In 2008, when Barrack Obama took over the office, United States received not only

its first black and democratic president, but also a new milestone in the U.S. foreign policies,
especially the one in Asia (Beeson 2010: 229). In the fall of 2011, the Obama Administration
decided that it would enlarge and strengthen the U.S. role in the region of Asia-Pacific
(Cheng 2013), and that the centre of gravity for U.S. foreign policy, national security, and
economic interests is shifting towards Asia. (Manyin, Stephen, Susan, Vaughn, Bruce, and
ORouke 2012: 6). The decision then led to the emergence of the so called U.S Pivot to
Asia (hereafter referred to as the U.S. pivot) by the administration. Since its inception, the
US pivot has been recognized as a substantial and remarkable shift in the American approach
towards East Asian Region. The US pivot or what also known as Re-balancing towards
Asia also involved an in-depth engagement with East Asian Regions security dynamics.
(Mishra 2014: 149) However, the closed relation between Washington and Asia is not a new
thing. In fact, trade relations between the U.S. and Asia, and between the U.S and China in
particular has long been established which have been two decades now. Hence, the U.S pivot
in Asia is just a new branding given to the already existed trend between U.S. and Asia
(Schiavenza 2013). The U.S. pivot is also not about disengagement and then re-engagement
in Asia, but rather a matter of emphasising and building an intricate foundation of the already
existing relations between them (Stutter, Michael, Timothy, Mike, and Ollapally 2013: 1). In
addition, when Asia grows economically, the growth has boosted the interest of U.Ss
businesses, media, academics and other in Asia. However, one question remain unanswered
until date is whether the U.S. pivot in Asia is a U.S strategy to contain China or a strategy
to rebalance Asia. I will analyse the question in the next section as it is fundamental to get an
overview of the key drivers of the U.S. pivot in order to better understand the pivot. Other
than that, in the next section, I will show the economy, and military consequences of the
U.Ss pivot on the region in general. Meanwhile, on the third section of this essay, I will
show how the U.S pivot caused significant impact on the regional security dynamics
particularly towards East Asia. Lastly, in the conclusion, I will conclude that the U.S pivot
can be both negative and positive to the region based on the evidences provided in this paper.
To contain China or to rebalance Asia.
Numerous debates regarding the key drivers behind the implementation of the U.S
Pivot in Asia have been growing since its inception. It involves the most crucial theories of

International Relations (IR) including Power Transition Theory and Balance of Power
Theory.

Starting from the late 1970s, when the Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping decided to open
up Chinas trade, the decision has enabled China to grow in power, wealth, and military
might without neglecting its cooperation and friendly relations with most of the worlds
counterpart (Ross 2012). Until a few years ago, that is when Beijing seemed to shift to an
approach that caused suspicion to its neighbours and abroad. (Ross 2012) For instance, in
2009 Beijing has refused to cooperate at the United Nations (UN) Climate Change
Conferences which subsequently caused European countries and the U.S. get annoyed and
angered (Ross 2012). The Chinas rise, and rebellious behaviour has been interpreted by
many analysts as the sign of the nations growing confidence. In The Washington Post, the
Chinas rise is symbolized as a new triumphalist attitude which convinced the Chinese
leaders that they can silhouette events in Asia as they never could before (Promfet 2010).
Hence, the U.S. pivot that was brought out in 2010 was considered by Chinese assessment as
U.Ss tactic to contain China from growing influence in East Asia (Feng 2012). This situation
can be related with the first theory which is power transition theory where U.S. as the
prevalent power feels threatened by the China as a rising power. This is due to the reason that
the U.S is afraid that the Chinas rise in East Asia will deter and challenge its interests in the
region. Other than that, the U.S. also see the Chinas growing military power as a risk to the
regional stability (Ross 2012). Additionally, according to Amitav Acharya, China has viewed
these initiatives with much suspicion and regards them as detrimental to its interest.
(Acharya 2013). Hence, it is not surprising that most of the Chinese leaders and media are
sceptical towards the U.S Pivot or Rebalancing towards Asia as they believe that the pivot is
directed at them with an objective to contain them (Mishra 2014: 150).
On the other hand, U.S. has been denying all the accusation made to them by the
Chinese. The idea that the U.S. pivot is to contain China is simplistic reading of the new
policy. It is true that the U.S. is aware about the Chinas rise, however the pivot is driven by a
more sophisticated set of strategic, economic, and political considerations (Stutter, Michael,
Timothy, Mike, and Ollapally 2013: 1) rather to contain China. Other than that, the idea of
rebalancing Asia is to rebalance the security burden in Asia. This can be accomplished by the
U.S. pivot since it holds a burden-sharing feature intended to securitize the region against any

possible aggression (Niu 2012: 6). Parallel to the rebalancing strategy, the engagement is
premised on the U.S. desire to help and assist the East Asia to develop as a peaceful, stable
and economically prosperous region (Campbell and Andrews 2013: 3). Other than that, the
U.S. pivot is the U.S.s response towards the insecurity that the East Asia feels about the
rising of Chinas power in that region. This is because the East Asian countries has
increasingly feel uncomfortable and uneasy with the Chinas growing influence in the region
as they are already accustomed and used to American hegemony. The uneasiness also aroused
due to the Chinas size, history, proximity, potential power and more importantly the
memories of the middle kingdom syndrome (Mishra 2014: 152). Moreover, most of the East
Asian countries believe that the U.S.s comprehensive involvement will bring good to the
region. East Asian countries like Japan and South Korea are amongst the supporters of greater
U.S. commitment in the region for the purpose to hedge and counter-balance the Chinas
growing influence in the region (Feng 2012). In addition, instead of containing China, the
U.S. fundamental goal of the pivot is to strengthen its relations with American allies and
partners, including China (Stutter, Michael, Timothy, Mike, and Ollapally 2013: 1). This
situation is compatible with the theory of Balance of Power where U.S. does everything it
could in order to maintain the balance in the East Asian region. Hence, the U.S. pivot in Asia
is believed to be an instrument to rebalance Asia by avoiding the growth of unipolar power in
the region.
These are the two disputable key drivers of the U.S. pivot in Asia. However, no one
can be certain about the real key driver behind the U.S. pivot until date. In the next section, I
will briefly elaborate on these consequences.
Economy and military consequences of the U.S. pivot in Asia in general.
The U.S. pivot in Asia includes a number of economic activities. The most obvious
economy shift caused by the pivot in the region is the U.S.s recognition of Asia as its vital
economic region for the future (Stutter, Michael, Timothy, Mike, and Ollapally 2013: 13).
U.S. also realized that Asias burgeoning economies are essential for its economy
development (Stutter, Michael, Timothy, Mike, and Ollapally 2013: 13). Other than that, the
U.S. pivot in Asia also has caused growing desire in Asia to economically invest in the U.S.
(Campbell an Andrews 2013: 5). From this, we can see that the implementation of the U.S.
pivot in Asia has caused the region to be the centre of gravity of the U.S foreign policy,
national security, and economic interest. One of the most profound commercial arm of the

U.S. pivot in Asia is the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement which will involve U.S.s
allies with China as an exception. However, although U.S. has anticipated that the TPP will
be as the 21st Century trade treaty, this situation is not applicable to the ASEAN as it might
cause dilemma to it as it already comes up with Regional Comprehensive Economic
Partnership (RCEP) which comprises China and India as members (Mishra 2014: 163). The
TPP which is an extension treaty of the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership
Agreement (TPSEP or P4) of 2005 is projected as the economic pillar of the U.S. pivot with
an objective to make the region as a stable economic zone and indirectly become the worlds
largest free trade zone (Mishra 2014: 163). However, for China, the TPP has been recognized
by Li Xianyang as
an important part of the U.S. Return to Asia strategy that is based on economic and geopolitical-security considerations. China containment is an undeniable target of the
agreement the exclusive TPP will not only bring about the excludability effect, but also
possibly reverse the course of the East Asian regional integration... It will constitute a major
challenge to Chinas rise. (Das 2013).
However, this statement has been opposed by some experts who believe that the TPP
is not a tool to contain China, instead a tool to help the economy development in the region
by strengthening the regions economy development and by making the region as the worlds
largest free trade zone.
Meanwhile, militarily, the U.S. pivot in Asia had caused an increase in U.S.s military
engagement with Asia and made Asia as its important military region after its pullback from
Afghanistan and Iraq (Stutter, Michael, Timothy, Mike, and Ollapally 2013: 11). The U.S.
pivot proved that Asia has become as U.S.s priority since the cutbacks in its overall military
spending does not affect its military engagement in the region as reassured by Secretary
Hagel and other U.S. leaders. Despite the lack of military budget, the military engagement in
Asia must be accomplished since U.S. cannot afford to jeopardize the importance of the
region for its pivot to Asia (Stutter, Michael, Timothy, Mike, and Ollapally 2013: 11). Hence,
U.S has clearly increased its military funding in the region. For instance, it has been reported
that the number of U.Ss ships visiting Philippines have increased from 50 ships in 2010 to 90
ships in January 2014 (Grudgings 2013). Other than that, U.S and Singapore also has signed a
military agreement known as the Strategic Framework Agreement which projected for a
closer military engagement between them. Few things that have been outlined in the

agreements are bilateral defence and security relationship, expanding the scope of current
operation in areas including counter-terrorism, counter-proliferation, joint military exercises
and training, policy dialogues and defence technology (MINDEF Singapore 2005 in Mishra
2014: 161). Other than that, the pivot also has caused the U.S. to attend to almost every
countries in the regions needs which is to seek for greater opportunities to exercise, train,
and interact with the U.S. military (Campbell and Andrews 2013: 8).
From the explanation above, we can see that the pivot has caused growing military
agreement and cooperation between the U.S. and Asia despite the military spending cutbacks
as they cannot afford to lose their military influence in the region to China.
How the U.S pivot caused significant impact on the regional security dynamics
particularly towards East Asia?
In this section, I will analyse the impact of the U.S. pivot to Asia on the regional
security dynamics of the East Asia. Why East Asia? In my point of view, I believe that this
question focusing on the East Asia considering that China is one of the countries in East Asia.
Hence, since it plays a very vital role in the U.S. pivot to Asia, this question is seek to see the
impact generally on the East Asia and particularly on China.
Particularly, security impact of the pivot towards China is that it leads to growing
strategic distrust between China and U.S (Feng 2012). This is due to the reason that China
feels threatened with the Obamas pivot to Asia because they believed that the pivot will
squeeze and highly risky for their roles in East Asia (Feng 2012). Hence, it is not impossible
that the growing strategic distrust between these two nations will lead to a new Cold War.
This situation is supported with the response given by Chinese President Hu Jintao towards
the U.S pivot. He emphasized the need of China to hasten the revolution of its naval force
structure and encourage combative readiness. This bold statement given out on December 6th
is a sign that China feels threatened by the U.S. pivot and ready to counter attack against the
U.S. if necessary (Feng 2012). Other than that, the pivot also cause the situation in East Asia
to intensify. The U.S. rebalancing has lead the situation in East Asia to become unstable. It
worsened the regional security, complicated major powers relations and accelerate the
possibility of clashes between China and the U.S. which are detrimental to the regional peace,
stability and prosperity. This situation will give an impact generally on East Asia since it
serves as the point where the interests of China and U.S intersected (Haihan 2013). Thus, if
the U.S. is keen to make sure its pivot to Asia becomes successful, it must first clarify its

objective and intention to China to clear any misunderstanding between them (Feng
2012).Other than that, in order to raise mutual understanding and trust between them, both of
them must try to avoid any suspicious moves. They must stop giving people the idea that an
established power and rising power can only engage in a strategic rivalry by respecting each
others right and interest in East Asia (Haihan 2013)
Hence, in my opinion, the U.S. pivot to Asia has significant impact on the regional
security of the East Asia. This is due to the reason that the U.S. pivot has immediately trigger
Chinas insecurity for its interest in East Asia. Other than that, East Asia in general will be the
scapegoat if the new Cold War between the China and the U.S. ever erupted.
To conclude, the U.S. pivot in Asia is a strategy made by the U.S. to strengthen its
position in the region. However, until date no one can be certain about the real key driver of
the pivot. The key driver still remain disputable with different opinion between Chinese
leaders and U.S. leaders. There are two significant IRs theory in explaining the key driver
which are firstly Power Transition Theory which is in this case backed by the Chinese
assessment, and secondly is the Balance of Power which is supported by the U.S. leaders.
On the other hand, the pivot has caused significant impacts generally on the region. The
impacts are reflected in two perspectives which are economically and militarily. Briefly, the
pivot has caused the engagement between U.S and the region to accelerate both economically
and militarily. In addition, the pivot also has significant impacts on the regional security
dynamics generally on East Asia and particularly on China. In my point of view, the pivot can
be both positive and negative to Asia. What determines the outcome at the end of the day is
how Asia adapts to the pivot and how the U.S. convince the China that the pivot is not to
contain them.
(2600 words)

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