Jimenez, Jr.

v People
G.R. No. 209195 / September 17, 2014 / J. Brion
Facts:
On May 18, 2009 and June 11, 2009, Manuel A. Montero (a former employee
of the BSJ Company owned by the Jimenezes) executed sworn statements
confessing his participation in the killing of Ruby Rose Barrameda (Ruby Rose), and
naming petitioner Manuel J. Jimenez, Jr., Lope Jimenez (Lope, the petitioner
Jimenezs younger brother), Lennard A. Descalso (Lennard) alias Spyke, Robert
Ponce (Robert) alias Obet, and Eric Fernandez (Eric), as his co-conspirators.
The statements of Montero which provided the details on where the alleged
steel casing containing the body of Ruby Rose was dumped, led to the recovery of a
cadaver, encased in a drum and steel casing, near or practically at the place that
Montero pointed to.
On August 20, 2009, the People, through the state prosecutors, filed an
Information before the RTC, charging Jimenez, Lope, Lennard, Robert, Eric and
Montero of murder for the killing of Ruby Rose.
Montero thereafter filed a motion for his discharge entitled Motion for the
Discharge of the Witness as Accused Pursuant to the Witness Protection
Program pursuant to Republic Act No. 6981. The People also filed a motion to
discharge Montero as a state witness for the prosecution. Jimenez opposed both
motions.
On March 19, 2010, the RTCs Acting Presiding Judge Hector B.
Almeyda (Judge Almeyda) denied the motion to discharge Montero as a state
witness.
Judge Almeyda ruled that the prosecution failed to comply with the
requirements of Section 17, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure for
the discharge of an accused as a state witness; it failed to clearly show that Montero
was not the most guilty or, at best, the least guilty among the accused. The judge
further ruled that Monteros statements were not corroborated by the other
evidence on record. The prosecution, too, failed to present evidence to sustain the
possibility of conviction against Jimenez.
On July 30, 2010, Judge Docena, the newly-appointed regular judge,
reconsidered and reversed Judge Almeydas order. On appeal, the CA held that
Judge Docena did not gravely abuse his discretion in ordering Monteros discharge
to become a state witness because the prosecution had complied with the
requirements of Section 17, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that Judge Docena did not commit
grave abuse of discretion in granting the motion to discharge Montero as a state
witness.
Ruling:

No. We agree with the CAs ruling that Judge Docena did not gravely abuse
his discretion when he granted the motion to discharge Montero as a state witness.
We agree with the CA that the prosecution has complied with the requisites
under Section 17, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which
provides that:
(1) Two or more accused are jointly charged with the commission of an
offense;
(2) The motion for discharge is filed by the prosecution before it rests its
case;
(3) The prosecution is required to present evidence and the sworn statement
of each proposed state witness at a hearing in support of the discharge;
(4) The accused gives his consent to be a state witness; and
(5) The trial court is satisfied that:
a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose
discharge is requested;
b) There is no other direct evidence available for the proper
prosecution of the offense committed, except the testimony of said accused;
c) The testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in
its material points;
d) Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and,
e) Said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense
involving moral turpitude.
We also find it necessary to clarify the roles of the prosecution and the trial
court judge in the resolution of a motion to discharge an accused as a state witness.
This need arises from what appears to us to be a haphazard use of the statement
that the trial court judge must rely in large part on the prosecutions suggestion in
the resolution of a motion to discharge.
In the present case, the CA cited Quarto v. Marcelo in ruling that the trial
court must rely in large part upon the suggestions and the information furnished by
the prosecuting officer, thus:
A trial judge cannot be expected or required to inform himself with absolute
certainty at the very outset of the trial as to everything which may be developed in
the course of the trial in regard to the guilty participation of the accused in the
commission of the crime charged in the complaint. If that were practicable or
possible there would be little need for the formality of a trial. He must rely in large
part upon the suggestions and the information furnished by the prosecuting officer
in coming to his conclusions as to the "necessity for the testimony of the accused
whose discharge is requested"; as to the availability or non-availability of other
direct or corroborative evidence; as to which of the accused is most guilty, and
the like.
We deem it important to place this ruling in its proper context lest we create
the wrong impression that the trial court is a mere rubber stamp of the
prosecution, in the manner that Jimenez now argues.
In Quarto, we emphasized that it is still the trial court that determines
whether the prosecutions preliminary assessment of the accused-witness

qualifications to be a state witness satisfies the procedural norms. This relationship

is in reality a symbiotic one as the trial court, by the very nature of its role in the
administration of justice, largely exercises its prerogative based on the prosecutors
findings and evaluation.
Thus, we ruled in People v. Pring that in requiring a hearing in support of the
discharge, the essential objective of the law is for the court to receive evidence for
or against the discharge, which evidence shall serve as the courts tangible and
concrete basis independently of the fiscal's or prosecution's persuasions in
granting or denying the motion for discharge. We emphasize, in saying this, that
actual hearing is not required provided that the parties have both presented their
sides on the merits of the motion.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN
GR Nos. 185729-32, 26 June 2013
FACTS:
Homero A. Mercado, President of JAM Liner, Inc. applied with the Department
of Justice for immunity as State Witness under its witness protection program
on the case of fraudulent issuance of Tax Credit Certificates in favor of JAM
Liner, Inc. by the Department of Finance One-Stop Shop, which application was
granted.
Since the investigation fell within the authority of the Office of the Ombudsman,
the latter charged him before the Sandiganbayan with violation of RA 3019 and
falsification under the RPC.
Mercado filed an MR before the Ombudsman citing DOJs grant of immunity.
The Ombudsman executed an Immunity Agreement and filed a motion to
discharge Mercado from the Information involving him. The Sandiganbayan,
however, denied the motion holding that it has failed to establish the conditions
required under Section 17, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court for the discharge of
an accused as a State Witness.
ISSUE: WON the Sandiganbayan erred in refusing to recognize the immunity from
criminal prosecution that the Ombudsman granted to respondent Mercado and, as
a result, in declining to discharge him from the Information as a State Witness.
RULING: Yes, Sandiganbayan erred in not discharging Mercado from the criminal
Information to be used as State Witness.
Section 17, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court states that,
The conditions for the discharge of an accused as a state witness are as
follows:
a There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose
discharge is requested;
b There is no direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the
offense committed, except the testimony of the said accused;
c The testimony of the said accused can be substantially corroborated in its
material points;
d Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and

Said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving
moral turpitude.
The authority to grant immunity is not an inherent judicial function.
Indeed, Congress has vested such power in the Ombudsman as well as in the
DOJ Secretary. Besides, the decision to employ an accused as a State
Witness must necessarily originate from the public prosecutors whose
mission is to obtain a successful prosecution of the several accused
before the courts. The latter do not as a rule have a vision of the true strength
of the prosecutions evidence until after the trial is over. Consequently, courts
should generally defer to the judgment of the prosecution and deny a motion to
discharge an accused so he be used as a witness only in clear cases of failure to
meet the requirements under the law.
The SB held that Mercados testimony is not absolutely necessary because the
state has other direct evidence that may prove the offenses charged. It held
that Mercados testimony, in large, would only help identify documents and
disclose matters essentially contained in such documents. But the records,
particularly Mercados consolidated affidavit, show that his testimony if true
could be indispensable in establishing the circumstances that led to the
preparation and issuance of fraudulent tax credit certificates. Indeed, nobody
appears to be in a better position to testify on this than he, as president
of JAM Liner, Inc..
Moreover, on the question of conspiracy, the Court ruled that the discharge of
one of the conspirators is essential so he can testify against the others. Hence,
no one can underestimate Mercados testimony since he alone can provide a
detailed picture of the fraudulent scheme that went into the approval and
issuance of the tax credit certificates. The documents can show the
irregularities but not the detailed events that led to their issuances. As
correctly pointed out by the prosecution, Mercados testimony can fill in the
gaps in evidence.
On the question that Mercado benefited from the unlawful transactions, the
Court contended that the immunity granted to Mercado does not blot out the
fact that he committed the offense. While he is liable, the State saw a higher
social value in eliciting information from him rather than engaging in his
prosecution.

Yu v. Judge, RTC of Tagaytay

G.R.NO. 142848, June 30, 2006
Crime: Murder & Kidnapping
FACTS
Atty. Eugene Tan and his driver Eduardo Constantino were abducted from
Alabang, were brought to Cavite and were shot to death. The Presidential Anti-Crime
Commission (PACC) filed a case against named persons and John does. The DOJ
found probable cause against the petitioner and his wife among other people. The
charges against petitioner and his wife were dropped due to lack of evidence to
show probable cause.
Ochoa and de los Santos executed separate sworn
statements implicating petitioner in the abduction and killing of the victim thus
prompting the PAAC to refile against the petitioner for Murder and Kidnapping.
Petitioner filed to dismiss the sworn statements for failing to show probable cause
but the court dismissed the motion and ruled to have ascertained probable cause in
the case. Later on the prosecution filed a "Petition to Discharge as State Witnesses

and Exclude from the Information accused Ochoa and de los Santos" which the
court granted. Petitioner claims that the court has committed a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in granting the petition but
was dismissed for lack of merit. CA concluded that there was no necessity for a
hearing to determine a persons qualification as a state witness after the DOJ had
attested to his qualification.
ISSUE
W/N the court made an error in discharging the accused as state witnesses?
HELD
NO. The contention of the petitioner that since they were already charged
before being admitted into the witness protection their admission is a judicial
prerogative which requires prior determination by the trial court of their
qualification as state witnesses, in accordance with Section 17, Rule 119 of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure is wrong for the DOJ, through RA.6981, already
determined the respondents as state witnesses and this is the mode used to make
the respondent into state witnesses. The other mode involves rule 119 of the rules
of court which is not applies in this case. The mode used is exclusively an executive
function.
According to the DOJ it appears that the respondents were included in an alleged
military operation and unaware that the persons they abducted were innocent
civilians because they were misled by their military superiors into believing that
these individuals were unnamed communist rebels. From their account, private
respondents claim to have been oblivious that the people subject of their
surveillance were to be abducted and subsequently killed. With such the
respondents dont appear to be most guilty
PEOPLE v. CHAVES
GR No. 131377, 11 Feb. 2003
TOPIC INVOLVED: Discharge of accused as state witness Sec. 17, Rule 119.
FACTS: In October 1986, Informations for Multiple Murder for the killing of
members of the Bucag family in Gingoog City were filed against Felipe Galarion,
Manuel Sabit, Cesar Sabit, Julito Ampo, Eddie Torion, John Doe, Peter Doe and
Richard Doe, with the RTC of Gingoog City which was later transferred to RTC of
Cagayan de Oro City presided by respondent Judge Nazar U. Chaves. Only Felipe
Galarion was tried and convicted. All the other accused were at large.
In October 1988, Felizardo Roxas was identified as one of the offender. He
engaged the services of private respondent Miguel Paderanga as his counsel. In his
counter-affidavit, Roxas implicated Atty. Paderanga as the mastermind of the
killings.
At the hearing, the prosecution called Felizardo Roxas as its first witness. The
trial court objected, arguing that the presentation of Roxas testimony will violate
his right against self-incrimination. The trial court ruled further that before Roxas
can be presented as a witness for the prosecution, he must first be discharged as a
state witness. The prosecution filed a motion for the discharge of Roxas as state
witness. It also manifested its intention to present Julito Ampo as another state
witness or ordinary prosecution witness. In the hearing of the motion for discharge
of the proposed state witness, the trial court held that insofar as the proposed
state witness is concerned, only his sworn statement may be admitted and

considered; that the evidence contemplated in the last portion of the first
paragraph of Rule 119, Sec. 9 (now Rule 119, Sec. 17), is any evidence other than
his testimony.
The prosecution, through the OSG, filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus with the CA. CA dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
ISSUE: WON the CA gravely erred in limiting the evidence that needs to be
presented by the prosecution in its motion to discharge to the respective sworn
statement in executed by its proposed witnesses and in upholding the trial courts
denial of the presentation of other evidence.
HELD: Yes. Rule 119, Section 17 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
(formerly Rule 119, Section 9), provides that the trial court may direct one or more
of the accused to be discharged with their consent so that they may be witnesses
for the state after requiring the prosecution to present evidence and the sworn
statement of each proposed state witness at a hearing in support of the discharge
(underscoring ours). The provision does not make any distinction as to the kind of
evidence the prosecution may present. What it simply requires, in addition to the
presentation of the sworn statement of the accused concerned, is the presentation
of such evidence as are necessary to determine if the conditions exist for the
discharge, so as to meet the object of the law, which is to prevent unnecessary or
arbitrary exclusion from the complaint of persons guilty of the crime charged. No
exemption from the term evidence is provided by the law as to exclude the
testimony of the accused. When the law does not distinguish, we should not
distinguish.
There is no other evidence more competent than the testimony of the proposed
witness himself to prove the conditions that his testimony is absolutely necessary
in the case; that there is no other direct evidence available for the proper
prosecution of the offense; that his testimony can be corroborated in its material
points; that he does not appear to be the most guilty; and that he has not been
convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude. Further, the trial judge will not
be able to clarify matters found in the sworn statements of the proposed witnesses
if they are not allowed to testify.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FELICIANO ANABE
G. R. NO. 179033, September 6, 2011, (J. CARPIO-MORALES)
RULING:
The Court modified the crime committed by appellant, and deletes the monetary
awards and damages. The court found that appellant took the Tag Heuer watch of
Uy without his consent and with intent to gain, without any doubt. The court did not
give credence to the uncorroborated statement that the watch was bought from
Gemma, as evidence fails to substantiate such claim. The Court finds, however, that
the prosecution evidence is insufficient to support the conclusion that appellant also
committed violence against Uy in order to effect the felonious taking.

The Court has held that circumstantial evidence suffices to convict an accused only
if the circumstances proven constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair
and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all
others, as the guilty person; the circumstances proved must be consistent with
each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the
same time inconsistent with any other hypothesis except that of guilt.
As a corollary to the constitutional precept of presumption of innocence, a
conviction based on circumstantial evidence must exclude each and every
hypothesis consistent with innocence.
In affirming the Decision of the trial court, the appellate court found the following
circumstances sufficient to sustain appellants conviction: appellant ordered Felicita
and Conrada to go inside their room while he kept Uy company in the living room;
when Felicita and Conrada next saw appellant, he was already holding a
bloodstained knife and Uy was already dead; appellant told them that they had to
go with him or else they would be suspected of killing Uy; the blood in the kitchen
knife was found to be human blood; and during the confrontation at the CPD,
appellant was wearing Uys Tag Heuer watch.
Considering the far-reaching consequences of a criminal conspiracy, the
same degree of proof necessary in establishing the crime is required to support the
attendance thereof, i.e., it must be shown to exist as clearly and convincingly as the
commission of the offense itself. While conspiracy need not be established by direct
evidence, it is nonetheless required that it be proved by clear and convincing
evidence by showing a series of acts done by each of the accused in concert and in
pursuance of the common unlawful purpose.
In the present case, there is want of evidence to show the concerted acts of
appellant, Conrada and Felicita in pursuing a common design to rob Uy. The
prosecution in fact appears to have abandoned the theory of conspiracy altogether,
no evidence

thereof

having

been

presented.

The

claim of

Felicita

must

be substantially corroborated in its material points by unimpeachable testimony and

strong circumstances, and must be to such an extent that its trustworthiness
becomes manifest.

The only other evidence purportedly linking appellant to the commission of violence
on Uy is the bloodstained kitchen knife (allegedly seen by Conrada being held by
appellant; seen by Felicita on the kitchen table; and recovered by the police at the
back of the house). The Court fails to see, however, how it warrants the conclusion
that appellant inflicted those wounds. Even gratuitously crediting the hearsay claim
of Felicita that Conrada saw appellant holding it, there is lack of proof that he was
the only person who held the knife at the crime scene.
Turning an accused into a state witness is not a magic formula that cures all the
deficiencies in the prosecutions evidence. The state witness cannot simply allege
everything left unproved and automatically produce a conviction of the crime
charged against the remaining accused. Corroboration of the account of the state
witness is key.
It is in fact a requirement for the discharge of an accused to be a state witness
under Section 17, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court that the testimony to be given
can be substantially corroborated in its material points;
Sec. 17. Discharge of accused to be state witness. When two or more
persons are jointly charged with the commission of any offense, upon
motion of the prosecution before resting its case, the court may direct
one or more of the accused to be discharged with their consent so that
they may be witnesses for the state when, after requiring the
prosecution to present evidence and the sworn statement of each
proposed state witness at a hearing in support of the discharge, the
court is satisfied that:
(a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused
whose discharge is requested;
(b) There is no other direct evidence available for the proper
prosecution of the offense committed, except the testimony of said
accused;
(c) The testimony of said accused can be substantially
corroborated in its material points;
(d) Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and
(e) Said accused has not at any time been convicted of any
offense involving moral turpitude.
Evidence adduced in support of the discharge shall automatically form
part of the trial. If the court denies the motion for discharge of the
accused as state witness, his sworn statement shall be inadmissible in
evidence. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The Court is not unaware that as an exception to the general rule requiring
corroboration, the uncorroborated testimony of a state witness may be sufficient
when it is shown to be sincere in itself because it is given unhesitatingly and in a
straightforward manner and full of details which, by their nature, could not have
been the result of deliberate afterthought. This exception, however, applies only if
the state witness is an eyewitness since the testimony would then be direct
evidence. The above-quoted Section 17 of Rule 119 actually assumes that the
testimony of the accused sought to be discharged as a state witness would
constitute direct evidence (i.e., that he or she is an eyewitness) in that it requires
that there is no other direct evidence, except the testimony of the said accused.
In

the

appreciation

of

circumstantial

evidence,

the

rule

is

that

the

circumstances must be proved, and not what they presumed. The circumstantial
evidence must

exclude the

possibility

that

some

other

person

has

committed the offense charged.

The crime committed by appellant is qualified theft. As defined, theft is
committed by any person who, with intent to gain, but without violence against, or
intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall take the personal property of
another without the latter's consent. Intent to gain or animus lucrandi is an internal
act that is presumed from the unlawful taking by the offender of the thing subject of
asportation.
As reflected earlier, from appellants possession of the stolen Tag Heuer watch of Uy,
the unlawful taking and intent to gain follow. Appellant could not have committed
the crime had he not been employed as a house helper of Chan and family. His
employers, as well as their relatives who stay at the Chan residence, reposed their
trust and confidence in him while he was living thereat. He was allowed an almost
unlimited access throughout the house and was even provided his own room. It was
this trust and confidence that he exploited to enrich himself. Committed with grave
abuse of confidence, the theft cannot but be qualified.
Appellant is, however, guilty of qualified theft only with respect to Uys Tag
Heuer watch, there being no competent evidence of his complicity in the

asportation of the other items declared in the Information, including Gemmas ring
and bracelet which were in state witness Felicitas possession after she was arrested.
This charge deserves scant consideration. Appellant being only guilty of qualified
theft for stealing the Tag Heuer watch of Uy, the burning of the house of Chan and
family for the purpose of concealing or destroying the evidence could not be
unceremoniously imputed to him. The Court even fails to appreciate what evidence
of qualified theft was left to conceal or destroy after appellant ran away with
the Tag Heuer watch.
The claim of Felicita that appellant, before boarding the getaway taxi, returned to
the house to set it on fire is likewise uncorroborated. The findings of police
investigators on the damage to the house and adjacent warehouse do not serve to
corroborate Felicitas claim as they only attest to the commission of the crime,
not its authorship. Again, at least three persons were at the crime scene and they
all left at the same time. Being uncorroborated, Felicitas account on appellants
authorship of destructive arson does not suffice to convict him.
While denial is generally a weak defense looked upon with disfavor, the weakness of
the defense cannot be the basis of a conviction. The primary burden still lies with
the prosecution whose evidence must stand or fall on its own weight. Under this
rule, the defense of denial finds its special place and assumes primacy when the
case for the prosecution is at the margin of sufficiency in establishing proof beyond
reasonable doubt,as in this case.
Respecting the trial courts awards of money and damages, affirmed by the
appellate court, they cease to have any basis in light of the return of the Tag
Heuer watch. They are thus deleted.
ROSALES VS CA, GR. No. 80418-19, 1992
FACTS: Separate Information were filed before the Regional Trial Court of Lucena
City charging petitioner Eduardo Rosales, together with Crisanto Bautista and
private respondents Nelson Exconde and Ronilo Aonuevo for the murder of
Marcial Punzalan and his leader, Demetrio Ramos. In the trial of the case, the
prosecution presented Eduardo Rosales and then Crisanto Bautista as witnesses
before moving for their discharge. Admittedly, their testimonies led to the

identification of the alleged masterminds of the slayings, which included prominent

local political leaders.
The trial court granted the discharge of Rosales but deferred action on the motion
to discharge Bautista pending resolution of this case. Upon petition for certiorari
with the Court of Appeals, however, the order of discharge was recalled as the
appellate court found no plausible reason for the discharge of Rosales after he
admitted his guilt in the course of his testimony. It also noted that there was an
eyewitness to the slaying incident, thus, the testimonies of the accused turnedstate-witnesses would "merely constitute independent evidence against a few of
the accused". Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: WON the CA gravely erred in recalling the order of discharge of Rosales.
RULING: The CA erred.
The rule is that the discharge of an accused is left to the sound discretion of the
lower court, which has the exclusive responsibility. While it is the usual practice of
the prosecution to present the accused who turns state witness only after his
discharge, the trial court may nevertheless sanction his discharge after his
testimony if circumstances so warrant.
In the case before Us, the imminent risk to his life justified the deviation from the
normal course of procedure as a measure to protect him while at the same time
ensuring his undaunted cooperation with the prosecution. Indeed, as is explicit
from the Rule, as long as the motion for discharge of an accused to be utilized as a
state witness is filed before the prosecution rests, the trial court should, if
warranted, grant it.
Also, the nullification of the order of discharge by the appellate court was
premised on its interpretation that Sec. 9, Rule 119, of the New Rules on Criminal
Procedure contemplates only of a situation where the prosecution moves for the
discharge of one or more accused "so that they may be witnesses for the State."
Indeed, as the Court of Appeals noted, the phrase "so that they may be witnesses
for the state" presupposes a future undertaking of the accused. Considering that
Rosales had already testified against his co-accused, the appellate court deemed it
unnecessary to order the discharge of Rosales. Yet, the Court of Appeals failed to
consider one important detail: Rosales was still to take the witness stand against
the alleged architects of the Punzalan killing in Crim. Case No. 86-330. At the time
of Rosales' discharge, the corresponding Information against the alleged
masterminds had not yet been filed. His testimony, if ever, was then to be a future
undertaking on his part, and the successful prosecution of those responsible for
the dastardly acts would hinge solely on his testimony as a state witness. As such,
his discharge satisfied the intent of Sec. 9 of Rule 119 that one or more discharged
accused "may be witnesses for the State" and was therefore in accord with law.
Likewise, the finding of the Court of Appeals that Rosales' testimony was no longer
necessary is not well-taken. We agree with the observation of the Solicitor General
that before Rosales testified on the circumstances surrounding the killing of
Punzalan there was no direct evidence to establish the identity of the plotters xxx

It was Rosales who supplied the necessary evidence to link them to the murder of
Punzalan and Ramos.
Consequently, the Court of Appeals committed an irreversible error when it
annulled and set aside the order for the discharge of the accused Eduardo Rosales
there being no showing that he actually failed or refused to testify against his coconspirations.
Pontejos vs. Desierto G.R. No. 148600 July 7, 2009
Ruling:
The pertinent provision of the Rules of Court reads:
"Sec. 17. Discharge of accused to be state witness. When two or more persons are
jointly charged with the commission of any offense, upon motion of the prosecution
before resting its case, the court may direct one or more of the accused to be
discharged with their consent so that they may be witnesses for the state when
after requiring the prosecution to present evidence and the sworn statement of
each proposed state witness at a hearing in support of the discharge, the court is
satisfied that:
(a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose
discharge is requested;
(b) There is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of
the offense committed, except the testimony of said accused;
(c) The testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in its
material points;
(d) Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and
(e) Said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving
moral turpitude.

Evidence adduced in support of the discharge shall automatically form part of the
trial. If the court denies the motion for discharge of the accused as state witness,
his sworn statement shall be inadmissible in evidence."

The Court has already held that this provision is applicable only to cases already
filed in court. The trial court is given the power to discharge an accused as a state
witness only because it has already acquired jurisdiction over the crime and the
accused.

The power to choose who to discharge as state witness is an executive function.

Essentially, it is not a judicial prerogative. The fact that an individual had not been
previously charged or included in an information does not prevent the prosecution
from utilizing said person as a witness.
Indeed, there must be a standard to follow in the exercise of the prosecutors
discretion. The decision to grant immunity cannot be made capriciously. Should
there be unjust favoritism, the Court may exercise its certiorari power.

In the present case, certiorari is not proper. Pontejos allegations do not show, much
less allege, grave abuse of discretion in the granting of immunity to Atos. The OMB
considered Atos position, record and involvement in the case prior to the discharge.
Pontejos also claims that he was not furnished a copy of Atos Affidavit that
connected him to the crimes. Since he was not afforded the opportunity to
challenge the assertions in said Affidavit, his right to due process had allegedly
been violated.

The alleged denial of due process is controverted by the facts. It appears from the
records that Pontejos eventually received a copy of the aforementioned Affidavit.

More importantly, he had challenged the Affidavit in his Motion for Reinvestigation
and request for reconsideration of the Review and Recommendation of the Overall
Deputy Ombudsman. Pontejos contention must necessarily fail because -- as shown
-- he had the opportunity to be heard and in fact, availed of it.

RULE 119

Demurrer to evidence - Sec. 23

People vs. Go, G.R. No. 191015, August 6, 2014 - Estafa thru Falsification of
Commercial Documents
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v.
JOSE C. GO, AIDA C. DELA ROSA, and FELECITAS D. NECOMEDES
G.R. No. 191015, 6 August 2014; Del Castillo, J.
FACTS:
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) ordered the closure of the Orient Commercial
Banking Corporation (OCBC) and placed such bank under the receivership of the
Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC).

PDIC collected OCBCs past due loans receivable by sending demand letters to
its borrowers for the settlement of their outstanding loans. Allegedly among
these borrowers of OCBC are Timmys, Inc. and Asia Textile Mills, Inc. which
appeared to have obtained a loan of [P]10 Million each. A representative of
Timmys, Inc. denied being granted any loan by OCBC and insisted that the
signatures on the loan documents were falsified. A representative of Asia Textile
Mills, Inc. denied having applied, much less being granted, a loan by OCBC.

PDIC conducted an investigation and allegedly came out with a finding that the
loans were released in the form of managers checks in the name of Philippine
Recyclers and Zeta International, Inc. These managers checks were then
allegedly deposited to the savings account of the private respondent Jose C. Go
with OCBC and, thereafter, were automatically transferred to his current account
in order to fund personal checks issued by him earlier.

PDIC filed two (2) counts of Estafa thru Falsification of Commercial Documents
against the private respondents.

The respondents pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, trial ensued and after the
presentation of all of the prosecutions evidence, the private respondents filed a
Motion for Leave to File Demurrer to Evidence and a Motion for Voluntary
Inhibition. The Motion for Voluntary Inhibition was granted and ordered the case
to be re-raffled to another branch. The case was subsequently re-raffled to the
branch of the respondent RTC judge.

The RTC granted the Motion for Leave to File Demurrer to Evidence and ruled
that the motion was meritorious, dismissing the cases.

The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. Hence, the petition.

ISSUE: Whether the granting of demurrer of evidence was validly entered.

RULING: No. The Court declares that the CA grossly erred in affirming the trial
courts Order granting the respondents demurrer, which Order was patently null
and void for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion and manifest
irregularity, thus causing substantial injury to the banking industry and public
interest. The Court finds that the prosecution has presented competent evidence to
sustain the indictment for the crime of estafa through falsification of commercial
documents, and that respondents appear to be the perpetrators thereof. In
evaluating the evidence, the trial court effectively failed and/or refused to weigh
the prosecutions evidence against the respondents, which it was duty-bound to do
as a trier of facts; considering that the case involved hundreds of millions of pesos
of OCBC depositors money not to mention that the banking industry is impressed
with public interest, the trial court should have conducted itself with circumspection
and engaged in intelligent reflection in resolving the issues.
Demurrer to the evidence is "an objection by one of the parties in an action, to
the effect that the evidence which his adversary produced is insufficient in point
of law, whether true or not, to make out a case or sustain the issue. The party
demurring challenges the sufficiency of the whole evidence to sustain a verdict.
The court, in passing upon the sufficiency of the evidence raised in a demurrer,
is merely required to ascertain whether there is competent or sufficient evidence
to sustain the indictment or to support a verdict of guilt.

Sufficient evidence for purposes of frustrating a demurrer thereto

is such evidence in character, weight or amount as will legally
justify the judicial or official action demanded according to the
circumstances. To be considered sufficient therefore, the
evidence must prove: (a) the commission of the crime, and (b)
the precise degree of participation therein by the accused. Thus,
when the accused files a demurrer, the court must evaluate
whether the prosecution evidence is sufficient enough to warrant
the conviction of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.

As a general rule, an order granting the accuseds demurrer to evidence

amounts to an acquittal. There are certain exceptions, however, as when the
grant thereof would not violate the constitutional proscription on double
jeopardy. For instance, this Court ruled that when there is a finding that there
was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in dismissing a
criminal case by granting the accuseds demurrer to evidence, its judgment is
considered void.

Simply put, the evidence strongly indicates that Go converted OCBC funds to his
own personal use and benefit.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The September 30, 2009 Decision

and January 22, 2010 Resolution of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The July 2, 2007 and October 19, 2007 Orders of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 49 in Criminal Case Nos. 00-187318
and 00-187319 are declared null and void, and the said cases are ordered
REINSTATED for the continuation of proceedings. SO ORDERED.

People vs. Sayaboc

GR No. 147201
January 15, 2004
Davide Jr., C.J.:
Facts:
1

August 13, 1994, 9:00am, Solano, Nueva Vizcaya. Marlon Buenviaje and Joseph Galam
were engaged in a fisticuff (fistfight). Both men were eventually subdued. As bloodied
Marlon was about to leave, he turned to face Galam and, with his right index finger
making a slicing motion across his throat, shouted: Putang ina mo Joseph, may araw ka
rin, papatayin kita. Galam retorted, Gago, traydor, gold digger, halika. Buenviaje did
not respond anymore and left on a tricycle.

December 2, 1994, 3:00pm. Benjamin Sayaboc went to the Rooftop Disco and Lodging
House (Rooftop) and asked the waitress therein as to what time does [her] bosing
arrive. The waitress said she did not know and went to the second floor of the Rooftop.

Around 5:30-5:45pm, while Sayaboc was angry as to the delay in his beer, the vehicle of
Joseph Galam arrived. Shortly thereafter, 4 gunbursts were heard as Sayaboc shoots
Galam. Later, Sayaboc ran out and disappeared into the darkness.

Sayaboc ran outside the establishment and met with Marlon Buenviaje, father Miguel
Buenviaje, and Patricio Escorpiso, all of whom are waiting at a tricycle parked outside
the Rooftop. After boarding the tricycle, the tricycle sped off towards the center of the
town.

Joseph Galam was brought to a hospital, but was declared dead on arrival.

Benjamin, Marlon, Miguel, and Patricio were charged with murder.

After the prosecution rested its case, counsel for Miguel, Marlon and Patricio manifested
that he be given 15 days to file a motion for leave to admit demurrer to the evidence.
RTC acceded. But instead of filing such motion first, he filed a Demurrer to
Evidence. The motion for leave to file the pleading was filed the next day only.

RTC denied the demurrer to evidence. It ruled that because they did not seek nor were
granted express leave of court prior to the filing of the demurrer, Miguel, Marlon, and

Patricio were deemed to have submitted their case for judgment in accordance with Sec.
15, Rule 119 of the Rules. Only Sayaboc was allowed to present his defense.
9

The RTC found Benjamin guilty of murder, Marlon principally guilty of homicide, and
Miguel and Patricio guilty of homicide as accomplices.

ISSUE: Whether or not the case of Marlon, Miguel, and Patricio should be remanded to the trial
court on the ground that they were denied of their constitutional right to be heard by the trial
court.
HELD: NO, We cannot subscribe to the contention of appellants Marlon Buenviaje, Miguel
Buenviaje, and Patricio Escorpiso that the case should be remanded to the trial court because
they were denied the right to be heard by the trial court.
It must be remembered that their demurrer to evidence filed on 12 July 1999 was without prior
leave of court. The motion for leave to file the said pleading was filed only the next day. The
filing of the demurrer was clearly without leave of court. The trial court, therefore, correctly
applied the rule on demurrer to evidence found in Section 15, Rule 119 of the 1985 Rules of
Criminal Procedure when it disallowed the abovementioned appellants to present evidence on
their behalf.
The filing of a demurrer to evidence without leave of court is an unqualified waiver of the right
to present evidence for the accused. The rationale for this rule is that when the accused moves for
dismissal on the ground of insufficiency of evidence of the prosecution evidence, he does so in
the belief that said evidence is insufficient to convict and, therefore, any need for him to present
any evidence is negated. An accused cannot be allowed to wager on the outcome of judicial
proceedings by espousing inconsistent viewpoints whenever dictated by convenience. The
purpose behind the rule is also to avoid the dilatory practice of filing motions for dismissal as a
demurrer to the evidence and, after denial thereof, the defense would then claim the right to
present its evidence.
The trial court, therefore, correctly applied Section 15, Rule 119 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure on demurrer to evidence when it disallowed the abovementioned appellants to present
evidence on their behalf. They cannot now claim that they were denied their right to be heard by
themselves and counsel.
WHEREFORE, Appellants Benjamin Sayaboc and Marlon Buenviaje are found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide, while appellants Miguel Buenviaje and Patricio
Escorpiso are hereby ACQUITTED on the ground of reasonable doubt.
G.R. No. L-69251 September 13, 1989
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
DANILO GOLE CRUZ, accused-appellant.

*Important: Rule 119

Sec. 3. Exclusions The following periods of delay shall be excluded in computing the time within which
trial must commence:
a

Any period of delay resulting from other proceedings concerning the accused, including but not
limited to the following:
1

Delay resulting from an examination of the physical and mental condition of the accused

Sec 24. Reopening At any time before finality of the judgment of conviction the judge may motu proprio
or upon motion with hearing in either case reopen the proceedings to avoid miscarriage of justice. The
proceedings shall be terminated within 30 days from the order granting it.
FACTS:
Teresita Gumapay, who was married to Marcelo Buenaventura and a mother of a then six months old
child, having been the victim, according to the trial court, of a most detestable crime. The deplorable
incident occurred in Caypombo, a barrio several kilometers from the poblacion of Sta. Maria, Bulacan, on
December 22, 1977. Witness Antonio San Victores testified that at around 4:30 in the afternoon of that
day, while he was walking towards an uninhabited resthouse of one Antonio Pantaleon to get a pail to
water his plants, he saw the accused Danilo Gole Cruz suddenly run away from the direction of the
washing area located beside the resthouse and jump over the fence surrounding the premises As he was
leaving the kitchen with the pail, he heard someone moaning. The sound led him outside the resthouse,
to the adjacent washing area, where he found a woman lying on her back, wounded in the neck, and
bleeding profusely. He recognized her to be Teresita Gumapay, his first cousin. She was nude from the
waist down, her vagina exposed; she was wearing a T-shirt raised up to her lower ribs, and her pair of
shorts was found on one foot, with the lone front button missing. San Victores asked her what happened;
and Teresita said she had been "raped and stabbed by Danilo Gole Cruz, the son of Pio." San Victores
then asked her who did it, and Teresita repeated the name "Danilo Gole Cruz, the son of Pio."
After putting her shorts back to cover the lower part of her body, San Victores lifted Teresita and carried
her inside her father's house, which was situated about 25 brazas away, and laid her on the floor.
Teresita's moaning stopped; she did not utter anything, and no one talked to her. Meanwhile, her father
procured a jeepney, driven by a certain Jose, which took Teresita to Dr. Totoy Hermogenes' St. Mary's
Hospital at the Poblacion. None of the four persons aboard the jeepney-Teresita her father, San Victores,
and driver Jose said anything on the way. Upon reaching the hospital, Teresita was carried to the
emergency room; and 15 minutes later, the father and San Victores were told that she was dead.
The information for rape with homicide, dated June 6, 1978, was filed against Danilo Gole Cruz with the
then Court of First Instance of Sta. Maria, Bulacan, Branch V, at that time presided over by Judge Jesus
Elbinias. While bail of P40,000.00 was recommended, the accused was not released for failure to post the
same.
Accused pleaded not guilty in the arraignment and trial on the merits followed wherein several witnesses
were presented. The accused took the stand on September 18, 1979 and on January 14, 1980. In both
instances, however, after the accused had testified for some time, the hearings were suspended and
reset for another date on the claim of the accused that he was feeling dizzy and could not concentrate on
the witness stand. Thereafter, on January 18, 1980, defense counsel filed by mail a motion to submit the
accused to psychiatric examination.
Subsequently, a report on the mental and physical condition of the accused signed by Dr. Simplicio
Masikip, Medical Specialist I and Physician-in-Charge and Dr. Arturo Merit, Chief of Forensic Psychiatry
Service, was submitted in compliance with the order of the court. The report states that the accused was

admitted to the National Mental Hospital in Mandaluyong, Rizal on February 16, 1980. As remarks, the
report states that the accused "was found suffering from a mental disorder called schizophrenia He is
psychotic or insane, hence cannot yet stand trial in court. He needs further hospitalization and treatment.
On March 22, 1982, Dr. Eduardo T. Maaba, Medical Specialist and Physician-in-Charge, submitted a
report with respect to the mental and physical condition of the accused remarking that, based on the
examinations and observations conducted, "Danilo Gole Cruz y Santos is now free from sign and
symptoms of psychosis, and hence he can now stand trial. He is therefore recommended for discharge
from this hospital and return to the Provincial Jail of Bulacan.
however, the Judiciary Reorganization Act (Batas Pambansa Blg. 129) took effect and the case was
subsequently re-raffled to the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan, Branch XIX, of the Third Judicial Region
presided over by Judge Camilo R. Montesa, Jr.
About five months later, counsel for the accused filed a "motion to reopen the case and allow accused to
adduce additional evidence," praying that "the case be reopened and the accused be allowed to continue
testifying should the expert certifies that he can stand trial; and/or adduce additional evidence in order to
afford him full opportunity to be heard and complete his evidence."
Accordingly, the court promulgated the decision which found the accused Danilo Gole Cruz guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape with homicide; declared his defense of insanity unavailing as an
exempting circumstance; imposed the death penalty upon the accused; sentenced him to indemnify the
heirs of the victim in the amount of P12,000.00 for her death and P20,000.00 as moral damages; and
ordered him to pay the costs.
The accused seasonably appealed to this Court praying for his acquittal and, alternatively, for the remand
of the case to the lower court for further proceedings.
ISSUE:
WON accused Danilo Gole Cruz was denied due process because he was not afforded full opportunity to
exercise his constitutional right to be heard and present evidence
HELD:
His thesis is that the joint agreement manifested in open court by the prosecution and the defense that
the case be deemed submitted for decision should be considered as having been withdrawn in view of the
filing of the motion to reopen the case about five months thereafter.
The sheer untenability of this contention is apparent. The failure of the accused to complete his testimony
was of his own making, on the initiation, confirmation and reiteration of his own counsel. As discussed
earlier, the suspension of the direct examination of the accused was at his instance and as moved by his
counsel. Later, Dr. Maaba recommended on March 22, 1982 the discharge of the accused from the
mental hospital and for his return to the provincial jail of Bulacan, he having been found fit to stand trial.
This unrebutted fact notwithstanding, the accused refused to take the witness stand without any plausible
justification. In addition, it was the defense itself which moved to terminate the testimony of the accused,
which fact became the basis for such testimony being stricken from the records for lack of crossexamination. In fact, when the former presiding judge thereafter ordered the reopening of the case sua
sponte, it was the defense that objected to the same and insisted that the case be deemed submitted for
decision. Verily, the present stance of the accused is a blatant disregard of solemn agreements submitted
to and approved by a court of justice and would make a mockery of the judicial process.

Furthermore, the mere filing of a motion to reopen a case must not in any way automatically vacate an
agreement and order submitting the case for decision. While the court may reopen a case for reception of
further evidence after the parties have closed their evidence, such action is addressed to the sound
discretion of the court, to be exercised only on valid and justifiable reasons which undoubtedly are
inexistent in this case.
WHEREFORE, with the modifications that the death sentence imposed by the trial court is reduced
to reclusion perpetua pursuant to Section 19(l), Article III of the Constitution, and the indemnification for
the death of Teresita Gumapay is hereby increased from P12,000.00 to P30,000.00, consonant with
present jurisprudence, the judgment of the lower court is AFFIRMED in all other respects.