as the testimonial and documentary evidence on record have established
the guilt of appellants beyond reasonable doubt.
CA Decision meets the
constitutional standard
The Constitution commands that [n]o decision shall be rendered by any
court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on
which it is based.499[128] Judges are expected to make complete findings of fact in
their decisions and scrutinize closely the legal aspects of the case in the light of the
evidence presented. They should avoid the tendency to generalize and form
conclusions without detailing the facts from which such conclusions are deduced.
500
[129]
him and shall contain clearly and distinctly a statement of the facts proved or
admitted by the accused and the law upon which the judgment is based.
xxx
xxx
x x x. [EMPHASIS SUPPLIED.]
501[130]Yao v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 132428, October 24, 2000, 344 SCRA 202,
215-216, citing People v. Bongbahoy, G.R. No. 124097, June 17, 1999, 308 SCRA
383, People v. Landicho, G.R. No. 116600, July 3, 1996, 258 SCRA 1, 26, People v.
Sadiosa, G.R. No. 107084, May 15, 1998, 290 SCRA 92, 107 and People v. Gastador,
G.R. No. 123727, April 14, 1999, 305 SCRA 659, 670.
the liberty if not the life of a human being. 502[131] The parties to a litigation should
be informed of how it was decided, with an explanation of the factual and legal
reasons that led to the conclusions of the trial court. The losing party is entitled to
know why he lost, so he may appeal to the higher court, if permitted, should he
believe that the decision should be reversed. A decision that does not clearly and
distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is based leaves the parties in the
dark as to how it was reached and is precisely prejudicial to the losing party, who is
unable to pinpoint the possible errors of the court for review by a higher tribunal. 503
[132]
In Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Leobrera,504[133] we held that though it
is not a good practice, we see nothing illegal in the act of the trial court completely
copying the memorandum submitted by a party, provided that the decision clearly
and distinctly states sufficient findings of fact and the law on which they are
based.505[134] In another case where we upheld the validity of memorandum
decisions, we nevertheless took occasion to remind judges that it is still desirable
for an appellate judge to endeavor to make the issues clearer and use his own
perceptiveness in unraveling the rollo and his own discernment in discovering the
law. No less importantly, he must use his own language in laying down his
judgment.506[135]
Perusing the CA decision, we hold that it cannot be deemed constitutionally
infirm, as it clearly stated the facts and law on which the ruling was based, and
while it did not specifically address each and every assigned error raised by
appellants, it cannot be said that the appellants were left in the dark as to how the
CA reached its ruling affirming the trial courts judgment of conviction. The
principal arguments raised in their Memorandum submitted before this Court
actually referred to the main points of the CA rulings, such as the alleged
sufficiency of prosecution evidence, their common defense of alibi, allegations of
torture, probative value of ballistic and fingerprint test results, circumstances
qualifying the offense and modification of penalty imposed by the trial court. What
appellants essentially assail is the verbatim copying by the CA of not only the facts
narrated, but also the arguments and discussion including the legal authorities, in
disposing of the appeal. On such wholesale adoption of the Office of the Solicitor
Generals position, as well as the trial courts insufficient findings of fact, appellants
anchor their claim of failure of intermediate review by the CA.
We now proceed to the other substantive issues presented by appellants.
Rights of Accused During
Custodial Investigation
The rights of persons under custodial investigation are enshrined in Article
III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution, which provides:
506[135]See Francisco v. Permskul, G.R. No. 81006, May 12, 1989, 173 SCRA 324
(1989), cited in ABD Overseas Manpower Corporation v. NLRC, G.R. No. 117056,
February 24, 1998, 286 SCRA 454, 463.
Extrajudicial Confession
of Joel de Jesus Not Valid
Custodial investigation refers to the critical pre-trial stage when the
investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime, but has begun
to focus on a particular person as a suspect. 507[136] Police officers claimed that
appellants were apprehended as a result of hot pursuit activities on the days
following the ambush-slay of Abadilla. There is no question, however, that when
appellants were arrested they were already considered suspects: Joel was
pinpointed by security guard Alejo who went along with the PARAC squad to
Fairview on June 19, 1996, while the rest of appellants were taken by the same
operatives in follow-up operations after Joel provided them with the identities of
his conspirators and where they could be found.
507[136]People v. Rodriguez, G.R. No. 129211, October 2, 2000, 341 SCRA 645, 654,
citing People v. Domantay, G.R. No. 130612, May 11, 1999, 307 SCRA 1, 15 and
People v. Andan, G.R. No. 116437, March 3, 1997, 269 SCRA 95.
R.A. No. 7438,508[137] approved on May 15, 1992, has reinforced the
constitutional mandate protecting the rights of persons under custodial
investigation. The pertinent provisions read:
SEC. 2. Rights of Persons Arrested, Detained or under Custodial
Investigation; Duties of Public Officers.
a. Any person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation shall at
all times be assisted by counsel.
b. Any public officer or employee, or anyone acting under his order or his
place, who arrests, detains or investigates any person for the commission of
an offense shall inform the latter, in a language known to and understood by him,
of his rights to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel,
preferably of his own choice, who shall at all times be allowed to confer private
with the person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation. If such person
cannot afford the services of his own counsel, he must be provided by with a
competent and independent counsel.
xxxx
f. As used in this Act, custodial investigation shall include the practice of
issuing an invitation to a person who is investigated in connection with an offense
he is suspected to have committed, without prejudice to the liability of the inviting
officer for any violation of law. [EMPHASIS SUPPLIED.]
Police officers claimed that upon arresting Joel, they informed him of his
constitutional rights to remain silent, that any information he would give could be
used against him, and that he had the right to a competent and independent
counsel, preferably, of his own choice, and if he cannot afford the services of
counsel he will be provided with one (1). However, since these rights can only be
waived in writing and with the assistance of counsel, there could not have been
such a valid waiver by Joel, who was presented to Atty. Sansano at the IBP Office,
Quezon City Hall only the following day and stayed overnight at the police station
before he was brought to said counsel.
P/Insp. Castillo admitted that the initial questioning of Joel began in the
morning of June 20, 1996, the first time said suspect was presented to him at the
CPDC station, even before he was brought to the IBP Office for the taking of his
formal statement. Thus, the possibility of appellant Joel having been subjected to
intimidation or violence in the hands of police investigators as he claims, cannot be
discounted. The constitutional requirement obviously had not been observed.
Settled is the rule that the moment a police officer tries to elicit admissions or
confessions or even plain information from a suspect, the latter should, at that
juncture, be assisted by counsel, unless he waives this right in writing and in the
presence of counsel.509[138] The purpose of providing counsel to a person under
custodial investigation is to curb the police-state practice of extracting a confession
that leads appellant to make self-incriminating statements.510[139]
Even assuming that custodial investigation started only during Joels
execution of his statement before Atty. Sansano on June 20, 1996, still the said
confession must be invalidated. To be acceptable, extrajudicial confessions must
conform to constitutional requirements. A confession is not valid and not
admissible in evidence when it is obtained in violation of any of the rights of
persons under custodial investigation.511[140]
509[138]People v. Rapeza, G.R. No. 169431, April 4, 2007, 520 SCRA 596, 623, citing
People v. Delmo, 439 Phil. 212 (2002), cited in People v. Dueas, Jr., G.R. No.
151286, March 31, 2004, 426 SCRA 666.
510[139]Id. at 630.
511[140]People v. Muleta, G.R. No. 130189, June 25, 1999, 309 SCRA 148, 160.
Since Joel was provided with a lawyer secured by CPDC investigators from
the IBP-Quezon City chapter, it cannot be said that his right to a counsel preferably
of his own choice was not complied with, particularly as he never objected to Atty.
Sansano when the latter was presented to him to be his counsel for the taking down
of his statement. The phrase preferably of his own choice does not convey the
message that the choice of a lawyer by a person under investigation is exclusive as
to preclude other equally competent and independent attorneys from handling the
defense; otherwise the tempo of custodial investigation would be solely in the
hands of the accused who can impede, nay, obstruct the progress of the
interrogation by simply selecting a lawyer who, for one reason or another, is not
available to protect his interest.512[141] Thus, while the choice of a lawyer in cases
where the person under custodial interrogation cannot afford the services of
counsel or where the preferred lawyer is not available is naturally lodged in the
police investigators, the suspect has the final choice, as he may reject the counsel
chosen for him and ask for another one. A lawyer provided by the investigators is
deemed engaged by the accused when he does not raise any objection against the
counsels appointment during the course of the investigation, and the accused
thereafter subscribes to the veracity of the statement before the swearing officer.513
[142]
The question really is whether or not Atty. Sansano was an independent and
competent counsel as to satisfy the constitutional requirement. We held that the
modifier competent and independent in the 1987 Constitution is not an empty
512[141]People v. Mojello, G.R. No. 145566, March 9, 2004, 425 SCRA 11, 18, citing
People v. Barasina, G.R. No. 109993, January 21, 1994, 229 SCRA 450.
513[142]Id., at 18, citing People v. Continente, G.R. Nos. 100801-02, August 25,
2000, 339 SCRA 1.
rhetoric. It stresses the need to accord the accused, under the uniquely stressful
conditions of a custodial investigation, an informed judgment on the choices
explained to him by a diligent and capable lawyer.514[143] An effective and vigilant
counsel necessarily and logically requires that the lawyer be present and able to
advise and assist his client from the time the confessant answers the first question
asked by the investigating officer until the signing of the extrajudicial confession.
Moreover, the lawyer should ascertain that the confession is made voluntarily and
that the person under investigation fully understands the nature and the
consequence of his extrajudicial confession in relation to his constitutional rights.
A contrary rule would undoubtedly be antagonistic to the constitutional rights to
remain silent, to counsel and to be presumed innocent.515[144]
Atty. Sansano, who supposedly interviewed Joel and assisted the latter while
responding to questions propounded by SPO2 Garcia, Jr., did not testify on
whether he had properly discharged his duties to said client. While SPO2 Garcia,
Jr. testified that Atty. Sansano had asked Joel if he understood his answers to the
questions of the investigating officer and sometimes stopped Joel from answering
certain questions, SPO2 Garcia, Jr. did not say if Atty. Sansano, in the first place,
verified from them the date and time of Joels arrest and the circumstances thereof,
or any previous information elicited from him by the investigators at the station,
and if said counsel inspected Joels body for any sign or mark of physical torture.
514[143]People v. Suela, G.R. Nos. 133570-71, January 15, 2002, 373 SCRA 163,
182, citing People v. Deniega, G.R. No. 103499, December 29, 1995, 251 SCRA 626,
638-639 and People v. Santos, G.R. No. 117873, December 22, 1997, 283 SCRA 443.
515[144]Id., at pp. 181-182, citing People v. Labtan, G.R. No. 127493, December 8,
1999, 320 SCRA, 140, 159.
The right to counsel has been written into our Constitution in order to
prevent the use of duress and other undue influence in extracting confessions from
a suspect in a crime. The lawyers role cannot be reduced to being that of a mere
witness to the signing of a pre-prepared confession, even if it indicated compliance
with the constitutional rights of the accused. The accused is entitled to effective,
vigilant and independent counsel.516[145] Where the prosecution failed to discharge
the States burden of proving with clear and convincing evidence that the accused
had enjoyed effective and vigilant counsel before he extrajudicially admitted his
guilt, the extrajudicial confession cannot be given any probative value.517[146]
With respect to the other appellants, they were likewise entitled to the rights
guaranteed by the Constitution when they were brought to the police station as
suspects and were, therefore under custodial investigation.518[147] However, they
cannot simply rely on those violations of constitutional rights during custodial
investigation, which are relevant only when the conviction of the accused by the
trial court is based on the evidence obtained during such investigation. 519[148] As
for the matters stated in the extrajudicial confession of appellant Joel, these were
not the basis for appellants conviction. It has to be stressed further that no
516[145]People v. Peralta, G.R. No. 145176, March 30, 2004, 426 SCRA 472, 481482, citing People v. Binamira, G.R. No. 110397, August 14, 1997, 277 SCRA 232,
238; People v. Ordoo, G.R. No. 132154, June 29, 2000, 334 SCRA 673, 688; People
v. Rodriguez, G.R. No. 129211, October 2, 2000, 341 SCRA 645, 653; People v.
Rayos, G.R. No. 133823, February 7, 2001, 351 SCRA 336, 344; and People v.
Patungan, G.R. No. 138045, March 14, 2001, 354 SCRA 413, 424.
517[146]People v. Paule, G.R. Nos. 118168-70, September 11, 1996, 261 SCRA 649.
518[147]See People v. Hijada, G.R. No. 123696, March 11, 2004, 425 SCRA 304.
519[148]People v. Sabalones, G.R. No. 123485, August 31, 1998, 294 SCRA 751,
790.
of cases is a flexible concept. It is consistent with delays and depends upon the
circumstances. What the Constitution prohibits are unreasonable, arbitrary and
oppressive delays, which render rights nugatory.525[154]
In this case, the records of Criminal Case No. Q-96-66684 were transmitted
to this Court for automatic review on February 11, 2000. On September 7, 2001,
this Court rendered a decision dismissing the Petition for Certiorari (Rule 65) and
for Extraordinary Legal and Equitable Relief (G.R. No. 142065). By June 2004, all
appeal briefs for the present review had been filed and on July 6, 2004, appellants
filed a Consolidated Motion for Early Decision. On December 13, 2004, they filed
a Motion for Early Decision.526[155]
By resolution of January 18, 2005, we transferred this case to the CA for
intermediate review, conformably with our pronouncement in People v. Mateo
decided on July 7, 2004. Appellants Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of Transfer
to the Court of Appeals filed on February 24, 2005 was denied on March 29, 2005.
A similar request filed on June 2, 2005 was likewise denied by our Resolution
dated July 12, 2005.527[156] At the CA, appellants also moved for early resolution
of their appeal after the case was submitted for decision on November 29, 2006.
The case remained unresolved due to a number of factors, such as the CA internal
reorganization and inhibition of some Justices to whom the case was re-raffled. 528
[157] Before the retirement of the ponente, Justice Agustin S. Dizon, the CAs
525[154]Ombudsman v. Jurado, G.R. No. 154155, August 6, 2008, 561 SCRA 135,
146-147, citing Caballero v. Alfonso, Jr., G.R. No. L-45647, August 21, 1987, 153
SCRA 153, 163.
526[155]CA rollo, Vol. II, pp. 1530-1531 and 1580.
527[156]Id., at pp. 1581-1582, 1605-1609.
Time and again, we have held that the testimony of a sole eyewitness is
sufficient to support a conviction so long as it is clear, straightforward and worthy
of credence by the trial court. 531[160] Indeed, when it comes to credibility of
witnesses, this Court accords the highest respect, even finality, to the evaluation
made by the lower court of the testimonies of the witnesses presented before it.
This holds true notwithstanding that it was another judge who presided at the trial
and Judge Jaime N. Salazar, Jr. who penned the decision in this case heard only
some witnesses for the defense. It is axiomatic that the fact alone that the judge
who heard the evidence was not the one who rendered the judgment, but merely
relied on the record of the case, does not render his judgment erroneous or
irregular. This is so even if the judge did not have the fullest opportunity to weigh
the testimonies, not having heard all the witnesses speak or observed their
deportment and manner of testifying.532[161]
Verily, a judge who was not present during the trial can rely on the transcript
of stenographic notes taken during the trial as basis of his decision. Such reliance
does not violate substantive and procedural due process. 533[162] We have ruled in
People v. Rayray534[163] that the fact that the judge who heard the evidence was
not himself the one who prepared, signed and promulgated the decision constitutes
no compelling reason to jettison his findings and conclusions, and does not per se
531[160]People v. Rivera, G.R. No. 139185, September 29, 2003, 412 SCRA 224,
236.
532[161]Concepcion v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 120706, January 31, 2000, 324
SCRA 85, 92.
533[162]Serna v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124605, June 18, 1999, 308 SCRA 527,
533, citing People v. Espanola, G.R. No. 119308, April 18, 1997, 271 SCRA 689, 716.
534[163]G.R. No. 90628, February 1, 1995, 241 SCRA 1, 8-9.
render his decision void. The validity of a decision is not necessarily impaired by
the fact that its ponente only took over from a colleague who had earlier presided
at the trial. This circumstance alone cannot be the basis for the reversal of the trial
courts decision.535[164]
In giving full credence to the eyewitness testimony of security guard Alejo,
the trial judge took into account his proximity to the spot where the shooting
occurred, his elevated position from his guardhouse, his opportunity to view
frontally all the perpetrators for a brief time -- enough for him to remember their
faces (when the two [2] lookouts he had earlier noticed walking back and forth
infront of his guard post pointed their guns at him one [1] after the other, and later
when the four [4] armed men standing around the victims car momentarily looked
at him as he was approached at the guardhouse by the second lookout), and his
positive identification in the courtroom of appellants as the six (6) persons whom
he saw acting together in the fatal shooting of Abadilla on June 13, 1996. The clear
view that Alejo had at the time of the incident was verified by Judge Jose Catral
Mendoza (now an Associate Justice of this Court) during the ocular inspection
conducted in the presence of the prosecutors, defense counsel, court personnel, and
witnesses Alejo and Maj. Villena.
The trial judge also found that Alejo did not waver in his detailed account of
how the assailants shot Abadilla who was inside his car, the relative positions of
the gunmen and lookouts, and his opportunity to look at them in the face. Alejo
immediately gave his statement before the police authorities just hours after the
incident took place. Appellants make much of a few inconsistencies in his
535[164]Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation v. Gobonseng, Jr., G.R. No. 163562,
July 21, 2006, 496 SCRA 305, 320.
statement and testimony, with respect to the number of assailants and his reaction
when he was ordered to get down in his guard post. But such inconsistencies have
already been explained by Alejo during cross-examination by correcting his earlier
statement in using number four (4) to refer to those persons actually standing
around the car and two (2) more persons as lookouts, and that he got nervous only
when the second lookout shouted at him to get down, because the latter actually
poked a gun at him. It is settled that affidavits, being ex-parte, are almost always
incomplete and often inaccurate, but do not really detract from the credibility of
witnesses.536[165] The discrepancies between a sworn statement and testimony in
court do not outrightly justify the acquittal of an accused, 537[166] as testimonial
evidence carries more weight than an affidavit.538[167]
As to appellants attempt to discredit Alejo by reason of the latters acceptance
of benefits from the Abadilla family, the same is puerile, considering that the trial
court even verified for itself how Alejo could have witnessed the shooting incident
and after he withstood intense grilling from defense lawyers. Case law has it that
where there is no evidence that the principal witness for the prosecution was
actuated by improper motive, the presumption is that he was not so actuated and
his testimony is entitled to full faith and credit.539[168]
536[165]People v. Silvano, G.R. No. 125923, January 31, 2001, 350 SCRA 650, 660.
537[166]People v. Gallo, G.R. No. 133002, October 19, 2001, 367 SCRA 662, 668.
538[167]People v. Mendoza, G.R. No. 142654, November 16, 2001, 369 SCRA 268,
286.
539[168]People v. Tagana, G.R. No. 133027, March 4, 2004, 424 SCRA 620, 639.
The trial judge also correctly rejected appellants proposition that the
eyewitness testimony of security guard Herbas should have been given due weight
and that other eyewitnesses should have been presented by the prosecution,
specifically Cesar Espiritu and Minella Alarcon, who allegedly had better
opportunity to recognize Abadillas attackers. As correctly pointed out by the trial
judge, Herbas could not have really seen at close range the perpetrators from his
position at a nearby building, which is several meters away from the ambush site,
as confirmed by photographs submitted by the prosecution, which Herbas failed to
refute. The same thing can be said of Espiritu who admitted in his Sinumpaang
Salaysay that his car was ahead of the Honda Accord driven by Abadilla, and that
he had already alighted from his car some houses away from the exact spot where
Abadilla was ambushed while his car was in the stop position.540[169]
Positive Identification of Appellants
Appellants assail the out-of-court identification made by Alejo who pointed
to appellant Joel de Jesus and Lorenzo delos Santos in a line-up at the police
station together with police officers. However, appellants claim that the police
officers who joined the line-up were actually in their police uniforms at the time, as
to make the identification process suggestive and hence not valid, was
unsubstantiated.
In People v. Teehankee, Jr.,541[170] we explained the procedure for out-ofcourt identification and the test to determine the admissibility of such
identification, thus:
540[169]Records , Vol. I, pp. 27-29.
541[170]G.R. Nos. 111206-08, October 6, 1995, 249 SCRA 54.
542[171]Id., at p. 95.
543[172]People v. Rivera, supra, at p. 239, citing People v. Timon, G.R. Nos. 9784142, November 12, 1997, 281 SCRA 577, 592.
544[173]Id., citing People v. Timon, id. and People v. Lapura, G.R. No. 94494, March
15, 1996, 255 SCRA 85, 96.
(2)
the identifying witness knew the accused before the crime, but made no
accusation against him when questioned by the police;
(3)
(4)
before identifying the accused at the trial, the witness erroneously identified
some other person;
(5)
(6)
before trial, the witness sees the accused but fails to identify him;
(7)
before the commission of the crime, the witness had limited opportunity to
see the accused;
(8)
the witness and the person identified are of different racial groups;
(9)
during his original observation of the perpetrator of the crime, the witness
was unaware that a crime was involved;
(10) a considerable time elapsed between the witness view of the criminal and
his identification of the accused;
(11) several persons committed the crime; and
(12) the witness fails to make a positive trial identification.545[174]
Iyong tumutok sa akin ay naka-asul na t-shirt, edad 30-35, 55-56 ang taas,
katamtaman ang katawan, maikli ang buhok, kayumanggi. Ang baril niya ay
tipong 45 o 9 mm na pistola. Iyong sumakal sa biktima at nang-agaw ng clutch
bag nito ay 25-30 ang edad, payat, mahaba ang buhok na nakatali, maitim, may
taas na 55-56, maiksi din ang baril niya at naka-puting polo. Iyong iba ay maaring
makilala ko kung makikita ko uli.546[175]
Appellants claimed that if Alejo was referring to appellant Joel de Jesus who
pointed a gun at him, his description did not jibe at all since Joel de Jesus was just
22 years old and not 30-35 years of age, and who stands 59 and not 55-56. And if
indeed it was appellant Lenido Lumanog whom Alejo saw as the gunman who had
grabbed the victim by the neck after opening the cars left front door, his description
again failed because far from being maitim, Lumanog was in fact faircomplexioned.
We are not persuaded. Alejo positively identified Joel de Jesus in a line-up at
the police station and again inside the courtroom as the first lookout who pointed a
gun at him. Though his estimate of Joels age was not precise, it was not that far
from his true age, especially if we consider that being a tricycle driver who was
exposed daily to sunlight, Joels looks may give a first impression that he is older
than his actual age. Moreover Alejos description of Lumanog as dark-skinned was
made two (2) months prior to the dates of the trial when he was again asked to
identify him in court. When defense counsel posed the question of the discrepancy
in Alejos description of Lumanog who was then presented as having a fair
complexion and was 40 years old, the private prosecutor manifested the possible
effect of Lumanogs incarceration for such length of time as to make his appearance
different at the time of trial.
Applying the totality-of-circumstances test, we thus reiterate that Alejos outcourt-identification is reliable, for reasons that, first, he was very near the place
where Abadilla was shot and thus had a good view of the gunmen, not to mention
that the two (2) lookouts directly approached him and pointed their guns at them;
second, no competing event took place to draw his attention from the event; third,
Alejo immediately gave his descriptions of at least two (2) of the perpetrators,
while affirming he could possibly identify the others if he would see them again,
and the entire happening that he witnessed; and finally, there was no evidence that
the police had supplied or even suggested to Alejo that appellants were the
suspects, except for Joel de Jesus whom he refused to just pinpoint on the basis of
a photograph shown to him by the police officers, insisting that he would like to
see said suspect in person. More importantly, Alejo during the trial had positively
identified appellant Joel de Jesus independently of the previous identification made
at the police station. Such in-court identification was positive, straightforward and
categorical.
Appellants contend that the subsequent acquittal of Lorenzo delos Santos,
whom Alejo had categorically pointed to as one (1) of the two (2) men whom he
saw walking to and fro infront of his guard post prior to the shooting incident, and
as one (1) of the two (2) men who pointed a gun at him and ordered him to get
down, totally destroyed said witness credibility and eroded the trustworthiness of
each and every uncorroborated testimony he gave in court. This assertion is
untenable. A verdict of acquittal is immediately final; hence, we may no longer
review the acquittal of accused Lorenzo delos Santos. 547[176] However, the
acquittal of their co-accused does not necessarily benefit the appellants. We have
547[176]People v. Dulay, G.R. No. 174775, October 11, 2007, 535 SCRA 656, 662,
citing People v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 159261, February 21, 2007, 516 SCRA
383.
ruled that accused-appellant may not invoke the acquittal of the other conspirators
to merit the reversal of his conviction for murder.548[177]
Ballistic
and
fingerprint
examination
results
are
inconclusive
and
not
indispensable
Appellants deplore the trial courts disregard of the results of the ballistic and
fingerprint tests, which they claim should exonerate them from liability for the
killing of Abadilla. These pieces of evidence were presented by the defense to
prove that the empty shells recovered from the crime scene and deformed slug
taken from the body of Abadilla were not fired from any of the firearms seized
from appellants. Instead, they matched the same firearm used in the killings of
Suseso de Dios and other supposed victims of ambush-slay perpetrated by
suspected members of the ABB. Further, none of the fingerprints lifted from the
KIA Pride, used by the gunmen as getaway vehicle, matched any of the specimens
taken from the appellants.
We are not persuaded. As correctly held by the CA, the negative result of
ballistic examination was inconclusive, for there is no showing that the firearms
supposedly found in appellants possession were the same ones used in the ambushslay of Abadilla. The fact that ballistic examination revealed that the empty shells
and slug were fired from another firearm does not disprove appellants guilt, as it
was possible that different firearms were used by them in shooting Abadilla. 549
548[177]Id., citing People v. Uganap, G.R. No. 130605, June 19, 2001, 358 SCRA 674,
684.
549[178]See Maandal v. People, G.R. No. 144113, June 28, 2001, 360 SCRA 209,
228.
[178] Neither will the finding that the empty shells and slug matched those in
another criminal case allegedly involving ABB members, such that they could have
been fired from the same firearms belonging to said rebel group, exonerate the
appellants who are on trial in this case and not the suspects in another case. To
begin with, the prosecution never claimed that the firearms confiscated from
appellants, which were the subject of separate charges for illegal possession of
firearms, were the same firearms used in the ambush-slay of Abadilla. A ballistic
examination is not indispensable in this case. Even if another weapon was in fact
actually used in killing the victim, still, appellants Fortuna and Lumanog cannot
escape criminal liability therefor, as they were positively identified by eyewitness
Freddie Alejo as the ones who shot Abadilla to death.550[179]
As this Court held in Velasco v. People551[180] -As regards the failure of the police to present a ballistic report on the
seven spent shells recovered from the crime scene, the same does not constitute
suppression of evidence. A ballistic report serves only as a guide for the courts in
considering the ultimate facts of the case. It would be indispensable if there are no
credible eyewitnesses to the crime inasmuch as it is corroborative in nature. The
presentation of weapons or the slugs and bullets used and ballistic
examination are not prerequisites for conviction. The corpus delicti and the
positive identification of accused-appellant as the perpetrator of the crime are
more than enough to sustain his conviction. Even without a ballistic report, the
positive identification by prosecution witnesses is more than sufficient to prove
accuseds guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In the instant case, since the identity of
the assailant has been sufficiently established, a ballistic report on the slugs
can be dispensed with in proving petitioners guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
[EMPHASIS SUPPLIED.]
that no prints had been lifted from inside the KIA Pride and only two (2)
fingerprints were taken from the car of Abadilla.
Defense of Alibi Cannot
Prevail
Over
Positive
Identification
Alibi is the weakest of all defenses, for it is easy to fabricate and difficult to
disprove, and it is for this reason that it cannot prevail over the positive
identification of the accused by the witnesses. 552[181] To be valid for purposes of
exoneration from a criminal charge, the defense of alibi must be such that it would
have been physically impossible for the person charged with the crime to be at the
locus criminis at the time of its commission, the reason being that no person can be
in two places at the same time. The excuse must be so airtight that it would admit
of no exception. Where there is the least possibility of accuseds presence at the
crime scene, the alibi will not hold water.553[182]
Deeply embedded in our jurisprudence is the rule that positive identification
of the accused, where categorical and consistent, without any showing of ill motive
on the part of the eyewitness testifying, should prevail over the alibi and denial of
appellants, whose testimonies are not substantiated by clear and convincing
evidence.554[183] However, none of the appellants presented clear and convincing
excuses showing the physical impossibility of their being at the crime scene
552[181]People v. Medina, G.R. No. 155256, July 30, 2004, 435 SCRA 610, 619.
553[182]People v. Bracamonte, G.R. No. 95939, June 17, 1996, 257 SCRA 380.
554[183]People v. Abes, 465 Phil. 165 (2004).
between 8:00 oclock and 9:00 oclock in the morning of June 13, 1996. Hence, the
trial court and CA did not err in rejecting their common defense of alibi.
As to the failure of appellant Lumanog to take the witness stand, indeed the
grave charges of murder and illegal possession of firearms would have normally
impelled an accused to testify in his defense, particularly when his life is at stake.
As this Court observed in People v. Delmendo:555[184]
An adverse inference may also be deduced from appellant's failure to take
the witness stand. While his failure to testify cannot be considered against him, it
may however help in determining his guilt. The unexplained failure of the
accused to testify, under a circumstance where the crime imputed to him is so
serious that places in the balance his very life and that his testimony might at
least help in advancing his defense, gives rise to an inference that he did not
want to testify because he did not want to betray himself.
An innocent person will at once naturally and emphatically repel an
accusation of crime, as a matter of self-preservation, and as a precaution against
prejudicing himself. A persons silence, therefore, particularly when it is persistent,
may justify an inference that he is not innocent. Thus, we have the general
principle that when an accused is silent when he should speak, in circumstances
where an innocent person so situated would have spoken, on being accused of a
crime, his silence and omission are admissible in evidence against him.
Accordingly, it has been aptly said that silence may be assent as well as consent,
and may, where a direct and specific accusation of crime is made, be regarded
under some circumstances as a quasi-confession.556[185]
Id.
suddenly fired upon by the appellants -- was deliberate, sudden and unexpected.
There was simply no chance for Abadilla to survive the ambush-slay, with
successive shots quickly fired at close range by two (2) armed men on both sides of
his car; and much less to retaliate by using his own gun, as no less than 23 gunshot
wounds on his head and chest caused his instantaneous death. As we have
consistently ruled, the essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack on
an unsuspecting victim by the perpetrator of the crime, depriving the victim of any
chance to defend himself or to repel the aggression, thus insuring its commission
without risk to the aggressor and without any provocation on the part of the
victim.557[186]
Evident premeditation was likewise properly appreciated by the trial court,
notwithstanding the inadmissibility of Joel de Jesuss extrajudicial confession
disclosing in detail the pre-planned ambush of Abadilla, apparently a contract
killing in which the perpetrators were paid or expected to receive payment for the
job. As correctly pointed out by the CA, Alejo had stressed that as early as 7:30 in
the morning of June 13, 1996, he already noticed something unusual going on upon
seeing the two (2) lookouts (appellants Joel de Jesus and Lorenzo delos Santos)
walking to and fro along Katipunan Avenue infront of the building he was
guarding. True enough, they were expecting somebody to pass that way, who was
no other than Abadilla driving his Honda Accord. After the lapse of more or less
one (1) hour, he already heard successive gunshots, while in his guard post, from
the direction of the middle lane where Abadillas car was surrounded by four (4)
men carrying short firearms. All the foregoing disclosed the execution of a preconceived plan to kill Abadilla. The essence of evident premeditation is that the
execution of the criminal act is preceded by cool thought and reflection upon the
557[186]People v. Castillo, 426 Phil. 752, 767 (2002).
resolution to carry out criminal intent within a span of time sufficient to arrive at a
calm judgment.558[187]
The trial court and CA were therefore correct in declaring the appellants
guilty as conspirators in the ambush-slay of Abadilla, the presence of treachery and
evident premeditation qualifying the killing to murder under Art. 248 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended.
Proper Penalty
The CA correctly modified the death penalty imposed by the trial court. At
the time the crime was committed, the penalty for murder was reclusion perpetua
to death. Since the penalty is composed of two (2) indivisible penalties, then for
the purpose of determining the imposable penalty, Article 63 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, must be considered. It provides in part:
1. When in the commission of the deed there is present only one
aggravating circumstance, the greater penalty shall be applied.
into law on June 24, 2006, the imposition of the death penalty has been prohibited.
Pursuant to Section 2 thereof, the penalty to be meted to appellants shall be
reclusion perpetua. Said section reads:
SECTION 2. In lieu of the death penalty, the following shall be imposed:
(a) the penalty of reclusion perpetua, when the law violated makes use of
the nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised Penal Code; or
(b) the penalty of life imprisonment, when the law violated does not make
use of the nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised Penal Code.
Court has consistently held that the Indeterminate Sentence Law likewise does not
apply to persons sentenced to reclusion perpetua. In People v. Enriquez, we
declared:
[R]eclusion perpetua is the only penalty that can be imposed
against the appellants. As correctly argued by the Solicitor General, Act
No. 4103, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, cannot be
applied in the case of appellants considering the proscription in Sec. 2
thereof, viz:
xxxx
Indeed, in People v. Asturias, Serrano v. Court of Appeals, People
v. Lampaza and People v. Tan, to name a few cases, we in effect equated
the penalty of reclusion perpetua as synonymous to life-imprisonment for
purposes of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and ruled that the latter law
does not apply to persons convicted of offenses punishable with the said
penalty. Consequently, we affirm the Court of Appeals in not applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, and in imposing upon appellants the penalty
of reclusion perpetua instead.
Reclusion perpetua is an indivisible penalty without a minimum or
maximum period. Parole, on the other hand, is extended only to those sentenced
to divisible penalties as is evident from Sec. 5 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
which provides that it is only after any prisoner shall have served the minimum
penalty imposed on him that the Board of Indeterminate Sentence may consider
whether such prisoner may be granted parole.562[191]
Further, we cite the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Dante Tinga in People
v. Tubongbanua,563[192] addressing the issue herein raised by appellants, to wit:
No constitutional sanctities will be offended if persons previously sentenced
to death, or persons sentenced to reclusion perpetua, are denied the benefit of
parole conformably to Section 3 of Rep. Act No. 9346. As to persons previously
sentenced to death, it should be remembered that at the time of the
commission of the crime, the penalty attached to the crime was death. To their
benefit, Rep. Act No. 9346 reduced the penalty attached to the crime to
reclusion perpetua. Yet such persons cannot claim the benefit of parole on the basis
of the ex post facto clause of the Constitution, since an ex post facto law is one
562[191]Id., citing People v. Enriquez, Jr., G.R. No. 158797, July 29, 2005, 465 SCRA
407, 418; and People v. Tubongbanua, G.R. No. 171271, August 31, 2006, 500 SCRA
727 (see Concurring Opinion).
563[192]Id.
which, among others, changes punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment than
the law annexed to the crime when committed. Rep. Act No. 9346 had the effect of
inflicting a lighter punishment, not a greater punishment, than what the law
annexed to the crime when committed.564[193] [EMPHASIS SUPPLIED.]
Civil Liability
When death occurs due to a crime, the following damages may be awarded:
(1) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim; (2) actual or
compensatory damages; (3) moral damages; (4) exemplary damages; and (5)
temperate damages.565[194]
Civil indemnity is mandatory and granted to the heirs of the victim without
need of proof other than the commission of the crime.566[195] We have ruled that
even if the penalty of death is not to be imposed because of the prohibition in R.A.
No. 9346, the civil indemnity of P75,000.00 is proper, because it is not dependent
on the actual imposition of the death penalty but on the fact that qualifying
circumstances warranting the imposition of the death penalty attended the
commission of the offense.567[196] As explained in People v. Salome,568[197] while
R.A. No. 9346 prohibits the imposition of the death penalty, the fact remains that
564[193]Id., at pp. 746-747.
565[194] Id., citing People v. Enriquez, Jr., G.R. No. 158797, July 29, 2005, 465 SCRA
407, 418; and People v. Tubongbanua, G.R. No. 171271, August 31, 2006, 500 SCRA
727 (see Concurring Opinion).
566[195] Id.
567[196] Madsali v. People, G.R. No. 179570, February 4, 2010, citing People v.
Quiachon, G.R. No. 170236, August 31, 2006, 500 SCRA 704, 719.
568[197] 500 Phil. 659, 676 (2006).
the penalty provided for by the law for a heinous offense is still death, and the
offense is still heinous. Accordingly, the heirs of Col. Rolando N. Abadilla is
entitled to civil indemnity in the amount of P75,000.00. The grant of actual
damages representing burial expenses, funeral services and cost of repair of the
Honda car, is likewise in order, being duly supported by receipts.569[198]
With regard to moral and exemplary damages, we find the amounts awarded
by the trial court excessive and the same are hereby reduced to P75,000.00 and
P30,000.00, respectively. It must again be stressed that moral damages are
emphatically not intended to enrich a plaintiff at the expense of the defendant.
When awarded, moral damages must not be palpably and scandalously excessive
as to indicate that it was the result of passion, prejudice or corruption on the part of
the trial judge or appellate court justices. 570[199] As to exemplary damages, the
same is justified under Article 2230 of the New Civil Code when a crime is
committed with an aggravating circumstance, either qualifying or generic.571[200]
WHEREFORE, the consolidated petitions and appeal are hereby
DISMISSED. The Decision dated April 1, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR-HC No. 00667 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS in that the civil
569[198] Exhibits T to T-6, folder of exhibits, pp. 40-46; TSN, January 27, 1997, p. 3.
570[199] Francisco v. Ferrer, Jr., G.R. No. 142029, February 28, 2001, 353 SCRA 261,
266-267, citing American Home Assurance Company v. Chua, G.R. No. 130421, June
28, 1999, 309 SCRA 250, 263, Benguet Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 127326, December 23, 1999, 321 SCRA 524, 537, Singson v.
Court of Appeals, 346 Phil. 831, 845 and De la Serna v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
109161, June 21, 1994, 233 SCRA 325, 329-330.
571[200] People v. Padilla, G.R. No. 167955 (Formerly G.R. No. 151275), September
30, 2009, citing People v. Marcos, G.R. No. 185380, June 18, 2009.
WE CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
No part
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice
C E R T I F I C AT I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, I certify that
the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
John Colcol (John), born on June 9, 1983, was employed as electrician by Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc., on board the
vessel Maersk Danville, since February 2008. As such, he was enrolled under the government's Employees' Compensation
Program (ECP).3 Unfortunately, on June 2, 2008, an accident occurred on board the vessel whereby steel plates fell on John,
which led to his untimely death the following day.4
John was, at the time of his death, childless and unmarried. Thus, petitioner Bernardina P. Bartolome, Johns biological
mother and, allegedly, sole remaining beneficiary, filed a claim for death benefits under PD 626 with the Social Security
System (SSS) at San Fernando City, La Union. However, the SSS La Union office, in a letter dated June 10, 20095
addressed to petitioner, denied the claim, stating:
We regret to inform you that wecannot give due course to your claim because you are no longer considered as the parent of
JOHN COLCOL as he was legally adopted by CORNELIO COLCOL based on documents you submitted to us.
The denial was appealed tothe Employees Compensation Commission (ECC), which affirmed the ruling of the SSS La
Union Branch through the assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED and the claim is hereby dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.6
In denying the claim, both the SSS La Union branch and the ECC ruled against petitioners entitlement to the death benefits
sought after under PD 626 on the ground she can no longer be considered Johns primary beneficiary. As culled from the
records, John and his sister Elizabeth were adopted by their great grandfather, petitioners grandfather, Cornelio Colcol
(Cornelio), by virtue of the Decision7 in Spec. Proc. No. 8220-XII of the Regional Trial Court in Laoag City dated February
4, 1985, which decree of adoption attained finality.8 Consequently, as argued by the agencies, it is Cornelio who qualifies as
Johns primary beneficiary, not petitioner. Neither, the ECC reasoned, would petitioner qualify as Johns secondary
beneficiary even if it wereproven that Cornelio has already passed away. As the ECC ratiocinated:
Under Article 167 (j) of P.D. 626, as amended, provides (sic) that beneficiaries are the "dependent spouse until he remarries
and dependent children, who are the primary beneficiaries. In their absence, the dependent parentsand subject to the
restrictions imposed on dependent children, the illegitimate children and legitimate descendants who are the secondary
beneficiaries; Provided; that the dependent acknowledged natural child shall be considered as a primary beneficiary when
there are no other dependent children who are qualified and eligible for monthly income benefit."
The dependent parent referred to by the above provision relates to the legitimate parent of the covered member, as provided
for by Rule XV, Section 1 (c) (1) of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation. This Commission believes that the
appellant is not considered a legitimate parent of the deceased, having given up the latter for adoption to Mr. Cornelio C.
Colcol. Thus, in effect, the adoption divested her of the statusas the legitimate parent of the deceased.
xxxx
In effect, the rights which previously belong [sic] to the biological parent of the adopted child shall now be upon the
adopting parent. Hence, in this case, the legal parent referred to by P.D. 626, as amended, as the beneficiary, who has the
right to file the claim, is the adoptive father of the deceased and not herein appellant.9 (Emphasis supplied)
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was likewise denied by the ECC.10 Hence, the instant
petition.
The Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues in the petition:
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
I. The Honorable ECCs Decision is contrary to evidence on record.
II. The Honorable ECC committed grave abuse in denying the just, due and lawful claims of the petitioner as
a lawful beneficiary of her deceased biological son.
III. The Honorable ECC committed grave abuse of discretion in not giving due course/denying petitioners
otherwise meritorious motion for reconsideration.11
In resolving the case, the pivotal issue is this: Are the biological parents of the covered, but legally adopted, employee
considered secondary beneficiaries and, thus, entitled, in appropriate cases, to receive the benefits under the ECP?
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
The ECCs factual findings are not consistent with the evidence on record
To recall, one of the primary reasons why the ECC denied petitioners claim for death benefits is that eventhough she is
Johns biological mother, it was allegedly not proven that his adoptive parent, Cornelio, was no longer alive. As intimated by
the ECC:
Moreover, there had been no allegation in the records as to whether the legally adoptive parent, Mr. Colcol, is dead, which
would immediately qualify the appellant [petitioner] for Social Security benefits. Hence, absent such proof of death of the
adoptive father, this Commission will presume him to be alive and well, and as such, is the one entitled to claim the benefit
being the primary beneficiary of the deaceased. Thus, assuming that appellant is indeed a qualified beneficiary under the
Social Security law, in view of her status as other beneficiary, she cannot claim the benefit legally provided by law to the
primary beneficiary, in this case the adoptive father since he is still alive.
We disagree with the factual finding of the ECC on this point.
Generally, findings of fact by administrative agencies are generally accorded great respect, if not finality, by the courts by
reason of the special knowledge and expertise of said administrative agenciesover matters falling under their jurisdiction.12
However, in the extant case, the ECC had overlooked a crucial piece of evidence offered by the petitioner Cornelios death
certificate.13
Based on Cornelios death certificate, it appears that Johns adoptive father died on October 26, 1987,14 or only less than
three (3) years since the decree of adoption on February 4, 1985, which attained finality.15 As such, it was error for the ECC
to have ruled that it was not duly proven that the adoptive parent, Cornelio, has already passed away.
The rule limiting death benefits claims to the legitimate parents is contrary to law
This brings us to the question of whether or not petitioner is entitled to the death benefits claim in view of Johns workrelated demise. The pertinent provision, in this regard, is Article 167 (j) of the Labor Code, as amended, which reads:
ART. 167. Definition of terms. - Asused in this Title unless the context indicates otherwise:
xxxx
(j) 'Beneficiaries' means the dependent spouse until he remarries and dependent children, who are the primary beneficiaries.
In their absence, the dependent parents and subject to the restrictions imposed on dependent children, the illegitimate
children and legitimate descendants who are the secondary beneficiaries; Provided, that the dependent acknowledged natural
child shall be considered as a primary beneficiary when there are no other dependent children who are qualified and eligible
for monthly income benefit. (Emphasis supplied)
Concurrently, pursuant to the succeeding Article 177(c) supervising the ECC "[T]o approve rules and regulations governing
the processing of claims and the settlement of disputes arising therefrom as prescribed by the System," the ECC has issued
the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation, interpreting the above-cited provision as follows:
RULE XV BENEFICIARIES
SECTION 1. Definition. (a) Beneficiaries shall be either primary or secondary, and determined atthe time of employees
death.
(b) The following beneficiaries shall be considered primary:
(1) The legitimate spouse living with the employee at the time of the employees death until he
remarries; and
(2) Legitimate, legitimated, legally adopted or acknowledged natural children, who are
unmarried not gainfully employed, not over 21 years of age, or over 21 years of age provided
that he is incapacitated and incapable of self - support due to physicalor mental defect which is
congenital or acquired during minority; Provided, further, that a dependent acknowledged
natural child shall be considered as a primary beneficiary only when there are no other
dependent children who are qualified and eligible for monthly income benefit; provided
finally, that if there are two or more acknowledged natural children, they shall be counted
from the youngest and without substitution, but not exceeding five.
(c) The following beneficiaries shall be considered secondary:
(1) The legitimate parentswholly dependent upon the employee for regular support;
(2) The legitimate descendants and illegitimate children who are unmarried, not gainfully
employed, and not over 21 years of age, or over 21 years of age providedthat he is
incapacitated and incapable of self - support dueto physical or mental defect which is
congenital or acquired during minority. (Emphasis supplied)
Guilty of reiteration, the ECC denied petitioners claim on the ground that she is no longer the deceaseds legitimate parent,
as required by the implementing rules. As held by the ECC, the adoption decree severed the relation between John and
petitioner, effectively divesting her of the status of a legitimate parent, and, consequently, that of being a secondary
beneficiary.
We disagree.
a. Rule XV, Sec. 1(c)(1) of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation deviates from the clear language of Art. 167
(j) of the Labor Code, as amended
Examining the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation in light of the Labor Code, as amended, it is at once apparent
that the ECC indulged in an unauthorized administrative legislation. In net effect, the ECC read into Art. 167 of the Code an
interpretation not contemplated by the provision. Pertinent in elucidating on this point isArticle 7 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, which reads:
Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance shall not beexcused by disuse,
or custom or practice to the contrary.
When the courts declared a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern.
Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the
Constitution.(Emphasis supplied)
As applied, this Court held in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Fortune Tobacco Corporation16 that:
As we have previously declared, rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or proceedings in
order to carry into effect the law as it has been enacted, and it cannot be extended to amend or expand the statutory
requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute. Administrative regulations must always be in harmony with
the provisions of the law because any resulting discrepancy between the two will always be resolved in favor of the basic
law. (Emphasis supplied)
Guided by this doctrine, We find that Rule XV of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation is patently a wayward
restriction of and a substantial deviation from Article 167 (j) of the Labor Code when it interpreted the phrase "dependent
parents" to refer to "legitimate parents."
It bears stressing that a similar issue in statutory construction was resolved by this Court in Diaz v. Intermediate Appellate
Court17 in this wise:
It is Our shared view that the word "relatives" should be construed in its general acceptation. Amicus curiae Prof. Ruben
reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane tothe
purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same
class. "Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification."20
In the instant case, there is no compelling reasonable basis to discriminate against illegitimate parents. Simply put, the
above-cited rule promulgated by the ECC that limits the claim of benefits to the legitimate parents miserably failed the test
of reasonableness since the classification is not germane to the law being implemented. We see no pressing government
concern or interest that requires protection so as to warrant balancing the rights of unmarried parents on one hand and the
rationale behind the law on the other. On the contrary, the SSS can better fulfill its mandate, and the policy of PD 626 that
employees and their dependents may promptly secure adequate benefits in the event of work-connected disability or death will be better served if Article 167 (j) of the Labor Code is not so narrowly interpreted.
There being no justification for limiting secondary parent beneficiaries to the legitimate ones, there can be no other course of
action to take other than to strikedown as unconstitutional the phrase "illegitimate" as appearing in Rule XV, Section 1(c)(1)
of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation.
Petitioner qualifies as Johns dependent parent
In attempting to cure the glaring constitutional violation of the adverted rule, the ECC extended illegitimate parents an
opportunity to file claims for and receive death benefitsby equating dependency and legitimacy to the exercise of parental
authority. Thus, as insinuated by the ECC in its assailed Decision, had petitioner not given up John for adoption, she could
have still claimed death benefits under the law.
To begin with, nowhere in the law nor in the rules does it say that "legitimate parents" pertain to those who exercise parental
authority over the employee enrolled under the ECP. Itwas only in the assailed Decision wherein such qualification was
made. In addition, assuming arguendothat the ECC did not overstep its boundaries in limiting the adverted Labor Code
provision to the deceaseds legitimate parents, and that the commission properly equated legitimacy to parental authority,
petitioner can still qualify as Johns secondary beneficiary.
True, when Cornelio, in 1985, adoptedJohn, then about two (2) years old, petitioners parental authority over John was
severed. However, lest it be overlooked, one key detail the ECC missed, aside from Cornelios death, was that when the
adoptive parent died less than three (3) years after the adoption decree, John was still a minor, at about four (4) years of age.
Johns minority at the time of his adopters death is a significant factor in the case at bar. Under such circumstance, parental
authority should be deemed to have reverted in favor of the biological parents. Otherwise, taking into account Our consistent
ruling that adoption is a personal relationship and that there are no collateral relatives by virtue of adoption,21 who was then
left to care for the minor adopted child if the adopter passed away?
To be sure, reversion of parental authority and legal custody in favor of the biological parents is not a novel concept. Section
20 of Republic Act No. 855222 (RA 8552), otherwise known as the Domestic Adoption Act, provides:
Section 20. Effects of Rescission. If the petition [for rescission of adoption] is granted, the parental authority of the
adoptee's biological parent(s), if known, or the legal custody of the Department shall be restored if the adoptee is still a
minoror incapacitated. The reciprocal rights and obligations of the adopter(s) and the adoptee to each other shall be
extinguished. (emphasis added)
The provision adverted to is applicable herein by analogy insofar as the restoration of custody is concerned.1wphi1 The
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 193551, November 19, 2014
HEIRS OF GREGORIO LOPEZ, REPRESENTED BY ROGELIA LOPEZ, ET AL.,
Petitioners, v. DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES [NOW SUBSTITUTED
BY PHILIPPINE INVESTMENT TWO (SPV-AMC), INC.], Respondents.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
This case involves the application of the doctrine on innocent purchaser or mortgagee for value.
It also involves the application of the doctrines on sales by persons who are not owners of the
property.
This is a Rule 45 petition1 filed on October 15, 2010, assailing the Court of Appeals May 8, 2009
decision2 and August 16, 2010 resolution.3 The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the
Regional Trial Courts December 27, 2005 decision,4 which ordered the nullification of the
affidavit of self-adjudication executed by Enrique Lopez, and the documents relating to the sale
and mortgage of the property to respondent Development Bank of the Philippines.
Gregoria Lopez owned a 2,734-square-meter property in Bustos, Bulacan.5 She died on March
19, 19226 and was survived by her three sons: Teodoro Lopez, Francisco Lopez, and Carlos
Lopez.7 Tax Declaration No. 613 was issued under the names of Teodoro, Francisco, and
Carlos.8
Teodoro, Francisco, and Carlos died.9 Only Teodoro was survived by children: Gregorio,
Enrique, Simplicio, and Severino.10
Petitioners in this case are Simplicio substituted by his daughter Eliza Lopez, and the heirs of
Gregorio and Severino.11 Enrique is deceased.12
Petitioners discovered that on November 29, 1990, Enrique executed an affidavit of selfadjudication declaring himself to be Gregoria Lopezs only surviving heir, thereby adjudicating
upon himself the land in Bulacan.13 He sold the property to Marietta Yabut.14
Petitioners demanded from Marietta the nullification of Enriques affidavit of self-adjudication
and the deed of absolute sale.15 They also sought to redeem Enriques one-fourth share.16
Marietta, who was already in possession of the property, refused.17
Sometime in 1993, Marietta obtained a loan from Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP)
and mortgaged the property to DBP as security.18 At the time of the loan, the property was
covered by Tax Declaration No. 18727, with the agreement that the land shall be brought under
the Torrens system.19 On July 26, 1993, an original certificate of title was issued in Mariettas
name.20 Marietta and DBP executed a supplemental document dated 28 February 1995 placing
the subject [property] within the coverage of the mortgage.21 The mortgage was annotated to
the title.22
Sometime between 1993 and 1994, petitioners filed a complaint23 and an amended complaint24
with the Regional Trial Court for the annulment of document, recovery of possession, and
reconveyance of the property. They prayed that judgment be rendered, ordering the annulment
of Enriques affidavit of self-adjudication, the deed of sale executed by Enrique and Marietta,
and the deed of real estate mortgage executed by Marietta in favor of DBP.25 Petitioners also
prayed for the reconveyance of their three-fourth share in the property, their exercise of their
right of redemption of Enriques one-fourth share, as well as attorneys fees and costs of suit.26
Petitioners caused the annotation of a notice of lis pendens at the back of the original certificate
of title.27 The annotation was inscribed on June 27, 1994.28
Marietta failed to pay her loan to DBP.29 DBP instituted foreclosure proceedings on the . . .
land.30 It was awarded the sale of the [property] as the highest bidder.31 The Certificate of
Sale was registered with the Register of Deeds . . . on 11 September 1996.32 Marietta failed to
redeem the property.33 The title to the property was consolidated in favor of DBP.34
On December 27, 2005, the Regional Trial Court ruled in favor of petitioners.35 The Regional
Trial Court found that the affidavit of self-adjudication and the deed of absolute sale did not
validly transfer to Marietta the title to the property.36 Enrique could not transfer three-fourths of
the property since this portion belonged to his co-heirs.37 The Regional Trial Court also found
that Marietta was not an innocent purchaser for value because when the deed of absolute sale
was executed, the property was only covered by a tax declaration in the name of the heirs of
Gregoria Lopez,38 thus:
[Marietta] should have looked further into the veracity of vendor Enrique Lopez claim of
ownership over the subject property considering that he has not presented her any other proof of
his ownership when the said Deed of Absolute Sale was executed other than his mere allegation
of ownership thereof.39
Hence, the issuance of the original certificate of title would not protect Marietta. Title is not
vested through a certificate.40 At best, Mariettas ownership over the subject property would
cover only Enriques share.41
The Regional Trial Court also found that DBP was not a mortgagee in good faith because at the
time of the execution of the mortgage contract, a certificate of title was yet to be issued in favor
of Marietta.42 Mariettas title at that time was still based on a tax declaration.43 Based on
jurisprudence, a tax declaration is not a conclusive proof of ownership.44 The DBP should have
exerted due diligence in ascertaining Mariettas title to the property.45
The Regional Trial Court ordered the nullification of Enriques affidavit of self-adjudication, the
sale of the three-fourth portion of the subject property in favor of Marietta, the reconveyance of
the three-fourth share of the property in favor of petitioners, the nullification of the real estate
mortgage executed in favor of DBP, and the surrender of possession of the property to
petitioners.46 The trial court also ordered DBP to pay attorneys fees.
DBP, substituted by Philippine Investment Two (PI Two), appealed to the Court of Appeals.47
The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the Regional Trial Court in the decision48
promulgated on May 8, 2009. It held that DBP was a mortgagee in good faith:
[W]ith the absence of any evidence to show that the DBP was ever privy to the fraudulent
execution of the late Enrique Lopez [sic] affidavit of Adjudication over the subject land, the
right of the former over the same must be protected and respected by reason of public policy.49
The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The 27 December 2005 Decision of the Regional Trial
Court is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE as to defendant-appellant Development Bank of
the Philippines and dismissing the complaint against the latter [now substituted by Philippine
Investment Two (SPV-AMC), Inc.]50
The Court of Appeals denied petitioners motion for reconsideration on August 16, 2010.51
Petitioners filed a Rule 45 petition52 before this court on October 15, 2010.
The issue in this case is whether the property was validly transferred to Marietta and, eventually,
to DBP.
Petitioners argued that the Court of Appeals erred in its application of the doctrine on innocent
purchaser for value.53 DBP should have exercised diligence in ascertaining Mariettas claim of
ownership since at the time of the mortgage, the property was only covered by a tax declaration
under Mariettas name.54 As a financial institution of which greater care and prudence55 is
required, DBP should not have relied on the face of a certificate of title to the property.56
On the other hand, DBPs position, citing Blanco v. Esquierdo,57 was that since its participation
in Enriques execution of the affidavit of self-adjudication was not shown on record, it could not
have been aware that there was any irregularity in the sale in favor of Marietta and in her title to
the property.58 Moreover, Marietta was in possession of the property at the time of the contract
with DBP.59 Therefore, DBP should enjoy the protection accorded to innocent purchasers for
value.60
We find merit in the petition.
I
Validity of Enriques affidavit and the sale to Marietta
We have consistently upheld the principle that no one can give what one does not have.61 A
seller can only sell what he or she owns, or that which he or she does not own but has authority
to transfer, and a buyer can only acquire what the seller can legally transfer. 62
This principle is incorporated in our Civil Code. It provides that in a contract of sale, the seller
binds himself to transfer the ownership of the thing sold, thus:
Art. 1458. By the contract of sale, one of the contracting parties obligates himself to transfer the
ownership of and to deliver a determinate thing, and the other to pay therefor a price certain in
money or its equivalent.
The seller cannot perform this obligation if he or she does not have a right to convey ownership
of the thing. Hence, Article 1459 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 1459. The thing must be licit and the vendor must have a right to transfer the ownership
thereof at the time it is delivered.
Title or rights to a deceased persons property are immediately passed to his or her heirs upon
death.63 The heirs rights become vested without need for them to be declared heirs.64 Before
the property is partitioned, the heirs are co-owners of the property.65
In this case, the rights to Gregoria Lopezs property were automatically passed to her sons
Teodoro, Francisco, and Carlos when she died in 1922.66 Since only Teodoro was survived by
children, the rights to the property ultimately passed to them when Gregoria Lopezs sons died.67
The children entitled to the property were Gregorio, Simplicio, Severino, and Enrique.
Gregorio, Simplicio, Severino, and Enrique became co-owners of the property, with each of them
entitled to an undivided portion of only a quarter of the property. Upon their deaths, their
children became the co-owners of the property, who were entitled to their respective shares, such
that the heirs of Gregorio became entitled to Gregorios one-fourth share, and Simplicios and
Severinos respective heirs became entitled to their corresponding one-fourth shares in the
property.68
The heirs cannot alienate the shares that do not belong to them. Article 493 of the Civil Code
provides:
Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits
pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute
another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the
alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which
may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.
Since Enriques right to the property was limited to his one-fourth share, he had no right to sell
the undivided portions that belonged to his siblings or their respective heirs. Any sale by one
heir of the rest of the property will not affect the rights of the other heirs who did not consent to
the sale. Such sale is void with respect to the shares of the other heirs.
Regardless of their agreement, Enrique could only convey to Marietta his undivided one-fourth
share of the property, and Marietta could only acquire that share. This is because Marietta
obtained her rights from Enrique who, in the first place, had no title or interest over the rest of
the property that he could convey.
Art. 2085. The following requisites are essential to the contracts of pledge and mortgage:
(1) That they be constituted to secure the fulfilment of a principal obligation;
(2) That the pledgor or mortgagor be the absolute owner of the thing pledged or mortgaged;
(3) That the persons constituting the pledge or mortgage have the free disposal of their property,
and in the absence thereof, that they be legally authorized for the purpose.
Third persons who are not parties to the principal obligation may secure the latter by pledging or
mortgaging their own property.
Applying this provision and having established that Marietta acquired no valid title or ownership
from Enrique over the undivided portions of the property, this court finds that no valid mortgage
was executed over the same property in favor of DBP. Without a valid mortgage, there was also
no valid foreclosure sale and no transfer of ownership of petitioners undivided portions to DBP.
In other words, DBP acquired no right over the undivided portions since its predecessor-ininterest was not the owner and held no authority to convey the property.
As in sales, an exception to this rule is if the mortgagee is a mortgagee in good faith.78 This
exception was explained in Torbela v. Rosario:
Under this doctrine, even if the mortgagor is not the owner of the mortgaged property, the
mortgage contract and any foreclosure sale arising therefrom are given effect by reason of public
policy. This principle is based on the rule that all persons dealing with property covered by a
Torrens Certificate of Title, as buyers or mortgagees, are not required to go beyond what appears
on the face of the title. This is the same rule that underlies the principle of "innocent purchasers
for value." The prevailing jurisprudence is that a mortgagee has a right to rely in good faith on
the certificate of title of the mortgagor to the property given as security and in the absence of any
sign that might arouse suspicion, has no obligation to undertake further investigation. Hence,
even if the mortgagor is not the rightful owner of, or does not have a valid title to, the mortgaged
property, the mortgagee in good faith is, nonetheless, entitled to protection.79
DBP claims that it is covered by this exception. DBP is mistaken. The exception applies when,
at the time of the mortgage, the mortgagor has already obtained a certificate of title under his or
her name.80 It does not apply when, as in this case, the mortgagor had yet to register the property
under her name.81
The facts show that DBP disregarded circumstances that should have aroused suspicion. For
instance, at the time of the mortgage with DBP, Marietta only had a tax declaration under her
name to show that she was the owner of the property. A tax declaration, by itself, neither proves
ownership of property nor grants title. Yet, DBP agreed to accept the property as security even
though Mariettas claim was supported only by the tax declaration, and a certificate of title was
yet to be issued under her name.
Granting that Marietta was in possession of the property, DBP should have inquired further as to
Mariettas rights over the property since no certificate of title was issued to her. DBP took the
risks attendant to the absence of a certificate of title. It should bear the burden of checking the
ownership as well as the validity of the deed of sale. This is despite the eventual issuance of a
certificate of title in favor of Marietta.
The rule on innocent purchasers or [mortgagees] for value is applied more strictly when the
purchaser or the mortgagee is a bank. Banks are expected to exercise higher degree of diligence
in their dealings, including those involving lands. Banks may not rely simply on the face of the
certificate of title.
Thus, in Cruz v. Bancom Finance Corporation,82 this court ruled that:
Respondent . . . is not an ordinary mortgagee; it is a mortgagee-bank. As such, unlike private
individuals, it is expected to exercise greater care and prudence in its dealings, including those
involving registered lands. A banking institution is expected to exercise due diligence before
entering into a mortgage contract. The ascertainment of the status or condition of a property
offered to it as security for a loan must be a standard and indispensable part of its operations.83
(Citations omitted)
DBP failed to exercise the degree of diligence required of banks when it accepted the
unregistered property as security for Mariettas loan despite circumstances that should have
aroused its suspicion.
Citing Blanco v. Esquierdo, DBP argued that since it did not participate in the dealings between
Enrique and Marietta, it should be considered as an innocent mortgagee for value.
Blanco involves an alleged widow of the deceased who adjudicated to herself the deceaseds
property and thereafter mortgaged the property to DBP.84 The brothers and sisters of the
deceased filed an action for the annulment of the affidavit executed by the alleged widow and the
cancellation of the certificate of title under her name.85 The trial court ordered the cancellation of
the certificate of title issued to the alleged widow, including the registration of the mortgage
deed.86
In Blanco, this court declared that DBP was a mortgagee in good faith, thus:
The trial court, in the decision complained of, made no finding that the defendant mortgagee
bank was a party to the fraudulent transfer of the land to Fructuosa Esquierdo. Indeed, there is
nothing alleged in the complaint which may implicate said defendant mortgagee in the fraud, or
justify a finding that it acted in bad faith. On the other hand, the certificate of title was in the
name of the mortgagor Fructuosa Esquierdo when the land was mortgaged by her to the
defendant bank. Such being the case, the said defendant bank, as mortgagee, had the right to rely
on what appeared in the certificate and, in the absence of anything to excite suspicion, was under
no obligation to look beyond the certificate and investigate the title of the mortgagor appearing
on the face of said certificate. (De Lara, et al. vs. Ayroso, 95 Phil., 185; 50 Off. Gaz., 10 4838;
Joaquin vs. Madrid, et al., 106 Phil., 1060). Being thus an innocent mortgagee for value, its right
or lien upon the land mortgaged must be respected and protected, even if the mortgagor obtained
her title thereto thru fraud.87
DBPs reliance on Blanco is misplaced. In Blanco, the certificate of title had already been issued
under the name of the mortgagor when the property was mortgaged to DBP. This is not the
situation in this case.
To reiterate, the protection accorded to mortgagees in good faith cannot be extended to
mortgagees of properties that are not yet registered or registered but not under the mortgagors
name.
Therefore, the Regional Trial Court did not err in ordering the nullification of the documents of
sale and mortgage. Contracts involving the sale or mortgage of unregistered property by a
person who was not the owner or by an unauthorized person are void.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 8,
2009 and its resolution dated August 16, 2010 are reversed and SET ASIDE. The December 27,
2005 decision of the Regional Trial Court is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, (Chairperson), Brion, Del Castillo, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
SECOND DIVISION
Present:
ZENAIDO ALUAD,
Respondent.
Promulgated:
October 17, 2008
x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
Crispin was the owner of six lots identified as Lot Nos. 674, 675, 676, 677,
680, and 682 of the Pilar Cadastre, Capiz. After Crispin died, his wife Matilde
adjudicated the lots to herself.572[1]
572[1] Exhibit G, Records, pp. 172-173.
That, for and in consideration of the love and affection of the DONOR
[Matilde] for the DONEE [Maria], the latter being adopted and hav[ing] been
brought up by the former the DONOR, by these presents, transfer and convey, BY
WAY OF DONATION, unto the DONEE the property above-described, to
become effective upon the death of the DONOR , but in the event that the
DONEE should die before the DONOR, the present donation shall be deemed
rescinded and [of] no further force and effect; Provided, however, that anytime
during the lifetime of the DONOR or anyone of them who should survive, they
could use[,] encumber or even dispose of any or even all of the parcels of land
herein donated.575[4] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
On September 30, 1986, Original Certificates of Title over Lot Nos. 674 and
676 were issued in Matildes name.
On August 26, 1991, Matilde sold Lot No. 676 to respondent by a Deed of
Absolute Sale of Real Property.576[5]
Matilde died on January 25, 1994, while Maria died on September 24 of the
same year.578[7]
On August 21, 1995, Marias heirs-herein petitioners filed before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Roxas City a Complaint,579[8] for declaration and recovery of
ownership and possession of Lot Nos. 674 and 676, and damages against
respondent, alleging:
That in 1978, plaintiff[s] possessed the two (2) parcels of land abovedescribed until January 1991 when defendant entered and possessed the two (2)
parcels of land claiming as the adopted son of Crispin Aluad who refused to give
back possession until Matilde Aluad died in [1994] and then retained the
576[5] Exhibit 1, id. at 221.
577[6] Exhibit 2, id. at 222-223.
578[7] Exhibits B C, id. at 166-167.
579[8] Id. at 1-6.
possession thereof up to and until the present time, thus, depriving the plaintiffs of
the enjoyment of said parcels of land x x x;
That after the death of Matilde R. Aluad, the plaintiffs succeeded by
inheritance by right of representation from their deceased mother, Maria Aluad
who is the sole and only daughter of Matilde Aluad[.]580[9]
That Lot 674 is owned by the defendant as this lot was adjudicated to him
in the Last Will and Testament of Matilde Aluad x x x while Lot 676 was
purchased by him from Matilde Aluad. These two lots are in his possession as true
owners thereof.582[11] (Underscoring supplied)
Petitioners later filed a Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint Already Filed
to Conform to Evidence583[12] to which it annexed an Amended Complaint584[13]
which cited the donation of the six lots via Deed of Donation in favor of their
mother Maria. Branch 15 of the RTC granted the motion and admitted the Amended
Complaint.585[14]
580[9] Id. at 3.
581[10] Id. at 15-21.
582[11] Id. at 18-19.
583[12] Id. at 102-104.
584[13] Id. at 105-110.
The trial court, by Decision589[18] of September 20, 1996, held that Matilde
could not have transmitted any right over Lot Nos. 674 and 676 to respondent, she
having previously alienated them to Maria via the Deed of Donation. Thus it
disposed:
1. Declaring the plaintiffs as the rightful owners of the subject Lots Nos.
674 and 676, Pilar Cadastre;
2. Ordering the defendant to deliver the possession of the subject lots to
the plaintiffs;
b.
c.
Art. 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at
the end thereof by the testator himself or by the testators name written by some
other person in his presence, and by his express direction, and attested and
subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and
of one another.
The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the
instrumental witnesses of the will shall, also sign, as aforesaid, each and every
page thereof, except the last on the left margin and all the pages shall be
numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each page.
The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon which the will is
written, and the fact that that testator signed the will and every page thereof, or
caused some other person to write his name, under his express direction, in the
presence of the instrumental witnesses, and that the latter witnessed and signed
the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the testator, and of one
another.
If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the witnesses, it
shall be interpreted to them.
While the appellate court declared respondent as the rightful owner of Lot
No. 676, it did not so declare with respect to Lot No. 674, as Matildes last will and
testament had not yet been probated. Thus the Court of Appeals disposed:
592[21] Penned by Court of Appeals Associate Justice Priscilla Baltazar-Padilla, with
the concurrence of Associate Justices Pampio A. Abarintos and Marlene GonzalesSison; CA rollo, pp. 130-146.
As did the appellate court, the Court finds the donation to petitioners mother
one of mortis causa, it having the following characteristics:
(1)
(2)
That before the death of the transferor, the transfer should be revocable by
the transferor at will, ad nutum; but revocability may be provided for
indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the
properties conveyed; and
(3)
That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the
transferee.598[27] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The statement in the Deed of Donation reading anytime during the lifetime
of the DONOR or anyone of them who should survive, they could use, encumber
or even dispose of any or even all the parcels of land herein donated 600[29]
means that Matilde retained ownership of the lots and reserved in her the right to
dispose them. For the right to dispose of a thing without other limitations than those
established by law is an attribute of ownership. 601[30] The phrase in the Deed of
Donation or anyone of them who should survive is of course out of sync. For the
Deed of Donation clearly stated that it would take effect upon the death of the
598[27] Maglasang v. Heirs of Corazon Cabatingan, 432 Phil. 548, 554 (2002); Reyes
v. Mosqueda, G.R. No. 45262, July 23, 1990, 187 SCRA 661, 670-671; Bonsato, et al.
v. Court of Appeals, et al., 95 Phil. 481, 487 (1954).
599[28] Ibid.
600[29] Exhibit A-1, records, p. 164.
601[30] Vide CIVIL CODE, Article 428: The owner has the right to enjoy and dispose
of a thing, without other limitations than those established by law x x x.
donor, hence, said phrase could only have referred to the donor Matilde. Petitioners
themselves concede that such phrase does not refer to the donee, thus:
x x x [I]t is well to point out that the last provision (sentence) in the
disputed paragraph should only refer to Matilde Aluad, the donor, because she
was the only surviving spouse at the time the donation was executed on 14
November 1981, as her husband Crispin Aluad [] had long been dead as early as
1975.602[31]
The trial court, in holding that the donation was inter vivos, reasoned:
A similar ratio in a case had been brushed aside by this Court, however, thus:
The donation being then mortis causa, the formalities of a will should have
been observed607[36] but they were not, as it was witnessed by only two, not three
or more witnesses following Article 805 of the Civil Code.608[37]
Further, the witnesses did not even sign the attestation clause 609[38] the
execution of which clause is a requirement separate from the subscription of the
will and the affixing of signatures on the left-hand margins of the pages of the will.
So the Court has emphasized:
undertakings in the clause, since the signatures that do appear on the page were
directed towards a wholly different avowal.
x x x It is the witnesses, and not the testator, who are required under
Article 805 to state the number of pages used upon which the will is written; the
fact that the testator had signed the will and every page thereof; and that they
witnessed and signed the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the
testator and of one another. The only proof in the will that the witnesses have
stated these elemental facts would be their signatures on the attestation clause.610
[39] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Furthermore, the witnesses did not acknowledge the will before the notary
public,611[40] which is not in accordance with the requirement of Article 806 of the
Civil Code that every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the
testator and the witnesses.
More. The requirement that all the pages of the will must be numbered
correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each page was not also
followed.612[41]
The Deed of Donation which is, as already discussed, one of mortis causa,
not having followed the formalities of a will, it is void and transmitted no right to
petitioners mother. But even assuming arguendo that the formalities were
610[39] Azuela v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 122880, April 12, 2006, 487 SCRA 119,
141-142. Vide Cagro v. Cagro, 92 Phil. 1032, 1033-1034 (1953).
611[40] Exhibit A, records, p. 165.
612[41] Id. at 164-165. Vide CIVIL CODE, Article 805.
observed, since it was not probated, no right to Lot Nos. 674 and 676 was
transmitted to Maria.613[42] Matilde thus validly disposed of Lot No. 674 to
respondent by her last will and testament, subject of course to the qualification that
her (Matildes) will must be probated. With respect to Lot No. 676, the same had, as
mentioned earlier, been sold by Matilde to respondent on August 26, 1991.
Petitioners nevertheless argue that assuming that the donation of Lot No.
674 in favor of their mother is indeed mortis causa, hence, Matilde could devise it
to respondent, the lot should nevertheless have been awarded to them because they
had acquired it by acquisitive prescription, they having been in continuous,
uninterrupted, adverse, open, and public possession of it in good faith and in the
concept of an owner since 1978.614[43]
to present further evidence material to the new theory, which it could have done
had it been aware of it at the time of the hearing before the trial court.616[45]
SO ORDERED.
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
616[45] Vide Philippine Ports Authority v. City of Iloilo, 453 Phil. 927, 934 (2003)
(citation omitted).
Chairperson
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts
Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Supreme Court
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
Petitioner,
Present:
- versus -
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
NACHURA, and
DE CARLOS or FELICIDAD
REYES, JJ.
SANDOVAL CARLOS or
FELICIDAD SANDOVAL VDA.
DE CARLOS, and TEOFILO
Promulgated:
CARLOS II,
Respondents.
x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
The Facts
The events that led to the institution of the instant suit are
unveiled as follows:
617[1] Rollo, pp. 47-63. Dated October 15, 2002. Penned by Associate Justice
Rebecca De Guia-Salvador, with Associate Justices Cancio C. Garcia and Bernardo P.
Abesamis, concurring.
618[2] Civil Case No. 95-135.
Parcel No. 1
Lot No. 162 of the MUNTINLUPA ESTATE SUBDIVISION, Case No. 6137 of
the Court of Land Registration.
Parcel No. 2
A parcel of land (Lot No. 159-B), being a portion of Lot 159, situated in
the Bo. of Alabang, Municipality of Muntinlupa, Province of Rizal, x x x
containing an area of Thirteen Thousand Four Hundred Forty One
(13,441) square meters.
Parcel No. 3
PARCEL No. 4
PARCEL No. 5
PARCEL No. 6
of
partial
compromise
agreement.
Under
the
adjudicated in favor of plaintiffs Rillo. The remaining 10,000square meter portion was later divided between petitioner and
respondents.
and
exemplary
damages,
attorneys
fees,
litigation
the
marriage.
Respondents
also
submitted
the
Petitioner
also
incorporated
in
the
counter-motion
for
another case. Said testimony was made in Civil Case No. 89-2384,
entitled Carlos v. Gorospe, before the RTC Branch 255, Las Pias. In
her testimony, respondent Felicidad narrated that co-respondent
Teofilo II is her child with Teofilo.621[5]
2.
Declaring that the defendant minor, Teofilo S. Carlos II, is
not the natural, illegitimate, or legally adopted child of the late Teofilo
E. Carlos;
3.
Ordering defendant Sandoval to pay and restitute to
plaintiff the sum of P18,924,800.00 together with the interest thereon
at the legal rate from date of filing of the instant complaint until fully
paid;
4.
Declaring plaintiff as the sole and exclusive owner of the
parcel of land, less the portion adjudicated to plaintiffs in Civil Case No.
11975, covered by TCT No. 139061 of the Register of Deeds of Makati
City, and ordering said Register of Deeds to cancel said title and to
issue another title in the sole name of plaintiff herein;
5.
Declaring the Contract, Annex K of complaint, between
plaintiff and defendant Sandoval null and void, and ordering the
Register of Deeds of Makati City to cancel TCT No. 139058 in the name
of Teofilo Carlos, and to issue another title in the sole name of plaintiff
herein;
6.
Declaring the Contract, Annex M of the complaint,
between plaintiff and defendant Sandoval null and void;
7.
Ordering the cancellation of TCT No. 210877 in the names
of defendant Sandoval and defendant minor Teofilo S. Carlos II and
ordering the Register of Deeds of Manila to issue another title in the
exclusive name of plaintiff herein;
8.
Ordering the cancellation of TCT No. 210878 in the name
of defendant Sandoval and defendant Minor Teofilo S. Carlos II and
ordering the Register of Deeds of Manila to issue another title in the
sole name of plaintiff herein.
Let this case be set for hearing for the reception of plaintiffs
evidence on his claim for moral damages, exemplary damages,
SO ORDERED.622[6]
On October 15, 2002, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC
ruling, disposing as follows:
SO ORDERED.623[7]
The CA opined:
622[6] CA rollo, pp. 48-49.
623[7] Id. at 63.
Considering that the burden of proof also rests on the party who
disputes the legitimacy of a particular party, the same may be said of
the trial courts rejection of the relationship between appellant Teofilo
Carlos II and his putative father on the basis of the inconsistencies in
appellant Felicidad Sandovals statements. Although it had effectively
disavowed appellants prior claims regarding the legitimacy of appellant
Teofilo Carlos II, the averment in the answer that he is the illegitimate
son of appellees brother, to Our mind, did not altogether foreclose the
possibility of the said appellants illegitimate filiation, his right to prove
the same or, for that matter, his entitlement to inheritance rights as
such.
Issues
Our Ruling
626[10] Rules of Civil Procedure (1997), Rule 34, Sec. 1.SECTION 1. Judgment on the
pleadings. Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material
allegations of the adverse partys pleading, the court may, on motion of that party, direct
judgment on such pleading. However, in actions for declaration of nullity or annulment
of marriage or for legal separation, the material facts alleged in the complaint shall
always be proved.
He argues that the CA should have applied Rule 35 of the Rules of Court
governing summary judgment, instead of the rule on judgment on the pleadings.
Petitioner is misguided. The CA did not limit its finding solely within the
provisions of the Rule on judgment on the pleadings. In disagreeing with the trial
court, the CA likewise considered the provisions on summary judgments, to wit:
SEC. 17. Trial. (1) The presiding judge shall personally conduct the trial
of the case. No delegation of evidence to a commissioner shall be allowed except
as to matters involving property relations of the spouses.
628[12] Sec. 25. Effectivity. This Rule shall take effect on March 15, 2003 following
its publication in a newspaper of general circulation not later than March 7, 2003.
629[13] G.R. No. 152154, November 18, 2003, 416 SCRA 133, citing Family Code,
Arts. 48 & 60, and Roque v. Encarnacion, 96 Phil. 643 (1954).
By issuing said summary judgment, the trial court has divested the State of
its lawful right and duty to intervene in the case. The participation of the State is
not terminated by the declaration of the public prosecutor that no collusion exists
between the parties. The State should have been given the opportunity to present
controverting evidence before the judgment was rendered.631[15]
Both the Civil Code and the Family Code ordain that the court should order the
prosecuting attorney to appear and intervene for the State. It is at this stage when
the public prosecutor sees to it that there is no suppression of evidence.
Concomitantly, even if there is no suppression of evidence, the public prosecutor
has to make sure that the evidence to be presented or laid down before the court is
not fabricated.
Truly, only the active participation of the public prosecutor or the Solicitor
General will ensure that the interest of the State is represented and protected in
proceedings for declaration of nullity of marriages by preventing the fabrication or
suppression of evidence.632[16]
632[16] Id. at 187-188, citing Republic v. Iyoy, G.R. No. 152577, September 21,
2005, 470 SCRA 508, 529, and Ancheta v. Ancheta, G.R. No. 145370, March 4, 2004,
424 SCRA 725, 740.
(a) Who may file. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife. (Underscoring supplied)
Section 2(a) of the Rule makes it the sole right of the husband or the wife to
file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage. The rationale of
the Rule is enlightening, viz.:
The new Rule recognizes that the husband and the wife are the sole
architects of a healthy, loving, peaceful marriage. They are the only ones who can
decide when and how to build the foundations of marriage. The spouses alone are
the engineers of their marital life. They are simultaneously the directors and actors
of their matrimonial true-to-life play. Hence, they alone can and should decide
when to take a cut, but only in accordance with the grounds allowed by law.
not mean that the compulsory or intestate heirs are without any recourse under the
law. They can still protect their successional right, for, as stated in the Rationale of
the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages, compulsory or intestate heirs can still question the
validity of the marriage of the spouses, not in a proceeding for declaration of
nullity but upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the
estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts.635[19]
It is emphasized, however, that the Rule does not apply to cases already
commenced before March 15, 2003 although the marriage involved is within the
coverage of the Family Code. This is so, as the new Rule which became effective
on March 15, 2003636[20] is prospective in its application. Thus, the Court held in
Enrico v. Heirs of Sps. Medinaceli,637[21] viz.:
636[20] A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages.SEC. 25. Effectivity. This Rule shall take effect on March 15,
2003 following its publication in a newspaper of general circulation not later than March 7,
2003.
The marriage having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family
Code, the applicable law is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time
of its celebration.640[24] But the Civil Code is silent as to who may bring an action
to declare the marriage void. Does this mean that any person can bring an action
for the declaration of nullity of marriage?
procedural law that every action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of
the real party-in-interest.642[26]
Interest within the meaning of the rule means material interest or an interest
in issue to be affected by the decree or judgment of the case, as distinguished from
mere curiosity about the question involved or a mere incidental interest. One
having no material interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as
plaintiff in an action. When plaintiff is not the real party-in-interest, the case is
dismissible on the ground of lack of cause of action.643[27]
641[25] Republic v. Agunoy, Sr., G.R. No. 155394, February 17, 2005, 451 SCRA 735,
746.
642[26] Oco v. Limbaring, G.R. No. 161298, January 31, 2006, 481 SCRA 348.
643[27] Id. at 358, citing Abella, Jr. v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 152574,
November 17, 2004, 442 SCRA 507, 521; Pascual v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
115925, August 15, 2003, 409 SCRA 105, 117; and Bank of America NT & SA v.
Court of Appeals, 448 Phil. 181, 194-195 (2003); Borlongan v. Madrideo, 380 Phil.
215, 224 (2000); Mathay v. Court of Appeals, 378 Phil. 466, 482 (1999); Ralla v.
Ralla, G.R. No. 78646, July 23, 1991, 199 SCRA 495, 499; Rebollido v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 81123, February 28, 1989, 170 SCRA 800, 806; Chua v. Torres,
G.R. No. 151900, August 30, 2005, 468 SCRA 358, citing Tan v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 127210, August 7, 2003, 408 SCRA 470, 475-76; citing in turn University of
the Philippines Board of Regents v. Ligot-Telan, G.R. No. 110280, October 21, 1993,
227 SCRA 342, 355; Ralla v. Ralla, supra; Rebollido v. Court of Appeals, supra;
Shipside, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 143377, February 20, 2001, 352 SCRA
334, 346, in turn citing Pioneer Insurance & Surety Corporation v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. Nos. 84197 & 84157, July 18, 1989, 175 SCRA 668.
True, under the New Civil Code which is the law in force at the time the
respondents were married, or even in the Family Code, there is no specific
provision as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of marriage; however,
only a party who can demonstrate proper interest can file the same. A petition to
declare the nullity of marriage, like any other actions, must be prosecuted or
defended in the name of the real party-in-interest and must be based on a cause of
action. Thus, in Nial v. Badayog, the Court held that the children have the
personality to file the petition to declare the nullity of marriage of their deceased
father to their stepmother as it affects their successional rights.
xxxx
In the case at bench, the records reveal that when Teofilo died intestate in 1992, his
only surviving compulsory heirs are respondent Felicidad and their son, Teofilo II.
Under the law on succession, successional rights are transmitted from the moment
of death of the decedent and the compulsory heirs are called to succeed by
operation of law.646[30]
to
his
compulsory
heirs.
These
heirs
were
Article 887 of the Civil Code outlined who are compulsory heirs, to wit:
(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate parents
and ascendants;
(2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants, with respect to
their legitimate children and descendants;
(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in Article 287 of the Civil Code.647[31]
Clearly, a brother is not among those considered as compulsory heirs. But although
a collateral relative, such as a brother, does not fall within the ambit of a
compulsory heir, he still has a right to succeed to the estate. Articles 1001 and 1003
of the New Civil Code provide:
647[31] Paragraphs 4 & 5 are no longer controlling. The distinctions among different
classes of illegitimate children under the Civil Code have been removed. All of them
fall in the category of illegitimate children, as provided under Article 165 of the Family
Code:Article 165. Children conceived and born outside a valid marriage are
illegitimate, unless otherwise provided in this Code.
ART. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the
widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and
the brothers and sisters or their children to the other half.
The records reveal that Teofilo was predeceased by his parents. He had no
other siblings but petitioner. Thus, if Teofilo II is finally found and proven to be not
a legitimate, illegitimate, or adopted son of Teofilo, petitioner succeeds to the other
half of the estate of his brother, the first half being allotted to the widow pursuant
to Article 1001 of the New Civil Code. This makes petitioner a real-party-interest
to seek the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage of his deceased brother with
respondent Felicidad. If the subject marriage is found to be void ab initio,
petitioner succeeds to the entire estate.
Thus, the Court finds that a remand of the case for trial on the merits to
determine the validity or nullity of the subject marriage is called for. But the RTC
is strictly instructed to dismiss the nullity of marriage case for lack of cause of
action if it is proven by evidence that Teofilo II is a legitimate, illegitimate, or
legally adopted son of Teofilo Carlos, the deceased brother of petitioner.
Petitioner did not assign as error or interpose as issue the ruling of the CA on the
remand of the case concerning the filiation of respondent Teofilo II. This
notwithstanding, We should not leave the matter hanging in limbo.
This Court has the authority to review matters not specifically raised or
assigned as error by the parties, if their consideration is necessary in arriving at a
just resolution of the case.652[36]
We agree with the CA that without trial on the merits having been conducted in the
case, petitioners bare allegation that respondent Teofilo II was adopted from an
indigent couple is insufficient to support a total forfeiture of rights arising from his
putative filiation. However, We are not inclined to support its pronouncement that
the declaration of respondent Felicidad as to the illegitimate filiation of respondent
Teofilo II is more credible. For the guidance of the appellate court, such
declaration of respondent Felicidad should not be afforded credence. We remind
the CA of the guaranty provided by Article 167 of the Family Code to protect the
status of legitimacy of a child, to wit:
legitimacy of her child cannot affect the legitimacy of a child born or conceived
within a valid marriage.653[37]
Finally, the disposition of the trial court in favor of petitioner for causes of action
concerning reconveyance, recovery of property, and sum of money must be
vacated. This has to be so, as said disposition was made on the basis of its finding
that the marriage in controversy was null and void ab initio.
1.
2.
653[37] Concepcion v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123450, August 31, 2005, 468
SCRA 438.
3.
The Regional Trial Court is ORDERED to conduct trial on the merits with
dispatch and to give this case priority in its calendar.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ATTESTATION
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
FIRST DIVISION
MANUEL L. LEE,
Complainant,
Present:
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
-versus-
CORONA,
AZCUNA and
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, JJ.
Promulgated:
February 12, 2008
x------------------------------------------ - - - - - - - -x
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
658[5] Id., p. 1.
Doc. 14, Page No. 4, Book No. 1, Series of 1965 refers to an AFFIDAVIT
executed by BARTOLOME RAMIREZ on June 30, 1965 and is available in
this Office[s] files.659[6]
659[6] Rollo, p. 9.
660[7] Dated July 11, 2001. Id., p. 94.
661[8] Dated July 11, 2001. Id., p. 95.
662[9] Id., p. 90.
In
his
report,
the
investigating
commissioner
found
The IBP Board of Governors, in its Resolution No. XVII-2006285 dated May 26, 2006, resolved:
fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and
rules, and considering Respondents failure to comply with the laws in
the discharge of his function as a notary public, Atty. Regino B.
Tambago is hereby suspended from the practice of law for one year
and Respondents notarial commission is Revoked and Disqualified
from reappointment as Notary Public for two (2) years. 667[14]
As
the
acknowledging
officer
of
the
contested
will,
certificate
upon
notarization
of
document
or
instrument:
[cedula] residence certificate or are exempt from the [cedula] residence tax, and
there shall be entered by the notary public as a part of such certificate the number,
place of issue, and date of each [cedula] residence certificate as aforesaid.678[25]
When a person liable to the taxes prescribed in this Act acknowledges any
document before a notary public xxx it shall be the duty of such person xxx with
whom such transaction is had or business done, to require the exhibition of the
residence certificate showing payment of the residence taxes by such person xxx.
register. The old Notarial Law required the entry of the following
matters in the notarial register, in chronological order:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
his
claim,
he
presented
photocopy
of
680[27] REVISED ADMINISTRATIVE CODE, Book I, Title IV, Chapter 11, Sec. 246.
will
not
be
admitted.
Thus,
the
photocopy
of
contents.687[34]
Accordingly,
respondent
must
be
held
accountable for his acts. The validity of the will was seriously
compromised as a consequence of his breach of duty. 688[35]
xxx
(b)
xxx
xxx
(f)
xxx
xxx
xxx
to
uphold the
society
has
entrusted
the
administration
of
law
and
the
dispensation of justice.694[41]
While the duty to uphold the Constitution and obey the law is
an obligation imposed on every citizen, a lawyer assumes
responsibilities well beyond the basic requirements of good
citizenship. As a servant of the law, a lawyer should moreover
make himself an example for others to emulate. 695[42] Being a
lawyer, he is supposed to be a model in the community in so far
as respect for the law is concerned. 696[43]
Disbarment
is
the
most
severe
form
of
disciplinary
698[45] Guidelines for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, Integrated Bar of the Philippines
Commission on Bar Discipline.
699[46] San Jose Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Romanillos, A.C. No. 5580, 15 June
2005, 460 SCRA 105.
700[47] Santiago v Rafanan, supra note 22 at 101. Alitagtag v. Garcia, A.C. No.
4738, 10 June 2003, 403 SCRA 335.
701[48] Suzuki v. Tiamson, A.C. No. 6542, 30 September 2005, 471 SCRA 140;
Amaya v. Tecson, A.C. No. 5996, 7 February 2005, 450 SCRA 510, 516.
702[49] Bantolo v. Castillon, Jr., A.C. No. 6589, 19 December 2005, 478 SCRA 449.
as
well,
commission703[50]
sufficient
and
his
basis
for
perpetual
the
revocation
of
his
disqualification
to
be
SO ORDERED.
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Chairperson
Associate Justice
SECOND DIVISION
PAZ SAMANIEGO-CELADA,
Petitioner,
Present:
- versus -
QUISUMBING,
Chairperson,
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA,
VELASCO, JR., and
BRION, JJ.
LUCIA D. ABENA,
Promulgated:
J.,
Respondent.
June 30, 2008
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure seeking to reverse the Decision 705[1] dated
October 13, 2000 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
41756, which affirmed the Decision706[2] dated March 2, 1993 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 66, Makati City. The RTC had
declared the last will and testament of Margarita S. Mayores
probated and designated respondent Lucia D. Abena as the
executor of her will. It also ordered the issuance of letters
testamentary in favor of respondent.
The facts are as follows:
Petitioner Paz Samaniego-Celada was the first cousin of
decedent Margarita S. Mayores (Margarita) while respondent was
705[1] Rollo, pp. 41-48. Penned by Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr., with Associate
Justices Salvador J. Valdez, Jr. and Eliezer R. delos Santos concurring.
706[2] Id. at 34-40. Penned by Judge Eriberto U. Rosario, Jr.
Samaniego-Bombay,
Manuelita
Samaniego
Sajonia,
2)
3)
So ordered.708[4]
SO ORDERED.709[5]
712[8] Art. 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end
thereof by the testator himself or by the testators name written by some other person in his
presence, and by his express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible
witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another.The testator or the person
requested by him to write his name and the instrumental witnesses of the will, shall also sign,
as aforesaid, each and every page thereof, except the last, on the left margin, and all the pages
shall be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each page.
The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon which the will is written, and the
fact that the testator signed the will and every page thereof, or caused some other person to
write his name, under his express direction, in the presence of the instrumental witnesses, and
that the latter witnessed and signed the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the
testator and of one another.
If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the witnesses, it shall be interpreted to
them.
713[9] Art. 1009. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters nor children of brothers or
sisters, the other collateral relatives shall succeed to the estate. The latter shall succeed
without distinction of lines or preference among them by reason of relationship by the whole
blood.
714[10] Art. 1010. The right to inherit ab intestato shall not extend beyond the fifth
degree of relationship in the collateral line.
715[11] Rollo, pp. 108-111.
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10) When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on
the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the
evidence on record.717[13]
719[15] Art. 887. The following are compulsory heirs: (1) Legitimate
descendants, with respect to their legitimate parents and ascendants;
children
and
(2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants, with respect to their
legitimate
children and descendants;
LEONARDO A.
QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO,
JR.
Associate Justice
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
LEONARDO A.
QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
FERNANDO, J.:
A constitutional question with an element of novelty is raised in this appeal from a lower court order dismissing an action for certiorari and prohibition against the then respondent
Fiscal of Rizal, Benjamin H. Aquino, to prevent him from conducting a preliminary investigation. It is whether there is an encroachment on the constitutional prerogatives of the
Auditor General if, after the final approval of certain vouchers by him without an appeal being made, an inquiry by a provincial fiscal to determine whether criminal liability for
malversation through falsification of public, official and commercial documents based thereon could lawfully be conducted. The lower court that a prosecutor could, without offending
the constitutional grant of authority to the Auditor General, do so. We therefore affirm. In the certiorari and prohibition proceeding filed with the lower court on June 6, 1967,
1
petitioners, now appellants, assailed the jurisdiction of cases Benjamin Aquino, then Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, to conduct the preliminary
investigation of the alleged commission of malversation through falsification of public, official and commercial documents imputed to
them by the other respondent, then the Commanding General, Philippine Army, Fort Bonifacio, Rizal, Romeo Espino. The basis for such
a motion was that under the Constitution, the Auditor General is not only vested with the duty to examine or audit all expenditures of
funds of the Government, but also to audit or investigate and "bring to the attention of the proper administrative officer expenditures of
funds or property which in his opinion are irregular, unnecessary, excessive, or extravagant." It is their contention that under the above,
it is incumbent on the Auditor General to determine whether criminal responsibility for the anomaly discovered in the courage of his
audit or examination of the accounts lies. It was further contended that the decisions of the Auditor-General on the correctness of the
vouchers on which the alleged of cases were based having become final and irrevocable, not even the courts could substitute its
findings. Otherwise the provision of law that vouchers, claims or accounts "once finally settled shall in no case be opened or reviewed
except as herein provided" would be meaningless if the army authorities and respondent Fiscal were permitted to proceed with the
preliminary investigation to determine whether criminal case could be filed. 2
The above legal objections were brought to the attention of the then cases Provincial Fiscal by petitioners in a motion to quash which
was denied by him in a resolution of May 23, 1967 on this ground: "The exclusive jurisdiction of the Auditor General on matters now
raised by respondents refer to auditorial requirements and approval but not to the criminal liability, if any, of the persons involved in an
alleged irregular or anomalous disbursement of public funds. The authority of the Fiscal to investigate whether a criminal act has been
committed or not in the disbursement of public funds, and finally of the Courts to try any person involved in the alleged malversation of
public funds is not curtailed or in any way divested by the administrative findings of the Auditor General. To hold otherwise would be to
arrogate unto the Office of the Auditor General the power which pertains to the judicial branch of the government." 3
Then came thus petition before the lower court, petitioners praying for a judgment annulling aforesaid resolution of cases Provincial
Fiscal denying their motion to quash, rendering judgment that he was without petition to conduct such preliminary investigation and
prohibiting him from further proceeding on the matter. 4 On November 2, 1967, there was a motion to dismiss by respondent Provincial
Fiscal based on the argument that the amounts subject to the criminal cases were not closed and settled accounts and that even if they
were such, respondent Fiscal could still institute the appropriation criminal action, there being no need for a certification by the Auditor
General as to any irregularity in the settlement of accounts as an essential element for a criminal prosecution in malversation cases.
After an opposition was filed by petitioner to the aforesaid motion to dismiss on November 21, 1967, the lower court, in an order of
December 20, 1967, dismissed the petition. In support of such an order, it was set forth in such order of dismissal: "The Provincial
Fiscal is only studying whether or not, as complained of, from these accounts or vouchers which have already been passed in audit by
the Auditor General or his representatives more than three years ago, there is a crime to be prosecuted in which the petitioners are
answerable. 5 It was further emphasized: Were the theory of the petitioners to prevail, then the Auditor General will be arrogating unto
himself duties which pertain to the judicial branch of the government. 6 The last ground on which the plea that the prohibition be
dismissed was sustained the principle that one "cannot restrain the Fiscal, by means of injunction from prosecuting [this] case ...." 7
The matter was duly elevated on appeal to this Court on January 3, 1968. The brief for petitioners appellants was filed on March 6 of
that year. With the submission of the brief for respondents as appellants on May 3, 1968, the appeal was deemed submitted. As set
forth at the outset, there is no legal ground for reversing the lower court.
1. Appellants, in their brief, reiterate their principal argument that the order of the lower court dismissing their motion and thus allowing
their investigation by cases Fiscal to proceed, did amount to an encroachment on the constitutional prerogatives of the Auditor General.
Such a contention lacks merit. It betrays on its face a lack of understanding of the constitutional provision relied upon. The Auditor
General, as noted, is vested with the power to examine, audit and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenues and receipts from
whatever source, and to audit, in accordance with law and administrative regulations" all expenditures of funds or property pertaining to
or held in trust by the government as well as the provinces or municipalities thereof. 8 That is one thing. The ascertainment of whether a
crime committed and by whom is definitely another.
There is thus a manifest failure on the part of appellants to appreciate correctly the constitutional objective in the conferment of
authority on the Auditor General. It is based on the fundamental postulate that in the division of powers, the control over the purse
remains with the legislative branch. There is the explicit requirement then that there be no expenditure of public founds except in
pursuance of an appropriation made by law. 9 There is need, therefore, for an enactment to permit disbursement from the public
treasury. Nor does fidelity to this constitutional mandated end there. There must be compliance with the terms of the statute. If it were
not so to, the extent that there is a deviation, there is a frustration of the legislative will. It is obvious that Congress itself is not in a
position to oversee and supervise the actual release of each and every appropriation. That is where the Auditor General comes in. It is
the responsibility of his office to exact obedience to any law that allows the expenditure of public funds. He serves as the necessary
check to make certain that no department of the government, especially its main spending arm, the Executive, exceeds the statutory
limits of the appropriation to which it is entitled. That is the purpose and end calling for the creation of such an office, certainly not the
enforcement of criminal statutes.
So it has been made clear by the then Delegate, later President, Manuel Roxas in the Constitutional Convention of 1934. To the
question as to the method or means to determine whether public funds are spent in accordance with the congressional will, this was his
answer: "The only means provided in our Constitution, as in the constitutions in other countries, is the office of the auditor; therefore, if
the auditor is a check on the Executive, it is not wise to make the auditor depend on the Executive. For another ways, the Executive, if
he is able to influence the auditor, may spent the proper checking of the expenditures of the public money." 10 For such a dignitary to live
up to such grave responsibility, he must, according to Delegate Roxas, be independent, not only of the President but even of Congress,
even if he were in a true and vital sense fulfilling a task appertaining to it. Thus, "In the United States while the auditor is appointed by
the President with the advice and consent of the United States Senate, the office is kept as an independent office independent [of]
the Executive and independent [of] the Legislature, because he has not only to check the accounts of the Executive, but also the
accounts of the Legislature ...." 11
It could be that appellants were not completely oblivious to the force of the observations. They therefore did seek to lend plausibility to
their contention with reminder that there is likewise included in the constitutional provision in question the task incumbent on the Auditor
General to "bring forth the attention of the proper administrative officer expenditures of funds or property which, in his opinion, are
irregular, unnecessary, excessive, or extravagant." From which, by a process of construction rather latitudinarian in character, they
would imply that on the Auditor General alone rests the determination of whether or not criminal liability is incurred for any anomaly
discovered in the course of his audit or examination. Such a conclusion is at war with the controlling doctrine. As construed in Guevara
v. Gimenez, 12 at most such a duty goes no further then requiring him to call the attention of the proper administrative officer of the
existence of such a situation but does not even extend to the power "to refuse and disapprove payment of such expenditures, ...." 13
Much less then could it justify the assertion devoid of any legal justification that even, the ascertainment of any possible criminal liability
is likewise a part and parcel of such constitutional competence of the Auditor General. How, then, can it be said that their plea is
thereby strengthened?
There is likewise an invocation by appellants of alleged statutory support for their untenable view. It is likewise in vain. All that
appellants have to go on is the concluding paragraph of section 657 of the Revised Administrative Code: "Accounts once finally settled
shall in no case be opened or reviewed except as herein provided." The paragraph immediately preceding should have disabused the
minds of appellants of any cause for optimism. All that set it provides for is that in case any settled account "appears to be infected with
fraud, collusion or error of calculation or when new and material evidence is discovered, the Auditor General may within three years
after original settlement, open such account, and after a reasonable time for his reply or appearance, may certify thereon a new
balance." The official given the opportunity for a reply or appearance is the provincial auditor, for under the first paragraph of this
particular section, the Auditor General at any time before the expiration of three years and the making of any settlement by a provincial
auditor, may, of his own motion, review and revise the same and certify a new balance. Nowhere does it appear that such a statutory
grant of authority of the Auditor General to open revised accounts carries with it the power to determine who may be constituted in the
event that in the preparation thereof a crime has been committed. The conclusive effect of the finality of his decision on the execution of
branch of the government thus relates solely to the administrative aspect of the matter. 14
From the constitutional, no less than the statutory standpoint then, this claim of appellants finds no support. It has nothing but novelty to
call for any attention being paid to it. It is singularly unpersuasive. To repeat, it would be to stretch to unwarranted limits the
constitutional power thus conferred on the Auditor General to accede to such a plea. Nothing is better settled than that, broad and
comprehensive as it is, it does not include a participation in the investigation of charges to determine whether or not a criminal
prosecution should be instituted. 15 Thus, the first two errors of the appellants which would impugn the order of dismissal for reaching a
similar conclusion are disposed of.
2. The third assigned error by appellants would find fault with the lower court's reliance on the well-settled doctrine that as a general
principle, no action lies to enjoin fiscals from conducting investigations to ascertain whether an offense has been committed. To
demonstrate its equally groundless character, it suffices to refer to Ramos v. Torres, 16 dismissing an original action for prohibition
instituted, by five of the six petitioners, now appellants, 17 to cut short further proceedings on an information accusing them of
malversation through falsification of public and commercial documents. In the opinion of the present Chief Justice, it is emphatically
affirmed: "Upon a review of the record, we are satisfied that petitioners herein have not established their right to the writ prayed for.
Indeed, it is well-settled that, as a matter of general rule, the writ of prohibition will not issue to restrain criminal prosecution." 18 An
excerpt from the opinion of Justice Sanchez in Hernandez v. Albano 19 was then quoted. Thus: "Agreeably to the foregoing, a rule now
of long standing and frequent application was formulated that ordinarily criminal prosecution may not be blocked by court prohibition or
injunction. Really, if at every turn investigation of a crime will be halted by a court order, the administration of criminal justice will meet
with an undue setback. Indeed, the investigative power of the Fiscal may suffer such a tremendous shrinkage that it may end up in
hollow sound rather than as a part and parcel of the machinery of criminal justice." 20 Nor is the accused person thereby left unprotected
for, as was noted by the Chief Justice, referring to Gorospe v. Peaflorida, 21 he could defend himself from any possible prosecution by
establishing that he did not commit the act charged or that the statute or ordinance on which the prosecution is based is invalid or in the
event of conviction, he could appeal. While the general rule admits of exceptions, no showing has been made that petitioners
appropriately invoke them. As they failed in their previous action of prohibition in Ramos v. Torres, so they must now.
WHEREFORE, the appealed order of the lower court of December 20, 1967 dismissing the petitioners' action for certiorari and
prohibition is affirmed. With costs against petitioner-appellants.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Teehankee, Villamor and Makasiar, JJ, concur.
Footnotes
1 Except for petitioner Andres Ascueta, who is not a party, the other petitioners were identified in a previous case Ramos v. Torres, L-23454, Oct. 25,
1968, 25 SCRA 557 thus: "Petitioners herein are Edilberto M. Ramos, Pagano Capalongan, Victorino B. Reyes, Andres Atienza, Consorcia Joven,
Jose Joaquin and Andres Ascueta. All of them are army personnel, working, with the exception of the last, in the Finance Service of the Philippine
Army, the first as Colonel and Chief of said service, the second as Major and Chief of the Audit and Fiscal Branch thereof, the third as Captain and
Officer-in-Charge of its Audit on the fourth as Captain, in charge of pre-auditing and processing commercial vouchers, the fifth as Audit Examiner,
and the sixth as Clerk in charge of processing vouchers." At p. 558. Andres Atienza is not a petitioner in this suit.
2 For the requisite statutory support for the above view, petitioners invoke Section 657 of the Administrative Code which reads: "Power of Auditor to
open and settled accounts. At any time before the expiration of three years after the making of any settlement by a provincial auditor, the Auditor
General may, on his own motion, review and revise the same and certify a new balance. For such purpose he may require any account, vouchers,
or other papers connected with the matter to be forwarded to him. When any settled account appears to be infected with fraud, collusion, or error of
calculation, or when new and material evidence is discovered, the Auditor General may, within three years after original settlement, open such
account, and after a reasonable time for his reply or appearance, may certify thereon a new balance. A provincial auditor may exercise the same
power in respect to settled accounts pertaining to the branches of the Government under his jurisdiction. Accounts once finally settled shall in no
case be opened or reviewed except as herein provided." Cf. Petition before the lower court, pars. 5 and 8.
3 Ibid, par. 6, referring to Annex B thereof.
4 Ibid, petitory part.
5 Order, Record on Appeal, pp. 77-78.
6 Ibid, p. 78.
7 Ibid.
8 "The constitutional provision reads in full: "The Auditor General shall examine, audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenues and
receipts from whatever source, including trust funds derived from bond issues; and audit, in accordance with law and administrative regulations, all
expenditures of funds of property pertaining to or held in trust by the Government or the provinces or municipalities thereof. He shall keep the
general accounts of the Government and preserve the vouchers pertaining thereto. It shall be the duty of the Auditor General to bring to the attention
of the proper administrative officer expenditures of funds or property which in his opinion, are irregular, unnecessary, excessive, or extravagant. He
shall also perform such other functions as may be prescribed by law." Art. XI, Sec. 2, Constitution. "According to the Constitution:
"No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law."
9 According to the constitution: "No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law." Art. VI, sec. 23,
par. 2.
10 V Laurel, Proceedings of the Philippine Constitutional Convention, 636 (1967).
11 Ibid, p. 637.
12 L-17115, Nov. 30, 1962, 6 SCRA 807.
13 Ibid, p. 813. The authoritative excerpt from the opinion of the present Chief Justice reads as follows: "Under our Constitution, the authority of the
Auditor General, in connection with expenditures of the Government is limited to the auditing of expenditures of funds or property pertaining to, or
held in trust by, the Government or the provinces or municipalities thereof (Article XI, section 2, of the Constitution). Such function is limited to a
determination of whether there is a law appropriating funds for a given purpose; whether a contract, made by the proper officer, has been entered
into in conformity with said appropriation law; whether the goods or services covered by said contract have been delivered or rendered in pursuance
of the provisions thereof, as attested to by the proper officer; and whether payment therefor has been authorized by the officials of the
corresponding department or bureau. If these requirements have been fulfilled, it is the ministerial duty of the Auditor General to approve and pass
in audit the voucher and treasury warrant for said payment. He has no discretion or authority to disapprove said payment upon the ground that the
aforementioned contract was unwise or that the amount stipulated thereon is unreasonable. If he entertains such belief, he may do no more than
discharge the duty imposed upon him by the Constitution (Article XI, section 2), 'to bring to the attention of the proper administrative officer
expenditures of funds or property which, in his opinion, are irregular, unnecessary, excessive or extravagant'. This duty implies a negation of the
power to refuse and disapprove payment of such expenditures, for its disapproval, if he had authority therefor, would bring to the attention of the
aforementioned administrative officer the reason for the adverse action thus taken by the General Auditing Office, and, hence, render the imposition
of said duty unnecessary."
14 Section 655 of the Administrative Code reads as follows: "Finality of decision by Auditor. A decision of the Auditor General or of a provincial
auditor upon any matter within their respective powers shall be conclusive upon the executive branches of the Government, subject to appeal or
review as hereinafter provided."
15 Cf Guevara v. Gimenez, L-17115, Nov. 30, 1962, 6 SCRA 807; Villegas v. Auditor General, L-21352, Nov. 29, 1966, 18 SCRA 877; Resins, Inc. v.
Auditor General, L-17888, Oct. 29, 1968, 25 SCRA 754.
16 L-23454, Oct. 25, 1968, 25 SCRA 557.
17 Vide fn 1.
18 Ibid, p. 563. Six cases were referred to by the Chief Justice, starting from Kwong Sing v. City of Manila, 41 Phil. 103 (1920); where the doctrine
was first announced through Justice Malcolm. The other cases follow: Gorospe v. Peaflorida, 101 Phil. 886 (1957); University of the Philippines v.
City Fiscal of Quezon City, L-18562, July 31, 1961, 2 SCRA 980; Tadeo v. Provincial Fiscal, L-16474, January 31, 1962, 4 SCRA 235; Grifien v.
Consolacion, L-16050, July 31, 1962, 5 SCRA 722; Lava v. Gonzales, L-23084, July 31, 1964, 11 SCRA 650. People v. Mencias, L-19633, Nov. 28,
1966, 18 SCRA 807, may also be cited.
19 L-19272, January 25, 1967, 19 SCRA 95.
20 Ibid, p. 98.
21 101 Phil. 886 (1957).
THIRD DIVISION
Petitioners,720[1]
720[1] The case before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 4, is entitled
Trusteeship of the Estate of Doa Margarita Rodriguez v. Jesus Ayala and Lorenzo
Rodriguez. In the present petition filed by petitioners, they erroneously designate
the petitioner as the Trusteeship of the Estate of Doa Margarita Rodriguez v. Jesus
Ayala and Lorenzo Rodriguez, the executors of the estate. The title of the present
petition should reflect the actual petitioners, and the Trusteeship of the Estate of
Doa Margarita Rodriguez, represented by the executors, as the respondent.
Present:
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
- versus -
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA, and
TRUSTEESHIP OF THE ESTATE
OF DOA MARGARITA
RODRIGUEZ,
Respondent.
PERALTA, JJ.
Promulgated:
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
xxxx
xxxx
xxxx
xxxx
xxxx
CLAUSULA VIGESIMA CUARTA O PANG-DALAWANGPU AT APAT: Ipinaguutos ko sa aking manga Tagapangasiwa na sa fondong
ipinapasok sa Banco para sa gastos ng Nia Maria, Misa at iba pa,
kukuha sila na kakailanganin para maitulong sa manga sumusunod:
Florentina Luna, Roberta Ponce, Marciada Ponce, Benita Ponce,
Constancia Pineda, Regino Pineda, Tomas Payumo, Rosito Payumo,
xxxx
Even with the purpose that the testatrix had in mind were not as
unequivocal, still the same conclusion emerges. There is no room for
intestacy as would be the effect if the challenged resolution of January
8, 1968 were not set aside. The wishes of the testatrix constitute the
law. Her will must be given effect. This is so even if there could be an
element of uncertainty insofar as the ascertainment thereof is
concerned. In the language of a Civil Code provision: If a testamentary
disposition admits of different interpretations, in case of doubt, that
interpretation by which the disposition is to be operative shall be
preferred. Nor is this all. A later article of the Civil Code equally calls for
observance. Thus: The words of a will are to receive an interpretation
which will give to every expression some effect, rather than one which
will render any of the expressions inoperative; and of two modes of
interpreting a will, that is to be preferred which will prevent intestacy.
xxxx
725[6] Art. 870. The dispositions of the testator declaring all or part of the estate
inalienable for more than twenty years are void.
The wishes of the testatrix constitute the law. Her will must be
given effect. This is even if there could be an element of uncertainty
insofar as the ascertainment thereof is concerned. This Court so
emphatically expressed it in a decision rendered more than sixty years
ago. Thus, respect for the will of a testator as [an] expression of his
last testamentary disposition, constitutes the principal basis of the
rules which the law prescribes for the correct interpretation of all of the
clauses of the will; the words and provision therein written must be
plainly construed in order to avoid a violation of his intentions and real
purpose. The will of the testator clearly and explicitly stated must be
respected and complied with as an inviolable law among the parties in
interest. Such is the doctrine established by the Supreme Court of
Spain, constantly maintained in a great number of decisions.
1.
WHETHER THE TRUSTEESHIP OVER THE PROPERTIES LEFT BY
DOA MARGARITA RODRIGUEZ CAN BE DISSOLVED APPLYING ARTICLES
867 AND 870 OF THE CIVIL CODE.
2.
WHETHER THE LOWER COURT IS CORRECT IN STATING THAT THE
ABOVE-CITED PROVISIONS OF THE CIVIL CODE FINDS NO APPLICATION
IN THE PRESENT MOTION TO DISSOLVE THE TRUST CREATED BY THE
TESTATRIX.
3.
CONCOMITANT THERETO, [WHETHER] THE LOWER COURT [IS]
CORRECT IN APPLYING ARTICLE 1013 PARAGRAPH 4 OF THE CIVIL
CODE.730[11]
is
the
creation
of
perpetual
trust
for
the
In
all,
the
decedent
did
not
contemplate
the
We disagree.
2.
4.
xxxx
xxxx
(2)
When the will does not institute an heir to, or dispose of
all the property belonging to the testator. In such case, legal
succession shall take place only with respect to the property of which
the testator has not disposed;
xxx
succession.
testamentary
provision
The
article
which
did
does
not
not
cure
institute
void
an
heir.
Article 870 of the New Civil Code, which regards as void any
disposition of the testator declaring all or part of the estate inalienable
for more than 20 years, is not violated by the trust constituted by the
late Luis Palad; because the will of the testator does not interdict the
alienation of the parcels devised. The will merely directs that the
income of said two parcels be utilized for the establishment,
maintenance and operation of the high school.
properties which were definitely more than the two (2) properties
in the aforecited case. The herein testatrixs large landholdings
cannot be subjected indefinitely to a trust because the ownership
thereof would then effectively remain with her even in the
afterlife.
The
properties
listed
in
Clause
10
of
the
will,
constituting the perpetual trust, which are still within reach and
have not been disposed of as yet; and
2.
means
that
the
probate
court
should
now
make
WHEREFORE,
premises
considered,
the
petition
is
1.
SO ORDERED.
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
MINITA V. CHICONAZARIO
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO,
JR.
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
THIRD DIVISION
NARANJA-RUBINOS, NILDA
NARANJA-LIMANA, and NAIDA
NARANJA-GICANO,
Present:
Petitioners,
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
- versus -
Chairperson,
COURT OF APPEALS, LUCILIA P.
BELARDO, represented by her
Attorney-in-Fact, REBECCA
CORDERO, and THE LOCAL
REGISTER OF DEEDS, BACOLOD
CITY,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
NACHURA, and
PERALTA, JJ.
Respondents.
Promulgated:
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
738[2] Penned by Associate Justice Amelita G. Tolentino, with Associate Justices Edgardo P.
Cruz and Sergio L. Pestao, concurring; rollo, pp. 31-32.
(SGD.)
ROQUE NARANJA742[6]
Roques copies of TCT No. T-18764 and TCT No. T-18762 were
entrusted to Atty. Sanicas for registration of the deed of sale and
transfer of the titles to Belardo. But the deed of sale could not be
registered because Belardo did not have the money to pay for the
registration fees.743[7]
Rebecca
with
Cordero,
damages.
The
instituted
suit
complaint
prayed
for
that
Subsequently,
petitioners
also
filed
case
against
1.
2.
a)
Declaring the Deed of Sale dated August 21,
1981, executed by Roque Naranja, covering his one-third (1/3)
share of Lot 2 of the consolidation-subdivision plan (LRC) Pcs886, being a portion of the consolidation of Lots 240-A, 240-B,
240-C and 240-D, described on plan, Psd-33443 (LRC) GLRO
Cad. Rec. No. 55 in favor of Lucilia Belardo, and entered as Doc.
No. 80, Page 17, Book No. XXXVI, Series of 1981 of Notary Public
b)
Ordering the Register of Deeds of Bacolod City to
cancel Entry No. 148123 annotate at the back of Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-18762;
c)
Ordering Lucilia Belardo or her successors-ininterest to pay plaintiffs the sum of P20,000.00 as attorneys
fees, the amount of P500.00 as appearance fees.
SO ORDERED.752[16]
SO ORDERED.753[17]
1.
2.
In
her
Comment,
private
respondent
questioned
the
sale under Article 1458 of the Civil Code are: (1) consent or
meeting of the minds; (2) determinate subject matter; and (3)
price certain in money or its equivalent.
notarized
document
carries
the
evidentiary
weight
otherwise,
the
latters
presumed
consent
to
the
contract
acknowledge
to
my
entire
satisfaction
is
an
Heirs
are
bound
by
contracts
entered
into
by
their
inherited.
The
deed
of
extrajudicial
settlement
that
petitioners executed over Lot No. 4 is, therefore, void, since the
property subject thereof did not become part of Roques estate.
SO ORDERED.
766[30] CIVIL CODE, Art. 1311; Santos v. Lumbao, G.R. No. 169129, March 28, 2007,
519 SCRA 408, 430.
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
Associate Justice
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
SECOND DIVISION
Present:
NACHURA,
ABAD,
MENDOZA, and
SERENO,* JJ.
ERNESTO PALAGANAS,
Respondent.
Promulgated:
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
This case is about the probate before Philippine court of a will executed
abroad by a foreigner although it has not been probated in its place of execution.
for the probate of Rupertas will and for his appointment as special administrator of
her estate.767[1] On October 15, 2003, however, petitioners Manuel Miguel
Palaganas (Manuel) and Benjamin Gregorio Palaganas (Benjamin), nephews of
Ruperta, opposed the petition on the ground that Rupertas will should not be
probated in the Philippines but in the U.S. where she executed it. Manuel and
Benjamin added that, assuming Rupertas will could be probated in the Philippines, it
is invalid nonetheless for having been executed under duress and without the
testators full understanding of the consequences of such act. Ernesto, they claimed,
is also not qualified to act as administrator of the estate.
Meantime, since Rupertas foreign-based siblings, Gloria Villaluz and Sergio, were on
separate occasions in the Philippines for a short visit, respondent Ernesto filed a
motion with the RTC for leave to take their deposition, which it granted. On April, 13,
2004 the RTC directed the parties to submit their memorandum on the issue of
whether or not Rupertas U.S. will may be probated in and allowed by a court in the
Philippines.
On June 17, 2004 the RTC issued an order: 768[2] (a) admitting to probate
Rupertas last will; (b) appointing respondent Ernesto as special administrator at the
request of Sergio, the U.S.-based executor designated in the will; and (c) issuing the
Letters of Special Administration to Ernesto.
Aggrieved by the RTCs order, petitioner nephews Manuel and Benjamin appealed to
the Court of Appeals (CA),769[3] arguing that an unprobated will executed by an
American citizen in the U.S. cannot be probated for the first time in the Philippines.
On July 29, 2005 the CA rendered a decision, 770[4] affirming the assailed order of
the RTC,771[5] holding that the RTC properly allowed the probate of the will, subject
to respondent Ernestos submission of the authenticated copies of the documents
specified in the order and his posting of required bond. The CA pointed out that
Section 2, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court does not require prior probate and
allowance of the will in the country of its execution, before it can be probated in the
Philippines. The present case, said the CA, is different from reprobate, which refers
to a will already probated and allowed abroad. Reprobate is governed by different
rules or procedures. Unsatisfied with the decision, Manuel and Benjamin came to
this Court.
But our laws do not prohibit the probate of wills executed by foreigners
abroad although the same have not as yet been probated and allowed in the
countries of their execution. A foreign will can be given legal effects in our
jurisdiction. Article 816 of the Civil Code states that the will of an alien who is
abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made in accordance with the formalities
prescribed by the law of the place where he resides, or according to the formalities
observed in his country.772[6]
In this connection, Section 1, Rule 73 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides
that if the decedent is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the RTC of the province
where he has an estate may take cognizance of the settlement of such estate.
Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 76 further state that the executor, devisee, or legatee
named in the will, or any other person interested in the estate, may, at any time
after the death of the testator, petition the court having jurisdiction to have the will
allowed, whether the same be in his possession or not, or is lost or destroyed.
Our rules require merely that the petition for the allowance of a will must
show, so far as known to the petitioner: (a) the jurisdictional facts; (b) the names,
ages, and residences of the heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator or
decedent; (c) the probable value and character of the property of the estate; (d) the
name of the person for whom letters are prayed; and (e) if the will has not been
delivered to the court, the name of the person having custody of it. Jurisdictional
facts refer to the fact of death of the decedent, his residence at the time of his
death in the province where the probate court is sitting, or if he is an inhabitant of a
foreign country, the estate he left in such province. 773[7] The rules do not require
proof that the foreign will has already been allowed and probated in the country of
its execution.
In insisting that Rupertas will should have been first probated and allowed by the
court of California, petitioners Manuel and Benjamin obviously have in mind the
procedure for the reprobate of will before admitting it here. But, reprobate or reauthentication of a will already probated and allowed in a foreign country is different
from that probate where the will is presented for the first time before a competent
court. Reprobate is specifically governed by Rule 77 of the Rules of Court. Contrary
to petitioners stance, since this latter rule applies only to reprobate of a will, it
cannot be made to apply to the present case. In reprobate, the local court
acknowledges as binding the findings of the foreign probate court provided its
jurisdiction over the matter can be established.
pass either real or personal property unless the will has been proved and allowed by
the proper court.774[8]
Notably, the assailed RTC order of June 17, 2004 is nothing more than an initial
ruling that the court can take cognizance of the petition for probate of Rupertas will
and that, in the meantime, it was designating Ernesto as special administrator of
the estate. The parties have yet to present evidence of the due execution of the will,
i.e. the testators state of mind at the time of the execution and compliance with the
formalities required of wills by the laws of California. This explains the trial courts
directive for Ernesto to submit the duly authenticated copy of Rupertas will and the
certified copies of the Laws of Succession and Probate of Will of California.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the Court of
Appeals decision in CA-G.R. CV 83564 dated July 29, 2005.
SO ORDERED.
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
774[8] CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Art. 838; RULES OF COURT, Rule 75, Sec. 1.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts
Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division
Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
HEIRS OF POLICRONIO M. URETA, SR., namely: CONRADO B. URETA, MACARIO B. URETA, GLORIA
URETA-GONZALES, ROMEO B. URETA, RITA URETA-SOLANO, NENA URETA-TONGCUA, VENANCIO B.
URETA, LILIA URETA-TAYCO, and HEIRS OF POLICRONIO B. URETA, JR., namely: MIGUEL T. URETA,
RAMON POLICRONIO T. URETA, EMMANUEL T. URETA, and BERNADETTE T. URETA, Petitioners,
vs.
HEIRS OF LIBERATO M. URETA, namely: TERESA F. URETA, AMPARO URETA-CASTILLO, IGNACIO F.
URETA, SR., EMIRITO F. URETA, WILKIE F. URETA, LIBERATO F. URETA, JR., RAY F. URETA, ZALDY F.
URETA, and MILA JEAN URETA CIPRIANO; HEIRS OF PRUDENCIA URETA PARADERO, namely:
WILLIAM U. PARADERO, WARLITO U. PARADERO, CARMENCITA P. PERLAS, CRISTINA P. CORDOVA,
EDNA P. GALLARDO, LETICIA P. REYES; NARCISO M. URETA; VICENTE M. URETA; HEIRS OF
FRANCISCO M. URETA, namely: EDITA T. URETA-REYES and LOLLIE T. URETA-VILLARUEL; ROQUE M.
URETA; ADELA URETA-GONZALES; HEIRS OF INOCENCIO M. URETA, namely: BENILDA V. URETA,
ALFONSO V. URETA II, DICK RICARDO V. URETA, and ENRIQUE V. URETA; MERLINDA U. RIVERA;
JORGE URETA; ANDRES URETA, WENEFREDA U. TARAN; and BENEDICT URETA, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 165930
HEIRS OF LIBERATO M. URETA, namely: TERESA F. URETA, AMPARO URETA-CASTILLO, IGNACIO F.
URETA, SR., EMIRITO F. URETA, WILKIE F. URETA, LIBERATO F. URETA, JR., RAY F. URETA, ZALDY F.
URETA, and MILA JEAN URETA CIPRIANO; HEIRS OF PRUDENCIA URETA PARADERO, namely:
WILLIAM U. PARADERO, WARLITO U. PARADERO, CARMENCITA P. PERLAS, CRISTINA P. CORDOVA,
EDNA P. GALLARDO, LETICIA P. REYES; NARCISO M. URETA; VICENTE M. URETA; HEIRS OF
FRANCISCO M. URETA, namely: EDITA T. URETA-REYES and LOLLIE T. URETA-VILLARUEL; ROQUE M.
URETA; ADELA URETA-GONZALES; HEIRS OF INOCENCIO M. URETA, namely: BENILDA V. URETA,
ALFONSO V. URETA II, DICK RICARDO V. URETA, and ENRIQUE V. URETA; MERLINDA U. RIVERA;
JORGE URETA; ANDRES URETA, WENEFREDA U. TARAN; and BENEDICT URETA,Petitioners,
vs.
HEIRS OF POLICRONIO M. URETA, SR., namely: CONRADO B. URETA, MACARIO B. URETA, GLORIA
URETA-GONZALES, ROMEO B. URETA, RITA URETA-SOLANO, NENA URETA-TONGCUA, VENANCIO B.
URETA, LILIA URETA-TAYCO, and HEIRS OF POLICRONIO B. URETA, JR., namely: MIGUEL T. URETA,
RAMON POLICRONIO T. URETA, EMMANUEL T. URETA, and BERNADETTE T. URETA, Respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
These consolidated petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure assail the
April 20, 2004 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), and its October 14, 2004 Resolution2 in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 71399,
which affirmed with modification the April 26, 2001 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 9, Kalibo, Aklan (RTC)
in Civil Case No. 5026.
The Facts
In his lifetime, Alfonso Ureta (Alfonso) begot 14 children, namely, Policronio, Liberato, Narciso, Prudencia, Vicente,
Francisco, Inocensio, Roque, Adela, Wenefreda, Merlinda, Benedicto, Jorge, and Andres. The children of Policronio (Heirs
of Policronio), are opposed to the rest of Alfonsos children and their descendants (Heirs of Alfonso).
Alfonso was financially well-off during his lifetime. He owned several fishpens, a fishpond, a sari-sari store, a passenger
jeep, and was engaged in the buying and selling of copra. Policronio, the eldest, was the only child of Alfonso who failed to
The case is hereby REMANDED to the court of origin for the proper partition of ALFONSO URETAS Estate in accordance
with Rule 69 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. No costs at this instance.
SO ORDERED.
The CA affirmed the finding of the RTC that the Deed of Sale was void. It found the Deed of Sale to be absolutely simulated
as the parties did not intend to be legally bound by it. As such, it produced no legal effects and did not alter the juridical
situation of the parties. The CA also noted that Alfonso continued to exercise all the rights of an owner even after the
execution of the Deed of Sale, as it was undisputed that he remained in possession of the subject parcels of land and enjoyed
their produce until his death.
Policronio, on the other hand, never exercised any rights pertaining to an owner over the subject lands from the time they
were sold to him up until his death. He never took or attempted to take possession of the land even after his fathers death,
never demanded delivery of the produce from the tenants, and never paid realty taxes on the properties. It was also noted
that Policronio never disclosed the existence of the Deed of Sale to his children, as they were, in fact, surprised to discover
its existence. The CA, thus, concluded that Policronio must have been aware that the transfer was only made for taxation
purposes.
The testimony of Amparo Castillo, as to the circumstances surrounding the actual arrangement and agreement between the
parties prior to the execution of the four (4) Deeds of Sale, was found by the CA to be unrebutted. The RTCs assessment of
the credibility of her testimony was accorded respect, and the intention of the parties was given the primary consideration in
determining the true nature of the contract.
Contrary to the finding of the RTC though, the CA annulled the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition due to the incapacity of one
of the parties to give his consent to the contract. It held that before Conrado could validly bind his co-heirs to the Deed of
Extra-Judicial Partition, it was necessary that he be clothed with the proper authority. The CA ruled that a special power of
attorney was required under Article 1878 (5) and (15) of the Civil Code. Without a special power of attorney, it was held that
Conrado lacked the legal capactiy to give the consent of his co-heirs, thus, rendering the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition
voidable under Article 1390 (1) of the Civil Code.
As a consequence, the CA ordered the remand of the case to the RTC for the proper partition of the estate, with the option
that the parties may still voluntarily effect the partition by executing another agreement or by adopting the assailed Deed of
Partition with the RTCs approval in either case. Otherwise, the RTC may proceed with the compulsory partition of the
estate in accordance with the Rules.
With regard to the claim for damages, the CA agreed with the RTC and dismissed the claim for actual and compensatory
damages for lack of factual and legal basis.
Both parties filed their respective Motions for Reconsideration, which were denied by the CA for lack of merit in a
Resolution dated October 14, 2004.
In their Motion for Reconsideration, the Heirs of Policronio argued that the RTC violated the best evidence rule in giving
credence to the testimony of Amparo Castillo with regard to the simulation of the Deed of Sale, and that prescription had set
in precluding any question on the validity of the contract.
The CA held that the oral testimony was admissible under Rule 130, Section 9 (b) and (c), which provides that evidence
aliunde may be allowed to explain the terms of the written agreement if the same failed to express the true intent and
agreement of the parties thereto, or when the validity of the written agreement was put in issue. Furthermore, the CA found
that the Heirs of Policronio waived their right to object to evidence aliunde having failed to do so during trial and for raising
such only for the first time on appeal. With regard to prescription, the CA ruled that the action or defense for the declaration
of the inexistence of a contract did not prescribe under Article 1410 of the Civil Code.
On the other hand, the Heirs of Alfonso argued that the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition should not have been annulled, and
instead the preterited heirs should be given their share. The CA reiterated that Conrados lack of capacity to give his coheirs consent to the extra-judicial settlement rendered the same voidable.
Hence, the present Petitions for Review on Certiorari.
The Issues
The issues presented for resolution by the Heirs of Policronio in G.R. No. 165748 are as follows:
I.
Whether the Court of Appeals is correct in ruling that the Deed of Absolute Sale of 25 October 1969 is
void for being absolutely fictitious and in relation therewith, may parol evidence be entertained to
thwart its binding effect after the parties have both died?
Assuming that indeed the said document is simulated, whether or not the parties thereto including
their successors in interest are estopped to question its validity, they being bound by Articles 1412 and
1421 of the Civil Code?
II.
Whether prescription applies to bar any question respecting the validity of the Deed of Absolute Sale
dated 25 October 1969? Whether prescription applies to bar any collateral attack on the validity of the
deed of absolute sale executed 21 years earlier?
III.
Whether the Court of Appeals correctly ruled in nullifying the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition because
Conrado Ureta signed the same without the written authority from his siblings in contravention of
Article 1878 in relation to Article 1390 of the Civil Code and in relation therewith, whether the defense
of ratification and/or preterition raised for the first time on appeal may be entertained?
The issues presented for resolution by the Heirs of Alfonso in G.R. No. 165930 are as follows:
I.
Whether or not grave error was committed by the Trial Court and Court of Appeals in declaring the
Deed of Sale of subject properties as absolutely simulated and null and void thru parol evidence based
on their factual findings as to its fictitious nature, and there being waiver of any objection based on
violation of the parol evidence rule.
II.
Whether or not the Court of Appeals was correct in holding that Conrado Uretas lack of capacity to
give his co-heirs consent to the Extra-Judicial Partition rendered the same voidable.
III.
Granting arguendo that Conrado Ureta was not authorized to represent his co-heirs and there was no
ratification, whether or not the Court of Appeals was correct in ordering the remand of the case to the
Regional Trial Court for partition of the estate of Alfonso Ureta.
IV.
Since the sale in favor of Policronio Ureta Sr. was null and void ab initio, the properties covered therein
formed part of the estate of the late Alfonso Ureta and was correctly included in the Deed of
Extrajudicial Partition even if no prior action for nullification of the sale was filed by the heirs of
Liberato Ureta.
V.
Whether or not the heirs of Policronio Ureta Sr. can claim that estoppel based on Article 1412 of the
Civil Code as well as the issue of prescription can still be raised on appeal.
These various contentions revolve around two major issues, to wit: (1) whether the Deed of Sale is valid, and (2) whether
the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition is valid. Thus, the assigned errors shall be discussed jointly and in seriatim.
The Ruling of the Court
Validity of the Deed of Sale
Two veritable legal presumptions bear on the validity of the Deed of Sale: (1) that there was sufficient consideration for the
contract; and (2) that it was the result of a fair and regular private transaction. If shown to hold, these presumptions infer
prima facie the transactions validity, except that it must yield to the evidence adduced.10
As will be discussed below, the evidence overcomes these two presumptions.
Absolute Simulation
First, the Deed of Sale was not the result of a fair and regular private transaction because it was absolutely simulated.
The Heirs of Policronio argued that the land had been validly sold to Policronio as the Deed of Sale contained all the
essential elements of a valid contract of sale, by virtue of which, the subject properties were transferred in his name as
evidenced by the tax declaration. There being no invalidation prior to the execution of the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition,
the probity and integrity of the Deed of Sale should remain undiminished and accorded respect as it was a duly notarized
public instrument.
The Heirs of Policronio posited that his loyal services to his father and his being the eldest among Alfonsos children, might
have prompted the old man to sell the subject lands to him at a very low price as an advance inheritance. They explained that
Policronios failure to take possession of the subject lands and to claim their produce manifests a Filipino family practice
wherein a child would take possession and enjoy the fruits of the land sold by a parent only after the latters death.
Policronio simply treated the lands the same way his father Alfonso treated them - where his children enjoyed usufructuary
rights over the properties, as opposed to appropriating them exclusively to himself. They contended that Policronios failure
to take actual possession of the lands did not prove that he was not the owner as he was merely exercising his right to
dispose of them. They argue that it was an error on the part of the CA to conclude that ownership by Policronio was not
established by his failure to possess the properties sold. Instead, emphasis should be made on the fact that the tax
declarations, being indicia of possession, were in Policronios name.
They further argued that the Heirs of Alfonso failed to appreciate that the Deed of Sale was clear enough to convey the
subject parcels of land. Citing jurisprudence, they contend that there is a presumption that an instrument sets out the true
agreement of the parties thereto and that it was executed for valuable consideration,11 and where there is no doubt as to the
intention of the parties to a contract, the literal meaning of the stipulation shall control.12 Nowhere in the Deed of Sale is it
indicated that the transfer was only for taxation purposes. On the contrary, the document clearly indicates that the lands were
sold. Therefore, they averred that the literal meaning of the stipulation should control.
The Court disagrees.
The Court finds no cogent reason to deviate from the finding of the CA that the Deed of Sale is null and void for being
absolutely simulated. The Civil Code provides:
Art. 1345. Simulation of a contract may be absolute or relative. The former takes place when the parties do not intend to be
bound at all; the latter, when the parties conceal their true agreement.
Art. 1346. An absolutely simulated or fictitious contract is void. A relative simulation, when it does not prejudice a third
person and is not intended for any purpose contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy binds the
parties to their real agreement.
Valerio v. Refresca13 is instructive on the matter of simulation of contracts:
In absolute simulation, there is a colorable contract but it has no substance as the parties have no intention to be bound by it.
The main characteristic of an absolute simulation is that the apparent contract is not really desired or intended to produce
legal effect or in any way alter the juridical situation of the parties. As a result, an absolutely simulated or fictitious contract
is void, and the parties may recover from each other what they may have given under the contract. However, if the parties
state a false cause in the contract to conceal their real agreement, the contract is relatively simulated and the parties are still
bound by their real agreement. Hence, where the essential requisites of a contract are present and the simulation refers only
to the content or terms of the contract, the agreement is absolutely binding and enforceable between the parties and their
successors in interest.
Lacking, therefore, in an absolutely simulated contract is consent which is essential to a valid and enforceable contract.14
Thus, where a person, in order to place his property beyond the reach of his creditors, simulates a transfer of it to another, he
does not really intend to divest himself of his title and control of the property; hence, the deed of transfer is but a sham.15
Similarly, in this case, Alfonso simulated a transfer to Policronio purely for taxation purposes, without intending to transfer
ownership over the subject lands.
The primary consideration in determining the true nature of a contract is the intention of the parties. If the words of a
contract appear to contravene the evident intention of the parties, the latter shall prevail. Such intention is determined not
only from the express terms of their agreement, but also from the contemporaneous and subsequent acts of the parties.16 The
true intention of the parties in this case was sufficiently proven by the Heirs of Alfonso.
The Heirs of Alfonso established by a preponderance of evidence17 that the Deed of Sale was one of the four (4) absolutely
simulated Deeds of Sale which involved no actual monetary consideration, executed by Alfonso in favor of his children,
Policronio, Liberato, and Prudencia, and his second wife, Valeriana, for taxation purposes.
Amparo Castillo, the daughter of Liberato, testified, to wit:
Q: Now sometime in the year 1969 can you recall if your grandfather and his children [met] in your house?
A: Yes sir, that was sometime in October 1969 when they [met] in our house, my grandfather, my late uncle Policronio
Ureta, my late uncle Liberato Ureta, my uncle Francisco Ureta, and then my auntie Prudencia Ureta they talk[ed] about, that
idea came from my uncle Francisco Ureta to [sell] some parcels of land to his children to lessen the inheritance tax whatever
happened to my grandfather, actually no money involved in this sale.
Q: Now you said there was that agreement, verbal agreement. [W]here were you when this Alfonso Ureta and his children
gather[ed] in your house?
A: I was near them in fact I heard everything they were talking [about]
xxx
Q: Were there documents of sale executed by Alfonso Ureta in furtherance of their verbal agreement?
A: Yes sir.
Q: To whom in particular did your grandfather Alfonso Ureta execute this deed of sale without money consideration
according to you?
A: To my uncle Policronio Ureta and to Prudencia Ureta Panadero.
Q: And who else?
A: To Valeriana dela Cruz.
Q: How about your father?
A: He has.18
The other Deeds of Sale executed by Alfonso in favor of his children Prudencia and Liberato, and second wife Valeriana, all
bearing the same date of execution, were duly presented in evidence by the Heirs of Alfonso, and were uncontested by the
Heirs of Policronio. The lands which were the subject of these Deeds of Sale were in fact included in the Deed of ExtraJudicial Partition executed by all the heirs of Alfonso, where it was expressly stipulated:
That the above-named Amparo U. Castillo, Prudencia U. Paradero, Conrado B. Ureta and Merlinda U. Rivera do hereby
recognize and acknowledge as a fact that the properties presently declared in their respective names or in the names of their
respective parents and are included in the foregoing instrument are actually the properties of the deceased Alfonso Ureta and
were transferred only for the purpose of effective administration and development and convenience in the payment of taxes
and, therefore, all instruments conveying or affecting the transfer of said properties are null and void from the beginning.19
As found by the CA, Alfonso continued to exercise all the rights of an owner even after the execution of the Deeds of Sale.
It was undisputed that Alfonso remained in possession of the subject lands and enjoyed their produce until his death. No
credence can be given to the contention of the Heirs of Policrionio that their father did not take possession of the subject
lands or enjoyed the fruits thereof in deference to a Filipino family practice. Had this been true, Policronio should have
taken possession of the subject lands after his father died. On the contrary, it was admitted that neither Policronio nor his
heirs ever took possession of the subject lands from the time they were sold to him, and even after the death of both Alfonso
and Policronio.
It was also admitted by the Heirs of Policronio that the tenants of the subject lands never turned over the produce of the
properties to Policronio or his heirs but only to Alfonso and the administrators of his estate. Neither was there a demand for
their delivery to Policronio or his heirs. Neither did Policronio ever pay real estate taxes on the properties, the only payment
on record being those made by his heirs in 1996 and 1997 ten years after his death. In sum, Policronio never exercised any
rights pertaining to an owner over the subject lands.
The most protuberant index of simulation of contract is the complete absence of an attempt in any manner on the part of the
ostensible buyer to assert rights of ownership over the subject properties. Policronios failure to take exclusive possession of
the subject properties or, in the alternative, to collect rentals, is contrary to the principle of ownership. Such failure is a clear
badge of simulation that renders the whole transaction void. 20
It is further telling that Policronio never disclosed the existence of the Deed of Sale to his children. This, coupled with
Policronios failure to exercise any rights pertaining to an owner of the subject lands, leads to the conclusion that he was
aware that the transfer was only made for taxation purposes and never intended to bind the parties thereto.
As the above factual circumstances remain unrebutted by the Heirs of Policronio, the factual findings of the RTC, which
were affirmed by the CA, remain binding and conclusive upon this Court.21
It is clear that the parties did not intend to be bound at all, and as such, the Deed of Sale produced no legal effects and did
not alter the juridical situation of the parties. The Deed of Sale is, therefore, void for being absolutely simulated pursuant to
Article 1409 (2) of the Civil Code which provides:
Art. 1409. The following contracts are inexistent and void from the beginning:
xxx
(2) Those which are absolutely simulated or fictitious;
xxx
For guidance, the following are the most fundamental characteristics of void or inexistent contracts:
1) As a general rule, they produce no legal effects whatsoever in accordance with the principle "quod nullum
est nullum producit effectum."
2) They are not susceptible of ratification.
3) The right to set up the defense of inexistence or absolute nullity cannot be waived or renounced.
4) The action or defense for the declaration of their inexistence or absolute nullity is imprescriptible.
5) The inexistence or absolute nullity of a contract cannot be invoked by a person whose interests are not
directly affected.22
Since the Deed of Sale is void, the subject properties were properly included in the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition of the
estate of Alfonso.
Absence and Inadequacy of Consideration
The second presumption is rebutted by the lack of consideration for the Deed of Sale.
In their Answer,23 the Heirs of Alfonso initially argued that the Deed of Sale was void for lack of consideration, and even
granting that there was consideration, such was inadequate. The Heirs of Policronio counter that the defenses of absence or
inadequacy of consideration are not grounds to render a contract void.
The Heirs of Policronio contended that under Article 1470 of the Civil Code, gross inadequacy of the price does not affect a
contract of sale, except as it may indicate a defect in the consent, or that the parties really intended a donation or some other
act or contract. Citing jurisprudence, they argued that inadequacy of monetary consideration does not render a conveyance
inexistent as liberality may be sufficient cause for a valid contract, whereas fraud or bad faith may render it either rescissible
or voidable, although valid until annulled.24 Thus, they argued that if the contract suffers from inadequate consideration, it
remains valid until annulled, and the remedy of rescission calls for judicial intervention, which remedy the Heirs of Alfonso
failed to take.
It is further argued that even granting that the sale of the subject lands for a consideration of 2,000.00 was inadequate,
absent any evidence of the fair market value of the land at the time of its sale, it cannot be concluded that the price at which
it was sold was inadequate.25 As there is nothing in the records to show that the Heirs of Alfonso supplied the true value of
the land in 1969, the amount of 2,000.00 must thus stand as its saleable value.
On this issue, the Court finds for the Heirs of Alfonso.
For lack of consideration, the Deed of Sale is once again found to be void. It states that Policronio paid, and Alfonso
received, the 2,000.00 purchase price on the date of the signing of the contract:
That I, ALFONSO F. URETA, x x x for and in consideration of the sum of TWO THOUSAND (2,000.00) PESOS,
Philippine Currency, to me in hand paid by POLICRONIO M. URETA, x x x, do hereby CEDE, TRANSFER, and
CONVEY, by way of absolute sale, x x x six (6) parcels of land x x x.26 [Emphasis ours]
Although, on its face, the Deed of Sale appears to be supported by valuable consideration, the RTC found that there was no
money involved in the sale.27 This finding was affirmed by the CA in ruling that the sale is void for being absolutely
simulated. Considering that there is no cogent reason to deviate from such factual findings, they are binding on this Court.
It is well-settled in a long line of cases that where a deed of sale states that the purchase price has been paid but in fact has
never been paid, the deed of sale is null and void for lack of consideration.28 Thus, although the contract states that the
purchase price of 2,000.00 was paid by Policronio to Alfonso for the subject properties, it has been proven that such was
never in fact paid as there was no money involved. It must, therefore, follow that the Deed of Sale is void for lack of
consideration.
Given that the Deed of Sale is void, it is unnecessary to discuss the issue on the inadequacy of consideration.
Parol Evidence and Hearsay
The Heirs of Policronio aver that the rules on parol evidence and hearsay were violated by the CA in ruling that the Deed of
Sale was void.
They argued that based on the parol evidence rule, the Heirs of Alfonso and, specifically, Amparo Castillo, were not in a
position to prove the terms outside of the contract because they were not parties nor successors-in-interest in the Deed of
Sale in question. Thus, it is argued that the testimony of Amparo Castillo violates the parol evidence rule.
Stemming from the presumption that the Heirs of Alfonso were not parties to the contract, it is also argued that the parol
evidence rule may not be properly invoked by either party in the litigation against the other, where at least one of the parties
to the suit is not a party or a privy of a party to the written instrument in question and does not base a claim on the
instrument or assert a right originating in the instrument or the relation established thereby.29
Their arguments are untenable.
The objection against the admission of any evidence must be made at the proper time, as soon as the grounds therefor
become reasonably apparent, and if not so made, it will be understood to have been waived. In the case of testimonial
evidence, the objection must be made when the objectionable question is asked or after the answer is given if the
objectionable features become apparent only by reason of such answer.30 In this case, the Heirs of Policronio failed to timely
object to the testimony of Amparo Castillo and they are, thus, deemed to have waived the benefit of the parol evidence rule.
Granting that the Heirs of Policronio timely objected to the testimony of Amparo Castillo, their argument would still fail.
Section 9 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 9. Evidence of written agreements. When the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is
considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their successors in interest, no
evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written agreement.
However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of written agreement if he puts in issue in his
pleading:
(a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written agreement;
(b) The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the parties thereto;
(c) The validity of the written agreement; or
(d) The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their successors in interest after the execution of
the written agreement.
The term "agreement" includes wills.
[Emphasis ours]
Paragraphs (b) and (c) are applicable in the case at bench.
The failure of the Deed of Sale to express the true intent and agreement of the parties was clearly put in issue in the
Answer31 of the Heirs of Alfonso to the Complaint. It was alleged that the Deed of Sale was only made to lessen the payment
of estate and inheritance taxes and not meant to transfer ownership. The exception in paragraph (b) is allowed to enable the
court to ascertain the true intent of the parties, and once the intent is clear, it shall prevail over what the document appears to
be on its face.32 As the true intent of the parties was duly proven in the present case, it now prevails over what appears on the
Deed of Sale.
The validity of the Deed of Sale was also put in issue in the Answer, and was precisely one of the issues submitted to the
RTC for resolution.33 The operation of the parol evidence rule requires the existence of a valid written agreement. It is, thus,
not applicable in a proceeding where the validity of such agreement is the fact in dispute, such as when a contract may be
void for lack of consideration.34 Considering that the Deed of Sale has been shown to be void for being absolutely simulated
and for lack of consideration, the Heirs of Alfonso are not precluded from presenting evidence to modify, explain or add to
the terms of the written agreement.
The Heirs of Policronio must be in a state of confusion in arguing that the Heirs of Alfonso may not question the Deed of
Sale for not being parties or successors-in-interest therein on the basis that the parol evidence rule may not be properly
invoked in a proceeding or litigation where at least one of the parties to the suit is not a party or a privy of a party to the
written instrument in question and does not base a claim on the instrument or assert a right originating in the instrument or
the relation established thereby. If their argument was to be accepted, then the Heirs of Policronio would themselves be
precluded from invoking the parol evidence rule to exclude the evidence of the Heirs of Alfonso.
Indeed, the applicability of the parol evidence rule requires that the case be between parties and their successors-in-interest.35
In this case, both the Heirs of Alfonso and the Heirs of Policronio are successors-in-interest of the parties to the Deed of Sale
as they claim rights under Alfonso and Policronio, respectively. The parol evidence rule excluding evidence aliunde,
however, still cannot apply because the present case falls under two exceptions to the rule, as discussed above.
With respect to hearsay, the Heirs of Policronio contended that the rule on hearsay was violated when the testimony of
Amparo Castillo was given weight in proving that the subject lands were only sold for taxation purposes as she was a person
alien to the contract. Even granting that they did not object to her testimony during trial, they argued that it should not have
been appreciated by the CA because it had no probative value whatsoever.36
The Court disagrees.
It has indeed been held that hearsay evidence whether objected to or not cannot be given credence for having no probative
value.37 This principle, however, has been relaxed in cases where, in addition to the failure to object to the admissibility of
the subject evidence, there were other pieces of evidence presented or there were other circumstances prevailing to support
the fact in issue. In Top-Weld Manufacturing, Inc. v. ECED S.A.,38 this Court held:
Hearsay evidence alone may be insufficient to establish a fact in an injunction suit (Parker v. Furlong, 62 P. 490) but, when
no objection is made thereto, it is, like any other evidence, to be considered and given the importance it deserves. (Smith v.
Delaware & Atlantic Telegraph & Telephone Co., 51 A 464). Although we should warn of the undesirability of issuing
judgments solely on the basis of the affidavits submitted, where as here, said affidavits are overwhelming, uncontroverted by
competent evidence and not inherently improbable, we are constrained to uphold the allegations of the respondents
regarding the multifarious violations of the contracts made by the petitioner.
In the case at bench, there were other prevailing circumstances which corroborate the testimony of Amparo Castillo. First,
the other Deeds of Sale which were executed in favor of Liberato, Prudencia, and Valeriana on the same day as that of
Policronios were all presented in evidence. Second, all the properties subject therein were included in the Deed of ExtraJudicial Partition of the estate of Alfonso. Third, Policronio, during his lifetime, never exercised acts of ownership over the
subject properties (as he never demanded or took possession of them, never demanded or received the produce thereof, and
never paid real estate taxes thereon). Fourth, Policronio never informed his children of the sale.
As the Heirs of Policronio failed to controvert the evidence presented, and to timely object to the testimony of Amparo
Castillo, both the RTC and the CA correctly accorded probative weight to her testimony.
Prior Action Unnecessary
The Heirs of Policronio averred that the Heirs of Alfonso should have filed an action to declare the sale void prior to
executing the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition. They argued that the sale should enjoy the presumption of regularity, and
until overturned by a court, the Heirs of Alfonso had no authority to include the land in the inventory of properties of
Alfonsos estate. By doing so, they arrogated upon themselves the power of invalidating the Deed of Sale which is
exclusively vested in a court of law which, in turn, can rule only upon the observance of due process. Thus, they contended
that prescription, laches, or estoppel have set in to militate against assailing the validity of the sale.
The Heirs of Policronio are mistaken.
A simulated contract of sale is without any cause or consideration, and is, therefore, null and void; in such case, no
independent action to rescind or annul the contract is necessary, and it may be treated as non-existent for all purposes.39 A
void or inexistent contract is one which has no force and effect from the beginning, as if it has never been entered into, and
which cannot be validated either by time or ratification. A void contract produces no effect whatsoever either against or in
favor of anyone; it does not create, modify or extinguish the juridical relation to which it refers.40 Therefore, it was not
necessary for the Heirs of Alfonso to first file an action to declare the nullity of the Deed of Sale prior to executing the Deed
of Extra-Judicial Partition.
Personality to Question Sale
The Heirs of Policronio contended that the Heirs of Alfonso are not parties, heirs, or successors-in-interest under the
contemplation of law to clothe them with the personality to question the Deed of Sale. They argued that under Article 1311
of the Civil Code, contracts take effect only between the parties, their assigns and heirs. Thus, the genuine character of a
contract which personally binds the parties cannot be put in issue by a person who is not a party thereto. They posited that
the Heirs of Alfonso were not parties to the contract; neither did they appear to be beneficiaries by way of assignment or
inheritance. Unlike themselves who are direct heirs of Policronio, the Heirs of Alfonso are not Alfonsos direct heirs. For the
Heirs of Alfonso to qualify as parties, under Article 1311 of the Civil Code, they must first prove that they are either heirs or
assignees. Being neither, they have no legal standing to question the Deed of Sale.
They further argued that the sale cannot be assailed for being barred under Article 1421 of the Civil Code which provides
that the defense of illegality of a contract is not available to third persons whose interests are not directly affected.
Again, the Court disagrees.
Article 1311 and Article 1421 of the Civil Code provide:
Art. 1311. Contracts take effect only between the parties, their assigns and heirs, x x x
Art. 1421. The defense of illegality of contracts is not available to third persons whose interests are not directly affected.
The right to set up the nullity of a void or non-existent contract is not limited to the parties, as in the case of annullable or
voidable contracts; it is extended to third persons who are directly affected by the contract. Thus, where a contract is
absolutely simulated, even third persons who may be prejudiced thereby may set up its inexistence.41 The Heirs of Alfonso
are the children of Alfonso, with his deceased children represented by their children (Alfonsos grandchildren). The Heirs of
Alfonso are clearly his heirs and successors-in-interest and, as such, their interests are directly affected, thereby giving them
the right to question the legality of the Deed of Sale.
Inapplicability of Article 842
The Heirs of Policronio further argued that even assuming that the Heirs of Alfonso have an interest in the Deed of Sale,
they would still be precluded from questioning its validity. They posited that the Heirs of Alfonso must first prove that the
sale of Alfonsos properties to Policronio substantially diminished their successional rights or that their legitimes would be
unduly prejudiced, considering that under Article 842 of the Civil Code, one who has compulsory heirs may dispose of his
estate provided that he does not contravene the provisions of the Civil Code with regard to the legitime of said heirs. Having
failed to do so, they argued that the Heirs of Alfonso should be precluded from questioning the validity of the Deed of Sale.
Still, the Court disagrees.
From the position that the Deed of Sale is valid and not void, the Heirs of Policronio argued that any question regarding its
validity should have been initiated through judicial process within 10 years from its notarization in accordance with Article
1144 of the Civil Code. Since 21 years had already elapsed when the Heirs of Alfonso assailed the validity of the Deed of
Sale in 1996, prescription had set in. Furthermore, since the Heirs of Alfonso did not seek to nullify the tax declarations of
Policronio, they had impliedly acquiesced and given due recognition to the Heirs of Policronio as the rightful inheritors and
should, thus, be barred from laying claim on the land.
The Heirs of Policronio are mistaken.
Article 1410 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 1410. The action for the declaration of the inexistence of a contract does not prescribe.
This is one of the most fundamental characteristics of void or inexistent contracts.44
As the Deed of Sale is a void contract, the action for the declaration of its nullity, even if filed 21 years after its execution,
cannot be barred by prescription for it is imprescriptible. Furthermore, the right to set up the defense of inexistence or
absolute nullity cannot be waived or renounced.45 Therefore, the Heirs of Alfonso cannot be precluded from setting up the
defense of its inexistence.
Validity of the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition
The Court now resolves the issue of the validity of the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition.
Unenforceability
The Heirs of Alfonso argued that the CA was mistaken in annulling the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition due to the incapacity
of Conrado to give the consent of his co-heirs for lack of a special power of attorney. They contended that what was
involved was not the capacity to give consent in behalf of the co-heirs but the authority to represent them. They argue that
the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition is not a voidable or an annullable contract under Article 1390 of the Civil Code, but
rather, it is an unenforceable or, more specifically, an unauthorized contract under Articles 1403 (1) and 1317 of the Civil
Code. As such, the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition should not be annulled but only be rendered unenforceable against the
siblings of Conrado.
They further argued that under Article 1317 of the Civil Code, when the persons represented without authority have ratified
the unauthorized acts, the contract becomes enforceable and binding. They contended that the Heirs of Policronio ratified the
Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition when Conrado took possession of one of the parcels of land adjudicated to him and his
siblings, and when another parcel was used as collateral for a loan entered into by some of the Heirs of Policronio. The Deed
of Extra-Judicial Partition having been ratified and its benefits accepted, the same thus became enforceable and binding
upon them.
The Heirs of Alfonso averred that granting arguendo that Conrado was not authorized to represent his co-heirs and there was
no ratification, the CA should not have remanded the case to the RTC for partition of Alfonsos estate. They argued that the
CA should not have applied the Civil Code general provision on contracts, but the special provisions dealing with succession
and partition. They contended that contrary to the ruling of the CA, the extra-judicial parition was not an act of strict
dominion, as it has been ruled that partition of inherited land is not a conveyance but a confirmation or ratification of title or
right to the land.46 Therefore, the law requiring a special power of attorney should not be applied to partitions.
On the other hand, the Heirs of Policronio insisted that the CA pronouncement on the invalidity of the Deed of ExtraJudicial Partition should not be disturbed because the subject properties should not have been included in the estate of
Alfonso, and because Conrado lacked the written authority to represent his siblings. They argued with the CA in ruling that a
special power of attorney was required before Conrado could sign in behalf of his co-heirs.
The Heirs of Policronio denied that they ratified the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition. They claimed that there is nothing on
record that establishes that they ratified the partition. Far from doing so, they precisely questioned its execution by filing a
complaint. They further argued that under Article 1409 (3) of the Civil Code, ratification cannot be invoked to validate the
illegal act of including in the partition those properties which do not belong to the estate as it provides another mode of
acquiring ownership not sanctioned by law.
Furthermore, the Heirs of Policronio contended that the defenses of unenforceability, ratification, and preterition are being
raised for the first time on appeal by the Heirs of Alfonso. For having failed to raise them during the trial, the Heirs of
Alfonso should be deemed to have waived their right to do so.
The Court agrees in part with the Heirs of Alfonso.
To begin, although the defenses of unenforceability, ratification and preterition were raised by the Heirs of Alfonso for the
first time on appeal, they are concomitant matters which may be taken up. As long as the questioned items bear relevance
and close relation to those specifically raised, the interest of justice would dictate that they, too, must be considered and
resolved. The rule that only theories raised in the initial proceedings may be taken up by a party thereto on appeal should
refer to independent, not concomitant matters, to support or oppose the cause of action.47
In the RTC, the Heirs of Policronio alleged that Conrados consent was vitiated by mistake and undue influence, and that he
signed the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition without the authority or consent of his co-heirs.
The RTC found that Conrados credibility had faltered, and his claims were rejected by the RTC as gratuitous assertions. On
the basis of such, the RTC ruled that Conrado duly represented his siblings in the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition.
On the other hand, the CA annulled the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition under Article 1390 (1) of the Civil Code, holding
that a special power of attorney was lacking as required under Article 1878 (5) and (15) of the Civil Code. These articles are
as follows:
Art. 1878. Special powers of attorney are necessary in the following cases:
xxx
(5) To enter into any contract by which the ownership of an immovable is transmitted or acquired either gratuitously or for a
valuable consideration;
xxx
Code. Article 1390 renders a contract voidable if one of the parties is incapable of giving consent to the contract or if the
contracting partys consent is vitiated by mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence or fraud. x x x
The deed of extrajudicial parition and sale is an unenforceable or, more specifically, an unauthorized contract under Articles
1403(1) and 1317 of the New Civil Code.50
Therefore, Conrados failure to obtain authority from his co-heirs to sign the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition in their behalf
did not result in his incapacity to give consent so as to render the contract voidable, but rather, it rendered the contract valid
but unenforceable against Conrados co-heirs for having been entered into without their authority.
A closer review of the evidence on record, however, will show that the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition is not unenforceable
but, in fact, valid, binding and enforceable against all the Heirs of Policronio for having given their consent to the contract.
Their consent to the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition has been proven by a preponderance of evidence.
Regarding his alleged vitiated consent due to mistake and undue influence to the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition, Conrado
testified, to wit:
Q: Mr. Ureta you remember having signed a document entitled deed of extra judicial partition consisting of 11 pages and
which have previously [been] marked as Exhibit I for the plaintiffs?
A: Yes sir.
Q: Can you recall where did you sign this document?
A: The way I remember I signed that in our house.
Q: And who requested or required you to sign this document?
A: My aunties.
Q: Who in particular if you can recall?
A: Nay Pruding Panadero.
Q: You mean that this document that you signed was brought to your house by your Auntie Pruding Pa[r]adero [who]
requested you to sign that document?
A: When she first brought that document I did not sign that said document because I [did] no[t] know the contents of that
document.
Q: How many times did she bring this document to you [until] you finally signed the document?
A: Perhaps 3 times.
Q: Can you tell the court why you finally signed it?
A: Because the way she explained it to me that the land of my grandfather will be partitioned.
Q: When you signed this document were your brothers and sisters who are your co-plaintiffs in this case aware of your act to
sign this document?
A: They do not know.
xxx
Q: After you have signed this document did you inform your brothers and sisters that you have signed this document?
No I did not. 51
xxx
Q: Now you read the document when it was allegedly brought to your house by your aunt Pruding Pa[r]adero?
A: I did not read it because as I told her I still want to ask the advise of my brothers and sisters.
Q: So do I get from you that you have never read the document itself or any part thereof?
A: I have read the heading.
xxx
Q: And why is it that you did not read all the pages of this document because I understand that you know also how to read in
English?
A: Because the way Nay Pruding explained to me is that the property of my grandfather will be partitioned that is why I am
so happy.
xxx
Q: You mean to say that after you signed this deed of extra judicial partition up to the present you never informed them?
A: Perhaps they know already that I have signed and they read already the document and they have read the document.
Q: My question is different, did you inform them?
A: The document sir? I did not tell them.
Q: Even until now?
A: Until now I did not inform them.52
This Court finds no cogent reason to reverse the finding of the RTC that Conrados explanations were mere gratuitous
assertions not entitled to any probative weight. The RTC found Conrados credibility to have faltered when he testified that
perhaps his siblings were already aware of the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition. The RTC was in the best position to judge
the credibility of the witness testimony. The CA also recognized that Conrados consent was not vitiated by mistake and
undue influence as it required a special power of attorney in order to bind his co-heirs and, as such, the CA thereby
recognized that his signature was binding to him but not with respect to his co-heirs. Findings of fact of the trial court,
particularly when affirmed by the CA, are binding to this Court.53
Furthermore, this Court notes other peculiarities in Conrados testimony. Despite claims of undue influence, there is no
indication that Conrado was forced to sign by his aunt, Prudencia Paradero. In fact, he testified that he was happy to sign
because his grandfathers estate would be partitioned. Conrado, thus, clearly understood the document he signed. It is also
worth noting that despite the document being brought to him on three separate occasions and indicating his intention to
inform his siblings about it, Conrado failed to do so, and still neglected to inform them even after he had signed the
partition. All these circumstances negate his claim of vitiated consent. Having duly signed the Deed of Extra-Judicial
Partition, Conrado is bound to it. Thus, it is enforceable against him.
Although Conrados co-heirs claimed that they did not authorize Conrado to sign the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition in their
behalf, several circumstances militate against their contention.
First, the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition was executed on April 19, 1989, and the Heirs of Policronio claim that they only
came to know of its existence on July 30, 1995 through an issue of the Aklan Reporter. It is difficult to believe that Conrado
did not inform his siblings about the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition or at least broach its subject with them for more than
five years from the time he signed it, especially after indicating in his testimony that he had intended to do so.
Second, Conrado retained possession of one of the parcels of land adjudicated to him and his co-heirs in the Deed of ExtraJudicial Partition.
Third, after the execution of the partition on April 19, 1989 and more than a year before they claimed to have discovered the
existence of the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition on July 30, 1995, some of the Heirs of Policronio, namely, Rita Solano,
Macario Ureta, Lilia Tayco, and Venancio Ureta executed on June 1, 1994, a Special Power of Attorney54 in favor of their
sister Gloria Gonzales, authorizing her to obtain a loan from a bank and to mortgage one of the parcels of land adjudicated
to them in the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition to secure payment of the loan. They were able to obtain the loan using the
land as collateral, over which a Real Estate Mortgage55 was constituted. Both the Special Power of Attorney and the Real
Estate Mortgage were presented in evidence in the RTC, and were not controverted or denied by the Heirs of Policronio.
Fourth, in the letter dated August 15, 1995, sent by the counsel of the Heirs of Policronio to the Heirs of Alfonso requesting
for amicable settlement, there was no mention that Conrados consent to the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition was vitiated by
mistake and undue influence or that they had never authorized Conrado to represent them or sign the document on their
behalf. It is questionable for such a pertinent detail to have been omitted. The body of said letter is reproduced hereunder as
follows:
Greetings:
Your nephews and nieces, children of your deceased brother Policronio Ureta, has referred to me for appropriate legal action
the property they inherited from their father consisting of six (6) parcels of land which is covered by a Deed of Absolute
Sale dated October 25, 1969. These properties ha[ve] already been transferred to the name of their deceased father
immediately after the sale, machine copy of the said Deed of Sale is hereto attached for your ready reference.
Lately, however, there was published an Extra-judicial Partition of the estate of Alfonso Ureta, which to the surprise of my
clients included the properties already sold to their father before the death of said Alfonso Ureta. This inclusion of their
property is erroneous and illegal because these properties were covered by the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of their father
Policronio Ureta no longer form part of the estate of Alfonso Ureta. Since Policronio Ureta has [sic] died in 1974 yet, these
properties have passed by hereditary succession to his children who are now the true and lawful owners of the said
properties.
My clients are still entitled to a share in the estate of Alfonso Ureta who is also their grandfather as they have stepped into
the shoes of their deceased father Policronio Ureta. But this estate of Alfonso Ureta should already exclude the six (6)
parcels of land covered by the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Policronio Ureta.
My clients cannot understand why the properties of their late father [should] be included in the estate of their grandfather
and be divided among his brothers and sisters when said properties should only be divided among themselves as children of
Policronio Ureta.
Since this matter involves very close members of the same family, I have counseled my clients that an earnest effort towards
a compromise or amicable settlement be first explored before resort to judicial remedy is pursued. And a compromise or
amicable settlement can only be reached if all the parties meet and discuss the problem with an open mind. To this end, I am
suggesting a meeting of the parties on September 16, 1995 at 2:00 P.M. at B Place Restaurant at C. Laserna St., Kalibo,
Aklan. It would be best if the parties can come or be represented by their duly designated attorney-in-fact together with their
lawyers if they so desire so that the problem can be discussed unemotionally and intelligently.
I would, however, interpret the failure to come to the said meeting as an indication that the parties are not willing to or
interested in amicable settlement of this matter and as a go signal for me to resort to legal and/or judicial remedies to protest
the rights of my clients.
Thank you very much.56
Based on the foregoing, this Court concludes that the allegation of Conrados vitiated consent and lack of authority to sign in
behalf of his co-heirs was a mere afterthought on the part of the Heirs of Policronio. It appears that the Heirs of Policronio
were not only aware of the existence of the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition prior to June 30, 1995 but had, in fact, given
Conrado authority to sign in their behalf. They are now estopped from questioning its legality, and the Deed of ExtraJudicial Partition is valid, binding, and enforceable against them.
In view of the foregoing, there is no longer a need to discuss the issue of ratification.
Preterition
The Heirs of Alfonso were of the position that the absence of the Heirs of Policronio in the partition or the lack of authority
of their representative results, at the very least, in their preterition and not in the invalidity of the entire deed of partition.
Assuming there was actual preterition, it did not render the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition voidable. Citing Article 1104 of
the Civil Code, they aver that a partition made with preterition of any of the compulsory heirs shall not be rescinded, but the
heirs shall be proportionately obliged to pay the share of the person omitted. Thus, the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition
should not have been annulled by the CA. Instead, it should have ordered the share of the heirs omitted to be given to them.
The Heirs of Alfonso also argued that all that remains to be adjudged is the right of the preterited heirs to represent their
father, Policronio, and be declared entitled to his share. They contend that remand to the RTC is no longer necessary as the
issue is purely legal and can be resolved by the provisions of the Civil Code for there is no dispute that each of Alfonsos
heirs received their rightful share. Conrado, who received Policronios share, should then fully account for what he had
received to his other co-heirs and be directed to deliver their share in the inheritance.
These arguments cannot be given credence.
Their posited theory on preterition is no longer viable. It has already been determined that the Heirs of Policronio gave their
consent to the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition and they have not been excluded from it. Nonetheless, even granting that the
Heirs of Policronio were denied their lawful participation in the partition, the argument of the Heirs of Alfonso would still
fail.
Preterition under Article 854 of the Civil Code is as follows:
Art. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time
of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises and
legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious.
If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the testator, the institution shall be effectual, without prejudice to the right
of representation.
Preterition has been defined as the total omission of a compulsory heir from the inheritance.1wphi1 It consists in the
silence of the testator with regard to a compulsory heir, omitting him in the testament, either by not mentioning him at all, or
by not giving him anything in the hereditary property but without expressly disinheriting him, even if he is mentioned in the
will in the latter case.57 Preterition is thus a concept of testamentary succession and requires a will. In the case at bench,
there is no will involved. Therefore, preterition cannot apply.
Remand Unnecessary
The Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition is in itself valid for complying with all the legal requisites, as found by the RTC, to wit:
A persual of the Deed of Extra-judicial Partition would reveal that all the heirs and children of Alfonso Ureta were
represented therein; that nobody was left out; that all of them received as much as the others as their shares; that it
distributed all the properties of Alfonso Ureta except a portion of parcel 29 containing an area of 14,000 square meters, more
or less, which was expressly reserved; that Alfonso Ureta, at the time of his death, left no debts; that the heirs of Policronio
Ureta, Sr. were represented by Conrado B. Ureta; all the parties signed the document, was witnessed and duly acknowledged
before Notary Public Adolfo M. Iligan of Kalibo, Aklan; that the document expressly stipulated that the heirs to whom some
of the properties were transferred before for taxation purposes or their children, expressly recognize and acknowledge as a
fact that the properties were transferred only for the purpose of effective administration and development convenience in the
payment of taxes and, therefore, all instruments conveying or effecting the transfer of said properties are null and void from
the beginning (Exhs. 1-4, 7-d).58
Considering that the Deed of Sale has been found void and the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition valid, with the consent of all
the Heirs of Policronio duly given, there is no need to remand the case to the court of origin for partition.1vvph!1
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 165748 is DENIED. The petition in G.R. No. 165930 is GRANTED. The assailed
April 20, 2004 Decision and October 14, 2004 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 71399, are hereby
MODIFIED in this wise:
(1) The Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition, dated April 19, 1989, is VALID, and
(2) The order to remand the case to the court of origin is hereby DELETED.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
Chairperson
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
Footnotes
*
Designated as additional member of the Third Division per Special Order No. 1028 dated June 21, 2011.
Penned by Associate Justice Perlita J. Tria Tirona with Associate Justice B.A. Adefuin-De La Cruz and
Associate Justice Arturo D. Brion (now a member of this Court), concurring.
2
Penned by Associate Justice Perlita J. Tria Tirona with Associate Justice Ruben T. Reyes and Associate
Justice Arturo D. Brion (now a member of this Court), concurring.
3
10
Manila Banking Corporation v. Silverio, 504 Phil. 17, 25-26 (2005), citing Suntay v. Court of Appeals, 321
Phil. 809 (1995) and Rules of Court, Rule 131, Sec. 3 (r) and (p).
11
Gatmaitan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 76500, August 2, 1991, 200 SCRA 38.
12
13
G.R. No. 163687, March 28, 2006, 485 SCRA 494, 500-501; citing Loyola v. Court of Appeals, 383 Phil.
171 (2000), and Balite v. Lim, 487 Phil. 281 (2004).
14
Manila Banking Corporation v. Silverio, supra note 10 at 27, citing Peoples Aircargo and Warehousing
Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 357 Phil. 850 (1998).
15
Tongoy v. Court of Appeals, 208 Phil. 95, 113 (1983); citing Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, 127 Phil. 294, 301302 (1967).
16
17
Lopez v. Lopez, G.R. No. 161925, November 25, 2009, 605 SCRA 358, 367.
Rules of Court, Rule 133, Sec. 1. Preponderance of evidence, how determined. In civil cases, the party
having the burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. In determining where the
preponderance or superior weight of evidence on the issues involved lies, the court may consider all the facts
and circumstance of the case, the witnesses manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and
opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts to which they testify, the
probability of their testimony, their interest or want of interest, and also their personal credibility so far as the
same may legitimately appear upon the trial. The court may also consider the number of witnesses, though
the preponderance is not necessarily with the greater number.
18
19
20
Manila Banking Corporation v. Silverio, supra note 10 at 31, citing Suntay v. Court of Appeals, 321 Phil.
809 (1995); Santiago v. Court of Appeals, 343 Phil. 612 (1997); Cruz v. Bancom Finance Corporation, 429
Phil. 225 (2002); and Ramos v. Heirs of Ramos, 431 Phil. 337 (2002).
21
22
Tongoy v. Court of Appeals, supra note 15; Manila Banking Corporation v. Silverio, 504 Phil. 17, 33
(2005).
23
24
Morales Development Company, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 137 Phil. 307 (1969).
25
26
27
28
Montecillo v. Reynes, 434 Phil. 456, 469 (2002); citing Ocejo Perez & Co. v. Flores, 40 Phil 921 (1920);
Mapalo v. Mapalo, 123 Phil. 979 (1966); Vda. de Catindig v. Roque, 165 Phil. 707 (1976); Rongavilla v.
Court of Appeals, 355 Phil. 721 (1998); and Yu Bu Guan v. Ong, 419 Phil. 845 (2001).
29
30
31
32
Premier Insurance v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 225 Phil. 370, 381 (1986); citing Labasan v. Lacuesta,
175 Phil. 216 (1978).
33
34
35
36
Eugenio v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 103737, December 15, 1994, 239 SCRA 207.
37
38
39
Ocejo Perez & Co. v. Flores, 40 Phil. 921 (1920); De Belen v. Collector of Customs, 46 Phil. 241 (1924);
Gallion v. Gayares, 53 Phil. 43 (1929); Escutin v. Escutin, 60 Phil. 922 (1934); Gonzales v. Trinidad, 67 Phil.
682 (1939); Portugal v. IAC, 242 Phil. 709 (1988).
40
41
Arsenal v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 227 Phil. 36, 46-47 (1986); Tolentiono, Civil Code of the
Philippines, Vol. IV, p. 643, [2002].
42
Sta. Romana v. Imperio, 122 Phil. 1001, 1007 (1965); Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. IV, p.
634, (2002).
43
Gonzales v. Trinidad, 67 Phil. 682, 683-684 (1939); Castro v. Escutin, 179 Phil. 277, 284 (1979).
44
Tongoy v. Court of Appeals, supra note 15; Manila Banking Corporation v. Silverio, 504 Phil. 17, 33
(2005).
45
Id.
46
47
48
Barcelona v. Barcelona, 100 Phil. 251, 255 (1956); Maestrado v. Court of Appeals, 384 Phil. 418, 432
(2000); Castro v. Miat, 445 Phil. 282 297-298 (2003), citing Pada-Kilario v. Court of Appeals, 379 Phil. 515
(2000).
49
50
51
52
Id. at 8-11.
53
Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines Inc. v. Macalinao, 491 Phil. 249, 255 (2005).
54
55
56
57
Neri v. Akutin, 72 Phil. 322, 325 (1914); Maninang v. Court of Appeals, 199 Phil. 640, 647 (1982).
58
FIRST DIVISION
ANTONIO B. BALTAZAR,
SEBASTIAN M. BALTAZAR,
ANTONIO
L.
MANGALINDAN,
ROSIE M. MATEO,
Present:
NENITA A. PACHECO,
VIRGILIO REGALA, JR.,
CORONA,
Chairperson,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
Petitioners,
C.J.,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO, and
- versus -
LORENZO LAXA,
Respondent.
Promulgated:
April 11, 2012
x-------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
775[1] Gonzales Vda. de Precilla v. Narciso, 150-B Phil. 437, 473 (1972).
776[2] Rollo, pp. 9-31.
777[3] CA rollo, pp. 177-192; penned by Associate Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr. and
concurred in by Associate Justices Hakim S. Abdulwahid and Vicente Q. Roxas.
778[4] Records, pp. 220-246; penned by Judge Jonel S. Mercado.
SO ORDERED.779[5]
Factual Antecedents
Paciencia was a 78 year old spinster when she made her last will
and testament entitled Tauli Nang Bilin o Testamento Miss Paciencia
Regala781[7] (Will) in the Pampango dialect on September 13, 1981.
779[5] CA rollo, p. 192.
780[6] Id. at 212.
781[7] Exhibit G, Folder of Exhibits, pp. 36-39.
The witnesses to the Will were Dra. Maria Lioba A. Limpin (Dra.
Limpin), Francisco Garcia (Francisco) and Faustino R. Mercado
(Faustino). The three attested to the Wills due execution by affixing
their signatures below its attestation clause784[10] and on the left
margin of pages 1, 2 and 4 thereof,785[11] in the presence of Paciencia
and of one another and of Judge Limpin who acted as notary public.
Childless and without any brothers or sisters, Paciencia
bequeathed all her properties to respondent Lorenzo R. Laxa
(Lorenzo) and his wife Corazon F. Laxa and their children Luna Lorella
Laxa and Katherine Ross Laxa, thus:
xxxx
xxxx
786[12] English Translation of the Last Will and Testament of Miss Paciencia Regala,
Exhibits H-1 and H-2, id. at 41-42.
More than four years after the death of Paciencia or on April 27,
2000, Lorenzo filed a petition788[14] with the RTC of Guagua,
Pampanga for the probate of the Will of Paciencia and for the issuance
of Letters of Administration in his favor, docketed as Special
Proceedings No. G-1186.
in favor of Antonio.801[27]
797[23] Id. at 17.
798[24] Id. at 25-28.
claim as a co-owner of the properties subject of the Will has not yet
been established.
For his part, Lorenzo testified that: from 1944 until his departure
for the USA in April 1980, he lived in Sasmuan, Pampanga with his
family and his aunt, Paciencia; in 1981 Paciencia went to the USA and
lived with him and his family until her death in January 1996; the
805[31] TSN dated January 18, 2001, pp. 2-4.
806[32] Id. at 5-6.
relationship between him and Paciencia was like that of a mother and
child since Paciencia took care of him since birth and took him in as
an adopted son; Paciencia was a spinster without children, and
without brothers and sisters; at the time of Paciencias death, she did
not suffer from any mental disorder and was of sound mind, was not
blind, deaf or mute; the Will was in the custody of Judge Limpin and
was only given to him after Paciencias death through Faustino; and he
was already residing in the USA when the Will was executed.807[33]
Lorenzo positively identified the signature of Paciencia in three
different documents and in the Will itself and stated that he was
familiar with Paciencias signature because he accompanied her in her
transactions.808[34] Further, Lorenzo belied and denied having used
force, intimidation, violence, coercion or trickery upon Paciencia to
execute the Will as he was not in the Philippines when the same was
executed.809[35] On cross-examination, Lorenzo clarified that Paciencia
informed him about the Will shortly after her arrival in the USA but
that he saw a copy of the Will only after her death.810[36]
was
placed
inside
an
envelope.815[41]
However,
she
with her the said envelope.817[43] Upon going home, however, the
envelope was no longer with Paciencia.818[44] Rosie further testified
that Paciencia was referred to as magulyan or forgetful because she
would sometimes leave her wallet in the kitchen then start looking for
it moments later.819[45] On cross examination, it was established that
Rosie was neither a doctor nor a psychiatrist, that her conclusion that
Paciencia was magulyan was based on her personal assessment,820
[46]
817[43] Id. at 7.
818[44] Id. at 8.
819[45] Id. at 9.
820[46] Id. at 10.
821[47] Id. at 11.
822[48] TSN dated January 7, 2003, p. 3.
823[49] Id. at 6-8.
were shown to him, the same were still unsigned. 824[50] According to
him, Paciencia thought that the documents pertained to a lease of
one of her rice lands,825[51] and it was he who explained that the
documents were actually a special power of attorney to lease and sell
her fishpond and other properties upon her departure for the USA,
and a Will which would transfer her properties to Lorenzo and his
family upon her death.826[52] Upon hearing this, Paciencia allegedly
uttered the following words: Why will I never [return], why will I sell all
my properties? Who is Lorenzo? Is he the only [son] of God? I have
other relatives [who should] benefit from my properties. Why should I
die already?827[53] Thereafter, Antonio advised Paciencia not to sign
the documents if she does not want to, to which the latter purportedly
replied, I know nothing about those, throw them away or it is up to
you. The more I will not sign them.828[54] After which, Paciencia left the
documents with Antonio. Antonio kept the unsigned documents
and eventually turned them over to Faustino on September 18,
1981.829[55]
824[50] Id. at 12.
825[51] Id. at 11.
826[52] Id. at 16.
827[53] Id. at 17.
828[54] Id.
829[55] Id at 18-19.
WHEREFORE, this court hereby (a) denies the petition dated April 24,
2000; and (b) disallows the notarized will dated September 13, 1981 of
Paciencia Regala.
SO ORDERED.831[57]
person
is of sound mind.
Further,
no
concrete
Issues
833[59] CA rollo, p. 185.
834[60] Id. at 188.
835[61] Id. at 193-199.
836[62] Id. at 212.
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT ALLOWED
THE PROBATE OF PACIENCIAS WILL DESPITE RESPONDENTS UTTER FAILURE
TO COMPLY WITH SECTION 11, RULE 76 OF THE RULES OF COURT;
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN MAKING
CONCLUSIONS NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD;
III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT
PETITIONERS FAILED TO PROVE THAT PACIENCIA WAS NOT OF SOUND MIND
AT THE TIME THE WILL WAS ALLEGEDLY EXECUTED837[63]
Our Ruling
Faithful
compliance
formalities
with
the
Rule 75
PRODUCTION OF WILL. ALLOWANCE OF WILL NECESSARY.
Art. 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end
thereof by the testator himself or by the testator's name written by some other person in
his presence, and by his express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more
credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another.
The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the
instrumental witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as aforesaid, each and every page
thereof, except the last, on the left margin, and all the pages shall be numbered
correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each page.
The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon which the will is
written, and the fact that the testator signed the will and every page thereof, or caused
some other person to write his name, under his express direction, in the presence of the
instrumental witnesses, and that the latter witnessed and signed the will and all the pages
thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another.
If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the witnesses, it shall be
interpreted to them.
839[65] Id.
Art. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator
and the witnesses. The notary public shall not be required to retain a copy of the will, or
file another with the Office of the Clerk of Court.
Art. 799. To be of sound mind, it is not necessary that the testator be in full
possession of all his reasoning faculties, or that his mind be wholly unbroken,
unimpaired, or unshattered by disease, injury or other cause.
It shall be sufficient if the testator was able at the time of making the will to know
the nature of the estate to be disposed of, the proper objects of his bounty, and the
character of the testamentary act.
840[66] CA rollo, pp. 193-199.
841[67] Id. at 194-195.
842[68] Torres and Lopez de Bueno v. Lopez, 48 Phil. 772, 810 (1926); Sancho v.
Abella, 58 Phil.728, 732-733 (1933).
Art. 800. The law presumes that every person is of sound mind, in the absence of
proof to the contrary.
The burden of proof that the testator was not of sound mind at the time of making
his dispositions is on the person who opposes the probate of the will; but if the testator,
one month, or less, before making his will was publicly known to be insane, the person
who maintains the validity of the will must prove that the testator made it during a lucid
interval.
RULE 76
ALLOWANCE OR DISALLOWANCE OF WILL
Section 11. Subscribing witnesses produced or accounted for where will
contested. If the will is contested, all the subscribing witnesses, and the notary in the case
of wills executed under the Civil Code of the Philippines, if present in the Philippines and
not insane, must be produced and examined, and the death, absence, or insanity of any of
them must be satisfactorily shown to the court. If all or some of such witnesses are
present in the Philippines but outside the province where the will has been filed, their
deposition must be taken. If any or all of them testify against the due execution of the
will, or do not remember having attested to it, or are otherwise of doubtful credibility, the
will may nevertheless, be allowed if the court is satisfied from the testimony of other
witnesses and from all the evidence presented that the will was executed and attested in
the manner required by law.
If a holographic will is contested, the same shall be allowed if at least three (3)
witnesses who know the handwriting of the testator explicitly declare that the will and the
signature are in the handwriting of the testator; in the absence of any competent
witnesses, and if the court deem it necessary, expert testimony may be resorted to.
(Emphasis supplied.)
They insist that all subscribing witnesses and the notary public
should have been presented in court since all but one witness,
Francisco, are still living.
was able to satisfactorily account for the incapacity and failure of the
said subscribing witness and of the notary public to testify in court.
Because of this the probate of Paciencias Will may be allowed on the
basis of Dra. Limpins testimony proving her sanity and the due
execution of the Will, as well as on the proof of her handwriting. It is
an established rule that [a] testament may not be disallowed just
because the attesting witnesses declare against its due execution;
neither does it have to be necessarily allowed just because all the
attesting witnesses declare in favor of its legalization; what is decisive
is that the court is convinced by evidence before it, not necessarily
from the attesting witnesses, although they must testify, that the will
was or was not duly executed in the manner required by law.847[73]
WE CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Chairperson
849[75] Id. at 473.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
TEEHANKEE, J.:
In this review by certiorari of the appellate court's resolution dismissing the petition filed by petitioners challenging the lower court's orders
appointing private respondent Beda Gonzales as special administrator of the intestate estate of the decedent Agustin Medina, the Court
excludes the said special administrator from interfering in the possession and enjoyment of the harvests of the property known as "Bitukang
Manok" by petitioner Rosalia M. del Carmen to whom the said property had been sold, and full payment therefor received, by the estate
through Gonzales' predecessor with the approval of the lower court, which overruled Gonzales' opposition thereto as an assignee of some
heirs of the estate, and as one personally interested in the purchase of the property for himself.
The Court's action is based on the established doctrine that a person with an adverse conflicting interest is unsuitable for the trust reposed in
an administrator of an estate. Respondent Gonzales, whose appeal of the lower court's order of approval of the sale to the Court of Appeals
is pending, cannot be at the same time an appellant in his personal capacity opposing the sale of the property and an appellee representing
the estate and upholding the same sale as made by the estate through Gonzales' predecessor as special administrator with the due approval
and confirmation of the lower court. Since the estate proceedings have been pending for over 13 years now without the lower court once
having appointed a regular administrator, said court is directed to name a suitable person as regular administrator charged with the task of
accomplishing the administration of the estate with the utmost reasonable dispatch.
From the papers submitted with the petition, it appears that as noted by respondent court of first instance of Zambales, presided by Judge
1
most expeditious way", and the said court expressed its "desire ... to terminate the proceedings once and
for all."
Respondent lower court, through its said order, overruled the opposition of therein oppositor-heir Uldarico
S. Medina and of assignee Beda J. Gonzales, private respondent herein, who claimed therein "to have an
interest over the estate on the ground that certain heirs have already sold their shares and/or interest over
the same in his favor" as being "without merit." It found Uldarico's interest as "confined solely to his desire
to partake of whatever share he has in the estate in the same way with that of the rest of the heirs." It
further held that respondent Beda J. Gonzales "could not ... claim a better right over that of the herein
vendee Rosalia Medina del Carmen in the deed of sale because the said Beda J. Gonzales is merely
subrogated, if at all, to the interests of the heirs concerned who according to the records, have received
more benefits from the estate even before its distribution as against that of the vendee, who according to
the records has never received anything yet from the estate." 2
In the same order, upon "suggestion and agreement of the parties" which the lower court "considered to
be well taken for the speedy termination of the instant proceedings," it designated its clerk of court, Atty.
Pastor de Castro, Jr. as "special administrator and to qualify immediately as such in lieu of special
administrator Demetrio Encarnacion." 3
No regular administrator to settle the estate once and for all appears to have ever been appointed by
respondent lower court during the period of over thirteen years that the estate has been pending
settlement.
Respondent Gonzales appealed respondent court's order of approval and confirmation of the sale of the
"Bitukang Manok" property as an interested party-assignee opposed to the sale executed by the estate of
the deceased Agustin Medina through its then special administrator Demetrio Encarnacion, later replaced
by the clerk of court, Atty. Pastor de Castro, Jr., as above stated, on his assertion that he had bought the
rights of the other heirs of the estate those of a majority of the heirs, according to his answer at bar.
The appeal is now pending in the Court of Appeals. 4
Almost a year later, in an order dated February 11, 1971, acting on the motion dated October 5, 1970 of
respondent Gonzales for appointment as regular administrator of the estate, respondent lower court
appointed him "not as a regular administrator but only as special administrator for the intestate estate of
the deceased Agustin Medina" and he qualified as such upon posting of the bond fixed in the amount of
P5,000.00 and replaced "judicial administrator Pastor de Castro, Jr." 5
An urgent motion dated March 22, 1971 to revoke Gonzales' appointment as special administrator on the
ground that "by said order, Beda Gonzales is now assuming the inconsistent positions of administering
the estate especially the Bitukang Manok property and at the same time appealing from the order
approving the sale of that property only for the purpose of enabling himself to buy and acquire that
property to the loss and prejudice of the estate contrary to law" 6 was denied by respondent lower court in
its order dated July 21, 1971. 7
In the same order of July 21, 1971, said court also rejected the petitioner Rosalia's petition dated May 5,
1971, for the appointment of a regular administrator as "very urgent and necessary" and proposing that
co-petitioner Serafin Medina, as heir and son and next of kin of the decedent, who has no adverse
interests in his favor and against the estate and is a qualified and competent resident of Olongapo City be
named as such, holding that:
... considering that whatever rights and interest the heirs may have over the estate now
under administration by Beda J. Gonzales could be amply protected since the said
special administrator has posted a bond in the amount of P5,000.00; considering further
that there is no showing that said administrator has been remiss in the performance of his
duties or violated the trust reposed on him as administrator; and in order not to delay any
further the termination of this proceeding which has lagged long enough, the Court finds
said petition of Serafin Medina to be without merit and the same is hereby denied and the
appointment of said J. Gonzales as special administrator is hereby retained. 8
Reconsideration having been denied by respondent lower court under its order of September 28, 1971,
petitioners instituted in the Court of Appeals an action for certiorari with preliminary injunction under date
of September 20, 1971, citing respondent Gonzales' conflicting interests as special administrator and as
"interested buyer ... persisting in objecting to the sale, in his desire to be the buyer (of the Bitukang
Manok property) despite Court approval, thereby causing the estate unnecessary delay and expense to
the prejudice of the other heirs" and his interference with and collection of the harvests of the said
property duly sold to petitioner Rosalia M. del Carmen, as well as pressing for the appointment instead of
petitioner Serafin Medina, as disinterested heir and next of kin, as administrator of the estate. 9
Respondent court of appeals, however, under its resolution of January 6, 1972, found the "petition
insufficient in substance to merit due course" and ordered the dismissal thereof, on the ground "(1) that it
is not disputed that the lower court has jurisdiction to appoint respondent Beda J. Gonzales as special
administrator; (2) that petitioners merely allege that the lower court had gravely abused its discretion
without any prima facie showing to this effect: (3) considering further that the lower court had considered
and resolved herein petitioners' objections to respondent Gonzales' continuation as such administrator, to
wit, [quoting the considerations stated in the lower court's order dated July 21, 1971, already quoted
hereinabove]; considering, finally, that it is well-settled that the actuations of the trial court should not be
disturbed except upon showing of lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
tribunal, involving whimsical and/or capricious exercise of discretion."
Their motion for reconsideration of such dismissal having failed, petitioners instituted the present action
for review on February 23, 1972. The Court issued on February 29, 1972 a temporary restraining order
restraining respondent lower court and respondent Gonzales "from implementing (the lower court's)
orders dated February 11, 1971, July 21, 1971 and September 28, 1971 ... and from otherwise interfering
in the possession by the petitioner Rosalia M. del Carmen of a property known as "Bitukang Manok" of
the intestate estate of the deceased Agustin Medina ... and private respondent ... from interfering in the
cultivation and harvests or otherwise disturbing the possession of aforementioned property by said
petitioner." Upon the Court's giving due course to the petition per its resolution of March 24, 1972, it
ordered the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to the same effect upon the posting of an injunction
bond of P2,000.00, and such writ was issued on May 29, 1972.
Insofar as the petition assails the appointment of respondent Gonzales as special administrator giving rise
to the anomalous situation "where in an appealed intestate case to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No.
49439-R, entitled "Intestate Estate of the Deceased Agustin R. Medina; Pastor de Castro, Jr. (now Beda
Gonzales) Special Administrator, versus Uldarico Medina and Beda J. Gonzales, Movant's) the appellate
and the appellant are one and the same person," the petition is manifestly meritorious and must be
granted.The sale to Rosalia of the Bitukang Manok property having been approved and confirmed by
respondent lower court over the personal opposition of said respondent on March 6, 1970 which approval
he appealed to the Court of Appeals, his subsequent appointment as special administrator of the estate a
year later under respondent lower court's order of February 11, 1971 created a clear conflict of interest
that could cause grave damage and prejudice to the estate and subject it to unnecessary suits.
With specific reference to the Bitukang Manok property as sold by the estate through Gonzales'
predecessor as special administrator and confirmed by the lower court, the same has passed to petitioner
Rosalia's ownership and possession since the court's confirmation of the sale on March 6, 1970 and the
estate makes no further claim against the same but on the contrary has defended the sale and Rosalia's
title thereto as the vendee thereof as against Gonzales' adverse opposition in the appeal brought by
Gonzales in his personal capacity. Yet now, as complained of by Rosalia, Gonzales by virtue of his
appointment, as special administrator a year later seeks in such other capacity to interfere with her in the
harvests of the property purportedly on behalf of the estate when in fact he is going against the official
stand of the estate which upholds the sale.
It is readily seen thereby that Gonzales has been placed in an unduly favored position where he may use
his position as special administrator to favor his personal interests as one interested in the purchase of
the property for himself, although he denies obliquely in his brief such personal interest with the statement
that "there is no evidence or pleading of record that (he) is interested in the acquisition for himself of the
Bitukang Manok property ... and it is a matter of record that having acquired the rights and interests of the
majority of the heirs, he had stepped into the shoes of such heirs, hence, his concern and interest to
protect the estate, as special administrator" 10 which is to say, to protect his claimed majority interest in
the estate, hence his insistence on opposing the sale.
Grave prejudice may thus be inflicted by him on petitioner Rosalia's as an heir as well as the other heirs
such as petitioner Serafin Medina because of the further delay (13 years now) in their receiving their
distributive shares of their father's estate (as against their co-heirs who have sold and assigned their
rights and shares in the estate to Gonzales) as well as to Rosalia as buyer because of Gonzales'
interference with her enjoyment of the property paid for in full by her since 1970.
Hence, the established doctrine that an administrator is deemed unsuitable and should be removed
where his personal interests conflict with his official duties, by virtue of the equally established principle
that an administrator is a quasi trustee, disqualified from acquiring properties of the estate, 11 and who
should be indifferent between the estate and claimants of the property except to preserve it for due
administration, and who should be removed when his interest conflicts with such right and duly. 12
As restated by the Court in Lim vs. Dias-Millares, 13 "(I)n this jurisdiction, one is considered to be
unsuitable for appointment as administrator when he has adverse interest of some kind of hostility to
those immediately interested in the estate.".
The Court noted from the questioned order of February 11, 1971 that respondent Gonzales was
designated special administrator in replacement of the lower court's clerk of court, Atty. Pastor de Castro,
Jr., who had been appointed as such in the earlier order of March 6, 1970. The Court does not look with
favor on such practice of clerks of court or other court employees being appointed as administrators of
estates of decedents pending settlement before the probate court. The objectivity and impartiality of such
clerks of court or other employees so appointed as administrators in discharging their regular functions
may be easily compromised by extraneous considerations. Furthermore, because of the administrator's
fees and compensation payable to them, it is not inconceivable that self-interest intrudes and consciously
or unconsciously, obstacles are placed against the prompt settlement and termination of the proceedings
in derogation of the primordial purpose of the law to strive to have the estate settled expeditiously and
promptly so that the benefits that may flow therefrom may be immediately enjoyed by the decedent's heirs
and beneficiaries. 14 Probate courts are therefore enjoined to desist from such practice of appointing their
clerks of court or other court employees as administrators or receivers of estates or the like.
On this consideration (the replacement of the clerk of court) and on the further consideration of the
specific and limited powers of special administrators and that their appointment merely temporary and
subsists only until a regular administrator is duly appointed (since Rule 80, section 1 provides for the
appointment of a special administrator as a caretaker only "when there is delay in granting letters
testamentary or of administration by any cause") 15 the Court has resolved to allow the appointment of
respondent Gonzales as special administrator to stand, insofar as taking care of the other properties of
the estate are concerned, to the exclusion of the Bitukang Manok property already sold by the estate to
petitioner Rosalia del Carmen. (The said property shall pertain to said petitioner's possession and
enjoyment as the vendee thereof and in the event that the appellate courts find cause to set aside the
lower court's confirmation of the sale in her favor in the pending appeal of Gonzales in his personal
capacity, then shall be the time for the estate and/or the heirs to reclaim possession of the property upon
return to her of the purchase price paid by her).
The Court has finally noted that while the estate involved is not large and there seem to be no
complicated questions that have impeded its prompt settlement, and notwithstanding the lower court's
avowed desire to terminate the proceedings once and for all, the said estate proceedings have been
pending now for over thirteen years without the lower court once having appointed a regular administrator
in accordance with the Rules of Court to take charge of the settlement thereof and the distribution and
partition of the net estate to the heirs entitled thereto.
As time and again stated by the Court, while the provisions of the Rules of Court may be deemed
directory in nature, "the speedy settlement of the estates of deceased persons for the benefit of creditors
and those entitled to residue by way of inheritance or legacy after the debts and expenses of
administration have been paid, is the ruling spirit of our probate law" 16 and "courts of first instance should
exert themselves to close up estate within twelve months from the time they are presented, and they may
refuse to allow any compensation to executors and administrators who do not actively labor to that end,
and they may even adopt harsher measures." 17
As in the cited jurisprudence, therefore, respondent lower court is directed to name a suitable person or
entity, who is competent and qualified and doesnot suffer from any proscribed conflict of interest, (and
preferably upon the common agreement of the heirs, to avoid any further bickerings) as regular
administrator charged with the task of accomplishing and terminating the administration of the estate with
the utmost reasonable dispatch, with a view to an early distribution of the net estate among the heirs and
persons entitled thereto.
ACCORDINGLY, the dismissal resolution of the Court of Appeals is hereby modified and in lieu thereof,
judgment is entered allowing the appointment of respondent Gonzales special administrator to stand,
insofar as taking care temporarily of the other properties of the estate are concerned, but to the exclusion
of the Bitukang Manok property previously sold by the estate to petitioner Rosalia M. del Carmen, who is
entitled to the enjoyment of said property as the vendee thereof.
The writ of preliminary injunction heretofore granted is hereby ordered liftedexcept as to the portion
thereof enjoining private respondent from interfering in the cultivation and harvests or otherwise disturbing
the possession of the Bitukang Manok property by petitioner Rosalia M. del Carmen which is hereby
made permanent.
Respondent lower court is ordered to implement the above directive of this Court to name a suitable
person as regular administrator charged with the task of accomplishing and terminating the administration
of the estate with the utmost reasonable dispatch and to submit a report of his action thereon to the Court
within thirty (30) days from notice of entry of this judgment.
Without pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.
Makalintal, Actg. C.J., Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Barredo, Antonio and Esguerra, JJ., concur.
Makasiar, J., took no part.
July 8, 2013
HEIRS OF MAGDALENO YPON, NAMELY, ALVARO YPON, ERUDITA Y. BARON, CICERO YPON, WILSON
YPON, VICTOR YPON, AND HINIDINO Y. PEALOSA, PETITIONERS,
vs.
GAUDIOSO PONTERAS RICAFORTE A.K.A. "GAUDIOSO E. YPON," AND THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF
TOLEDO CITY, RESPONDENTS.
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
This is a direct recourse to the Court from the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City, Branch 59 (RTC), through a petition for
review on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, raising a pure question of law. In particular, petitioners assail the
July 27, 20112 and August 31, 20113 Orders of the RTC, dismissing Civil Case No. T-2246 for lack of cause of action.
The Facts
On July 29, 2010, petitioners, together with some of their cousins,4 filed a complaint for Cancellation of Title and
Reconveyance with Damages (subject complaint) against respondent Gaudioso Ponteras Ricaforte a.k.a. "Gaudioso E.
Ypon" (Gaudioso), docketed as Civil Case No. T-2246.5 In their complaint, they alleged that Magdaleno Ypon (Magdaleno)
died intestate and childless on June 28, 1968, leaving behind Lot Nos. 2-AA, 2-C, 2-F, and 2-J which were then covered by
Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. T-44 and T-77-A.6 Claiming to be the sole heir of Magdaleno, Gaudioso executed
an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication and caused the cancellation of the aforementioned certificates of title, leading to their
subsequent transfer in his name under TCT Nos. T-2637 and T-2638,7 to the prejudice of petitioners who are Magdalenos
collateral relatives and successors-in-interest.8
In his Answer, Gaudioso alleged that he is the lawful son of Magdaleno as evidenced by: (a) his certificate of Live Birth; (b)
two (2) letters from Polytechnic School; and (c) a certified true copy of his passport.9 Further, by way of affirmative defense,
he claimed that: (a) petitioners have no cause of action against him; (b) the complaint fails to state a cause of action; and (c)
the case is not prosecuted by the real parties-in-interest, as there is no showing that the petitioners have been judicially
declared as Magdalenos lawful heirs.10
The RTC Ruling
On July 27, 2011, the RTC issued the assailed July 27, 2011 Order,11 finding that the subject complaint failed to state a cause
of action against Gaudioso. It observed that while the plaintiffs therein had established their relationship with Magdaleno in
a previous special proceeding for the issuance of letters of administration,12 this did not mean that they could already be
considered as the decedents compulsory heirs. Quite the contrary, Gaudioso satisfactorily established the fact that he is
Magdalenos son and hence, his compulsory heir through the documentary evidence he submitted which consisted of: (a)
a marriage contract between Magdaleno and Epegenia Evangelista; (b) a Certificate of Live Birth; (c) a Letter dated
February 19, 1960; and (d) a passport.13
The plaintiffs therein filed a motion for reconsideration which was, however, denied on August 31, 2011 due to the counsels
failure to state the date on which his Mandatory Continuing Legal Education Certificate of Compliance was issued.14
Aggrieved, petitioners, who were among the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. T-2246,15 sought direct recourse to the Court
through the instant petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The core of the present controversy revolves around the issue of whether or not the RTCs dismissal of the case on the
ground that the subject complaint failed to state a cause of action was proper.
The Courts Ruling
The petition has no merit.
Cause of action is defined as the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another.16 It is well-settled that the
existence of a cause of action is determined by the allegations in the complaint.17 In this relation, a complaint is said to assert
a sufficient cause of action if, admitting what appears solely on its face to be correct, the plaintiff would be entitled to the
relief prayed for.18Accordingly, if the allegations furnish sufficient basis by which the complaint can be maintained, the same
should not be dismissed, regardless of the defenses that may be averred by the defendants.19
As stated in the subject complaint, petitioners, who were among the plaintiffs therein, alleged that they are the lawful heirs
of Magdaleno and based on the same, prayed that the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication executed by Gaudioso be declared null
and void and that the transfer certificates of title issued in the latters favor be cancelled. While the foregoing allegations, if
admitted to be true, would consequently warrant the reliefs sought for in the said complaint, the rule that the determination
of a decedents lawful heirs should be made in the corresponding special proceeding20 precludes the RTC, in an ordinary
action for cancellation of title and reconveyance, from granting the same. In the case of Heirs of Teofilo Gabatan v. CA,21 the
Court, citing several other precedents, held that the determination of who are the decedents lawful heirs must be made in the
proper special proceeding for such purpose, and not in an ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and/or possession, as in
this case:
Jurisprudence dictates that the determination of who are the legal heirs of the deceased must be made in the proper special
proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and possession of property.1wphi1 This must
take precedence over the action for recovery of possession and ownership. The Court has consistently ruled that the trial
court cannot make a declaration of heirship in the civil action for the reason that such a declaration can only be made in a
special proceeding. Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court, a civil action is defined as one by which a
party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong while a special
proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. It is then decisively clear that
the declaration of heirship can be made only in a special proceeding inasmuch as the petitioners here are seeking the
establishment of a status or right.
In the early case of Litam, et al. v. Rivera, this Court ruled that the declaration of heirship must be made in a special
proceeding, and not in an independent civil action. This doctrine was reiterated in Solivio v. Court of Appeals x x x:
In the more recent case of Milagros Joaquino v. Lourdes Reyes, the Court reiterated its ruling that matters relating to the
rights of filiation and heirship must be ventilated in the proper probate court in a special proceeding instituted precisely for
the purpose of determining such rights. Citing the case of Agapay v. Palang, this Court held that the status of an illegitimate
child who claimed to be an heir to a decedent's estate could not be adjudicated in an ordinary civil action which, as in this
case, was for the recovery of property.22 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; citations omitted)
By way of exception, the need to institute a separate special proceeding for the determination of heirship may be dispensed
with for the sake of practicality, as when the parties in the civil case had voluntarily submitted the issue to the trial court and
already presented their evidence regarding the issue of heirship, and the RTC had consequently rendered judgment thereon,23
or when a special proceeding had been instituted but had been finally closed and terminated, and hence, cannot be reopened.24
In this case, none of the foregoing exceptions, or those of similar nature, appear to exist. Hence, there lies the need to
institute the proper special proceeding in order to determine the heirship of the parties involved, ultimately resulting to the
dismissal of Civil Case No. T-2246.
Verily, while a court usually focuses on the complaint in determining whether the same fails to state a cause of action, a
court cannot disregard decisions material to the proper appreciation of the questions before it.25 Thus, concordant with
applicable jurisprudence, since a determination of heirship cannot be made in an ordinary action for recovery of ownership
and/or possession, the dismissal of Civil Case No. T-2246 was altogether proper. In this light, it must be pointed out that the
RTC erred in ruling on Gaudiosos heirship which should, as herein discussed, be threshed out and determined in the proper
special proceeding. As such, the foregoing pronouncement should therefore be devoid of any legal effect.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The dismissal of Civil Case No. T-2246 is hereby AFFIRMED, without prejudice
to any subsequent proceeding to determine the lawful heirs of the late Magdaleno Ypon and the rights concomitant
therewith.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, (Chairperson), Del Castillo, Perez, and Mendoza,* JJ., concur.
Footnotes
* Designated Acting Member per Special Order No. 1484 dated July 9, 2013.
1
Id. at 31.
Id. at 32. The plaintiffs in Civil Case No. T-2246 are as follows: Francisca Y. Trilla, Elena Yntig, Cerelo
Ypon, Esterlita Y. Sereo, Alvaro Ypon, Rogelio Ypon, Simplico Ypon, Jr., Monaliza B. Judilla, Lilia B.
Quinada, Teodora A. Baron, Teofilo Ypon, Mauricio Ypon, Vicente Ypon, Pabling Ypon and Diega Ypon,
Erudita Baron, Cristobal Ypon, Elizabeth Ypon, Francisco Ypon, Lolita Y. Gamao, Egnacia Y. Cavada, Serafin
Ypon, Victor Ypon, Prudencio Ypon, Jr., Allan Ypon, Raul Ypon, Rey Rufo Ypon, Galicursi Ypon, Minda Y.
Libre, Moises Ypon, Jr., Bethoven Ypon, Divina A. Sanchez, Cicero Ypon, Minerva Ypon, Lucinita Ypon,
Crisolina Y. Tingal, Jessica Ypon, Nonoy Ypon, Wilson Ypon, Arthur Ypon, Yolanda Ypon, Lilia Y. Cordero,
Ester Y. Hinlo, Lydia Ypon, Percival Ypon, Esmeralda Y. Baron, Emelita Y. Chiong, Victor Ypon, Primitivo
Ypon, Jr., Pura Ypon, Ma. Nila Ypon, Roy Ipon, Eric Ypon, Henry Ypon, Felipa, Ypon, Felipa Ypon, Vivian
Ypon, Hilarion Pealosa, Angeles D. Libre, Clarita P. Lopez, Vicente Y. Pealosa, Jr., Columbus Y. Pealosa,
Jose Y. Pealosa, Alberto Y. Pealosa, Teodoro Y. Pealosa, Louella P. Madraga, Pomelo Y. Pealosa, and
Agnes P. Villora. (In boldface are the names of the plaintiffs who are also petitioners in this case.)
5
Id. at 32-39.
Id. at 33.
Id. at 34.
Id.
Id. at 53-54.
10
Id. at 54.
11
Id. at 28-30.
12
Id. at 69. Docketed as Sp. Pro. No. 608-T. Entitled "In Re: Petition for Issuance of Letter of Administration,
Minda Ypon Libre, Cristobal E. Ypon, and Agnes P. Veloria, petitioners v. City Registrar of Deeds and City
Assessor of the City of Toledo, respondents."
13
Id. at 30.
14
Id. at 31.
15
Based on the records, it appears that only petitioner Hinidino Y. Pealosa was not a complainant in Civil
Case No. T-2246.
16
17
Peltan Development, Inc. v. Court of Appeals (CA), 336 Phil. 824, 833 (1997).
18
Davao Light & Power Co., Inc. v. Judge, Regional Trial Court Davao City, Branch 8, G.R. No. 147058,
March 10, 2006, 484 SCRA 272, 281.
19
The Consolidated Bank and Trust Corp. v. CA, 274 Phil. 947, 955 (1991).
20
21
22
Id. at 78-80.
23
Id. at 80-81. "[When] there appears to be only one parcel of land being claimed by the contending parties as
their inheritance x x x [i]t would be more practical to dispense with a separate special proceeding for the
determination of the status of respondent as the sole heir x x x specially [when the parties to the civil case
had] voluntarily submitted the issue to the RTC and already presented their evidence regarding the issue of
heirship in these proceedings [and] the RTC [had] assumed jurisdiction over the same and consequently
rendered judgment thereon."
24
"Where special proceedings had been instituted but had been finally closed and terminated, however, or if a
putative heir has lost the right to have himself declared in the special proceedings as co-heir and he can no
longer ask for its re-opening, then an ordinary civil action can be filed for his declaration as heir in order to
bring about the annulment of the partition or distribution or adjudication of a property or properties belonging
to the estate of the deceased." (Republic v. Mangotara, G.R. No. 170375, July 07, 2010, 624 SCRA 360, 443,
citing Portugal v. Portugal-Beltran, G.R. No. 155555, August 16, 2005, 467 SCRA 184-189).
25
ANTIPOLO INING (DECEASED), SURVIVED BY MANUEL VILLANUEVA, TEODORA VILLANUEVAFRANCISCO, CAMILO FRANCISCO, ADOLFO FRANCISCO, LUCIMO FRANCISCO, JR., MILAGROS
FRANCISCO,* CELEDONIO FRANCISCO, HERMINIGILDO FRANCISCO; RAMON TRESVALLES,
ROBERTO TAJONERA, NATIVIDAD INING-IBEA (DECEASED) SURVIVED BY EDILBERTO IBEA, JOSEFA
IBEA, MARTHA IBEA, CARMEN IBEA, AMPARO IBEA-FERNANDEZ, HENRY RUIZ, EUGENIO RUIZ AND
PASTOR RUIZ; DOLORES INING-RIMON (DECEASED) SURVIVED BY JESUS RIMON, CESARIA RIMON
GONZALES AND REMEDIOS RIMON CORDERO; AND PEDRO INING (DECEASED) SURVIVED BY ELISA
TAN INING (WIFE) AND PEDRO INING, JR., PETITIONERS,
vs.
LEONARDO R. VEGA, SUBSTITUTED BY LOURDES VEGA, RESTONILO I. VEGA, CRISPULO M. VEGA,
MILBUENA VEGA-RESTITUTO, AND LENARD VEGA, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
One who is merely related by affinity to the decedent does not inherit from the latter and cannot become a co-owner of the
decedents property. Consequently, he cannot effect a repudiation of the co-ownership of the estate that was formed among
the decedents heirs.
Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari1 are the March 14, 2006 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CAG.R. CV No. 74687 and its September 7, 2006 Resolution3 denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.4
Factual Antecedents
Leon Roldan (Leon), married to Rafaela Menez (Rafaela), is the owner of a 3,120-square meter parcel of land (subject
property) in Kalibo, Aklan covered by Original Certificate of Title No. (24071) RO-6305 (OCT RO-630). Leon and Rafaela
died without issue. Leon was survived by his siblings Romana Roldan (Romana) and Gregoria Roldan Ining (Gregoria),
who are now both deceased.
Romana was survived by her daughter Anunciacion Vega and grandson, herein respondent Leonardo R. Vega (Leonardo)
(also both deceased). Leonardo in turn is survived by his wife Lourdes and children Restonilo I. Vega, Crispulo M. Vega,
Milbuena Vega-Restituto and Lenard Vega, the substituted respondents.
Gregoria, on the other hand, was survived by her six children: petitioners Natividad Ining-Ibea (Natividad), Dolores IningRimon (Dolores), Antipolo, and Pedro; Jose; and Amando. Natividad is survived by Edilberto Ibea, Josefa Ibea, Martha
Ibea, Carmen Ibea, Amparo Ibea-Fernandez, Henry Ruiz and Pastor Ruiz. Dolores is survived by Jesus Rimon, Cesaria
Rimon Gonzales and Remedios Rimon Cordero. Antipolo is survived by Manuel Villanueva, daughter Teodora VillanuevaFrancisco (Teodora), Camilo Francisco (Camilo), Adolfo Francisco (Adolfo), Lucimo Francisco, Jr. (Lucimo Jr.), Milagros
Francisco, Celedonio Francisco, and Herminigildo Francisco (Herminigildo). Pedro is survived by his wife, Elisa Tan Ining
and Pedro Ining, Jr. Amando died without issue. As for Jose, it is not clear from the records if he was made party to the
proceedings, or if he is alive at all.
In short, herein petitioners, except for Ramon Tresvalles (Tresvalles) and Roberto Tajonera (Tajonera), are Gregorias
grandchildren or spouses thereof (Gregorias heirs).
In 1997, acting on the claim that one-half of subject property belonged to him as Romanas surviving heir, Leonardo filed
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Kalibo, Aklan Civil Case No. 52756 for partition, recovery of ownership and
possession, with damages, against Gregorias heirs. In his Amended Complaint,7 Leonardo alleged that on several occasions,
he demanded the partition of the property but Gregorias heirs refused to heed his demands; that the matter reached the level
of the Lupon Tagapamayapa, which issued a certification to file a court action sometime in 1980; that Gregorias heirs
claimed sole ownership of the property; that portions of the property were sold to Tresvalles and Tajonera, which portions
must be collated and included as part of the portion to be awarded to Gregorias heirs; that in 1979, Lucimo Francisco, Sr.
(Lucimo Sr.), husband of herein petitioner Teodora, illegally claimed absolute ownership of the property and transferred in
his name the tax declaration covering the property; that from 1988, Lucimo Sr. and Teodora have deprived him (Leonardo)
of the fruits of the property estimated at P1,000.00 per year; that as a result, he incurred expenses by way of attorneys fees
and litigation costs. Leonardo thus prayed that he be declared the owner of half of the subject property; that the same be
partitioned after collation and determination of the portion to which he is entitled; that Gregorias heirs be ordered to execute
the necessary documents or agreements; and that he (Leonardo) be awarded actual damages in the amount of P1,000.00 per
year from 1988, attorneys fees of P50,000.00, and lawyers appearance fees of P500.00 per hearing.
In their Answer8 with counterclaim, Teodora, Camilo, Adolfo, Lucimo Jr. and Herminigildo claimed that Leonardo had no
cause of action against them; that they have become the sole owners of the subject property through Lucimo Sr. who
acquired the same in good faith by sale from Juan Enriquez (Enriquez), who in turn acquired the same from Leon, and
Leonardo was aware of this fact; that they were in continuous, actual, adverse, notorious and exclusive possession of the
property with a just title; that they have been paying the taxes on the property; that Leonardos claim is barred by estoppel
and laches; and that they have suffered damages and were forced to litigate as a result of Leonardos malicious suit. They
prayed that Civil Case No. 5275 be dismissed; that Leonardo be declared to be without any right to the property; that
Leonardo be ordered to surrender the certificate of title to the property; and that they be awarded P20,000.00 as moral
damages, P10,000.00 as temperate and nominal damages, P20,000.00 as attorneys fees, and double costs.
The other Gregoria heirs, as well as Tresvalles and Tajonera were declared in default.9
As agreed during pre-trial, the trial court commissioned Geodetic Engineer Rafael M. Escabarte to identify the metes and
bounds of the property.10 The resulting Commissioners Report and Sketch,11 as well as the Supplementary Commissioners
Report,12 were duly approved by the parties. The parties then submitted the following issues for resolution of the trial court:
Whether Leonardo is entitled to a share in Leons estate;
Whether Leon sold the subject property to Lucimo Sr.; and
Whether Leonardos claim has prescribed, or that he is barred by estoppel or laches.13
In the meantime, Leonardo passed away and was duly substituted by his heirs, the respondents herein.14
During the course of the proceedings, the following additional relevant facts came to light:
1. In 1995, Leonardo filed against petitioners Civil Case No. 4983 for partition with the RTC Kalibo, but the
case was dismissed and referred to the Kalibo Municipal Trial Court (MTC), where the case was docketed as
Civil Case No. 1366. However, on March 4, 1997, the MTC dismissed Civil Case No. 1366 for lack of
jurisdiction and declared that only the RTC can take cognizance of the partition case;15
2. The property was allegedly sold by Leon to Enriquez through an unnotarized document dated April 4,
1943.16 Enriquez in turn allegedly sold the property to Lucimo Sr. on November 25, 1943 via another private
sale document;17
3. Petitioners were in sole possession of the property for more than 30 years, while Leonardo acquired
custody of OCT RO-630;18
4. On February 9, 1979, Lucimo Sr. executed an Affidavit of Ownership of Land19 claiming sole ownership of
the property which he utilized to secure in his name Tax Declaration No. 16414 (TD 16414) over the property
On March 14, 2006, the CA issued the questioned Decision,27 which contained the following decretal portion:
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, this appeal is GRANTED. The decision of the Regional Trial Court, Br. 8, Kalibo,
Aklan in Civil Case No. 5275 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. In lieu thereof, judgment is rendered as follows:
1. Declaring 1/2 portion of Lot 1786 as the share of the plaintiffs as successors-in-interest of Romana Roldan;
2. Declaring 1/2 portion of Lot 1786 as the share of the defendants as successors-in-interest of Gregoria
Roldan Ining;
3. Ordering the defendants to deliver the possession of the portion described in paragraphs 8 and 9 of the
Commissioners Report (Supplementary) to the herein plaintiffs;
4. Ordering the cancellation of OCT No. RO-630 (24071) in the name of Leon Roldan and the Register of
Deeds of Aklan is directed to issue transfer certificates of title to the plaintiffs in accordance with paragraphs
8 and 9 of the sketch plan as embodied in the Commissioners Report (Supplementary) and the remaining
portion thereof be adjudged to the defendants.
Other claims and counterclaims are dismissed.
Costs against the defendants-appellees.
SO ORDERED.28
The CA held that the trial courts declaration of nullity of the April 4, 1943 and November 25, 1943 deeds of sale in favor of
Enriquez and Lucimo Sr., respectively, became final and was settled by petitioners failure to appeal the same. Proceeding
from the premise that no valid prior disposition of the property was made by its owner Leon and that the property which
remained part of his estate at the time of his death passed on by succession to his two siblings, Romana and Gregoria,
which thus makes the parties herein who are Romanas and Gregorias heirs co-owners of the property in equal shares,
the appellate court held that only the issues of prescription and laches were needed to be resolved.
The CA did not agree with the trial courts pronouncement that Leonardos action for partition was barred by prescription.
The CA declared that prescription began to run not from Leons death in 1962, but from Lucimo Sr.s execution of the
Affidavit of Ownership of Land in 1979, which amounted to a repudiation of his co-ownership of the property with
Leonardo. Applying the fifth paragraph of Article 494 of the Civil Code, which provides that "[n]o prescription shall run in
favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the coownership," the CA held that it was only when Lucimo Sr. executed the Affidavit of Ownership of Land in 1979 and
obtained a new tax declaration over the property (TD 16414) solely in his name that a repudiation of his co-ownership with
Leonardo was made, which repudiation effectively commenced the running of the 30-year prescriptive period under Article
1141.
The CA did not consider Lucimo Sr.s sole possession of the property for more than 30 years to the exclusion of Leonardo
and the respondents as a valid repudiation of the co-ownership either, stating that his exclusive possession of the property
and appropriation of its fruits even his continuous payment of the taxes thereon while adverse as against strangers, may
not be deemed so as against Leonardo in the absence of clear and conclusive evidence to the effect that the latter was ousted
or deprived of his rights as co-owner with the intention of assuming exclusive ownership over the property, and absent a
showing that this was effectively made known to Leonardo. Citing Bargayo v. Camumot29 and Segura v. Segura,30 the
appellate court held that as a rule, possession by a co-owner will not be presumed to be adverse to the other co-owners but
will be held to benefit all, and that a co-owner or co-heir is in possession of an inheritance pro-indiviso for himself and in
representation of his co-owners or co-heirs if he administers or takes care of the rest thereof with the obligation to deliver
the same to his co-owners or co-heirs, as is the case of a depositary, lessee or trustee.
The CA added that the payment of taxes by Lucimo Sr. and the issuance of a new tax declaration in his name do not prove
ownership; they merely indicate a claim of ownership. Moreover, petitioners act of partitioning the property among
themselves to the exclusion of Leonardo cannot affect the latter; nor may it be considered a repudiation of the co-ownership
as it has not been shown that the partition was made known to Leonardo.
The CA held further that the principle of laches cannot apply as against Leonardo and the respondents. It held that laches is
controlled by equitable considerations and it cannot be used to defeat justice or to perpetuate fraud; it cannot be utilized to
deprive the respondents of their rightful inheritance.
On the basis of the above pronouncements, the CA granted respondents prayer for partition, directing that the manner of
partitioning the property shall be governed by the Commissioners Report and Sketch and the Supplementary
Commissioners Report which the parties did not contest.
Petitioners filed their Motion for Reconsideration31 which the CA denied in its assailed September 7, 2006 Resolution.32
Hence, the present Petition.
Issues
Petitioners raise the following arguments:
I
THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN REVERSING THE
DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT ON THE GROUND THAT LUCIMO FRANCISCO REPUDIATED
THE CO-OWNERSHIP ONLY ON FEBRUARY 9, 1979.
II
THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN NOT UPHOLDING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT
DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT ON THE GROUND OF PRESCRIPTION AND LACHES. 33
Petitioners Arguments
Petitioners insist in their Petition and Reply34 that Lucimo Sr.s purchase of the property in 1943 and his possession thereof
amounted to a repudiation of the co-ownership, and that Leonardos admission and acknowledgment of Lucimo Sr.s
possession for such length of time operated to bestow upon petitioners as Lucimo Sr.s successors-in-interest the benefits
of acquisitive prescription which proceeded from the repudiation.
Petitioners contend that Leonardos inaction from Lucimo Sr.s taking possession in 1943, up to 1995, when Leonardo
filed Civil Case No. 4983 for partition with the RTC Kalibo amounted to laches or neglect. They add that during the
proceedings before the Lupon Tagapamayapa in 1980, Leonardo was informed of Lucimo Sr.s purchase of the property in
1943; this notwithstanding, Leonardo did not take action then against Lucimo Sr. and did so only in 1995, when he filed
Civil Case No. 4983 which was eventually dismissed and referred to the MTC. They argue that, all this time, Leonardo did
nothing while Lucimo Sr. occupied the property and claimed all its fruits for himself.
Respondents Arguments
Respondents, on the other hand, argue in their Comment35 that
For purposes of clarity, if [sic] is respectfully submitted that eighteen (18) legible copies has [sic] not been filed in this case
for consideration in banc [sic] and nine (9) copies in cases heard before a division in that [sic] all copies of pleadings served
to the offices concern [sic] where said order [sic] was issued were not furnished two (2) copies each in violation to [sic] the
adverse parties [sic] to the clerk of court, Regional Trial Court, Branch 8, Kalibo, Aklan, Philippines; to the Honorable Court
of Appeals so that No [sic] action shall be taken on such pleadings, briefs, memoranda, motions, and other papers as fail
[sic] to comply with the requisites set out in this paragraph.
The foregoing is confirmed by affidavit of MERIDON F. OLANDESCA, the law secretary of the Petitioner [sic] who sent
[sic] by Registered mail to Court of Appeals, Twentieth Division, Cebu City; to Counsel for Respondent [sic] and to the
Clerk of Court Supreme Court Manila [sic].
These will show that Petitioner has [sic] violated all the requirements of furnishing two (2) copies each concerned party [sic]
under the Rule of Courts [sic].36
Our Ruling
The Court denies the Petition.
The finding that Leon did not sell the property to Lucimo Sr. had long been settled and had become final for failure of
petitioners to appeal. Thus, the property remained part of Leons estate.
One issue submitted for resolution by the parties to the trial court is whether Leon sold the property to Lucimo Sr.1wphi1
The trial court, examining the two deeds of sale executed in favor of Enriquez and Lucimo Sr., found them to be spurious. It
then concluded that no such sale from Leon to Lucimo Sr. ever took place. Despite this finding, petitioners did not appeal.
Consequently, any doubts regarding this matter should be considered settled. Thus, petitioners insistence on Lucimo Sr.s
1943 purchase of the property to reinforce their claim over the property must be ignored. Since no transfer from Leon to
Lucimo Sr. took place, the subject property clearly remained part of Leons estate upon his passing in 1962.
Leon died without issue; his heirs are his siblings Romana and Gregoria.
Since Leon died without issue, his heirs are his siblings, Romana and Gregoria, who thus inherited the property in equal
shares. In turn, Romanas and Gregorias heirs the parties herein became entitled to the property upon the sisters
passing. Under Article 777 of the Civil Code, the rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of death.
(4) Among brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half blood.
In point of law, therefore, Lucimo Sr. is not a co-owner of the property; Teodora is. Consequently, he cannot validly effect a
repudiation of the co-ownership, which he was never part of. For this reason, prescription did not run adversely against
Leonardo, and his right to seek a partition of the property has not been lost.
Likewise, petitioners argument that Leonardos admission and acknowledgment in his pleadings that Lucimo Sr. was in
possession of the property since 1943 should be taken against him, is unavailing. In 1943, Leon remained the rightful
owner of the land, and Lucimo Sr. knew this very well, being married to Teodora, daughter of Antipolo, a nephew of Leon.
More significantly, the property, which is registered under the Torrens system and covered by OCT RO-630, is in Leons
name. Leons ownership ceased only in 1962, upon his death when the property passed on to his heirs by operation of law.
In fine, since none of the co-owners made a valid repudiation of the existing co-ownership, Leonardo could seek partition of
the property at any time.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The assailed March 14, 2006 Decision and the September 7, 2006 Resolution of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 74687are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
AT T E S T AT I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
C E R T I F I C AT I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion
of the Court's Division.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice
Footnotes
*
CA rollo, pp. 97-107; penned by Associate Justice Pampio A. Abarintos and concurred in by Associate
Justices Enrico A. Lanzanas and Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr.
3
Id. at 136.
Id. at 113-120.
Exhibit "A," Folder of Exhibits for the Respondents. The property is alternately referred to in the various
pleadings and in the decisions of the trial and appellate courts as "Original Certificate of Title No. RO-630
(24071)," or "Original Certificate of Title No. RO-630 (2407)," or "Original Certificate of Title No. RO-630
(240710)," or "Original Certificate of Title No. 630."
6
Assigned to Branch 8.
Id. at 28-31.
10
11
12
13
14
Id. at 198-199.
15
Id. at 12.
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
Id. at 278-279.
24
Art. 1141. Real actions over immovables prescribe after thirty years.
This provision is without prejudice to what is established for the acquisition of ownership and other
real rights by prescription.
25
26
Id. at 302.
27
28
29
30
31
32
Id. at 136.
33
Rollo, p. 40
34
Id. at 278-281.
35
Id. at 259-275.
36
Id. at 272-273.
37
38
39
40
41
42
Rollo, p. 294.
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 186332
of P700,000.00. On October 13, 1984, the spouses Lopez filed against Planters Bank complaint for rescission of the loan
agreements and for damages with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City.12 They alleged that they could not continue
the construction of the dormitory building because Planters Bank had refused to release the remaining loan balance.
In defense, Planters Bank argued that the spouses Lopez had no cause of action. It pointed out that its refusal to release the
loan was the result of the spouses Lopezs violations of the loan agreement, namely: (1) non-submission of the
accomplishment reports; and (2) construction of a six-story building. As a counterclaim, Planters Bank prayed for the
payment of the overdue released loan in the amount of P3,500,000.00, with interest and damages.13
On November 16, 1984, Planters Bank foreclosed the mortgaged properties in favor of third parties after the spouses Lopez
defaulted on their loan.14
The RTC Ruling
In a decision15 dated August 18, 1997, the RTC ruled in Planters Banks favor. It held that the spouses Lopez had no right to
rescind the loan agreements because they were not the injured parties. It maintained that the spouses Lopez violated the loan
agreement by failing to submit accomplishment reports and by deviating from the construction project plans. It further
declared that rescission could not be carried out because the mortgaged properties had already been sold in favor of third
parties. The dispositive portion of the RTC decision provides:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the plaintiffs to pay the defendant-bank the amount
of Three Million Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P3,500,000.00) plus the 27% stipulated interest per annum commencing on
June 22, 1994 until fully paid minus the proceeds of the foreclosed mortgaged property in the auction sale.16 (emphasis ours)
Subsequently, the RTC amended17 its decision, upon Planters Banks filing of a Motion for Partial Reconsideration and/or
Amendment of the Decision dated August 18, 1997.18 It clarified that the interest rate shall commence on June 22, 1984, as
proven during trial, thus:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the plaintiffs to pay the defendant-bank the amount
of Three Million Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P3,500,000.00) plus the 27% stipulated interest per annum commencing on
June 22, 1984 until fully paid minus the proceeds of the foreclosed mortgaged property in the auction sale.19 (emphasis ours)
CA Ruling
The spouses Lopez died during the pendency of the case. On appeal to the CA, compulsory heirs Joseph Wilfred, Joseph
Gilbert and Marlyn, all surnamed Joven20 (respondents) substituted for the deceased Florentina Lopez.
On November 27, 2006, the CA reversed the RTC ruling.21 It held that Planters Banks refusal to release the loan was a
substantial breach of the contract. It found that the spouses Lopez submitted accomplishment reports. It gave weight to
Engineer Edgard Fianzas testimony that he prepared accomplishment reports prior to the release of the funds. Moreover,
Planters Banks appraisal department head, Renato Marayag, testified that accomplishment reports were a prerequisite for
the release of the loan.
It also declared that Planters Bank was estopped from raising the issue of the spouses Lopezs deviation from the
construction project. Planters Bank conducted several ocular inspections of the building from 1983 to 1987. Planters Bank
continuously released partial amounts of the loan despite its knowledge of the construction of a six-story building.
It further concluded that Planters Bank did not release the loan because the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP)
lacked funds. Ma. Agnes Jopson Angeles, Planters Banks senior accountant for the marketing group, testified that Planters
Banks source of funds in real estate loans was DBP. According to the CA, Angeles admitted DBPs non-availability of
funds in her testimony. The dispositive ruling of the CA decision provides:
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is MODIFIED in that the loan interest to be paid by plaintiff-appellant to defendantappellee is hereby reduced to 12% per annum computed from finality of this Decision until full payment of the amount of
P3.5 million, minus the proceeds of auction sale of the foreclosed mortgaged property.22
Subsequently, the respondents filed a motion for reconsideration. They sought clarification of the dispositive portion which
does not declare the rescission of the loan and accessory contracts. On the other hand, Planters Bank filed a Comment on
March 2, 2007, praying for the reinstatement of the RTC ruling. The CA re-examined the case and treated the comment as a
motion for reconsideration. It affirmed its previous decision but modified the dispositive portion, thus:
ACCORDINGLY, defendant-appellees motion for reconsideration is DENIED while plaintiffs-appellants motion for
reconsideration is PARTLY GRANTED. The dispositive part of Our Decision dated November 27, 2006 is hereby clarified
and corrected to read as follows:
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The loan agreement between the parties, including
all its accessory contracts, is declared RESCINDED.
Plaintiffs-appellants are ordered to return to defendant-appellee bank the amount of P2,885,830.56 with interest of twelve
percent (12%) per annum from the time this Decision becomes final and executory until it is fully paid.
Defendant-appellee bank is ordered to convey and restore to plaintiffs-appellants the foreclosed property.23 (emphases and
underscores supplied)
The CA also denied Planters Banks Motion for Reconsideration dated August 22, 2007, prompting it to file the present
petition.
The Petitioners Position
Planters Bank reiterates in its petition before this Court that the respondents had no cause of action. It posits that the spouses
Lopez violated the loan agreements for their failure to submit accomplishment reports and by constructing a six-story
building instead of a four-story building. It maintains that there was no estoppel because only one year and twenty days have
elapsed from the violation of the contract until the spouses Lopezs filing of the complaint. It argues that there must be an
unjustifiable neglect for an unreasonable period of time for estoppel to apply. It also avers that even assuming that it
breached the contract, it was only a slight breach because only P700,000.00 of the P4,200,000.00 loan was not released.
Moreover, it highlights that it cannot convey the foreclosed properties because they were already sold to third parties.24
Planters Bank also clarifies its date of receipt of the CA amended decision in a Manifestation dated March 13, 2009.25 It
states that it received the amended decision on August 7, 2007, as evidenced by the attached certifications from the Makati
and Manila Central Post Offices.
There is also no merit to the respondents argument that Planters Banks motion for reconsideration is disallowed under
Section 2, Rule 52 of the Rules of Court.30 We point out in this respect that there is a difference between an amended
judgment and a supplemental judgment. In an amended judgment, the lower court makes a thorough study of the original
judgment and renders the amended and clarified judgment only after considering all the factual and legal issues. The
amended and clarified decision is an entirely new decision which supersedes or takes the place of the original decision. On
the other hand, a supplemental decision does not take the place of the original; it only serves to add to the original decision.31
In the present case, the CA promulgated an amended decision because it re-examined its factual and legal findings in its
original decision. Thus, Planters Bank may file a motion for reconsideration. The amended decision is an entirely new
decision which replaced the CAs decision dated November 27, 2006.
In sum, the amended decision is not yet final and executory because Planters Bank filed a motion for reconsideration on
time; its filing is allowed by the Rules of Court.
The spouses Lopez submitted accomplishment reports
We see no reason to disturb the CAs finding that the spouses Lopez religiously submitted accomplishment reports. The
evidence on record32 shows that Engr. Fianza submitted accomplishment reports from November 19, 1983 until June 9,
1984. Engr. Fianza also testified that he prepared these accomplishment reports.33 His testimony is corroborated by the
testimony of Marayag, Planters Banks appraisal department head.
This latter testimony shows that the spouses Lopez indeed submitted accomplishment reports.
Planters Bank is estopped from opposing the spouses Lopezs deviation from the construction project
We also affirm the CAs finding that Planters Bank is estopped from opposing the spouses Lopezs construction of a sixstory building. Section 2, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court provides that whenever a party has, by his own declaration, act, or
omission, intentionally and deliberately led another to believe that a particular thing is true, and to act upon such belief, he
cannot, in any litigation arising out of such declaration, act or omission, be permitted to falsify it.
The concurrence of the following requisites is necessary for the principle of equitable estoppel to apply: (a) conduct
amounting to false representation or concealment of material facts or at least calculated to convey the impression that the
facts are otherwise than, and inconsistent with, those which the party subsequently attempts to assert; (b) intent, or at least
expectation that this conduct shall be acted upon, or at least influenced by the other party; and (c) knowledge, actual or
constructive, of the actual facts.
Inaction or silence may under some circumstances amount to a misrepresentation, so as to raise an equitable estoppel. When
the silence is of such a character and under such circumstances that it would become a fraud on the other party to permit the
party who has kept silent to deny what his silence has induced the other to believe and act on, it will operate as an estoppel.
This doctrine rests on the principle that if one maintains silence, when in conscience he ought to speak, equity will debar
him from speaking when in conscience he ought to remain silent.
The principle of equitable estoppel prevents Planters Bank from raising the spouses Lopezs violation of the loan agreement.
Planters Bank was already aware that the spouses Lopez were building six floors as early as September 30, 1983. Records
disclose that Planters Bank also conducted a series of ocular inspections.35 Despite such knowledge, the bank kept silent on
the violation of the loan agreement as Planters Bank still continued to release the loan in partial amounts to the spouses
Lopez. As the CA correctly pointed out, Planters Bank only raised this argument during trial a move that highly appears to
be an afterthought.
Planters Bank only committed a slight or casual breach of the contract
Despite our affirmation of the CAs factual findings, we disagree with the CAs conclusion that rescission is proper. Planters
Bank indeed incurred in delay by not complying with its obligation to make further loan releases.36 Its refusal to release the
remaining balance, however, was merely a slight or casual breach as shown below. In other words, its breach was not
sufficiently fundamental to defeat the object of the parties in entering into the loan agreement. The well-settled rule is that
rescission will not be permitted for a slight or casual breach of the contract. The question of whether a breach of contract is
substantial depends upon the attending circumstances.37
The factual circumstances of this case lead us to the conclusion that Planters Bank substantially complied with its obligation.
To reiterate, Planters Bank released P3,500,000.00 of the P4,200,000.00 loan. Only the amount of P700,000.00 was not
released. This constitutes 16.66% of the entire loan. Moreover, the progress report dated May 30, 1984 states that 85% of the
six-story building was already completed by the spouses Lopez.38 It is also erroneous to solely impute the non-completion of
the building to Planters Bank. Planters Bank is not an insurer of the buildings construction. External factors, such as the
steep price of the materials and the cost of labor, affected the erection of the building. More importantly, the spouses Lopez
took the risk that the project would not be finished when they constructed a six-story building instead of four-story structure.
Even assuming that Planters Bank substantially breached its obligation, the fourth paragraph of Article 1191 of the Civil
Code expressly provides that rescission is without prejudice to the rights of third persons who have acquired the thing, in
accordance with Article 1385 of the Civil Code. In turn, Article 1385 states that rescission cannot take place when the things
which are the object of the contract are legally in the possession of third persons who did not act in bad faith.
In the present case, the mortgaged properties had already been foreclosed. They were already sold to the highest bidder at a
public auction. We recognize that transferees pendente lite are proper, but not indispensable, parties in this case, as they
would, in any event, be bound by the judgment against Planters Bank.39 However, the respondents did not overcome the
presumption that the buyers bought the foreclosed properties in good faith.40 The spouses Lopez did not cause the annotation
of notice of lis pendens at the back of the title of the mortgaged lot.41 Moreover, the respondents did not adduce any
evidence that would show that the buyers bought the property with actual knowledge of the pendency of the present case.
Furthermore, the spouses Lopezs failure to pay the overdue loan made them parties in default, not entitled to rescission
under Article 1191 of the Civil Code.
The estate of Florentina Lopez shall pay Planters Bank the amount of P3,500,000.00 with 12% monetary interest p.a. from
June 22, 1984 until full payment of the obligation
Planters Bank and the spouses Lopez undertook reciprocal obligations when they entered into a loan agreement. In
reciprocal obligations, the obligation or promise of each party is the consideration for that of the other. The mere pecuniary
inability of one contracting party to fulfill an engagement does not discharge the other contracting party of the obligation in
the contract.42 Planters Banks slight breach does not excuse the spouses Lopez from paying the overdue loan in the amount
of P3,500,000.00. Despite this finding, however, we cannot sustain the imposition of the interest rate in the loan contract.
We are aware that the parties did not raise this issue in the pleadings. However, it is a settled rule that an appeal throws the
entire case open for review once accepted by this Court. This Court has thus the authority to review matters not specifically
raised or assigned as error by the parties, if their consideration is necessary in arriving at a just resolution of the case.43
In the present case, Planters Bank unilaterally increased the monetary interest rate to 32% p.a. after the execution of the third
amendment to the loan agreement. This is patently violative of the element of mutuality of contracts. Our Civil Code has
long entrenched the basic principle that the validity of or compliance to the contract cannot be left to the will of one party.44
Even if we disregard the 32% p.a., the interest rate of 27% p.a. in the third amended agreement is still excessive. In Trade &
Investment Devt Corp. of the Phil. v. Roblett Industrial Construction Corp.,45 we lowered the interest resulting charge for
being excessive in the context of its computation period . We equitably reduced the interest rate from 18% p.a. to 12% p.a.
because the case was decided with finality sixteen years after the filing of the complaint. We noted that the amount of the
loan swelled to a considerably disproportionate sum, far exceeding the principal debt.
A parallel situation prevails in the present case. Almost 29 years have elapsed since the filing of the complaint in 1984. The
amount of the principal loan already ballooned to an exorbitant amount unwarranted in fact and in operation. While the
Court recognizes the right of the parties to enter into contracts, this rule is not absolute. We are allowed to temper interest
rates when necessary. We have thus ruled in several cases that when the agreed rate is iniquitous, it is considered as contrary
to morals, if not against the law. Such stipulation is void.46
The manifest unfairness caused to the respondents by this ruling and our sense of justice dictate that we judiciously reduce
the monetary interest rate. Our imposition of the lower interest rate is based on the demands of substantial justice and in the
exercise of our equity jurisdiction.
We thus equitably reduce the monetary interest rate to 12% p.a. on the amount due computed from June 22, 1984 until full
payment of the obligation. We point out in this respect that the monetary interest accrues under the terms of the loan
agreement until actual payment is effected47 for the reason that its imposition is based on the stipulation of the parties.48
In the present case, the lower courts found that the monetary interest accrued on June 22, 1984. Incidentally, the lower courts
also found that June 22, 1984 is also the spouses Lopezs date of default.
The estate of Florentina Lopez shall further be liable for compensatory interest at the rates of 12% p.a. from June 22, 1984
until June 30, 2013 and 6% p.a. from July 1, 2013 until the finality of this Decision
With respect to the computation of compensatory interest, Section 1 of Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) Circular No. 799,
Series of 2013, which took effect on July 1, 2013, provides:
Section 1. The rate of interest for the loan or forbearance of any money, goods or credits and the rate allowed in judgments,
in the absence of an express contract as to such rate of interest, shall be six percent (6%) per annum. [emphasis ours]
This provision amends Section 2 of Central Bank (CB) Circular No. 905-82, Series of 1982, which took effect on January 1,
1983. Notably, we recently upheld the constitutionality of CB Circular No. 905-82 in Advocates for Truth in Lending, Inc.,
et al. v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Monetary Board, etc.49 Section 2 of CB Circular No. 905-82 provides:
Section 2. The rate of interest for the loan or forbearance of any money, goods or credits and the rate allowed in judgments,
in the absence of express contract as to such rate of interest, shall continue to be twelve percent (12%) per annum. [emphasis
ours]
Pursuant to these changes, this Court modified the guidelines in Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals50 in the
case of Dario Nacar v. Gallery Frames, et al.51 (Nacar). In Nacar, we established the following guidelines:
I. When an obligation, regardless of its source, i.e., law, contracts, quasi- contracts, delicts or quasi-delicts is breached, the
contravenor can be held liable for damages. The provisions under Title XVIII on "Damages" of the Civil Code govern in
determining the measure of recoverable damages.
II. With regard particularly to an award of interest in the concept of actual and compensatory damages, the rate of interest, as
well as the accrual thereof, is imposed, as follows:
1. When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a sum of money, i.e., a loan or
forbearance of money, the interest due should be that which may have been stipulated in writing.
Furthermore, the interest due shall itself earn legal interest from the time it is judicially demanded. In the
absence of stipulation, the rate of interest shall be 6% per annum to be computed from default, i.e., from
judicial or extrajudicial demand under and subject to the provisions of Article 1169 of the Civil Code.
2. When an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of money, is breached, an interest on the amount
of damages awarded may be imposed at the discretion of the court at the rate of 6% per annum. No interest,
however, shall be adjudged on unliquidated claims or damages, except when or until the demand can be
established with reasonable certainty. Accordingly, where the demand is established with reasonable certainty,
the interest shall begin to run from the time the claim is made judicially or extrajudicially (Art. 1169, Civil
Code), but when such certainty cannot be so reasonably established at the time the demand is made, the
interest shall begin to run only from the date the judgment of the court is made (at which time the
quantification of damages may be deemed to have been reasonably ascertained). The actual base for the
computation of legal interest shall, in any case, be on the amount finally adjudged.
3. When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes final and executory, the rate of legal
interest, whether the case falls under paragraph 1 or paragraph 2, above, shall be 6% per annum from such
finality until its satisfaction, this interim period being deemed to be by then an equivalent to a forbearance of
credit. And, in addition to the above, judgments that have become final and executory prior to July 1, 2013,
shall not be disturbed and shall continue to be implemented applying the rate of interest fixed therein.
[emphasis ours]
Since we declare void the monetary interest agreed upon by the parties, we impose a compensatory interest of 12% p.a.
which accrues from June 22, 1984 until June 30, 2013, pursuant to CB Circular No. 905-82.52 As we have earlier stated, June
22, 1984 is the spouses Lopezs established date of default. In recognition of the prospective application of BSP Circular No.
799, we reduce the compensatory interest of 12% p.a. to 6% p.a. from July 1, 2013 until the finality of this Decision.
Furthermore, the interest due shall earn legal interest from the time it is judicially demanded, pursuant to Article 2212 of the
Civil Code.
The estate of Florentina Lopez shall further be liable for interest at the rate of 6% p.a. from the finality of this decision until
full payment of the obligation
Also, pursuant to the above-quoted Section 1 of BSP Circular No. 799, we impose an interest rate of 6% p.a. from the
finality of this Decision until the obligation is fully paid, the interim period being deemed equivalent to a forbearance of
credit.
Lastly, to prevent future litigation in the enforcement of the award, we clarify that the respondents are not personally
responsible for the debts of their predecessor. The respondents extent of liability to Planters Bank is limited to the value of
the estate which they inherited from Florentina Lopez.53 In our jurisdiction, "it is the estate or mass of the property left by
the decedent, instead of the heirs directly, that becomes vested and charged with his rights and obligations which survive
after his death."54To rule otherwise would unduly deprive the respondents of their properties.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed amended decision dated July 30, 2007 and resolution dated February 5,
2009 of the Court of Appeals are hereby REVERSED. Respondents Joseph Wilfred, Joseph Gilbert and Marlyn, all
surnamed Joven, are ordered to pay THREE MILLION FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (1 3,500,000.00) with 12%
monetary interest per annum commencing on June 22, 1984 until fully paid; 12% compensatory interest per annum
commencing on June 22, 1984 until June 30, 2013; 6% compensatory interest per annum commencing on July 1 2013 until
the finality of this Decision; and 6% interest rate per annum commencing from the finality of this Decision until fully paid.
The proceeds of the foreclosed mortgaged property in the auction sale shall be deducted from the principal of the loan from
the time payment was made to Planters Bank and the remainder shall be the new principal from which the computation shall
thereafter be made. Furthermore, the respondents' liability is limited to the value of the inheritance they received from the
deceased Florentina Lopez.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.*
Associate Justice
BIENVENIDO L. REYES**
Associate Justice
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
AT T E S T AT I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Footnotes
*
Designated as Acting Member in lieu of Associate Justice Jose P. Perez, per Special Order No. 1567 dated
October 11 2013.
**
Designated as Acting Member in lieu of Associate Justice Mariano C. del Castillo, per Special Order No.
1564 dated October 11, 2013.
1
Dated February 24, 2009 and filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court; rollo, pp. 3-30.
Id. at 34-65; penned by Presiding Justice Ruben T. Reyes, and concurred in by Associate Justices Juan Q.
Enriquez, Jr. and Vicente S. E. Veloso.
3
Id. at 67-69; penned by Associate Justice Arturo G. Tayag, and concurred in by Associate Justices Martin S.
Villarama, Jr. and Noel G. Tijam.
4
Id. at 76-85.
Id. at 86-87.
Id. at 91-93.
Id. at 96-98.
10
Id. at 94-95.
11
Id. at 39.
12
13
Id. at 19-27.
14
Rollo, p. 104.
15
16
Id. at 164-165.
17
Id. at 172-173.
18
Id. at 166-171.
19
Id. at 173.
20
CA rollo, p. 116.
21
22
Id. at 202.
23
24
Supra note 1.
25
26
Id. at 270-282.
27
28
Rollo, p. 260.
29
Id. at 259.
30
31
Magdalena Estate, Inc. v. Hon. Caluag and Nava, 120 Phil. 338, 342 (1964); and Lee v. Trocino, G.R. No.
164648, June 19, 2009, 590 SCRA 32, 37.
32
33
34
A: Yes.
Q: How often do you normally require the submission of progress reports?
A: Everytime the client requests for a release.
Q: Before any further release is made by the bank there is a progress report required and it is only
upon the submission of this progress report and upon your satisfaction that you release funds to the
client, is that correct?
A: That is right. [emphases ours]
35
36
37
38
39
Santiago Land Devt. Corp. v. CA, 334 Phil. 741, 747-749 (1997).
40
41
42
Central Bank of the Phil. V. Court of Appeals, 223 Phil. 266, 273 (1985).
43
Aliling v. Feliciano, G.R. No. 185829, April 25, 2012, 671 SCRA 186, 199, citing Sociedad Europea de
Financiacion SA v. CA, G.R. No. 75787, January 21, 1991,193 SCRA 105, 114.
44
45
46
Imperial v. Jaucian, 471 Phil. 484, 494-495 (2004); and Castro v. Tan, G.R. No. 168940, November 24,
2009, 605 SCRA 231, 237-238.
47
State Investment House, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 90676, June 19, 1991, 198 SCRA 390, 398.
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
Desiderio P. Jurado, Comments and Jurisprudence on Obligations and Contracts 2002 ed., p 375.
i[1] In Spl. Proc. No. 4689, Order dated 20 August 1993, Judge Bartolome M. Fanual, presiding.
ii[2] Petition, Annex D, Rollo, pp. 26-28.
iii[3] Petition, Annex E, Rollo, pp. 29-30.
iv[4] Petition, Annex F, Rollo, pp. 31-35.
v[5] Petition, Annex H, Rollo, pp. 38-46.
vi[6] Petition, Annex A, Rollo, p. 23.
vii[7] Petition, Annex Q, Rollo, pp. 96-100.
viii[8] Petition, Annex B, Rollo, p. 24.
ix[9] Petition filed on November 19, 1993, Rollo, pp. 9-22.
x[10] Uy v. Jardeleza, G. R. No. 109557, November 29, 2000.