Accountability and Worth: A Study of New Zealands

Tertiary Education Institutions

Rodney Dormer
Victoria Business School
Victoria University of Wellington
New Zealand
rodney.dormer@vuw.ac.nz

Accountability and Worth: A Study of New Zealands

Tertiary Education Institutions

Abstract
This paper explores the complex web of accountability relationships between New Zealands
tertiary education institutions (TEIs) and the different forums with whom they interact. A
brief review of the extensive literature on accountability suggests that previous approaches to
this topic have largely adopted the perspective of those forums to whom accountability is
provided. However, it is argued that the alternative perspectives of those giving an account
provide a more insightful understanding of accountability practices.

Key Words: universities, polytechnics, wnanga, accountability, worth

Introduction
This paper seeks to answer the question, what does accountability mean for New Zealands
twenty-three tertiary education institutions (TEIs) that include universities, polytechnics and
wnanga (mori tertiary education providers). All of those organisations receive a significant
proportion of their funding (between 40 and 80 per cent) from government but are also
involved in a web of accountability relationships that incudes students, donors, employers
and local communities. However, the nature of those relationships and the conceptions of
accountability involved are variable, confusing and at times conflicting and as Denhardt and
Denhardt (2015) have observed: accountability is not, and cannot be made, simple (p.143).
What follows is a brief review of the extensive literature on accountability. The paper then
provides an analysis of a series of semi-structured interviews, undertaken with senior
managers in a range of tertiary education institutions, adopting, and to some extent adapting,
the economies of worth framework suggested by Boltanski and Thvenot (2006).
Literature Review
The complex nature of accountability in a public context has been identified my many
observers including Denhardt and Denhardt (2015) who suggest that it encompasses:
a constellation of institutions and standards including the public interest,
statutory and constitutional law, other agencies, other levels of government, the
media, professional standards, situational factors, democratic norms, and of course
citizens. (p. 123)
Bovens (2007, p.449) has suggested that the concept of accountability today resembles a
dustbin filled with good intentions, loosely defined concepts and vague images of good
governance. Certainly accountability means different things to different people and yet it is
central to any discussion of good governance.
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This confusion is increased by the at times interchangeable use of the words accountable
and responsible although, as Gregory (2012) has noted, being responsible for something or
someone does not necessarily imply being accountable. A mistake made by a subordinate
does not necessarily mean that a responsible manager, or Minister, is accountable unless
there is a broader, systemic issue involved. In this sense an actor is accountable to one or
more others but responsible, often in a moral sense, for something that involves the actors, or
others, actions. Thus while on the one hand good governance can be seen to be associated
with control through specific and clear definition of what is to be delivered or achieved, it
might also be seen to require the facilitation of a shared ownership of those objectives.
Gregory therefore quotes Uhr (1993) who suggested:
Accountability is about compliance with authority, whereas responsibility is about
empowerment and independence. Accountability is the negative end of the same
band in which responsibility is the positive end.

If accountability is about

minimising mis-government, responsibility is about maximising good government.

(p.3)
Thus it has been argued that administrative accountability involves both external pre-set
performance criteria and internal professional, or technical, values that administrators
internalise and hold each other accountable to (Denhardt and Denhardt 2015). And therefore:
the problem of how to bring about responsible conduct of the administrative
staff of a large organization is, particularly in a democratic society, very largely a
question of sound rules and effective morale. (Friedrich, 1960, p.19)
At a macro level Bovens (2007) has also proffered a solution to this confusion by way of the
following definition:

Accountability is a relationship between an actor and a forum, in which the actor

has an obligation to explain and justify his or her conduct, the forum can pose
questions and pass judgement, and the actor may face consequences. (p. 450)
Which suggests three questions by which a relationship involving accountability may be
distinguished from those involving a simpler wish to share information, cooperate or be
transparent. i.e.:

does the actor have an obligation (legal, implied or assumed) to explain and justify

his/her conduct?
can the forum pose questions and pass judgement? and
could the actor face consequences?

This standard, economically framed approach to accountability is also presented by Hughes

(2012) and many others who describe accountability in the context of a hierarchy of
principal-agent relationships in which agents have a singular and clear relationship with a
principal to whom they must explain and justify their use and stewardship of delegated
resources and power. This requires:
an agreed definition of tasks, measures of performance, appropriate organisation
and control of resources, systems for monitoring and reporting, and incentives and
sanctions. (OECD, 1991, p.12)
Thus for Gregory (2012) the essence of accountability is organisational control (p.687); a
control that is dependent on an ability to know what the facts are. However, it has also been
noted that many public functions, or the activities they involve, do not readily lend
themselves to clear ex ante definition and subsequent measurement (Wilson, 1989). As
Noordegraaf (2008) has argued, the attempt to turn complex social and economic phenomena
into crisp facts and figures can both fall short of capturing the reality of a situation and

further change and complicate it as a result of the inevitable behavioural consequences of the
measurement process.
Behn (2001) has described a broader conception of accountability that, as well as
accountability for performance against some kind of objective goal or target, also
encompasses:

financial accountability for the wise use of public money; and

an accountability for treating all citizens fairly and for maintaining rules and
procedures that protect citizens from abuses of power.

Although Behn acknowledges that these accountabilities might at times overlap and conflict.
Considine (2002) has also discussed the broader implications of a system of accountability,
defined as the legal obligation to be responsive to the legitimate interests of those affected
by decisions, programmes and interventions (p.22). He distinguishes between a standard
approach informed by legal and economic theories that are concerned with authorisation and
control through vertical structures, and, arguably more realistic, structures of horizontal
accountability. The web of accountability then moves beyond the instrumental, transactionbased rationality of specifically defined ends and clearly understood means to one in which
desired ends and acceptable means emerge from a discursive relationship. As Considine
(2002) has also noted:
Horizontal accountability issues can be seen as those able to invite and
authorise the contributions of social partners, community interests, other
levels of government, and other autonomous contributors. It may, thereby,
improve the legitimacy of the whole system. (p.28)
Certainly, horizontal accountability takes on more significance in the context of increasingly
fragmented arrangements for the provision of public services that include elements of co-

production with other service providers, communities and citizens. As Considine suggests,
horizontal accountability requires moving away from both law and economic markets to
embrace network relations and different approaches to governance. He states:
the question of accountability then goes beyond being a matter of compliance
(legal strategy) or performance (economic strategy) and becomes a matter of
organisational convergence (cultural strategy). (p.28)
However, the concept of convergence may be neither attainable nor desirable if it suggests a
one correct way approach to issues that, particularly in the public domain, involve the
diverse identities and objectives of complex societies. Structures of lateral accountability
involving diverse principles of evaluation have been described by Stark (2009) as a
heterarchy. He argues that, with no hierarchical ordering of these principles, the friction
between them may represent a productive dissonance from which new and innovative
knowledge can emerge.
Bovens (2007) has also argued that public institutions are accountable to a plethora of
different forums all of which apply different criteria (p.455). He broadly classifies these
forums as involving:

political accountability,
legal accountability,
administrative accountability,
professional accountability, and
social accountability.1

In effect, Bovens fivefold framework of forums of accountability starts from the perspective
of those actors to whom an account is given. However, we might more profitably ask, from
the perspective of the actors giving an account, why do they do so? Understanding how those
we wish to hold accountable conceive of their roles, duties and obligations, and especially
1 See also Romzek and Ingraham, 2000.
7

what principles might guide them, arguably provides a more real-world insight into practice
(Burke, 1986). The meaning that accountability has for different actors will reflect the nature
of those forums to which they believe they are accountable together with those things for
which they believe they are accountable. (The significant implication here is that if actors do
not believe themselves to be accountable to a particular forum, they cannot, or will not, in
practice be accountable.) Those beliefs will in turn reflect a conception of what is important
or of value in a particular context.
It is, therefore, again important to note that those actors will co-exist in a number of different
contexts, or worlds, each of which will have its alternative conception of what is valuable,
what is worthy, what counts (Stark, 2009, p.5). This occurs in contexts not governed by
hierarchical relationships of authority where design preceded execution, with the latter
carried out with the time-management precision of a Taylorist organisational machine; but
rather in those in which organisational boundaries are crisscrossed by dense ties of
interlocking patterns of ownership and complex patterns of strategic alliances (ibid. p.23).
We may, then, argue that, rather than organisational control, the essence of the practice of
accountability is justification. Being accountable is a process by which an actor will justify
their provision of value, of their worth. Dependent upon to whom (to which forum) that
accountability occurs different repertoires of justification (Wagner, 1999) will be
employed. As Boltanski and Thvenot (1999) have noted:
the same persons have, on the same day and in the same social space, to use
different devices for assessment, including the reference to different types of worth,
when they shift from one situation to another. (p.369)

Although they have subsequently acknowledged that these are neither exclusive nor
necessarily valid for all time, in their 1991 work On Justification Boltanski and Thvenot

identified six such types or orders of worth, namely:

the world of inspiration,

the domestic world,
the world of renown,
the civic world,
the market world, and
the industrial world.

The justification of worth is, in effect, a mechanism by which actors or organisations seek to
establish a legitimacy which has been described as:
a generalised perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable,
proper or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values
beliefs and definitions. (Suchman, 1994, p.574)
Scott (2001) has described three institutional systems by which legitimacy may be
established. Firstly, regulative legitimacy is based on conformity to the rules framed by legal
or quasi-legal structures that also underpin worth in the industrial and market worlds
described by Boltanski and Thvenot (2006). Secondly, normative legitimacy for which the
rewards and sanctions are more likely to be intrinsic as well as extrinsic reflecting the deeper
moral criteria that are more likely to be internalized by actors. Normative legitimacy can be
seen as more pertinent to the renown and civic worlds. Thirdly, cultural-cognitive legitimacy,
which is relevant to the domestic world, is based on a common frame of reference or
orthodoxy that employs preconscious, taken-for-granted understandings (p. 61).
What follows is an exploration of the extent to which those worlds and orders of worth are
applied in the accountability and legitimisation practices of New Zealands tertiary education
institutions.
2 translated into English in 2006
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Research Methods
To establish a context the research initially involved a review and analysis of publicly
available documents from New Zealands Tertiary Education Commission and the twentyeight tertiary education institutions. A sample of managers from within these institutions was
then sought from approaches to three universities, three polytechnics and two wnanga, As a
result five individual semi-structured interviews were conducted with senior managers of one
university and three polytechnics and a further semi-structured interview was undertaken
with three senior members of a wnanga.
Notes were taken during these interviews which were also transcribed and a copy provided to
each interviewee for correction or further comment. The final documents were loaded into
the NVivo software where successive readings allowed the recurring themes, and common
and differing ideas, to emerge.
By listening to the interviewees and also observing the context of how and where their
statements were made, this study aims to reveal the practices by which the structures of
accountability are brought to life (Berger and Luckman, 1967).
Research Findings
In what follows, comments received in the semi-structured interviews are mapped against
five of the worlds described by Boltanski and Thvenot.

The sixth of these worlds,

inspiration, did not receive any relevant statements. The following table summarizes these
worlds and its application is explained in the following sections.
TEI Accountability
Industrial

Market

Renown

Civic

Domestic

Mode of
legitimacy

regulatory

regulatory

normative

normative

culturalcognitive

Mode of
evaluation

efficiency
productivity
predictability

price

other peoples
opinion

collective
interest

reputation
esteem
tradition

Relevant
information

measurable
criteria

monetary
values

semiotic
surveys

formal
official

oral,
explanatory,
anecdotal

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statistics
Human
Qualification
s

professional
competency
expertise

purchasing
power
desire

celebrity

equality,
belonging to a
group, or
representative
of a collective

authority

Tangible
Expression

formal plans
agreements
contracts
reports

possessions
market share

trade marks,
badges
social media
likes

rules, codes,
procedures
physical
premises

titles, visiting
cards, houses,
estates

(Based on Boltanski and Thvenot, 1999)

The Industrial World
So what we try and prove through those sorts of financial or fiscal analyses is our
value for money, our public good. (P2)
As noted above, accountability is commonly framed as a hierarchical structure of
expectations and obligations in which those to whom accountability is due exercise
independent and external administrative and financial supervision and control (Bovens,
2007, p.456). In the context of the economic logic of public sector management reforms over
the last thirty years, that obligation to explain and justify has been conceived as a contractual
one in which a contracted agent is required to give an account of the extent to which it has
met the pre-defined requirements of a principal.
The worth that accountability then seeks to justify is associated with efficiency, productivity
and predictability. Boltanski and Thvenot describe this as an industrial world of clear
cause and effect relationships, control of which:
requires a correct vision of the space (environment) in which the problem is
inscribed, so as to detect, discover, identify, bring to light, measure, analyse and
decompose the relevant elements. The operations of standardisation and
formalisation make it possible to see the world expressed in numbers, quantified,
ready to be processed, combined, added up (Boltanski and Thvenot , 2006, p.210).
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In this world negative signs of worth are associated with weak controls that lead to waste and
deterioration that occurs unexpectedly as a consequence of unidentified or un-managed risks.
Worthy actors in this world exist in a hierarchy of states of worth that reflect professional
qualifications, competencies and management responsibilities. Thus:
A more worthy person is in relation to a less worthy person primarily through the
responsibility he assumes for production, by the control he has over the future.
(ibid. p.209)
For New Zealands TEIs, external financial and operational oversight is provided by the
Tertiary Education Commission (TEC), the New Zealand Qualifications Authority (NZQA),
and, for the universities, the Academic Quality Agency and the Committee on University
Academic Programmes (CUAP).

This complex web of administrative accountability

relationships within which the TEIs operate therefore involves not just vertical accountability
to a single principal but potentially to a series of different principals who provide financial
support and/or academic accreditation.
Boltanski and Thvenot explain that in the industrial world tangible expression of worth is
contained in formal plans, agreements, contracts and reports. Thus, a senior polytechnic
manager described his organisations accountability relationship with the Tertiary Education
Commission as being, theoretically, based on return on investment in which the discussions
now are very much based around employment outcomes (P3). However, he also suggested
that in practice, and possibly because of measurement problems, that relationship was still
very much based around measures such as course completions, retentions and progressions.
Similarly, when asked what he was accountable for, an interviewee who was a senior
university faculty member responded by reaching for the universitys strategic plan and then

12

explaining the goals that it contained. The instrumental logic thus evidences was explained
as follows:
Its fairly clear what Im accountable for its laid out there. In fact, at the
beginning of each year, the vice-chancellor and I agree what the priorities are and
that is my performance goals and throughout the year we talk about progress on
these. And at the end of the year I provide a report to the vice-chancellor, who then
assesses performances against those agreed goals. (U5)
In contrast, it was only as I was leaving at the conclusion of an interview with three members
of a wnanga that one of them went to look for a copy of their annual report.
Perhaps not surprisingly, accountability in Boltanski and Thvenots industrial world was
not always viewed favourably by those who were interviewed.

One polytechnic chief

executive suggested we are a compliance sector, noting:

When the education performance indicators drive a very punitive regime, which
they do if you dont get this and this and this you lose funding in the next round
it drives you to some odd behaviours, or it could. (P3)
Similarly, a senior university manager described the reporting requirements related to the
universitys funding plan with the TEC as: a reward, punish, accountability type method
(U4). Another polytechnic chief executive also stated: TEC needs to understand that they
have created a control environment and the smart among us can play the system: (P1). The
burden created by this model was explained as follows:
The figures are quite frightening when you see there might be 150 of these target
areas. Its not just course completion, its course completion split at level 1 and 2,
level 3 to 4, level 5 to six and level 7 to 8. Then it's separated in each of those to
Mori, Pasifika, under 25s and the organisation as a whole. And there will be
13

measurement of how many EFTs and the results of those in primary industries,
agriculture, science and technology, [and] engineering. And this goes on for pages
and pages and pages of goals and targets. (P2)
For universities, who are financially less dependent on the TEC, the influence of this world is
not seen as so significant. As a senior university manager suggested:
There are some performance measures which the TEC have established to monitor
the performance of universities. My own view is that some of those are not well
conceived, but they have them they are performance measures which as a
university we may or may not prioritise. Thats for us to decide how well they fit
with our strategic plan. (U5)
Or, as another senior university manager observed, while the government is wanting
universities to report a standard set of performance indicators on their websites, the
universities do not see this as a priority. It was suggested:
When you talk to vice-chancellors about government involvement in monitoring,
their eyes glaze over because they feel theyre doing a fair amount of stuff already.
And also, I guess, they feel that well actually governments a 40% shareholder the
majority shareholder in terms of size but not the only one, and its increasingly
becoming less. (U4)
This perspective was further extended by a senior member of a wnanga who believed that
TECs accountability model was not applicable to that institution: a funder just has to
provide the funding and let us get on with it dont get in the way. Dont impose your model
on our model because they are different (W1).
A criticism of TECs formal accountability model that was also repeated was that it is
inherently short-term in its focus. A senior manager in a polytechnic suggested:
14

 the risk is that [the TEC] have become too technical, too transactional if you
like, and focus on the shorter-term rather than the longer-tern contribution. Which,
yes, is hard to measure and its hard to report; but it doesnt mean to say we should
lose sight of it. (P1)
The Market World
in a transactional sense, were accountable for a whole variety of different
things for a whole variety of different exchanges. (U4)
In Boltanski and Thvenots market world worth is associated with desire or demand for
objectified objects or commodities and is reflected in much of the discourse associated with
neo-liberal reforms of the public sector that, as much as any other sector, have impacted on
the governance of education. As one critique of their impact has claimed:
Higher education has been transformed from a public good, funded collectively, to a
private good which comes at a large personal cost. Tertiary education has
become increasingly a private benefit to satisfy a market, not citizens preferences,
capabilities or aspirations. (Grey & Sedgewick, 2014, p.113)
In this market world of buyers and sellers the worth of actors is:
proportionate to their own value, which they know how to sell, and which is
expressed by their success designated in particular by the vocabulary of
competition: getting ahead, challenging oneself, taking the edge, being a winner, a
top dog. (Boltanski and Thvenot, 2006, p.197)
Thus a number of the interviewees described being in competition with other tertiary
institutions in respect of the student numbers, retentions and progressions that are central to
their TEC Investment Plans and related funding.
A polytechnic chief executive who described herself as a marketer suggested:
15

Im breaking down 40 years of tertiary stodge. Right, so Ive now - and Ive got a
lot of work to do. The next time you come and see us, you might see the Spark
approach to a front office. No more people sitting behind desks, no more waiting in
queue. You walk in, theres an iPad, theres someone roving thats going to help
you. (P1)
Another senior polytechnic manger described how that institution trades under their brand
but are:
struggling, as are others, in terms of really finding our market niche to a degree
as well, and thats very much driven by the international market dynamics rather
than the needs of New Zealand. (P3)
That interviewee also explained the importance of the market for international students by
explaining: our Auckland campus, to be brutally honest, is very much a business model
based around revenues.
The concept of a market exchange was also applied to funding received from alumni and
donors who:
will be expecting to influence the research direction of [a funded] chair in return
for the money that they provide. But they might also be expecting to sit at the table
with other people who have an interest in that particular discipline so they can
collectively exchange ideas and information. (U4)
The Civic World
We wouldnt be able to deliver these programme areas if we didnt have the correct
accreditations and approvals. (P2)
In what Boltanski and Thvenot (2006) broadly describe as the civic world worth is
associated with the collective interest and belonging to, or representing, the collective such as
16

a professional body or accreditation agency. Signs and symbols that acknowledge that
membership or mandate:
stabilise and equip the collective persons, to objectify them in such a way
as to give them body, permanence and presence. (Boltanski and Thvenot
2006, p. 185)
In this world accountability relationships reflect the interdependence of organisations
working towards common objectives.

These relationships are frequently governed by

professional bodies that:

lay down codes with standards for acceptable practice that are binding for
all members. These standards are monitored and enforced by professional
and supervisory bodies on the basis of peer review. (Bovens, 2007, p.456)
For the TEIs professional accountability relationships therefore exist with the various
international organisations from whom they seek accreditation as well as between different
staff groups and the professional bodies to which they belong, such as those that exist for
accountants or nurses. Particularly for university business schools, worth is demonstrated by
the accreditation provided by international organisations such as the Association to Advance
Collegiate Schools of Business (AACSB), the Association of MBAs (AMBA), or the
Network of Schools of Public Policy, Affairs and Administration (NASPAA). In each case
accreditation is provided for a limited period and its initial achievement and subsequent
maintenance involves a substantial process of review and reporting. Nonetheless a senior
university manager described them as important because:
they allow us to benchmark ourselves against international standards
across a range of factors, such as the way programmes are run, administered,
quality of staff, design of the curriculum and so on. Assurance of learning
17

processes. So the international accrediting agencies we decided as a Business

School to pursue because we saw advantages in leveraging continuous
improvement within the Business School to enhance our international
reputation and keep us abreast of international developments and standards.
(U 5)
Oversight and accreditation by professional bodies and those representing industry groups,
such as industry training organisations, or even large employers can also have a significant
influence on the structure and content of academic programmes. Engagement in this sense is
arguably more intensive in the vocationally-based programme environment of the
polytechnics. A senior polytechnic manager explained that the ability to integrate work
practices into learning also resulted in employees being more involved determining the
content of programmes both at a national level, for sectors like nursing and early childhood
education, and regionally, for trade and hospitality sector programmes that can more easily be
locally customised. As a polytechnic chief executive explained:
it falls into regulation. So if we deliver a programme like social work: we do a
four-year social work degree. Thats regulated by the Social Workers Registration
Board. In the same way if we did nursing it would be the Nursing Registration
Board. (P2)
That professional accountability is also reflected in:
expectations on us from government to be more engaged with our industry
partners so we can increase the net worth of New Zealands economy and our place
in the global market. (U5)
In further contrast to the clich of academic isolation in ivory towers, TEIs identify a broad
accountability to not just students and staff but also to local communities, citizens and, at
18

times, humanity as a whole. An obligation to explain and justify may then be framed not in
terms of a formal contract between an agent and a principal but in the context of relational
contracts and deeper social, religious or cultural expectations.
Bovens (2007) describes: more direct and explicit accountability relationships between
public agencies, on the one hand, and clients, citizens and civil society, on the other (p. 457)
that have developed with an increased interest in corporate and social responsibility.
Some of New Zealands tertiary education institutions, including most of the polytechnics,
are very regionally focused although the Open Polytechnic draws students from, and
functions across, the whole of New Zealand. Engagement in a broader sense was therefore
explained by a polytechnic chief executive who stated: We have an accountability, I think, to
the community (P1).

This local focus was described not just as an accountability to

employers but also to the families of students and other elements of the community that they
will impact. So that families: are above the poverty line; kids go to school with breakfast
and shoes; and theres internet in [the community] (P1). That interviewees desire to create
citizens in the community who feel they have worth (P1) was echoed by another polytechnic
chief executive who wanted that institutions students: to have beliefs and ethics and
interests outside themselves, so that they are connected to the community (P2).
Another regional polytechnic manager similarly explained that institution saw itself as part
of the community and accountable not just for providing students with skills and
qualifications needed by the local economy, but also in terms of a broader social
responsibility:
thats very much about meeting the needs of the community; and a lot of those
are social needs. So that could be providing a central computer hub, for example,

19

so that a lot of the community can access some of their social needs as well as
getting training. (P6)
This can be seen to reflect Considines (2002) conception of public accountability as being an
obligation to be responsive to the legitimate interests of those affected by decisions,
programmes and interventions. In more formal sense a senior university manager discussed
an accountability to make a difference to society by explaining:
Were accountable to the public in general because were seen as the critic and
conscience of society and a source of objectivity, a fountain of knowledge in a
number of discipline areas. (U4)
In respect of research, the international research community also operates a rigorous system
of accountability through its peer review process. (Although this may be associated with the
recognition by specific, highly rated, journals not of the publication itself.

Those

publications, such as books, that are not normally peer reviewed are thus rated as much less
worthy.)
As Broadbent and Laughlin (2009) have suggested, accountability in this context:
will be less like a defined project, less short term in nature and more
concerned with the long term survival and sustainability of the
organisation/unit through which the stakeholders are working. (p.289)
The World of Renown
Its all very well, anyone can claim theyre high quality but how credible is that?
And for overseas students, and in particular overseas staff, they want to know what
sort of institution theyre likely to come to and they want some independent
assessment. (U5)

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Such accountability relationships are also central to less economically framed conceptions of
public governance and the ways in which public value is generated. That perceived value can
be either developed or eroded but its existence is vital to the continued provision of resources
and support. Its absence is often reflected in defensive strategies and an increased external
involvement of the organisations affairs.
Thus, in what Boltanski and Thvenot (1999) describe as the world of renown, while worth
is nothing but the result of other peoples opinion (p. 371) the value it represents may be
reinforced as:
the publication of results indicating that a majority of persons has a given
opinion reinforces the opinion of these persons, underwriting it, as it were, and
influencing the opinion of others.

The regular publication of surveys thus

contributes to ensuring the transparency of the state of worthiness of famous beings

who cannot hide the fluctuations of their standing. (Boltanski and Thvenot. 2006,
p. 181)
Reputation has arguably always been important for both tertiary education institutions and
their alumni although, as a senior university manager explained, the components of reputation
will differ for local and international audiences. In respect of domestic students it was
suggested:
Its not what the TEC says about the university it makes not one jot of difference
about where the student goes. Its about do we have the right offerings for them? Is
it a city they can relate to? Are their friends going there? What their influencers say
about it. These are the things that matter to students. (U4)
On the other hand, that manager argued, more formally measured criteria are important for
international students. Thus:
21

 we do know that the QS3 rankings are important to our international students;
and the QS Stars, which is about student experience. But these things are more
important to international parents than they are to domestic parents and prospective
students. (U4)
Nonetheless, university interviewees did comment on the importance of their New Zealand
PBRF4 rankings, because it very much impinges on our reputation (U5) and also provided
bragging rights (U4).
Whilst a university manager explained a plan to routinely survey each of our stakeholder
groups to find out exactly what they think of us (U4), a polytechnic chief executive stated:
We survey students as they go through the course formally, but theres also a realtime evaluation where they can give star ratings and comments as they go. We also
work with BERL to do much broader economic studies of our worth as a polytech,
not just to a particular student or a particular vocation, but more to the nation of
what the worth of the organisation is. (P2)
In this context the increased role of, and need to interact with, the media, particularly those
elements on the internet, should not be underestimated. Reputation, both professional and
social, matters a great deal to TEIs and impacts on their ability to attract students, staff and
funding.
The Domestic World
That sense of belonging is really important. It was really important to my Dad and
its really important to me. And I want my grandchildren my childrens
3 The QS World University Rankings are compiled based on academic and employer surveys
as well as research citation data. The rankings reflect performance criteria that assess
universities in respect of their research, teaching, employability and internationalisation.
4 PBRF: the Performance Based Research Fund is a model that assesses the research
performance of degree related institutions and funds them accordingly.
22

grandchildren to understand that: thats important to us, that sense of belonging.

We call that ukaipotanga thats one of our 10 kaupapa tuku. (W8)
In what Boltanski and Thvenots (1999 and 2006) describe as the domestic world:
peoples worth depends on a hierarchy of trust based on a chain of personal
dependencies. The political link between beings is seen as a generalisation of
kinship and is based on face-to-face relations and on the respect for tradition. The
person in this world cannot be separated from his/her belonging to a body, a family,
a lineage, an estate. (Boltanski and Thvenot, 1999, p.370)
As explained by an interviewee, for wnanga accountability may be defined in terms of the
Mori tribes to which they are affiliated:
We are accountable to our people we report to them annually, visit them, tell
them what weve been going and ask if there are any questions. (W6)
And while the need to meet the accountability requirements of the TEC was acknowledged:
actually thats awkward for me to be talking about reporting on Mori to the
Crown thats a matter of convenience. I dont like the idea of reporting on Mori
performance to the Crown. Our primary target for reporting are Mori its partly
the students but it's the Mori people. (W1)
That interview with three members of a wnanga was led by the more senior of the three to
whom deference was shown and who was referred to as uncle. Thus Boltanski and
Thvenot explain: important persons are chiefs, bosses, or even relatives. Their main
qualities are to be distinguished, straightforward, faithful and to have character. (1999,
p.370).
The wnanga interviewees explained how the performance of both that institution as a whole
and that of its individual students is assessed according to their conformity with the
23

wnangas kaupapa (underlying values and principles) and tikanga or behaviours that enact
and demonstrate those values.
Uncle has talked before about having the tautau in our veins having the blood and
being Mori but there is a behaviour and there is a way in which we act and
behave that makes us distinctively Mori as well. (W8)
It was explained that this strong focus on kaupapa Mori also affects how the institutions
programmes are framed; so:
whatever programme they want to do here, every student who is full-time, a
quarter of their load will involve studying the Mori language. Another quarter will
involve studies including interviewing kaumtua5, studying and writing about their
marae, writing about iwi history, where theyve come from and how do they belong.
And they choose a specialisation to keep themselves occupied for the other half.
(W6)
In this domestic world:
the exercise of worth is subject here to constraints of place and time linked to the
need to present oneself in person in the presence of others, in order to manifest
ones own importance. (Boltanski and Thvenot, 2006 p.164)
A polytechnic chief executive thus explained;
the most important stuff is the relationship I have developed with probably eight
or nine people at the TEC. Thats an individual relationship that I maintain in all
sorts of ways. So they come to our chief executives meetings that we have every
month in Wellington and theyll always stay for lunch. I make lunch appointments
with them. (P1)
5 a senior elder or person with status.
24

Conclusions
This research began in a discussion with New Zealands Tertiary Education Commission in
respect of the question, how should tertiary education institutions be accountable?
Subsequent conversations with members of those institutions identified what Stark (2009) has
referred to as a perplexing situation in which there is a principled disagreement about
what counts (p.5).
It is evident that for the tertiary education institutions from which the interviewees were
drawn, the conception and practice of accountability is far more complex than one
represented by a simple agent-principal relationship with the TEC. Being accountable, or
providing an account, does not always require an explicit obligation or contract; it can also
reflect social, moral or cultural beliefs and practices in respect of what is appropriate
behaviour. Indeed such normative rules are central to the practice of giving an account.
How, then, should we avoid the impediments to learning created by the corrosive decoupling
of what is accounted for and what is valued (Oldenhof et al, 2014)? Boltanski and Thvenot
(1991) have argued for a process of compromise, that is ultimately a form of satisficing and
therefore fragile and potentially short term. Alternatively, in the acknowledged absence of an
overarching norm, Stark (2009) has suggested that it is possible to constructively organise
dissonance in a heterarchy of distributed intelligence in which units are laterally
accountable according to diverse principles of evaluation (p.19). He proposes that such
dissonance, arising from the need for simultaneous responses to conflicting values, can be
productive offering new opportunities for learning that are not based solely on current
assumptions.
The challenge for all those communities of interest who are affected by the decisions of
tertiary education institutions, and to whom accountability is therefore due, is to recognise
and learn from these diverse conceptions of worth. Given the limited empirical research
25

supporting this paper, further research is warranted to explore the extent to which those
differing conceptions cam influence and inform one another.

26

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