Metaphor Revisited

Dennis Sobolev

lready for several generations, the problem of metaphor

has been the constant focus of different disciplines: from liter ary studies and analytical philosophy to cognitive psychology and
linguistics. For literary criticism, however, it has been especially significant. In order to evaluate this significance, one has to bear in mind that
since the Prague group and French structuralism, and until the rise of
different types of poststructuralist research, literary scholars had been
working within the literature as a language paradigm.1 And since the
same type of structuralist research considered metaphor as one of the
two pivotal operations on which the whole system of language is based,2
it was used as a model for an extremely wide range of structures and
functions empirically found in literature. Having this in mind, one may
surmise that the significance of the problem of metaphor was doomed
to become downplayed when the linguistic paradigm was replaced with
postmodern ones. Indeed, the poststructural paradigms of literary
analysis tend to view the space of literature as a product of the superposition of different cultural forces, structures, and partial determinations and thus tend to deny the linguistic model the role of a single,
privileged hermeneutic strategy. However, from the theoretical point
of view, this tendency is not an inevitable result of the replacement of
analytical paradigms.
On the contrary, from the logical point of view, within a paradigm that
tends to view culture as a field of partial and heterogeneous determinations, the significance of metaphor as a model must only grow. One
of the operations central to the very being of culture, when viewed as
such a field of heterogeneous determinations, is that of the creation of
synthetic relations. Such operations of synthesis range from the narrative synthesis of heterogeneous historical and personal materials to the
basic operations of the cultural construction of existential space and
time. Therefore, being one of the simplest and most exhaustively studied
operations of synthesis, metaphor may serve as a good case study and
thus as a model of the analysis of the operations of synthesis in general.
However, as will be shown, this exemplum demonstrates the high level
of complexity of problems of cultural analysis. The studies of metaphor
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carried out over the last decades have shown the extreme complexity
of this seemingly simple operation of synthesis; metaphor has revealed
itself to be an embodiment of analytical difficulties, as well as a source
of irresolvable contradictions between different approaches.
Although most scholars who have written about metaphor agree that it
is central to the understanding of poetic language, this seems to be the
only subject upon which a relative consensus has been achieved. None
of the theories propounded in the field has been able to convince the
majority of the academic community; and for every theory that has been
proposed, numerous counterexamples have been found. In light of this
situation, two mutually exclusive hypotheses become possible. One can
either state that the failure to find a sufficiently cogent solution to this
problem is just a temporary difficulty, and thus the philosophers of language and literary critics should continue looking for it. Or, conversely,
one can suggest that the whole discussion has been misguided and that
there is no such thing as the structure of metaphor, or, similarly, that
there is no such thing as metaphor in the traditional sense of the term.
I believe, however, that both radical positions are misguided. This essay
aims to demonstrate that metaphor, even though it is formally identifiable,
is not a single unified structure, but rather a field of heterogeneous possibilities, which is organized along several independent axes and is limited
by border parameters. Correspondingly, it is the culturally constructed
possibility of identifying metaphor that is responsible for the illusion
of the existence of its singular essence, while it is the heterogeneity and
multiplicity of metaphorical functions that is responsible for both its
actual applications and the proliferation of the theories of metaphor.
The firstpreliminaryproblem of metaphorical discourse is terminological. In order to account for the structure of metaphor, different sets of concepts have been proposed; the most known of them are
I. A. Richardss distinction between tenor and vehicle, and Max Blacks
double dichotomy of focus and frame,3 principal and subsidiary
subjects.4 In Blacks later essay, the latter dichotomy was renamed as
that between primary and subsidiary subjects.5 Significantly, as Black
stresses, the difference between his system and that of Richards is not
only terminological; and their dichotomies do not overlap.6 Therefore,
the choice of one of these conceptual sets has far reaching implications.
It should be stressed, however, that the analysis of metaphors in terms
of a dichotomy (of any dichotomy) implies that the general structure
of metaphor is bipartite; and this has yet to be proven. Moreover, to my
mind, this is a misconception. This structure includes a frame, which
should be interpreted literally, a word (or several words) that are used
figuratively (in other words, whose literal interpretation seems to be
impossible or insufficient in a given case), and a theme (an object,

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movement, idea or almost anything else) about which a metaphorical

statement is made. While retaining the label frame for the first of
these components, I would like to modify Blacks terminology regarding
two other cases. In those cases, when metaphors designate processes,
movements, values or abstract ideas, the word subject often seems to
be out of place; therefore, I will call these components the primary and
secondary terms of metaphor.
This more complex wording will prove to be helpful in the elucidation
of the question of the structure of metaphor below. One immediately
notices, however, that looking for this structure, different scholars pursue
two essentially different questions, and the differences in their aims have
shaped both researches and their results. First, scholars often ask how a
metaphor is identified and singled out by the reader, who processes and
interprets it differently than literal speech. Another version of the same
question belongs to the prescriptive rather than descriptive plane: many
authors try to define the exact structure of speech that deserves to be
called metaphoric. Unlike these questions, the second question that is
implied by the problem is of a completely different nature: it is related
to the functioning of metaphor and its impact upon the reader rather
than its identification. Those scholars who pursue this question try to
formalize the semantic peculiarities of metaphoric speech, scrutinize its
impact upon the recipients consciousness, and propose different hypotheses that attempt to account for the richness of metaphoric discourse
and the apparent difficulties of its paraphrase. If the former question
can be labeled as the structure of identification, the latter should be
designated as the question of the structure of functioning.
There is an essential difference between these questions, and the existence of an answer to the former does not guarantee that there must
also exist an answer to the latter; the structure of functioning is not
necessarily deducible from the structure of identification. Indeed, to
propose a formal procedure for the identification of a metaphor in a text
is like saying that John will be the man in black jeans who will stand to
the left of the metro station, near a hamburger kiosk, with a newspaper
in his right hand. In all probability, this information will suffice to identify
John in the crowd, although it will say almost nothing about John as a
man, his behavior, or his soul. Exactly the same can be said about the
two main questions that are related to the structure of metaphor: it is
insufficient to know how metaphors are identified in order to explain the
essence of their functioning. In addition, there is an essential difference
between these questions from the point of view of the clarity of their
answers. Unlike the question of the essence of metaphor, which is still
by far the most obscure and controversial question in the whole field of
rhetoric, that of the structure of identification is much clearer. As will

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be shown below, the answer to this question can be formulated after a

brief analysis of the problem and the discussion of certain misunderstandings. The intuition involved in the recognition of metaphors can
be spelled out as a relatively simple, though bipartite, procedure, which
requires only minimal linguistic competence.
At the same time, this problem still deserves discussion and analysis; to
the best of my knowledge, no existing theory can account with reasonable precision for the process of the identification of metaphors. Black
even believed that it is impossible to be precise about the identifying
and individuating criteria for metaphorical statements.7 As a tool for this
identification, Eva Feder Kittay proposed an analytical system consisting of
the necessary and sufficient conditions: not a single sufficient condition
as such but rather a set of alternative conditions any of which is sufficient
just in case the necessary conditions are fulfilled.8 This approach seems
to me both cogent and promising, although I believe that one has to
enlarge and modify the list of necessary conditions, clarify their meaning,
and completely change what Kittay considered sufficient conditions.
Almost all the critics who have written about metaphor have pointed out
that it involves an incongruity or explicit contradiction; other scholars
added irrelevance, tautology, and both explicit and implicit indications
of the presence of metaphorical discourse. As this list showsand in
contrast to the assumption shared by most scholarsthere is no single
criterion for metaphorical incongruity. At the same time, after lengthy
reflection upon the subject and the existing researchand after checking
different and heterogeneous examplesI have come to the conclusion
that all known instances of metaphorical divergence belong to one of
the following types. The crucial role of the frameand hence of the
tripartite structure of metaphorin the definition of all these conditions is worth noting.
1. Logical contradiction: which becomes apparent, for example, when I say
that the essence of metaphor is a round square.
2. Conceptual incongruity: I can say, for instance, that metaphor is a barking
triangle, ascribing to an abstract and inanimate entity the features of the
concrete and animate.
3. Nonexistence of a given entity in a given world or textual context. The last
two words must be stressed: in the Middle Ages and contemporary science,
in realistic prose and folktales, the lists of existing creatures and entities
are different. Hobbits and dragons are not metaphorical within J. R. R. Tolkiens world, although this world as a whole can be interpreted as a metaphor
when viewed from a more realistic perspective. The sentences Tolkien was a
model hobbit and Bilbo was a model hobbit are essentially different from
this point of view. As an example of this category, I can say that metaphor
is a siren of the philosophy of language and literary criticism.

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4. Clear empirical falsity in a given conceptual space: this category is only

slightly different from the previous one. Here, unlike the previous case,
all the components of a metaphorical statement do indeed exist, but the
statement made is false on empirical grounds. The problem of metaphor is
usually analyzed by shoemakers and zoologists can serve as an example.
5. Clear contextual irrelevance: it is important to stress that this context can be
either textual or existential, or both. Unfortunately, in this case, providing
an example is problematic, for there is no statement that is so irrelevant
that it cannot serve as an example of irrelevance.
6. Tautology business is business,9 war is war. Slightly parodying Gertrude
Stein, one may say that metaphor is a metaphor is a metaphor is a metaphor.
7. Banality or a true, but explicitly self-evident, pointless, statement: No metaphor is an island. One cannot solve the problem of metaphor standing on
one leg. This category is similar to the previous one, but in this case, the
reasons for the rejection of the literal meaning are empirical rather than
logical, a posteriori rather than a priori. The difference between these categories is somewhat similar to the difference between categories three and
four.
8. An explicit indication of the use of metaphorical language. Speaking metaphorically, the problem of metaphor is a subject for metaphysics. But for this
indication, the reader would interpret the sentence literally and conclude
that either the writer is mistaken or he knows something that the reader
does not.
9. Special contexts that make the reader look for metaphors and metaphoric
interpretations even in those cases when a literal interpretation may seem
true and sufficient. In Shakespeare or Gerard Manley Hopkins, unlike a
plumbers ad, certain statements, which are literally true, may also imply a
metaphorical meaning.10 By the same token, when reading Romantic poets,
we are on the lookout for metaphors.11

As has been said, to the best of my knowledge, in all of the existing

metaphors, one of these alternative necessary conditions is fulfilled,
although these conditions do not exclude one another and some can
be fulfilled simultaneously.
Two remarks should be made at this point. First, it should be stressed
that these necessary conditions belong to quite different planes: some
of them are related to logical grammar, some to semantics, others to
pragmatics. Therefore, all the claims that metaphor is a strictly logical,
or a strictly semantic, or a strictly pragmatic phenomenon, are mistaken:
metaphors can be related to any and all of these spheres. Correspondingly, the spirited polemics surrounding the question whether metaphor
is a semiotic or a pragmatic phenomenon seem to be quite misguided, as
the above list of the necessary conditions highlights the heterogeneity of
empirically found metaphors. Second, one should say a few words about
the theoretical meaning of these necessary conditions; this explana-

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tion, in turn, can clarify the meaning of the bipartite structure of the
identification of metaphor as a whole. To be precise, the above attributes
are not exclusive features of metaphor; they rather indicate the presence
of a rhetorical operation. Some of them can also indicate a metonymy,
while others may be the intimations of irony. Thus, in order to conclude
that a given figure is a metaphor, an additional condition (or conditions)
must be fulfilled. Once again, following Kittays suggestion, I will call it
the sufficient condition. At the same time, I can hardly agree with her
description of this condition.
Defining these sufficient conditions, Kittay writes that it is sufficient
for an utterance to be a metaphorical utterance either if the utterance
was intended to be understood metaphorically or if it is possible to attribute a metaphorical interpretation . . . [it] must be either intended
as such or must be taken as such.12 To my mind, this definition has
three serious shortcomings. First, in principle, almost any utterance
can be taken metaphorically, and thus she endlessly widens the subject.
Second, she defines metaphor in terms of pragmatics, and moreover,
introduces intentional and affective components into the very definition. For literary criticism, this would mean that the language of Homer,
whose intentions we cannot know, is metaphoric only if taken as such;
and this is definitely counterintuitive. Finally, Kittays functional definition in the style of Ernst Cassirer seems to be based on a logical circle.
When she writes that metaphor must be intended or taken as having
a metaphorical function, she actually defines the structure by means of
which metaphor can be identified (the structure of identification in
terms of this essay) through a reference to its function. Yet, as has already
been stressed, the question of the functioning of metaphor is the most
complicated and controversial question in the whole field of rhetoric,
and it is closely associated with the same problem of identification. Consequently, to say that metaphor can be called metaphor only if it was
intended or interpreted as metaphor merely redirects the discussion of
the procedure of identification to a much more complicated question:
what is metaphor? or how does it function? In reality, however, such a
circle is not indispensable. The sufficient condition of the identification
of metaphor has been widely known since Aristotle: this is similarity or
resemblance.13 However, although it was the basis for the understanding of metaphor in traditional rhetoric, in the fifties it fell into disfavor:
Black questioned its centrality,14 while Nelson Goodman dismissed it completely.15 Yet, subsequently, Paul Ricoeurs compelling analysis of Blacks
and Goodmans case against resemblance restored its importance for
the understanding of the functioning of metaphor.16 Donald Davidson
underscored it;17 George Miller proposed a theory of metaphor that focuses on relational (rather than substantial) similarities and analogies;18

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John Searle compiled a list of principles of metaphorical interpretation,

all of which are based on different types of similarity, including both
substantial and relational.19 Yet, since the rise of the cognitive school,
this notion has once again fallen into disrepute.
Most of the attacks on resemblance centered on two issues. First, its
critics asked if there is a real resemblance between a lion and Achilles
or whether this alleged resemblance is only a product of the personification and metaphorization of the lion. Second, they stressed that in
many metaphors there seems to be no similarity whatsoever prior to
the formation of the metaphor itself;20 this similarity is produced by
metaphor rather than serving as the basis of its formation. Yet, it seems
to me that both objections are misguided. In relation to the latter, the
answer is quite simple: the creation of similarity by metaphor does not
make this notion less central to its understanding than the use of a
ready-made one. As regards the former objection, it is not convincing
either. The similarity should not necessarily be one between Achilles
and a real lion, which can be described by a zoologist; it will suffice if
Achilles possesses an attribute that is similar to one of the conventional
attributes of a lion, whether real or imaginary. Moreover, as Miller suggested, many metaphors are based on similarities not between objects as
such but between their relations to other objects.21 In the final analysis,
to try to show that two terms of metaphor have nothing in common is
not a very promising strategy, since in this world, to use Umberto Ecos
unforgettable phrase, everything is similar to everything. The question is not whether the terms of metaphor are similar (they arein
one sense or another), but whether this similarity plays a central role
in the production of its meaning. This is not to say that there are no
other features that could be central to a metaphor, but rather that this
one is indispensable.
This is the sufficient condition for the identification of metaphoror
to be precise, one that becomes sufficient, given that one of the necessary conditions is fulfilled. In a metaphor, as its meaning is construed by
persons sufficiently competent in language and the surrounding cultural
context, a similarity between the terms (substantial or relation, real or
imaginary, literal or figurative) plays a central role in the production of
meaning. At the same time, this does not mean that the meaning of a
metaphorical utterance can be paraphrased as a statement of similarity,
as most of the scholars who analyzed metaphor on the basis of similarity once believed. Let us take some classical examples of metaphor and
metonymy. By calling Samson a lion, one stresses his force, his bravery,
and his courage, which are conventionally associated with lions, and
hence, the similarity between them comes to the fore; this similarity is
underscored even further by the fact that Samson was able to withstand

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a lion in a physical fight. Thus, this rhetorical figure fulfills both one of
the necessary conditions (Samson was not a lion; it is false on empirical grounds) and the sufficient condition (it emphasizes a similarity);
and hence, it is a metaphor. By contrast, calling the epoch of cars the
epoch of Ford does not foreground any similarity whatsoever between
Ford the man and the car (even though, after a while, one can easily
find many); the relation upon which this figure focuses is the relation
of production, which can be roughly classified as a causal one.
At first sight, this bipartite structure of identification might seem
commonsensical and even trivial, were it not able to clarify one of the
most controversial issueswithout any reference to other problematic
subjectslike the problem of the functioning of metaphor. At this point
of analysis, the reason for separating the question of identification from
the question of its functioning becomes clear; it has made it possible
to single out the object of analysis before the beginning of the analysis
itself and thus to avoid a vicious circle. The level of cultural competence
this analysis presupposes does not transcend that of an average native
speaker: the person must be able to identify explicit logical contradictions,
categorical incongruities, and clear contextual irrelevance, as well as to
possess basic competence in figurative language, which is necessary to
determine whether a given construction foregrounds similarity or not.
It also becomes clear why most metaphors involve a transition from one
semantic field to another. Within one semantic field, there are numerous
and diverse relations between different entities (part and whole, cause
and effect, they may belong to one class, and the like), and hence a
relation of similarity is often obscured by other relations. In contrast, if
the terms of metaphor belong to different semantic fields, a relation of
similarity becomes clear and visible.
To summarize: there is a peculiar type of discourse that we identify
as metaphoric; and there is a formal procedure through which one can
pinpoint this type of discourse. Now it is high time we addressed the main
issue of this essay. Having analyzed the identification of metaphorical
discourse, one has to analyze its functioning and its impact. As has already
been mentioned above, the range of answers to this question is impressive
and even somewhat overwhelming. Moreover, long and spirited debates
between different schools have complicated the situation even further.
It is not my intention, however, to analyze here the existing theories of
metaphor, their refutations, and the refutations of refutations. Instead,
I would like to propound a different framework for the understanding
of metaphoric utterances, within which many of the ideas and findings
of previous research cease to be mutually contradictory, while othersas
well as some objectionsreveal themselves to be misguided.

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1. The best-known problem of metaphor is related to the nature of

interaction between the primary and secondary terms. According to traditional rhetoric, metaphor is an elliptic comparison, which foregrounds
one of the attributes of its subject; Achilles is a lion simply means that
Achilles is as brave as a lion. To put it in more theoretical terms, metaphor
states a similarity between its terms and stresses one of the attributes of
its secondary term as being possessed by its primary term as well. In the
twentieth century, this approach to metaphor was both questioned and
developed in different directions. Richards suggested that metaphorical
statement is the interaction between its terms and their context; according to him, metaphor is fundamentally a borrowing between and an
intercourse of thoughts, a transaction between contexts.22 Unlike Richards, Black developed a theory of metaphor as a filter;23 where the
principal subject is seen through the metaphorical expressionor, if
we prefer, that the principal subject is projected upon the field of the
subsidiary subject (41). Explaining this idea a little later, he writes: The
metaphor selects, emphasizes, suppresses, and organizes features of the
principal subject by implying statements about it that normally apply to
the subsidiary subject (44 45). According to him, metaphor transfers
the system of commonplaces associated with the secondary subject to
the primary subject in order to foreground some of its features, even
though they are often transmitted in a slightly modified form (40 41).
The effect, then, of (metaphorically) calling a man a wolf is to evoke
the wolf-system of related commonplaces. If the man is a wolf, he preys
upon other animals, is fierce, hungry, engaged in a constant struggle, a
scavenger, and so on (41).
Paradoxically enough, Black labeled his approach the interaction view
of metaphor (38); and this label added confusion to the field as a whole,
since, as many scholars have noted, Blacks transference of associated
commonplaces is quite mechanical and implies little interaction between
the terms of metaphor. Moreover, criticizing Richards, Black wrote that
the picture of two ideas working upon each other is an inconvenient
fiction (47); however, as subsequent research has shown, it is not. Black
himself significantly modified his theory in a later essay (1993) and suggested that the choice of the predicates transferred depends, to a considerable extent, on the primary subject on which they are transferred.
And this means that in this later model, the principle of transference is
indeed complemented with elements of interaction. Yet, this more traditional model also raised numerous objections; and the polemic upon
the question of the essence of metaphorical interaction continued for
many years after Blacks death. Foreshadowing the development of the
essay, one should say that this polemic is both inevitable and misleading,
for there is no single model that can describe the process of interaction

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between the primary and the secondary terms of all metaphors. Even
Black has admitted that there are other types of metaphors, in addition
to the type he described (47), but, according to him, it is only his type
that is of importance in philosophy (45). Leaving aside Blacks evaluation of philosophical significance, I would like to say a few words about
different types of metaphor.
On the one hand, there are indeed such metaphors as man is wolf,
where the interaction between the terms is quite limited: the primary
term (man) limits to a certain degree the type of attributes that can
be transferred to it (those that are applicable to a human being), and
then these associated commonplaces are transferred quite mechanically,
without any juxtapositions, between the concepts of man and wolf. Yet
there are still other metaphors as well. For example, in order to make
sense of such a metaphor as Bill is a barn door,24 it is necessary to make
a close examination and comparison between John and the idea of the
barn door, not only because there is no standard system of commonplaces
associated with the barn door, but also because it is far from being evident that there are any points of similarity and interaction between the
two. Nevertheless, there are contexts in which such a metaphor can be
quite telling and meaningful. In these contexts, the interaction between
its terms can bring to the fore certain hidden similarities between them.
In such cases, the reader feels puzzled for a moment and then activates
the process of hermeneutic search and detailed comparison frequently
assisted by visualizationand often resorts to the hermeneutic strategies
described by Searle with reference to Gricean pragmatics.25 In these cases,
the resultant meaning of a metaphor is produced through an intellectual search rather than straightforward linguistic predication. One can
define this search process as the gradual foregrounding of a common
attribute. It is to this type of metaphor that Donald Davidsons remark
applies, when he writes: It may be remarked with justice that the claim
that a metaphor provokes or invites a certain view of its subject rather
than saying it straight out is a commonplace; so it is This view is neatly
summed up by what Heraclites said of the Delphic oracle: It does not say
and it does not hide, it intimates.26 However, in contrast to the popular
interpretation of the theory of interaction,27 which states the complete
symmetry between the terms of metaphor, this process of metaphorical
interaction is still asymmetrical; eventually, it results in the foregrounding
of certain attributes of the primary term in the first turn.
It is noteworthy, however, that in most empirical metaphors the
principles of transference and foregrounding are combined. Such
metaphors imply both the transference of associated attributes and
the necessity of a comparison between their termseven though these
components are mixed in different proportions. When, for example,

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Hopkins writes that mans mounting spirit in his bone-house, mean

house, dwells, this metaphor is based, first and foremost, on the process
of transference, while his fell of dark not day initiates the process of
foregrounding; yet, as has been said, in most cases, both processes are
combined, as Hopkinss times eunuch shows.28 In other words, both
pure transference and pure foregrounding are only the ideal poles
of metaphor. Using a quasi-mathematical model, one may say that all
empirical metaphors are situated along the axis of the type of metaphorical
operation, whose border parameters are marked as transference and
foregrounding. Correspondingly, in any empirical metaphor, there is
a parameter of metaphorical operation that can take any value between
these border values.
2. At this juncture, one can already address another vexing question:
whether metaphors can be true or false. Goodman, for example, insists
that a metaphorical statement can be true or false like any other;29
Davidson,on the contrary, rejects the notion of metaphorical truth and
writes that, strictly speaking, all metaphors are either false or tautological;30 Ricoeur tends to agree with Davidson.31 In reality, however, both
positions disregard important aspects of empirically found metaphors.
There are metaphors which can be true or false, but there are others
which cannot. Discussing an imaginary picture in gray colors, Goodman
writes: To say that our picture is yellow is not metaphorical but merely
false. To say that it is gay is false both literally and metaphorically. But
to say that it is sad is metaphorically true even though literally false;32
the question why predicates apply as they do metaphorically is much
the same as the question why they apply as they do literally.33 In my
view, Goodmans example is slightly problematic, for one can argue that
one of the dictionary meanings of the word sad is having a quality
of expressing the feeling of sadness, and hence, in terms of this essay,
what he analyzes is not a metaphor at all. Yet, one can easily find similar
examples among metaphors proper: Achilles is a lion is metaphorically
true, while Tiresias is a lion is metaphorically falseat least within the
limits of the Homeric moral world. The death of his son smashed him
can be true or false depending on the circumstances; the same holds
true for the statement she is falling apart today.
At the same time, there are numerous metaphors that cannot be classified as either true or false. Achilles is an Intel processor is one of
them; Achilles is a kettle is another. The same holds true for Hopkinss
unforgettable line The mind has mountains, cliffs of fall. . . .34 On closer
inspection, one finds that such metaphors can be classified as successful /
unsuccessfulinstead of true / false. Depending on the choice of their
terms and their context, the interaction between these terms can fore-

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ground a similarity between them and so suggest a possible interpretation

(or several interpretations) to most readers, or, conversely, it can only
puzzle readers and leave them in a state of hermeneutic dizziness. In the
former case, it is successful; in the latter, it is not. Without a doubt, this
ability of being successful or unsuccessful is not something peculiar to
metaphors; as J. L. Austin has demonstrated,35 this is one of the central
notions of language in general. Yet the notion of successfulness is much
more useful when one is analyzing those metaphors that avoid being
classified as true or false. The mind has mountains is neither true nor
false; but the interaction between its terms is definitely successful, for its
cognitive content is extremely rich. Sally is a prime number between 17
and 23 is not.36 Yet, once again, in most cases, metaphors combine both
features: they both imply certain statements to which truth conditions
can be assigned, and create semantic interaction, which makes the reader
look for additional similarities. Nativity, once in the main of light, /
Crawls to maturity, wherewith being crownd, / Crooked eclipses gainst
his glory fight, / And Time that gave doth now his gift confound. To
most of these metaphors one can assign truth conditions: the third line
of this stanza (Crooked eclipses. . .), for example, would be false, were
human life untroubled and consistent. At the same time, the meaning of
crooked eclipses is irreducible to these conditions: it makes the reader
notice numerous similarities between human life, on the one hand, and
eclipses and crooked forms, on the other. Moreover, the lists of these
similarities will be different for different readers.
Thus, as in the previous case, this axis of the modality of metaphorical
operation implies a range of possibilities rather than a set consisting of a
limited number of possible values. Its ideal poles are marked as ability
to be true / false and ability to be successful / unsuccessful. Almost all
empirical metaphors are situated between these poles and, consequently,
they are able to take both values; however, as has been shown, depending on their structures and contexts, one of these conceptual sets can
become more relevant than another. Finally, one should note that this
axis is closely associated with the one discussed above, even though the
whole problem is viewed here from a different perspective. Indeed, if a
given metaphor has the value transference on the axis of the type of
metaphorical interaction, it tends to transfer to the primary term a clear
and limited set of conventional attributes associated with the secondary
term; and to such statements, truth conditions can be relatively easily
assigned. For example, John is a pig is true if and only if he behaves in
a mean way. Interaction, by contrast, in most cases, can be successful or
unsuccessful, but it cannot be true or false. Thus, it is extremely difficult
to assign truth conditions to the mind has mountains; and if one says
that it is true when and only when mental life is uneven, he immedi-

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ately notices that almost all the cognitive content of this metaphor has
vanished. Actually, the relation between this parameter of metaphoric
utterance and the previous one is so close that one may even suggest
that it is the same parameter, although since it is viewed from a different
perspective, it entails essentially different types of theoretical problems. At
the present stage of research, however, I do not see definitive arguments
for its contingency, as well as its independence. Therefore, heuristically,
it is defined as an independent parameter, at least for the time being.
3. The problems of the type of relation between the terms of metaphor,
discussed above, are closely associated with another parameter: that of
the type of similarity upon which a metaphor is based. As has already been
stressed, metaphor always foregrounds similarity, although this similarity
can be of different types. Sometimes this similarity seems to be evident
and objective, and the metaphor is used only to emphasize it, as in case
of Achilles is a lion. This similarity can be labeled as a given. In
other cases, metaphors yoke togetherto use Dr. Johnsons unforgettable expressionthe most dissimilar things: twin compasses and lovers
in John Donne or evening . . . patient etherized in T. S. Eliot. Black
writes: it would be more illuminating in some of these cases to say that
the metaphor creates the similarity than to say that it formulates some
similarity antecedently existing.37 Kittay quotes Wallace Stevenss line,
The garden was a slum of bloom, and asks: What objectively given
similarity is there between a garden and a slum prior to the formation of
the metaphor itself?38 Trying to come to grips with the same problem,
Andrew Ortony introduces a distinction between predicate promotion
metaphors and predicate introduction metaphors,39 by which he means
a distinction between metaphors that just highlight the knowledge the
reader already has and those that state something new. Once again,
in most cases, these are only ideal poles. On the one hand, only a few
metaphors refer to subjects about which we know absolutely nothing; as
a result, any introduction of a new attribute reorganizes the structure
and the hierarchy of the existing ones. On the other hand, there are
very many metaphors that do not make it possible to deduce from their
secondary terms new cognitive information in relation to the primary
onesin addition to foregrounding and strengthening the importance
of some of its attributes. Moreover, in most cases, metaphors both use
evident, given similarities and produce new ones; such as Hopkinss
mornings minion, kingdom of daylights dauphin, dapple-dawn-drawn
Falcon.40 Clearly, there are numerous given similarities upon which
these metaphors are based, but they also draw the attention of the reader
to other similarities, which are not evident at all. In other words, again,
one does not deal here with the two opposed values that a metaphor

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new literary history

may take, but rather, with another axis, along which all metaphors are
situated, at different distances from its poles.
There is another question, however, that should be immediately asked.
Perhaps this is not an independent axis but only another perspective
from which we can analyze the already familiar parameters. Indeed, at
first sight, it seems that the transference of an attribute must be based
upon a given similarity, whereas metaphorical interaction creates this
similarity. In some instances, this is indeed the case; in others, however,
this intuition is misleading, and these axes are independent. John is a
pig functions differently in two different cases: in the case where the
listener knows much about John and in the case where he knows little
or nothing. In both cases, a standard attribute of the secondary term is
transferredand hence the value on the first axis is close to the ideal
pole transference. Yet, in the first example, this statement is based
upon a given similarity (and if there is contrast rather than similarity,
this statement is metaphorically false), while in the latter this similarity
is produced. In this latter case, if the axis of the type of relation has the
value transference and the axis of the type of similaritythe value of
production, the principal term of metaphorical statement (John in
the above example) acquires new attributes, structures, and relations. In
most cases, however, metaphor both uses existing knowledge and adds
something new. The same holds true for the opposite value on the axis
of the type of similarity: interaction. John is a kettle, which implies
interaction between the terms rather than transference, can be based
on a given similarity (at the present moment, John boils), as well as
create a new, perhaps far-fetched, resemblance. Taking a richer example,
one can see that the traditional metaphorical representation of death
as a departure to a final destinationa metaphor that may also imply
interaction, as it does in Emily Dickinsontransfers to death the structures that death, as a physical event, does not have.41 To put it briefly,
the third axis of the production of metaphorical meaning is that of the
type of similarity, which is independent from the previous axes and is
limited by the ideal pole values given and produced.
4. Another distinction, whose understanding is crucial, is that between
the metaphors of creation and those of elucidationwhich mark the
ideal poles of the axis of the object of metaphorical synthesis. Near the creation pole of this axis, one should place all the catachreses that actually create their objects, for which no other word in the world exists.
In this sense, it is important to remember that the significance of the
notion of catachresis is not restricted to such evidentand essentially
nonmetaphoriccases as the leg of the table or electromagnetic wave;
the elements of catachresis are present in all the metaphors that cannot

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917

be paraphrased. This impossibility of paraphrase points to the fact that,

at least to a certain degree, a given metaphor falls into a semantic gap
and that this lacuna cannot be filled otherwise. Already Quintillian noted
that [in] the metaphor . . . a noun or verb is transferred from the place
to which it properly belongs to another where there is no literal term
or the transferred is better than the literal.42 To the other pole belong
those metaphors that simply stress one of the aspects of their primary
term, without adding any new information about it. Thus, the metaphor
the president is a pig adds nothing to the understanding of the subject
under consideration, even though it does stress one of its aspects. The
same contrast, though less pronounced, can also be found when analyzing more poetic metaphors. Thus, on the one hand, when Hopkins
writes, A hearts clarion! / Away griefs gasping, joyless days, dejection. /
Across my foundering deck shone / A beacon, an eternal beam this
is a common familiar psychological experience, for which many other
descriptions exist.43 On the other hand, when he exclaims, And after
it almost unmade, what with dread, / Thy doing: and dost thou touch
me afresh? / Over again I feel thy finger, he aims to expresses a deeply
personal, mystical and perhaps essentially unnamable experience.44
5. The three following parameters are related to the type of similarity
on which a given metaphor is based, which it evokes or produces. The
first is that of the form of metaphorical similarity. The values this parameter
can accept differ from objectively grounded to conventional. Near
the former pole are situated such metaphors as butcher, when it is
used with reference to a murderer; both of them literally kill. Near
the other pole, one can find metaphors such as love is a rose; here,
the set of properties and relations, which are culturally associated with
rose, is transferred to the concept of love. In addition, a conventionally grounded similarity can be culturally constructed in a different,
though symmetrical, sense; in these cases, the literal attributes of the
secondary term bring to the fore the previous ascription of associated
attributes to the primary term. Thus, for example, in accordance with our
understanding of death, we can call it a redeemer, a healer, a devourer,
a robber, or a pirate. Moreover, it is important to remember that many
metaphors, which are traditionally viewed as being based on an actual,
objective similarity, bring to the fore a similarity between objective and
associated attributes, or ascribe the associated attributes of the secondary
term to the primary term, or vice versa. This holds true, for example, for
the metaphors Man is wolf and Achilles is a lion, which have been
discussed repeatedly by Analytic philosophy, losing only a few points to
the cat on the mat. As Searle, as well as Lakoff and Turner,45 stress, this
lion metaphor is based on the relation between an associated attribute

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new literary history

of a lion (bravery, as a human attribute, cannot be a literal attribute

of a lion) and the literal bravery of Achilles. However, for the sake of
precision, one needs to correct the radicalism of this statement. In addition to the relation between literal and metaphorical bravery, one can
easily find points of objective similarity: both the lion and Achilles, for
example, are said to attack regardless of danger and irrespective of the
number of enemies. In other words, it is based on both objective and
constructed similarities, and thus should be placed somewhere between
the poles of the axis under analysis.
6. The second group of parameters, which describes the similarity on
which a given metaphor is based (or which it evokes or produces), can
take all possible values along the axes of the modality of similarity from substantial to relational. Near the substantial pole of this axis, one can find
such metaphors as Jane is Ophelia or Jane is a rose, which underscore
a similarity between the essences of the primary and the secondary terms
(in the first case between the real essences, in the second between the
real and attributed ones). To the other pole belong those metaphors that
are based on a similarity between the respective relations of the terms
of a metaphor to other entities, between the systems of such relations
or their structures. This difference, however minor it may seem at first
sight, was the focus of a spirited debate among scholars; and the understanding of a possibility of difference at this point too may help to get
rid of a quite central theoretical aporia. This problem, however, deserves
further explanations. Perhaps the most impressive work devoted to this
subject was done by Miller,46 but this line of analysis has been taken up
and continued by other scholars as well. Kittay, for example, analyzes
the sentence The seal dragged himself out of the office, specifies its
contexts of tiresome bureaucratic work,47 and then explains: The metaphoric mapping of the sentence . . . induces the structure in the field
of human relations in the corporate world which is transported from
the field of seals as performing animals.48 Another concordant example
that she analyzes, the designation of Socrates as midwife in Theaetetus,
focuses on a similarity between a midwifes relation to the mothers body
and her child, and Socrates relation to his students minds and their
ideas.49 The emphasis placed by the cognitive school upon the mapping
of relations to another cognitive domain often seems to be a continuation of the same line of thought.
7. Another axis, which is structured by differences in the character of
metaphorical similarity, has intelligible similarity and perceptible similarity as its poles. Those metaphors that should be placed near the intelligible pole tend to stress theoretical or abstract analogies, whereas near

metaphor revisited

919

the perceptible pole, one will find, alongside others, those metaphors
that focus on visual similarities. Again, the necessity of stressing these
two possibilities results from continuous polemics upon the question of
whether the procession of metaphor must imply visualization or not.50
In reality, metaphors that are close to the former pole require little or
no visualization, whereas those belonging to the perceptible part of
the spectrum imply it as an integral part of the process of interpretation.
Thus, on the one hand, when in The Wreck of the Deutschland Hopkins
writes, I am soft sift / In a hourglass, he stresses his transparence before
God, who sees into the heart, as well as the slow, gradual, and inescapable dynamics of his spiritual progress.51 As a result, no visualization
is required for the understanding of this metaphor, even though the
visualization of an hourglass can become a significant assent for some
readers. Near the other pole of this axis, one will find Andr Bretons
line, My wife . . . whose waist is an hourglass, which underscores the
visual similarity between the waist of a woman and the shape of an
hourglass. Its correct interpretation does require a mental image of an
hourglass. In both examples, metaphors use the secondary terms in
order to make a statement about the primary term and to underscore
some of its features, but the mechanism of focus and projection works
in two essentially different domains. This, in turn, means thatas in all
the previous casesthe polemics about whether the interpretation of
metaphors uses mental images, whether it requires an effort of imagination and an act of visualization, is somewhat misguided: it may require
them, but this requirement is not universal.
8. Another major typological dichotomy of the ideal poles of metaphor
is between the metaphors of identification and the metaphors of juxtaposition
along the axis of the configuration of the terms. In the former case, the
identity between the primary and the secondary terms of metaphor is
explicitly stated (John is a pig); in the latterthe existence of a relation, if there is one, must be deduced by the recipient (for example, by
the reader); the former states a similarity clearly, while the latter only
implies one. It seems that it is this, or a comparable, distinction that
Philip Wheelwright had in mind when he coined his slightly enigmatic
dichotomy of two major types of metaphor. He wrote that epiphora is
standing for the outreach and extension of meaning through comparison, whereas diaphora causes the creation of new meaning by juxtaposition and synthesis.52 Epiphora often implies explicit predication (A is
B), while diaphora is based on simple juxtaposition; as an example of
the latter category, he quotes Pounds In a Station of the Metro: The
apparition of these faces in the crowd; / Petals on a wet, black bough.
If in epiphora semantic exchange results from a statement of identity or

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new literary history

a substitution based on resemblance, in diaphora this exchange results

from juxtaposition, which implies the existence of a relation. At the
same time, it is important to bear in mind that both explicit predication and pure, so to speak neutral, juxtaposition mark only the poles
of possible relations; most empirical metaphors imply both functions.
Moreover, Wheelwright himself admits this, thus calling into question
the dichotomy he proposes.53 There are several contingent differences
between metaphors along this axis. The first is related to the processing
of a metaphor. In metaphors of identification (not only John is a pig,
but also this elephant is my flower), the similarity between the terms of
the metaphor will be found (or created) under almost any circumstances,
regardless of the semantic distance between the terms. In metaphors
that are situated somewhere halfway between the poles, this similarity
will be found only in cases where the distance between the terms is reasonable; yet, too large a semantic gap between the secondary term and
the implied primary term (or the absence of any visible similarity) may
make a metaphor either meaningless or noninterpretable (my Indian
flower has a gray fell). Finally, a pure metaphor of juxtaposition (a pure
diaphora) will remain unnoticed, unless there exists a special reason for
making a comparison, which should be contained either in the terms
themselves (explicit similarity) or in the frame that necessitates such a
comparison.
In addition, there is an important subdistinction within the category
of the metaphors of identification related to the status of the primary
term. In metaphors such as Achilles is a lion, the literal designation of
this term is present and evident; whatever the frame of this metaphor
may be, its primary term is Achilles. This is not to say that in these
cases the frame of metaphor is superfluous, but it is necessary only for
the interpretation of the metaphorical relation, rather than the meaning of the primary term. This type of metaphor can be labeled as a
metaphor of explicit designation. In contrast, if one says that the Greek
lion frightened the enemies, the primary term is not clear, or, to be
precise, it is contextually boundits correct interpretation hinges upon
the frame. In such cases, the significance of the frame is greater than in
the previous case. This is a different type of metaphor, one that implies
a different function of the frame and a different mental operation: the
process of reconstruction or even hypothesizing of the primary term,
which is unnecessary when one is dealing with the metaphors of explicit predication. The fact that in both cases the hermeneutic process
is catalyzed by semantic tension, as well as the impossibility of literal
interpretation, is insufficient to prove a similarity between the mental
operations involved, for such tension exists in many other tropes, like
synecdoche and metonymy. This type of metaphor can be designated

metaphor revisited

921

as the metaphor of replacement. Importantly, metaphors of replacement

can require different types of reconstruction processes: from a simple
return to the previous clause (When they saw Achilles, they immediately
understood why the Greek lion frightened the enemies) to a complex
process of hypothesizing and deduction.54 In the former case, after the
meaning of the anaphoric reference has been clarified, the metaphor
is processed exactly as a metaphor of explicit predication. In the latter
case, its interpretation is preceded by a much more complex process of
search and interpretation. Moreover, there are metaphors whose primary term is not only unclear, but it cannot be reconstructed with any
sufficient certaintylike Hopkinss self-representation as one who in
smooth spoons spy lifes masque mirrored.55 Finally, it is the structural
difference between these types of metaphor that is worth noting. If in
the metaphors of explicit designation the significance of the frame is
reduced, in the metaphors of replacement the frame is always indispensable, while it is the primary term that can sometimes become unclear
and thus relatively less important. Finally, in most metaphors of replacement, there is an overlapping of two different operations: the avoidance
of the explicit reference to the primary term is partly compensated by its
elucidation by means of the frame; and the lack of explicit designation
is balanced by the replacement of the primary term with the secondary
term, which stresses their similarity, and hence functions as a substitute
for such a designation.
9. The next parameter that is crucial for the understanding of metaphor
describes the degree of dependence (of a given metaphorical utterance) on
more general systems of conceptual transference. This definition, however, requires additional clarifications. As the cognitive school has demonstrated,
there are numerousand often seemingly idiosyncraticmetaphors,
which are based on more general systems of conceptual transference.
Dantes In the middle of lifes road / I found myself, for example,
is based on the conventional representation of life as a journey in European cultures. 56 In an article written within the framework of this
school, this conceptual scheme will be spelled out in block letters, as
in: LIFE IS A JOURNEY. Such conceptual relations can be unified into
larger classes: time is a devourer, time is a destroyer, and time is an
evaluator belong to a more general class of time is a changer.57 From
the genealogical point of view, the history of the cognitive approach to
metaphor can be traced back to the theory of metaphor proposed by
Nelson Goodman. In contrast to Black, Goodman interprets metaphors
as the transference of the whole system of terms and relations to a new
conceptual realm, rather than as the transference of an isolated term.58
For quite a long time, this approach remained a rather idiosyncratic

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one, and the change in the attitude towards it coincided with that in
evaluation of the frequency of use of metaphor in everyday speech and
communication.
Since the mid-1970s, numerous studies have demonstrated the ubiquitous presence of metaphors in human speech and thought. In all probability, the most influential of them was by Lakoff and Mark Johnson,
who cogently showed that different metaphors, far from being singular
and arbitrary instances of transference of an isolated sign, are often
based on more general conceptual transferences, which organize conceptual systems and structure human understanding of different aspects
of existential experience. This approach was developed in the works of
Lakoff, Gibbs, Turner, and many others. Finally, Lakoff suggested that all
the studies of metaphors should be reduced to the study of conceptual
transferences (or mappings in his terms), which he labels as conceptual metaphors.59 Correspondingly, metaphor in the traditional sense
began to be seen as a surface manifestation of conceptual metaphor,
and referred to as linguistic metaphor.60 It is this suggestion of the
cognitive school that must be corrected: not every metaphor is based on
conventional conceptual transference. Furthermore, to the best of my
knowledge, at least half of the most memorable literary metaphors are
not. It is impossible to say, for example, what the standard conceptual
transference behind Hopkinss unforgettable fell of dark is: DARKNESS
HAS BODY or NIGHT IS A CROCODILE.61 The same holds true for his
famous blue-bleak embers that fall, gall themselves, and gash goldvermilion.62 At the same time, the case of Hopkinss metaphor the mind
has mountains, cliffs of fall is more complicated. The representation of
the mind as a landscape, which is behind it, is indeed conventional. Yet,
it is not a part of the language in its common everyday form, but rather,
that of a more specific conceptual system of European Romanticism.
In addition, there are whole groups of metaphors, which are not
based on conceptual transferences; the so-called scientific metaphors
are among them. Thus, for example, from different points of view, light
can be described as either a wave (which has a front and a length)
or corpuscular (which has a charge). These metaphors have been
initially taken from essentially different conceptual domains; and their
relations have been completely restructured according to scientific
needs and concerns. Another group of metaphors, which exist outside
of the transferences of conceptual schemes, includes those idiosyncratic
metaphors, which make sense only in certain contexts but are completely
meaningless in others, like Searles Sally is a block of ice.63 Certainly,
one can say that this statement is an example of the conceptual metaphor MAN IS AN OBJECT, but this answer only foregrounds the general
problem of this theory as a whole. The problem is that the following

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923

metaphorical classes: MAN IS A GOD (She is a real Venus), MAN IS AN

ANGEL (what a little cherub!), MAN IS AN ANIMAL (John is a pig),
MAN IS A PLANT (Kate is a rose), and MAN IS AN INANIMATE OBJECT (Sally is a block of ice) are clearly subclasses of the general class
MAN IS EVERYTHING. Yet, this simply means that man is ready to use
everything to talk about himself, the beloved. Once again, this is not
to say that transference among conceptual domains does not exist, but
rather, that empirical metaphors are not always based on it; moreover,
they may use the structures of such transferences in different degrees.
That is why, from the very beginning, I used the term conceptual transference, instead of conceptual metaphor. To my mind, the choice of
the term metaphor for the designation of conceptual transference
was infelicitous; and it seriously complicated the problem as a whole, by
representingas Duns Scotus would sayan attribute as an essence.
10. The next parameter of metaphorical discourse characterizes the
degree of transference of the associated field; it is closely associated not only
with the previous parameter, but also with the problem of the modality
of similarity (number six above). According to different schools, the use
of metaphoric discourse is often associated with the transference of
relations, properties, implications, and even evaluations from one conceptual domain to another and results in the conceptualization of the
target domain in terms of the source domain. To return to the example
above, many metaphors require that the experience of life should be
interpreted in terms of a physical journey. Once again, this understanding can be traced back to Goodman, as he stresses that the transferred
labels retain their connections, and that these connections restructure
the conceptual domain to which they are moved.64 Since the beginning
of the 1980s, numerous scholars have emphasized that metaphors transfer
not only isolated attributes, but rather, the whole structure of relations to
other realms, which are then structured in accordance with the source
domain of the secondary metaphorical term. This approach was also
applied in the analysis of literature, even though in most cases, literary
texts were used as empirical materials in the analysis of the process of
human cognition.
Yet, there are also significant differences between the approaches of
different scholars. A relatively cautious approach focuses on a single
metaphorical act and limits the relations transferred to the relations of
contrast and affinity.65 In contrast, Lakoff, Johnson, and Turner, whose
approach is far more radical, suggest that any type of relation can be transferred. Moreover, it is not only relations, but also properties, knowledge,
and even evaluations which get mapped onto corresponding entities
(relations, properties, and knowledge) in the target domain.66 It is far

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new literary history

from my intention, however, to question the existence of the mechanism

of conceptual transference, as has been shown cogently by Reddy, Lakoff,
Johnson, Turner, Kittay, Gibbs, and many others. Yet, at this point, one
must also correct their analysis: the mechanism they have shown is by
no means a universal characteristic of metaphor; in this sense, not every
metaphor is similar to lifes way. There are numerous contrary examples,
which imply only the transference of a major attribute, and not of the
whole set of conceptual relations from the conceptual source domain
of the secondary term. Thus, metaphysical conceits (such as Donnes
twin compasses) and modernist metaphors often have a very limited
common denominator between their primary and secondary terms, and,
as a result, most of the initial relations of the secondary term are not
projected upon the primary one. Scientific metaphors do not transfer
conceptual relations either, as the existence of electromagnetic waves
definitely implies neither shores nor tides.
Moreover, scientific metaphors and metaphysical conceits are only the
most radical examples of this nontransference of the associated field of
the secondary term. As in all previous cases, most empirical metaphors are
located somewhere in between the transference of the whole associated
field of the secondary term (as in the case of life as a journey) and the
complete lack of transference, which is exemplified by twin compasses.
Correspondingly, understanding both the nature and the quantity of the
relations transferred is crucial for the analysis of any given metaphor.
Finally, one should ask once again if this is an independent parameter
or whether it is contingent upon another one; in the case under consideration, one should ask if the quantity of the associated elements
transferred is not just another name for the degree of dependence on
wider systems of conceptual transference. Indeed, the metaphors that
are isolated from major conceptual systems are often based on a single
point of relation, while those that are based on such systems frequently
imply the use of transferred relations and properties. However, these
are only tendencies, not universal rules. On the one hand, returning to
Hopkinss fell of dark and his blue-bleak embers that gall themselves,
which exist outside major systems of conceptual transference, one can
easily notice numerous relations and properties, which are transferred
from the secondary term to the primary one: these relations cover a
large field from physical properties (the texture of fell and the short
life of embers) to the typological echo of the secondary terms (fell,
gall, gold-vermilionthe color of blood). On the other hand, most
hard-worn or dead metaphors, which, in most cases, are based on wider
conceptual transferences, are often used without any reference to the
field of associated relations and properties of the secondary terms. Saying,
for example, that I support a given party, I do not represent myself as

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925

an Atlas who physically holds heaven. Finally, as I have shown elsewhere,

there are metaphors that aim to bridge the gap between two different
conceptual domains, both of which are represented as real, instead of
using one domain for the remapping of another.67
11. The next parameter of metaphor is the degree of deautomatization that
is implied by a given use of metaphorical discourse in normal circumstances. Once again, this parameter is closely associated with the previous
ones. In most cases, a metaphor, which is unrelated to existing systems
of conceptual transference, requires a rethinking of the primary term
in relation to the secondary one. Conversely, a simple reproduction
of a basic conceptual transference (metaphor) on the rhetorical level
does not draw attention to its conceptual basis. By saying he is gone,
for example, we do not attempt to think through the whole conceptual
representation of death as journey. Nevertheless, the axis of the degree
of deautomatization is independent. A metaphor that is unrelated to any
conceptual system can be a dead (or a hard-worn) metaphor, and its use
can entail little deautomatization, if any. To the best of my knowledge,
the leg of a table is unrelated to any major conceptual transference
(FURNITURE IS BODY does not sound convincing, neither does FURNITURE IS ANIMAL); and yet in normal circumstances, the use of such
a metaphor does not necessitate the rethinking of this legneither from
the point of view of its function, nor from that of its visual shape. And,
conversely, there are numerous metaphors that are associated with major
conceptual transferences, but, nonetheless, do cause marked deautomatization. This is especially conspicuous in the poetic realm. Lakoff and
Turner suggest that there are three stances that poets have chosen to
take towards standard conceptual transferences: to versify them in an
automatic way, to deploy them masterfully, and to attempt to step
outside the ordinary ways.68 From the point of view of literary criticism,
however, this taxonomy is misleading; these are not three values that a
parameter can take, but rather one more axis that implies a possibility
of continuous change from automatic reproduction to Viktor Shklovskys
defamiliarization.69 Thus, for example, Hopkinss Not, Ill not, carrion
comfort, Despair, not feast on thee; / Not untwistslack they may be
these last strands of man / In me is situated somewhere between the
second and the third categories of Lakoff and Turners taxonomy.70 By
the same token, there are many other, so to speak, poetic metaphors
whose beauty and complexity deautomatizes the conventional conceptual
transferences on which they are based.
12. Finally, there is the last axisthat of the degree of metaphorical symmetry; this axis also significantly shapes the character of metaphorical

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predication. Black touched upon this problem when he wrote: If to call

a man a wolf is to put him in a special light, we must not forget that the
metaphor makes the wolf seem more human than he otherwise would.71
Later on, Ortony suggested that metaphors (in contrast to comparisons)
are based on a relation between the pivotal (high-salient) predicates
of the secondary term and the subsidiary (low-salient) or absent predicates of the primary term. As a result, according to him, all metaphors
and similes are asymmetrical. In billboards are like warts, for example,
the comparison stresses the ugliness of billboards (as a predicate, it is
high-salient for warts and low-salient for billboards). Conversely, in
warts are like billboards, the comparison stresses the fact that warts
can be large and conspicuous.72 Thus, simile is promoting the salience
of [the] predicates if they were low salient, and of introducing them if
they were not there at all.73 According to Ortony, the same holds true
for metaphors, which, as a result, turn out to be asymmetrical and irreversible. However, a closer examination shows that this asymmetry is not
universal. Even in the most trivial and hard-worn metaphor, Achilles is
a lion, what is actually transferred is the most essential attributes of the
notions of Achilles and the lion: strength and courage. In this case, the
metaphor is quite symmetrical and hence reversible: Lion is Achilles
focuses on precisely the same features and attributes as Achilles is a
lion. In other words, from the point of view of the status of the attribute
on which similarity is based, metaphors can vary from symmetrical, where
the essential attribute of the secondary term is related to the essential
attribute of the primary term, to asymmetrical, in which an essential attribute is related to a subsidiary one.
To summarize, the problem of metaphor is much more complicated
than most scholars have been prepared to even admit. Its spacestructured by several independent axes and complicated by a potential of
additional variationscreates a possibility of hundreds of metaphorical
structures, which are based on different values of parameters along each
of these axes. These could be metaphors based on interactions between
their terms, and those, where an associated attribute of the secondary
term is mechanically transferred to the primary one; metaphors that can
be true or false; and those that can be only successful or unsuccessful;
metaphors isolated from the basic paradigms of conceptual transference;
those which are explicitly based on these paradigms; and many others.
Yet none of these possibilities offer a means by which metaphor in its entirety may be defined. Moreover, although some of these parameters can
accept only discrete dichotomous values, others imply a possibility of any
value between the pole values along the corresponding axes. Therefore,
most empirical metaphors are situated somewhere between these poles
and combine different functions in different degrees. At the same time,

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metaphor revisited

not all the collocations of values of these parameters are possible; and
this significantly limits the number of possible structures in comparison
to pure combinatory estimation. Thus, for example, the radical version
of creation along the axis of the basis of metaphorical synthesis is
incompatible with the value juxtaposition on the axis of configuration:
in simpler words, the same metaphor cannot be both a diaphora and a
catachresis, for diaphora requires both its terms to be explicitly present.
This does not mean that these axes are not independent, but rather,
that in the space of metaphor there exist combinations of values that
are prohibited for theoretical reasonsexactly as certain combinations
of parameters might be prohibited in physics or in chemistry.
To put it briefly, metaphor as such is only a field of different possibilities,
which is unified owing to the existence of the structure of identification
(and, consequently, the external form of metaphor), rather than a clear
and unambiguous essence. As a result, any attempt to define a single
essence of metaphor may be compared to the old Buddhist parable
of the blind men who try to describe an elephant: one, who holds its
tail, believes that it is a rope, while the others hold its trunk, leg, belly,
and ear. Like an elephant, metaphor is neither a rope, nor a trumpet
or a pillar, nor a winnowing basket or a storage bin; but in a sense, it
can become any of them. The pure eidetic concept of metaphor, like
pure existence, is not an essence but only a field of possibilities. And
this, in turn, is the answer to the question why most metaphors are not
paraphrasablebecause of the multiplicity and heterogeneity of possible
metaphorical functions. Indeed, in principle, one can find a functional
analogue for almost any single parameter, when it is isolated from the
whole structure, but to find another linguistic entity that will perform
a dozen different functions exactly as a given entity does is, in most
cases, impossiblesomething that is quite predictable from both logical
and theoretical points of view. To return to one of the examples above,
metaphor is a metaphor is a metaphor is a metaphor.
University of Haifa
Notes
1 Jonathan Culler, Part One: Structuralism and Linguistic Models, in Structuralist Poetics:
Structuralism, Linguistics and the Study of Literature (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ. Press, 1975),
3109.
2 Roman Jakobson, Language in Literature, ed. Krystyna Pomarska and Stephen Rudy
(Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1987), 95117.
3 Max Black, Metaphor, in Models and Metaphors: Studies in Language and Philosophy
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ. Press, 1962), 28.
4 Black, Metaphor, 39.
5 Black, More About Metaphor, in Metaphor and Thought, ed. Andrew Ortony (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1993), 27.

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6 Black, More About Metaphor, 47.

7 Black, More About Metaphor, 24.
8 Eva Feder Kittay, Metaphor: Its Cognitive Force and Linguistic Structure (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1987), 148.
9 Donald Davidson, What Metaphors Mean, in On Metaphor, ed. Sheldon Sacks (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1979), 40.
10 Robert Boyle, Metaphor in Hopkins (Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press,
1961).
11 John R. Searle, Expression and Meaning: Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts (Cambridge:
Cambridge Univ. Press, 1979), 105.
12 Kittay, Metaphor, 148.
13 Aristotle, Poetics, 1457b, 1459a.
14 Black, Metaphor, 2547.
15 Nelson Goodman, Languages of Art: An Approach to a Theory of Symbols (Indianapolis,
IN: Bobbs-Merrill, 1968), 6885.
16 Paul Ricoeur, The Rule of Metaphor: Multi-Disciplinary Studies of the Creation of Meaning
in Language (Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Press, 1977), 191, 193215.
17 Davidson, What Metaphors Mean, 31.
18 George A. Miller, Images and Models, Similes and Metaphors, in Metaphor and
Thought, ed. Andrew Ortony (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1993), 357400.
19 Searle, Expression and Meaning, 76116.
20 Kittay, Metaphor, 17.
21 Miller, Images and Models, Similes and Metaphors.
22 I. A. Richards, The Philosophy of Rhetoric (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1950), 94.
23 Black, Metaphor, 39 (hereafter cited in text).
24 Searle, Expression and Meaning, 76.
25 See, for example, H. P. Grice, Logic and Conversation, in The Logic of Grammar, eds.
Donald Davidson and Gilbert Harman (Encino, CA: Dickenson, 1975), 6475.
26 Davidson, What Metaphors Mean, 4344.
27 George Lakoff and Mark Turner, More than Cool Reason: a Field Guide to Poetic Metaphor,
(Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1989), 13132.
28 The Poetical Works of Gerard Manley Hopkins, ed. Norman H. MacKenzie (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 148, 181, 201.
29 Goodman, Languages of Art, 195215.
30 Davidson, What Metaphors Mean.
31 Ricoeur, Rule of Metaphor, 191, 230.
32 Goodman, Languages of Art, 70.
33 Goodman, Languages of Art, 78.
34 Poetical Works of Gerard Manley Hopkins, 182.
35 J. L. Austin, How To Do Things with Words (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962).
36 Searle, Expression and Meaning, 76ff.
37 Black, Metaphor, 37.
38 Kittay, Metaphor, 17.
39 Andrew Ortony, The Role of Similarity in Similes and Metaphors, in Metaphor and
Thought, ed. Andrew Ortony (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1993), 354.
40 Poetical Works of Gerard Manley Hopkins, 144.
41 Lakoff and Turner, More than Cool Reason,123.
42 Wendell V. Harris Metaphor, in Dictionary of Concepts in Literary Criticism and Theory
(New York: Greenwood Press, 1992), 226.
43 Poetical Works of Gerard Manley Hopkins, 198.
44 Poetical Works of Gerard Manley Hopkins, 119.
45 Lakoff and Turner, More than Cool Reason, 19598.

metaphor revisited

929

46 Miller, Images and Models, Similes and Metaphors.

47 Kittay, Metaphor, 162.
48 Kittay, Metaphor, 164.
49 Kittay, Metaphor, 27887.
50 As in Ricoeur, Rule of Metaphor.
51 Poetical Works of Gerard Manley Hopkins, 120.
52 Philip Wheelwright, Metaphor and Reality (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1967),
1078.
53 Wheelwright, Metaphor and Reality, 108.
54 Searle, Expression and Meaning, 8185. 9393, 103ff.
55 Poetical Works of Gerard Manley Hopkins, 204.
56 Lakoff and Turner, More than Cool Reason, 9.
57 Lakoff and Turner, More than Cool Reason, 34.
58 Goodman, Languages of Art, 7273.
59 Lakoff, The Contemporary Theory of Metaphor, in Metaphor and Thought, ed. Andrew
Ortony (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1993), 203.
60 Lakoff, Contemporary Theory of Metaphor, 20251.
61 Poetical Works of Gerard Manley Hopkins, 181.
62 Poetical Works of Gerard Manley Hopkins, 144.
63 Searle, Expression and Meaning, 83.
64 Goodman, Languages of Art, 74.
65 Kittay, Metaphor, 14956.
66 Lakoff and Turner, More than Cool Reason, 6364.
67 Dennis Sobolev, Hopkinss Rhetoric: Between the Material and the Transcendent,
Language and Literature: Journal of the Poetics and Linguistics Association 12, no. 2 (2003):
99117.
68 Lakoff and Turner, More than Cool Reason, 51.
69 Viktor Shklovsky, Art as Technique, in Russian Formalist Criticism: Four Essays (Lincoln:
Univ. of Nebraska Press, 1965), 324.
70 Poetical Works of Gerard Manley Hopkins, 183.
71 Black, Metaphor, 44.
72 Ortony, The Role of Similarity, 35152.
73 Ortony, The Role of Similarity, 355.