G.R. No.

L-42226

July 26, 1935

In re estate of the deceased Ines Basa de Mercado.

JOAQUINA BASA, ET AL., petitioners-appellants,
vs.
ATILANO G. MERCADO, respondent-appellee.
Briones and Martinez for appellants.
Jose Gutierrez David for appellee.
GODDARD, J.:
By virtue of an order dated June 27, 1931, the Honorable Hermogenes Reyes, Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga, allowed and probated the last will and testament of Ines Basa, deceased. On January 30, 1932, the same judge
approved the account of the administrator of the estate, declared him the only heir of the deceased under the will and
closed the administration proceedings. On April 11, 1934, the herein petitioners-appellants filed a motion in which they
prayed that said proceedings be reopened and alleged that the court lacked jurisdiction to act in the matter because there
was a failure to comply with requirements as to the publication of the notice of hearing prescribed in the following section
of the Code of Civil Procedure:
SEC. 630. Court to appoint hearing on will. When a will is delivered to a court having jurisdiction of the same,
the court shall appoint a time and place when all concerned may appear to contest the allowance of the will, and
shall cause public notice thereof to be given by publication in such newspaper or newspapers as the court directs
of general circulation in the province, three weeks successively, previous to the time appointed, and no will shall
be allowed until such notice has been given. At the hearing all testimony shall be taken under oath, reduced to
writing and signed by the witnesses.
In this motion the appellants claim that the provisions of section 630 of the Code of Civil Procedure have not been
complied with in view of the fact that although the trial judge, on May 29, 1931, ordered the publication of the required
notice for "three weeks successively" previous to the time appointed for the hearing on the will, the first publication was
on June 6, 1931, the third on June 20, 1931, and the hearing took place on the 27th of that month, only twenty-one days
after the date of the first publication instead of three full weeks before the day set for the hearing.
Section 630 of our Code of Civil Procedure is taken from the Code of Civil Procedure of the State of Vermont. The
Supreme Court of that State, commenting on the phrase "three weeks successively", held:
The date of examining and allowing P.A. Barlett's final account of administration, and for decreeing the residue of
the estate to the lawful claimants of the same, was set by the probate court for December 19, 1919, at the probate
office in Brighton, and an order was made to this effect on November 28, 1919. The order provided also that
notice should be given by publication for three weeks successively in the Essex County Herald. In accordance
with this order, the notice was published in the issues for December 4, 11 and 18, respectively. This was "public
notice" to all persons interested of the time and place of examining and allowing said account and making decree
of distribution, and was sufficient under the provisions of G.L. 3276. (Lenehen vs. Spaulding, 57 Vt., 115.) "The
proceeding was according to law in all respects, and being in the nature of a proceeding in rem, it binds
everybody by its legal effect." (Burbeck vs. Little, 50 Vt., 713.) At the time and place set for the hearing none of
the petitioners or other legatees under the will of Nickerson Warner appeared. Thereupon the judge of probate
then and there continued the hearing until April 6, 1920, at which time the final account of P.A .Barlett as
administrator de bonis non with will annexed was filed and, no one appearing to object, the same was allowed,
and the decree of distribution was entered. (In reWarner's Estate [Supreme Court of Vermont] 1925; 127 Atl. Rep.,
362, 364; 98 Vt., 254, 261.)

It will be noted that in the above cited case the last of the three publications was on December 18, 1919, and the hearing
on the administrators's final account was set for December 19 of that year, only fifteen days after the date of the first
publication.
In view of the foregoing, it is held that the language used in section 630 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not mean that
the notice, referred to therein, should be published for three full weeks before the date set for the hearing on the will. In
other words the first publication of the notice need not be made twenty-one days before the day appointed for the hearing.
The appellants also contend that the trial court erred in ruling that the weekly newspaper, Ing Katipunan, in which the
notice of hearing was published, was a newspaper of general circulation in the Province of Pampanga.
The record shows that Ing Katipunan is a newspaper of general circulation in view of the fact that it is published for the
dissemination of local news and general information; that it has a bona fide subscription list of paying subscribers; that it
is published at regular intervals and that the trial court ordered the publication to be made in Ing Katipunan precisely
because it was a "newspaper of general circulation in the Province of Pampanga."
Furthermore no attempt has been made to prove that it was a newspaper devoted to the interests or published for the
entertainment of a particular class, profession, trade, calling, race or religious denomination. The fact that there is another
paper published in Pampanga that has a few more subscribers (72 to be exact) and that certain Manila dailies also have a
larger circulation in that province is unimportant. The law does not require that publication of the notice, referred to in the
Code of Civil Procedure, should be made in the newspaper with the largest numbers is necessary to constitute a newspaper
of general circulation.
The assignments of error of the appellants are overruled and the appealed order of the trial court is affirmed with costs in
this instance against the appellants.

G.R. No. 154380 October 5, 2005

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III, Respondent.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where one party is later naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains
a valid divorce decree capacitating him or her to remarry, can the Filipino spouse likewise remarry under Philippine law?
Before us is a case of first impression that behooves the Court to make a definite ruling on this apparently novel question,
presented as a pure question of law.
In this petition for review, the Solicitor General assails the Decision1 dated May 15, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court of
Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23 and its Resolution2 dated July 4, 2002 denying the motion for reconsideration.
The court a quo had declared that herein respondent Cipriano Orbecido III is capacitated to remarry. The fallo of the
impugned Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, by virtue of the provision of the second paragraph of Art. 26 of the Family Code and by reason of the
divorce decree obtained against him by his American wife, the petitioner is given the capacity to remarry under the
Philippine Law.
IT IS SO ORDERED.3
The factual antecedents, as narrated by the trial court, are as follows.
On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United Church of Christ in the
Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage was blessed with a son and a daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V.
Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido.
In 1986, Ciprianos wife left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years later, Cipriano
discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen.
Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree and then married a certain
Innocent Stanley. She, Stanley and her child by him currently live at 5566 A. Walnut Grove Avenue, San Gabriel,
California.

Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the
Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit in the petition, the court granted the same. The Republic, herein
petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), sought reconsideration but it was denied.
In this petition, the OSG raises a pure question of law:
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY UNDER ARTICLE 26 OF THE FAMILY CODE4
The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is not applicable to the instant case because it only
applies to a valid mixed marriage; that is, a marriage celebrated between a Filipino citizen and an alien. The proper
remedy, according to the OSG, is to file a petition for annulment or for legal separation. 5 Furthermore, the OSG argues
there is no law that governs respondents situation. The OSG posits that this is a matter of legislation and not of judicial
determination.6
For his part, respondent admits that Article 26 is not directly applicable to his case but insists that when his naturalized
alien wife obtained a divorce decree which capacitated her to remarry, he is likewise capacitated by operation of law
pursuant to Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.7
At the outset, we note that the petition for authority to remarry filed before the trial court actually constituted a petition for
declaratory relief. In this connection, Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court provides:
RULE 63
DECLARATORY RELIEF AND SIMILAR REMEDIES
Section 1. Who may file petitionAny person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, or whose
rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or other governmental regulation may, before
breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of
construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.
...
The requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are: (1) there must be a justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy must
be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) that the party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the controversy;
and (4) that the issue is ripe for judicial determination. 8
This case concerns the applicability of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 to a marriage between two Filipino citizens where one
later acquired alien citizenship, obtained a divorce decree, and remarried while in the U.S.A. The interests of the parties
are also adverse, as petitioner representing the State asserts its duty to protect the institution of marriage while respondent,
a private citizen, insists on a declaration of his capacity to remarry. Respondent, praying for relief, has legal interest in the
controversy. The issue raised is also ripe for judicial determination inasmuch as when respondent remarries, litigation
ensues and puts into question the validity of his second marriage.
Coming now to the substantive issue, does Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code apply to the case of respondent?
Necessarily, we must dwell on how this provision had come about in the first place, and what was the intent of the
legislators in its enactment?
Brief Historical Background

On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as the
"Family Code," which took effect on August 3, 1988. Article 26 thereof states:
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and
38.
On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code, Executive Order No. 227 was likewise signed into
law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family Code. A second paragraph was added to Article 26. As so amended, it
now provides:
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they
were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1),
(4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to
remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)
On its face, the foregoing provision does not appear to govern the situation presented by the case at hand. It seems to
apply only to cases where at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties are a Filipino citizen and a foreigner.
The instant case is one where at the time the marriage was solemnized, the parties were two Filipino citizens, but later on,
the wife was naturalized as an American citizen and subsequently obtained a divorce granting her capacity to remarry, and
indeed she remarried an American citizen while residing in the U.S.A.
Noteworthy, in the Report of the Public Hearings9 on the Family Code, the Catholic Bishops Conference of the
Philippines (CBCP) registered the following objections to Paragraph 2 of Article 26:
1. The rule is discriminatory. It discriminates against those whose spouses are Filipinos who divorce them abroad. These
spouses who are divorced will not be able to re-marry, while the spouses of foreigners who validly divorce them abroad
can.
2. This is the beginning of the recognition of the validity of divorce even for Filipino citizens. For those whose foreign
spouses validly divorce them abroad will also be considered to be validly divorced here and can re-marry. We propose that
this be deleted and made into law only after more widespread consultation. (Emphasis supplied.)
Legislative Intent
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the intent of Paragraph 2 of Article 26,
according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil Code Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation
where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the
Filipino spouse.
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.10 The Van Dorncase
involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court held therein that a divorce decree validly
obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry
under Philippine law.
Does the same principle apply to a case where at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties were Filipino
citizens, but later on, one of them obtains a foreign citizenship by naturalization?

The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v. Court of Appeals.11 In Quita, the parties were, as in this
case, Filipino citizens when they got married. The wife became a naturalized American citizen in 1954 and obtained a
divorce in the same year. The Court therein hinted, by way of obiter dictum, that a Filipino divorced by his naturalized
foreign spouse is no longer married under Philippine law and can thus remarry.
Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, we hold that Paragraph 2 of Article
26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were
Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The
Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the
solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice. Where the interpretation of
a statute according to its exact and literal import would lead to mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the
legislature, it should be construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law. A
statute may therefore be extended to cases not within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its spirit
or intent.12
If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married
to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce is no longer married to the Filipino spouse, then the instant case must be
deemed as coming within the contemplation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26.
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their
citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.
In this case, when Ciprianos wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there was still a valid marriage that has been
celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate would have it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid
divorce capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both
present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the "divorced" Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry.
We are also unable to sustain the OSGs theory that the proper remedy of the Filipino spouse is to file either a petition for
annulment or a petition for legal separation. Annulment would be a long and tedious process, and in this particular case,
not even feasible, considering that the marriage of the parties appears to have all the badges of validity. On the other hand,
legal separation would not be a sufficient remedy for it would not sever the marriage tie; hence, the legally separated
Filipino spouse would still remain married to the naturalized alien spouse.
However, we note that the records are bereft of competent evidence duly submitted by respondent concerning the divorce
decree and the naturalization of respondents wife. It is settled rule that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it
and mere allegation is not evidence.13
Accordingly, for his plea to prosper, respondent herein must prove his allegation that his wife was naturalized as an
American citizen. Likewise, before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our own courts, the party pleading it
must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. 14 Such foreign law must
also be proved as our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other fact, such laws must be alleged and
proved.15 Furthermore, respondent must also show that the divorce decree allows his former wife to remarry as
specifically required in Article 26. Otherwise, there would be no evidence sufficient to declare that he is capacitated to
enter into another marriage.

Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our holding that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code (E.O. No. 209, as
amended by E.O. No. 227), should be interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen, who has been divorced by a spouse who had
acquired foreign citizenship and remarried, also to remarry. However, considering that in the present petition there is no
sufficient evidence submitted and on record, we are unable to declare, based on respondents bare allegations that his wife,
who was naturalized as an American citizen, had obtained a divorce decree and had remarried an American, that
respondent is now capacitated to remarry. Such declaration could only be made properly upon respondents submission of
the aforecited evidence in his favor.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition by the Republic of the Philippines is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated May 15,
2002, and Resolution dated July 4, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23, are
hereby SET ASIDE.
No pronouncement as to costs.

G.R. No. L-19313

January 19, 1962

DOMINADOR R. AYTONA, petitioner,

vs.
ANDRES V. CASTILLO, ET AL., respondents.
R E S O L U T I O N.
BENGZON, C.J.:
Without prejudice to the subsequent promulgation of more extended opinion, the Court adopted today, the following
resolutions: .
On December 29, 1961, then President Carlos P. Garcia appointed Dominador R. Aytona as ad interim Governor of the
Central Bank. On the same day, the latter took the corresponding oath.
On December 30, 1961, at noon, President-elect Diosdado Macapagal assumed office; and on December 31, 1961, he
issued Administrative Order No. 2 recalling, withdrawing, and cancelling all ad interim appointment made by President
Garcia after December 13, 1961, (date when he, Macapagal, had been proclaimed elected by the Congress). On January 1,
1962, President Macapagal appointed Andres V. Castillo as ad interim Governor of the Central Bank, and the latter
qualified immediately.

On January 2, 1962, both appointed exercised the powers of their office, although Castillo informed Aytona of his title
thereto; and some unpleasantness developed in the premises of the Central Bank. However, the next day and thereafter,
Aytona was definitely prevented from holding office in the Central Bank.
So, he instituted this proceeding which is practically, a quo warranto, challenging Castillo's right to exercise the powers of
Governor of the Central Bank. Aytona claims he was validly appointed, had qualified for the post, and therefore, the
subsequent appointment and qualification of Castillo was void, because the position was then occupied by him. Castillo
replies that the appointment of Aytona had been revoked by Administrative Order No. 2 of Macapagal; and so, the real
issue is whether the new President had power to issue the order of cancellation of the ad interim appointments made by
the past President, even after the appointees had already qualified.1wph1.t
The record shows that President Garcia sent to the Commission on Appointments which was not then in session a
communication dated December 29, 1961, submitting "for confirmation" ad interim appointments of assistant director of
lands, councilors, mayors, members of the provincial boards, fiscals, justices of the peace, officers of the army, etc.; and
the name of Dominador R. Aytona as Governor of the Central Bank occupies number 45, between a justice of the peace
and a colonel of the Armed Forces.
Another communication of President Garcia bearing the same date, submitted a list of ad interim appointments of Foreign
Affairs officers, judges, fiscals, chiefs of police, justices of the peace, mayors, councilors, etc. number 63 of which was
that of Dominador R. Aytona for Governor of the Philippines in the Boards of International Monetary Fund, International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development, etc.
A third communication likewise dated December 29, 1961, addressed to the Commission on Appointments submitted for
confirmation 124 names of persons appointed as judges of first instance, members of provincial boards, and boards of
government corporations, fiscals, justice of the peace, even one associate justice of this Court occupying position No. 8
and two associate justices of the Court of Appeals (9 and 10) between an assistant of the Solicitor-General's Office, and
the chairman of the board of tax appeals of Pasay City, who in turn are followed by judges of first instance, and inserted
between the latter is the name of another associate justice of the Court of Appeals.
There were other appointments thus submitted by President Garcia on that date, December 29, 1961. All in all, about three
hundred fifty (350) "midnight" or "last minute" appointments.
In revoking the appointments, President Macapagal is said to have acted for these and other reasons: (1) the outgoing
President should have refrained from filling vacancies to give the new President opportunity to consider names in the light
of his new policies, which were approved by the electorate in the last elections; (2) these scandalously hurried
appointments in mass do not fall within the intent and spirit of the constitutional provision authorizing the issuance of ad
interim appointments; (3) the appointments were irregular, immoral and unjust, because they were issued only upon the
condition that the appointee would immediately qualify obviously to prevent a recall or revocation by the incoming
President, with the result that those deserving of promotion or appointment who preferred to be named by the new
President declined and were by-passed; and (4) the abnormal conditions surrounding the appointment and qualifications
evinced a desire on the part of the outgoing President merely subvert the policies of the incoming administration.
It is admitted that many of the persons mentioned in the communication to the Commission on Appointments dated
December 29, 1961, did not qualify. There is evidence that in the night of December 29, there was a scramble in
Malacaan of candidates for positions trying to get their written appointments or having such appointments changed to
more convenient places, after some last minute bargaining. There was unusual hurry in the issuance of the appointments
which were not coursed through the Department Heads and in the confusion, a woman appointed judge was
designated "Mr." and a man was designated "Madam." One appointee who got his appointment and was required to
qualify, resorted to the rush of asking permission to swear before a relative official, and then never qualified.
We are informed, it is Malacaan's practice which we find to be logical to submit ad interim appointments only
when the Commission on Appointments is in session. One good reason for the practice is that only those who have
accepted the appointment and qualified are submitted for confirmation. Nevertheless, this time, Malacaan submitted its
appointments on the same day they were issued; and the Commission was not then in session; obviously because it
foresaw the possibility that the incoming President would refuse to submit later the appointees of his predecessor. As a

result, as already adverted to, some persons whose names were submitted for confirmation had not qualified nor accepted
their appointments.
Because of the haste and irregularities, some judges of first instance qualified for districts wherein no vacancies existed,
because the incumbents had not qualified for other districts to which they had been supposedly transferred or promoted.
Referring specifically to judges who had not qualified, the course of conduct adopted by Former Chief Justice Moran is
cited. Being ambassador in Spain and desiring to return to this Court even as associate justice, Moran was tendered an ad
interim appointment thereto by President Quirino, after the latter had lost the election to President Magsaysay, and before
leaving the Presidency. Said Ambassador declined to qualify being of the opinion that the matter should be left to the
incoming newly-elected President.
Of course, nobody will assert that President Garcia ceased to be such earlier than at noon of December 30, 1961. But it is
common sense to believe that after the proclamation of the election of President Macapagal, his was no more than a "caretaker" administration. He was duty bound to prepare for the orderly transfer of authority the incoming President, and he
should not do acts which he ought to know, would embarrass or obstruct the policies of his successor. The time for debate
had passed; the electorate had spoken. It was not for him to use powers as incumbent President to continue the political
warfare that had ended or to avail himself of presidential prerogatives to serve partisan purposes. The filling up vacancies
in important positions, if few, and so spaced to afford some assurance of deliberate action and careful consideration of the
need for the appointment and the appointee's qualifications may undoubtedly be permitted. But the issuance of 350
appointments in one night and planned induction of almost all of them a few hours before the inauguration of the new
President may, with some reason, be regarded by the latter as an abuse Presidential prerogatives, the steps taken being
apparently a mere partisan effort to fill all vacant positions 1 irrespective of fitness and other conditions, and thereby
deprive the new administration of an opportunity to make the corresponding appointments.
Normally, when the President makes appointments the consent of the Commission on Appointments, he has benefit of
their advice. When he makes ad interim appointments, he exercises a special prerogative and is bound to be prudent to
insure approval of his selection either previous consultation with the members of the Commission or by thereafter
explaining to them the reason such selection. Where, however, as in this case, the Commission on Appointments that will
consider the appointees is different from that existing at the time of the appointment 2 and where the names are to be
submitted by successor, who may not wholly approve of the selections, the President should be doubly careful in
extending such appointments. Now, it is hard to believe that in signing 350 appointments in one night, President Garcia
exercised such "double care" which was required and expected of him; and therefore, there seems to be force to the
contention that these appointments fall beyond the intent and spirit of the constitutional provision granting to the
Executive authority to issue ad interim appointments.
Under the circumstances above described, what with the separation of powers, this Court resolves that it must decline to
disregard the Presidential Administrative Order No. 2, cancelling such "midnight" or "last-minute" appointments.
Of course, the Court is aware of many precedents to the effect that once an appointment has been issued, it cannot be
reconsidered, specially where the appointee has qualified. But none of them refer to mass ad interimappointments (threehundred and fifty), issued in the last hours of an outgoing Chief Executive, in a setting similar to that outlined herein. On
the other hand, the authorities admit of exceptional circumstances justifying revocation 3and if any circumstances justify
revocation, those described herein should fit the exception.
Incidentally, it should be stated that the underlying reason for denying the power to revoke after the appointee has
qualified is the latter's equitable rights. Yet it is doubtful if such equity might be successfully set up in the present
situation, considering the rush conditional appointments, hurried maneuvers and other happenings detracting from that
degree of good faith, morality and propriety which form the basic foundation of claims to equitable relief. The appointees,
it might be argued, wittingly or unwittingly cooperated with the stratagem to beat the deadline, whatever the resultant
consequences to the dignity and efficiency of the public service. Needless to say, there are instances wherein not only
strict legality, but also fairness, justice and righteousness should be taken into account.
WHEREFORE, the Court exercising its judgment and discretion in the matter, hereby dismiss the action, without costs.

Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes and De Leon, J.J., concur.

Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J., concurring:
Once more this Court has to pass upon and determine a controversy that calls for an interpretation of the provisions of the
Constitution. The facts that gave rise to the petition need not be restated as they are set forth in opinion rendered for the
Court. The question is whether the appointment of a person to a public office by a President whose term of office was
about to expire or cease is lawful or does not contravene the Constitution; or, if lawful after the appointee has taken his
oath, until when would such appointment be valid and effective. The constitutional point involved seems to have been
overlooked the framers of the Constitution. It would seem that the framers, well-meaning persons that they were, never
foresaw an eventuality such as the one confronting the Republic. The framers never thought and anticipated that citizen
elevated by the people to such an exalted office the President of the Republic, would perform an act which though not
expressly prohibited by the Constitution and the law, ought not to be done, since a sense of propriety would be enough to
stop him from performing it.
The petitioner invokes section 10, paragraph 4, article VII, of the Constitution which provides that
The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, but such
appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next
adjournment of the Congress.
Under these constitutional provisions there seems to be no doubt that the President may make the appointment, and if
approved by the Commission on Appointments, it would unquestionably be lawful, valid and effective, but if disapproved
or not acted upon by the Commission on Appointments then the appointment becomes ineffectual and the appointee
ceases and can no longer perform the duties of the office to which he had been appointed.
It is urged that the petitioner's appointment having been made by the President during the recess of the Congress and he
having taken his oath, the appointment is lawful, valid and effective until disapproval by the Commission on
Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress should the Commission on Appointments fail to act on it.
Ad interim appointments that the President may make during the recess of the Congress are those made during a period of
time from the adjournment of the Congress to the opening session, regular or special, of the same Congress. In other
words, if the President had convened in a special session the fourth Congress whose term was to expire on the 30th of
December 1961 and during such session the ad interim appointments had been confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments there would be little doubt that the appointments would be lawful and valid.
The government established by the Constitution is one of checks and balances to preclude and prevent arrogation of
powers by officers elected or appointed under it.
Under the provisions of the Constitution "The term of office of Senators shall be six years and shall begin on the thirtieth
day of December next following their election."1 And "The term of office of the Members of the House of Representatives
shall be four years and shall begin on the thirtieth day of December next following their election." 2Under section 10,
paragraph 4, article VII, of the Constitution, above quoted, the President may make appointments during the recess of the
Congress, "but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until
the next adjournment of the Congress." .
The term "recess", in its broadest sense, means and refers to the intervening period between adjournment of a regular
session of one hundred days exclusive of Sundays, or of a Special session which cannot continue longer than thirty days,
and the convening thereof in regular session once every year on the fourth Monday of January or in special session to
consider general legislation or only such subjects as he (the President) may designate. 3 And such intervening period refers
to the same Congress that had adjourned and was to be convened. Such intervening period cannot refer to two different
Congresses, one that has adjourned and one newly chosen or elected to meet in regular session as provided for by the
Constitution, or in special session by the call of the President.

The term of the President ... shall end at noon the thirtieth day of December following the expiration four years
after (his) election and the term of (his) successor shall begin from such time. 4
If the ad interim appointments made by the President during the recess of the Congress are effective only until disapproval
by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress a limitation on the power of the
President there is a cogent and strong reason for holding to be the intent of the framers of the Constitution that such
appointments made by him ceased to be valid and effective after the term of the Congress existing at the time of the
making of such appointments had ended or expired. The end or expiration of the of the Congress existing at the time of
the making of the ad interim appointments by the President is a stronger cause or reason for the lapse or ineffectuality of
such appointments than "the next adjournment of the Congress." Since that Congress no longer exists and hence can no
longer convene and then "adjourn." The effectivity and validity of the appointment of the petitioner as Governor of the
Central Bank ceased, lapsed and expired on thirtieth of December 1961. He is no longer entitled hold the office to which
he had been appointed. My vote, therefore, is for the denial of the petition.
Dizon, J., concurs.
I concur with the foregoing concurring opinion of Justice Padilla, the same being based on an additional ground justifying
denial of the petition under consideration.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J., concurring: .
In addition to the reasons stated in the resolution adopted by this Court on January 19, 1962, I wish to express the
following views: .
1. The "midnight appointments" made by President Garcia were extended by him under Section 10, Paragraph 4, Article
VII of the Constitution which provides: "The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of
the Congress, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or
until the next adjournment of the Congress." It is clear that these appointments can only be made during the recess of
Congress because they are ad interim appointments.
The term "recess" has a definite legal meaning. It means the interval between a session of Congress that has adjourned and
another of the same Congress. It does not refer to the interval between the session of one Congress and that of another. In
that case the interval is not referred to as a "recess" but an adjournment sine die. Thus, in the case of Tipton v. Parker, 71
Ark. 194, the court said: "The 'recess' here referred to by Judge Cooley means the intermission between sittings of the
same body at its regular or adjourned session, and not to the interval between the final adjournment of one body and the
convening of another at the next regular session. When applied to a legislative body, it means a temporary dismissal, and
not an adjournment sine die." Since the appointments in question were made after the Fourth Congress has adjourned sine
die and ceased to function on December 30, 1961, they cannot partake of the nature of ad interim appointments within the
meaning of the Constitution.
2. The Commission on Appointments under our constitutional set-up is not continuing body but one that co-exists with the
Congress that has created it. This is so because said Commission is a creation of the Senate and of the House of
Representatives. While the Senate is a continuing body, the House ceases at the end of its fourth year. It cannot therefore
be continuing it being a creation of a body half of which is alive and the other half has ceased to exist. This theory can
also be gleaned from the proceedings of the constitutional convention.
Thus, the preliminary draft of the Philippine Constitution provides for a permanent Commission and for the holding of
sessions of the Commission even during the recess of Congress. After mature deliberation the proposal was defeated and a
substitute was adopted which is now embodied in Article VI, Section 12, of our Constitution. As a matter of fact, as finally
adopted, the Commission on Appointments has to be organized upon the convening of a new Congress after the election
of the Speaker of the House of Representatives or of the President of the Senate, as the case may be, as provided for in
Section 13, Article VI of the Constitution (Article VII, Preliminary Draft of the Constitution, Vol. 2, Aruego: The Framing
of the Constitution, pp. 982, 987).

An ad interim appointment, to be complete, needs to be submitted to the Commission on Appointments one the same is
constituted. This is reflected in the Constitution when it provides that "such appointments shall be effective only until
disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress" (Section 10, Paragraph 4,
Article VII). This mean that it must be submitted to the Commission on Appointments of the Congress that has created it.
It cannot be submitted to the Commission on Appointments of a different Congress. Since the appointments in question
were submitted to the Commission on Appointments which ceased to function on December 30, 1961, they lapsed upon
the cessation of said Commission. Consequently, they can be recalled by the new Chief Executive.
3. An ad interim appointment is not complete until the appointee takes the oath of office and actually takes possession of
the position or enters upon the discharge of its duties. The mere taking of the oath of office without actual assumption of
office is not sufficient to constitute the appointee the actual occupant thereof who may not be removed therefrom except
for cause (McChesney v. Sampson, 23 S.W. 2d. 584). The case of Summers v. Ozaeta, 81 Phil., 754, cannot be cited as a
precedent as to when an ad interim appointment becomes permanent and binding. That case involves a cadastral judge
who was given an ad interim appointment as judge at large. After assuming the office and discharging his duties, his
appointment was not confirmed. He claimed that he could still revert to his former position as cadastral judge. True, this
Court made a statement therein that an ad interimappointment becomes permanent after taking the oath of office, but such
statement is merely an obiter dictumbecause the case could have been decided on the doctrine that, having accepted an
incompatible office, petitioner was deemed to have abandoned the position of cadastral judge.
In relying on certain cases for the proposition that once an appointee has taken the oath of office his appointment becomes
irrevocable petitioner fails to consider that in said cases there had either been an actual discharge of duty and actual
physical possession or assumption of office following the oath-taking as to constitute the appointee the occupant of the
position from which he cannot be removed without cause. Even the case ofMarbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch, U.S. 137, 2 L.
Ed., 61, 69, cannot be invoked as a precedent, for there the appointees were merely nominated and their nominations
confirmed by the Commission on Appointments even if they have later taken their oath of office. Certainly, they can no
longer be deprived of their appointments for then the executive would be acting in disregard of the confirming body which
is a coordinate and independent body not subject to his control.
Since the appointments in question were made not in the light of the views herein expressed, I am of the opinion that they
did not ripen into valid and permanent appointments and as such were properly recalled by the new Chief Executive.
CONCEPCION, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part: .
It is well settled that the granting of writs of prohibition and mandamus is ordinarily within the sound discretion of the
courts, to be exercised on equitable principles, and that said writs should be issued when the right to the relief is clear (55
C.J.S. 25, 29, 73 C.J.S. 18). Insofar as the majority resolution relied upon discretion and the equities of the case in
denying said writs, I concur, therefore, in the aforementioned resolution.
However, I cannot see my way clear to subscribing the observations therein made representing the motives allegedly
underlying petitioner's appointment and that of many others who are not parties in this case, and justifying the revocation
of such appointments. My reasons, among others, are: .
1. Save where the incumbent has a temporary appointment or is removable at the will of the appointing power, an
appointment once complete, by the performance of all acts required by law of the appointing power, is irrevocable.
An appointment to office may be revoked at any time before the appointment becomes final and complete, but
thereafter unless the appointee is removable at the will of appointing power. For the purpose of this rule, an
appointment to office is complete when the last act required of the person or body vested with the appointing
power has been performed. Where by constitutional, statutory, or other legal provision it is required that certain
steps be taken to make effective appointment, it has been held that the appointment becomes complete beyond the
possibility of recall when the last of the prescribed steps is taken, and that, where no method of appointment is
provided, an appointment does not become effective and beyond recall until the appointing officer by some act or
word evinces a final intent to vest the appointee with title to the office." (67 C.J.S., pp. 161-162) .

After the act of appointment is complete, the appointing authority may not revoke its former appointment and
make another. And appointment to office is complete when the last act required of the person or body vested with
the appointing power has been performed. (56 C., p. 954) .
In all jurisdictions where appointment to office is regarded as an executive function, as here, an appointment to
office once made is incapable of revocation or cancellation by the appointing executive in the absence of a
statutory or constitutional power of removal. Barrett v. Duff 114, Kan. 220; 217 P. 918; People v. Mizner, 7 Cal.
519, State v. Williams, 222 Mo. 268, 121 S.W. 64, 17 Ann. Cas. 1006; Draper v. State, 175 Ala. 547, 57 So. 772,
Ann. Cas. 1914D, page 305, Annotation." (McChesney v. Sampson, 23 S.W. 2d., 584) .
May an appointment be revoked by reason of error or fraud? This question was taken up in Ex rel Coogan vs. Barbour (22
A 686) and Ex rel Scofield vs. Starr (63 A 512). The first involved a City Charter providing that its common council shall,
in joint convention, appoint a prosecuting attorney. In such convention, Coogan obtained a majority of the votes cast and
of the convention. Upon announcement of this result, a member of the convention offered a resolution declaring Coogan
elected, but the resolution was defeated. Then, two resolutions were offered and approved: one declaring that the ballots
taken were null and of no effect by reason of errors in the same and another declaring Barbour elected prosecuting
attorney. The issue was who had been appointed thereto. The court held that it was Coogan, he having obtained a clear
majority and there having been no error or fraud in the voting, although it did not deny the power of the convention to
correct errors and to nullify the effects of fraud in the voting by invalidating the same and calling another election, had the
proceedings been tainted with such error or fraud.
The second case referred to a similar provision in a city charter, to the effect that appointments by the common council
shall be by ballot and that the person receiving a plurality of ballots shall be elected. The first balloting taken for the
election of the city surveyor of Brigeport resulted in 25 ballots being cast. It was announced that there was one ballot
more than members voting, and that there were 13 ballots for Scofield, 11 for Starr and one blank ballot. Scofield
maintained that this result amounted to his appointment precluding the council from taking a new ballot but such pretense
was rejected. Inasmuch as the number of ballots cast exceeded the number of persons voting, the council was justified in
believing that the proceeding was not free from suspicion of fraud or mistake in the voting and, accordingly in taking
another vote.
In both cases, the fraud or mistake alluded to referred to the manner of voting or of counting the ballots cast, not to the
intent of the voters in choosing a particular appointee.
2. An ad interim appointment, made during a recess of Congress, is complete and irrevocable upon the performance of the
last act required by law from the appointing power, even without previous notice to the appointee, or acceptance by him,
or without subsequent action of the legislative organ that may terminate its effectivity.
In the case of appointment made by a single executive such as a governor, mayor, etc., it is undisputed that the
appointment once made is irrevocable.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Where an appointment subject to confirmation by the senate is made by a governor during a recess of the
senate, ... the question arises as to whether such an appointment may be reconsidered and withdrawn by the
governor before it is acted upon by the Senate.
xxx

xxx

xxx

In Barrett v. Duff (1923) 114 Kan. 220, 217 Pac. 918, where appointments made by the governor during a recess
of the legislature, which appointments could not be confirmed by the senate as required by law until the next
session of that body, were revoked by the governor's successor, and other persons were appointed to the offices,
such action by him being taken after the senate had convened and had taken under advisement the confirmation of
the persons first appointed to the offices, but before the senate had taken any definite action with regard to such
confirmation, and the senate, confirmed the first appointee, but, despite this act of the senate, commissions were
issued by the governor to the second appointee, it was held, in reliance upon the terms of the statutes which

provided that the governor should 'appoint' persons to such offices with the advice and consent of the senate, as
distinguished from the provision of the Constitution of the United States governing appointments by the
President, which provides that the President shall 'nominate' and, by and with the advice and consent of the
senate, shall 'appoint' persons to office, that the act of the governor in making the first appointments
was final and exhausted the power of the governor's office in that regard unless and until the appointments were
rejected by the senate, and that, therefore, the persons appointed by the first governor were entitled to the office.
In the words of the court, 'The power of the governor having been exercised, he had no further power of the
governor having been exercised, he had no further control over the respective offices unless and until the
appointees had been rejected by the senate.' In reaching this result, the court emphasized the difference between a
nomination and an appointment, holding that, where the statute relating to appointments by the governor with the
consent of the senate provides that the governor shall appoint persons to the office with the consent of the senate,
rather than merely nominate persons for consideration by the senate, the appointment is final and conclusive
without confirmation. ... .
Likewise in McChesney v. Sampson (1930) 232 Ky 395, 23 S.W. (2d.) 584, the act of governor in making a recess
appointment was held to be not merely a nomination subject to revocation by the governor at any time prior to
action thereon by the senate, but a final and irrevocable appointment subject only to rejection by the senate. In
support of this result, it was said: 'It is urged that appointment to the office consists of two separate acts, one by
the governor and one by the senate, and until both have acted there is no appointment such as to bring the
incumbent within the protection of the law. Even so, the two powers do not act concurrently, but consecutively,
and action once taken and completed by the executive is not subject to reconsideration or recall. ... The fact that
the title to the office, and the tenure of the officer, are subject to the action of the senate, does not render
incomplete the act of the chief executive in making the appointment.The appointment alone confers upon the
appointee for the time being the right to take and hold the office, and constitutes the last act respecting the matter
to be performed by the executive power.' .
xxx

xxx

xxx

In People ex rel. Byder v. Mizner (1857) 7 Cal. 519, in holding that an appointment made by a governor to fill an
office which had expired during a recess of the legislature was not merely an appointment to fill a vacancy which
would expire at the end of the next session of the legislature, but was an appointment for a full term, and that the
act of the governor during a subsequent session of the legislature, in appointing another to the office and asking
his confirmation by the legislature, was unauthorized and void, it was said that, the power of the executive having
been once exercised, he had no further control over the office until the appointee has been rejected by the senate."
(89 ALR, pp. 138, 139, 140.) .
3. The irrevocability of the ad interim appointment adverted to above becomes more apparent when we consider that the
House, Commission on Appointments or other agency of Congress charged with the function of terminating the effectivity
of such appointment, may act thereon, by approving or disapproving the same, even though the Executive had not
submitted or forwarded it to said House, Commission or agency of Congress, and even though either the outgoing or the
incoming Executive shall have submitted for confirmation the name of a subsequent appointee in lieu of the first one..
This was the situation met in People ex rel, Emerson vs. Shawver (30 Wyo 366, 222 Pac. 11). The facts therein were: On
July 1, 1919, Governor Carey of Wyoming appointed Emerson as state engineer, to fill the vacancy caused by the
resignation of its incumbent. Upon the expiration of the latter's term, Governor Carey reappointed Emerson for a full term
of six (6) years, from and after April 1, 1921. This last appointment was confirmed by the state legislature at its next
session in 1923. Prior thereto, however, Governor Carey's term had expired and his successor had appointed Shawver as
state engineer. Thereupon Shawver ousted Emerson from such office. It was held that Emerson had a better right thereto;
that his appointment in 1921 was a completed appointment,requiring no action by the Senate to entitle him to hold said
office; that a recess appointment once made by "the executive is not subject to reconsideration or recall, "even though not
as yet confirmed by the Senate, inasmuch as," the appointment alone confers upon the appointee for the time being the
right to take and hold the office, and constitutes the last act respecting the matter to be performed by the executive
power"; and that, although the term of Governor Carey had expired and neither he nor his successor had forwarded
Emerson's appointment to the Senate for confirmation or requested the Senate to act upon said appointment, the same had
been validly confirmed by said body, for .

The provision as to the office here in question found in the Constitution does not say that the appointment made
by the Governor shall be confirmed by the Senate when requested by the former, or upon a communication by
him submitting the matter to the Senate. And we perceive no substantial reason for adding by construction any
such restriction upon the Senate's right to act. (People v. Shawver, 222 P. 11; see, also, Commonwealth v. Waller,
145 Pa. 235, 23 Atl. 382; State v. Williams, 20 S.C. 13; Richardson v. Henderson, 4 Wyo. 535, 35 Pac. 517, and
other cases cited in the Shawver case.) .
4. The foregoing goes to show, also, that the question whether the Commission on Appointments is or is not a continuing
body can not affect the determination of the case. Besides, the constitutional provision making an ad interim appointment,
if not disapproved by the Commission on Appointments, effective only until the next adjournment of Congress, clearly
indicates that such Commission must have an opportunity to approve or disapprove the appointment and that its inaction,
despite such opportunity, at the session of Congress next following the making of the appointment during which it
could have met, and, probably, did meet must be understood as an expression of unwillingness to stamp its approval
upon the act of the executive. No such opportunity exists when the outgoing Congress has not held any session, regular or
special after the making of the appointment and before the expiration of the term of said Congress, and the new Congress
has not, as yet, organized itself or even met.
5. The American rule concerning irrevocability of appointments is bolstered up in the Philippines by Section 4 of Article
XII of the Constitution, which provides that "no officer of employee in the Civil Service shall be removed except for
cause as provided by law." (Article VII, Section 4.) .
In fact, in his concurring opinion in Eraa vs. Vergel de Dios (85 Phil., 17), our distinguished Chief Justice pointed out
that the revocation of an appointment, if feasible, "should be communicated to the appointee before the moment he
qualified," and that "any revocation thereafter, is tantamount to removal and must be judged according to the rules
applicable to the removal" (emphasis ours). In the present case, the revocation of petitioner's appointment was not
communicated to him before he qualified by taking his oath of office. It is not even claimed that any of the statutory
causes for removal of petitioner herein exists, or that the procedure prescribed for such removal has been complied with.
6. Once an appointee has qualified, he acquires a legal, not merely equitable right, which is protected not only by statute,
but, also by the Constitution, for it cannot be taken away from him, either by revocation of the appointment or by removal,
except for cause, and with previous notice and hearing, consistently with said Section 4 of Article XII of our fundamental
law, and with the constitutional requirement of due process (Segovia vs. Noel, 47 Phil., 547; Sec. 67 C.J.S. 117, 42 Am.
Jur. 887). (See also, People ex rel Ryan v. Green, 58 N. v. 295; People vs. Gardner, 59 Barb 198; II Lewis Sutherland
Statutory Construction, pp. 1161 and 1162; Mechem on Public Officers, Sec. 389; 22 R. C. L. 377- 378; 25 Am. Dec. 690691, 703).
7. The case of Tipton vs. Parker (74 S. W., 298) has been cited in support of the theory that Congress of the Philippines
was not in "recess" on December 29, 1961, and that, accordingly, ad interim appointments could not validly be made in
such date. The question involved in said case was whether a committee of the Senate of Arkansas could be authorized by
the same to function after the adjournment sine die of the regular session of the state General Assembly. The State
Supreme Court considered as decisive authority the view expressed by Judge Cooley, to the effect that a legislative
committee "has no authority to sit during a recess of a House which appointed him, without its permission to that effect".
The issue thus hinged on the meaning of the term "recess" asused by Judge Cooley. Resolving this question, said court
held that the recess referred to by Judge Cooley was "only the intermission between the sittings of the same body at its
regular or adjourned session and not to the interval between the final adjournment of one body and the convening of
another at the next regular session"..
In this connection, it should be noted that, as an agency of the Senate, the committee involved in said case could not
operate for its principal beyond the latter's term. Moreover, under the Constitution of Arkansas, the regular biennial
session of the General Assembly could not exceed 60 days, unless by a vote of 2/3 of the members of each of
the two Houses of the legislature. Inasmuch as the Senate could not, without the concurrence of the House, directly extend
the period of its regular session, neither could it, without such concurrence, indirectly extend said period, by granting its
aforementioned committee the authority to function beyond said period. As stated by the Court "the committee, being the
mere agency of the body which appointed it, dies when the body itself dies, unless it is continued by law", which the
Senate may not enact, without the concurrence of the House..

The decision in said case did not seek to define the meaning of the term "recess" as used in any constitution or statute. It
did not even refer to the authority to make appointments during "recess". It has absolutely no bearing, therefore, on the
issue before us.
Upon the other hand, Dr. Jose M. Aruego, a prominent member of the constitutional convention, says, in his work on "The
Framing of the Philippine Constitution" (Vol I, pp. 434-435), that the draft of the provision on ad interimappointments by
the President, as submitted by the corresponding committee, followed the principles of the Jones Law and that the
recommendation of the committee was readily approved on the floor of the convention, although the committee on style
gave said provision its present phraseology. Pursuant to the Jones Law, "appointments made while the Senate is not in
session shall be effective either until disapproval or until the next adjournment of the Senate". Hence, the term "recess"
appearing in Section 10(4) of Article VII of our Constitution should be construed to mean "while Congress is not in
session" and this is confirmed by the practice consistently observed in the Philippines for time immemorial, as well as
the ad interim appointment extended by President Macapagal to respondent Castillo.
8. The case of McChesney vs. Sampson (23 S. W. 2d. 584) has, also, been invoked in support of the proposition that
"an ad interim appointment is not complete until the appointee takes the oath of office and actually takes possession of the
position or enters upon the discharge of its duties" and that, before such actual taking of possession, though after the oath
taking, the appointee may be removed without cause.
We have not found in said case anything justifying such claim. The issue in said case was whether a state governor could
recall an unconfirmed appointment of McChesney to the state textbook commission when there had been no session of the
Senate subsequent to the appointment, and such issue was decided in the negative.
Although, in addition to accepting the appointment, McChesney had qualified and exercised the function of the office, the
decision of the Court clearly indicates that it was not necessary for him either to discharge the duties of the office or even
to take the oath of office, in order to render his appointment irrevocable. The Court explicitly declared that the
appointment, once "completed by the executive is not subject to reconsideration or recall;" that the appointment "is
complete when the appointing authority has performed the acts incumbent upon him to accomplish the purpose;" and that
in the case of recess appointments, like that of McChesney," the appointment alone confers upon the appointee for the
time being the right to take and hold the office and constitutes the last act respecting the matter to be performed by the
executive power" completing the appointment and rendering the same irrevocable.
In short, the McChesney case is authority for the petitioner herein.
9. Most, if not all appointments made by the President have two (2) aspects, namely, the legal and the political. The first
refers to his authority to make the appointment. The second deals with the wisdom in the exercise of such authority, as
well as with its propriety. Whether given vacancy or number of vacancies should be filled, or who among several qualified
persons shall be chosen, or whether a given appointment or number of appointment will favor the political party to whom
the power of appointment belongs and will injure the interest of a rival political party and to what extent, are, to my mind,
essentially and typically political matters. Hence, I believe that the question whether certain appointments should be
sanctioned or turned down by reason of the improper, immoral or malevolent motives with which said matters were
allegedly handled is, likewise, clearly political, and as such, its determination belongs, not to the courts of justice (Vera vs.
Avelino, 77 Phil., 192, 205; 16 C.J.S 689-690; Willoughby on the Constitution, Vol. III 1326-1327), but to the political
organ established precisely to check possible abuses in the exercise of the appointing power the Commission on
Appointments.
Indeed, I can hardly conceive of any question more patently and characteristically political than this one, or more
appropriate for determination of said body. Neither the possible or probable control thereof by members of the
Nacionalista Party nor the number of offices or appointments involved can affect the nature of the issue. Surely, its
political character is the same whichever political party may have the largest number of votes in the Commission on
Appointments. The big number of said appointments merely tend to make more manifest the political complexion thereof
and its non-justifiable nature.
10. In Osmea vs. Pendatum (L-17144, October 28, 1960), we refused to disturb the action of the House of
Representatives in suspending a member thereof who had made derogatory imputations against the President of the
Philippines upon the ground that such imputations constituted a breach of the courtesy due to a coordinate branch of

the Government. Yet, in the present case, imputations similarly derogatory to the same branch of the Government are, in
effect, made in the majority resolution.
I cannot see how such imputations can be reconciled with the position taken by this Court in the Osmea case and in other
cases (Barcelona vs. Baker, 5 Phil., 87; Severino vs. Governor-General, 16 Phil., 366; Abueva vs. Wood, 45 Phil., 612;
Alejandrino vs. Quezon, 46 Phil., 85; Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil., 1; Cabili vs. Francisco, L-4638, May 8, 1951) in
which it "fastidiously observed" the theory of separation of powers (Osmea vs. Pendatum, supra). Thus, in Santos vs.
Yatco (55 Off. Gaz. 8641), in which a department head was sought to be enjoined from electioneering, in view of the
explicit provision of the Civil Service Act of 1959 (Republic Act No. 2260, section 29), prohibiting all officers and
employees in the civil service, "whether in the competitive or classified, or non-competitive or unclassified service," from
engaging directly or indirectly in partisan political activities or taking part in any election except to vote, we held that the
issue therein raised was one of "impropriety as distinguished from illegality," and that, as such, it "is not justiciable by this
Court." In Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito (78 Phil., 1), we refused to decide, upon the same ground, whether specified numbers
of votes constituted three-fourths of all members of each House of Congress. In Vera vs. Avelino (77 Phil., 192), we not
only declared that "the judiciary is not the repository of remedies for all political or social evils," but, also, quoted with
approval the statement, made in Alejandrino vs. Quezon (46 Phil., 81), to the effect that "the judicial department has no
power to revise even the most arbitrary and unfair action of the legislative department, or of either House thereof, taken in
pursuance of the power committed exclusively to that department by the Constitution." (Emphasis ours.) .
11. In the present case, we have completely reversed our stand on the principle of separation of powers. We have inquired
into the motives of the Executive department in making the appointments in question, although it is well settled, under the
aforementioned principle, that: .
Generally courts cannot inquire into the motive, policy, wisdom, or expediency of legislation.
The justice, wisdom, policy, necessity, or expediency, of a law which is within its powers are for the legislature, and are
not open to inquiry by the courts, except as an aid to proper interpretation." (16 C.J.S. 471-478) .
If this is true as regards the legislative branch of the government, I can see no valid reason, and none has been pointed out,
why the same norm should not govern our relations, with the executive department. However, we have not merely
disregarded such norm. We are, also, in effect, restraining the Commission on Appointments an organ of a coordinate,
co-equal branch of the Government from acting on the questioned appointments. What is more, we are virtually
assuming in advance that said body which has not been organized as yet and whose membership is still undetermined
will not act in harmony with the spirit of our Constitution.
12. It is trite to say that certain moral and political aspects of the issue before us cannot but produce a strong aversion
towards the case of petitioner herein and the hundreds of others appointed under the same conditions as he was. Although
members of the bench must always endeavor to minimize the influence of emotional factors tending to affect the
objectivity essential to a fair and impartial appraisal of the issues submitted for their determination, it is only natural
and, I venture to add, fortunate (for, otherwise, how could they hope to do justice to their fellowmen?) that they should
basically react as other members of the human family. This is probably the reason why Justice Douglas of the Federal
Supreme Court of the U.S., said, in Abel v. U.S. (4 Lawyers Edition, 2d, 668, 688) :
"Cases of notorious criminals like cases of small, miserable ones are apt to make bad law. When guilt
permeates a record, even judges sometimes relax and let the police take shortcuts not sanctioned by constitutional
procedures. .... The harm in the given case may seem excusable. But the practices generated by the precedent have
far-reaching consequences that are harmful and injurious beyond measurement.".
Let us hope that no such consequences will flow from the precedent established in this case.
BARRERA, J., dissenting:
The instant case started with a simple petition for prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction instituted by
petitioner Aytona who claims to have been duly appointed ad interim Governor of the Central Bank, against respondent
Castillo who, allegedly accompanied by his correspondent Colonel Gutierrez and a host of heavily armed Philippine

Constabulary Rangers, interfered with and prevented the petitioner in the discharge of his duties and prerogatives as such
Governor of the Central Bank. During the hearing, however, and immediately thereafter, a great amount of extraneous
matter affecting persons not parties to the proceedings has been introduced into the case and a veritable avalanche of
memoranda after memoranda and manifestations after manifestations swelled the records and helped involve the issues.
One among the dozens who asked to be admitted as amici curiae, even presented an answer in behalf of the people to
support the side of the respondents. Unfortunately, in the confusion, the case of the immediate parties became obscured by
considerations of circumstances and matters for and with which petitioner and respondents are not directly connected..
In my opinion, the fundamental questions which this Court is called upon to resolve in the present case a specifically: .
(1) Is the ad interim, appointment of petitioner Aytona valid when extended? .
(2) If so, did it automatically lapse with the ending the term of office of the twelve Congressmen composing onehalf of the membership of the Commission Appointments? .
(3) May this appointment be legally recalled or withdrawal after Aytona has qualified? .
Before entering into the discussion of the "propriety, morality and wisdom" of the appointment, it is necessary, I believe,
that the foregoing legal propositions must first be cleared out.
I. The Validity of Aytona's Appointment: .
Aytona's ad interim appointment is assailed on the theory that it was not made during a "recess" of Congress as provided
in paragraph 4, section 10 of Article VII of the Constitution. It is claimed for the respondents dents that the word "recess"
means "the intermission between sittings of the same body at its regular or adjourned session, and not to the interval
between the final adjournment of one body and the convening of another at the next regular session. When applied to a
legislative body, it means a temporary dismissal, and not adjournment sine die." In support of this view, counsel cites the
case of Tipton v. Parker, 71 Ark. 193, from which the foregoing quotation was taken.
An examination of this case, however, discloses that it did not refer to the power of the President to make ad
interim appointments. The pronouncement was made in connection with the interpretation of Section 17, Article 5 of the
Constitution of the State of Arkansas. The case involved the validity of the certificate of the auditor with reference to the
legality of the expenses of a committee of the State Senate authorized by the latter to make certain investigations beyond
the duration of the session of the General Assembly. The court, in declaring the certificate without sanction of law,
stated: .
"The Senate has no power by resolution of its own to extend its session, and neither did it have power to such
separate resolution to continue its committee, a mere agency of the body, beyond the term of the body itself which
created it." .
in view of the provisions of the aforementioned Section 17, Article 5 of the state Constitution prescribing "that the regular
biennial session of the Legislature shall not exceed 60 days, unless by 2/3 vote of the members elected to each house, and
section 23 requiring a vote of the majority of each house to enact a law or pass a resolution having the force and effect of
a law". Apparently an opinion of Judge Cooley seemingly to the contrary was cited to refute this view of the court, and so
the decision went on to say:
Each house, says Judge Cooley, must also be allowed to proceed in its own way in the collection of such
information may seem important to a proper discharge of its functions; and whenever it is deemed desirable that
witnesses should be examined, the power and the authority to do so is very properly referred to a committee, with
any such powers short of final legislative or judicial action as may seem necessary or expedient in the particular
case. Such a committee has no authority to sit during a recess of the housewhich has appointed it, without its
permission to that effect. But the house is at liberty to confer such authority if it sees fit.
It is in this connection and evidently in a desire to explain the opinion of Judge Cooley that the court made the
pronouncement relied upon by respondents, thus: .

.... The recess here referred to by Judge Cooley we think should be construed to mean only the intermission
between sittings of the same body at its regular or adjourned session, and not to the interval between the final
adjournment of one body and the convening of another at the next regular session. When applied to a legislative
body, it means a temporary dismissal and not an adjournment sine die.
The conclusion reached by the court can not be otherwise. The case refers to the powers of one house of the state
Legislature, with the concurrence of the other, to confer authority upon its own committee to act beyond the duration of
the session of the General Assembly. Certainly, Judge Cooley's view that each house has power to confer authority to its
committee to act during a recess must be understood to exist only during the life of the house creating the committee. It
can not go beyond its own existence, that is, beyond its adjournment sine die.
But this ruling is no argument that the Executive's power to make appointments during such adjournment sine diedoes not
exist just because a house of the legislature lacks power to authorize its committee to act during the same adjournment.
One refers to the power of a defunct body to act beyond its life; the other refers to the power of another authority, the
executive, to perform its functions after the expiration of that other body. Non-existence of the first does not mean nonexistence of the other.
It is to be noted that the different counsel advocating the cause of the respondents are not even agreed in the application of
their interpretation of the word "recess". Some of them argue that the interregnum which they contend is not recess,
compromises the entire period between the adjournment of the 4th Congress in May, 1961 and the opening of the 1st
session of the first session of the 5th Congress on January 22, 1962, so that all ad interim appointments extended during
this period are null and void. Others claim that such interregnum is that period between December 13, 1961, date of
adjournment of the last session of the 4th Congress, and January 22, 1962. It seems that President Macapagal is of this
same view because his administrative Order No. 2 specifically refers to all appointments made after December 13, 1961.
Still others, at least one, advanced the theory during the oral argument that the banned period is that between the
adjournment of the 4th Congress in May, and December 30, 1961, excluding therefrom the period between this last date
and January 22, 1962. Obviously, this theory was advanced in an effort to lend validity to the appointments recently made
by President Macapagal, for if the entire period between May or December, 1961 to January 22, 1962 is held not a recess,
but an adjournment sine die, then all appointments heretofore made by the present Chief Executive would suffer the same
defect as those extended by former President Garcia. This last argument is unavailing because it, likewise, is untenable,
tested upon the same authority cited by counsel, i.e., that the term "recess" means "the intermission between sittings of
the same body." Since the 5th Congress has not as yet even convened, the period between December 30 and January 22
can not be a recess of the 5th Congress because it, definitely, is not an intermission between sittingsof the same body.
In the circumstances, it seems it is an over-statement to say that the term "recess has a definite legal meaning in the sense
attributed to it in the Tipton vs. Parker case. The confusion in the minds of the several counsels for the respondents as to
the application of the alleged meaning of the term, indicates a belabored effort on their part to impute a meaning to satisfy
their case. Upon the other hand, we find in "Hinds Precedents of the House of Representatives" (Vol. 5, pp. 852-853), a
legislative interpretation by the United States Senate made during the discussion of the term "recess of the Senate" in
connection with the President's1 power to make appointments, as follows: .
The word 'recess' is one of ordinary, not technical, signification, and it is evidently used in the constitutional
provision in its common and popular sense. It means in Article II, above referred to, precisely what it means in
Article III, in which it is again used. Conferring power upon the executive of a State to make temporary
appointment of a Senator, it says: .
And if vacancies happen, by resignation or otherwise, during the recess of the legislature of any State, the
executive thereof may make temporary appointments until the next meeting of the legislature, which shall then fill
such vacancies.' .
It means just what was meant by it in the Article of Confederation, in which it is found in the following
provision": .
The United States in Congress assembled shall have authority to appoint a committee to sit in the recess of
Congress, it be denominated a committee of the States, and to consist of one delegate from each State.' .

It was evidently intended by the framers of the Constitution that it should mean something real, not something
imaginary; something actual, not something fictitious. They used the word as the mass of mankind then
understood it and now understand it. It means, in our judgment, in this connection the period of time when the
Senate is not sitting in regular or extraordinary session as a branch of the Congress, or in extraordinary session for
the discharge of executive functions; when its members owe no duty of attendance; when its Chamber is empty;
when, because of its absence, it cannot receive communications from the President or participate as body in
making appointments." .
The Attorney General of the United States was also of this view when he stated: .
The recess of the Senate during which the President shall have power to fill a vacancy that may happen, means the
period after the final adjournment of Congress for the session and before the next session begins; while an
adjournment during a session of Congress means a merely temporary suspension of business from day to day, or
for such brief periods of time as are agreed upon by the joint action of the two houses. The President is not
authorized to appoint an officer during the current holiday adjournment of the Senate, which will have the effect
of an appointment made in the recess occurring between two sessions of the Senate." (President - Appointment
Officers - Holiday Recess, 1901, 23 Op. Atty. Gen. 599, (U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 2, Sec. 2[2]..
It is worthwhile to note that our Constitution in paragraph 4, Section 10 of Article VII speaks of "recess" without making
any distribution between the sessions one congress and the sessions of another. And it is trite to say that when the law
makes no distinction, no distinction should be made, especially if to do so would result in a strained interpretation thereof
and defeat the evident purpose of the framers of the Constitution - in this instance, to render it certain that at times there
should be, whether the Congress is in session or not, an officer for every office, entitled to discharge the duties thereof. (5
Hinds, op. cit., p. 853.) .
II. Lapsing of Aytona's Appointment: .
It is contended for the respondents that since 12 members of the Commission on Appointments ceased to be such upon the
expiration of their term of office at midnight of December 29, 1961, the Commission on Appointments likewise ceased to
exist on the theory that creation can not exist beyond the life of its creator at least with respect to one-half of its members.
This seems to stem from the wrong notion that the Commission on Appointments is a creature of the Congress. This
confuses the Commission on Appointments as a constitutional body with its members. The body continued to exist, but
only its membership changes periodically. When the Constitution provides in Section 13 of Article 6 thereof that "the
Electoral Tribunals and the Commission on Appointments shall be constituted within 30 days after the Senate and the
House of Representatives shall have been organized with the election of their President and Speaker, respectively", it did
not mean that the Senate and the House of Representatives thereby create said bodies, no more than the President can be
said to create the Supreme Court by appointing the Justices therein. It simply ordained that the Commission be constituted
or organized by electing the members thereof, whose positions have already been created in virtue of Section 12 of the
same Constitution. To hold the Electoral Tribunals and the Commission on Appointments are non-existing during the
period from December 30, 1961 to January 22, 1962 (and during the corresponding period every four years thereafter)
will result in an absurdity and a situation destructive of the normal processes provided in the Constitution. One of such
absurd results would be that no electoral protest against any elected and proclaimed congressman or senator can be legally
filed with the Electoral Tribunals within the period prescribe by their rules, that is, within fifteen days following the
proclamation of the results of the election, which period falls within the time when the Electoral Tribunals (as is the case
of Commission on Appointments) are allegedly non-existent.
The proceedings in the Constitutional Convention are cited to support the theory that the Commission on Appointments is
not a permanent commission. A review of the records, however, of that convention reveals that what was intended in the
proposed draft was to authorize the Commission on Appointments to hold sessions even when the Congress is not in
session. The mere fact that such a proposal was defeated and, consequently, the word "permanent" was not adopted in the
final text, does not import that the Constitution meant to give an off and on existence to the Commission on Appointments
lapsing every four years when the twelve of its members cease to be such. On the contrary, it seems more logical to hold
that the legal existence of the Commission as well as the Electoral Tribunals continue irrespective of the vacancies that
may exist in the membership thereof. It is for this reason that the personnel of these bodies do not cease periodically, but
continue to perform their duties in their respective offices for which they are legally paid their salaries by the government.
It seems clear, therefore, that the Commission on Appointments did not lapse on December 29, 1961. Neither did the

appointment of Aytona lapse on that date because the same could not be acted upon by the Commission on Appointments
during the recess of the Congress.
III. May the appointment of Aytona be legally recalled or withdrawn after he has qualified for the position to which he
was appointed? .
Precedents are to the effect that when once an appointment has been extended by the Chief Executive who, as is provided
in our Constitution, has the sole power of appointment subject only to the consent of the Commission on Appointments,
and the appointee has accepted the appointment, the same becomes complete and the appointing power can not withdraw
it except in cases where the tenure of the appointee is at the Chief Executive's pleasure or upon grounds justifying removal
and after due process. This is not because the appointment constitutes a contract (for truly a public office can not be
subject of any contract), but because of the provisions of the Constitution itself to the effect that "no officer or employee
in the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law." If, therefore, the recall or the
withdrawal of the appointment of Aytona was not authorized by law, then his assumption of the functions of his office on
January 2, 1962 was clearly within his legal right and the interference of Castillo, aggravated by the assistance or at least
the presence of members of the Armed Forces, was clearly unlawful.
The foregoing disposes, in my opinion, the legal issue and the rights of the parties in the present case. But against these, to
me, clear mandates of the Constitution and the legal and judicial precedents, respondents have appealed to this Court for it
to exercise "judicial statesmanship" invoking the spirit of the Constitution. It is claimed that there was a manifest abuse of
power by the outgoing President in extending, on the eve of the expiration of his term, some three hundred and fifty ad
interim appointments to fill an equal number of vacancies in the different branches of the government; that no proper
consideration was given of the merits of the appointees, it appearing that in the case of at least some of the appointees to
the judiciary, their assurance of an immediate assumption of office or the taking of oath was made a condition precedent
to the appointments, and that there was a wild scramble in Malacaan among the appointees on the night of December 29.
We are scandalized by this and expect the Court to apply the remedy. What of the proceedings in Congress during the last
day of session when bills after bills are passed in a manner not too dissimilar to the described scene in Malacaan? Can
the Supreme Court be expected to correct this too by declaring all such laws as invalid just as we are asked to invalidate
these appointments? .
Be this as it may, whatever may be our personal views on this matter, I agree with Mr. Justice Concepcion that not all
wrongs or even abuse of power can be corrected by the exercise of the high prerogatives of the Supreme Court vested in it
by the Constitution. As I take it, the higher and more delicate is the prerogative, the greater should be the degree of selfrestraint in the exercise thereof, lest the fine and tested scale of checks and balances set up by the Constitution be jarred.
In the same manner that we expect circumspection and care, even double care, on the part of the other two co-equal
coordinate departments of the government, so must we be most cautious and slow in judging the morality, propriety and
good faith involved in the actuations of the other departments in matters coming within their competence. The remedy, I
believe, under the circumstances is with the Commission on Appointments to which the appointments have been
submitted. The more fact that it is expected that the Commission on Appointments would be controlled by the party of the
outgoing President is immaterial, because legal processes can not be made to depend upon the fortunes of political parties,
for there is still the ultimate remedy by the people in all authority. At any rate, as has already been aptly said: the judiciary
is not the repository of remedies for all political or social evils, and that the judicial department has no power to revise
even arbitrary or unfair action of the other departments taken in pursuance of the power committed exclusively to those
departments by the Constitution..
May I add: all the scandalous circumstances brought to the attention of this Court did not link the petitioner herein, save
for the fact that this appointment was extended on the same day as those issued under the unusual and irregular
circumstances attending the other appointments. If at all, there is evidence in favor of Aytona to the effect that insofar as
he is concerned, his appointment to the position of Governor of the Central Bank has been under consideration for a long
time and that he is qualified for the position. It can not, therefore be said that with respect to him there was no mature
deliberation and due consideration of his qualifications and of the need of the service. he charge was made that the
position of Governor of the Central Bank has been vacant for several months and that the President should have filled it
earlier. Yet, when the President actually filled it as he did, he is criticized claiming that there was no immediate need for
such action in view of the fact that there was an Acting Governor. That it was really necessary to fill the position is
evidenced by the act of President Macapagal himself in making his own appointment hardly twenty-four hours after he
recalled the appointment of Aytona.

Summarizing, I would say that all the circumstances cited by the respondents that have surrounded the issuance of the
appointments in question, have to do with the mode or manner of the exercise of the authority to make the appointment,
quite apart from the existence of the authority itself. The observance of good faith, morality and propriety by the other two
co-equal coordinate departments in the performance of their functions must be secured by their sense of duty and official
oath hand not by any supervisory power of the courts..
The role of courts in our scheme of government is to interpret the law and render justice under it. This simply means that
whatever may be our own personal feelings as to the propriety, morality, or wisdom of any official act or actuation of a
public officer or any agency of the government within their respective competence brought to the attention of the Court
for adjudication, they should not be permitted to prevail over clear legal considerations, for ours is a regime under the
Rule of Law..
In view of the foregoing, I am constrained to register my dissent.

G.R. No. L-39110

November 28, 1933

ANTONIA L. DE JESUS, ET AL., plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
CESAR SYQUIA, defendant-appellant.
Jose Sotelo for plaintiffs-appellants.
Vicente J. Francisco for defendant-appellant.

STREET, J.:
This action was instituted in the Court of First Instance of Manila by Antonia Loanco de Jesus in her own right and by her
mother, Pilar Marquez, as next friend and representative of Ismael and Pacita Loanco, infants, children of the first-named
plaintiff, for the purpose of recovering from the defendant, Cesar Syquia, the sum of thirty thousand pesos as damages
resulting to the first-named plaintiff from breach of a marriage promise, to compel the defendant to recognize Ismael and
Pacita as natural children begotten by him with Antonia, and to pay for the maintenance of the three the amount of five
hundred pesos per month, together with costs. Upon hearing the cause, after answer of the defendant, the trial court erred

a decree requiring the defendant to recognize Ismael Loanco as his natural child and to pay maintenance for him at the
rate of fifty pesos per month, with costs, dismissing the action in other respects. From this judgment both parties appealed,
the plaintiffs from so much of the decision as denied part of the relief sought by them, and the defendant from that feature
of the decision which required him to recognize Ismael Loanco and to pay for his maintenance.
At the time with which we are here concerned, the defendant, Cesar Syquia was of the age of twenty-three years, and an
unmarried scion of the prominent family in Manila, being possessed of a considerable property in his own right. His
brother-in-law, Vicente Mendoza is the owner of a barber shop in Tondo, where the defendant was accustomed to go for
tonsorial attention. In the month of June Antonia Loanco, a likely unmarried girl of the age of twenty years, was taken on
as cashier in this barber shop. Syquia was not long in making her acquaintance and amorous relations resulted, as a
consequence of which Antonia was gotten with child and a baby boy was born on June 17, 1931. The defendant was a
constant visitor at the home of Antonia in the early months of her pregnancy, and in February, 1931, he wrote and placed
in her hands a note directed to the padre who has expected to christen the baby. This note was as follows:
Saturday, 1:30 p. m.
February 14, 1931
Rev. FATHER,
The baby due in June is mine and I should like for my name to be given to it.
CESAR SYQUIA
The occasion for writing this note was that the defendant was on the eve of his departure on a trip to China and Japan; and
while he was abroad on this visit he wrote several letters to Antonia showing a paternal interest in the situation that had
developed with her, and cautioning her to keep in good condition in order that "junior" (meaning the baby to be, "Syquia,
Jr.") might be strong, and promising to return to them soon. The baby arrived at the time expected, and all necessary
anticipatory preparations were made by the defendant. To this he employed his friend Dr. Crescenciano Talavera to attend
at the birth, and made arrangements for the hospitalization of the mother in Saint Joseph's Hospital of the City of Manila,
where she was cared for during confinement.
When Antonio was able to leave the hospital, Syquia took her, with her mother and the baby, to a house at No. 551
Camarines Street, Manila, where they lived together for about a year in regular family style, all household expenses,
including gas and electric light, being defrayed by Syquia. In course of time, however, the defendant's ardor abated and,
when Antonia began to show signs of a second pregnancy the defendant decamped, and he is now married to another
woman. A point that should here be noted is that when the time came for christening the child, the defendant, who had
charge of the arrangement for this ceremony, caused the name Ismael Loanco to be given to him, instead of Cesar Syquia,
Jr., as was at first planned.
The first question that is presented in the case is whether the note to the padre, quoted above, in connection with the
letters written by the defendant to the mother during pregnancy, proves an acknowledgment of paternity, within the
meaning of subsection 1 of article 135 of the Civil Code. Upon this point we have no hesitancy in holding that the
acknowledgment thus shown is sufficient. It is a universal rule of jurisprudence that a child, upon being conceived,
becomes a bearer of legal rights and capable of being dealt with as a living person. The fact that it is yet unborn is no
impediment to the acquisition of rights. The problem here presented of the recognition of unborn child is really not
different from that presented in the ordinary case of the recognition of a child already born and bearing a specific name.
Only the means and resources of identification are different. Even a bequest to a living child requires oral evidence to
connect the particular individual intended with the name used.

It is contended however, in the present case that the words of description used in the writings before us are not legally
sufficient to indemnify the child now suing as Ismael Loanco. This contention is not, in our opinion, well founded. The
words of recognition contained in the note to the padre are not capable of two constructions. They refer to a baby then
conceived which was expected to be born in June and which would thereafter be presented for christening. The baby
came, and though it was in the end given the name of Ismael Loanco instead of Cesar Syquia, Jr., its identity as the child
which the defendant intended to acknowledge is clear. Any doubt that might arise on this point is removed by the letters
Exhibit F, G, H, and J. In these letters the defendant makes repeated reference to junior as the baby which Antonia, to
whom the letters were addressed, was then carrying in her womb, and the writer urged Antonia to eat with good appetite
in order that junior might be vigorous. In the last letter (Exhibit J) written only a few days before the birth of the child, the
defendant urged her to take good care of herself and of junior also.
It seems to us that the only legal question that can here arise as to the sufficiency of acknowledgment is whether the
acknowledgment contemplated in subsection 1 of article 135 of the Civil Code must be made in a single document or may
be made in more than one document, of indubitable authenticity, written by the recognizing father. Upon this point we are
of the opinion that the recognition can be made out by putting together the admissions of more than one document,
supplementing the admission made in one letter by an admission or admissions made in another. In the case before us the
admission of paternity is contained in the note to the padreand the other letters suffice to connect that admission with the
child then being carried by Antonia L. de Jesus. There is no requirement in the law that the writing shall be addressed
to one, or any particular individual. It is merely required that the writing shall be indubitable.
The second question that presents itself in this case is whether the trial court erred in holding that Ismael Loanco had been
in the uninterrupted possession of the status of a natural child, justified by the conduct of the father himself, and that as a
consequence, the defendant in this case should be compelled to acknowledge the said Ismael Loanco, under No. 2 of
article 135 of the Civil Code. The facts already stated are sufficient, in our opinion, to justify the conclusion of the trial
court on this point, and we may add here that our conclusion upon the first branch of the case that the defendant had
acknowledged this child in writings above referred to must be taken in connection with the facts found by the court upon
the second point. It is undeniable that from the birth of this child the defendant supplied a home for it and the mother, in
which they lived together with the defendant. This situation continued for about a year, and until Antonia
became enciente a second time, when the idea entered the defendant's head of abandoning her. The law fixes no period
during which a child must be in the continuous possession of the status of a natural child; and the period in this case was
long enough to evince the father's resolution to concede the status. The circumstance that he abandoned the mother and
child shortly before this action was started is unimportant. The word "continuous" in subsection 2 of article 135 of the
Civil Code does not mean that the concession of status shall continue forever, but only that it shall not be of an
intermittent character while it continues.
What has been said disposes of the principal feature of the defendant's appeal. With respect to the appeal of the plaintiffs,
we are of the opinion that the trial court was right in refusing to give damages to the plaintiff, Antonia Loanco, for
supposed breach of promise to marry. Such promise is not satisfactorily proved, and we may add that the action for breach
of promise to marry has no standing in the civil law, apart from the right to recover money or property advanced by the
plaintiff upon the faith of such promise. This case exhibits none of the features necessary to maintain such an action.
Furthermore, there is no proof upon which a judgment could be based requiring the defendant to recognize the second
baby, Pacita Loanco.
Finally, we see no necessity or propriety in modifying the judgment as to the amount of the maintenance which the trial
court allowed to Ismael Loanco. And in this connection we merely point out that, as conditions change, the Court of First
Instance will have jurisdiction to modify the order as to the amount of the pension as circumstances will require.
The judgment appealed from is in all respects affirmed, without costs. So ordered.

Malcolm, Abad Santos, Hull, Vickers, and butte, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

VILLA-REAL, J., dissenting:

The majority opinion is predicated on two grounds: First, that the defendant-appellant Cesar Syquia has expressly
acknowledged his paternity of the child Ismael Loanco in an indubitable writing of his; and secondly, that said child has
enjoyed the uninterrupted possession of the status of a natural son of said defendant-appellant Cesar Syquia, justified by
his acts, as required by article 135 of the Civil Code.
The first conclusion is drawn from Exhibits C, F, G, H, and J.
Exhibit C, which is in the handwriting of any signed by the defendant-appellant Cesar Syquia, reads as follows:
Sabado, 1.30 p. m. 14 febrero, 1931
Rev. PADRE:
La criatura que vendra el junio es mio y que yo quisiera mi nombre que se de a la criatura.
(Fdo.) CESAR SYQUIA
Exhibit F, G, H, and j, which are letters written by the said defendant-appellant Cesar Syquia to plaintiff-appellee Antonia
L. de Jesus prior to the birth of the child contain the following expressions:
Exhibit F, Feb. 18, 1931: "No hagas nada malo; ni manches mi nombre y el de junior tambien no lo manches. A cuerdate
muy bien Toni que es por ti y por junior volvere alli pronto. ..."
Exhibit G. Feb. 24, 1931: "Toni por favor cuida bien a junior eh? . ..."
Exhibit H, March 25, 1931: "Toni, cuida tu bien a junior y cuidate bien, y come tu mucho. ... ."
Exhibit J, June 1, 1931: "Cuidate bien y junior tambien . ..."
Article 135, number 1, provides as follows:
ART. 135. The father may be compelled to acknowledge his natural child in the following cases:
1. When an indisputable paper written by him, expressly acknowledging his paternity, is in existence.
Maresa (Codigo Civil, Vol. 1, page 596, 4th ed.) commenting on said article, says:
Con arreglo al articulo que comentamos, no puede haber cuestion acerca de si es posible admitir por otro medio la
prueba de la paternidad natural. Entendemos que no, porquel el articulo es terminante y la intencion de la ley mas
terminante aun. Se establecio en la base 5.a que "no se admitira investigacion de la paternidad sino en los casos de

delito, o cuando exista escrito del padre en el que conste su voluntad indubitada de reconocer por suyo al hijo,
deliberadamente expresada con ese fin, o cuando medie posesion de estado", y esto mismo es lo que se ordena en
el presente articulo.
No puede, pues, prosperar la demanda para obligar al padre al reconocimiento de un hijo natural, aunque solo se
limite a pedir alimentos, si no se funda en el reconocimiento expreso del padre hecho por escrito, en la posesion
constante de estado de hijo natural o en sentencia firme recaida en causa por de delito violacin, estupro o rapto. El
escrito y la sentencia habran de acompaarse a la demandada, y no puede admitirse otra prueba que la conducente
a justificar que el escrito es indubitadamente del padre que en el reconozca su paternidad, o la relativa a los actos
directos del mismo padre o de su familia, que demuestren la posesion continua de dicho estado. Para la prueba de
estos dos hechos podran utilizarse todos los medios que permite la Ley de Enjuiciamiento Civil, debiendo el juez
rechazar la que por cualquier otro concepto se dirija a la investigacion de la paternidad.
xxx

xxx

xxx

En cuanto al otro requisito de ser expreso el reconocimiento, tengase presente que no basta hacerlo por incidencia;
es indespensable que se consigne en el escrito la voluntad indubitada, clara y terminante del padre, de reconocer
por suyo al hijo, deliberadamente expresada con este fin, como se ordena an la base 5.a antes citada, de las
aprobadas por la Ley de 11 de mayo de 1888; de suerte que el escrito, aunque contenga otros particulares, como
sucede en los testamentos, ha de tener por objecto el reconocimiento deliberado y expreso del hijo natural. No
llena, pues, ese objecto la manifestacion que incidentalmente haga el padre de ser hijo natural suyo la persona a
quien se refiera, y mucho menos el dar a una persona el titulo y tratamiento de hijo en cartas familiares. Sin
embrago, en cada caso decidiran los un modo suficientemente expresivo la paternidad, servira de base para
acreditar, en union con otros datos, la posesion contante del estado del hijo a los efectos de este articulo, y con
arreglo a su numero 2.
Let it first be noted that the law prohibits the investigation of paternity (Borres and Barza vs. Municipality of Panay, 42
Phil., 643; Donado vs. Menendez Donado, 55 Phil., 861). The only exceptions to this rule are those established in article
135 of the Civil Code quoted above, the first of which is that the father may be compelled to acknowledge his paternity,
"When an indubitable writing of his exists in which he expressly acknowledge his paternity." The writing that is required
by said provision must be complete in itself and by itself, and must contain all the statements that are necessary to
constitute a full and clear acknowledgment by a father of his paternity of a child, in order that it may serve as a basis for
compelling him to acknowledge said child should be afterwards deny his paternity. If several writings put together, each
not being complete in itself, should be necessary in order to obtain a full and complete expression of acknowledgment by
a father of his paternity of a child, the general prohibition to investigate paternity would be violated.
By the mere reading of all said letters, the one addressed to a priest and the others to the herein plaintiff-appellee, Antonia
L. de Jesus, the reader cannot ascertain which is the "creature that is coming on June", which the defendant- appellant,
Cesar Syquia, says in the said letter addressed to the priest is his, nor who is the "junior" that he recommends to said
Antonia L. de Jesus to take good care of, as there is nothing in anyone of said letters from which it may be inferred that
Antonia L. de Jesus was enciente at the time, that the "junior" was the being she was carrying in her womb, and that it was
the "creature that is coming in June." To connect all these facts it was necessary to prove that Cesar Syquia had had illicit
relations with Antonia L. de Jesus, that as a result of such relations the woman became pregnant, and that she gave birth to
a boy in June 1931. All this certainly constitutes an investigation of the paternity of Cesar Syquia of said child outside of
the documents, which is prohibited by law.
Either taken alone therefore, or in connection with Exhibits F, G, H, and J, Exhibit C is insufficient to constitute a
"indubitable writing of Cesar Syquia, in which he expressly acknowledges his paternity of the child Ismael Loanco," as
required by number 1 of article 135 of the Civil Code.

As to the second ground of the decision of the majority, number 2 of article 135 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 135. The father may be compelled to acknowledge his natural child in the following cases:
xxx

xxx

xxx

2. When the child has been in the uninterrupted possession of the status of a natural child of the defendant father,
justified by the conduct of the father himself or that of his family.
The majority decision bases its connection on the second point on Exhibits C, F, G, H, and J and the following facts, as
found by the lower court in its decision:
Cuando la demandante Antonia L. de Jesus estaba para dar a luz, el demandado Cesar Syquia llamo a su
comprovinciano Dr. Crescenciano Talavera, medico que entonces ejercia su profesion en la Ciudad de Manila,
para que asistiera a aquella en su parto y a ese efecto llevo a la demandante Antonia L. de Jesus acompaado del
Dr. Talavera al Hospital San Jose, de esta Ciudad, donde ella dio a luz el 17 de junio de 1931 asistida por dicho
Dr. Talavera, que firmo el certificado de necimiento Exhibit E.
Despues del nacimiento del demandante Ismael Loanco, el demandado estuvo viviendo con este y con la
demandante Antonio L. de Jesus en la casa No. 551 de la Calle Camarines, Manila, entregando a dicha
demandante el dinero para los gastos de casa y el pago del consumo de gas y luz electrica, habiendo firmado el
contrato para el suministro del fluido electrico en dicha casa.
Exhibit, C, F, G, H, and J, are inadmissible in evidence the purpose of showing that Ismael Loanco has enjoyed the
continuous possession of the status of a natural child, because being of prior date to the birth of said child they can not be
considered as direct acts of Cesar Syquia showing possession of the status of natural child, as no human being can enjoy
such possession until he be born with legal capacity for acquiring civil rights (Infante vs. Figueras, 4 Phil., 738;
Granados vs. Leynes, G.R. No. 31224, promulgated September 9, 1929, not reported).
It must also be stated that Cesar Syquia refused to allow his name to be given to the child Ismael when it was baptized, so
that the name of its mother, Loanco, had to be given to it.
The facts which were found by the court below to have been proved by the testimony of the witnesses during the trial, are
not sufficient to constitute the uninterrupted possession of the status of Ismael Loanco as natural child of said Cesar
Syquia, in the light of the following authorities:
In the case of Buenaventura vs. Urbano (5 Phil., 1, 9), this court said:
. . . Confining ourselves to the acts proved to have been performed by Don Telesforo, we find that he visited the
mother of the plaintiff; that he paid money for her support; that he paid money for the support of the plaintiff; that
he hold one witness that the plaintiff was his son; that the plaintiff called him "Papa," and that Don Telesforo
answered to this designation; that when the plaintiff visited Don Telesforo he kissed his hand; that Don Telesforo
wrote letters to him; that he paid his fees for instruction in school, and secured him a position in a commercial
house.
xxx

xxx

xxx

All these facts taken together are not sufficient to show that plaintiff possesses continuously the status of a natural
child. They may have a tendency to show that Don Telesforo was the father of the child, but that it is not
sufficient. It is not sufficient that the father recognize the child as his. By the express terms of article 135 that

recognition must appear either in writing, made by the father, or it must appear in acts which show that the son
has possessed continuously the status of a natural child. No recognition by the father of the child which comes
short of the requirements of these two paragraphs is sufficient. It must appear that it was the intention of the father
to recognize the child as to give him that status, and that the acts performed by him were done with that intention.
Manresa (Codigo Civil, Vol. 1, page 602, 4th ed.) in citing some decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain says:
En la sentencia de 5 de junio de 1906 declarase que para justificar la posesion de estado de hijo natural se requiere
que los actos sean de tal naturaleza que revelen, a la vez que el convencimiento de la paternidad, la voluntad
ostensible de tener y tratar al hijo como tal en las relaciones sociales y de la vida, y esto no accidentalmente, sino
continuedamente, porque en tal supuesto los actos tiene el mismo valor que el reconocimiento expreso.lawphil.net
En el mismo criterio restrictivo se inspira la de 12 de octubre de 1907, que estima que el hecho de que dos
nodrizas criaron a otros tantos nios, sufragando el gasto el demandado, quien ademas iba a casa de la
demandante, los besada, los llamaba hijos y encargaba para los mismos el mayor cuidado; el de que subvenia a las
necesidades de la madre y de los seis hijos que la nacieron, el primero de los cuales se llamaba como el padre; y el
de que los porteros de la casa donde vivio la actora sabian que el finado visitaba a esta, se lamentaba de la mucha
familia que tenia y era tenido en el concepto publico como padre de los menores, no son suficientes para fundar la
declaracion de paternidad, pues no es legal confundir actos que puedan revelar mas o menos la presuncion o
convencimiento en que una persona este de su paternidad con relacion a hijos naturales, con los que demuestren
su proposito de poner a estos hijos en la posesion de tal estado.
It will thus be seen from the foregoing discussion and authorities that the herein defendant-appellant Cesar Syquia cannot
be compelled to acknowledge the child Ismael Loanco as his natural son because there exists not an indubitable writing of
his in which he expressly acknowledges his paternity of said child, and because the said child has not enjoyed the
uninterrupted possession of the status of a natural child of the said
defendant-appellant, justified by his own conduct or that of his family, as required by article 135 of the Civil Code.
The decision appealed from should, therefore, be reversed and the complaint dismissed.

G.R. No. L-18630

December 17, 1966

APOLONIO TANJANCO, petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ARACELI SANTOS, respondents.
P. Carreon and G. O. Veneracion, Jr. for petitioner.
Antonio V. Bonoan for respondents.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeals (in its Case No. 27210-R) revoking an order of the Court of First Instance
of Rizal (in Civil Case No. Q-4797) dismissing appellant's action for support and damages.
The essential allegations of the complaint are to the effect that, from December, 1957, the defendant (appellee herein),
Apolonio Tanjanco, courted the plaintiff, Araceli Santos, both being of adult age; that "defendant expressed and professed
his undying love and affection for plaintiff who also in due time reciprocated the tender feelings"; that in consideration of
defendant's promise of marriage plaintiff consented and acceded to defendant's pleas for carnal knowledge; that regularly
until December 1959, through his protestations of love and promises of marriage, defendant succeeded in having carnal
access to plaintiff, as a result of which the latter conceived a child; that due to her pregnant condition, to avoid
embarrassment and social humiliation, plaintiff had to resign her job as secretary in IBM Philippines, Inc., where she was
receiving P230.00 a month; that thereby plaintiff became unable to support herself and her baby; that due to defendant's
refusal to marry plaintiff, as promised, the latter suffered mental anguish, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral
shock, and social humiliation. The prayer was for a decree compelling the defendant to recognize the unborn child that
plaintiff was bearing; to pay her not less than P430.00 a month for her support and that of her baby, plus P100,000.00 in
moral and exemplary damages, plus P10,000.00 attorney's fees.
Upon defendant's motion to dismiss, the court of first instance dismissed the complaint for failure to state a cause of
action.
Plaintiff Santos duly appealed to the Court of Appeals, and the latter ultimately decided the case, holding with the lower
court that no cause of action was shown to compel recognition of a child as yet unborn, nor for its support, but decreed
that the complaint did state a cause of action for damages, premised on Article 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines,
prescribing as follows:

ART. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
The Court of Appeals, therefore, entered judgment setting aside the dismissal and directing the court of origin to proceed
with the case.
Defendant, in turn, appealed to this Court, pleading that actions for breach of a promise to marry are not permissible in
this jurisdiction, and invoking the rulings of this Court in Estopa vs. Piansay, L-14733, September 30,
1960; Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals, L-14628, January 29, 1962; and De Jesus vs. SyQuia, 58 Phil. 886.
We find this appeal meritorious.
In holding that the complaint stated a cause of action for damages, under Article 21 above mentioned, the Court of
Appeals relied upon and quoted from the memorandum submitted by the Code Commission to the Legislature in 1949 to
support the original draft of the Civil Code. Referring to Article 23 of the draft (now Article 21 of the Code), the
Commission stated:
But the Code Commission has gone farther than the sphere of wrongs defined or determined by positive law.
Fully sensible that there are countless gaps in the statutes, which leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless,
even though they have actually suffered material and moral injury, the Commission has deemed it necessary, in
the interest of justice, to incorporate in the proposed Civil Code the following rule:
"ART. 23. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage."
An example will illustrate the purview of the foregoing norm: "A" seduces the nineteen-year old daughter of "X".
A promise of marriage either has not been made, or can not be proved. The girl becomes pregnant. Under the
present laws, there is no crime, as the girl is above eighteen years of age. Neither can any civil action for breach
of promise of marriage be filed. Therefore, though the grievous moral wrong has been committed, and though the
girl and her family have suffered incalculable moral damage, she and her parents cannot bring any action for
damages. But under the proposed article, she and her parents would have such a right of action.
The Court of Appeals seems to have overlooked that the example set forth in the Code Commission's memorandum refers
to a tort upon a minor who has been seduced. The essential feature is seduction, that in law is more than mere sexual
intercourse, or a breach of a promise of marriage; it connotes essentially the idea of deceit, enticement, superior power or
abuse of confidence on the part of the seducer to which the woman has yielded (U.S. vs. Buenaventura, 27 Phil. 121; U.S.
vs. Arlante, 9 Phil. 595).
It has been ruled in the Buenaventura case (supra) that
To constitute seduction there must in all cases be some sufficient promise or inducement and the woman must
yield because of the promise or other inducement. If she consents merely from carnal lust and the intercourse is
from mutual desire, there is no seduction (43 Cent. Dig. tit. Seduction, par. 56). She must be induced to depart
from the path of virtue by the use of some species of arts, persuasions and wiles, which are calculated to have and
do have that effect, and which result in her ultimately submitting her person to the sexual embraces of her seducer
(27 Phil. 123).
And in American Jurisprudence we find:

On the other hand, in an action by the woman, the enticement, persuasion or deception is the essence of the injury;
and a mere proof of intercourse is insufficient to warrant a recover.
Accordingly it is not seduction where the willingness arises out of sexual desire or curiosity of the female, and the
defendant merely affords her the needed opportunity for the commission of the act. It has been emphasized that to
allow a recovery in all such cases would tend to the demoralization of the female sex, and would be a reward for
unchastity by which a class of adventuresses would be swift to profit." (47 Am. Jur. 662)
Bearing these principles in mind, let us examine the complaint. The material allegations there are as follows:
I. That the plaintiff is of legal age, single, and residing at 56 South E. Diliman, Quezon City, while defendant is
also of legal age, single and residing at 525 Padre Faura, Manila, where he may be served with summons;
II. That the plaintiff and the defendant became acquainted with each other sometime in December, 1957 and soon
thereafter, the defendant started visiting and courting the plaintiff;
III. That the defendant's visits were regular and frequent and in due time the defendant expressed and professed
his undying love and affection for the plaintiff who also in due time reciprocated the tender feelings;
IV. That in the course of their engagement, the plaintiff and the defendant as are wont of young people in love had
frequent outings and dates, became very close and intimate to each other and sometime in July, 1958, in
consideration of the defendant's promises of marriage, the plaintiff consented and acceded to the former's earnest
and repeated pleas to have carnal knowledge with him;
V. That subsequent thereto and regularly until about July, 1959 except for a short period in December, 1958 when
the defendant was out of the country, the defendant through his protestations of love and promises of marriage
succeeded in having carnal knowledge with the plaintiff;
VI. That as a result of their intimate relationship, the plaintiff started conceiving which was confirmed by a doctor
sometime in July, 1959;
VII. That upon being certain of her pregnant condition, the plaintiff informed the defendant and pleaded with him
to make good his promises of marriage, but instead of honoring his promises and righting his wrong, the
defendant stopped and refrained from seeing the plaintiff since about July, 1959 has not visited the plaintiff and to
all intents and purposes has broken their engagement and his promises.
Over and above the partisan allegations, the facts stand out that for one whole year, from 1958 to 1959, the plaintiffappellee, a woman of adult age, maintained intimate sexual relations with appellant, with repeated acts of intercourse.
Such conduct is incompatible with the idea of seduction. Plainly there is here voluntariness and mutual passion; for had
the appellant been deceived, had she surrendered exclusively because of the deceit, artful persuasions and wiles of the
defendant, she would not have again yielded to his embraces, much less for one year, without exacting early fulfillment of
the alleged promises of marriage, and would have cut chart all sexual relations upon finding that defendant did not intend
to fulfill his promises. Hence, we conclude that no case is made under Article 21 of the Civil Code, and no other cause of
action being alleged, no error was committed by the Court of First Instance in dismissing the complaint.
Of course, the dismissal must be understood as without prejudice to whatever actions may correspond to the child of the
plaintiff against the defendant-appellant, if any. On that point, this Court makes no pronouncement, since the child's own
rights are not here involved.

FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and that of the Court of First
Instance is affirmed. No costs.

G.R. No. L-20089

December 26, 1964

BEATRIZ P. WASSMER, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
FRANCISCO X. VELEZ, defendant-appellant.
Jalandoni & Jamir for defendant-appellant.
Samson S. Alcantara for plaintiff-appellee.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
The facts that culminated in this case started with dreams and hopes, followed by appropriate planning and serious
endeavors, but terminated in frustration and, what is worse, complete public humiliation.
Francisco X. Velez and Beatriz P. Wassmer, following their mutual promise of love, decided to get married and set
September 4, 1954 as the big day. On September 2, 1954 Velez left this note for his bride-to-be:
Dear Bet
Will have to postpone wedding My mother opposes it. Am leaving on the Convair today.

Please do not ask too many people about the reason why That would only create a scandal.
Paquing
But the next day, September 3, he sent her the following telegram:
NOTHING CHANGED REST ASSURED RETURNING VERY SOON APOLOGIZE MAMA PAPA
LOVE .
PAKING
Thereafter Velez did not appear nor was he heard from again.
Sued by Beatriz for damages, Velez filed no answer and was declared in default. Plaintiff adduced evidence before the
clerk of court as commissioner, and on April 29, 1955, judgment was rendered ordering defendant to pay plaintiff
P2,000.00 as actual damages; P25,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages; P2,500.00 as attorney's fees; and the costs.
On June 21, 1955 defendant filed a "petition for relief from orders, judgment and proceedings and motion for new trial
and reconsideration." Plaintiff moved to strike it cut. But the court, on August 2, 1955, ordered the parties and their
attorneys to appear before it on August 23, 1955 "to explore at this stage of the proceedings the possibility of arriving at
an amicable settlement." It added that should any of them fail to appear "the petition for relief and the opposition thereto
will be deemed submitted for resolution."
On August 23, 1955 defendant failed to appear before court. Instead, on the following day his counsel filed a motion to
defer for two weeks the resolution on defendants petition for relief. The counsel stated that he would confer with
defendant in Cagayan de Oro City the latter's residence on the possibility of an amicable element. The court granted
two weeks counted from August 25, 1955.
Plaintiff manifested on June 15, 1956 that the two weeks given by the court had expired on September 8, 1955 but that
defendant and his counsel had failed to appear.
Another chance for amicable settlement was given by the court in its order of July 6, 1956 calling the parties and their
attorneys to appear on July 13, 1956. This time. however, defendant's counsel informed the court that chances of settling
the case amicably were nil.
On July 20, 1956 the court issued an order denying defendant's aforesaid petition. Defendant has appealed to this Court. In
his petition of June 21, 1955 in the court a quo defendant alleged excusable negligence as ground to set aside the
judgment by default. Specifically, it was stated that defendant filed no answer in the belief that an amicable settlement was
being negotiated.
A petition for relief from judgment on grounds of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence, must be duly
supported by an affidavit of merits stating facts constituting a valid defense. (Sec. 3, Rule 38, Rules of Court.) Defendant's
affidavit of merits attached to his petition of June 21, 1955 stated: "That he has a good and valid defense against plaintiff's
cause of action, his failure to marry the plaintiff as scheduled having been due to fortuitous event and/or circumstances
beyond his control." An affidavit of merits like this stating mere conclusions or opinions instead of facts is not valid.
(Cortes vs. Co Bun Kim, L-3926, Oct. 10, 1951; Vaswani vs. P. Tarrachand Bros., L-15800, December 29, 1960.)
Defendant, however, would contend that the affidavit of merits was in fact unnecessary, or a mere surplusage, because the
judgment sought to be set aside was null and void, it having been based on evidence adduced before the clerk of court. In
Province of Pangasinan vs. Palisoc, L-16519, October 30, 1962, this Court pointed out that the procedure of designating

the clerk of court as commissioner to receive evidence is sanctioned by Rule 34 (now Rule 33) of the Rules of Court. Now
as to defendant's consent to said procedure, the same did not have to be obtained for he was declared in default and thus
had no standing in court (Velez vs. Ramas, 40 Phil. 787; Alano vs. Court of First Instance, L-14557, October 30, 1959).
In support of his "motion for new trial and reconsideration," defendant asserts that the judgment is contrary to law. The
reason given is that "there is no provision of the Civil Code authorizing" an action for breach of promise to marry. Indeed,
our ruling in Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals (L-14628, Sept. 30, 1960), as reiterated in Estopa vs. Biansay (L-14733,
Sept. 30, 1960), is that "mere breach of a promise to marry" is not an actionable wrong. We pointed out that Congress
deliberately eliminated from the draft of the new Civil Code the provisions that would have it so.
It must not be overlooked, however, that the extent to which acts not contrary to law may be perpetrated with impunity, is
not limitless for Article 21 of said Code provides that "any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage."
The record reveals that on August 23, 1954 plaintiff and defendant applied for a license to contract marriage, which was
subsequently issued (Exhs. A, A-1). Their wedding was set for September 4, 1954. Invitations were printed and distributed
to relatives, friends and acquaintances (Tsn., 5; Exh. C). The bride-to-be's trousseau, party drsrses and other apparel for
the important occasion were purchased (Tsn., 7-8). Dresses for the maid of honor and the flower girl were prepared. A
matrimonial bed, with accessories, was bought. Bridal showers were given and gifts received (Tsn., 6; Exh. E). And then,
with but two days before the wedding, defendant, who was then 28 years old,: simply left a note for plaintiff stating: "Will
have to postpone wedding My mother opposes it ... " He enplaned to his home city in Mindanao, and the next day, the
day before the wedding, he wired plaintiff: "Nothing changed rest assured returning soon." But he never returned and was
never heard from again.
Surely this is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. As stated, mere breach of promise to marry is not an
actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through all the above-described preparation and publicity, only to
walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary
to good customs for which defendant must be held answerable in damages in accordance with Article 21 aforesaid.
Defendant urges in his afore-stated petition that the damages awarded were excessive. No question is raised as to the
award of actual damages. What defendant would really assert hereunder is that the award of moral and exemplary
damages, in the amount of P25,000.00, should be totally eliminated.
Per express provision of Article 2219 (10) of the New Civil Code, moral damages are recoverable in the cases mentioned
in Article 21 of said Code. As to exemplary damages, defendant contends that the same could not be adjudged against him
because under Article 2232 of the New Civil Code the condition precedent is that "the defendant acted in a wanton,
fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner." The argument is devoid of merit as under the above-narrated
circumstances of this case defendant clearly acted in a "wanton ... , reckless [and] oppressive manner." This Court's
opinion, however, is that considering the particular circumstances of this case, P15,000.00 as moral and exemplary
damages is deemed to be a reasonable award.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, with the above-indicated modification, the lower court's judgment is hereby affirmed, with
costs.

Prejudicial Question Elements

DREAMWORK G.R. No. 184861
CONSTRUCTION, INC.,
Petitioner, Present:
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
- versus - CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA, and
PERALTA, JJ.

CLEOFE S. JANIOLA and Promulgated:

HON. ARTHUR A. FAMINI,
Respondents. June 30, 2009
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The Case

Petitioner Dreamwork Construction, Inc. seeks the reversal of the August 26, 2008 Decision [1] in SCA No. 080005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 253 in Las Pias City. The Decision affirmed the Orders dated October 16,
2007[2] and March 12, 2008[3] in Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61 issued by the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC), Branch 79
in Las Pias City.

The Facts

On October 18, 2004, petitioner, through its President, Roberto S. Concepcion, and Vice-President for Finance
and Marketing, Normandy P. Amora, filed a Complaint Affidavit dated October 5, 2004 [4] for violation of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22) against private respondent Cleofe S. Janiola with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Las
Pias City. The case was docketed as I.S. No. 04-2526-33. Correspondingly, petitioner filed a criminal information for
violation of BP 22 against private respondent with the MTC on February 2, 2005 docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 5555461, entitled People of the Philippines v. Cleofe S. Janiola.

On September 20, 2006, private respondent, joined by her husband, instituted a civil complaint against petitioner
by filing a Complaint dated August 2006 [5] for the rescission of an alleged construction agreement between the parties, as
well as for damages. The case was filed with the RTC, Branch 197 in Las Pias City and docketed as Civil Case No. LP06-0197. Notably, the checks, subject of the criminal cases before the MTC, were issued in consideration of the
construction agreement.

Thereafter, on July 25, 2007, private respondent filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings dated July 24, 2007 [6] in
Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61, alleging that the civil and criminal cases involved facts and issues similar or intimately
related such that in the resolution of the issues in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be
determined. In other words, private respondent claimed that the civil case posed a prejudicial question as against the
criminal cases.

Petitioner opposed the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal cases in an undated Comment/Opposition to
Accuseds Motion to Suspend Proceedings based on Prejudicial Question [7]on the grounds that: (1) there is no prejudicial
question in this case as the rescission of the contract upon which the bouncing checks were issued is a separate and
distinct issue from the issue of whether private respondent violated BP 22; and (2) Section 7, Rule 111 of the Rules of
Court states that one of the elements of a prejudicial question is that the previously instituted civil action involves an issue
similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action; thus, this element is missing in this case,
the criminal case having preceded the civil case.

Later, the MTC issued its Order dated October 16, 2007, granting the Motion to Suspend Proceedings, and
reasoned that:
Should the trial court declare the rescission of contract and the nullification of the checks issued as the
same are without consideration, then the instant criminal cases for alleged violation of BP 22 must be
dismissed. The belated filing of the civil case by the herein accused did not detract from the correctness of
her cause, since a motion for suspension of a criminal action may be filed at any time before the
prosecution rests (Section 6, Rule 111, Revised Rules of Court). [8]

In an Order dated March 12, 2008, [9] the MTC denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration dated November 29,
2007.

Petitioner appealed the Orders to the RTC with a Petition dated May 13, 2008. Thereafter, the RTC issued the
assailed decision dated August 26, 2008, denying the petition. On the issue of the existence of a prejudicial question, the
RTC ruled:

Additionally, it must be stressed that the requirement of a previously filed civil case is intended
merely to obviate delays in the conduct of the criminal proceedings. Incidentally, no clear evidence of any
intent to delay by private respondent was shown. The criminal proceedings are still in their initial stages
when the civil action was instituted. And, the fact that the civil action was filed after the criminal action
was instituted does not render the issues in the civil action any less prejudicial in character. [10]

Hence, we have this petition under Rule 45.

The Issue
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT PERCEIVING GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION ON THE PART OF THE INFERIOR COURT, WHEN THE LATTER
RULED TO SUSPEND PROCEEDINGS IN CRIM. CASE NOS. 55554-61 ON THE BASIS OF
PREJUDICIAL QUESTION IN CIVIL CASE NO. LP-06-0197.[11]

The Courts Ruling

This petition must be granted.

The Civil Action Must Precede the Filing of the

Criminal Action for a Prejudicial Question to Exist

Under the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended by Supreme Court Resolutions dated June 17, 1988 and
July 7, 1988, the elements of a prejudicial question are contained in Rule 111, Sec. 5, which states:
SEC. 5. Elements of prejudicial question. The two (2) essential elements of a prejudicial question
are: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal
action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.

Thus, the Court has held in numerous cases [12] that the elements of a prejudicial question, as stated in the abovequoted provision and in Beltran v. People,[13] are:
The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. It
has two essential elements: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue
raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal
action may proceed.

On December 1, 2000, the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure, however, became effective and the above provision
was amended by Sec. 7 of Rule 111, which applies here and now provides:
SEC. 7. Elements of prejudicial question.The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a)
thepreviously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in
the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal
action may proceed. (Emphasis supplied.)

Petitioner interprets Sec. 7(a) to mean that in order for a civil case to create a prejudicial question and, thus, suspend a
criminal case, it must first be established that the civil case was filed previous to the filing of the criminal case. This,
petitioner argues, is specifically to guard against the situation wherein a party would belatedly file a civil action that is
related to a pending criminal action in order to delay the proceedings in the latter.

On the other hand, private respondent cites Article 36 of the Civil Code which provides:
Art. 36. Pre-judicial questions which must be decided before any criminal prosecution may be instituted
or may proceed, shall be governed by rules of court which the Supreme Court shall promulgate and which
shall not be in conflict with the provisions of this Code. (Emphasis supplied.)

Private respondent argues that the phrase before any criminal prosecution may be instituted or may proceed must
be interpreted to mean that a prejudicial question exists when the civil action is filed either before the institution of the
criminal action or during the pendency of the criminal action. Private respondent concludes that there is an apparent
conflict in the provisions of the Rules of Court and the Civil Code in that the latter considers a civil case to have presented
a prejudicial question even if the criminal case preceded the filing of the civil case.

We cannot agree with private respondent.

First off, it is a basic precept in statutory construction that a change in phraseology by amendment of a provision
of law indicates a legislative intent to change the meaning of the provision from that it originally had. [14] In the instant
case, the phrase, previously instituted, was inserted to qualify the nature of the civil action involved in a prejudicial
question in relation to the criminal action. This interpretation is further buttressed by the insertion of subsequent directly

before the term criminal action. There is no other logical explanation for the amendments except to qualify the
relationship of the civil and criminal actions, that the civil action must precede the criminal action.

Thus, this Court ruled in Torres v. Garchitorena[15] that:

Even if we ignored petitioners procedural lapse and resolved their petition on the merits, we hold
that Sandiganbayan did not abuse its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in denying
their omnibus motion for the suspension of the proceedings pending final judgment in Civil Case No.
7160. Section 6, Rule lll of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, reads:
Sec. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question. - A petition for suspension of the
criminal action based upon the pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil action may be filed in
the office of the prosecutor or the court conducting the preliminary investigation. When the
criminal action has been filed in court for trial, the petition to suspend shall be filed in the same
criminal action at any time before the prosecution rests.
Sec. 7. Elements of prejudicial question. - The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a)
the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue
raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether
or not the criminal action may proceed.
Under the amendment, a prejudicial question is understood in law as that which must precede the
criminal action and which requires a decision before a final judgment can be rendered in the criminal
action with which said question is closely connected. The civil action must be instituted prior to the
institution of the criminal action. In this case, the Information was filed with the Sandiganbayan ahead of
the complaint in Civil Case No. 7160 filed by the State with the RTC in Civil Case No. 7160. Thus, no
prejudicial question exists. (Emphasis supplied.)

Additionally, it is a principle in statutory construction that a statute should be construed not only to be consistent
with itself but also to harmonize with other laws on the same subject matter, as to form a complete, coherent and
intelligible system.[16] This principle is consistent with the maxim, interpretare et concordare leges legibus est optimus
interpretandi modus or every statute must be so construed and harmonized with other statutes as to form a uniform system
of jurisprudence.[17]
In other words, every effort must be made to harmonize seemingly conflicting laws. It is only when
harmonization is impossible that resort must be made to choosing which law to apply.

In the instant case, Art. 36 of the Civil Code and Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court are susceptible of an
interpretation that would harmonize both provisions of law. The phrase previously instituted civil action in Sec. 7 of Rule
111 is plainly worded and is not susceptible of alternative interpretations. The clause before any criminal prosecution may

be instituted or may proceed in Art. 36 of the Civil Code may, however, be interpreted to mean that the motion to suspend
the criminal action may be filed during the preliminary investigation with the public prosecutor or court conducting the
investigation, or during the trial with the court hearing the case.

This interpretation would harmonize Art. 36 of the Civil Code with Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court but
also with Sec. 6 of Rule 111 of the Civil Code, which provides for the situations when the motion to suspend the criminal
action during the preliminary investigation or during the trial may be filed. Sec. 6 provides:
SEC. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question.A petition for suspension of the criminal
action based upon the pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil action may be filed in the office of the
prosecutor or the court conducting the preliminary investigation. When the criminal action has been filed
in court for trial, the petition to suspend shall be filed in the same criminal action at any time before the
prosecution rests.
Thus, under the principles of statutory construction, it is this interpretation of Art. 36 of the Civil Code that should
govern in order to give effect to all the relevant provisions of law.

It bears pointing out that the circumstances present in the instant case indicate that the filing of the civil action and
the subsequent move to suspend the criminal proceedings by reason of the presence of a prejudicial question were a mere
afterthought and instituted to delay the criminal proceedings.
In Sabandal v. Tongco,[18] we found no prejudicial question existed involving a civil action for specific
performance, overpayment, and damages, and a criminal complaint for BP 22, as the resolution of the civil action would
not determine the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. In resolving the case, we said:
Furthermore, the peculiar circumstances of the case clearly indicate that the filing of the civil case was a
ploy to delay the resolution of the criminal cases. Petitioner filed the civil case three years after the
institution of the criminal charges against him. Apparently, the civil action was instituted as an
afterthought to delay the proceedings in the criminal cases. [19]

Here, the civil case was filed two (2) years after the institution of the criminal complaint and from the time that private
respondent allegedly withdrew its equipment from the job site. Also, it is worth noting that the civil case was instituted
more than two and a half (2 ) years from the time that private respondent allegedly stopped construction of the proposed
building for no valid reason. More importantly, the civil case praying for the rescission of the construction agreement for
lack of consideration was filed more than three (3) years from the execution of the construction agreement.

Evidently, as in Sabandal, the circumstances surrounding the filing of the cases involved here show that the filing of the
civil action was a mere afterthought on the part of private respondent and interposed for delay. And as correctly argued by
petitioner, it is this scenario that Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court seeks to prevent. Thus, private respondents
positions cannot be left to stand.
The Resolution of the Civil Case Is Not
Determinative of the Prosecution of the Criminal Action

In any event, even if the civil case here was instituted prior to the criminal action, there is, still, no prejudicial
question to speak of that would justify the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal case.

To reiterate, the elements of a prejudicial question under Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court are: (1) the
previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent
criminal action; and (2) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.

Petitioner argues that the second element of a prejudicial question, as provided in Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules,
is absent in this case. Thus, such rule cannot apply to the present controversy.

Private respondent, on the other hand, claims that if the construction agreement between the parties is declared
null and void for want of consideration, the checks issued in consideration of such contract would become mere scraps of
paper and cannot be the basis of a criminal prosecution.

We find for petitioner.

It must be remembered that the elements of the crime punishable under BP 22 are as follows:

(1) the making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value;
(2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue there are no sufficient
funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment; and

(3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit,
or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop
payment.[20]

Undeniably, the fact that there exists a valid contract or agreement to support the issuance of the check/s or that
the checks were issued for valuable consideration does not make up the elements of the crime. Thus, this Court has held in
a long line of cases[21] that the agreement surrounding the issuance of dishonored checks is irrelevant to the prosecution for
violation of BP 22. In Mejia v. People,[22] we ruled:
It must be emphasized that the gravamen of the offense charge is the issuance of a bad check. The
purpose for which the check was issued, the terms and conditions relating to its issuance, or any
agreement surrounding such issuance are irrelevant to the prosecution and conviction of petitioner. To
determine the reason for which checks are issued, or the terms and conditions for their issuance, will
greatly erode the faith the public reposes in the stability and commercial value of checks as currency
substitutes, and bring havoc in trade and in banking communities. The clear intention of the framers of
B.P. 22 is to make the mere act of issuing a worthless check malum prohibitum.

Lee v. Court of Appeals[23] is even more poignant. In that case, we ruled that the issue of lack of valuable
consideration for the issuance of checks which were later on dishonored for insufficient funds is immaterial to the success
of a prosecution for violation of BP 22, to wit:

Third issue. Whether or not the check was issued on account or for value.
Petitioners claim is not feasible. We have held that upon issuance of a check, in the absence of
evidence to the contrary, it is presumed that the same was issued for valuable consideration. Valuable
consideration, in turn, may consist either in some right, interest, profit or benefit accruing to the party
who makes the contract, or some forbearance, detriment, loss or some responsibility, to act, or labor, or
service given, suffered or undertaken by the other side. It is an obligation to do, or not to do in favor of
the party who makes the contract, such as the maker or indorser.
In this case, petitioner himself testified that he signed several checks in blank, the subject check
included, in exchange for 2.5% interest from the proceeds of loans that will be made from said account.
This is a valuable consideration for which the check was issued. That there was neither a pre-existing
obligation nor an obligation incurred on the part of petitioner when the subject check was given by
Bautista to private complainant on July 24, 1993 because petitioner was no longer connected with Unlad
or Bautista starting July 1989, cannot be given merit since, as earlier discussed, petitioner failed to
adequately prove that he has severed his relationship with Bautista or Unlad.
At any rate, we have held that what the law punishes is the mere act of issuing a bouncing check,
not the purpose for which it was issued nor the terms and conditions relating to its issuance. This is
because the thrust of the law is to prohibit the making of worthless checks and putting them into
circulation.[24] (Emphasis supplied.)

Verily, even if the trial court in the civil case declares that the construction agreement between the parties is void
for lack of consideration, this would not affect the prosecution of private respondent in the criminal case. The fact of the
matter is that private respondent indeed issued checks which were subsequently dishonored for insufficient funds. It is this
fact that is subject of prosecution under BP 22.

Therefore, it is clear that the second element required for the existence of a prejudicial question, that the
resolution of the issue in the civil action would determine whether the criminal action may proceed, is absent in the instant
case. Thus, no prejudicial question exists and the rules on it are inapplicable to the case before us.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT this petition. We hereby REVERSE and SET ASIDE the August 26, 2008 Decision
in SCA No. 08-0005 of the RTC, Branch 253 in Las Pias City and the Orders dated October 16, 2007 and March 12, 2008
in Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61 of the MTC, Branch 79 in Las Pias City. We order the MTC to continue with the
proceedings in Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61 with dispatch.

No costs.

G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and RORIDEL OLAVIANO MOLINA, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:
The Family Code of the Philippines provides an entirely new ground (in addition to those enumerated in the Civil Code)
to assail the validity of a marriage, namely, "psychological incapacity." Since the Code's effectivity, our courts have been
swamped with various petitions to declare marriages void based on this ground. Although this Court had interpreted the
meaning of psychological incapacity in the recent case ofSantos vs. Court of Appeals, still many judges and lawyers find
difficulty in applying said novel provision in specific cases. In the present case and in the context of the herein assailed

Decision of the Court of Appeals, the Solicitor General has labelled exaggerated to be sure but nonetheless expressive
of his frustration Article 36 as the "most liberal divorce procedure in the world." Hence, this Court in addition to
resolving the present case, finds the need to lay down specific guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36
of the Family Code.
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 challenging the January 25, 1993 Decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals 2 in CA-G.R. CV No. 34858 affirming in toto the May 14, 1991 decision of the Regional Trial Court of La
Trinidad, 3 Benguet, which declared the marriage of respondent Roridel Olaviano Molina to Reynaldo Molina void ab
initio, on the ground of "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Family Code.
The Facts
This case was commenced on August 16, 1990 with the filing by respondent Roridel O. Molina of a verified petition for
declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina. Essentially, the petition alleged that Roridel and Reynaldo were
married on April 14, 1985 at the San Agustin Church 4 in Manila; that a son, Andre O. Molina was born; that after a year
of marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of "immaturity and irresponsibility" as a husband and a father since he preferred to
spend more time with his peers and friends on whom he squandered his money; that he depended on his parents for aid
and assistance, and was never honest with his wife in regard to their finances, resulting in frequent quarrels between them;
that sometime in February 1986, Reynaldo was relieved of his job in Manila, and since then Roridel had been the sole
breadwinner of the family; that in October 1986 the couple had a very intense quarrel, as a result of which their
relationship was estranged; that in March 1987, Roridel resigned from her job in Manila and went to live with her parents
in Baguio City; that a few weeks later, Reynaldo left Roridel and their child, and had since then abandoned them; that
Reynaldo had thus shown that he was psychologically incapable of complying with essential marital obligations and was a
highly immature and habitually quarrel some individual who thought of himself as a king to be served; and that it would
be to the couple's best interest to have their marriage declared null and void in order to free them from what appeared to
be an incompatible marriage from the start.
In his Answer filed on August 28, 1989, Reynaldo admitted that he and Roridel could no longer live together as husband
and wife, but contended that their misunderstandings and frequent quarrels were due to (1) Roridel's strange behavior of
insisting on maintaining her group of friends even after their marriage; (2) Roridel's refusal to perform some of her marital
duties such as cooking meals; and (3) Roridel's failure to run the household and handle their finances.
During the pre-trial on October 17, 1990, the following were stipulated:
1. That the parties herein were legally married on April 14, 1985 at the Church of St. Augustine, Manila;
2. That out of their marriage, a child named Albert Andre Olaviano Molina was born on July 29, 1986;
3. That the parties are separated-in-fact for more than three years;
4. That petitioner is not asking support for her and her child;
5. That the respondent is not asking for damages;
6. That the common child of the parties is in the custody of the petitioner wife.
Evidence for herein respondent wife consisted of her own testimony and that of her friends Rosemarie Ventura and Maria
Leonora Padilla as well as of Ruth G. Lalas, a social worker, and of Dr. Teresita Hidalgo-Sison, a psychiatrist of the
Baguio General Hospital and Medical Center. She also submitted documents marked as Exhibits "A" to "E-1." Reynaldo
did not present any evidence as he appeared only during the pre-trial conference.

On May 14, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the marriage void. The appeal of petitioner was denied by
the Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the RTC's decision. Hence, the present recourse.
The Issue
In his petition, the Solicitor General insists that "the Court of Appeals made an erroneous and incorrect interpretation of
the phrase 'psychological incapacity' (as provided under Art. 36 of the Family Code) and made an incorrect application
thereof to the facts of the case," adding that the appealed Decision tended "to establish in effect the most liberal divorce
procedure in the world which is anathema to our culture."
In denying the Solicitor General's appeal, the respondent Court relied 5 heavily on the trial court's findings "that the
marriage between the parties broke up because of their opposing and conflicting personalities." Then, it added it sown
opinion that "the Civil Code Revision Committee (hereinafter referred to as Committee) intended to liberalize the
application of our civil laws on personal and family rights. . . ." It concluded that:
As ground for annulment of marriage, We view psychologically incapacity as a broad range of mental and
behavioral conduct on the part of one spouse indicative of how he or she regards the marital union, his or
her personal relationship with the other spouse, as well as his or her conduct in the long haul for the
attainment of the principal objectives of marriage. If said conduct, observed and considered as a whole,
tends to cause the union to self-destruct because it defeats the very objectives of marriage, then there is
enough reason to leave the spouses to their individual fates.
In the case at bar, We find that the trial judge committed no indiscretion in analyzing and deciding the
instant case, as it did, hence, We find no cogent reason to disturb the findings and conclusions thus made.
Respondent, in her Memorandum, adopts these discussions of the Court of Appeals.
The petitioner, on the other hand, argues that "opposing and conflicting personalities" is not equivalent to psychological
incapacity, explaining that such ground "is not simply the neglect by the parties to the marriage of their responsibilities
and duties, but a defect in their psychological nature which renders them incapable of performing such marital
responsibilities and duties."
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
In Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals 6 this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, ruled that "psychological
incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (nor physical) incapacity . . . and that (t)here is hardly any doubt that the
intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of 'psychological incapacity' to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated." Citing Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a
former presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila, 7 Justice Vitug wrote
that "the psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability."
On the other hand, in the present case, there is no clear showing to us that the psychological defect spoken of is an
incapacity. It appears to us to be more of a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some
marital obligations. Mere showing of "irreconciliable differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no wise constitutes
psychological incapacity. It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as
married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to beincapable of doing so, due to some psychological (nor
physical) illness.

The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she and her husband could nor get along with each other. There
had been no showing of the gravity of the problem; neither its juridical antecedence nor its incurability. The expert
testimony of Dr. Sison showed no incurable psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility, not psychological incapacity.
Dr. Sison testified: 8
COURT
Q It is therefore the recommendation of the psychiatrist based on your findings that it is
better for the Court to annul (sic) the marriage?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q There is no hope for the marriage?
A There is no hope, the man is also living with another woman.
Q Is it also the stand of the psychiatrist that the parties are psychologically unfit for each
other but they are psychologically fit with other parties?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Neither are they psychologically unfit for their professions?
A Yes, Your Honor.
The Court has no more questions.
In the case of Reynaldo, there is no showing that his alleged personality traits were constitutive of psychological
incapacity existing at the time of marriage celebration. While some effort was made to prove that there was a failure to
fulfill pre-nuptial impressions of "thoughtfulness and gentleness" on Reynaldo's part of being "conservative, homely and
intelligent" on the part of Roridel, such failure of expectation is nor indicative of antecedent psychological incapacity. If at
all, it merely shows love's temporary blindness to the faults and blemishes of the beloved.
During its deliberations, the Court decided to go beyond merely ruling on the facts of this case vis-a-visexisting law and
jurisprudence. In view of the novelty of Art. 36 of the Family Code and the difficulty experienced by many trial courts
interpreting and applying it, the Court decided to invite two amici curiae, namely, the Most Reverend Oscar V.
Cruz, 9 Vicar Judicial (Presiding Judge) of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, and Justice Ricardo C. Puno, 10 a member of the Family Code Revision Committee. The Court takes this
occasion to thank these friends of the Court for their informative and interesting discussions during the oral argument on
December 3, 1996, which they followed up with written memoranda.
From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations, the following guidelines in the interpretation and application of
Art. 36 of the Family Code are hereby handed down for the guidance of the bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor
of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both
our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an
entire Article on the Family, 11 recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable,"
thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the
state.

The Family Code 12 echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes the permanence,
inviolability and solidarity
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code
requires that the incapacity must be psychological not physical. although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be
physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or physically ill to such an
extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given
valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of
the provision under the principle ofejusdem generis, 13 nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological
illness and its incapacitating nature explained. Expert evidence may be given qualified psychiatrist and clinical
psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show
that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be
perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be
absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not
related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in
diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to
procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted
as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, nor a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much
less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in
the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the
obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the
husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such noncomplied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the
decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while
not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family
Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which
provides:
The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the essential
obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature. 14
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of
our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to decision of
such appellate tribunal. Ideally subject to our law on evidence what is decreed as canonically invalid should also be
decreed civilly void.

This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code provision, contemporaneous
religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the Church while remaining independent,
separate and apart from each other shall walk together in synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and
cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the nation.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state.
No decision shall he handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision,
briefly staring therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor
General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the
date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function
of the defensor vinculicontemplated under Canon 1095.
In the instant case and applying Leouel Santos, we have already ruled to grant the petition. Such ruling becomes even
more cogent with the use of the foregoing guidelines.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The marriage of
Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr., and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
Regalado, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concurs in the result.

Separate Opinions

PADILLA, J., concuring opinion:

I concur in the result of the decision penned by Mr. Justice Panganiban but only because of the peculiar facts of the case.
As to whether or not the psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of a marriage, depends
crucially, more than in any field of the law, on the facts of the case. InLeouel Santos v. Court of Appeals and Julia
Rosario-Bedia Santos, G.R. No. 112019, 4 January 1995, 240 SCRA 20-36, I maintained, and I still maintain, that there
was psychological incapacity on the part of the wife to discharge the duties of a wife in a valid marriage. The facts of the
present case, after an indepth study, do not support a similar conclusion. Obviously, each case must be judged, not on the
basis of a prioriassumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts. In the field of psychological
incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on "all fours" with another case. The trial
judge must take pains in examining the actual millieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting
its own judgment for that of the trial court.
ROMERO, J., separate opinion:
The majority opinion, overturning that of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the Regional Trial Court ruling. upheld
petitioner Solicitor General's position that "opposing and conflicting personalities" is not equivalent to psychological
incapacity, for the latter "is not simply the neglect by the parties to the marriage of their responsibilities and duties, but
a defect in their Psychological nature which renders them incapable of performing such marital responsibilities and duties.

In the present case, the alleged personality traits of Reynaldo, the husband, did not constitute so much "psychological
incapacity" as a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations. "It is not
enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that they
must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (not physical) illness."
I would add that neither should the incapacity be the result of mental illness. For if it were due to insanity or defects in the
mental faculties short of insanity, there is a resultant defect of vice of consent, thus rendering the marriage annulable
under Art. 45 of the Family Code.
That the intent of the members of the U.P. Law Center's Civil Code Revision Committee was to excludemental inability to
understand the essential nature of marriage and focus strictly on psychological incapacity is demonstrated in the way the
provision in question underwent revisions.
At the Committee meeting of July 26, 1986, the draft provision read:
(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was wanting in the
sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage or was psychologically
or mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such lack of incapacity is
made manifest after the celebration.
The twists and turns which the ensuing discussion took finally produced the following revised provision even before the
session was over:
(7) That contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to
discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such lack or incapacity becomes manifest after the
celebration.
Noticeably, the immediately preceding formulation above has dropped any reference to "wanting in the sufficient use of
reason or judgment to understand the essential nature or marriage" and to "mentally incapacitated." It was explained that
these phrases refer to "defects in the mental faculties vitiating consent, which is not the idea . . . but lack of appreciation of
one's marital obligation." There being a defect in consent, "it is clear that it should be a ground for voidable marriage
because there is the appearance of consent and it is capable of convalidation for the simple reason that there are lucid
intervals and there are sanity is curable. . . . Psychological incapacity does not refer to mental faculties and has nothing to
do with consent; it refers to obligations attendant to
marriage." 1
My own position as a member of the Committee then was that psychological incapacity is, in a sense, insanity of a lesser
degree.
As to the proposal of Justice Caguioa to use the term "psychological or mental impotence," Archbishop Oscar Cruz opined
in he earlier February 9, 1984 session that this term "is an invention of some churchmen who are moralists but not
canonists, that is why it is considered a weak phrase." He said that the Code of Canon Law would rather express it as
"psychological or mental incapacity to discharge. . . ." Justice Ricardo C. Puno opined that sometimes a person may be
psychologically impotent with one but not with another.
One of the guidelines enumerated in the majority opinion for the interpretation and application of Art. 36 is: "Such
incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or
even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex."

The Committee, through Prof. Araceli T. Barrera, considered the inclusion of the phrase" and is incurable" but Prof.
Esteban B. Bautista commented that this would give rise to the question of how they will determine curability and Justice
Caguioa agreed that it would be more problematic. Yet the possibility that one may be cured after the psychological
incapacity becomes manifest after the marriage was not ruled out by Justice Puno and Justice Alice Sempio-Diy. Justice
Caguioa suggested that the remedy was to allow the afflicted spouse to remarry.
For clarity, the Committee classified the bases for determining void marriages, viz:
1. lack of one or more of the essential requisites of marriage as contract;
2. reasons of public policy;
3. special cases and special situations.
The ground of psychological incapacity was subsumed under "special cases and special situations," hence its
special treatment in Art. 36 in the Family Code as finally enacted.
Nowhere in the Civil Code provisions on Marriage is there a ground for avoiding or annulling marriages that even comes
close to being psychological in nature.
Where consent is vitiated due to circumstances existing at the time of the marriage, such marriage which stands valid until
annulled is capable of ratification or convalidation.
On the other hand, for reasons of public policy or lack of essential requisites, some marriages are void from the beginning.
With the revision of Book I of the Civil Code, particularly the provisions on Marriage, the drafters, now open to fresh
winds of change in keeping with the more permissive mores and practices of the time, took a leaf from the relatively
liberal provisions of Canon Law.
Canon 1095 which states, inter alia, that the following persons are incapable of contracting marriage: "3. (those) who,
because of causes of a psychological nature, are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage" provided the
model for what is now Art. 36 of the Family Code: "A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise
be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
It bears stressing that unlike in Civil Law, Canon Law recognizes only two types of marriages with respect to their
validity: valid and void. Civil Law, however, recognizes an intermediate state, the voidable or annullable marriages. When
the Ecclesiastical Tribunal "annuls" a marriage, it actually declares the marriage null and void, i.e., it never really existed
in the first place, for a valid sacramental marriage can never be dissolved. Hence, a properly performed and consummated
marriage between two living Roman Catholics can only be nullified by the formal annulment process which entails a full
tribunal procedure with a Court selection and a formal hearing.
Such so-called church "annulments" are not recognized by Civil Law as severing the marriage ties as to capacitate the
parties to enter lawfully into another marriage. The grounds for nullifying civil marriage, not being congruent with those
laid down by Canon Law, the former being more strict, quite a number of married couples have found themselves in limbo
freed from the marriage bonds in the eyes of the Catholic Church but yet unable to contract a valid civil marriage under
state laws. Heedless of civil law sanctions, some persons contract new marriages or enter into live-in relationships.

It was precisely to provide a satisfactory solution to such anomalous situations that the Civil Law Revision Committee
decided to engraft the Canon Law concept of psychological incapacity into the Family Code and classified the same as
a ground for declaring marriages void ab initio or totally in existent from the beginning.
A brief historical note on the Old Canon Law (1917). This Old Code, while it did not provide directly for psychological
incapacity, in effect recognized the same indirectly from a combination of three old canons: "Canon #1081 required
persons to 'be capable according to law' in order to give valid consent; Canon #1082 required that persons 'be at least not
ignorant' of the major elements required in marriage; and Canon #1087 (the force and fear category) required that internal
and external freedom be present in order for consent to be valid. This line of interpretation produced two distinct but
related grounds for annulment, called 'lack of due discretion' and 'lack of due competence.' Lack of due discretion means
that the person did not have the ability to give valid consent at the time of the wedding and therefore the union is invalid.
Lack of due competence means that the person was incapable of carrying out the obligations of the promise he or she
made during the wedding ceremony.
"Favorable annulment decisions by the Roman Rota in the 1950s and 1960s involving sexual disorders such as
homosexuality and nymphomania laid the foundation for a broader approach to the kind of proof necessary for
psychological grounds for annulment. The Rota had reasoned for the first time in several cases that the capacity to give
valid consent at the time of marriage was probably not present in persons who had displayed such problems shortly after
the marriage. The nature of this change was nothing short of revolutionary. Once the Rota itself had demonstrated a
cautious willingness to use this kind of hindsight, the way was paved for what came after 1970. Diocesan Tribunals began
to accept proof of serious psychological problems that manifested themselves shortly after the ceremony as proof of an
inability to give valid consent at the time of the ceremony.
Furthermore, and equally significant, the professional opinion of a psychological expert became increasingly important in
such cases. Data about the person's entire life, both before and after the ceremony, were presented to these experts and
they were asked to give professional opinions about a party's mental at the time of the wedding. These opinions were
rarely challenged and tended to be accepted as decisive evidence of lack of valid consent.
The Church took pains to point out that its new openness in this area did not amount to the addition of new grounds for
annulment, but rather was an accommodation by the Church to the advances made in psychology during the past
decades. There was now the expertise to provide the all-important connecting link between a marriage breakdown and
premarital causes.
During the 1970s, the Church broadened its whole idea of marriage from that of a legal contract to that of a covenant. The
result of this was that it could no longer be assumed in annulment cases that a person who could intellectually understand
the concept of marriage could necessarily give valid consent to marry. The ability to both grasp and assume the real
obligations of a mature, lifelong commitment are now considered a necessary prerequisite to valid matrimonial consent. 2
Rotal decisions continued applying the concept of incipient psychological incapacity, "not only to sexual anomalies but to
all kinds of personality disorders that incapacitate a spouse or both spouses from assuming or carrying out the essential
obligations of marriage. For marriage . . . is not merely cohabitation or the right of the spouses to each others' body for
heterosexual acts, but is, in its totality, the right to the community of the whole of life, i.e., the right to a developing.
lifelong relationship. Rotal decisions since 1973 have refined the meaning of psychological or psychic capacity for
marriage as presupposing the development of an adult personality; as meaning the capacity of the spouses to give
themselves to each other and to accept the other as a distinct person; that the spouses must be 'other oriented' since the
obligations of marriage are rooted in a self-giving love; and that the spouses must have the capacity for interpersonal
relationship because marriage is more than just a physical reality but involves a true intertwining of personalities. The
fulfillment of the obligations of marriage depends. according to Church decisions, on the strength of this interpersonal
relationship. A serious incapacity for interpersonal sharing and support is held to impair the relationship and consequently,

the ability to fulfill the essential marital obligations. The marital capacity of one spouse is not considered in isolation but
in reference to the fundamental relationship to the other spouse. 3
Fr. Green, in an article in Catholic Mind, lists six elements necessary to the mature marital relationship:
The courts consider the following elements crucial to the marital commitment: (1) a permanent and
faithful commitment to the marriage partner; (2) openness to children and partner; (3) stability; (4)
emotional maturity; (5) financial responsibility; (6) an ability to cope with the ordinary stresses and
strains of marriage, etc.
Fr. Green goes on to speak about some of the psychological conditions that might lead to the failure of a
marriage:
At stake is a type of constitutional impairment precluding conjugal communion even with the best
intentions of the parties. Among the psychic factors possibly giving rise to his or her inability to fulfill
marital obligations are the following: (1) antisocial personality with its fundamental lack of loyalty to
persons or sense of moral values; (2) hyperesthesia, where the individual has no real freedom of sexual
choice; (3) the inadequate personality where personal responses consistently fallshort of reasonable
expectations.
xxx xxx xxx
The psychological grounds are the best approach for anyone who doubts whether he or she has a case for
an annulment on any other terms. A situation that does not fit into any of the more traditional categories
often fits very easily into the psychological category.
As new as the psychological grounds are, experts are already detecting a shift in their use. Whereas
originally the emphasis was on the parties' inability to exercise proper judgment at the time of the
marriage (lack of due discretion), recent cases seem to be concentrating on the parties' to assume or carry
out their responsibilities an obligations as promised (lack of due competence). An advantage to using the
ground of lack of due competence is that the at the time the marriage was entered into civil divorce and
breakup of the family almost is of someone's failure out marital responsibilities as promised at the time
the marriage was entered into. 4
In the instant case, "opposing and conflicting personalities" of the spouses were not considered equivalent to
psychological incapacity. As well in Santos v. Court of Appeals cited in the ponencia, the Court held that the failure of the
wife to return home from the U.S. or to communicate with her husband for more then five years is not proof of her
psychological incapacity as to render the marriage a nullity. 5 Therefore, Art. 36 is inapplicable and the marriages remain
valid and subsisting.
However in the recent case of Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals, 6 this Court upheld both the Regional Trial Court and the
Court of Appeals in declaring the presence of psychological incapacity on the part of the husband. Said petitioner
husband, after ten (10) months' sleeping with his wife never had coitus with her, a fact he did not deny but he alleged that
it was due to the physical disorder of his wife which, however, he failed to prove. Goaded by the indifference and
stubborn refusal of her husband to fulfill a basic marital obligation described as "to procreate children based on the
universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage," the wife brought
the action in the lower court to declare the marriage null.
The Court, quoting Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic
Archdiocese of Manila (Branch I) on Psychological incapacity concluded:

If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential marriage
obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to
psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to
psychological incapacity. Thus, the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or
her spouse is considered a sign of psychological incapacity.
We declared:
This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties found themselves trapped in its mire of
unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital obligations, can do no less but sustain the studied judgment of respondent
appellate court.
1 concur with the majority opinion that the herein marriage remains valid and subsisting absent psychological incapacity
(under Art. 36 of the Family Code) on the part of either or both of the spouses.

VITUG, J., concurring:

I fully concur with my esteemed 'colleague Mr. Justice Artemio V. Panganiban in his ponencia, and I find to be most
helpful the guidelines that he prepared for the bench and the bar in the proper appreciation of Article 36 of Executive
Order No. 209 ("The Family Code of the Philippines"). The term "psychological incapacity" was neither defined nor
exemplified by the Family Code. Thus
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if
such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
The Revision Committee, constituted under the auspices of the U.P. Law Center, which drafted the Code
explained:
(T)he Committee would like the judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by
experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of
church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the
provision was taken from Canon Law. 1
Article 36 of the Family Code was concededly taken from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law
Canon 1095. (The following persons) are incapable of contracting marriage; (those)
1. who lack sufficient use of reason;
2. who suffer from a grave defect of discretion of judgment concerning essential matrimonial rights and
duties, to be given and accepted mutually;
3. who for causes of psychological nature are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage
that should give that much value to Canon Law jurisprudence as an aid to the interpretation and construction of
the statutory enactment. 2

The principles in the proper application of the law teach us that the several provisions of a Code must be read like a
congruent whole. Thus, in determining the import of "psychological incapacity" under Article 36, one must also read it
along with, albeit to be taken as distinct from, the other grounds enumerated in the Code, like Articles 35, 37, 38 and 41
that would likewise, but for distinct reasons, render the marriage merely voidable, or Article 55 that could justify a
petition for legal separation. Care must be observed so that these various circumstances are not applied so indiscriminately
as if the law were indifferent on the matter.
I would wish to reiterate the Court's' statement in Santos vs. Court of Appeals; 3 viz:
(T)he use of the phrase "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Code has not been meant to
comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical
authorities, extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances. . . Article 36 of the Family
Code cannot be taken and construed independently of, but must stand in conjunction with, existing
precepts in our law on marriage. Thus correlated, "psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a
mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants
that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed
by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect
and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has
been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability of the spouse to have sexual relations
with the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which considers children
conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be "legitimate."
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the state of a party being of
unsound mind or concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism,
merely renders the marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug addiction,
habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality should occur only during the marriage, they become
mere grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code. These provisions of the Code,
however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility of these various circumstances being themselves,
depending on the degree and severity of the disorder,indicia of psychological
incapacity. 4
In fine, the term "psychological incapacity," to be a ground for then nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code, must be able to pass the following tests; viz:
First, the incapacity must be psychological or mental, not physical, in nature;
Second, the psychological incapacity must relate to the inability, not mere refusal, to understand, assume end discharge the
basic marital obligations of living together, observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering mutual help and support;
Third, the psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is contracted although its overt manifestations and the
marriage may occur only thereafter; and
Fourth, the mental disorder must be grave or serious and incurable.
It may well be that the Family Code Revision Committee has envisioned Article 36, as not a few observers would suspect,
as another form of absolute divorce or, as still others would also put it, to be a alternative to divorce; however, the fact still
remains that the language of the law has failed to carry out, even if true, any such intendment. It might have indeed turned
out for the better, if it were otherwise, there could be good reasons to doubt the constitutionality of the measure. The

fundamental law itself, no less, has laid down in terse language its unequivocal command on how the State should regard
marriage and the family, thus
Section 2, Article XV:
Sec. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected
by the State.
Section 12, Article II:
Sec. 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a
basic autonomous social institution . . . .
Section 1, Article XV:
Sec. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall
strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total development. (The 1987 Constitution)
The case of Marcelino vs. Cruz, 121 SCRA 51, might here be significant not so much for the specific issue there resolved
but for the tone it has set. The Court there has held that constitutional provisions are to be considered mandatory unless by
necessary implication, a different intention is manifest such that to have them enforced strictly would cause more harm
than by disregarding them. It is quite clear to me that the constitutional mandate on marriage and the family has not been
meant to be simply directory in character, nor for mere expediency or convenience, but one that demands a meaningful,
not half-hearted, respect.

Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J., concuring opinion:
I concur in the result of the decision penned by Mr. Justice Panganiban but only because of the peculiar facts of the case.
As to whether or not the psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of a marriage, depends
crucially, more than in any field of the law, on the facts of the case. InLeouel Santos v. Court of Appeals and Julia
Rosario-Bedia Santos, G.R. No. 112019, 4 January 1995, 240 SCRA 20-36, I maintained, and I still maintain, that there
was psychological incapacity on the part of the wife to discharge the duties of a wife in a valid marriage. The facts of the
present case, after an indepth study, do not support a similar conclusion. Obviously, each case must be judged, not on the
basis of a prioriassumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts. In the field of psychological
incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on "all fours" with another case. The trial
judge must take pains in examining the actual millieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting
its own judgment for that of the trial court.
ROMERO, J., separate opinion:
The majority opinion, overturning that of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the Regional Trial Court ruling. upheld
petitioner Solicitor General's position that "opposing and conflicting personalities" is not equivalent to psychological
incapacity, for the latter "is not simply the neglect by the parties to the marriage of their responsibilities and duties, but
a defect in their Psychological nature which renders them incapable of performing such marital responsibilities and duties.

In the present case, the alleged personality traits of Reynaldo, the husband, did not constitute so much "psychological
incapacity" as a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations. "It is not
enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that they
must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (not physical) illness."
I would add that neither should the incapacity be the result of mental illness. For if it were due to insanity or defects in the
mental faculties short of insanity, there is a resultant defect of vice of consent, thus rendering the marriage annulable
under Art. 45 of the Family Code.
That the intent of the members of the U.P. Law Center's Civil Code Revision Committee was to excludemental inability to
understand the essential nature of marriage and focus strictly on psychological incapacity is demonstrated in the way the
provision in question underwent revisions.
At the Committee meeting of July 26, 1986, the draft provision read:
(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was wanting in the
sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage or was psychologically
or mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such lack of incapacity is
made manifest after the celebration.
The twists and turns which the ensuing discussion took finally produced the following revised provision even before the
session was over:
(7) That contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to
discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such lack or incapacity becomes manifest after the
celebration.
Noticeably, the immediately preceding formulation above has dropped any reference to "wanting in the sufficient use of
reason or judgment to understand the essential nature or marriage" and to "mentally incapacitated." It was explained that
these phrases refer to "defects in the mental faculties vitiating consent, which is not the idea . . . but lack of appreciation of
one's marital obligation." There being a defect in consent, "it is clear that it should be a ground for voidable marriage
because there is the appearance of consent and it is capable of convalidation for the simple reason that there are lucid
intervals and there are sanity is curable. . . . Psychological incapacity does not refer to mental faculties and has nothing to
do with consent; it refers to obligations attendant to
marriage." 1
My own position as a member of the Committee then was that psychological incapacity is, in a sense, insanity of a lesser
degree.
As to the proposal of Justice Caguioa to use the term "psychological or mental impotence," Archbishop Oscar Cruz opined
in he earlier February 9, 1984 session that this term "is an invention of some churchmen who are moralists but not
canonists, that is why it is considered a weak phrase." He said that the Code of Canon Law would rather express it as
"psychological or mental incapacity to discharge. . . ." Justice Ricardo C. Puno opined that sometimes a person may be
psychologically impotent with one but not with another.
One of the guidelines enumerated in the majority opinion for the interpretation and application of Art. 36 is: "Such
incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or
even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex."

The Committee, through Prof. Araceli T. Barrera, considered the inclusion of the phrase" and is incurable" but Prof.
Esteban B. Bautista commented that this would give rise to the question of how they will determine curability and Justice
Caguioa agreed that it would be more problematic. Yet the possibility that one may be cured after the psychological
incapacity becomes manifest after the marriage was not ruled out by Justice Puno and Justice Alice Sempio-Diy. Justice
Caguioa suggested that the remedy was to allow the afflicted spouse to remarry.
For clarity, the Committee classified the bases for determining void marriages, viz:
1. lack of one or more of the essential requisites of marriage as contract;
2. reasons of public policy;
3. special cases and special situations.
The ground of psychological incapacity was subsumed under "special cases and special situations," hence its
special treatment in Art. 36 in the Family Code as finally enacted.
Nowhere in the Civil Code provisions on Marriage is there a ground for avoiding or annulling marriages that even comes
close to being psychological in nature.
Where consent is vitiated due to circumstances existing at the time of the marriage, such marriage which stands valid until
annulled is capable of ratification or convalidation.
On the other hand, for reasons of public policy or lack of essential requisites, some marriages are void from the beginning.
With the revision of Book I of the Civil Code, particularly the provisions on Marriage, the drafters, now open to fresh
winds of change in keeping with the more permissive mores and practices of the time, took a leaf from the relatively
liberal provisions of Canon Law.
Canon 1095 which states, inter alia, that the following persons are incapable of contracting marriage: "3. (those) who,
because of causes of a psychological nature, are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage" provided the
model for what is now Art. 36 of the Family Code: "A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise
be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
It bears stressing that unlike in Civil Law, Canon Law recognizes only two types of marriages with respect to their
validity: valid and void. Civil Law, however, recognizes an intermediate state, the voidable or annullable marriages. When
the Ecclesiastical Tribunal "annuls" a marriage, it actually declares the marriage null and void, i.e., it never really existed
in the first place, for a valid sacramental marriage can never be dissolved. Hence, a properly performed and consummated
marriage between two living Roman Catholics can only be nullified by the formal annulment process which entails a full
tribunal procedure with a Court selection and a formal hearing.
Such so-called church "annulments" are not recognized by Civil Law as severing the marriage ties as to capacitate the
parties to enter lawfully into another marriage. The grounds for nullifying civil marriage, not being congruent with those
laid down by Canon Law, the former being more strict, quite a number of married couples have found themselves in limbo
freed from the marriage bonds in the eyes of the Catholic Church but yet unable to contract a valid civil marriage under
state laws. Heedless of civil law sanctions, some persons contract new marriages or enter into live-in relationships.

It was precisely to provide a satisfactory solution to such anomalous situations that the Civil Law Revision Committee
decided to engraft the Canon Law concept of psychological incapacity into the Family Code and classified the same as
a ground for declaring marriages void ab initio or totally in existent from the beginning.
A brief historical note on the Old Canon Law (1917). This Old Code, while it did not provide directly for psychological
incapacity, in effect recognized the same indirectly from a combination of three old canons: "Canon #1081 required
persons to 'be capable according to law' in order to give valid consent; Canon #1082 required that persons 'be at least not
ignorant' of the major elements required in marriage; and Canon #1087 (the force and fear category) required that internal
and external freedom be present in order for consent to be valid. This line of interpretation produced two distinct but
related grounds for annulment, called 'lack of due discretion' and 'lack of due competence.' Lack of due discretion means
that the person did not have the ability to give valid consent at the time of the wedding and therefore the union is invalid.
Lack of due competence means that the person was incapable of carrying out the obligations of the promise he or she
made during the wedding ceremony.
"Favorable annulment decisions by the Roman Rota in the 1950s and 1960s involving sexual disorders such as
homosexuality and nymphomania laid the foundation for a broader approach to the kind of proof necessary for
psychological grounds for annulment. The Rota had reasoned for the first time in several cases that the capacity to give
valid consent at the time of marriage was probably not present in persons who had displayed such problems shortly after
the marriage. The nature of this change was nothing short of revolutionary. Once the Rota itself had demonstrated a
cautious willingness to use this kind of hindsight, the way was paved for what came after 1970. Diocesan Tribunals began
to accept proof of serious psychological problems that manifested themselves shortly after the ceremony as proof of an
inability to give valid consent at the time of the ceremony.
Furthermore, and equally significant, the professional opinion of a psychological expert became increasingly important in
such cases. Data about the person's entire life, both before and after the ceremony, were presented to these experts and
they were asked to give professional opinions about a party's mental at the time of the wedding. These opinions were
rarely challenged and tended to be accepted as decisive evidence of lack of valid consent.
The Church took pains to point out that its new openness in this area did not amount to the addition of new grounds for
annulment, but rather was an accommodation by the Church to the advances made in psychology during the past
decades. There was now the expertise to provide the all-important connecting link between a marriage breakdown and
premarital causes.
During the 1970s, the Church broadened its whole idea of marriage from that of a legal contract to that of a covenant. The
result of this was that it could no longer be assumed in annulment cases that a person who could intellectually understand
the concept of marriage could necessarily give valid consent to marry. The ability to both grasp and assume the real
obligations of a mature, lifelong commitment are now considered a necessary prerequisite to valid matrimonial consent. 2
Rotal decisions continued applying the concept of incipient psychological incapacity, "not only to sexual anomalies but to
all kinds of personality disorders that incapacitate a spouse or both spouses from assuming or carrying out the essential
obligations of marriage. For marriage . . . is not merely cohabitation or the right of the spouses to each others' body for
heterosexual acts, but is, in its totality, the right to the community of the whole of life, i.e., the right to a developing.
lifelong relationship. Rotal decisions since 1973 have refined the meaning of psychological or psychic capacity for
marriage as presupposing the development of an adult personality; as meaning the capacity of the spouses to give
themselves to each other and to accept the other as a distinct person; that the spouses must be 'other oriented' since the
obligations of marriage are rooted in a self-giving love; and that the spouses must have the capacity for interpersonal
relationship because marriage is more than just a physical reality but involves a true intertwining of personalities. The
fulfillment of the obligations of marriage depends. according to Church decisions, on the strength of this interpersonal
relationship. A serious incapacity for interpersonal sharing and support is held to impair the relationship and consequently,

the ability to fulfill the essential marital obligations. The marital capacity of one spouse is not considered in isolation but
in reference to the fundamental relationship to the other spouse. 3
Fr. Green, in an article in Catholic Mind, lists six elements necessary to the mature marital relationship:
The courts consider the following elements crucial to the marital commitment: (1) a permanent and
faithful commitment to the marriage partner; (2) openness to children and partner; (3) stability; (4)
emotional maturity; (5) financial responsibility; (6) an ability to cope with the ordinary stresses and
strains of marriage, etc.
Fr. Green goes on to speak about some of the psychological conditions that might lead to the failure of a
marriage:
At stake is a type of constitutional impairment precluding conjugal communion even with the best
intentions of the parties. Among the psychic factors possibly giving rise to his or her inability to fulfill
marital obligations are the following: (1) antisocial personality with its fundamental lack of loyalty to
persons or sense of moral values; (2) hyperesthesia, where the individual has no real freedom of sexual
choice; (3) the inadequate personality where personal responses consistently fallshort of reasonable
expectations.
xxx xxx xxx
The psychological grounds are the best approach for anyone who doubts whether he or she has a case for
an annulment on any other terms. A situation that does not fit into any of the more traditional categories
often fits very easily into the psychological category.
As new as the psychological grounds are, experts are already detecting a shift in their use. Whereas
originally the emphasis was on the parties' inability to exercise proper judgment at the time of the
marriage (lack of due discretion), recent cases seem to be concentrating on the parties' to assume or carry
out their responsibilities an obligations as promised (lack of due competence). An advantage to using the
ground of lack of due competence is that the at the time the marriage was entered into civil divorce and
breakup of the family almost is of someone's failure out marital responsibilities as promised at the time
the marriage was entered into. 4
In the instant case, "opposing and conflicting personalities" of the spouses were not considered equivalent to
psychological incapacity. As well in Santos v. Court of Appeals cited in the ponencia, the Court held that the failure of the
wife to return home from the U.S. or to communicate with her husband for more then five years is not proof of her
psychological incapacity as to render the marriage a nullity. 5 Therefore, Art. 36 is inapplicable and the marriages remain
valid and subsisting.
However in the recent case of Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals, 6 this Court upheld both the Regional Trial Court and the
Court of Appeals in declaring the presence of psychological incapacity on the part of the husband. Said petitioner
husband, after ten (10) months' sleeping with his wife never had coitus with her, a fact he did not deny but he alleged that
it was due to the physical disorder of his wife which, however, he failed to prove. Goaded by the indifference and
stubborn refusal of her husband to fulfill a basic marital obligation described as "to procreate children based on the
universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage," the wife brought
the action in the lower court to declare the marriage null.
The Court, quoting Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic
Archdiocese of Manila (Branch I) on Psychological incapacity concluded:

If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential marriage
obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to
psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to
psychological incapacity. Thus, the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or
her spouse is considered a sign of psychological incapacity.
We declared:
This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties found themselves trapped in its mire of
unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital obligations, can do no less but sustain the studied judgment of respondent
appellate court.
1 concur with the majority opinion that the herein marriage remains valid and subsisting absent psychological incapacity
(under Art. 36 of the Family Code) on the part of either or both of the spouses.

VITUG, J., concurring:

I fully concur with my esteemed 'colleague Mr. Justice Artemio V. Panganiban in his ponencia, and I find to be most
helpful the guidelines that he prepared for the bench and the bar in the proper appreciation of Article 36 of Executive
Order No. 209 ("The Family Code of the Philippines"). The term "psychological incapacity" was neither defined nor
exemplified by the Family Code. Thus
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if
such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
The Revision Committee, constituted under the auspices of the U.P. Law Center, which drafted the Code
explained:
(T)he Committee would like the judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by
experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of
church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the
provision was taken from Canon Law. 1
Article 36 of the Family Code was concededly taken from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law
Canon 1095. (The following persons) are incapable of contracting marriage; (those)
1. who lack sufficient use of reason;
2. who suffer from a grave defect of discretion of judgment concerning essential matrimonial rights and
duties, to be given and accepted mutually;
3. who for causes of psychological nature are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage
that should give that much value to Canon Law jurisprudence as an aid to the interpretation and construction of
the statutory enactment. 2

The principles in the proper application of the law teach us that the several provisions of a Code must be read like a
congruent whole. Thus, in determining the import of "psychological incapacity" under Article 36, one must also read it
along with, albeit to be taken as distinct from, the other grounds enumerated in the Code, like Articles 35, 37, 38 and 41
that would likewise, but for distinct reasons, render the marriage merely voidable, or Article 55 that could justify a
petition for legal separation. Care must be observed so that these various circumstances are not applied so indiscriminately
as if the law were indifferent on the matter.
I would wish to reiterate the Court's' statement in Santos vs. Court of Appeals; 3 viz:
(T)he use of the phrase "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Code has not been meant to
comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical
authorities, extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances. . . Article 36 of the Family
Code cannot be taken and construed independently of, but must stand in conjunction with, existing
precepts in our law on marriage. Thus correlated, "psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a
mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants
that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed
by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect
and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has
been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability of the spouse to have sexual relations
with the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which considers children
conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be "legitimate."
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the state of a party being of
unsound mind or concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism,
merely renders the marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug addiction,
habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality should occur only during the marriage, they become
mere grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code. These provisions of the Code,
however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility of these various circumstances being themselves,
depending on the degree and severity of the disorder,indicia of psychological
incapacity. 4
In fine, the term "psychological incapacity," to be a ground for then nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code, must be able to pass the following tests; viz:
First, the incapacity must be psychological or mental, not physical, in nature;
Second, the psychological incapacity must relate to the inability, not mere refusal, to understand, assume end discharge the
basic marital obligations of living together, observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering mutual help and support;
Third, the psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is contracted although its overt manifestations and the
marriage may occur only thereafter; and
Fourth, the mental disorder must be grave or serious and incurable.
It may well be that the Family Code Revision Committee has envisioned Article 36, as not a few observers would suspect,
as another form of absolute divorce or, as still others would also put it, to be a alternative to divorce; however, the fact still
remains that the language of the law has failed to carry out, even if true, any such intendment. It might have indeed turned
out for the better, if it were otherwise, there could be good reasons to doubt the constitutionality of the measure. The

fundamental law itself, no less, has laid down in terse language its unequivocal command on how the State should regard
marriage and the family, thus
Section 2, Article XV:
Sec. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected
by the State.
Section 12, Article II:
Sec. 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a
basic autonomous social institution . . . .
Section 1, Article XV:
Sec. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall
strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total development. (The 1987 Constitution)
The case of Marcelino vs. Cruz, 121 SCRA 51, might here be significant not so much for the specific issue there resolved
but for the tone it has set. The Court there has held that constitutional provisions are to be considered mandatory unless by
necessary implication, a different intention is manifest such that to have them enforced strictly would cause more harm
than by disregarding them. It is quite clear to me that the constitutional mandate on marriage and the family has not been
meant to be simply directory in character, nor for mere expediency or convenience, but one that demands a meaningful,
not half-hearted, respect.
Footnotes
5 The Court of Appeals reproduced in its Decision a substantial portion of the RTC Decision is follows:
"To sustain her claim that respondent is psychologically incapacitated to comply with his marital
obligations, petitioner testified that he is immature, irresponsible, dependent, disrespectful, arrogant, a
chronic liar, and an infidel. These characteristics of respondent are based on petitioner's testimony that the
former failed to be gainfully employed after he was relieved from the office of the Government Corporate
Counsel sometime in February, 1986. leaving petitioner as the sole breadwinner of the family. Also when
they were separated in fact, respondent practically abandoned both petitioner-mother and son except
during the first few months of separation when respondent regularly visited his son and gave him a
monthly allowance of P1,000.00 for about two to four months. Respondent is likewise dependent on his
parents for financial aid and support as he has no savings, preferring to spend his money with his friends
and peers. A year after their marriage, respondent informed petitioner that he bought a house and lot at BF
Homes, Paraaque for about a million pesos. They then transferred there only for the petitioner to
discover a few months later that they were actually renting the house with the respondent's parents
responsible for the payment of the rentals. Aside from this. respondent would also lie about his salary and
ability. And that at present, respondent is living with his mistress and their child. which fact he does not
deny.
It is unfortunate that the marriage between petitioner and respondent turned sour if we look at the
background of their relationship. During their college days, when they were still going steady, respondent
observed petitioner to be conservative, homely, and intelligent causing him to believe then that she would
make an ideal wife and mother. Likewise, petitioner fell in love with respondent because of his
thoughtfulness and gentleness. After a year, however, they decided to break their relationship because of

some differences in their personalities. Almost five (5) years later, while they were working in Manila,
petitioner and respondent rekindled their love affair. They became very close and petitioner was glad to
observe a more mature respondent. Believing that they know each other much better after two years of
going steady, they decided to settle down and get married. It would seem. therefore, that petitioner and
respondent knew each other well and were then prepared for married life.
During their marriage, however, the true personalities of the parties cropped-up and dominated their life
together. Unexpectedly on both their parts, petitioner and respondent failed to respond properly to the
situation. This failure resulted in their frequent arguments and fighting's. In fact, even with the
intervention and help of their parents who arranged for their possible reconciliation, the parties could not
come to terms.
It seems clear at this stage that the marriage between the parties broke-up because of their opposing and
conflicting personalities (sic). Neither of them can accept and understand the weakness of the other. No
one gives in and instead, blame each other for whatever problem or misunderstanding/s they encounter. In
fine, respondent cannot be solely responsible for the failure of other (sic) marriage. Rather, this resulted
because both parties cannot relate to each other as husband and wife which is unique and requisite in
marriage.
Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman with the basic objective of
establishing a conjugal and family life. (Article 1, Family Code). The unique element of permanency of
union signifies a continuing, developing, and lifelong relationship between the parties. Towards this end,
the parties must fully understand and accept the (implications and consequences of being permanently)
united in marriage. And the maintenance of this relationship demands from the parties, among others,
determination to succeed in their marriage as well as heartfelt understanding, acceptance, cooperation,
and support for each other. Thus, the Family Code requires them to live together, to observe mutual (love,
respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support. Failure to observe) and perform these
fundamental roles of a husband and a wife will most likely lead to the break-up of the marriage. Such is
the unfortunate situation in this case. (Decision, pp. 5-8; Original Records, pp. 70-73).
6 240 SCRA 20, 34, January 4, 1995.
7 Quoted from Justice Alicia Sempio-Diy, Handbook on the Family Code, First Edition, 1988.
8 TSN, April 6, 1991, p. 5.
9 The National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal reviews all decisions of the marriage tribunals of each
archdiocese in the country. Aside from heading the Appellate Tribunal, Most. Rev. Cruz is also incumbent
president of the Catholic Bishops' Conference of the Philippines, Archbishop of Dagupan-Lingayen, and
holds the degrees of Doctor of Canon Law and Doctor of Divinity. Archbishop Cruz was also SecretaryGeneral of the Second Plenary Council of the Philippines PCP II held from January 20, 1991 to
February 17, 1991, which is the rough equivalent of a parliament or a constitutional convention in the
Philippine Church, and where the ponente, who was a Council member, had the privilege of being
overwhelmed by his keen mind and prayerful discernments.
10 Justice Puno was a former member of the Court of Appeals, retired Minister of Justice, author, noted
civil law professor and the law practitioner.
Article XV

THE FAMILY
Sec. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino Family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall
strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total development.
Sec. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected
by the state.
Sec. 3. The State shall defend:
(1) The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious connections and the demands
of responsible parenthood;
(2) The right of children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and special protection from all
forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty. exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their development;
(3) The right of the family to a family living wage and income;
(4) The right of families or family associations to participate in the planning and implementation of
policies and programs that affect them.
Sec. 4. The family has the duty to care for its elderly members but the state may also do so through just
programs of social security.
Art. 1 Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered into in
accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the family
and an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and
not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the
marriage within the limits provided by this Code.
13 Salita vs. Magtolis, 233 SCRA 100, June 13, 1994.
14 This text is taken from the Memorandum of Archbishop Cruz. On the other hand, the text used in
Santos v. CA reads:
"Canon 1095. They are incapable of contracting marriage:
xxx xxx xxx
3. Who for causes of psychological nature are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
The difference in wording between this and that in Arch. Cruz's Memorandum is due to the fact that the
original Canon is written in Latin and both versions are differently-worded English translations.

G.R. No. 155800

March 10, 2006

LEONILO ANTONIO Petitioner,

vs.
MARIE IVONNE F. REYES, Respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
Statistics never lie, but lovers often do, quipped a sage. This sad truth has unsettled many a love transformed into
matrimony. Any sort of deception between spouses, no matter the gravity, is always disquieting. Deceit to the depth and
breadth unveiled in the following pages, dark and irrational as in the modern noir tale, dims any trace of certitude on the
guilty spouses capability to fulfill the marital obligations even more.
The Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the Decision1 and Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals dated 29 November
2001 and 24 October 2002. The Court of Appeals had reversed the judgment 3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati

declaring the marriage of Leonilo N. Antonio (petitioner) and Marie Ivonne F. Reyes (respondent), null and void. After
careful consideration, we reverse and affirm instead the trial court.
Antecedent Facts
Petitioner and respondent met in August 1989 when petitioner was 26 years old and respondent was 36 years of age.
Barely a year after their first meeting, they got married before a minister of the Gospel 4 at the Manila City Hall, and
through a subsequent church wedding5 at the Sta. Rosa de Lima Parish, Bagong Ilog, Pasig, Metro Manila on 6 December
1990.6 Out of their union, a child was born on 19 April 1991, who sadly died five (5) months later.
On 8 March 1993,7 petitioner filed a petition to have his marriage to respondent declared null and void. He anchored his
petition for nullity on Article 36 of the Family Code alleging that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential obligations of marriage. He asserted that respondents incapacity existed at the time their marriage was
celebrated and still subsists up to the present. 8
As manifestations of respondents alleged psychological incapacity, petitioner claimed that respondent persistently lied
about herself, the people around her, her occupation, income, educational attainment and other events or things, 9 to wit:
(1) She concealed the fact that she previously gave birth to an illegitimate son, 10 and instead introduced the boy to
petitioner as the adopted child of her family. She only confessed the truth about the boys parentage when petitioner
learned about it from other sources after their marriage. 11
(2) She fabricated a story that her brother-in-law, Edwin David, attempted to rape and kill her when in fact, no such
incident occurred.12
(3) She misrepresented herself as a psychiatrist to her obstetrician, Dr. Consuelo Gardiner, and told some of her friends
that she graduated with a degree in psychology, when she was neither.13
(4) She claimed to be a singer or a free-lance voice talent affiliated with Blackgold Recording Company (Blackgold); yet,
not a single member of her family ever witnessed her alleged singing activities with the group. In the same vein, she
postulated that a luncheon show was held at the Philippine Village Hotel in her honor and even presented an invitation to
that effect14 but petitioner discovered per certification by the Director of Sales of said hotel that no such occasion had
taken place.15
(5) She invented friends named Babes Santos and Via Marquez, and under those names, sent lengthy letters to petitioner
claiming to be from Blackgold and touting her as the "number one moneymaker" in the commercial industry worth P2
million.16 Petitioner later found out that respondent herself was the one who wrote and sent the letters to him when she
admitted the truth in one of their quarrels.17 He likewise realized that Babes Santos and Via Marquez were only figments
of her imagination when he discovered they were not known in or connected with Blackgold. 18
(6) She represented herself as a person of greater means, thus, she altered her payslip to make it appear that she earned a
higher income. She bought a sala set from a public market but told petitioner that she acquired it from a famous furniture
dealer.19 She spent lavishly on unnecessary items and ended up borrowing money from other people on false pretexts. 20
(7) She exhibited insecurities and jealousies over him to the extent of calling up his officemates to monitor his
whereabouts. When he could no longer take her unusual behavior, he separated from her in August 1991. He tried to
attempt a reconciliation but since her behavior did not change, he finally left her for good in November 1991. 21
In support of his petition, petitioner presented Dr. Dante Herrera Abcede (Dr. Abcede), a psychiatrist, and Dr. Arnulfo V.
Lopez (Dr. Lopez), a clinical psychologist, who stated, based on the tests they conducted, that petitioner was essentially a
normal, introspective, shy and conservative type of person. On the other hand, they observed that respondents persistent
and constant lying

to petitioner was abnormal or pathological. It undermined the basic relationship that should be based on love, trust and
respect.22 They further asserted that respondents extreme jealousy was also pathological. It reached the point of paranoia
since there was no actual basis for her to suspect that petitioner was having an affair with another woman. They concluded
based on the foregoing that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential marital obligations. 23
In opposing the petition, respondent claimed that she performed her marital obligations by attending to all the needs of her
husband. She asserted that there was no truth to the allegation that she fabricated stories, told lies and invented
personalities.24 She presented her version, thus:
(1) She concealed her child by another man from petitioner because she was afraid of losing her husband. 25
(2) She told petitioner about Davids attempt to rape and kill her because she surmised such intent from Davids act of
touching her back and ogling her from head to foot.26
(3) She was actually a BS Banking and Finance graduate and had been teaching psychology at the Pasig Catholic School
for two (2) years.27
(4) She was a free-lance voice talent of Aris de las Alas, an executive producer of Channel 9 and she had done three (3)
commercials with McCann Erickson for the advertisement of Coca-cola, Johnson & Johnson, and Traders Royal Bank.
She told petitioner she was a Blackgold recording artist although she was not under contract with the company, yet she
reported to the Blackgold office after office hours. She claimed that a luncheon show was indeed held in her honor at the
Philippine Village Hotel on 8 December 1979.28
(5) She vowed that the letters sent to petitioner were not written by her and the writers thereof were not fictitious. Bea
Marquez Recto of the Recto political clan was a resident of the United States while Babes Santos was employed with
Saniwares.29
(6) She admitted that she called up an officemate of her husband but averred that she merely asked the latter in a
diplomatic matter if she was the one asking for chocolates from petitioner, and not to monitor her husbands
whereabouts.30
(7) She belied the allegation that she spent lavishly as she supported almost ten people from her monthly budget
of P7,000.00.31
In fine, respondent argued that apart from her non-disclosure of a child prior to their marriage, the other lies attributed to
her by petitioner were mostly hearsay and unconvincing. Her stance was that the totality of the evidence presented is not
sufficient for a finding of psychological incapacity on her part. 32
In addition, respondent presented Dr. Antonio Efren Reyes (Dr. Reyes), a psychiatrist, to refute the allegations anent her
psychological condition. Dr. Reyes testified that the series of tests conducted by his assistant, 33 together with the screening
procedures and the Comprehensive Psycho-Pathological Rating Scale (CPRS) he himself conducted, led him to conclude
that respondent was not psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations. He postulated that
regressive behavior, gross neuroticism, psychotic tendencies, and poor control of impulses, which are signs that might
point to the presence of disabling trends, were not elicited from respondent. 34
In rebuttal, Dr. Lopez asseverated that there were flaws in the evaluation conducted by Dr. Reyes as (i) he was not the one
who administered and interpreted respondents psychological evaluation, and (ii) he made use of only one instrument
called CPRS which was not reliable because a good liar can fake the results of such test. 35
After trial, the lower court gave credence to petitioners evidence and held that respondents propensity to lying about
almost anythingher occupation, state of health, singing abilities and her income, among othershad been duly
established. According to the trial court, respondents fantastic ability to invent and fabricate stories and personalities
enabled her to live in a world of make-believe. This made her psychologically incapacitated as it rendered her incapable of
giving meaning and significance to her marriage.36 The trial court thus declared the marriage between petitioner and
respondent null and void.

Shortly before the trial court rendered its decision, the Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila annulled the
Catholic marriage of the parties, on the ground of lack of due discretion on the part of the parties. 37 During the pendency
of the appeal before the Court of Appeals, the Metropolitan Tribunals ruling was affirmed with modification by both the
National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal, which held instead that only respondent was impaired by a lack of due
discretion.38 Subsequently, the decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal was upheld by the Roman Rota of
the Vatican.39
Petitioner duly alerted the Court of Appeals of these rulings by the Catholic tribunals. Still, the appellate court reversed
the RTCs judgment. While conceding that respondent may not have been completely honest with petitioner, the Court of
Appeals nevertheless held that the totality of the evidence presented was insufficient to establish respondents
psychological incapacity. It declared that the requirements in the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals40 governing the
application and interpretation of psychological incapacity had not been satisfied.
Taking exception to the appellate courts pronouncement, petitioner elevated the case to this Court. He contends herein
that the evidence conclusively establish respondents psychological incapacity.
In considering the merit of this petition, the Court is heavily influenced by the credence accorded by the RTC to the
factual allegations of petitioner.41 It is a settled principle of civil procedure that the conclusions of the trial court regarding
the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect from the appellate courts because the trial court had an opportunity
to observe the demeanor of witnesses while giving testimony which may indicate their candor or lack thereof. 42 The Court
is likewise guided by the fact that the Court of Appeals did not dispute the veracity of the evidence presented by
petitioner. Instead, the appellate court concluded that such evidence was not sufficient to establish the psychological
incapacity of respondent.43
Thus, the Court is impelled to accept the factual version of petitioner as the operative facts. Still, the crucial question
remains as to whether the state of facts as presented by petitioner sufficiently meets the standards set for the declaration of
nullity of a marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. These standards were definitively laid down in the Courts 1997
ruling in Republic v. Court of Appeals44 (also known as the Molina case45), and indeed the Court of Appeals cited
the Molina guidelines in reversing the RTC in the case at bar.46 Since Molina was decided in 1997, the Supreme Court has
yet to squarely affirm the declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. 47 In fact, even
before Molina was handed down, there was only one case, Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals,48 wherein the Court
definitively concluded that a spouse was psychologically incapacitated under Article 36.
This state of jurisprudential affairs may have led to the misperception that the remedy afforded by Article 36 of the Family
Code is hollow, insofar as the Supreme Court is concerned. 49 Yet what Molina and the succeeding cases did ordain was a
set of guidelines which, while undoubtedly onerous on the petitioner seeking the declaration of nullity, still leave room for
a decree of nullity under the proper circumstances. Molina did not foreclose the grant of a decree of nullity under Article
36, even as it raised the bar for its allowance.
Legal Guides to Understanding Article 36
Article 36 of the Family Code states that "[a] marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if
such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization." 50 The concept of psychological incapacity as a ground for
nullity of marriage is novel in our body of laws, although mental incapacity has long been recognized as a ground for the
dissolution of a marriage.
The Spanish Civil Code of 1889 prohibited from contracting marriage persons "who are not in the full enjoyment of their
reason at the time of contracting marriage."51 Marriages with such persons were ordained as void, 52 in the same class as
marriages with underage parties and persons already married, among others. A partys mental capacity was not a ground
for divorce under the Divorce Law of 1917,53 but a marriage where "either party was of unsound mind" at the time of its
celebration was cited as an "annullable marriage" under the Marriage Law of 1929. 54 Divorce on the ground of a spouses
incurable insanity was permitted under the divorce law enacted during the Japanese occupation. 55 Upon the enactment of
the Civil Code in 1950, a marriage contracted by a party of "unsound mind" was classified under Article 85 of the Civil
Code as a voidable marriage.56 The mental capacity, or lack thereof, of the marrying spouse was not among the grounds

for declaring a marriage void ab initio.57 Similarly, among the marriages classified as voidable under Article 45 (2) of the
Family Code is one contracted by a party of unsound mind.58
Such cause for the annulment of marriage is recognized as a vice of consent, just like insanity impinges on consent freely
given which is one of the essential requisites of a contract. 59 The initial common consensus on psychological incapacity
under Article 36 of the Family Code was that it did not constitute a specie of vice of consent. Justices Sempio-Diy and
Caguioa, both members of the Family Code revision committee that drafted the Code, have opined that psychological
incapacity is not a vice of consent, and conceded that the spouse may have given free and voluntary consent to a marriage
but was nonetheless incapable of fulfilling such rights and obligations. 60 Dr. Tolentino likewise stated in the 1990 edition
of his commentaries on the Family Code that this "psychological incapacity to comply with the essential marital
obligations does not affect the consent to the marriage." 61
There were initial criticisms of this original understanding of Article 36 as phrased by the Family Code committee.
Tolentino opined that "psychologically incapacity to comply would not be
juridically different from physical incapacity of consummating the marriage, which makes the marriage only voidable
under Article 45 (5) of the Civil Code x x x [and thus] should have been a cause for annulment of the marriage only." 62 At
the same time, Tolentino noted "[it] would be different if it were psychological incapacity to understand the essential
marital obligations, because then this would amount to lack of consent to the marriage." 63 These concerns though were
answered, beginning with Santos v. Court of Appeals,64 wherein the Court, through Justice Vitug, acknowledged that
"psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the
marriage."65
The notion that psychological incapacity pertains to the inability to understand the obligations of marriage, as opposed to
a mere inability to comply with them, was further affirmed in the Molina66 case. Therein, the Court, through then Justice
(now Chief Justice) Panganiban observed that "[t]he evidence [to establish psychological incapacity] must convince the
court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such extent that the person could not have known
the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereto." 67 Jurisprudence since
then has recognized that psychological incapacity "is a malady so grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of
the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume." 68
It might seem that this present understanding of psychological incapacity deviates from the literal wording of Article 36,
with its central phase reading "psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations of marriage." 69 At the same time, it has been consistently recognized by this Court
that the intent of the Family Code committee was to design the law as to allow some resiliency in its application, by
avoiding specific examples that would limit the applicability of the provision under the principle ofejusdem
generis. Rather, the preference of the revision committee was for "the judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-case
basis, guided by experience, in the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of
church tribunals which, although not binding on
the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision was taken from Canon Law." 70
We likewise observed in Republic v. Dagdag:71
Whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of a marriage, depends crucially,
more than in any field of the law, on the facts of the case. Each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori
assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts. In regard to psychological incapacity as a
ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on "all fours" with another case. The trial judge must
take pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own
judgment for that of the trial court.72
The Court thus acknowledges that the definition of psychological incapacity, as intended by the revision committee, was
not cast in intractable specifics. Judicial understanding of psychological incapacity may be informed by evolving

standards, taking into account the particulars of each case, current trends in psychological and even canonical thought, and
experience. It is under the auspices of the deliberate ambiguity of the framers that the Court has developed
the Molina rules, which have been consistently applied since 1997. Molina has proven indubitably useful in providing a
unitary framework that guides courts in adjudicating petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. At the same time,
the Molina guidelines are not set in stone, the clear legislative intent mandating a case-to-case perception of each
situation, and Molina itself arising from this evolutionary understanding of Article 36. There is no cause to
disavow Molina at present, and indeed the disposition of this case shall rely primarily on that precedent. There is need
though to emphasize other perspectives as well which should govern the disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity
under Article 36.
Of particular notice has been the citation of the Court, first in Santos then in Molina, of the considered opinion of canon
law experts in the interpretation of psychological incapacity. This is but unavoidable, considering that the Family Code
committee had bluntly acknowledged that the concept of psychological incapacity was derived from canon law,73 and as
one member admitted, enacted as a solution to the problem of marriages already annulled by the Catholic Church but still
existent under civil law.74 It would be disingenuous to disregard the influence of Catholic Church doctrine in the
formulation and subsequent understanding of Article 36, and the Court has expressly acknowledged that interpretations
given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the local Church, while not controlling or decisive, should be
given great respect by our courts.75 Still, it must be emphasized that the Catholic Church is hardly the sole source of
influence in the interpretation of Article 36. Even though the concept may have been derived from canon law, its
incorporation into the Family Code and subsequent judicial interpretation occurred in wholly secular progression. Indeed,
while Church thought on psychological incapacity is merely persuasive on the trial courts, judicial decisions of this Court
interpreting psychological incapacity are binding on lower courts. 76
Now is also opportune time to comment on another common legal guide utilized in the adjudication of petitions for
declaration of nullity under Article 36. All too frequently, this Court and lower courts, in denying petitions of the kind,
have favorably cited Sections 1 and 2, Article XV of the Constitution, which respectively state that "[t]he State recognizes
the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its
total developmen[t]," and that "[m]arriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be
protected by the State." These provisions highlight the importance of the family and the constitutional protection accorded
to the institution of marriage.
But the Constitution itself does not establish the parameters of state protection to marriage as a social institution and the
foundation of the family. It remains the province of the legislature to define all legal aspects of marriage and prescribe the
strategy and the modalities to protect it, based on whatever socio-political influences it deems proper, and subject of
course to the qualification that such legislative enactment itself adheres to the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. This
being the case, it also falls on the legislature to put into operation the constitutional provisions that protect marriage and
the family. This has been accomplished at present through the enactment of the Family Code, which defines marriage and
the family, spells out the corresponding legal effects, imposes the limitations that affect married and family life, as well as
prescribes the grounds for declaration of nullity and those for legal separation. While it may appear that the judicial denial
of a petition for declaration of nullity is reflective of the constitutional mandate to protect marriage, such action in fact
merely enforces a statutory definition of marriage, not a constitutionally ordained decree of what marriage is. Indeed, if
circumstances warrant, Sections 1 and 2 of Article XV need not be the only constitutional considerations to be taken into
account in resolving a petition for declaration of nullity.
Indeed, Article 36 of the Family Code, in classifying marriages contracted by a psychologically incapacitated person as a
nullity, should be deemed as an implement of this constitutional protection of marriage. Given the avowed State interest in
promoting marriage as the foundation of the family, which in turn serves as the foundation of the nation, there is a
corresponding interest for the State to defend against marriages ill-equipped to promote family life. Void ab
initio marriages under Article 36 do not further the initiatives of the State concerning marriage and family, as they
promote wedlock among persons who, for reasons independent of their will, are not capacitated to understand or comply
with the essential obligations of marriage.
These are the legal premises that inform us as we decide the present petition.
Molina Guidelines As Applied in This Case

As stated earlier, Molina established the guidelines presently recognized in the judicial disposition of petitions for nullity
under Article 36. The Court has consistently applied Molina since its promulgation in 1997, and the guidelines therein
operate as the general rules. They warrant citation in full:
1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved
in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in
the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our
Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees
marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family
and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their permanence,
inviolability and solidarity.
2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family
Code requires that the incapacity must be psychologicalnot physical, although its manifestations and/or
symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally
or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or
knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be
given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle ofejusdem generis, nevertheless
such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert
evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence
must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I dos." The manifestation of the illness
need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability
may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of
the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not
necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a
pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but not be
psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of
marriage.
5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations
of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot
be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect
or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an
adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting
and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards
the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their
children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and
included in the text of the decision.
7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines,
while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken
by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became
effective in 1983 and which provides:
"The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the essential obligations of
marriage due to causes of psychological nature."

Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of
our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to decisions of
such appellate tribunal. Ideallysubject to our law on evidencewhat is decreed as canonically invalid should also be
decreed civilly void.77
Molina had provided for an additional requirement that the Solicitor General issue a certification stating his reasons for
his agreement or opposition to the petition.78 This requirement however was dispensed with following the implementation
of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, or the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages.79 Still, Article 48 of the Family Code mandates that the appearance of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
assigned be on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is
not fabricated or suppressed. Obviously, collusion is not an issue in this case, considering the consistent vigorous
opposition of respondent to the petition for declaration of nullity. In any event, the fiscals participation in the hearings
before the trial court is extant from the records of this case.
As earlier noted, the factual findings of the RTC are now deemed binding on this Court, owing to the great weight
accorded to the opinion of the primary trier of facts, and the refusal of the Court of Appeals to dispute the veracity of these
facts. As such, it must be considered that respondent had consistently lied about many material aspects as to her character
and personality. The question remains whether her pattern of fabrication sufficiently establishes her psychological
incapacity, consistent with Article 36 and generally, the Molina guidelines.
We find that the present case sufficiently satisfies the guidelines in Molina.
First. Petitioner had sufficiently overcome his burden in proving the psychological incapacity of his spouse. Apart from
his own testimony, he presented witnesses who corroborated his allegations on his wifes behavior, and certifications from
Blackgold Records and the Philippine Village Hotel Pavillon which disputed respondents claims pertinent to her alleged
singing career. He also presented two (2) expert witnesses from the field of psychology who testified that the aberrant
behavior of respondent was tantamount to psychological incapacity. In any event, both courts below considered
petitioners evidence as credible enough. Even the appellate court acknowledged that respondent was not totally honest
with petitioner.80
As in all civil matters, the petitioner in an action for declaration of nullity under Article 36 must be able to establish the
cause of action with a preponderance of evidence. However, since the action cannot be considered as a non-public matter
between private parties, but is impressed with State interest, the Family Code likewise requires the participation of the
State, through the prosecuting attorney, fiscal, or Solicitor General, to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties
and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. Thus, even if the petitioner is able establish the
psychological incapacity of respondent with preponderant evidence, any finding of collusion among the parties would
necessarily negate such proofs.
Second. The root cause of respondents psychological incapacity has been medically or clinically identified, alleged in the
complaint, sufficiently proven by experts, and clearly explained in the trial courts decision. The initiatory complaint
alleged that respondent, from the start, had exhibited unusual and abnormal behavior "of peren[n]ially telling lies,
fabricating ridiculous stories, and inventing personalities and situations," of writing letters to petitioner using fictitious
names, and of lying about her actual occupation, income, educational attainment, and family background, among others. 81
These allegations, initially characterized in generalities, were further linked to medical or clinical causes by expert
witnesses from the field of psychology. Petitioner presented two (2) such witnesses in particular. Dr. Abcede, a
psychiatrist who had headed the department of psychiatry of at least two (2) major hospitals, 82 testified as follows:
WITNESS:
Given that as a fact, which is only based on the affidavit provided to me, I can say that there are a couple of things that
[are] terribly wrong with the standards. There are a couple of things that seems (sic) to be repeated over and over again in
the affidavit. One of which is the persistent, constant and repeated lying of the "respondent"; which, I think, based on
assessment of normal behavior of an individual, is abnormal or pathological. x x x

ATTY. RAZ: (Back to the witness)

Q- Would you say then, Mr. witness, that because of these actuations of the respondent she is then incapable of
performing the basic obligations of her marriage?
A- Well, persistent lying violates the respect that one owes towards another. The lack of concern, the lack of love towards
the person, and it is also something that endangers human relationship. You see, relationship is based on communication
between individuals and what we generally communicate are our thoughts and feelings. But then when one talks and
expresse[s] their feelings, [you] are expected to tell the truth. And therefore, if you constantly lie, what do you think is
going to happen as far as this relationship is concerned. Therefore, it undermines that basic relationship that should be
based on love, trust and respect.
Q- Would you say then, Mr. witness, that due to the behavior of the respondent in constantly lying and fabricating stories,
she is then incapable of performing the basic obligations of the marriage?
xxx
ATTY. RAZ: (Back to the witness)
Q- Mr. witness, based on the testimony of Mr. Levy Mendoza, who is the third witness for the petitioner, testified that the
respondent has been calling up the petitioners officemates and ask him (sic) on the activities of the petitioner and ask him
on the behavior of the petitioner. And this is specifically stated on page six (6) of the transcript of stenographic notes, what
can you say about this, Mr. witness?
A- If an individual is jealous enough to the point that he is paranoid, which means that there is no actual basis on her
suspect (sic) that her husband is having an affair with a woman, if carried on to the extreme, then that is pathological. That
is not abnormal. We all feel jealous, in the same way as we also lie every now and then; but everything that is carried out
in extreme is abnormal or pathological. If there is no basis in reality to the fact that the husband is having an affair with
another woman and if she persistently believes that the husband is having an affair with different women, then that is
pathological and we call that paranoid jealousy.
Q- Now, if a person is in paranoid jealousy, would she be considered psychologically incapacitated to perform the basic
obligations of the marriage?
A- Yes, Maam.83
The other witness, Dr. Lopez, was presented to establish not only the psychological incapacity of respondent, but also the
psychological capacity of petitioner. He concluded that respondent "is [a] pathological liar, that [she continues] to lie [and]
she loves to fabricate about herself."84
These two witnesses based their conclusions of psychological incapacity on the case record, particularly the trial
transcripts of respondents testimony, as well as the supporting affidavits of petitioner. While these witnesses did not
personally examine respondent, the Court had already held in Marcos v. Marcos85 that personal examination of the subject
by the physician is not required for the spouse to be declared psychologically incapacitated. 86 We deem the methodology
utilized by petitioners witnesses as sufficient basis for their medical conclusions. Admittedly, Drs. Abcede and Lopezs
common conclusion of respondents psychological incapacity hinged heavily on their own acceptance of petitioners
version as the true set of facts. However, since the trial court itself accepted the veracity of petitioners factual premises,
there is no cause to dispute the conclusion of psychological incapacity drawn therefrom by petitioners expert witnesses.
Also, with the totality of the evidence presented as basis, the trial court explicated its finding of psychological incapacity
in its decision in this wise:
To the mind of the Court, all of the above are indications that respondent is psychologically incapacitated to perform the
essential obligations of marriage. It has been shown clearly from her actuations that respondent has that propensity for
telling lies about almost anything, be it her occupation, her state of health, her singing abilities, her income, etc. She has

this fantastic ability to invent and fabricate stories and personalities. She practically lived in a world of make believe
making her therefore not in a position to give meaning and significance to her marriage to petitioner. In persistently and
constantly lying to petitioner, respondent undermined the basic tenets of relationship between spouses that is based on
love, trust and respect. As concluded by the psychiatrist presented by petitioner, such repeated lying is abnormal and
pathological and amounts to psychological incapacity.87
Third. Respondents psychological incapacity was established to have clearly existed at the time of and even before the
celebration of marriage. She fabricated friends and made up letters from fictitious characters well before she married
petitioner. Likewise, she kept petitioner in the dark about her natural childs real parentage as she only confessed when the
latter had found out the truth after their marriage.
Fourth. The gravity of respondents psychological incapacity is sufficient to prove her disability to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. It is immediately discernible that the parties had shared only a little over a year of cohabitation
before the exasperated petitioner left his wife. Whatever such circumstance speaks of the degree of tolerance of petitioner,
it likewise supports the belief that respondents psychological incapacity, as borne by the record, was so grave in extent
that any prolonged marital life was dubitable.
It should be noted that the lies attributed to respondent were not adopted as false pretenses in order to induce petitioner
into marriage. More disturbingly, they indicate a failure on the part of respondent to distinguish truth from fiction, or at
least abide by the truth. Petitioners witnesses and the trial court were emphatic on respondents inveterate proclivity to
telling lies and the pathologic nature of her mistruths, which according to them, were revelatory of respondents inability
to understand and perform the essential obligations of marriage. Indeed, a person unable to distinguish between fantasy
and reality would similarly be unable to comprehend the legal nature of the marital bond, much less its psychic meaning,
and the corresponding obligations attached to marriage, including parenting. One unable to adhere to reality cannot be
expected to adhere as well to any legal or emotional commitments.
The Court of Appeals somehow concluded that since respondent allegedly tried her best to effect a reconciliation, she had
amply exhibited her ability to perform her marital obligations. We are not convinced. Given the nature of her
psychological condition, her willingness to remain in the marriage hardly banishes nay extenuates her lack of capacity to
fulfill the essential marital obligations. Respondents ability to even comprehend what the essential marital obligations are
is impaired at best. Considering that the evidence convincingly disputes respondents ability to adhere to the truth, her
avowals as to her commitment to the marriage cannot be accorded much credence.
At this point, it is worth considering Article 45(3) of the Family Code which states that a marriage may be annulled if the
consent of either party was obtained by fraud, and Article 46 which enumerates the circumstances constituting fraud under
the previous article, clarifies that "no other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, health, rank, fortune or chastity
shall constitute such fraud as will give grounds for action for the annulment of marriage." It would be improper to draw
linkages between misrepresentations made by respondent and the misrepresentations under Articles 45 (3) and 46. The
fraud under Article 45(3) vitiates the consent of the spouse who is lied to, and does not allude to vitiated consent of the
lying spouse. In this case, the misrepresentations of respondent point to her own inadequacy to cope with her marital
obligations, kindred to psychological incapacity under Article 36.
Fifth. Respondent is evidently unable to comply with the essential marital obligations as embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of
the Family Code. Article 68, in particular, enjoins the spouses to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity,
and render mutual help and support. As noted by the trial court, it is difficult to see how an inveterate pathological liar
would be able to commit to the basic tenets of relationship between spouses based on love, trust and respect.
Sixth. The Court of Appeals clearly erred when it failed to take into consideration the fact that the marriage of the parties
was annulled by the Catholic Church. The appellate court apparently deemed this detail totally inconsequential as no
reference was made to it anywhere in the assailed decision despite petitioners efforts to bring the matter to its
attention.88 Such deliberate ignorance is in contravention of Molina, which held that interpretations given by the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be
given great respect by our courts.
As noted earlier, the Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila decreed the invalidity of the marriage in question
in a Conclusion89 dated 30 March 1995, citing the "lack of due discretion" on the part of respondent. 90Such decree of

nullity was affirmed by both the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal, 91 and the Roman Rota of the Vatican.92 In fact,
respondents psychological incapacity was considered so grave that a restrictive clause 93was appended to the sentence of
nullity prohibiting respondent from contracting another marriage without the Tribunals consent.
In its Decision dated 4 June 1995, the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal pronounced:
The JURISRPRUDENCE in the Case maintains that matrimonial consent is considered ontologically defective and
wherefore judicially ineffective when elicited by a Part Contractant in possession and employ of a discretionary judgment
faculty with a perceptive vigor markedly inadequate for the practical understanding of the conjugal Covenant or serious
impaired from the correct appreciation of the integral significance and implications of the marriage vows.
The FACTS in the Case sufficiently prove with the certitude required by law that based on the depositions of the Partes in
Causa and premised on the testimonies of the Common and Expert Witnesse[s], the Respondent made the marriage option
in tenure of adverse personality constracts that were markedly antithetical to the substantive content and implications of
the Marriage Covenant, and that seriously undermined the integrality of her matrimonial consent in terms of its
deliberative component. In other words, afflicted with a discretionary faculty impaired in its practico-concrete judgment
formation on account of an adverse action and reaction pattern, the Respondent was impaired from eliciting a judicially
binding matrimonial consent. There is no sufficient evidence in the Case however to prove as well the fact of grave lack of
due discretion on the part of the Petitioner.94
Evidently, the conclusion of psychological incapacity was arrived at not only by the trial court, but also by canonical
bodies. Yet, we must clarify the proper import of the Church rulings annulling the marriage in this case. They hold sway
since they are drawn from a similar recognition, as the trial court, of the veracity of petitioners allegations. Had the trial
court instead appreciated respondents version as correct, and the appellate court affirmed such conclusion, the rulings of
the Catholic Church on this matter would have diminished persuasive value. After all, it is the factual findings of the
judicial trier of facts, and not that of the canonical courts, that are accorded significant recognition by this Court.
Seventh. The final point of contention is the requirement in Molina that such psychological incapacity be shown to be
medically or clinically permanent or incurable. It was on this score that the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the
trial court, the appellate court noting that it did not appear certain that respondents condition was incurable and that Dr.
Abcede did not testify to such effect.95
Petitioner points out that one month after he and his wife initially separated, he returned to her, desiring to make their
marriage work. However, respondents aberrant behavior remained unchanged, as she continued to lie, fabricate stories,
and maintained her excessive jealousy. From this fact, he draws the conclusion that respondents condition is incurable.
From the totality of the evidence, can it be definitively concluded that respondents condition is incurable? It would seem,
at least, that respondents psychosis is quite grave, and a cure thereof a remarkable feat. Certainly, it would have been
easier had petitioners expert witnesses characterized respondents condition as incurable. Instead, they remained silent on
whether the psychological incapacity was curable or incurable.
But on careful examination, there was good reason for the experts taciturnity on this point.
The petitioners expert witnesses testified in 1994 and 1995, and the trial court rendered its decision on 10 August 1995.
These events transpired well before Molina was promulgated in 1997 and made explicit the requirement that the
psychological incapacity must be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such requirement was not
expressly stated in Article 36 or any other provision of the Family Code.
On the other hand, the Court in Santos, which was decided in January 1995, began its discussion by first citing the
deliberations of the Family Code committee,96 then the opinion of canonical scholars,97 before arriving at its formulation
of the doctrinal definition of psychological incapacity.98 Santos did refer to Justice Caguioas opinion expressed during the
deliberations that "psychological incapacity is incurable," 99 and the view of a former presiding judge of the Metropolitan
Marriage Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila that psychological incapacity must be characterized "by (a) gravity, (b)
juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability." 100 However, in formulating the doctrinal rule on psychological incapacity, the
Court in Santos omitted any reference to incurability as a characteristic of psychological incapacity. 101

This disquisition is material as Santos was decided months before the trial court came out with its own ruling that
remained silent on whether respondents psychological incapacity was incurable. Certainly, Santos did not clearly
mandate that the incurability of the psychological incapacity be established in an action for declaration of nullity. At least,
there was no jurisprudential clarity at the time of the trial of this case and the subsequent promulgation of the trial courts
decision that required a medical finding of incurability. Such requisite arose only with Molina in 1997, at a time when this
case was on appellate review, or after the reception of evidence.
We are aware that in Pesca v. Pesca,102 the Court countered an argument that Molina and Santos should not apply
retroactively
with the observation that the interpretation or construction placed by the courts of a law constitutes a part of that law as of
the date the statute in enacted.103 Yet we approach this present case from utterly practical considerations. The requirement
that psychological incapacity must be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable is one that necessarily
cannot be divined without expert opinion. Clearly in this case, there was no categorical averment from the expert
witnesses that respondents psychological incapacity was curable or incurable simply because there was no legal necessity
yet to elicit such a declaration and the appropriate question was not accordingly propounded to him. If we
apply Pesca without deep reflection, there would be undue prejudice to those cases tried before Molina or Santos,
especially those presently on appellate review, where presumably the respective petitioners and their expert witnesses
would not have seen the need to adduce a diagnosis of incurability. It may hold in those cases, as in this case, that the
psychological incapacity of a spouse is actually incurable, even if not pronounced as such at the trial court level.
We stated earlier that Molina is not set in stone, and that the interpretation of Article 36 relies heavily on a case-to-case
perception. It would be insensate to reason to mandate in this case an expert medical or clinical diagnosis of incurability,
since the parties would have had no impelling cause to present evidence to that effect at the time this case was tried by the
RTC more than ten (10) years ago. From the totality of the evidence, we are sufficiently convinced that the incurability of
respondents psychological incapacity has been established by the petitioner. Any lingering doubts are further dispelled by
the fact that the Catholic Church tribunals, which indubitably consider incurability as an integral requisite of
psychological incapacity, were sufficiently convinced that respondent was so incapacitated to contract marriage to the
degree that annulment was warranted.
All told, we conclude that petitioner has established his cause of action for declaration of nullity under Article 36 of the
Family Code. The RTC correctly ruled, and the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court.
There is little relish in deciding this present petition, pronouncing as it does the marital bond as having been inexistent in
the first place. It is possible that respondent, despite her psychological state, remains in love with petitioner, as exhibited
by her persistent challenge to the petition for nullity. In fact, the appellate court placed undue emphasis on respondents
avowed commitment to remain in the marriage. Yet the Court decides these cases on legal reasons and not vapid
sentimentality. Marriage, in legal contemplation, is more than the legitimatization of a desire of people in love to live
together.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the RTC dated 10 August 1995, declaring the marriage
between petitioner and respondent NULL and VOID under Article 36 of the Family Code, is REINSTATED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

[G.R. No. 136490. October 19, 2000]

BRENDA B. MARCOS, petitioner, vs. WILSON G. MARCOS, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Psychological incapacity, as a ground for declaring the nullity of a marriage, may be established by the totality of
evidence presented. There is no requirement, however, that the respondent should be examined by a physician or a
psychologist as a conditio sine qua non for such declaration.
The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the July 24, 1998
Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 55588, which disposed as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the contested decision is set aside and the marriage between the parties is hereby declared valid." [2]
Also challenged by petitioner is the December 3, 1998 CA Resolution denying her Motion for Reconsideration.
Earlier, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) had ruled thus:
"WHEREFORE, the marriage between petitioner Brenda B. Marcos and respondent Wilson G. Marcos, solemnized on
September 6, 1982 in Pasig City is declared null and void ab initio pursuant to Art. 36 of the Family Code. The conjugal
properties, if any, is dissolved [sic] in accordance with Articles 126 and 129 of the same Code in relation to Articles 50, 51
and 52 relative to the delivery of the legitime of [the] parties' children. In the best interest and welfare of the minor
children, their custody is granted to petitioner subject to the visitation rights of respondent.
"Upon finality of this Decision, furnish copy each to the Office of the Civil Registrar of Pasig City where the marriage
was solemnized, the National Census and Statistics Office, Manila and the Register of Deeds of Mandaluyong City for
their appropriate action consistent with this Decision.
"SO ORDERED."

The Facts

The facts as found by the Court of Appeals are as follows:

"It was established during the trial that the parties were married twice: (1) on September 6, 1982 which was solemnized
by Judge Eriberto H. Espiritu at the Municipal Court of Pasig (Exh. A); and (2) on May 8, 1983 which was solemnized by
Rev. Eduardo L. Eleazar, Command Chaplain, at the Presidential Security Command Chapel in Malacaang Park, Manila
(Exh. A-1). Out of their marriage, five (5) children were born (Exhs. B, C, D, E and F).
"Appellant Wilson G. Marcos joined the Armed Forces of the Philippines in 1973. Later on, he was transferred to the
Presidential Security Command in Malacaang during the Marcos Regime. Appellee Brenda B. Marcos, on the other hand,
joined the Women's Auxilliary Corps under the Philippine Air Force in 1978. After the Edsa Revolution, both of them
sought a discharge from the military service.
"They first met sometime in 1980 when both of them were assigned at the Malacaang Palace, she as an escort of Imee
Marcos and he as a Presidential Guard of President Ferdinand Marcos. Through telephone conversations, they became
acquainted and eventually became sweethearts.
"After their marriage on September 6, 1982, they resided at No. 1702 Daisy Street, Hulo Bliss, Mandaluyong, a housing
unit which she acquired from the Bliss Development Corporation when she was still single.
"After the downfall of President Marcos, he left the military service in 1987 and then engaged in different business
ventures that did not however prosper. As a wife, she always urged him to look for work so that their children would see
him, instead of her, as the head of the family and a good provider. Due to his failure to engage in any gainful employment,
they would often quarrel and as a consequence, he would hit and beat her. He would even force her to have sex with him
despite her weariness. He would also inflict physical harm on their children for a slight mistake and was so severe in the
way he chastised them. Thus, for several times during their cohabitation, he would leave their house. In 1992, they were
already living separately.
"All the while, she was engrossed in the business of selling "magic uling" and chickens. While she was still in the
military, she would first make deliveries early in the morning before going to Malacaang. When she was discharged from
the military service, she concentrated on her business. Then, she became a supplier in the Armed Forces of the Philippines
until she was able to put up a trading and construction company, NS Ness Trading and Construction Development
Corporation.
"The 'straw that broke the camel's back' took place on October 16, 1994, when they had a bitter quarrel. As they were
already living separately, she did not want him to stay in their house anymore. On that day, when she saw him in their
house, she was so angry that she lambasted him. He then turned violent, inflicting physical harm on her and even on her
mother who came to her aid. The following day, October 17, 1994, she and their children left the house and sought refuge
in her sister's house.
"On October 19, 1994, she submitted herself [to] medical examination at the Mandaluyong Medical Center where her
injuries were diagnosed as contusions (Exh. G, Records, 153).
"Sometime in August 1995, she together with her two sisters and driver, went to him at the Bliss unit in Mandaluyong to
look for their missing child, Niko. Upon seeing them, he got mad. After knowing the reason for their unexpected
presence, he ran after them with a samurai and even [beat] her driver.
"At the time of the filing of this case, she and their children were renting a house in Camella, Paraaque, while the
appellant was residing at the Bliss unit in Mandaluyong.

"In the case study conducted by Social Worker Sonia C. Millan, the children described their father as cruel and physically
abusive to them (Exh. UU, Records, pp. 85-100).
"The appellee submitted herself to psychologist Natividad A. Dayan, Ph.D., for psychological evaluation (Exh. YY,
Records, pp. 207-216), while the appellant on the other hand, did not.
"The court a quo found the appellant to be psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations mainly
because of his failure to find work to support his family and his violent attitude towards appellee and their children, x x
x."[3]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Reversing the RTC, the CA held that psychological incapacity had not been established by the totality of the evidence
presented. It ratiocinated in this wise:
"Essential in a petition for annulment is the allegation of the root cause of the spouse's psychological incapacity which
should also be medically or clinically identified, sufficiently proven by experts and clearly explained in the decision. The
incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage and shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable. It must also be grave enough to bring about the disability of the parties to assume the
essential obligations of marriage as set forth in Articles 68 to 71 and Articles 220 to 225 of the Family Code and such noncomplied marital obligations must similarly be alleged in the petition, established by evidence and explained in the
decision.
"In the case before us, the appellant was not subjected to any psychological or psychiatric evaluation. The psychological
findings about the appellant by psychiatrist Natividad Dayan were based only on the interviews conducted with the
appellee. Expert evidence by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists is essential if only to prove that the parties
were or any one of them was mentally or psychically ill to be truly incognitive of the marital obligations he or she was
assuming, or as would make him or her x x x unable to assume them. In fact, he offered testimonial evidence to show that
he [was] not psychologically incapacitated. The root cause of his supposed incapacity was not alleged in the petition, nor
medically or clinically identified as a psychological illness or sufficiently proven by an expert. Similarly, there is no
evidence at all that would show that the appellant was suffering from an incapacity which [was] psychological or mental not physical to the extent that he could not have known the obligations he was assuming: that the incapacity [was] grave,
ha[d] preceded the marriage and [was] incurable." [4]
Hence, this Petition.[5]
Issues

In her Memorandum,[6] petitioner presents for this Court's consideration the following issues:
"I. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals could set aside the findings by the Regional Trial Court of
psychological incapacity of a respondent in a Petition for declaration of nullity of marriage simply because
the respondent did not subject himself to psychological evaluation.
II. Whether or not the totality of evidence presented and the demeanor of all the witnesses should be the basis of
the determination of the merits of the Petition."[7]
The Court's Ruling

We agree with petitioner that the personal medical or psychological examination of respondent is not a requirement
for a declaration of psychological incapacity. Nevertheless, the totality of the evidence she presented does not show such
incapacity.
Preliminary Issue: Need for Personal Medical Examination

Petitioner contends that the testimonies and the results of various tests that were submitted to determine respondent's
psychological incapacity to perform the obligations of marriage should not have been brushed aside by the Court of
Appeals, simply because respondent had not taken those tests himself. Petitioner adds that the CA should have realized
that under the circumstances, she had no choice but to rely on other sources of information in order to determine the
psychological capacity of respondent, who had refused to submit himself to such tests.
In Republic v. CA and Molina, [8] the guidelines governing the application and the interpretation of psychological
incapacity referred to in Article 36 of the Family Code[9] were laid down by this Court as follows:
"1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.This
is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the
family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it 'as the foundation of the
nation.' It decrees marriage as legally 'inviolable,' thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the
parties. Both the family and marriage are to be 'protected' by the state.
xxxxxxxxx
2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in
the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the
Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations
and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them,
was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such
incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle
of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.
3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at 'the time of the celebration' of the marriage. The evidence
must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their 'I do's.' The manifestation of the
illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior
thereto.
4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability
may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against
everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment
in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine
to cure them but not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an
essential obligation of marriage.
5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. Thus, 'mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional

outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability,
not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling
factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the
person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as
regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and
their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by
evidence and included in the text of the decision.
7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.
xxxxxxxxx
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for
the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be
quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be,
to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such
certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the
court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated
under Canon 1095."[10]
The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated by the Court in Santos v. Court of Appeals:
"psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability." The
foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. In
fact, the root cause may be "medically or clinicallyidentified." What is important is the presence of evidence that can
adequately establish the party'spsychological condition. For indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to
sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be
resorted to.
[11]

Main Issue: Totality of Evidence Presented

The main question, then, is whether the totality of the evidence presented in the present case -- including the
testimonies of petitioner, the common children, petitioner's sister and the social worker -- was enough to sustain a finding
that respondent was psychologically incapacitated.
We rule in the negative. Although this Court is sufficiently convinced that respondent failed to provide material
support to the family and may have resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, the totality of his acts does not lead to a
conclusion of psychological incapacity on his part. There is absolutely no showing that his "defects" were already present
at the inception of the marriage or that they are incurable.
Verily, the behavior of respondent can be attributed to the fact that he had lost his job and was not gainfully employed
for a period of more than six years. It was during this period that he became intermittently drunk, failed to give material
and moral support, and even left the family home.
Thus, his alleged psychological illness was traced only to said period and not to the inception of the
marriage. Equally important, there is no evidence showing that his condition is incurable, especially now that he is
gainfully employed as a taxi driver.

Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the
time the causes therefor manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the
celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. These marital obligations are those provided under
Articles 68 to 71, 220, 221 and 225 of the Family Code.
Neither is Article 36 to be equated with legal separation, in which the grounds need not be rooted in psychological
incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual
alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment and the like. [12] At best, the evidence presented by petitioner refers only to
grounds for legal separation, not for declaring a marriage void.
Because Article 36 has been abused as a convenient divorce law, this Court laid down the procedural requirements
for its invocation in Molina. Petitioner, however, has not faithfully observed them.
In sum, this Court cannot declare the dissolution of the marriage for failure of petitioner to show that the alleged
psychological incapacity is characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability; and for her failure to observe
the guidelines outlined in Molina.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and assailed Decision AFFIRMED, except that portion requiring personal
medical examination as a conditio sine qua non to a finding of psychological incapacity.No costs.
SO ORDERED.

ROSA YAP PARAS, petitioner,

vs.
JUSTO J. PARAS, respondent.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
This case presents another occasion to reiterate this Courts ruling that the Guidelines set forth in Republic v. Court of
Appeals and Ronidel Olaviano Molina1 "do not require that a physician should examine the person to be declared
psychologically incapacitated. What is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the
partys psychological condition."2

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, are the
(a) Decision3 dated December 8, 2000 and (b) Resolution4 dated April 5, 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
49915, entitled "Rosa Yap-Paras, Plaintiff-Appellant vs. Justo J. Paras, Defendant-Appellee."
On May 21, 1964, petitioner Rosa Yap married respondent Justo J. Paras in Bindoy, Negros Oriental. They begot four (4)
children, namely: Raoul (+), Cindy Rose (+), Dahlia, and Reuel.
Twenty-nine (29) years thereafter, or on May 27, 1993, Rosa filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 31,
Dumaguete City, a complaint for annulment of her marriage with Justo, under Article 36 of the Family Code, docketed as
Civil Case No. 10613. She alleged that Justo is psychologically incapacitated to exercise the essential obligations of
marriage as shown by the following circumstances:
(a) he dissipated her business assets and forged her signature in one mortgage transaction;
(b) he lived with a concubine and sired a child with her;
(c) he did not give financial support to his children; and
(d) he has been remiss in his duties both as a husband and as a father.
To substantiate her charges, Rosa offered documentary and testimonial evidence.
This is her story. She met Justo in 1961 in Bindoy. She was then a student of San Carlos University, Cebu City.5 He
courted her, frequently spending time at her "Botica."6 Eventually, in 1964, convinced that he loved her, she agreed to
marry him. Their wedding was considered one of the "most celebrated" marriages in Bindoy.7
After the wedding, she and Justo spent one (1) week in Davao for their honeymoon. 8 Upon returning to Bindoy, they
resided at her parents house. It was their residence for three (3) years until they were able to build a house of their
own.9 For the first five (5) years of their marriage, Justo did not support her and their children because he shouldered his
sisters schooling.10 Consequently, she was the one who spent for all their family needs, using the income from her
"Botica" and store.11
Justo lived the life of a bachelor.12 His usual routine was to spend time with his "barkadas" until the wee hours of the
morning. Oftentimes, he would scold her when she sent for him during lunchtime. 13 He also failed to provide for their
childrens well-being.14 Sometime in 1975, their daughter Cindy Rose was afflicted with leukemia. It was her family who
paid for her medication. Also, in 1984, their son Raoul was electrocuted while Justo was in their rest house with his
"barkadas." He did not heed her earlier advice to bring Raoul in the rest house as the latter has the habit of climbing the
rooftop.15
To cope with the death of the children, the entire family went to the United States. Her sisters supported them throughout
their two-year stay there. However, after three months, Justo abandoned them and left for the Philippines. Upon her return
to the Philippines, she was shocked to find her "Botica" and other businesses heavy in debt. She then realized Justo was a
profligate. At one time, he disposed without her consent a conjugal piece of land. 16 At other times, he permitted the
municipal government to take gasoline from their gas station free of charge.
She endured all of Justos shortcomings, but his act of maintaining a mistress and siring an illegitimate child was the last
straw that prompted her to file the present case. She found that after leaving their conjugal house in 1988, Justo lived with
Jocelyn Ching. Their cohabitation resulted in the birth of a baby girl, Cyndee Rose, obviously named after her (Rosa) and
Justos deceased daughter Cindy Rose Paras.17

As expected, Justo has a different version of the story.

He met Rosa upon his return to Bindoy after taking the bar examinations in Manila. 18 He frequently spent time in her
store.19 Believing he loved her, he courted her and later on, they became sweethearts. In 1963, they decided to get married.
However, it was postponed because her family demanded a dowry. Their marriage took place in 1964 upon his mothers
signing a deed of conveyance involving 28 hectares of coconut land in favor of Rosa. 20
He blamed the subsequent dissipation of their assets from the slump of the price of sugar and not to his alleged
profligacy.21 Due to his business ventures, he and Rosa were able to acquire a 10-room family house, expand their store,
establish their gasoline station, and purchase several properties. He also denied forging her signature in one mortgage
transaction. He maintained that he did not dispose of a conjugal property and that he and Rosapersonally signed the
renewal of a sugar crop loan before the banks authorized employee.22
As to their marital relationship, he noticed the change in Rosas attitude after her return from the United States. She
became detached, cold, uncaring, and overly focused on the familys businesses. 23 He tried to reach her but Rosa was
steadfast in her "new attitudinal outlook." Before other people, he merely pretended that their relationship was blissful. 24
He did not abandon his family in the United States. It happened that they only had tourist visas. When they were there,
their childrens tourist visas were converted into study visas, permitting them to stay longer. For his part, he was granted
only three (3) months leave as municipal mayor of Bindoy, thus, he immediately returned to the Philippines. 25
He spent for his childrens education. At first, he resented supporting them because he was just starting his law practice
and besides, their conjugal assets were more than enough to provide for their needs. He admitted though that there were
times he failed to give them financial support because of his lack of income. 26
What caused the inevitable family break-out was Rosas act of embarrassing him during his birthday celebration in 1987.
She did not prepare food for the guests. When confronted, she retorted that she has nothing to do with his birthday. This
convinced him of her lack of concern.27 This was further aggravated when she denied his request for engine oil when his
vehicle broke down in a mountainous and NPA-infested area. 28
As to the charge of concubinage, he alleged that Jocelyn Ching is not his mistress, but her secretary in his Law Office. She
was impregnated by her boyfriend, a certain Grelle Leccioness. Cyndee Rose Ching Leccioness is not his daughter.
After trial or on February 28, 1995, the RTC rendered a Decision upholding the validity of the marriage. It found that: (a)
Justo did not abandon the conjugal home as he was forced to leave after Rosa posted guards at the gates of their
house;29 (b) the conjugal assets were sufficient to support the family needs, thus, there was no need for Justo to shell out
his limited salary;30 and (c) the charge of infidelity is unsubstantiated. 31 The RTC observed that the relationship between
the parties started well, negating the existence of psychological incapacity on either party at the time of the celebration of
their marriage.32 And lastly, it ruled that there appeared to be a collusion between them as both sought the declaration of
nullity of their marriage.33
Justo interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals.
In the interim, Rosa filed with this Court a petition for disbarment against Justo, docketed as A.C. No. 5333, premised on
the same charges alleged in her complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage. On October 18, 2000, this Court rendered
its Decision finding him guilty of falsifying Rosas signature in bank documents, immorality, and abandonment of his
family. He was suspended from the practice of law, thus:
In the light of the foregoing, respondent is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for SIX (6)
MONTHSon the charge of falsifying his wifes signature in bank documents and other related loan instruments;

and for ONE (1) YEAR from the practice of law on the charges of immorality and abandonment of his own
family, the penalties to be served simultaneously. Let notice of this Decision be spread in respondents record as
an attorney, and notice of the same served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and on the Office of the Court
Administrator for circulation to all the courts concerned.
SO ORDERED.
On December 8, 2000 or nearly two months after this Court promulgated the Decision in A.C. No. 5333, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the RTC Decision in the present case, holding that "the evidence of the plaintiff (Rosa) falls short of the
standards required by law to decree a nullity of marriage." It ruled that Justos alleged defects or idiosyncracies "were
sufficiently explained by the evidence," thus:
Certainly, we cannot ignore what is extant on the record first, the income which supported their children came
from the earnings of their conjugal properties and not singularly from Rosas industry; second, Justo gave his
share of the support to his children in the form of allowances, albeit smaller than that derived from the conjugal
property; third, he was booted out from their conjugal dwelling after he lost his bid for re-election and as such did
not voluntarily abandon his home; and fourth, although unjustifiable in the eyes of the law and morality, Justos
alleged infidelity came after he was driven out of his house by Rosa. x x x.
The Court of Appeals likewise held that Rosas inability to offer the testimony of a psychologist is fatal to her case, being
in violation of the tenets laid down by this Court in Molina. 34 Thus, she failed to substantiate her allegation that Justo is
psychologically incapacitated from complying with the essential obligations of marriage. 35
Rosa filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied. Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari.
Rosa contends that this Courts factual findings in A.C. No. 5333 for disbarment are conclusive on the present case.
Consequently, the Court of Appeals erred in rendering contrary factual findings. Also, she argues that she filed the instant
complaint sometime in May, 1993, well before this Courts pronouncement in Molina relied upon by the Court of Appeals.
She states that she could have presented an expert to prove the root cause of Justos psychological incapacity had she been
required to do so. For relief, she prays that her marriage with Justo be annulled on the bases of the
Courts conclusive factual findings in A.C. No. 5333; or in the alternative, remand this case to the court a quo for
reception of expert testimony in the interest of due process.
In his comment on the petition, Justo asserts that the present case is a "new matter completely foreign and removed" from
A.C. No. 5333; hence, the factual findings of this Court therein are not conclusive on this case. Besides, no hearing was
conducted in A.C. No. 5333 as it was decided merely on the bases of pleadings and documents.
The parties opposing contentions lead us to the following three (3) vital issues:
first, whether the factual findings of this Court in A.C. No. 5333 are conclusive on the present case;
second, whether a remand of this case to the RTC for reception of expert testimony on the root cause of Justos
alleged psychological incapacity is necessary; and
third, whether the totality of evidence in the case shows psychological incapacity on the part of Justo.
The petition is bereft of merit.
I

Whether the factual findings of this Court in

A.C. No. 5333 are conclusive on the present case.
Rosa, sad to say, had made much ado about nothing. A reading of the Court of Appeals Decision shows that she has no
reason to feel aggrieved. In fact, the appellate court even assumed that her charges "are true," but concluded that they are
insufficient to declare the marriage void on the ground of psychological incapacity. The pertinent portion of the Decision
reads:
Applying these parameters to the sifted evidence, we find that even if we assume Justos alleged infidelity, failure to
support his family and alleged abandonment of their family home are true, such traits are at best indicators that he is unfit
to become an ideal husband and father. However, by themselves, these grounds areinsufficient to declare the marriage
void due to an incurable psychological incapacity. These grounds, we must emphasize, do not manifest that he was truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that he must assume and discharge as a married person. While they may
manifest the "gravity" of his alleged psychological incapacity, they do not necessarily show incurability, such that while
his acts violated the covenants of marriage, they do not necessarily show that such acts show an irreparably hopeless state
of psychological incapacity which prevents him from undertaking the basic obligations of marriage in the future. 36
The Court of Appeals pointed this out in its Resolution denying Rosas motion for reconsideration, thus:
Even as we are fully cognizant of the findings of the Supreme Court in the disbarment case appellant filed against
her husband, namely, appellees falsification of documents to obtain loans and his infidelity, these facts, by
themselves, do not conclusively establish appellees psychological incapacity as contemplated under Article 36 of
the Family Code. In fact, we already went as far as to presume the existence of such seeming depravities in
appellees character in our earlier judgment. However, as we emphasized in our Decision, the existence of such
eventualities is not necessarily conclusive of an inherent incapacity on the part of appellee to discern and perform
the rudiments of marital obligations as required under Article 36.37
Clearly, Rosas insistence that the factual findings in A.C. No. 5333 be considered "conclusive" on the present case is
unmeritorious. The Court of Appeals already "went as far as to presume the existence" of Justos depravities, however,
even doing so could not bring about her (Rosas) desired result. As Rosas prayer for relief suggests, what she wants is for
this Court to annul her marriage on the bases of its findings in A.C. No. 5333. 38Obviously, she is of the impression that
since her charges in A.C. No. 5333 were found to be true, justifying the suspension of Justo from the practice of law, the
same charges are also sufficient to prove his psychological incapacity to comply with the essential marital obligations.
Her premise is of course non-sequitur.
Jurisprudence abounds that administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are distinct from and
may proceed independently of civil and criminal cases. The basic premise is that criminal and civil cases are altogether
different from administrative matters, such that the disposition in the first two will not inevitably govern the third
and vice versa.39 The Courts exposition in In re Almacen40 is instructive, thus:
x x x Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, they do
not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but are rather investigations by the Court into the conduct of one of its
officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, [they are] in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly,
there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. [They] may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public
interest is [their] primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a
fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely
calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of
preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging the
profession of members who by their misconduct have prove[n] themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with

the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. In such posture, there can thus be no
occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor.
Accordingly, ones unfitness as a lawyer does not automatically mean ones unfitness as a husband or vice versa.41 The
yardsticks for such roles are simply different. This is why the disposition in a disbarment case cannot be conclusive on an
action for declaration of nullity of marriage. While Rosas charges sufficiently proved Justos unfitness as a lawyer,
however, they may not establish that he is psychologically incapacitated to perform his duties as a husband. In the
disbarment case, "the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the
privileges as such." Its purpose is "to protect the court and the public from the misconduct of officers of the court." On the
other hand, in an action for declaration of nullity of marriage based on the ground of psychological incapacity, the
question for determination is whether the guilty party suffers a grave, incurable, and pre-existing mental incapacity that
renders him truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants. Its purpose is to free the innocent party from a meaningless
marriage. In this case, as will be seen in the following discussion, Justos acts are not sufficient to conclude that he is
psychologically incapacitated, albeit such acts really fall short of what is expected from a lawyer.
II
Whether a remand of this case to the RTC is necessary.
The presentation of an expert witness to prove psychological incapacity has its origin in Molina. 42 One of the Guidelines
set forth therein states:
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts, and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family
Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological -- not physical, although its manifestations and/or
symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally
or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or
knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be
given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless
such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert
evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
In the 2000 case of Marcos v. Marcos,43 the Court clarified that the above Guideline does not require that the respondent
should be examined by a physician or psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the declaration of the nullity of
marriage. What is important is "the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the partys psychological
condition."
Interestingly, in the same year (2000) that Marcos was decided, the Court backtracked a bit when it held inRepublic v.
Dagdag44 that, "the root cause of psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically identified and sufficiently
proven by experts" and this requirement was not deemed complied with where no psychiatrist or medical doctor testified
on the alleged psychological incapacity of one party.
Significantly, the New Rules on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages,45 promulgated by this Court on March 15, 2003, geared towards the relaxation of the requirement of expert
opinion. Section 2, paragraph (d) states:
(d) What to allege.- A petition under Article 36 of the Family Code shall specifically allege the complete facts
showing that either or both parties were psychologically incapacitated from complying with the essential marital
obligations of marriage at the time of the celebration of marriage even if such incapacity becomes manifest only
after its celebration.

The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are indicative of psychological incapacity
at the time of the celebration of the marriage but expert opinion need not be alleged.
In Barcelona v. Court of Appeals,46 this Court categorically explained that under the New Rules, a petition for declaration
of nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code need not allege expert opinion on the psychological incapacity or on its root
cause. What must be alleged are the physical manifestations indicative of said incapacity. The Court further held that
the New Rules, being procedural in nature, apply to actions pending and unresolved at the time of their adoption.
Later, in 2005, the Court reiterated the Marcos doctrine in Republic v. Iyoy.47 Thus:
A later case, Marcos v. Marcos, further clarified that there is no requirement that the defendant/respondent spouse
should be personally examined by a physician or psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the declaration of
nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity. Accordingly, it is no longer necessary to allege expert
opinion in a petition under Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines. Such psychological incapacity,
however, must be established by the totality of the evidence presented during the trial.
Significantly, the present case is exactly akin to Pesca v. Pesca.48 Pesca stemmed from a complaint for declaration of
nullity of marriage under Article 36 filed by a battered wife sometime in April 1994. The trial court, in its Decision dated
November 15, 1995, decreed the marriage void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of the
husband. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial courts Decision, applying the Guidelines set forth inSantos v. Court of
Appeals49 and Molina.50 When the matter was brought to this Court, the wife argued that Santosand Molina should not
have retroactive application, the Guidelines being merely advisory and not mandatory in nature. She submitted that the
proper application of Santos and Molina warranted only a remand of her case to the trial court for further proceedings, not
a dismissal. The Court declined to remand Pesca51 on the premise that theSantos and Molina Guidelines "constitute a part
of the law as of the date the statute is enacted," thus:
The doctrine of stare decisis, ordained in Article 8 of the Civil Code, expresses that judicial decisions applying
or interpreting the law shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines. The rule follows the settled legal
maxim legis interpretado legis vim obtinet that the interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent
court has the force of law. The interpretation or construction placed by the courts establishes the contemporaneous
legislative intent of the law. The latter as so interpreted and construed would thus constitute a part of the law as of
the date the statute is enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of this Court finds itself later overruled, and a
different view is adopted, that the new doctrine may have to be applied prospectively in favor of parties who have
relied on the old doctrine and have acted in good faith in accordance therewith under the familiar rule of lex
prospicit, non replicit.
The Court then opted to examine the evidence. It affirmed that the wife failed, both in her allegations in the complaint and
in her evidence, to make out a case of psychological incapacity on the part of her husband. The Court then concluded that
"emotional immaturity and irresponsibility" cannot be equated with psychological incapacity.
Applying the foregoing cases, Marcos, Barcelona, Iyoy, and Pesca, to the instant case, there is no reason to remand it to
the trial court. The records clearly show that there is sufficient evidence to establish the psychological condition of Justo.
III
Whether the totality of evidence in the case
shows psychological incapacity on the part of Justo
as to justify the declaration of nullity of marriage.

The last issue left for this Courts consideration is whether the totality of the evidence is sufficient to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity on the part of Justo so as to justify the dissolution of the marriage in question.
At this juncture, it is imperative that the parties be reminded of the States policy on marriage. Article XV of the
Constitution mandates that:
SEC. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen
its solidarity and actively promote its total development.
SEC. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the
State.
This State policy on the inviolability of marriage has been enshrined in Article 1 of the Family Code which states that:
ART. 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union, between a man and a woman entered into in
accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the family and an
inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law, and not subject to
stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the marriage within the limits
provided by this Code.
Given the foregoing provisions of constitutional and statutory law, this Court has held fast to the position that any doubt as
to the validity of a marriage is to be resolved in favor of its validity.52 Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio.
Of course, the law recognizes that not all marriages are made in heaven. Imperfect humans more often than not create
imperfect unions. Thus, when the imperfection is psychological in nature and renders a person incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations, the State provides refuge to the aggrieved spouse under Article 36 of the Family
Code which reads:
ART. 36. A marriage contracted by a party who, at the time of celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes
manifest only after its solemnization.
In Molina,53 the Court laid down the Guidelines for the interpretation and application of Article 36, thus:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved
in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. x x x.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family
Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological -- not physical, although its manifestations and/or
symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, were mentally
or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or
knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be
given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle ofejusdem generis, nevertheless
such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert
evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence
must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I dos." The manifestation of the illness
need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability
may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of
the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not
necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a
pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may
not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of
marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations
of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot
be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect
or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an
adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting
and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as
regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their
children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and
included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for
the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be
quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to
the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification
within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor
General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculicontemplated under Canon 1095.
The foregoing Guidelines incorporate the basic requirements mandated by the Court in Santos, 54 to reiterate:
psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability.
A review of the complaint, as well as the testimonial and documentary evidence, shows that Rosas main grounds in
seeking the declaration of nullity of her marriage with Justo are his infidelity, profligacy which includes the falsification
of her signature in one of the loan documents, failure to support the children, and abandonment of the family. Both the
courts below found the charges unsubstantiated and untrue. However, this Court, in A.C. No. 5333 for disbarment, found
the evidence sufficient to support Rosas charges of sexual infidelity, falsification of her signature, and abandonment of
family, thus:
ON THE CHARGE OF FALSIFICATION OF COMPLAINANTS SIGNATURE
The handwriting examination conducted by the National Bureau of Investigation on the signatures of complainant Rosa
Yap Paras and respondent Justo de Jesus Paras vis--vis the questioned signature "Rosa Y. Paras" appearing in the
questioned bank loan documents, contracts of mortgage and other related instrument, yielded the following results:
CONCLUSION:
1. The questioned and the standard sample signatures JUSTO J. PARAS were written by one and the same
person.

2. The questioned and the standard sample signatures ROSA YAP PARAS were not written by one and the
same person. (Annex "B", Rollo, p. 26, emphasis ours;)
The NBI did not make a categorical statement that respondent forged the signatures of complainant. However, an
analysis of the above findings lead to no other conclusion than that the questioned or falsified signatures of
complainant Rosa Y. Paras were authored by respondent as said falsified signatures were the same as the sample
signatures of respondent.
To explain this anomaly, respondent presented a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) executed in his favor by
complainant to negotiate for an agricultural or crop loan from the Bais Rural Bank of Bais City. Instead of
exculpating respondent, the presence of the SPA places him in hot water. For if he was so authorized to obtain
loans from the banks, then why did he have to falsify his wifes signatures in the bank loan documents? The
purpose of an SPA is to especially authorize the attorney-in-fact to sign for and on behalf of the principal using his
own name.
ON THE CHARGE OF IMMORALITY AND CONCUBINAGE
The evidence against respondent is overwhelming. The affidavit-statements of his children and three other
persons who used to work with him and have witnessed the acts indicative of his infidelity more than satisfy this
Court that respondent has strayed from the marital path. The baptismal certificate of Cyndee Rose Paras where
respondent was named as the father of the child (Annex "J", Rollo, p. 108); his naming the child after his
deceased first-born daughter Cyndee Rose; and his allowing Jocelyn Ching and the child to live in their house in
Dumaguete City bolster the allegation that respondent is carrying on an illicit affair with Ms. Ching, the mother of
his illegitimate child.
While this Court is convinced that the charges hurled against Justo by Rosa, such as sexual infidelity, falsification of her
signature, abandonment and inadequate support of children, are true, nonetheless, there is nothing in the records showing
that they were caused by a psychological disorder on his part. In other words, thetotality of the evidence is not sufficient
to show that Justo is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations.
The records indicate that the marriage between the parties had a good start, resulting in the birth of their four (4) children.
The early days of their cohabitation were blissful and harmonious. Justo was deeply in love with Rosa, even persuading
his mother to give her a dowry. They were able to build a 10-room family home and acquire several properties, thus,
proving themselves to be responsible couple. Even Rosa admitted that Justo took care of their children when they were
young. Unfortunately, the passage of time appeared to have taken its toll on their relationship. The acts committed by
Justo appeared to have been the result of irreconcilable differences between them caused by the death of their two (2)
children and financial difficulties due to his failure to win the mayoralty election and to sustain his law practice.
Furthermore, the superior business acumen of Rosa, as well as the insolent attitude of her family towards Justo, busted his
ego and lowered his self-esteem.
There is no evidence that Justos "defects" were present at the inception of the marriage. His "defects" surfaced only in the
latter years when these events took place; their two children died; he lost in the election; he failed in his business ventures
and law practice; and felt the disdain of his wife and her family. Surely, these circumstances explain why Rosa filed the
present case only after almost 30 years of their marriage.
Equally important is that records fail to indicate that Justos "defects" are incurable or grave.
The following catena of cases provides an adequate basis why the marriage between Justo and Rosa should not be
annulled.

In Dedel v. Court of Appeals55 which involved a promiscuous wife who left her family to live with one of her many
paramours, this Court ruled that the acts of sexual infidelity and abandonment do not constitute psychological incapacity
absent a showing of the presence of such promiscuity at the inception of the marriage, thus:
x x x. In this case, respondents sexual infidelity can hardly qualify as being mentally or physically ill to such an
extent that she could not have known the obligations she was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given a
valid assumption thereof. It appears that respondents promiscuity did not exist prior to or at the inception of the
marriage. What is, in fact, disclosed by the records is a blissful marital union at its celebration, later affirmed in
church rites, and which produced four children.
Respondents sexual infidelity or perversion and abandonment do not by themselves constitute psychological
incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code. Neither could her emotional immaturity and
irresponsibility be equated with psychological incapacity. It must be shown that these acts are manifestations of
a disordered personality which make respondent completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the
marital state, not merely due to her youth, immaturity, or sexual promiscuity.
In Carating-Siayngco v. Siayngco,56 the wifes inability to conceive led her husband to other women so he could fulfill his
ardent wish to have a child of his own flesh and blood. This Court ruled that this is not a manifestation of psychological
incapacity in the contemplation of the Family Code. In Choa v. Choa,57 this Court declared that a mere showing
of irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities does not constitute psychological incapacity. And, again, in
Iyoy,58 a Filipina left her husband, married an American and had a family by him, which she flaunted to her former
husband. This Court ruled that these acts, while embarrassing and hurting to the latter, did not satisfactorily establish a
serious or grave psychological or mental defect of an incurable nature present at the time of marriage; and that
irreconcilable differences, conflicting personalities, emotional immaturity, and irresponsibility, physical abuse, habitual
alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment per se do not warrant a finding of psychological incapacity
under Article 36.
What is clear in this case is a husband who has gone astray from the path of marriage because of a conflicting relationship
with his wife and her family and repeated lifes setbacks. While these do not justify his sins, they are not sufficient to
establish that he is psychologically incapacitated.
It is worthy to emphasize that Article 36 contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and assume
the basic marital obligations, not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the part of the errant
spouse.59 As this Court repeatedly declares, Article 36 of the Family Code is not to be confused with a divorce law that
cuts the marital bond at the time the causes thereof manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness
afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. These marital obligations are
those provided under Articles 68 to 71, 220, 221 and 225 of the Family Code. 60
Neither should Article 36 be equated with legal separation, in which the grounds need not be rooted in psychological
incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction, sexual infidelity,
and abandonment, and the like. At best the evidence presented by petitioner refers only to grounds for legal separation, not
for declaring a marriage void.61
In sum, this Court finds no cogent reason to reverse the ruling of the Court of Appeals. While this Court commiserates
with Rosas plight, however, it has no choice but to apply the law. Dura lex sed lex.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 49915 are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
Puno, Chief Justice, Corona, Azcuna, Garcia, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 119190 January 16, 1997
CHI MING TSOI, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and GINA LAO-TSOI, respondents.

TORRES, JR., J.:

Man has not invented a reliable compass by which to steer a marriage in its journey over troubled waters. Laws are
seemingly inadequate. Over time, much reliance has been placed in the works of the unseen hand of Him who created all
things.
Who is to blame when a marriage fails?
This case was originally commenced by a distraught wife against her uncaring husband in the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City (Branch 89) which decreed the annulment of the marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Petitioner appealed the decision of the trial court to respondent Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. CV No. 42758) which
affirmed the Trial Court's decision November 29, 1994 and correspondingly denied the motion for reconsideration in a
resolution dated February 14, 1995.
The statement of the case and of the facts made by the trial court and reproduced by the Court of Appeals 1 its decision are
as follows:
From the evidence adduced, the following acts were preponderantly established:
Sometime on May 22, 1988, the plaintiff married the defendant at the Manila Cathedral, . . . Intramuros Manila, as
evidenced by their Marriage Contract. (Exh. "A")
After the celebration of their marriage and wedding reception at the South Villa, Makati, they went and proceeded
to the house of defendant's mother.
There, they slept together on the same bed in the same room for the first night of their married life.
It is the version of the plaintiff, that contrary to her expectations, that as newlyweds they were supposed to enjoy
making love, or having sexual intercourse, with each other, the defendant just went to bed, slept on one side
thereof, then turned his back and went to sleep . There was no sexual intercourse between them during the first
night. The same thing happened on the second, third and fourth nights.
In an effort to have their honeymoon in a private place where they can enjoy together during their first week as
husband and wife, they went to Baguio City. But, they did so together with her mother, an uncle, his mother and
his nephew. They were all invited by the defendant to join them. [T]hey stayed in Baguio City for four (4) days.
But, during this period, there was no sexual intercourse between them, since the defendant avoided her by taking a
long walk during siesta time or by just sleeping on a rocking chair located at the living room. They slept together
in the same room and on the same bed since May 22, 1988 until March 15, 1989. But during this period, there was

no attempt of sexual intercourse between them. [S]he claims, that she did not: even see her husband's private parts
nor did he see hers.
Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical examinations to Dr. Eufemio Macalalag, a urologist at the
Chinese General Hospital, on January 20, 1989.
The results of their physical examinations were that she is healthy, normal and still a virgin, while that of her
husband's examination was kept confidential up to this time. While no medicine was prescribed for her, the doctor
prescribed medications for her husband which was also kept confidential. No treatment was given to her. For her
husband, he was asked by the doctor to return but he never did.
The plaintiff claims, that the defendant is impotent, a closet homosexual as he did not show his penis. She said,
that she had observed the defendant using an eyebrow pencil and sometimes the cleansing cream of his mother.
And that, according to her, the defendant married her, a Filipino citizen, to acquire or maintain his residency status
here in the country and to publicly maintain the appearance of a normal man.
The plaintiff is not willing to reconcile with her husband.
On the other hand, it is the claim of the defendant that if their marriage shall be annulled by reason of
psychological incapacity, the fault lies with his wife.
But, he said that he does not want his marriage with his wife annulled for several reasons, viz: (1) that he loves her
very much; (2) that he has no defect on his part and he is physically and psychologically capable; and, (3) since
the relationship is still very young and if there is any differences between the two of them, it can still be
reconciled and that, according to him, if either one of them has some incapabilities, there is no certainty that this
will not be cured. He further claims, that if there is any defect, it can be cured by the intervention of medical
technology or science.
The defendant admitted that since their marriage on May 22, 1988, until their separation on March 15, 1989, there
was no sexual contact between them. But, the reason for this, according to the defendant, was that everytime he
wants to have sexual intercourse with his wife, she always avoided him and whenever he caresses her private
parts, she always removed his hands. The defendant claims, that he forced his wife to have sex with him only
once but he did not continue because she was shaking and she did not like it. So he stopped.
There are two (2) reasons, according to the defendant , why the plaintiff filed this case against him, and these are:
(1) that she is afraid that she will be forced to return the pieces of jewelry of his mother, and, (2) that her husband,
the defendant, will consummate their marriage.
The defendant insisted that their marriage will remain valid because they are still very young and there is still a
chance to overcome their differences.
The defendant submitted himself to a physical examination. His penis was examined by Dr. Sergio Alteza, Jr., for
the purpose of finding out whether he is impotent . As a result thereof, Dr. Alteza submitted his Doctor's Medical
Report. (Exh. "2"). It is stated there, that there is no evidence of impotency (Exh. "2-B"), and he is capable of
erection. (Exh. "2-C")
The doctor said, that he asked the defendant to masturbate to find out whether or not he has an erection and he
found out that from the original size of two (2) inches, or five (5) centimeters, the penis of the defendant
lengthened by one (1) inch and one centimeter. Dr. Alteza said, that the defendant had only a soft erection which

is why his penis is not in its full length. But, still is capable of further erection, in that with his soft erection, the
defendant is capable of having sexual intercourse with a woman.
In open Court, the Trial Prosecutor manifested that there is no collusion between the parties and that the evidence
is not fabricated." 2
After trial, the court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered declaring as VOID the marriage entered into by the plaintiff with
the defendant on May 22, 1988 at the Manila Cathedral, Basilica of the Immaculate Conception, Intramuros,
Manila, before the Rt. Rev. Msgr. Melencio de Vera. Without costs. Let a copy of this decision be furnished the
Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City. Let another copy be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Manila.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.
Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioner alleges that the respondent Court of Appeals erred:
I
in affirming the conclusions of the lower court that there was no sexual intercourse between the parties without
making any findings of fact.
II
in holding that the refusal of private respondent to have sexual communion with petitioner is a psychological
incapacity inasmuch as proof thereof is totally absent.
III
in holding that the alleged refusal of both the petitioner and the private respondent to have sex with each other
constitutes psychological incapacity of both.
IV
in affirming the annulment of the marriage between the parties decreed by the lower court without fully satisfying
itself that there was no collusion between them.
We find the petition to be bereft of merit.
Petitioner contends that being the plaintiff in Civil Case No. Q-89-3141, private respondent has the burden of proving the
allegations in her complaint; that since there was no independent evidence to prove the alleged non-coitus between the
parties, there remains no other basis for the court's conclusion except the admission of petitioner; that public policy should
aid acts intended to validate marriage and should retard acts intended to invalidate them; that the conclusion drawn by the
trial court on the admissions and confessions of the parties in their pleadings and in the course of the trial is misplaced
since it could have been a product of collusion; and that in actions for annulment of marriage, the material facts alleged in
the complaint shall always be proved. 3

Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court reads:

Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings. Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the
material allegations of the adverse party's pleading, the court may, on motion of that party, direct judgment on
such pleading. But in actions for annulment of marriage or for legal separation the material facts alleged in the
complaint shall always be proved.
The foregoing provision pertains to a judgment on the pleadings. What said provision seeks to prevent is annulment of
marriage without trial. The assailed decision was not based on such a judgment on the pleadings. When private respondent
testified under oath before the trial court and was cross-examined by oath before the trial court and was cross-examined
by the adverse party, she thereby presented evidence in form of a testimony. After such evidence was presented, it be came
incumbent upon petitioner to present his side. He admitted that since their marriage on May 22, 1988, until their
separation on March 15, 1989, there was no sexual intercourse between them.
To prevent collusion between the parties is the reason why, as stated by the petitioner, the Civil Code provides that no
judgment annulling a marriage shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment (Arts. 88 and
101[par. 2]) and the Rules of Court prohibit such annulment without trial (Sec. 1, Rule 19).
The case has reached this Court because petitioner does not want their marriage to be annulled. This only shows that there
is no collusion between the parties. When petitioner admitted that he and his wife (private respondent) have never had
sexual contact with each other, he must have been only telling the truth. We are reproducing the relevant portion of the
challenged resolution denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration, penned with magisterial lucidity by Associate
Justice Minerva Gonzaga-Reyes, viz:
The judgment of the trial court which was affirmed by this Court is not based on a stipulation of facts. The issue
of whether or not the appellant is psychologically incapacitated to discharge a basic marital obligation was
resolved upon a review of both the documentary and testimonial evidence on record. Appellant admitted that he
did not have sexual relations with his wife after almost ten months of cohabitation, and it appears that he is not
suffering from any physical disability. Such abnormal reluctance or unwillingness to consummate his marriage is
strongly indicative of a serious personality disorder which to the mind of this Court clearly demonstrates an 'utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage' within the meaning of Article 36 of the
Family Code (See Santos vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112019, January 4, 1995). 4
Petitioner further contends that respondent court erred in holding that the alleged refusal of both the petitioner and the
private respondent to have sex with each other constitutes psychological incapacity of both. He points out as error the
failure of the trial court to make "a categorical finding about the alleged psychological incapacity and an in-depth analysis
of the reasons for such refusal which may not be necessarily due to physchological disorders" because there might have
been other reasons, i.e., physical disorders, such as aches, pains or other discomforts, why private respondent would
not want to have sexual intercourse from May 22, 1988 to March 15, 1989, in a short span of 10 months.
First, it must be stated that neither the trial court nor the respondent court made a finding on who between petitioner and
private respondent refuses to have sexual contact with the other. The fact remains, however, that there has never been
coitus between them. At any rate, since the action to declare the marriage void may be filed by either party, i.e., even the
psychologically incapacitated, the question of who refuses to have sex with the other becomes immaterial.
Petitioner claims that there is no independent evidence on record to show that any of the parties is suffering from
phychological incapacity. Petitioner also claims that he wanted to have sex with private respondent; that the reason for
private respondent's refusal may not be psychological but physical disorder as stated above.

We do not agree. Assuming it to be so, petitioner could have discussed with private respondent or asked her what is ailing
her, and why she balks and avoids him everytime he wanted to have sexual intercourse with her. He never did. At least,
there is nothing in the record to show that he had tried to find out or discover what the problem with his wife could be.
What he presented in evidence is his doctor's Medical Report that there is no evidence of his impotency and he is capable
of erection. 5 Since it is petitioner's claim that the reason is not psychological but perhaps physical disorder on the part of
private respondent, it became incumbent upon him to prove such a claim.
If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential marriage obligations,
and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological
incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
Thus, the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her spouse is considered a sign of
psychological incapacity. 6
Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is "To procreate children based on the universal
principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage." Constant non- fulfillment
of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the marriage. In the case at bar, the senseless and
protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
As aptly stated by the respondent court,
An examination of the evidence convinces Us that the husband's plea that the wife did not want carnal intercourse
with him does not inspire belief. Since he was not physically impotent, but he refrained from sexual intercourse
during the entire time (from May 22, 1988 to March 15, 1989) that he occupied the same bed with his wife, purely
out of symphaty for her feelings, he deserves to be doubted for not having asserted his right seven though she
balked (Tompkins vs. Tompkins, 111 Atl. 599, cited in I Paras, Civil Code, at p. 330). Besides, if it were true that
it is the wife was suffering from incapacity, the fact that defendant did not go to court and seek the declaration of
nullity weakens his claim. This case was instituted by the wife whose normal expectations of her marriage were
frustrated by her husband's inadequacy. Considering the innate modesty of the Filipino woman, it is hard to
believe that she would expose her private life to public scrutiny and fabricate testimony against her husband if it
were not necessary to put her life in order and put to rest her marital status.
We are not impressed by defendant's claim that what the evidence proved is the unwillingness or lack of intention
to perform the sexual act, which is not phychological incapacity, and which can be achieved "through proper
motivation." After almost ten months of cohabitation, the admission that the husband is reluctant or unwilling to
perform the sexual act with his wife whom he professes to love very dearly, and who has not posed any
insurmountable resistance to his alleged approaches, is indicative of a hopeless situation, and of a serious
personality disorder that constitutes psychological incapacity to discharge the basic marital covenants within the
contemplation of the Family Code. 7
While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity
(Art. 68, Family Code), the sanction therefor is actually the "spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and wife and
not any legal mandate or court order" (Cuaderno vs. Cuaderno 120 Phil. 1298). Love is useless unless it is shared with
another. Indeed, no man is an island, the cruelest act of a partner in marriage is to say "I could not have cared less." This is
so because an ungiven self is an unfulfilled self. The egoist has nothing but himself. In the natural order, it is sexual
intimacy which brings spouses wholeness and oneness. Sexual intimacy is a gift and a participation in the mystery of
creation. It is a function which enlivens the hope of procreation and ensures the continuation of family relations.
It appears that there is absence of empathy between petitioner and private respondent. That is a shared feeling which
between husband and wife must be experienced not only by having spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep sense of
spiritual communion. Marital union is a two-way process. An expressive interest in each other's feelings at a time it is

needed by the other can go a long way in deepening the marital relationship. Marriage is definitely not for children but for
two consenting adults who view the relationship with love amor gignit amorem, respect, sacrifice and a continuing
commitment to compromise, conscious of its value as a sublime social institution.
This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties found themselves trapped in its mire of
unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital obligations, can do no less but sustain the studied judgment of respondent
appellate court.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING PREMISES , the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 29, 1994 is
hereby AFFIRMED in all respects and the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, Romero, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 112019 January 4, 1995

LEOUEL SANTOS, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND JULIA ROSARIO BEDIA-SANTOS, respondents.

VITUG, J.:
Concededly a highly, if not indeed the most likely, controversial provision introduced by the Family Code is Article 36 (as
amended by E.O. No. 227 dated 17 July 1987), which declares:
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if
such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
The present petition for review on certiorari, at the instance of Leouel Santos ("Leouel"), brings into fore the
above provision which is now invoked by him. Undaunted by the decisions of the court a quo 1 and the Court of
Appeal, 2 Leouel persists in beseeching its application in his attempt to have his marriage with herein private
respondent, Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos ("Julia"), declared a nullity.
It was in Iloilo City where Leouel, who then held the rank of First Lieutenant in the Philippine Army, first met Julia. The
meeting later proved to be an eventful day for Leouel and Julia. On 20 September 1986, the two exchanged vows before
Municipal Trial Court Judge Cornelio G. Lazaro of Iloilo City, followed, shortly thereafter, by a church wedding. Leouel
and Julia lived with the latter's parents at the J. Bedia Compound, La Paz, Iloilo City. On 18 July 1987, Julia gave birth to
a baby boy, and he was christened Leouel Santos, Jr. The ecstasy, however, did not last long. It was bound to happen,
Leouel averred, because of the frequent interference by Julia's parents into the young spouses family affairs. Occasionally,
the couple would also start a "quarrel" over a number of other things, like when and where the couple should start living
independently from Julia's parents or whenever Julia would express resentment on Leouel's spending a few days with his
own parents.
On 18 May 1988, Julia finally left for the United Sates of America to work as a nurse despite Leouel's pleas to so dissuade
her. Seven months after her departure, or on 01 January 1989, Julia called up Leouel for the first time by long distance
telephone. She promised to return home upon the expiration of her contract in July 1989. She never did. When Leouel got
a chance to visit the United States, where he underwent a training program under the auspices of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines from 01 April up to 25 August 1990, he desperately tried to locate, or to somehow get in touch with, Julia but
all his efforts were of no avail.
Having failed to get Julia to somehow come home, Leouel filed with the regional trial Court of Negros Oriental, Branch
30, a complaint for "Voiding of marriage Under Article 36 of the Family Code" (docketed, Civil Case No. 9814).
Summons was served by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in Negros Oriental.

On 31 May 1991, respondent Julia, in her answer (through counsel), opposed the complaint and denied its allegations,
claiming, in main, that it was the petitioner who had, in fact, been irresponsible and incompetent.
A possible collusion between the parties to obtain a decree of nullity of their marriage was ruled out by the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor (in its report to the court).
On 25 October 1991, after pre-trial conferences had repeatedly been set, albeit unsuccessfully, by the court, Julia
ultimately filed a manifestation, stating that she would neither appear nor submit evidence.
On 06 November 1991, the court a quo finally dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. 3
Leouel appealed to the Court of Appeal. The latter affirmed the decision of the trial court. 4
The petition should be denied not only because of its non-compliance with Circular 28-91, which requires a certification
of non-shopping, but also for its lack of merit.
Leouel argues that the failure of Julia to return home, or at the very least to communicate with him, for more than five
years are circumstances that clearly show her being psychologically incapacitated to enter into married life. In his own
words, Leouel asserts:
. . . (T)here is no leave, there is no affection for (him) because respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos
failed all these years to communicate with the petitioner. A wife who does not care to inform her husband
about her whereabouts for a period of five years, more or less, is psychologically incapacitated.
The family Code did not define the term "psychological incapacity." The deliberations during the sessions of the Family
Code Revision Committee, which has drafted the Code, can, however, provide an insight on the import of the provision.
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
xxx xxx xxx
Art. 36. . . .
(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was wanting in the
sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage or was psychologically
or mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such lack of incapacity is
made manifest after the celebration.
On subparagraph (7), which as lifted from the Canon Law, Justice (Jose B.L.) Reyes suggested that they
say "wanting in sufficient use," but Justice (Eduardo) Caguioa preferred to say "wanting in the sufficient
use." On the other hand, Justice Reyes proposed that they say "wanting in sufficient reason." Justice
Caguioa, however, pointed out that the idea is that one is not lacking in judgment but that he is lacking in
the exercise of judgment. He added that lack of judgment would make the marriage voidable. Judge
(Alicia Sempio-) Diy remarked that lack of judgment is more serious than insufficient use of judgment
and yet the latter would make the marriage null and void and the former only voidable. Justice Caguioa
suggested that subparagraph (7) be modified to read:
"That contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such lack of
incapacity is made manifest after the celebration."

Justice Caguioa explained that the phrase "was wanting in sufficient use of reason of judgment to
understand the essential nature of marriage" refers to defects in the mental faculties vitiating consent,
which is not the idea in subparagraph (7), but lack of appreciation of one's marital obligations.
Judge Diy raised the question: Since "insanity" is also a psychological or mental incapacity, why is
"insanity" only a ground for annulment and not for declaration or nullity? In reply, Justice Caguioa
explained that in insanity, there is the appearance of consent, which is the reason why it is a ground for
voidable marriages, while subparagraph (7) does not refer to consent but to the very essence of marital
obligations.
Prof. (Araceli) Baviera suggested that, in subparagraph (7), the word "mentally" be deleted, with which
Justice Caguioa concurred. Judge Diy, however, prefers to retain the word "mentally."
Justice Caguioa remarked that subparagraph (7) refers to psychological impotence. Justice (Ricardo) Puno
stated that sometimes a person may be psychologically impotent with one but not with another. Justice
(Leonor Ines-) Luciano said that it is called selective impotency.
Dean (Fortunato) Gupit stated that the confusion lies in the fact that in inserting the Canon Law
annulment in the Family Code, the Committee used a language which describes a ground for voidable
marriages under the Civil Code. Justice Caguioa added that in Canon Law, there are voidable marriages
under the Canon Law, there are no voidable marriages Dean Gupit said that this is precisely the reason
why they should make a distinction.
Justice Puno remarked that in Canon Law, the defects in marriage cannot be cured.
Justice Reyes pointed out that the problem is: Why is "insanity" a ground for void ab initio marriages? In
reply, Justice Caguioa explained that insanity is curable and there are lucid intervals, while psychological
incapacity is not.
On another point, Justice Puno suggested that the phrase "even if such lack or incapacity is made
manifest" be modified to read "even if such lack or incapacity becomes manifest."
Justice Reyes remarked that in insanity, at the time of the marriage, it is not apparent.
Justice Caguioa stated that there are two interpretations of the phrase "psychological or mentally
incapacitated" in the first one, there is vitiation of consent because one does not know all the
consequences of the marriages, and if he had known these completely, he might not have consented to the
marriage.
xxx xxx xxx
Prof. Bautista stated that he is in favor of making psychological incapacity a ground for voidable
marriages since otherwise it will encourage one who really understood the consequences of marriage to
claim that he did not and to make excuses for invalidating the marriage by acting as if he did not
understand the obligations of marriage. Dean Gupit added that it is a loose way of providing for divorce.
xxx xxx xxx
Justice Caguioa explained that his point is that in the case of incapacity by reason of defects in the mental
faculties, which is less than insanity, there is a defect in consent and, therefore, it is clear that it should be

a ground for voidable marriage because there is the appearance of consent and it is capable of
convalidation for the simple reason that there are lucid intervals and there are cases when the insanity is
curable. He emphasized that psychological incapacity does not refer to mental faculties and has nothing to
do with consent; it refers to obligations attendant to marriage.
xxx xxx xxx
On psychological incapacity, Prof. (Flerida Ruth P.) Romero inquired if they do not consider it as going to
the very essence of consent. She asked if they are really removing it from consent. In reply, Justice
Caguioa explained that, ultimately, consent in general is effected but he stressed that his point is that it is
not principally a vitiation of consent since there is a valid consent. He objected to the lumping together of
the validity of the marriage celebration and the obligations attendant to marriage, which are completely
different from each other, because they require a different capacity, which is eighteen years of age, for
marriage but in contract, it is different. Justice Puno, however, felt that psychological incapacity is still a
kind of vice of consent and that it should not be classified as a voidable marriage which is incapable of
convalidation; it should be convalidated but there should be no prescription. In other words, as long as the
defect has not been cured, there is always a right to annul the marriage and if the defect has been really
cured, it should be a defense in the action for annulment so that when the action for annulment is
instituted, the issue can be raised that actually, although one might have been psychologically
incapacitated, at the time the action is brought, it is no longer true that he has no concept of the
consequence of marriage.
Prof. (Esteban) Bautista raised the question: Will not cohabitation be a defense? In response, Justice Puno
stated that even the bearing of children and cohabitation should not be a sign that psychological
incapacity has been cured.
Prof. Romero opined that psychological incapacity is still insanity of a lesser degree. Justice Luciano
suggested that they invite a psychiatrist, who is the expert on this matter. Justice Caguioa, however,
reiterated that psychological incapacity is not a defect in the mind but in the understanding of the
consequences of marriage, and therefore, a psychiatrist will not be a help.
Prof. Bautista stated that, in the same manner that there is a lucid interval in insanity, there are also
momentary periods when there is an understanding of the consequences of marriage. Justice Reyes and
Dean Gupit remarked that the ground of psychological incapacity will not apply if the marriage was
contracted at the time when there is understanding of the consequences of marriage. 5
xxx xxx xxx
Judge Diy proposed that they include physical incapacity to copulate among the grounds for void
marriages. Justice Reyes commented that in some instances the impotence that in some instances the
impotence is only temporary and only with respect to a particular person. Judge Diy stated that they can
specify that it is incurable. Justice Caguioa remarked that the term "incurable" has a different meaning in
law and in medicine. Judge Diy stated that "psychological incapacity" can also be cured. Justice Caguioa,
however, pointed out that "psychological incapacity" is incurable.
Justice Puno observed that under the present draft provision, it is enough to show that at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, one was psychologically incapacitated so that later on if already he can
comply with the essential marital obligations, the marriage is still void ab initio. Justice Caguioa
explained that since in divorce, the psychological incapacity may occur after the marriage, in void
marriages, it has to be at the time of the celebration of marriage. He, however, stressed that the idea in the

provision is that at the time of the celebration of the marriage, one is psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations, which incapacity continues and later becomes manifest.
Justice Puno and Judge Diy, however, pointed out that it is possible that after the marriage, one's
psychological incapacity become manifest but later on he is cured. Justice Reyes and Justice Caguioa
opined that the remedy in this case is to allow him to remarry. 6
xxx xxx xxx
Justice Puno formulated the next Article as follows:
Art. 37. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated, to comply with the essential obligations of marriage shall
likewise be void from the beginning even if such incapacity becomes manifest after its
solemnization.
Justice Caguioa suggested that "even if" be substituted with "although." On the other hand, Prof. Bautista
proposed that the clause "although such incapacity becomes manifest after its solemnization" be deleted
since it may encourage one to create the manifestation of psychological incapacity. Justice Caguioa
pointed out that, as in other provisions, they cannot argue on the basis of abuse.
Judge Diy suggested that they also include mental and physical incapacities, which are lesser in degree
than psychological incapacity. Justice Caguioa explained that mental and physical incapacities are vices
of consent while psychological incapacity is not a species of vice or consent.
Dean Gupit read what Bishop Cruz said on the matter in the minutes of their February 9, 1984 meeting:
"On the third ground, Bishop Cruz indicated that the phrase "psychological or mental
impotence" is an invention of some churchmen who are moralists but not canonists, that
is why it is considered a weak phrase. He said that the Code of Canon Law would rather
express it as "psychological or mental incapacity to discharge . . ."
Justice Caguioa remarked that they deleted the word "mental" precisely to distinguish it from vice of
consent. He explained that "psychological incapacity" refers to lack of understanding of the essential
obligations of marriage.
Justice Puno reminded the members that, at the last meeting, they have decided not to go into the
classification of "psychological incapacity" because there was a lot of debate on it and that this is
precisely the reason why they classified it as a special case.
At this point, Justice Puno, remarked that, since there having been annulments of marriages arising from
psychological incapacity, Civil Law should not reconcile with Canon Law because it is a new ground
even under Canon Law.
Prof. Romero raised the question: With this common provision in Civil Law and in Canon Law, are they
going to have a provision in the Family Code to the effect that marriages annulled or declared void by the
church on the ground of psychological incapacity is automatically annulled in Civil Law? The other
members replied negatively.
Justice Puno and Prof. Romero inquired if Article 37 should be retroactive or prospective in application.

Justice Diy opined that she was for its retroactivity because it is their answer to the problem of church
annulments of marriages, which are still valid under the Civil Law. On the other hand, Justice Reyes and
Justice Puno were concerned about the avalanche of cases.
Dean Gupit suggested that they put the issue to a vote, which the Committee approved.
The members voted as follows:
(1) Justice Reyes, Justice Puno and Prof. Romero were for prospectivity.
(2) Justice Caguioa, Judge Diy, Dean Gupit, Prof. Bautista and Director Eufemio were for retroactivity.
(3) Prof. Baviera abstained.
Justice Caguioa suggested that they put in the prescriptive period of ten years within which the action for
declaration of nullity of the marriage should be filed in court. The Committee approved the suggestion. 7
It could well be that, in sum, the Family Code Revision Committee in ultimately deciding to adopt the provision with less
specificity than expected, has in fact, so designed the law as to allow some resiliency in its application. Mme. Justice
Alicia V. Sempio-Diy, a member of the Code Committee, has been quoted by Mr. Justice Josue N. Bellosillo in Salita
vs. Hon. Magtolis (G.R. No. 106429, 13 June 1994); thus: 8
The Committee did not give any examples of psychological incapacity for fear that the giving of
examples would limit the applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis. Rather, the
Committee would like the judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience,
the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals
which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision was
taken from Canon Law.
A part of the provision is similar to Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, 9 which reads:
Canon 1095. They are incapable of contracting marriage:
1. who lack sufficient use of reason;
2. who suffer from a grave defect of discretion of judgment concerning essentila matrimonial rights and
duties, to be given and accepted mutually;
3. who for causes of psychological nature are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Accordingly, although neither decisive nor even perhaps all that persuasive for having no juridical or secular effect, the
jurisprudence under Canon Law prevailing at the time of the code's enactment, nevertheless, cannot be dismissed as
impertinent for its value as an aid, at least, to the interpretation or construction of the codal provision.
One author, Ladislas Orsy, S.J., in his treaties, 10 giving an account on how the third paragraph of Canon 1095 has been
framed, states:
The history of the drafting of this canon does not leave any doubt that the legislator intended, indeed, to
broaden the rule. A strict and narrow norm was proposed first:

Those who cannot assume the essential obligations of marriage because of a grave
psycho-sexual anomaly (ob gravem anomaliam psychosexualem) are unable to contract
marriage (cf. SCH/1975, canon 297, a new canon, novus);
then a broader one followed:
. . . because of a grave psychological anomaly (ob gravem anomaliam psychicam) . . . (cf. SCH/1980,
canon 1049);
then the same wording was retained in the text submitted to the pope (cf. SCH/1982, canon 1095, 3);
finally, a new version was promulgated:
because of causes of a psychological nature (ob causas naturae psychiae).
So the progress was from psycho-sexual to psychological anomaly, then the term anomaly was altogether
eliminated. it would be, however, incorrect to draw the conclusion that the cause of the incapacity need
not be some kind of psychological disorder; after all, normal and healthy person should be able to assume
the ordinary obligations of marriage.
Fr. Orsy concedes that the term "psychological incapacity" defies any precise definition since psychological causes can be
of an infinite variety.
In a book, entitled "Canons and Commentaries on Marriage," written by Ignatius Gramunt, Javier Hervada and LeRoy
Wauck, the following explanation appears:
This incapacity consists of the following: (a) a true inability to commit oneself to the essentials of
marriage. Some psychosexual disorders and other disorders of personality can be the psychic cause of this
defect, which is here described in legal terms. This particular type of incapacity consists of a real inability
to render what is due by the contract. This could be compared to the incapacity of a farmer to enter a
binding contract to deliver the crops which he cannot possibly reap; (b) this inability to commit oneself
must refer to the essential obligations of marriage: the conjugal act, the community of life and love, the
rendering of mutual help, the procreation and education of offspring; (c) the inability must be tantamount
to a psychological abnormality. The mere difficulty of assuming these obligations, which could be
overcome by normal effort, obviously does not constitute incapacity. The canon contemplates a true
psychological disorder which incapacitates a person from giving what is due (cf. John Paul II, Address to
R. Rota, Feb. 5, 1987). However, if the marriage is to be declared invalid under this incapacity, it must be
proved not only that the person is afflicted by a psychological defect, but that the defect did in
fact deprive the person, at the moment of giving consent, of the ability to assume the essential duties of
marriage and consequently of the possibility of being bound by these duties.
Justice Sempio-Diy 11 cites with approval the work of Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan
Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila (Branch 1), who opines that psychological incapacity must be
characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such
that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history
of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and it must be
incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.
It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing disquisitions, including, and most importantly, the deliberations of the
Family Code Revision Committee itself, that the use of the phrase "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Code

has not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical
authorities, extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances (cited in Fr. Artemio Baluma's "Void and
Voidable Marriages in the Family Code and their Parallels in Canon Law," quoting from the Diagnostic Statistical Manual
of Mental Disorder by the American Psychiatric Association; Edward Hudson's "Handbook II for Marriage Nullity
Cases"). Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently of, but must stand in conjunction
with, existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus correlated, "psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a
mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the
Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and
support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological
incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter intensitivity or inability to
give meaning and significance to the marriage. This pschologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated.
The law does not evidently envision, upon the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the
other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which considers children conceived prior to the
judicial declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be "legitimate."
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the state of a party being of unsound mind or
concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders the marriage
contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug addiction, habitual alcholism, lesbianism or homosexuality
should occur only during the marriage, they become mere grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family
Code. These provisions of the Code, however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility of these various circumstances
being themselves, depending on the degree and severity of the disorder, indicia of psychological incapacity.
Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are established, every circumstance that may have some bearing on
the degree, extent, and other conditions of that incapacity must, in every case, be carefully examined and evaluated so that
no precipitate and indiscriminate nullity is peremptorily decreed. The well-considered opinions of psychiatrists,
psychologists, and persons with expertise in psychological disciplines might be helpful or even desirable.
Marriage is not an adventure but a lifetime commitment. We should continue to be reminded that innate in our society,
then enshrined in our Civil Code, and even now still indelible in Article 1 of the Family Code, is that
Art. 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man a woman entered into in
accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the family
and an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and
not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the
marriage within the limits provided by this Code. (Emphasis supplied.)
Our Constitution is no less emphatic:
Sec. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall
strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total development.
Sec. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected
by the State. (Article XV, 1987 Constitution).
The above provisions express so well and so distinctly the basic nucleus of our laws on marriage and the family, and they
are doubt the tenets we still hold on to.

The factual settings in the case at bench, in no measure at all, can come close to the standards required to decree a nullity
of marriage. Undeniably and understandably, Leouel stands aggrieved, even desperate, in his present situation.
Regrettably, neither law nor society itself can always provide all the specific answers to every individual problem.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ.,
concur.
Feliciano, J., is on leave.

Separate Opinions

PADILLA, J., dissenting:

It is difficult to dissent from a well-written and studied opinion as Mr. Justice Vitug's ponencia. But, after an extended
reflection on the facts of this case, I cannot see my way clear into holding, as the majority do, that there is no ground for
the declaration of nullity of the marriage between petitioner and private respondent.
To my mind, it is clear that private respondent has been shown to be psychologically incapacitated to comply with at least
one essential marital obligation, i.e. that of living and cohabiting with her husband, herein petitioner. On the other hand, it
has not been shown that petitioner does not deserve to live and cohabit with his wife, herein private respondent.
There appears to be no disagreement that the term "psychological incapacity" defies precision in definition. But, as used
in Article 36 of the Family Code as a ground for the declaration of nullity of a marriage, the intent of the framers of the
Code is evidently to expand and liberalize the grounds for nullifying a marriage, as well pointed out by Madam Justice
Flerida Ruth P. Romero in her separate opinion in this case.
While it is true that the board term "psychological incapacity" can open the doors to abuse by couples who may wish to
have an easy way out of their marriage, there are, however, enough safeguards against this contingency, among which, is
the intervention by the State, through the public prosecutor, to guard against collusion between the parties and/or
fabrication of evidence.
In their case at bench, it has been abundantly established that private respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos exhibits
specific behavior which, to my mind, shows that she is psychologically incapacitated to fulfill her essential marital
obligations, to writ:
a. It took her seven (7) months after she left for the United States to call up her husband.
b. Julia promised to return home after her job contract expired in July 1989, but she never did and neither
is there any showing that she informed her husband (herein petitioner) of her whereabouts in the U.S.A.

c. When petitioner went to the United States on a mission for the Philippine Army, he exerted efforts to
"touch base" with Julia; there were no similar efforts on the part of Julia; there were no similar efforts on
the part of Julia to do the same.
d. When petitioner filed this suit, more than five (5) years had elapsed, without Julia indicating her plans
to rejoin the petitioner or her whereabouts.
e. When petitioner filed this case in the trial court, Julia, in her answer, claimed that it is the former who
has been irresponsible and incompetent.
f. During the trial, Julia waived her right to appear and submit evidence.
A spouse's obligation to live and cohabit with his/her partner in marriage is a basic ground rule in marriage, unless there
are overpowering compelling reasons such as, for instance, an incurable contagious disease on the part of a spouse or
cruelty of one partner, bordering on insanity. There may also be instances when, for economic and practical reasons,
husband and wife have to live separately, but the marital bond between the spouses always remains. Mutual love and
respect for each other would, in such cases, compel the absent spouse to at least have regular contracts with the other to
inform the latter of his/her condition and whereabouts.
In the present case, it is apparent that private respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos has no intention of cohabiting with
petitioner, her husband, or maintaining contact with him. In fact, her acts eloquently show that she does not want her
husband to know of her whereabouts and neither has she any intention of living and cohabiting with him.
To me there appears to be, on the part of private respondent, an unmistakeable indication of psychological incapacity to
comply with her essential marital obligations, although these indications were made manifest after the celebration of the
marriage.
It would be a great injustice, I believe, to petitioner for this Court to give a much too restrictive interpretation of the law
and compel the petitioner to continue to be married to a wife who for purposes of fulfilling her marital duties has, for all
practical purposes, ceased to exist.
Besides, there are public policy considerations involved in the ruling the Court makes today. Is it not, in effect directly or
indirectly, facilitating the transformation of petitioner into a "habitual tryster" or one forced to maintain illicit relations
with another woman or women with emerging problems of illegitimate children, simply because he is denied by private
respondent, his wife, the companionship and conjugal love which he has sought from her and to which he is legally
entitled?
I do not go as far as to suggest that Art. 36 of the Family Code is a sanction for absolute divorce but I submit that we
should not constrict it to non-recognition of its evident purpose and thus deny to one like petitioner, an opportunity to turn
a new leaf in his life by declaring his marriage a nullity by reason of his wife's psychological incapacity to perform an
essential marital obligation.
I therefore vote to GRANT the petition and to DECLARE the marriage between petitioner Leouel Santos and private
respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos VOID on the basis of Article 36 of the Family Code.
ROMERO, J., concurring:
I agree under the circumstances of the case, petitioner is not entitled to have his marriage declared a nullity on the ground
of psychological incapacity of private respondent.

However, as a member of both the Family Law Revision Committee of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Civil
Code Revision Committee of the UP Law Center, I wish to add some observations. The letter 1 dated April 15, 1985 of
then Judge Alicia V. Sempio-Diy written in behalf of the Family Law and Civil Code Revision Committee to then
Assemblywoman Mercedes Cojuangco-Teodoro traced the background of the inclusion of the present Article 36 in the
Family Code.
During its early meetings, the Family Law Committee had thought of including a chapter on absolute
divorce in the draft of a new Family Code (Book I of the Civil Code) that it had been tasked by the IBP
and the UP Law Center to prepare. In fact, some members of the Committee were in favor of a no-fault
divorce between the spouses after a number of years of separation, legal or de-facto. Justice J.B.L. Reyes
was then requested to prepare a proposal for an action for dissolution of marriage and the effects thereof
based on two grounds: (a) five continuous years of separation between the spouses, with or without a
judicial decree of legal separation, and (b) whenever a married person would have obtained a decree of
absolute divorce in another country. Actually, such a proposal is one for absolute divorce but called by
another name. Later, even the Civil Code Revision Committee took time to discuss the proposal of Justice
Reyes on this matter.
Subsequently, however, when the Civil Code Revision Committee and Family Law Committee started
holding joint meetings on the preparation of the draft of the New Family Code, they agreed and
formulated the definition of marriage as
"a special contract of permanent partnership between a man and a woman entered into in
accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is an inviolable
social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not
subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property relations
during the marriage within the limits provided by law."
With the above definition, and considering the Christian traditional concept of marriage of the Filipino
people as a permanent, inviolable, indissoluble social institution upon which the family and society are
founded, and also realizing the strong opposition that any provision on absolute divorce would encounter
from the Catholic Church and the Catholic sector of our citizenry to whom the great majority of our
people belong, the two Committees in their joint meetings did not pursue the idea of absolute divorce and
instead opted for an action for judicial declaration of invalidity of marriage based on grounds available
in the Canon Law. It was thought that such an action would not only be an acceptable alternative to
divorce but would also solve the nagging problem of church annulments of marriages on grounds not
recognized by the civil law of the State. Justice Reyes was thus requested to again prepare a draft of
provisions on such action for celebration of invalidity of marriage. Still later, to avoid the overlapping of
provisions on void marriages as found in the present Civil Code and those proposed by Justice Reyes on
judicial declaration of invalidity of marriage on grounds similar to the Canon Law, the two Committees
now working as a Joint Committee in the preparation of a New Family Code decided to consolidate the
present provisions on void marriages with the proposals of Justice Reyes. The result was the inclusion of
an additional kind of void marriage in the enumeration of void marriages in the present Civil Code, to wit:
"(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of
marriage or was psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential
marital obligations, even if such lack of incapacity is made manifest after the
celebration."

as well as the following implementing provisions:

"Art. 32. The absolute nullity of a marriage may be invoked or pleaded only on the basis
of a final judgment declaring the marriage void, without prejudice to the provision of
Article 34."
"Art. 33. The action or defense for the declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage
shall not prescribe."
xxx xxx xxx
It is believed that many hopelessly broken marriages in our country today may already dissolved or
annulled on the grounds proposed by the Joint Committee on declaration of nullity as well as annulment
of marriages, thus rendering an absolute divorce law unnecessary. In fact, during a conference with Father
Gerald Healy of the Ateneo University as well as another meeting with Archbishop Oscar Cruz of the
Archdiocese of Pampanga, the Joint Committee was informed that since Vatican II, the Catholic Church
has been declaring marriages null and void on the ground of "lack of due discretion" for causes that, in
other jurisdictions, would be clear grounds for divorce, like teen-age or premature marriages; marriage to
a man who, because of some personality disorder or disturbance, cannot support a family; the foolish or
ridiculous choice of a spouse by an otherwise perfectly normal person; marriage to a woman who refuses
to cohabit with her husband or who refuses to have children. Bishop Cruz also informed the Committee
that they have found out in tribunal work that a lot of machismo among husbands are manifestations of
their sociopathic personality anomaly, like inflicting physical violence upon their wives, constitutional
indolence or laziness, drug dependence or addiction, and psychological anomaly. . . . (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, by incorporating what is now Article 36 into the Family Code, the Revision Committee referred to above intended
to add another ground to those already listed in the Civil Code as grounds for nullifying a marriage, thus expanding or
liberalizing the same. Inherent in the inclusion of the provision on psychological incapacity was the understanding that
every petition for declaration of nullity based on it should be treated on a case-to-case basis; hence, the absence of a
definition and an enumeration of what constitutes psychological incapacity. Moreover, the Committee feared that the
giving of examples would limit the applicability of the provision under the principle ofejusdem generis. But the law
requires that the same be existing at the time of marriage although it be manifested later.
Admittedly, the provision on psychological incapacity, just like any other provision of law, is open to abuse. To prevent
this, "the court shall take order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take
steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed." 2 Moreover,
the judge, in interpreting the provision on a case-to-case basis, must be guided by "experience, the findings of experts and
researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil
courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provisions was taken from Canon Law." 3
The constitutional and statutory provisions on the family 4 will remain the lodestar which our society will hope to achieve
ultimately. Therefore, the inclusion of Article 36 is not to be taken as an abandonment of the ideal which we all cherish. If
at all, it is a recognition of the reality that some marriages, by reason of the incapacity of one of the contracting parties,
fall short of this ideal; thus, the parties are constrained to find a way of putting an end to their union through some legallyaccepted means.
Any criticism directed at the way that judges have interpreted the provision since its enactment as to render it easier for
unhappily-married couples to separate is addressed, not to the wisdom of the lawmakers but to the manner by which some
members of the Bench have implemented the provision. These are not interchangeable, each being separate and distinct
from the other.

PADILLA, J., dissenting:

It is difficult to dissent from a well-written and studied opinion as Mr. Justice Vitug's ponencia. But, after an extended
reflection on the facts of this case, I cannot see my way clear into holding, as the majority do, that there is no ground for
the declaration of nullity of the marriage between petitioner and private respondent.
To my mind, it is clear that private respondent has been shown to be psychologically incapacitated to comply with at least
one essential marital obligation, i.e. that of living and cohabiting with her husband, herein petitioner. On the other hand, it
has not been shown that petitioner does not deserve to live and cohabit with his wife, herein private respondent.
There appears to be no disagreement that the term "psychological incapacity" defies precision in definition. But, as used
in Article 36 of the Family Code as a ground for the declaration of nullity of a marriage, the intent of the framers of the
Code is evidently to expand and liberalize the grounds for nullifying a marriage, as well pointed out by Madam Justice
Flerida Ruth P. Romero in her separate opinion in this case.
While it is true that the board term "psychological incapacity" can open the doors to abuse by couples who may wish to
have an easy way out of their marriage, there are, however, enough safeguards against this contingency, among which, is
the intervention by the State, through the public prosecutor, to guard against collusion between the parties and/or
fabrication of evidence.
In their case at bench, it has been abundantly established that private respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos exhibits
specific behavior which, to my mind, shows that she is psychologically incapacitated to fulfill her essential marital
obligations, to writ:
a. It took her seven (7) months after she left for the United States to call up her husband.
b. Julia promised to return home after her job contract expired in July 1989, but she never did and neither
is there any showing that she informed her husband (herein petitioner) of her whereabouts in the U.S.A.
c. When petitioner went to the United States on a mission for the Philippine Army, he exerted efforts to
"touch base" with Julia; there were no similar efforts on the part of Julia; there were no similar efforts on
the part of Julia to do the same.
d. When petitioner filed this suit, more than five (5) years had elapsed, without Julia indicating her plans
to rejoin the petitioner or her whereabouts.
e. When petitioner filed this case in the trial court, Julia, in her answer, claimed that it is the former who
has been irresponsible and incompetent.
f. During the trial, Julia waived her right to appear and submit evidence.
A spouse's obligation to live and cohabit with his/her partner in marriage is a basic ground rule in marriage, unless there
are overpowering compelling reasons such as, for instance, an incurable contagious disease on the part of a spouse or
cruelty of one partner, bordering on insanity. There may also be instances when, for economic and practical reasons,
husband and wife have to live separately, but the marital bond between the spouses always remains. Mutual love and
respect for each other would, in such cases, compel the absent spouse to at least have regular contracts with the other to
inform the latter of his/her condition and whereabouts.

In the present case, it is apparent that private respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos has no intention of cohabiting with
petitioner, her husband, or maintaining contact with him. In fact, her acts eloquently show that she does not want her
husband to know of her whereabouts and neither has she any intention of living and cohabiting with him.
To me there appears to be, on the part of private respondent, an unmistakeable indication of psychological incapacity to
comply with her essential marital obligations, although these indications were made manifest after the celebration of the
marriage.
It would be a great injustice, I believe, to petitioner for this Court to give a much too restrictive interpretation of the law
and compel the petitioner to continue to be married to a wife who for purposes of fulfilling her marital duties has, for all
practical purposes, ceased to exist.
Besides, there are public policy considerations involved in the ruling the Court makes today. Is it not, in effect directly or
indirectly, facilitating the transformation of petitioner into a "habitual tryster" or one forced to maintain illicit relations
with another woman or women with emerging problems of illegitimate children, simply because he is denied by private
respondent, his wife, the companionship and conjugal love which he has sought from her and to which he is legally
entitled?
I do not go as far as to suggest that Art. 36 of the Family Code is a sanction for absolute divorce but I submit that we
should not constrict it to non-recognition of its evident purpose and thus deny to one like petitioner, an opportunity to turn
a new leaf in his life by declaring his marriage a nullity by reason of his wife's psychological incapacity to perform an
essential marital obligation.
I therefore vote to GRANT the petition and to DECLARE the marriage between petitioner Leouel Santos and private
respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos VOID on the basis of Article 36 of the Family Code.
ROMERO, J., concurring:
I agree under the circumstances of the case, petitioner is not entitled to have his marriage declared a nullity on the ground
of psychological incapacity of private respondent.
However, as a member of both the Family Law Revision Committee of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Civil
Code Revision Committee of the UP Law Center, I wish to add some observations. The letter 1 dated April 15, 1985 of
then Judge Alicia V. Sempio-Diy written in behalf of the Family Law and Civil Code Revision Committee to then
Assemblywoman Mercedes Cojuangco-Teodoro traced the background of the inclusion of the present Article 36 in the
Family Code.
During its early meetings, the Family Law Committee had thought of including a chapter on absolute
divorce in the draft of a new Family Code (Book I of the Civil Code) that it had been tasked by the IBP
and the UP Law Center to prepare. In fact, some members of the Committee were in favor of a no-fault
divorce between the spouses after a number of years of separation, legal or de-facto. Justice J.B.L. Reyes
was then requested to prepare a proposal for an action for dissolution of marriage and the effects thereof
based on two grounds: (a) five continuous years of separation between the spouses, with or without a
judicial decree of legal separation, and (b) whenever a married person would have obtained a decree of
absolute divorce in another country. Actually, such a proposal is one for absolute divorce but called by
another name. Later, even the Civil Code Revision Committee took time to discuss the proposal of Justice
Reyes on this matter.

Subsequently, however, when the Civil Code Revision Committee and Family Law Committee started
holding joint meetings on the preparation of the draft of the New Family Code, they agreed and
formulated the definition of marriage as
"a special contract of permanent partnership between a man and a woman entered into in
accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is an inviolable
social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not
subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property relations
during the marriage within the limits provided by law."
With the above definition, and considering the Christian traditional concept of marriage of the Filipino
people as a permanent, inviolable, indissoluble social institution upon which the family and society are
founded, and also realizing the strong opposition that any provision on absolute divorce would encounter
from the Catholic Church and the Catholic sector of our citizenry to whom the great majority of our
people belong, the two Committees in their joint meetings did not pursue the idea of absolute divorce and
instead opted for an action for judicial declaration of invalidity of marriage based on grounds available
in the Canon Law. It was thought that such an action would not only be an acceptable alternative to
divorce but would also solve the nagging problem of church annulments of marriages on grounds not
recognized by the civil law of the State. Justice Reyes was thus requested to again prepare a draft of
provisions on such action for celebration of invalidity of marriage. Still later, to avoid the overlapping of
provisions on void marriages as found in the present Civil Code and those proposed by Justice Reyes on
judicial declaration of invalidity of marriage on grounds similar to the Canon Law, the two Committees
now working as a Joint Committee in the preparation of a New Family Code decided to consolidate the
present provisions on void marriages with the proposals of Justice Reyes. The result was the inclusion of
an additional kind of void marriage in the enumeration of void marriages in the present Civil Code, to wit:
"(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of
marriage or was psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential
marital obligations, even if such lack of incapacity is made manifest after the
celebration."
as well as the following implementing provisions:
"Art. 32. The absolute nullity of a marriage may be invoked or pleaded only on the basis
of a final judgment declaring the marriage void, without prejudice to the provision of
Article 34."
"Art. 33. The action or defense for the declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage
shall not prescribe."
xxx xxx xxx
It is believed that many hopelessly broken marriages in our country today may already dissolved or
annulled on the grounds proposed by the Joint Committee on declaration of nullity as well as annulment
of marriages, thus rendering an absolute divorce law unnecessary. In fact, during a conference with Father
Gerald Healy of the Ateneo University as well as another meeting with Archbishop Oscar Cruz of the
Archdiocese of Pampanga, the Joint Committee was informed that since Vatican II, the Catholic Church
has been declaring marriages null and void on the ground of "lack of due discretion" for causes that, in
other jurisdictions, would be clear grounds for divorce, like teen-age or premature marriages; marriage to

a man who, because of some personality disorder or disturbance, cannot support a family; the foolish or
ridiculous choice of a spouse by an otherwise perfectly normal person; marriage to a woman who refuses
to cohabit with her husband or who refuses to have children. Bishop Cruz also informed the Committee
that they have found out in tribunal work that a lot of machismo among husbands are manifestations of
their sociopathic personality anomaly, like inflicting physical violence upon their wives, constitutional
indolence or laziness, drug dependence or addiction, and psychological anomaly. . . . (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, by incorporating what is now Article 36 into the Family Code, the Revision Committee referred to above intended
to add another ground to those already listed in the Civil Code as grounds for nullifying a marriage, thus expanding or
liberalizing the same. Inherent in the inclusion of the provision on psychological incapacity was the understanding that
every petition for declaration of nullity based on it should be treated on a case-to-case basis; hence, the absence of a
definition and an enumeration of what constitutes psychological incapacity. Moreover, the Committee feared that the
giving of examples would limit the applicability of the provision under the principle ofejusdem generis. But the law
requires that the same be existing at the time of marriage although it be manifested later.
Admittedly, the provision on psychological incapacity, just like any other provision of law, is open to abuse. To prevent
this, "the court shall take order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take
steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed." 2 Moreover,
the judge, in interpreting the provision on a case-to-case basis, must be guided by "experience, the findings of experts and
researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil
courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provisions was taken from Canon Law." 3
The constitutional and statutory provisions on the family 4 will remain the lodestar which our society will hope to achieve
ultimately. Therefore, the inclusion of Article 36 is not to be taken as an abandonment of the ideal which we all cherish. If
at all, it is a recognition of the reality that some marriages, by reason of the incapacity of one of the contracting parties,
fall short of this ideal; thus, the parties are constrained to find a way of putting an end to their union through some legallyaccepted means.
Any criticism directed at the way that judges have interpreted the provision since its enactment as to render it easier for
unhappily-married couples to separate is addressed, not to the wisdom of the lawmakers but to the manner by which some
members of the Bench have implemented the provision. These are not interchangeable, each being separate and distinct
from the other.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. ERLINDA MATIAS DAGDAG,respondent.

DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
For review on certiorari is the decision [1]of the Court of Appeals dated April 22, 1993, in CA-G.R. CV No. 34378,
which affirmed the decision of the Regi onal Trial Court of Olongapo City in Civil Case No. 380-0-90 declaring the
marriage of Erlinda Matias Dagdag and Avelino Dagdag void under Article 36 of the Family Code.
On September 7, 1975, Erlinda Matias, 16 years old, married Avelino Parangan Dagdag, 20 years old, at the Iglesia
Filipina Independent Church in Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija. [2] The marriage certificate was issued by the Office of the Local
Civil Registrar of the Municipality of Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija, on October 20, 1988.

Erlinda and Avelino begot two children, namely: Avelyn M. Dagdag, born on January 16, 1978; and Eden M.
Dagdag, born on April 21, 1982. [3] Their birth certificates were issued by the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of the
Municipality of Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija, also on October 20, 1988.
Erlinda and Avelino lived in a house in District 8, Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija, located at the back of the house of their inlaws.[4] A week after the wedding, Avelino started leaving his family without explanation. He would disappear for months,
suddenly reappear for a few months, then disappear again. During the times when he was with his family, he indulged in
drinking sprees with friends and would return home drunk. He would force his wife to submit to sexual intercourse and if
she refused, he would inflict physical injuries on her.[5]
On October 1993, he left his family again and that was the last they heard from him. Erlinda was constrained to look
for a job in Olongapo City as a manicurist to support herself and her children. Finally, Erlinda learned that Avelino was
imprisoned for some crime,[6] and that he escaped from jail on October 22, 1985. [7] A certification therefor dated February
14, 1990, was issued by Jail Warden Orlando S. Limon. Avelino remains at-large to date.
On July 3, 1990, Erlinda filed with the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City a petition for judicial declaration of
nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. [8] Since Avelino could
not be located, summons was served by publication in the Olongapo News, a newspaper of general circulation, on
September 3, 10, and 17, 1990. [9] Subsequently, a hearing was conducted to establish jurisdictional facts. Thereafter, on
December 17, 1990, the date set for presentation of evidence, only Erlinda and her counsel appeared. Erlinda testified and
presented her sister-in-law, Virginia Dagdag, as her only witness.
Virginia testified that she is married to the brother of Avelino. She and her husband live in Olongapo City but they
spend their vacations at the house of Avelinos parents in Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija. She testified that Erlinda and Avelino
always quarrelled, and that Avelino never stayed for long at the couples house. She knew that Avelino had been gone for a
long time now, and that she pitied Erlinda and the children. [10]
Thereafter, Erlinda rested her case. The trial court issued an Order giving the investigating prosecutor until January 2,
1991, to manifest in writing whether or not he would present controverting evidence, and stating that should he fail to file
said manifestation, the case would be deemed submitted for decision.
In compliance with the Order, the investigating prosecutor conducted an investigation and found that there was no
collusion between the parties. However, he intended to intervene in the case to avoid fabrication of evidence. [11]
On December 27, 1990, without waiting for the investigating prosecutors manifestation dated December 5, 1990, the
trial court rendered a decision[12] declaring the marriage of Erlinda and Avelino void under Article 36 of the Family Code,
disposing thus:
WHEREFORE, and viewed from the foregoing considerations, the Court hereby declares the marriage celebrated at
Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija between Erlinda Matias and Avelino Dagdag on 7 September 1975 to be null and void.
The Local Civil Registrar of Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija is hereby ordered to enter into his Book of Marriage this declaration
after this decision shall have become final and executory.
SO ORDERED.
On January 29, 1991, the investigating prosecutor filed a Motion to Set Aside Judgment on the ground that the
decision was prematurely rendered since he was given until January 2, 1991 to manifest whether he was presenting
controverting evidence.
The Office of the Solicitor General likewise filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the decision on the ground that the
same is not in accordance with the evidence and the law. After requiring Erlinda to comment, the trial court denied the
Motion for Reconsideration in an Order dated August 21, 1991 as follows: [13]
This resolves the Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision of this Honorable Court dated December 27, 1990 filed by
the Solicitor-General. The observation of the movant is to the effect that Mere alcoholism and abusiveness are not enough
to show psychological incapacity. Nor is abandonment. These are common in marriage. There must be showing that these
traits, stemmed from psychological incapacity existing at the time of celebration of the marriage.

In the case at bar, the abandonment is prolonged as the husband left his wife and children since 1983. The defendant,
while in jail escaped and whose present whereabouts are unknown. He failed to support his family for the same period of
time, actuations clearly indicative of the failure of the husband to comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage defined and enumerated under Article 68 of the Family Code. These findings of facts are uncontroverted.
Defendants character traits, by their nature, existed at the time of marriage and became manifest only after the marriage.
In rerum natura, these traits are manifestations of lack of marital responsibility and appear now to be incurable. Nothing
can be graver since the family members are now left to fend for themselves. Contrary to the opinion of the SolicitorGeneral, these are not common in marriage.
Let it be said that the provisions of Article 36 of the New Family Code, to assuage the sensibilities of the more numerous
church, is a substitute for divorce (See: Sempio Diy, New Family Code, p. 36) in order to dissolve marriages that exist
only in name.
WHEREFORE, and the foregoing considered, the motion for Reconsideration aforecited is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED
The Solicitor General appealed to the Court of Appeals, raising the sole assignment of error that:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING APPELLEES MARRIAGE TO AVELINO DAGDAG NULL AND
VOID ON THE GROUND OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF THE LATTER, PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 36
OF THE FAMILY CODE, THE PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF THE NATURE CONTEMPLATED BY THE
LAW NOT HAVING BEEN PROVEN TO EXIST.[14]
On April 22, 1993, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision [15] affirming the decision of the trial court, disposing
thus:
Avelino Dagdag is psychologically incapacitated not only because he failed to perform the duties and obligations of a
married person but because he is emotionally immature and irresponsible, an alcoholic, and a criminal. Necessarily, the
plaintiff is now endowed with the right to seek the judicial declaration of nullity of their marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code. Defendants constant non-fulfillment of any of such obligations is continously (sic) destroying the integrity
or wholeness of his marriage with the plaintiff. (Pineda, The Family Code of the Philippines Annotated, 1992 Ed., p. 46).
[16]

Hence, the present petition for review,[17] filed by the Solicitor General.
The Solicitor General contends that the alleged psychological incapacity of Avelino Dagdag is not of the nature
contemplated by Article 36 of the Family Code. According to him, the Court of Appeals made an erroneous and incorrect
interpretation of the phrase psychological incapacity and an incorrect application thereof to the facts of the case.
Respondent, in her Comment, insists that the facts constituting psychological incapacity were proven by preponderance of
evidence during trial.
At issue is whether or not the trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly declared the marriage as null and void
under Article 36 of the Family Code, on the ground that the husband suffers from psychological incapacity as he is
emotionally immature and irresponsible, a habitual alcoholic, and a fugitive from justice.
Article 36 of the Family Code provides A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with
the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.
Whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of a marriage, depends crucially,
more than in any field of the law, on the facts of the case. Each case must be judged, not on the basis of a
priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts. In regard to psychological incapacity as
a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on all fours with another case. The trial judge must

take pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own
judgment for that of the trial court.[18]
In Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina,[19] the Court laid down the following GUIDELINES in the interpretation
and application of Article 36 of the Family Code:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor
of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both
our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. x x x
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code
requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be
physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an
extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given
valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of
the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis (Salita vs. Magtolis, 233 SCRA 100, June 13, 1994), nevertheless
such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence
may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage. The evidence must show
that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their I dos. The manifestation of the illness need not be
perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be
absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not
related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in
diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to
procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Thus, mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted
as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much
less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in
the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the
obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code [20] as regards the
husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code [21] in regard to parents and their children. Such
non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the
decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while
not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. x x x
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state.
No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision,
briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The SolicitorGeneral, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the
date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor-General shall discharge the equivalent function
of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.[22]
Taking into consideration these guidelines, it is evident that Erlinda failed to comply with the above-mentioned
evidentiary requirements. Erlinda failed to comply with guideline No. 2 which requires that the root cause of
psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically identified and sufficiently proven by experts, since no

psychiatrist or medical doctor testified as to the alleged psychological incapacity of her husband. Further, the allegation
that the husband is a fugitive from justice was not sufficiently proven. In fact, the crime for which he was arrested was not
even alleged. The investigating prosecutor was likewise not given an opportunity to present controverting evidence since
the trial courts decision was prematurely rendered.
In the case of Hernandez v. Court of Appeals,[23] we affirmed the dismissal of the trial court and Court of Appeals of
the petition for annulment on the ground of dearth of the evidence presented. We further explained therein that Moreover, expert testimony should have been presented to establish the precise cause of private respondents
psychological incapacity, if any, in order to show that it existed at the inception of the marriage. The burden of proof to
show the nullity of the marriage rests upon petitioner. The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to
protect and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family.
(Art. II, Sec. 12, Art. XV, Secs. 1-2) Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage. (citing
Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, supra.)[24]
WHEREFORE, the present petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 22,
1993, in CA-G.R. CV No. 34378 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo (Chairman), Mendoza, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

[8]

Originally, Article 39 of the Family Code provided: Art. 39. The action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity
of a marriage shall not prescribe. However, in the case of marriage celebrated before the effectivity of this Code and
falling under Article 36, such action or defense shall prescribe in ten years after this Code shall have taken effect.
However, Republic Act No. 8533 was eventually enacted and approved on February 23, 1998, which amended Article 39
to read as follows: Art. 39. The action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage shall not prescribe.
[20]

Article 68, Family Code. The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity,
and render mutual help and support.
Art. 69, Family Code. The husband and wife shall fix the family domicile. In case of disagreement, the court shall decide.
xxx
Art. 70, Family Code. The spouses are jointly responsible for the support of the family. The expenses for such support and
other conjugal obligations shall be paid from the community property and, in the absence thereof, from the income or
fruits of their separate properties. In case of insufficiency or absence of said income or fruits, such obligations shall be
satisfied from their separate properties.
Art. 71, Family Code. The management of the household shall be the right and duty of both spouses. The expenses for
such management shall be paid in accordance with the provisions of Article 70.
[21]

Article 220, Family Code. The parents and those exercising parental authority shall have with respect to their
unemancipated children or wards the following rights and duties:
(1) To keep them in their company, to support, educate and instruct them by right precept and good example, and to
provide for their upbringing in keeping with their means;
(2) To give them love and affection, advice and counsel, companionship and understanding;
(3) To provide them with moral and spiritual guidance, inculcate in them honesty, integrity, self-discipline, self-reliance,
industry and thrift, stimulate their interest in civic affairs, and inspire in them compliance with the duties of citizenship;
(4) To enhance, protect, preserve and maintain their physical and mental health at all times;

(5) To furnish them with good and wholesome educational materials, supervise their activities, recreation and association
with others, protect them from bad company, and prevent them from acquiring habits detrimental to their health, studies
and morals;
(6) To represent them in all matters affecting their interests;
(7) To demand from them respect and obedience;
(8) To impose discipline on them as may be required under the circumstances; and
(9) To perform such other duties as are imposed by law upon parents and guardians.
Art. 221. Parents and other persons exercising parental authority shall be civilly liable for the injuries and damages caused
by the acts or omissions of their unemancipated children living in their company and under their parental authority subject
to the appropriate defenses provided by law.
Art. 225. The father and the mother shall, jointly exercise legal guardianship over the property of their unemancipated
common child without the necessity of a court appointment. In case of disagreement, the fathers decision shall prevail,
unless there is a judicial order to the contrary.
Where the market value of the property or the annual income of the child exceeds P50,000.00, the parent concerned shall
be required to furnish a bond in such amount as the court may determine, but not less than ten per centum (10%) of the
value of the property or annual income, to guarantee the performance of the obligations prescribed for general guardians.
A verified petition for approval of the bond shall be filed in the proper court of the place where the child resides, or, if the
child resides in a foreign country, in the proper court of the place where the property or any part thereof is situated.
The petition shall be docketed as a summary special proceeding in which all incidents and issues regarding the
performance of the obligations referred to in the second paragraph of this Article shall be heard and resolved.
The ordinary rules on guardianship shall be merely suppletory except when the child is under substitute parental authority,
or the guardian is a stranger, or a parent has remarried, in which case the ordinary rules on guardianship shall apply.

LORNA GUILLEN PESCA, petitioner, vs. ZOSIMO A. PESCA, respondent.

DECISION
VITUG, J.:
Submitted for review is the decision of the Court of Appeals, promulgated on 27 May 1998, in C.A. G.R. CV. No.
52374, reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City, Branch 130, which has declared the
marriage between petitioner and respondent to be null and void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity on the
part of respondent.

Petitioner Lorna G. Pesca and respondent Zosimo A. Pesca first met sometime in 1975 while on board an inter-island
vessel bound for Bacolod City. After a whirlwind courtship, they got married on 03 March 1975. Initially, the young
couple did not live together as petitioner was still a student in college and respondent, a seaman, had to leave the country
on board an ocean-going vessel barely a month after the marriage. Six months later, the young couple established their
residence in Quezon City until they were able to build their own house in Caloocan City where they finally resided. It was
blissful marriage for the couple during the two months of the year that they could stay together when respondent was on
vacation. The union begot four children, 19-year old Ruhem, 17-year old Rez, 11-year old Ryan, and 9-year old Richie.
It started in 1988, petitioner said, when she noticed that respondent surprisingly showed signs of psychological
incapacity to perform his marital covenant. His "true color" of being an emotionally immature and irresponsible husband
became apparent. He was cruel and violent. He was a habitual drinker, staying with friends daily from 4:00 o'clock in the
afternoon until 1:00 o'clock in the morning. When cautioned to stop or, to at least, minimize his drinking, respondent
would beat, slap and kick her. At one time, he chased petitioner with a loaded shotgun and threatened to kill her in the
presence of the children. The children themselves were not spared from physical violence.
Finally, on 19 November 1992, petitioner and her children left the conjugal abode to live in the house of her sister in
Quezon City as they could no longer bear his violent ways. Two months later, petitioner decided to forgive respondent,
and she returned home to give him a chance to change. But, to her dismay, things did not so turn out as expected. Indeed,
matters became worse.
On the morning of 22 March 1994, about eight oclock, respondent assaulted petitioner for about half an hour in the
presence of the children. She was battered black and blue. She submitted herself to medical examination at the Quezon
City General Hospital, which diagnosed her injuries as contusions and abrasions. Petitioner filed a complaint with the
barangay authorities, and a case was filed against respondent for slight physical injuries. He was convicted by the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Caloocan City and sentenced to eleven days of imprisonment.
This time, petitioner and her children left the conjugal home for good and stayed with her sister. Eventually, they
decided to rent an apartment. Petitioner sued respondent before the Regional Trial Court for the declaration of nullity of
their marriage invoking psychological incapacity. Petitioner likewise sought the custody of her minor children and prayed
for support pendente lite.
Summons, together with a copy of the complaint, was served on respondent on 25 April 1994 by personal service by
the sheriff. As respondent failed to file an answer or to enter his appearance within the reglementary period, the trial court
ordered the city prosecutor to look into a possible collusion between the parties. Prosecutor Rosa C. Reyes, on 03 August
1994, submitted her report to the effect that she found no evidence to establish that there was collusion between the
parties.
On 11 January 1995, respondent belatedly filed, without leave of court, an answer, and the same, although filed late,
was admitted by the court. In his answer, respondent admitted the fact of his marriage with petitioner and the birth of their
children. He also confirmed the veracity of Annex "A" of the complaint which listed the conjugal property. Respondent
vehemently denied, however, the allegation that he was psychologically incapacitated.
On 15 November 1995, following hearings conducted by it, the trial court rendered its decision declaring the
marriage between petitioner and respondent to be null and void ab initio on the basis of psychological incapacity on the
part of respondent and ordered the liquidation of the conjugal partnership.
Respondent appealed the above decision to the Court of Appeals, contending that the trial court erred, particularly, in
holding that there was legal basis to declare the marriage null and void and in denying his motion to reopen the case.

The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and declared the marriage between petitioner and
respondent valid and subsisting. The appellate court said:
"Definitely the appellee has not established the following: That the appellant showed signs of mental incapacity as would
cause him to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenant, as so provided for in Article 68 of the Family Code; that
the incapacity is grave, has preceded the marriage and is incurable; that his incapacity to meet his marital responsibility is
because of a psychological, not physical illness; that the root cause of the incapacity has been identified medically or
clinically, and has been proven by an expert; and that the incapacity is permanent and incurable in nature.
The burden of proof to show the nullity of marriage lies in the plaintiff and any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity." [1]
Petitioner, in her plea to this Court, would have the decision of the Court of Appeals reversed on the thesis that the
doctrine enunciated in Santos vs. Court of Appeals, [2] promulgated on 14 January 1995, as well as the guidelines set out in
Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Molina, [3] promulgated on 13 February 1997, should have no retroactive application
and, on the assumption that the Molina ruling could be applied retroactively, the guidelines therein outlined should be
taken to be merely advisory and not mandatory in nature. In any case, petitioner argues, the application
of the Santos and Molina dicta should warrant only a remand of the case to the trial court for further proceedings and not
its dismissal.
Be that as it may, respondent submits, the appellate court did not err in its assailed decision for there is absolutely no
evidence that has been shown to prove psychological incapacity on his part as the term has been so defined inSantos.
Indeed, there is no merit in the petition.
The term psychological incapacity, as a ground for the declaration of nullity of a marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code, has been explained by the Court in Santos and reiterated in Molina. The Court, in Santos, concluded:
"It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing disquisitions, including, and most importantly, the deliberations of the
Family Code Revision Committee itself, that the use of the phrase `psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Code
has not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical
authorities, extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances (cited in Fr. Artemio Balumad's `Void and
Voidable Marriages in the Family Code and their Parallels in Canon Law, quoting form the Diagnostic Statistical Manuel
of Mental Disorder by the American Psychiatric Association; Edward Hudson's `Handbook II for Marriage Nullity
Cases). Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently of, but must stand in conjunction
with, existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus correlated, `psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a
mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the
Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and
support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of `psychological
incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to
give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is
celebrated."
The "doctrine of stare decisis," ordained in Article 8 of the Civil Code, expresses that judicial decisions applying or
interpreting the law shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines. The rule follows the settled legal maxim legis
interpretado legis vim obtinet that the interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force of law.
[4]
The interpretation or construction placed by the courts establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent of the
law. The latter as so interpreted and construed would thus constitute a part of that law as of the date the statute is
enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of this Court finds itself later overruled, and a different view is adopted, that the

new doctrine may have to be applied prospectively in favor of parties who have relied on the old doctrine and have acted
in good faith in accordance therewith[5] under the familiar rule of lex prospicit, non respicit.
The phrase psychological incapacity, borrowed from Canon law, is an entirely novel provision in our statute books,
and, until the relatively recent enactment of the Family Code, the concept has escaped jurisprudential attention. It is in
Santos when, for the first time, the Court has given life to the term. Molina, that followed, has additionally provided
procedural guidelines to assist the courts and the parties in trying cases for annulment of marriages grounded on
psychological incapacity. Molina has strengthened, not overturned, Santos.
At all events, petitioner has utterly failed, both in her allegations in the complaint and in her evidence, to make out a
case of psychological incapacity on the part of respondent, let alone at the time of solemnization of the contract, so as to
warrant a declaration of nullity of the marriage. Emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, invoked by her, cannot be
equated with psychological incapacity.
The Court reiterates its reminder that marriage is an inviolable social institution and the foundation of the
family[6] that the State cherishes and protects. While the Court commisserates with petitioner in her unhappy marital
relationship with respondent, totally terminating that relationship, however, may not necessarily be the fitting
denouement to it. In these cases, the law has not quite given up, neither should we.
WHEREFORE, the herein petition is DENIED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 101749 July 10, 1992

CONRADO BUNAG, JR., petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, First Division, and ZENAIDA B. CIRILO, respondents.
Petitioner appeals for the reversal of the decision 1 of respondent Court of Appeals promulgated on May 17, 1991 in CAG.R. CV No. 07054, entitled "Zenaida B. Cirilo vs. Conrado Bunag, Sr. and Conrado Bunag, Jr.," which affirmed in
toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch XI at Bacoor, Cavite, and, implicitly, respondent court's resolution of
September 3, 1991 2 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
Respondent court having assiduously discussed the salient antecedents of this case, vis-a-vis the factual findings of the
court below, the evidence of record and the contentions of the parties, it is appropriate that its findings, which we approve
and adopt, be extensively reproduced hereunder:
Based on the evidence on record, the following facts are considered indisputable: On the afternoon of
September 8, 1973, defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr. brought plaintiff-appellant to a motel or hotel where
they had sexual intercourse. Later that evening, said defendant-appellant brought plaintiff-appellant to the
house of his grandmother Juana de Leon in Pamplona, Las Pias, Metro Manila, where they lived
together as husband and wife for 21 days, or until September 29, 1973. On September 10, 1973,
defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr. and plaintiff-appellant filed their respective applications for a marriage
license with the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Bacoor, Cavite. On October 1, 1973, after leaving

plaintiff-appellant, defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr. filed an affidavit withdrawing his application for a
marriage license.
Plaintiff-appellant contends that on the afternoon of September 8, 1973, defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr.,
together with an unidentified male companion, abducted her in the vicinity of the San Juan de Dios
Hospital in Pasay City and brought her to a motel where she was raped. The court a quo, which adopted
her evidence, summarized the same which we paraphrased as follows:
Plaintiff was 26 years old on November 5, 1974 when she testified, single and had
finished a college course in Commerce (t.s.n., p. 4, Nov. 5, 1974). It appears that on
September 8, 1973, at about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon, while she was walking along
Figueras Street, Pasay City on her way to the San Juan de Dios Canteen to take her snack,
defendant, Conrado Bunag, Jr., came riding in a car driven by a male companion.
Plaintiff and defendant Bunag, Jr. were sweethearts, but two weeks before September 8,
1973, they had a quarrel, and Bunag, Jr. wanted to talk matters over with plaintiff, so that
he invited her to take their merienda at the Aristocrat Restaurant in Manila instead of at
the San Juan de Dios Canteen, to which plaintiff obliged, as she believed in his sincerity
(t.s.n., pp. 8-10, Nov. 5, 1974).
Plaintiff rode in the car and took the front seat beside the driver while Bunag, Jr. seated
himself by her right side. The car travelled north on its way to the Aristocrat Restaurant
but upon reaching San Juan Street in Pasay City, it turned abruptly to the right, to which
plaintiff protested, but which the duo ignored and instead threatened her not to make any
noise as they were ready to die and would bump the car against the post if she persisted.
Frightened and silenced, the car travelled its course thru F.B. Harrison Boulevard until
they reached a motel. Plaintiff was then pulled and dragged from the car against her will,
and amidst her cries and pleas. In spite of her struggle she was no match to the joint
strength of the two male combatants because of her natural weakness being a woman and
her small stature. Eventually, she was brought inside the hotel where the defendant
Bunag, Jr. deflowered her against her will and consent. She could not fight back and repel
the attack because after Bunag, Jr. had forced her to lie down and embraced her, his
companion held her two feet, removed her panty, after which he left. Bunag, Jr.
threatened her that he would ask his companion to come back and hold her feet if she did
not surrender her womanhood to him, thus he succeeded in feasting on her virginity.
Plaintiff described the pains she felt and how blood came out of her private parts after her
vagina was penetrated by the penis of the defendant Bunag, Jr. (t.s.n. pp. 17-24, Nov. 5,
1974).
After that outrage on her virginity, plaintiff asked Bunag, Jr. once more to allow her to go
home but the latter would not consent and stated that he would only let her go after they
were married as he intended to marry her, so much so that she promised not to make any
scandal and to marry him. Thereafter, they took a taxi together after the car that they used
had already gone, and proceeded to the house of Juana de Leon, Bunag, Jr.'s grandmother
in Pamplona, Las Pias, Metro Manila where they arrived at 9:30 o'clock in the evening
(t.s.n., p. 26, Nov. 5, 1974). At about ten (10) o'clock that same evening, defendant
Conrado Bunag, Sr., father of Bunag, Jr. arrived and assured plaintiff that the following
day which was a Monday, she and Bunag, Jr. would go to Bacoor, to apply for a marriage
license, which they did. They filed their applications for marriage license (Exhibits "A"
and "C") and after that plaintiff and defendant Bunag, Jr. returned to the house of Juana

de Leon and lived there as husband and wife from September 8, 1973 to September 29,
1973.
On September 29, 1973 defendant Bunag, Jr. left and never returned, humiliating plaintiff
and compelled her to go back to her parents on October 3, 1973. Plaintiff was ashamed
when she went home and could not sleep and eat because of the deception done against
her by defendants-appellants (t.s.n., p. 35, Nov. 5, 1974).
The testimony of plaintiff was corroborated in toto by her uncle, Vivencio Bansagan who
declared that on September 8, 1973 when plaintiff failed to arrive home at 9:00 o'clock in
the evening, his sister who is the mother of plaintiff asked him to look for her but his
efforts proved futile, and he told his sister that plaintiff might have married (baka nagasawa, t.s.n., pp. 5-6, March 18, 1976). However, in the afternoon of the next day
(Sunday), his sister told him that Francisco Cabrera, accompanied by barrio captain
Jacinto Manalili of Ligas, Bacoor, Cavite, informed her that plaintiff and Bunag, Jr. were
in Cabrera's house, so that her sister requested him to go and see the plaintiff, which he
did, and at the house of Mrs. Juana de Leon in Pamplona, Las Pias, Metro Manila he
met defendant Conrado Bunag, Sr., who told him, "Pare, the children are here already.
Let us settle the matter and have them married."
He conferred with plaintiff who told him that as she had already lost her honor, she would bear her
sufferings as Boy Bunag, Jr. and his father promised they would be married.
Defendants-appellants, on the other hand, deny that defendant-appellant Conrado Bunag, Jr. abducted and
raped plaintiff-appellant on September 8, 1973. On the contrary, plaintiff-appellant and defendantappellant Bunag, Jr. eloped on that date because of the opposition of the latter's father to their
relationship.
Defendant-appellants claim that defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr. and plaintiff-appellant had earlier made
plans to elope and get married, and this fact was known to their friends, among them, Architect Chito
Rodriguez. The couple made good their plans to elope on the afternoon of September 8, 1973, when
defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr., accompanied by his friend Guillermo Ramos, Jr., met plaintiff-appellant
and her officemate named Lydia in the vicinity of the San Juan de Dios Hospital. The foursome then
proceeded to (the) aforesaid hospital's canteen where they had some snacks. Later, Guillermo Ramos, Jr.
took Lydia to Quirino Avenue where she could get a ride home, thereby leaving the defendant-appellant
Bunag, Jr. and plaintiff-appellant alone. According to defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr., after Guillermo
Ramos, Jr. and Lydia left, he and plaintiff-appellant took a taxi to the Golden Gate and Flamingo Hotels
where they tried to get a room, but these were full. They finally got a room at the Holiday Hotel, where
defendant-appellant registered using his real name and residence certificate number. Three hours later, the
couple check out of the hotel and proceeded to the house of Juana de Leon at Pamplona, Las Pias, where
they stayed until September 19, 1873. Defendant-appellant claims that bitter disagreements with the
plaintiff-appellant over money and the threats made to his life prompted him to break off their plan to get
married.
During this period, defendant-appellant Bunag, Sr. denied having gone to the house of Juan de Leon and
telling plaintiff-appellant that she would be wed to defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr. In fact, he phoned Atty.
Conrado Adreneda, member of the board of directors of Mandala Corporation, defendant-appellant
Bunag, Jr.'s employer, three times between the evening of September 8, 1973 and September 9, 1973
inquiring as to the whereabouts of his son. He came to know about his son's whereabouts when he was

told of the couple's elopement late in the afternoon of September 9, 1973 by his mother Candida
Gawaran. He likewise denied having met relatives and emissaries of plaintiff-appellant and agreeing to
her marriage to his son. 3
A complaint for damages for alleged breach of promise to marry was filed by herein private respondent Zenaida B. Cirilo
against petitioner Conrado Bunag, Jr. and his father, Conrado Bunag, Sr., as Civil Case No. N-2028 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch XIX at Bacoor, Cavite. On August 20, 1983, on a finding, inter alia, that petitioner had forcibly abducted
and raped private respondent, the trial court rendered a decision 4 ordering petitioner Bunag, Jr. to pay private respondent
P80,000.00 as moral damages, P20,000.00 as exemplary damages, P20,000.00 by way of temperate damages, and
P10,000.00 for and as attorney's fees, as well as the costs of suit. Defendant Conrado Bunag, Sr. was absolved from any
and all liability.
Private respondent appealed that portion of the lower court's decision disculpating Conrado Bunag, Sr. from civil liability
in this case. On the other hand, the Bunags, as defendants-appellants, assigned in their appeal several errors allegedly
committed by trial court, which were summarized by respondent court as follows: (1) in finding that defendant-appellant
Conrado Bunag, Jr. forcibly abducted and raped plaintiff-appellant; (2) in finding that defendants-appellants promised
plaintiff-appellant that she would be wed to defendant-appellant Conrado Bunag, Jr.; and (3) in awarding plaintiffappellant damages for the breach of defendants-appellants' promise of marriage. 5
As stated at the outset, on May 17, 1991 respondent Court of Appeals rendered judgment dismissing both appeals and
affirming in toto the decision of the trial court. His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner Bunag, Jr. is
before us on a petition for review, contending that (1) respondent court failed to consider vital exhibits, testimonies and
incidents for petitioner's defense, resulting in the misapprehensions of facts and violative of the law on preparation of
judgment; and (2) it erred in the application of the proper law and jurisprudence by holding that there was forcible
abduction with rape, not just a simple elopement and an agreement to marry, and in the award of excessive damages. 6
Petitioner Bunag, Jr. first contends that both the trial and appellate courts failed to take into consideration the alleged fact
that he and private respondent had agreed to marry, and that there was no case of forcible abduction with rape, but one of
simple elopement and agreement to marry. It is averred that the agreement to marry has been sufficiently proven by the
testimonies of the witnesses for both parties and the exhibits presented in court.
This submission, therefore, clearly hinges on the credibility of the witnesses and evidence presented by the parties and the
weight accorded thereto in the factual findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals. In effect, what petitioner would
want this Court to do is to evaluate and analyze anew the evidence, both testimonial and documentary, presented before
and calibrated by the trial court, and as further meticulously reviewed and discussed by respondent court.
The issue raised primarily and ineluctably involves questions of fact. We are, therefore, once again constrained to stress
the well-entrenched statutory and jurisprudential mandate that findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are, as a rule,
conclusive upon this Court. Only questions of law, distinctly set forth, may be raised in a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, subject to clearly settled exceptions in case law.
Our jurisdiction in cases brought to us from the Court of Appeals is limited to reviewing and revising the errors of law
imputed to the latter, its findings of fact being conclusive. This Court has emphatically declared that it is not its function to
analyze or weigh such evidence all over again, its jurisdiction being limited to reviewing errors of law that might have
been committed by the lower court. Barring, therefore, a showing that the findings complained of are totally devoid of
support in the record, or that they are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute serious abuse of discretion, such findings
must stand, for this Court is not expected or required to examine or contrast the oral and documentary evidence submitted
by the parties. 7 Neither does the instant case reveal any feature falling within, any of the exceptions which under our
decisional rules may warrant a review of the factual findings of the Court of Appeals. On the foregoing considerations and
our review of the records, we sustain the holding of respondent court in favor of private respondent.

Petitioner likewise asserts that since action involves a breach of promise to marry, the trial court erred in awarding
damages.
It is true that in this jurisdiction, we adhere to the time-honored rule that an action for breach of promise to marry has no
standing in the civil law, apart from the right to recover money or property advanced by the plaintiff upon the faith of such
promise. 8 Generally, therefore, a breach of promise to marry per se is not actionable, except where the plaintiff has
actually incurred expenses for the wedding and the necessary incidents thereof.
However, the award of moral damages is allowed in cases specified in or analogous to those provided in Article 2219 of
the Civil Code. Correlatively, under Article 21 of said Code, in relation to paragraph 10 of said Article 2219, any person
who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for moral damages. 9 Article 21 was adopted to remedy the countless gaps in the statutes which
leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless even though they have actually suffered material and moral injury, and is
intended to vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human
foresight to specifically provide for in the statutes. 10
Under the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, the acts of petitioner in forcibly abducting private respondent and
having carnal knowledge with her against her will, and thereafter promising to marry her in order to escape criminal
liability, only to thereafter renege on such promise after cohabiting with her for twenty-one days, irremissibly constitute
acts contrary to morals and good customs. These are grossly insensate and reprehensible transgressions which
indisputably warrant and abundantly justify the award of moral and exemplary damages, pursuant to Article 21 in relation
to paragraphs 3 and 10, Article 2219, and Article 2229 and 2234 of Civil Code.
Petitioner would, however, belabor the fact that said damages were awarded by the trial court on the basis of a finding that
he is guilty of forcible abduction with rape, despite the prior dismissal of the complaint therefor filed by private
respondent with the Pasay City Fiscal's Office.
Generally, the basis of civil liability from crime is the fundamental postulate of our law that every person criminally liable
for a felony is also civilly liable. In other words, criminal liability will give rise to civil liability ex delicto only if the same
felonious act or omission results in damage or injury to another and is the direct and proximate cause thereof. 11 Hence,
extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of civil liability unless the extinction proceeds from a
declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. 12
In the instant case, the dismissal of the complaint for forcible abduction with rape was by mere resolution of the fiscal at
the preliminary investigation stage. There is no declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil case
might arise did not exist. Consequently, the dismissal did not in any way affect the right of herein private respondent to
institute a civil action arising from the offense because such preliminary dismissal of the penal action did not carry with it
the extinction of the civil action.
The reason most often given for this holding is that the two proceedings involved are not between the same parties.
Furthermore, it has long been emphasized, with continuing validity up to now, that there are different rules as to the
competency of witnesses and the quantum of evidence in criminal and civil proceedings. In a criminal action, the State
must prove its case by evidence which shows the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, while in a civil action it is
sufficient for the plaintiff to sustain his cause by preponderance of evidence only. 13 Thus, in Rillon, et al. vs. Rillon, 14 we
stressed that it is not now necessary that a criminal prosecution for rape be first instituted and prosecuted to final judgment
before a civil action based on said offense in favor of the offended woman can likewise be instituted and prosecuted to
final judgment.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit, and the assailed judgment and resolution are hereby
AFFIRMED.