Narratives

Constitutional Law II
Michael Vernon Guerrero Mendiola
2005
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Table of Contents

In RE: Declaration of the Petitioner's Rights and Duties under Section 8 of RA 6132.
Kay Villegas Kami. [GR L-32485, 22 October 1970] 1
Mejia vs. Pamaran [GRs L-56741-42, 15 April 1988] 1
People vs. Ferrer [GRs L-32613-14, 27 December 1972] 3
Misolas vs. Panga [GR 83341, 30 January 1990] 4
People vs. Sandiganbayan [GR 101724, 3 July 1992] 5
Wright vs. CA [GR 113213, 15 August 1994] 6

This collection contains six (6) cases

summarized in this format by
Michael Vernon M. Guerrero (as a senior law student)
during the First Semester, school year 2005-2006
in the Political Law Review class
under Dean Mariano Magsalin Jr.
at the Arellano University School of Law (AUSL).
Compiled as PDF, September 2012.
Berne Guerrero entered AUSL in June 2002
and eventually graduated from AUSL in 2006.
He passed the Philippine bar examinations immediately after (April 2007).

berneguerrero.wordpress.com

Narratives (Berne Guerrero)

368

In RE: Declaration of the Petitioner's Rights and Duties under Section 8 of RA 6132. Kay
Villegas Kami. [GR L-32485, 22 October 1970]
First Division, Makasiar (J): 4 concur, 1 reserves vote, 2 maintain opinions in Imbong vs. Comelec and
Gonzales vs. Comelec, 1 concurs partly, 1 on leave, 1 files separate dissenting opinion
Facts: Kay Villegas Kami, Inc., filed a petition for declaratory relief, claiming to be a duly recognized and
existing non-stock and non-profit corporation created under the laws of the land, and praying for a
determination of the validity of Section 8 of RA 6132 and a declaration of petitioner's rights and duties
thereunder. In paragraph 7 of its petition, "Kay Villegas Kami" avers that it has printed materials designed to
propagate its ideology and program of government, and that in paragraph 11 of said petition, it intends to
pursue its purposes by supporting delegates to the Constitutional Convention who will propagate its ideology.
"Kay Villegas kami" actually impugns only the first paragraph of Sec. 8(a) on the ground that it violates the
due process clause, right of association, and freedom of expression and that it is an ex post facto law.
Issue: Whether Section 8 of RA 6132 is in the nature of an ex-post facto law.
Held: An ex post facto law is one which: (1) makes criminal an act done before the passage of the law and
which was innocent when done, and punishes such an act; (2) aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it
was, when committed; (3) changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to
the crime when committed; (4) alters the legal rules of evidence, and authorizes conviction upon less or
different testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense; (5) assuming to
regulate civil rights and remedies only, in effect imposes penalty or deprivation of a right for something which
when done was lawful; and (6) deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he
has become entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty.
From the aforesaid definition as well as classification of ex post facto laws, the constitutional inhibition refers
only to criminal laws which are given retroactive effect. While it is true that Sec. 18 penalizes a violation of
any provision of RA 6132 including Sec. 8 (a) thereof, the penalty is imposed only for acts committed after
the approval of the law and not those perpetrated prior thereto. There is nothing in the law that remotely
insinuates that Secs. 8(a) and 18, or any other provision thereof, shall apply to acts carried out prior to its
approval. On the contrary, Sec. 23 directs that the entire law shall be effective upon its approval. It was
approved on 24 August 1970.
369 Mejia vs. Pamaran [GRs L-56741-42, 15 April 1988]
En Banc, Gancayco (J): 14 concur
Facts: 6 ejectment cases were filed separately in the City Court of Manila by Eusebio Lu against Feliciano F.
Endangan, Josefina Meimban, Teodorico Bontia, Rolando Antillon, Jose Mabalot and Vicente Villamor. All
cases were decided by the City Court of Manila against Endangan, et. al., all of whom appealed in due time to
the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila, where the cases were raffled to Branch XXVI, presided over by
the Honorable Jose P. Alejandro (Civil Case 122794 to 122799). On 12 August 1979, Endangan, Bontia,
Antillon, Mabalot, and Villamor entered into a compromise agreement with Lu whereby the Endangan, et. al.
individually received from Lu the sum of P5,000 in consideration of which Endangan, et. al. agreed to vacate
the premises in question and remove their houses therefrom within 60 days from the date of the execution of
the agreement, failing which the appellee shall have the authority to demolish Endangan, et. al.'s houses with
costs thereof chargeable against them. The compromise agreement was submitted to the court. Josefina
Meimban did not join her co-defendants in entering into the compromise agreement. Up to that stage of the
cases, the counsel of record of the defendants was Atty. S. G. Doron. On 22 August 1979, Atty. Modesto R.
Espano of the Citizens Legal Assistant Office (CLAO), wrote Atty. Doron to inform him that Mrs. Meimban
has sought the assistance of the CLAO regarding her case, and asked that the records of the case be sent to
him. As a consequence, Atty. Doron filed on 30 August 1979 his motion to withdraw appearance as counsel
for Meimban in Civil Case 122795. While Endangan, Bontia, Antillon, Mabalot and Villamor, have decided to
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settle with Lu through compromise agreement that they signed, Meimban resolved to prosecute her appeal in
her own case, Civil Case 122795. When Meimban followed up her case in Branch XXVI of the CFI of Manila
and had occasion to talk to Danilo Buenaventura of that Branch who told her that her case was already
submitted for decision. She sought assistance from the CLAO where she was instructed by Atty. Espano to
find out the real status of the case. She returned to the court sometime in July 1979 and that was when she
first came to know Atty. Aurora Mejia who told her that the case has not yet been decided because there was
still one party who has not signed the compromise agreement prepared by Atty. Doron. Atty. Mejia also
remarked that she was surprised why rich people were helping in that case, like a certain Atty. Lu, a brother of
Eusebio Lu, who has been approaching the presiding judge; and then told her she would help them provided
they give P1,000 each for a gift to the Judge, to which she replied she would broach the matter to her
companions. From the court, she went to Atty. Modesto Espano and told the lawyer the case was not yet
submitted. Atty. Espano instructed her to get her papers from Atty. Doron, which she did. Thereafter, she told
Pilar Bautista, daughter of Jose Mabalot, and Gloria Antonio, daughter of Vicente Villamor, about the help
offered by Atty. Mejia. The two said they would think it over as they had already signed something. When she
went to the court to deposit her rentals Atty. Mejia asked her if her companions were agreeable to the
suggestion and she replied she had already told them and that they would consider the matter. On 20
November 1979, Sylvia Dizon y Resurreccion who loaned Meimban P500 accompanied the latter to the court.
She was seated at the corridor near the door of Atty. Mejia's office which was partially open, and she saw
Meimban handed an envelope to Atty. Mejia who put it inside her desk drawer. On 7 December 1979, the
date set for the hearing of the motion to withdraw the compromise and to file memoranda filed by Pilar
Bautista and Gloria Antonio in behalf of their fathers, Atty. Mejia approached Meimban and said no oppositor
might arrive, and asked her if Bautista had brought 1/2 of the P1,000.00. Bautista placed P600 in an envelope
and the two of them, Bautista and Meimban, went to Atty. Mejia's office. Bautista handed the envelope
containing the money to Atty. Mejia who received it. On 3 September 1980, Atty. Mejia attempted to bribe
the Tanodbayan Investigator (Christina Corall-Paterno), through intricate gold chain with a pendant hearing
an inscription of letter "C," (which the investigator returned through an employee, Dante Ramos). CorallPaterno investigated the complaints of Josefina Meimban and Pilar Bautista against Atty. Aurora Mejia y
Rodriguez for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. On 23 April 1981, the Sandiganbayan, in
Criminal Case 1988, found Aurora Mejia y Rodriguez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of
paragraph (b), Section 3 of RA 3019 and sentenced her to an indeterminate imprisonment ranging from 4
years and 1 day as minimum to 7 years as maximum, to suffer perpetual disqualification from public office
and to indemnify the victim Josefina Meimban the sum of P1,000.00 representing the money given to her. The
Sandiganbayan also found Mejia, in Criminal Case 1989, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of
paragraph (b), Section 3 of RA 3019 and likewise sentenced her to an indeterminate imprisonment ranging
from 4 years and 1 day as minimum to 7 years as maximum, to suffer perpetual disqualification from public
office and to indemnify the victim Pilar Bautista the amount of P500 representing the money given to her.
Mejia was also ordered to pay the costs of the proceedings. Mejia filed a petition for review with the Supreme
Court.
Issue: Whetehr Presidential Decree is an ex-post facto law.
Held: The contention that Presidential Decree 1606 is contrary to the ex post facto provision of the
Constitution is similarly premised on the allegation that "petitioner's right of appeal is being diluted or eroded
efficacy wise." Mejia alleged that the procedure provided for by the Sandiganbayan are ex post facto and
hence all proceedings taken against her are void ab initio being in violation of the Constitution. It is further
argued that only one stage of appeal is available to Mejia under PD 1606 which effectively deprives her of the
intermediate recourse to the Court of Appeals and that in said appeal to the Supreme Court only issues of law
may be raised and worse still the appeal has become a matter of discretion rather than a matter of right. A
more searching scrutiny of its rationale would demonstrate the lack of persuasiveness of such an argument.
The Kay Villegas Kami decision, promulgated in 1970, supplies the most recent and binding pronouncement
on the matter. To quote from the ponencia of Justice Makasiar: "An ex post facto law is one which: (1) makes
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criminal an act done before the passage of the law and which was innocent when done, and punishes such an
act; (2) aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when committed; (3) changes the punishment and
inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when committed; (4) alters the legal rules of
evidence, and authorizes conviction upon less or different testimony than the law required at the time of the
commission of the offense; (5) assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies only, in effect imposes penalty
or deprivation of a right for something which when done was lawful, and (6) deprives a person accused of a
crime of some lawful protection to which he has become entitled, such as the protection of a former
conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty." Even the most careful scrutiny of the said definition
fails to sustain Mejia's claim. The "lawful protection" to which an accused "has become entitled" is qualified,
not given a broad scope. It hardly can be argued that the mode of procedure provided for in the statutory right
to appeal is therein embraced.
370 People vs. Ferrer [GRs L-32613-14, 27 December 1972]
First Division, Castro (J): 5 concur, 12 took no part, 1 dissented in a separate opinion
Facts: On 5 March 1970 a criminal complaint for violation of section 4 of the Anti-Subversion Act was filed
against Feliciano Co in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Tarlac. On March 10, Judge Jose C. de Guzman
conducted a preliminary investigation and, finding a prima facie case against Co, directed the Government
prosecutors to file the corresponding information. The twice-amended information (Criminal Case 27), recites
"That on or about May 1969 to December 5, 1969, in the Municipality of Capas, Province of Tarlac,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, feloniously became
an officer and/or ranking leader of the Communist Party of the Philippines, an outlawed and illegal
organization aimed to overthrow the Government of the Philippines by means of force, violence, deceit,
subversion, or any other illegal means for the purpose of establishing in the Philippines a totalitarian regime
and placing the government under the control and domination of an alien power, by being an instructor in the
Mao Tse Tung University, the training school of recruits of the New People's Army, the military arm of the
said Communist Party of the Philippines. That in the commission of the above offense, the following
aggravating circumstances are present, to wit: (a) That the crime has been committed in contempt of or with
insult to public authorities; (b) That the crime was committed by a band; and (c) With the aid of armed men or
persons who insure or afford impunity." Co moved to quash on the ground that the Anti-Subversion Act is a
bill of attainder. Meanwhile, on 25 May 1970, another criminal complaint was filed with the same court,
charging Nilo Tayag and five others with subversion. After preliminary investigation was had, an information
was filed. On 21 July 1970 Tayag moved to quash, impugning the validity of the statute on the grounds that
(1) Republic Act 1700 is a bill of attainder; (2) it is vague; (3) it embraces more than one subject not
expressed in the title thereof; and (4) it denies him the equal protection of the laws. Resolving the
constitutional issues raised, the trial court, in its resolution of 15 September 1970, declared the statute void on
the grounds that it is a bill of attainder and that it is vague and overbroad, and dismissed the informations
against the two accused. The Government appealed. The Supreme Court resolved to treat its appeal as a
special civil action for certiorari.
Issue: Whether the Anti-Subversion Law partakes of the nature of a Bill of Attainder.
Held: Article III, section 1 (11) of the Constitution states that "No bill of attainder or ex post facto law shall
be enacted." A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without trial. Its essence is the
substitution of a legislative for a judicial determination of guilt. The constitutional ban against bills of
attainder serves to implement the principle of separation of powers by confining legislatures to rule-making
and thereby forestalling legislative usurpation of the judicial function. History in perspective, bills of attainder
were employed to suppress unpopular causes and political minorities, and it is against this evil that the
constitutional prohibition is directed. The singling out of a definite class, the imposition of a burden on it, and
a legislative intent, suffice to stigmatize a statute as a bill of attainder. Herein, when the Anti-Subversion Act
is viewed in its actual operation, it will be seen that it does not specify the Communist Party of the Philippines
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or the members thereof for the purpose of punishment. What it does is simply to declare the Party to be an
organized conspiracy for the overthrow of the Government for the purposes of the prohibition, stated in
section 4, against membership in the outlawed organization. The term "Communist Party of the Philippines"
is used solely for definitional purposes. In fact the Act applies not only to the Communist Party of the
Philippines but also to "any other organization having the same purpose and their successors." Its focus is not
on individuals but on conduct. Were the Anti-Subversion Act a bill of attainder, it would be totally
unnecessary to charge Communists in court, as the law alone, without more, would suffice to secure their
punishment. But the undeniable fact is that their guilt still has to be judicially established. The Government
has yet to prove at the trial that the accused joined the Party knowingly, willfully and by overt acts, and that
they joined the Party, knowing its subversive character and with specific intent to further its basic objective,
i.e., to overthrow the existing Government by force, deceit, and other illegal means and place the country
under the control and domination of a foreign power. Further, the statute specifically requires that
membership must be knowing or active, with specific intent to further the illegal objectives of the Party. That
is what section 4 means when it requires that membership, to be unlawful, must be shown to have been
acquired "knowingly, willfully and by overt acts." The ingredient of specific intent to pursue the unlawful
goals of the Party must be shown by "overt acts." This constitutes an element of "membership" distinct from
the ingredient of guilty knowledge. The former requires proof of direct participation in the organization's
unlawful activities, while the latter requires proof of mere adherence to the organization's illegal objectives.
Even assuming, however, that the Act specifies individuals and not activities, this feature is not enough to
render it a bill of attainder. It is only when a statute applies either to named individuals or to easily
ascertainable members of a group in such a way as to inflict punishment on them without a judicial trial does
it become a bill of attainder. Nor is it enough that the statute specify persons or groups in order that it may fall
within the ambit of the prohibition against bills of attainder. It is also necessary that it must apply
retroactively and reach past conduct. This requirement follows from the nature of a bill of attainder as a
legislative adjudication of guilt. Indeed, if one objection to the bill of attainder is that Congress thereby
assumes judicial magistracy, then it must be demonstrated that the statute claimed to be a bill of attainder
reaches past conduct and that the penalties it imposes are inescapable. Section 4 of Anti-Subversion Act
expressly states that the prohibition therein applies only to acts committed "After the approval of this Act."
Only those who "knowingly, willfully and by overt acts affiliate themselves with, become or remain members
of the Communist Party of the Philippines and/or its successors or of any subversive association" after 20
June 1957, are punished. Those who were members of the Party or of any other subversive association at the
time of the enactment of the law, were given the opportunity of purging themselves of liability by renouncing
in writing and under oath their membership in the Party. The law expressly provides that such renunciation
shall operate to exempt such persons from penal liability. The penalties prescribed by the Act are therefore not
inescapable.
371 Misolas vs. Panga [GR 83341, 30 January 1990]
En Banc, Cortes (J): 11 concur, 1 concurs in result, 2 dissented in separate opinions
Facts: After receiving information from an unidentified informant that members of the New People's Army
(NPA) were resting in a suspected "underground house" in Foster Village, Del Carmen, Pili, Camarines Sur,
elements of the Philippine Constabulary (PC) raided said house in the early morning of 8 August 1987. Three
persons were inside the house, Arnel P. Misolas and two women known by the aliases "Ka Donna" and "Ka
Menchie" but the women were able to escape in the confusion during the raid. The house was searched and
the raiders found in a red bag under a pillow allegedly used by Misolas a .20 gauge Remington shotgun and 4
live rounds of ammunition. Petitioner was arrested and brought to the PC headquarters. On 4 September 1987,
an information charging Misolas with illegal possession of firearms and ammunition under Presidential
Decree 1866 was filed by the provincial fiscal. The information alleged that the firearm and ammunition were
used in furtherance of subversion so as to qualify the offense under the third paragraph of Section 1 of PD
1866. Upon arraignment, Misolas, with the assistance of counsel de oficio pleaded "not guilty" to the charge.
However, a few days later, the same counsel filed a motion to withdraw the plea on the ground that there was
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basis for the filing of a motion to quash. Judge Benjamin V. Panga, as Judge of RTC Branch 33, Cadlan, Pili,
Camarines Sur, gave Misolas time to file a motion to quash. Misolas filed a motion to quash on the grounds
(1) that the facts charged do not constitute an offense because the information does not charge the proper
offense since from the allegations the offense that may be charged is either subversion or rebellion; and (2)
that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the person of petitioner because of violations of his constitutional
rights, i.e, his arrest and the seizure of the firearm and ammunition were illegal. The judge denied the motion
to quash for lack of merit in an order dated 7 January 1988. Misolas moved for reconsideration, but such was
denied on 15 February 1988. Misolas filed the petition for certiorari.
Issue: Whether PD 1866 constitutes a bill of attainder.
Held: Misolas objected to PD 1866 on the ground of substantive due process. Established rules of
constitutional litigation would, therefore, bar an inquiry based on the theory that PD 1866 constitutes a bill of
attainder. Yet, even if a challenge on the ground that PD 1866 is a bill of attainder could be appropriately
considered, it will still be met with little success. The Court, in People v. Ferrer, defined a bill of attainder as a
legislative act which inflicts punishment on individuals or members of a particular group without a judicial
trial. Essential to a bill of attainder are a specification of certain individuals or a group of individuals, the
imposition of a punishment, penal or otherwise, and the lack of judicial trial. This last element, the total lack
of court intervention in the finding of guilt and the determination of the actual penalty to be imposed, is the
most essential. PD 1866 does not possess the elements of a bill of attainder. It does not seek to inflict
punishment without a judicial trial. Nowhere in the measure is there a finding of guilt and an imposition of a
corresponding punishment. What the decree does is to define the offense and provide for the penalty that may
be imposed, specifying the qualifying circumstances that would aggravate the offense. There is no
encroachment on the power of the court to determine after due hearing whether the prosecution has proved
beyond reasonable doubt that the offense of illegal possession of firearms has been committed and that the
qualifying circumstance attached to it has been established also beyond reasonable doubt as the Constitution
and judicial precedents require.
372 People vs. Sandiganbayan [GR 101724, 3 July 1992]
En Banc, Grino-Aquino (J): 14 concur
Facts: Two letter-complaints were filed on 28 October 1986 and 9 December 1986, with the Tanodbayan by
Teofilo Gelacio, a political leader of Governor Valentina Plaza, wife of Congressman Democrito O. Plaza of
Agusan del Sur, shortly after the Ceferino S. Paredes had replaced Mrs. Plaza as OIC/provincial governor of
Agusan del Sur in March 1986. Gelacio's complaint questioned the issuance to Governor Paredes, when he
was still the provincial attorney in 1976, of a free patent title for Lot 3097-8, Pls. 67, with an area of 1,391
sq.m., more or less, in the Rosario public land subdivision in San Francisco, Agusan del Sur. On 23 February
1989, the Tanodbayan referred the complaint to the City Fiscal of Butuan City who subpoenaed Governor
Paredes. However, the subpoena was served on, and received by, the Station Commander of San Francisco,
Agusan del Sur, who did not serve it on Paredes. Despite the absence of notice to Paredes, Deputized
Tanodbayan/City Fiscal Ernesto M. Brocoy conducted a preliminary investigation ex parte. He recommended
that an information be filed in court. His recommendation was approved by the Tanodbayan who, on 10
August 10, 1989, filed an information in the Sandiganbayan (TBP Case 86-03368), alleging "That on or about
January 21, 1976, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in San Francisco, Agusan del Sur, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a public officer, being then the
Provincial Attorney of Agusan del Sur, having been duly appointed and qualified as such, taking advantage of
his public position, did, then and there, wilfully and unlawfully persuade, influence and induce the Land
Inspector of the Bureau of Lands, by the name of Armando L. Luison to violate an existing rule or regulation
duly promulgated by competent authority by misrepresenting to the latter that the land subject of an
application filed by the accused with the Bureau of Lands is disposable by a free patent when the accused
well knew that the said land had already been reserved for a school site, thus by the accused's personal
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misrepresentation in his capacity as Provincial Attorney of Agusan del Sur and applicant for a free patent, a
report favorably recommending the issuance of a free patent was given by the said Armando L. Luison, land
inspector, thereby paving the way to the release of a decree of title, by the Register of Deeds of Agusan del
Sur, an act committed by the accused, in outright prejudice of the public interest." Paredes was arrested upon
a warrant issued by the Sandiganbayan. Claiming that the information and the warrant of arrest were null and
void because he had been denied his right to a preliminary investigation, Paredes refused to post bail. His wife
filed a petition for habeas corpus praying this Court to order his release, but the Supreme Court denied her
petition because the proper remedy was for Paredes to file a bail bond of P20,000 fixed by the Sandiganbayan
for his provisional liberty, and move to quash the information before being arraigned. On 5 April 1991,
Paredes filed in the Sandiganbayan "An Urgent Motion to Quash Information and to Recall Warrant of
Arrest." After the parties had filed their written arguments, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution on 1 August
1991 granting the motion to quash on the ground of prescription of the offense charged. The People of the
Philippines, through the Solicitor General, filed the petition for certiorari.
Issue: Whether Paredes may no longer be prosecuted for his violation of RA 3019 in 1976.
Held: Batas Pambansa 195 which was approved on 16 March 1982, amending Section 11 of RA 3019 by
increasing from 10 to 15 years the period for the prescription or extinguishment of a violation of the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act, may not be given retroactive application to the "crime" which was committed
by Paredes in January 1976 yet, for it would be prejudicial to the accused. It would deprive him of the
substantive benefit of the shorter (10 years) prescriptive period under Section 11, RA 3019 which was an
essential element of the "crime" at the time he committed it. To apply BP 195 to Paredes would make it an ex
post facto law for it would alter his situation to his disadvantage by making him criminally liable for a crime
that had already been extinguished under the law existing when it was committed. Since an ex post facto law
is proscribed by our Constitution (Sec. 22, Article III, 1987 Constitution), the Sandiganbayan committed no
reversible error in ruling that Paredes may no longer be prosecuted for his supposed violation of RA 3019 in
1976, 6 years before BP 195 was approved. The new prescriptive period under that law should apply only to
those offenses which were committed after the approval of BP 195.
373 Wright vs. CA [GR 113213, 15 August 1994]
First Division, Kapunan (J): 3 concur, 1 on leave
Facts: On 17 March 1993, Assistant Secretary Sime D. Hidalgo of the Department of Foreign Affairs
indorsed to the Department of Justice Diplomatic Note 080/93 dated 19 February 1993 from the Government
of Australia to the Department of Justice through Attorney General Michael Duffy. Said Diplomatic Note was
a formal request for the extradition of Paul Joseph Wright who is wanted for the indictable crimes of: 1 count
of Obtaining Property by Deception contrary to Section 81(1) of the Victorian Crimes Act of 1958 (Wright
and Herbert Lance Orr, obtaining $315,250 from Mulcahy, Mendelson and Round Solicitors by falsely
representing that all relevant documents relating to the mortgage had been signed by Rodney and Janine
Mitchell who control Ruven Nominee Pty. Ltd. Which owned the Bangholme, Victoria property); and 13
counts of Obtaining Property by Deception contrary to Section 81(1) of the Victorian Crimes Act of 1958
(Wright and John Carson Cracker, obtaining 11.2 million commission including $367,044 in bonus
commission via Amazon Bond Pty. Ltd. by submitting 215 life insurance proposals and paying premiums
thereon, but where life proposals were not in existence and approximately 200 were allegedly false;
attempting to obtain $2,870.68 commission in the name of Amazon Bond by submitting one proposal for life
insurance with AMP Society; signing and swearing before the Solicitor); one count of attempting to Obtain
Property by Deception contrary to Section 321(m) of Victorian Crimes Act of 1958 (Wright and Carson
attempting to cause the payment of $2,870.68 commission to a bank account in the name of Amazon Bond
Pty. Ltd. by submitting a proposal for Life Insurance to the AMP Society, the policy-holder of which does not
exist); and one count of Perjury contrary to Section 314 of Victorian Crimes Act of 1958 (Wright and Cracker
signing and swearing before a Solicitor holding a current practicing certificate pursuant to the Legal
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Profession Practice Act of 1958, a Statutory Declaration attending to the validity of 29 of the most recent Life
Insurance proposals of AMP Society and containing 3 false statements). Pursuant to Section 5 of PD 1069, in
relation to the Extradition Treaty concluded between the Republic of the Philippines and Australia on 10
September 1990, extradition proceedings were initiated on 6 April 1993 by the State Counsels of the
Department of Justice before the Regional Trial Court. In its Order dated 13 April 1993, the trial court
directed Wright to appear before it on 30 April 1993 and to file his answer within 10 days. In the same order,
the Judge (Jose de la Rama, Branch 139) ordered the NBI to serve summons and cause the arrest of Wright.
The trial court received return of the warrant of arrest and summons signed by NBI Senior Agent Manuel
Almendras with the information that Wright was arrested on 26 April 1993 at Taguig, Metro Manila and was
subsequently detained at the NBI detention cell where Wright continue to be held. The trial court, in its
decision dated 14 June 1993, granted the petition for extradition requested by the Government of Australia,
concluding that the documents submitted by the Australian Government meet the requirements of Article 7 of
the Treaty of Extradition and that the offenses for which the petitioner were sought in his country are
extraditable offenses under Article 2 of the said Treaty. The trial court, moreover, held that under the
provisions of the same Article, extradition could be granted irrespective of when the offense in relation to
the extradition was committed, provided that the offense happened to be an offense in the requesting State
at the time the acts or omissions constituting the same were committed. Wright challenged the decision of the
Regional Trial Court before the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals, however, affirmed the trial court's
decision on 14 September 1993 and denied Wright's Motion for Reconsideration on 16 December 1993.
Hence, Wright filed the petition for review on certiorari to set aside the order of deportation.
Issue: Whether the Treaty's retroactive application violate the Constitutional prohibition against ex post facto
laws.
Held: Early commentators understood ex post facto laws to include all laws of retrospective application,
whether civil or criminal. However, Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase, citing Blackstone, The Federalist and
other early U.S. state constitutions in Calder vs. Bull concluded that the concept was limited only to penal and
criminal statutes. As conceived under our Constitution, ex post facto laws are (1) statutes that make an act
punishable as a crime when such act was not an offense when committed; (2) laws which, while not creating
new offenses, aggravate the seriousness of a crime; (3) statutes which prescribe greater punishment for a
crime already committed; or, (4) laws which alter the rules of evidence so as to make it substantially easier to
convict a defendant. "Applying the constitutional principle, the (Court) has held that the prohibition applies
only to criminal legislation which affects the substantial rights of the accused." This being so, there is
absolutely no merit in petitioner's contention that the ruling of the lower court sustaining the Treaty's
retroactive application with respect to offenses committed prior to the Treaty's coming into force and effect,
violates the Constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws. Here, the Treaty is neither a piece of
criminal legislation nor a criminal procedural statute. "It merely provides for the extradition of persons
wanted for prosecution of an offense or a crime which offense or crime was already committed or
consummated at the time the treaty was ratified."

Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 7 )