Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
neg
The implication is
that threats to its security today will lead Japan to reconsider its nuclear
strategy in the future . Japan perceives China as one of its greatest
security threats . As China continues to modernize and expand its military,
the threat becomes more acute. North Korea's ongoing tests of nuclear devices and delivery
vehicles have also altered the strategic dynamics in the East Asia region. Exchanging basing rights for security and
protection under the U.S. deterrence umbrella after WWII, any significant change in the United States' commitment
to maintaining its nuclear deterrence structure would have profound implications for Japan's defense policy
.A
received his MA in political science, visiting research scholar and Senior Fellow at
CSIS, senior fellow at the Mitsui Global Strategic Studies Institute in Tokyo, is
currently the director of research and a Senior Fellow at the Tokyo Foundation, while
concurrently an adjunct fellow, Center for Strategic and International Studies, and
senior fellow, Okinawa Peace Assistance Center; April 06, 2015; Japans Security
Strategy toward the Rise of China From a Friendship Paradigm to a Mix of
Engagement and Hedging;
http://www.tokyofoundation.org/en/articles/2015/security-strategy-toward-rise-ofchina//TPB]
Mochizuki saw the competitive engagement with hard hedge school as
being more skeptical of the possibility that China will adhere to a
cooperative strategy as its power capabilities increase. This school is also worried
that the balance in conventional weapons could tip in favor of the Chinese side, even in comparison to the
combined air and naval capabilities of Japan and the United States. Mochizuki chose competitive engagement
rather than cooperative, since the school sees Chinese leaders using the history card to weaken Japans to
resolve to stand up to China and to reduce its regional influence.[33] Mochizuki distinguished balancing and
containment from competitive engagement with hard hedge, saying that the former camp believes that China
will eventually embrace hegemonic ambitions based on cultural or historical reasons and could, in the future, face
internal turmoil due to socio-political contradictions. Some
were regarded as being the Korean Peninsula (56.7%), disarmament and weapon of mass destruction (35.2%), and
US-Russia relations (17.9%). China was not even among the choices offered except in the context of US-China
relations (13.1%) and China-Russia relations (11.7%). The Japanese did not assume that China itself was a security
Another poll conducted by a Japanese NGO in 2013 showed the Japanese feel most threatened militarily by North
The two
top choices were concern with Chinas intrusions into Japans territorial
waters, and concern with Japan and Chinas conflict over territories, which
were more 60%. The same poll asked the same questions to Chinese citizens, who saw the United State as
Korea (73.4%), followed by China (61.8%). Respondents choosing China also gave their reasons why.
being the biggest threat (71.6%) and Japan as the second biggest (53.9%).[38] The poll results suggest a growing
perception of China as a threat during the 2000s. The first turning point was Prime Minister Koizumis Yasukuni visit
in 2005. According to the same poll in 2006, 42.8% of Japanese respondents said they see China as a military
threat.[39] Yet, the Japanese were optimistic that mutual economic interdependence would prevent military conflict.
The second turning point was 2010 after the fishing boat collision near the
Senkaku Islands. The Japanese realized that China would resort to
economic measures to address diplomatic issues even if they may damage
their own economic interests. It may not be a coincidence that it was in 2010 that Chinas gross
domestic product surpassed Japans to become the second largest in the world. The Chinese economy was now big
seen as a serious security threat until very recently. China, though, has seen the Japan-US military alliance as being
against their security interests. Historically and structurally, the United States has been an integral part of Japans
security strategy toward China. In 1930s and 1940s, Imperial Japan invaded China with colonial ambitions. It was
the United States, which provided military support to Chiang Kai-shek, the leader of the Republic of China on the
mainland against Japans invasion. In 1941, Japan attacked Pearl Harbor to start a war against the United States.
After its defeat in World War II, Japans rearmament was driven by the US strategy for the emerging Cold War. Japan
recovered its independence and began limited rearmament under a new Constitution that included a clause vowing
to renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international
disputes. This idealistic clause was augmented with the US military presence in Japan under a mutual security
treaty to guarantee Japans security. For China, the Japan-US security arrangements were occasionally seen as a
threat to its own security. China was more antagonistic toward the United States in the early stages of the Cold War
and during Korean War than at any other time. China rewrote its former positive view of the United States in more
antagonistic terms during this era. At the same time, the US military presence in Japan and the constitutional
restraints on an independent defense policy were designed to prevent the reemergence of Japanese militarism. This
facilitated Chinas decision to normalize ties with the US and Japan after 1972 in the face of their urgent need to
counter the Soviet Union. At the same time, Japans economy grew more dependent on the markets of neighboring
Asian countries, especially in Southeast Asia. This was part of a US Cold War strategy to turn Japan into a showcase
of the success liberal democracies can enjoy and to encourage it to become a reliable security partner,
guaranteeing a US military presence in East Asia against the Soviet Union and the PRC. After the US strategic shift
to seek cooperation with China against the Soviet Union, China also became a very important economic partner for
Japan. Strategic cooperation between China and the Japan-US alliance successfully pushed the Soviet Union toward
collapse. The side effect of the Cold War victory was that China enjoyed military and economic assistance from the
United States and Japan and was able to create the foundations for its current economic success as the worlds
second-largest economy. As the current US strategy toward China no longer ignores the economic interdependence
with China, Japan is also heavily dependent on the Chinese economy. Another side effect of the Cold War is that
Japan failed to make a moral reconciliation with Chinese and South Korean nationals regarding its past aggressions
and colonial policy, although state-to-state agreements were reached. Japans normalization with China in 1972 was
achieved thanks to the strong leadership and grand strategic ideas of Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai. There was no
clear reconciliation, though, at the social level. China continued to conduct anti-Japanese education, since
winning independence from Imperial Japan is seen as an essential source of legitimacy for the ruling Communist
sympathetic to Chinas Marxist ideology, roused feelings of war guilt to block Japans return to normalcy with a
constitutional amendment, which requires the approval of a two-thirds majority in the Diet. Thus, Japans strategic
options have been shaped by historical and geopolitical limitations: a security alliance with the United States,
constitutional restraints on defense and security policy, diplomatic restrictions on rearmament via Chinas (and
South Koreas) history card, and, more recently, the heavy reliance on the Chinese economy. Current Trend toward
Hard Hedge
In Japans two
damaged by Prime Minister Hatoyamas unprofessional management of the Okinawa base issue. Although Ishiba
was defeated by Abe in the September 2012 LDP presidential election, he received more votes than Abe from nonDiet party members.(Abe won the election with higher support from Diet members.)
Ishiba is known as
This apparent trend does not signal the death of soft hedge school, though. The small but influential
New Komeito Party, which played a critical role in maintaining relations with China and continues to cooperate
closely with the LDP during elections, is an influential coalition partner advocating a soft hedge approach. For
example, the liveliest debate on the shift in security policy toward hard hedgesuch as a reinterpretation of
Article 9are now held between the LDP and Komeito, rather than within the government or with the opposition
Japan future
trajectory will be toward more normal country status, both in its
relationship with the United States and China. Chinas assertiveness in the
South and Easter China Sea pushes Japan toward a closer alliance with the
United States and encourages an increase in defense capacity. In the
parties. The general trend, despite the influence of the soft-hedge Komeito, though, is that
Japans Dilemma in
the Japan-US-China Triangle In a sense, thought, this is quite natural, as nearly 70 years have already passed since
the end of World War II. The trouble is, however, historical reconciliation has not been made in the minds of the
people in the PRC, who are still educated that Japan is a hostile nation. As matter of the fact, a majority of people
polled in China said that Japans current government is a military regime. This contrasts sharply with a BBC
worldwide poll conducted between 2011 and 2012 that scores Japan as the nation that has had the most positive
influence in the world.[43]
impasse and mutual distrust with China, it may find itself in a difficult
dilemma in the trilateral relationship with the United States and China . To
secure its territorial integrity, Japan needs to increase its own military
capabilities and force closer alliance ties with the United States, even
when such actions could raise Chinas anxiety or mistrust of Japan. There is no
getting around the fact that Japan needs to increase its business ties with China to secure its own economic growth.
However,
voice the concern about whether the United States would fully
support Japans security interests in the face of deepening USChina economic ties. The Japan-US-China triangle may have entered a
new difficult phase as China rises into a more influential military and
economic power. It behooves Japanese policymakers to address the complex nature of this triangle, in
which military rivalry and cooperation, economic competition and interdependence, and historical differences and
friendship are juxtaposed in the context of a dynamic power shift in the Asia-Pacific.
Chinas nuclear modernization program poses a particular worry for the Japanese defense establishment, and a
Defense Agency white paper from 2003 makes it clear that the objectives of this program should be watched very
carefully: China has been modernizing its nuclear and missile forces as well as its naval and air forces. Careful
deliberation should go into determining whether the objective of this modernization exceeds the scope necessary
for the defense of China, and future developments in this area merit special attention . Substantial increases and
improvements in Chinas nuclear deterrent can especially serve to create controversy within the U.S.-Japan Alliance.
Although Chinas nuclear arsenal will grow to match or exceed Americas only in the very long term, some short
term effects may also be seen. One expert contacted for this paper emphasized the role that a nuclear deterrent
plays in the establishment of national prestige. Even if China never perceives a military threat from the Alliance, it
would still seek to improve its deterrent because nuclear capabilities are characteristic of a true world power.
Chinas military buildup will only accentuate Japans relative decline and highlight its total dependence on U.S.
extended deterrence.
would face the threat of being pulled into a conflict between the two
Asian nations, even as the Sino-U.S. relationship grows in importance .
Chinas economic growth poses further challenges for the Alliance, even in
the short term. Trade between China and the two allies is dramatically
growing in importance, and will increasingly dwarf the economic
relationship between the allies themselves. This mutual dependence on a third party will
certainly complicate decision making in the Alliance. For example, the fear of Japan passing , or in
other words the threat that America will increasingly ignore its relationship
with Japan in favor of China, may affect Japanese confidence in the
credibility of U.S. extended deterrence.
Changes in U.S. nuclear strategy would harm perceptions of and confidence in the U.S. commitment to extended deterrence,
Extended nuclear
deterrence is the most important part of an American defense policy that
constrains war around the world. Especially because the United States must face increasing fiscal and
especially in East Asia, while making little progress towards the goal of nuclear zero.
political constraints to maintaining bases abroad, and a decreasing willingness of its partners to shoulder the burdens of these
bases, the nuclear component of its policies will only increase in value. The current dispute over U.S. bases in Okinawa between the
U.S. nuclear stockpile. Any potential changes to the stability of extended deterrence may pose trouble for the Alliance.
territorial disputes. For instance, one of the expert on Japan, Shelia A. Smith argues that: Until recently, this
territorial dispute was little more than a minor irritant in Sino-Japanese relations. However, against the backdrop of
and simple balancing acts against China, or bandwagoning the US Asia-Pacific strategy; on the contrary, it is more
Japans
hedging strategy is threefold: economic, military and diplomacy . Economically,
about hedging towards uncertainties stemming from China and the USs future in the region. All in all,
even though there are some anti-Japanese sentiment in Beijing, economic ties between two countries increased
over the last decades to a point where a major break up would damage severely both countries. In diplomatic front,
despite increased rhetoric there is a hot and cold diplomatic stability over the relations including the dispute of
2nc uq/brink
US-Japan alliances on the brink now postdates all aff
evidence
Hughes 4/28 (Christopher W. Hughes is Professor of International Politics and
Japanese
policymakers have for the first time in the post-war period begun to doubt
seriously whether the USA possesses the necessary military power to
counter the Chinese probing and access-denial strategies that have most direct impact on Japans
security in regard to territorial disputes and SLOC security. There are fears that Chinas A2/AD
further by the increasing Chinese challenge to the US role as an external balancer.
strategy may impose costs on the US military that might prevent its
intervention
in regional contingencies similar to that carried out in the 19951996 Taiwan Straits crisis.
Chinas ability to strike USAF Kadena in Okinawa, or USAF, USN, and USMC assets at Iwakuni, Misawa, and Yokota
Even more
worrying for Japan long term is Chinas development of anti-ship ballistic
missiles (ASBM) capable of striking US aircraft carriers operating out of Japan and in the Asia-Pacific, which
might severely undermine the US force projection and deterrent posture in
the region.98 Japanese policymakers hold out considerable hopes that the USs Air-Sea Battle Concept will
overcome Chinas A2/AD, but are concerned about whether or not the USA is deploying the full range of naval and
air capabilities necessary to effect what is not yet a clear-cut strategy, and whether or not it has sufficient
budgetary capacity to truly pivot its military might to the Asia-Pacific to counter Chinas rising power.99
Japanese anxieties about the sufficiency of the USs extant military capabilities to
control the global commons and enable intervention in the East Asia theatre have in turn raised
questions about the impact this might have on broader US political and
military security guarantees to Japan.100 Japan ese policymakers now fear the
heightened prospect of US abandonment in a situation of strategic
accommodation between the USA and China , and if the USA deems Japans security
interests as falling short of the necessary threshold for convergence with its own core interests to warrant
due to being under Japanese administration, and having drawn renewed reassurances from the USA in this regard
Japans attempting to recover the territories from China in a full-scale conflict rather than initial deterrence of
aggression.101
be sure that
clash? Unfortunately not. Chinas growing wealth and strength makes it both a more important partner and a more dangerous
a liability than an asset as China grows. If the US and China get on well,
its interests will be sidelined and, if they get on badly, it will be drawn into
an increasingly intense strategic competition between its two most
important international partners. So, Japan needs a whole new strategic model too raising immense
political issues both at home and abroad. Yet even after two dismal and demoralizing decades, Japan has immense strengths. It is
still the worlds third-largest economy and, on present trends, will not be overtaken for some time (ultimately, India may take its
place). It still has remarkable technological depth and management skills. Productivity in many sectors of the economy outside
manufacturing is low and could be increased sharply. Japan has a big population at 128 million and its declining workforce could
formidable strategic potential. It will never again send huge armies to seize an empire on the Asian mainland but it
just
a couple of years .
2nc spillover
Prior security commitments dont matter and Japan prolif
spills over to South Korea
Sokolski 5/8 (Henry Sokolski is the executive director of the Nonproliferation
Policy Education Center and the author of Underestimated: Our Not So Peaceful
Nuclear Future (Strategic Studies Institute, 2016). Japan and South Korea May
Soon Go Nuclear, The Wall Street Journal, 8 May 2016,
http://www.wsj.com/articles/japan-and-south-korea-may-soon-go-nuclear1462738914 //SY)
On Friday North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un praised his countrys recent hydrogen bomb test and satellite launch as
unprecedented achievements that will bring the final victory of the revolution. Such rhetoric is nothing new, but North Koreas
ruling-party leaders have urged President Park Geun-hye to stockpile peaceful plutonium as a military hedge against its neighbors.
A Feb. 19 article in Seouls leading conservative daily, the Chosun Ilbo, went so far as to detail how South Korea could use its
the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty, and Tokyos anti-nuclear-weapons stance dates to 1945 and the
existing civilian nuclear facilities to build a bomb in 18 months. Japan and South Korea are party to
nuclear devastation the U.S. wreaked on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. But that
wont
necessarily
stop either
country from joining the nuclear club or at least positioning themselves to do so quicklyif they feel
the U.S. nuclear umbrella is folding. Japan already has stockpiled 11 tons of plutonium, separated
from fuel used in its nuclear-power reactors. A bomb requires roughly five kilograms (or 1/200th of a ton). The old
shibboleth, popular with the nuclear industry, that such reactor-grade plutonium is
unsuitable for weapons, is essentially irrelevant for a technologically
advanced country. Japan also has builtbut not operateda large reprocessing plant of French design that can
separate about eight tons of plutonium a year. The shutdown of Japans power reactors following the 2011 Fukushima disaster
the equal of Japan . Should Japan operate Rokkasho, as it plans to do late in 2018, it will be
impossible politically to restrain South Korea from following suit.
XT public opinion
The publics support of pacifism declining in the squo lack of
peace education and new generation detached from
horrors of nuclear war
Yuan 2008 (Cai, graduate degree in International Affairs of Adelaide University.
The Rise and Decline of Japanese Pacifism New Voices Volume 2 The Japan
Foundation 2008 //LP)
If the birthplace of pacifism was among the ruins of an utterly defeated Japan, its ultimate deathbed must be the glittering new
Japan built atop the ruins. Japans meteoric rise as one of the largest economies in the world has been described as an economic
corporate buildings, neon lights and department stores dominate downtown Hiroshima. The imposing structure of the Hiroshima
baseball stadium, home to the celebrated Hiroshima Carp, replete with amplifiers and lights offer little reminder of the hellish
landscape it is built on. So complete was the reconstruction in Hiroshima, the hibakusha are committed to preserve the physical
It is a universal phenomenon that those who had lived through war and its
immediate aftermath developed a very different worldview and values from those who had only known prosperity and Japan is no
exception. Given the particularly horrible conditions in wartime Japan and its aftermath, the generational perception on war and
peace is even more pronounced. The older generation, those who are 50 years old or above generally regard issues on war and
rearmament with great suspicion, if not outright resentment, and on the other hand the younger generations 10 Naeve, Friends of
Hibakusha, p. 121. 11 60 Years since the Atomic Bombing: Time to Develop Actions and Cooperation for a Nuclear Weapon-Free,
Peaceful, Just World, 2005, the 2005 World Conference against A & H Bombs, Hiroshima, Japan. 12 Gerson, With Hiroshima Eyes:
Atomic War, Nuclear Extortion and Moral Imagination, p. 26. 13 Generational Change in Japan: Its implication for U.S-Japan Relations
The
most enduring feature of Japans wartime suffering and the key rallying
point of post-war pacifism and the peace movement are also showing
signs of weakening vigour. The peace memorial services at Hiroshima and
Nagasaki that were once regarded as sacred touchstone events on the
Japanese national calendar are losing their appeal to the Japanese public.
The Peace Commemoration event on August 6 at Hiroshima in 2005 drew a
crowd of 7000, but it paled in comparison to previous events at this same
Mecca of Peace that exerted a pull on tens of thousands of peace pilgrims.
Professor Ryuso Tanaka of the Hiroshima Peace Institute noticed that the
number of Japanese school children who visit the Peace Park on school
excursions had declined sharply in recent years, and the oblivion to the
Hiroshima memory is becoming a nationwide phenomenon. Sadakos
famous paper cranes, symbols of peace the world over have been set on
fire repeatedly by students on their excursion trips. Not even a specially constructed glass
2002, p. 6. Yuan Cai 185 born in the peace and prosperity of post-war Japan tend to be much less sensitized to this issue.
screen could save it from vandalism.14 A long time resident of Nagasaki also recalled in an interview that the annual
commemoration event at Nagasaki no longer makes headlines in the local news over the past few years, even the local residents
appear to be more preoccupied with such pressing problems as employment and schooling over peace and war.15 We are faced
with the challenge of conveying this experience to the next generations, said Noriyuki Masuda, associate director of the Hiroshima
Peace Memorial Association. At some point we realized that what we had was a crisis involving young peoples consciousness. We
the gradual withering of the surviving hibakusha. The people of Japan in general and residents of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in
particular need to find a way to perpetuate the peace message without the living voice of hibakusha. 14 Tanaka, The Hibakusha
Voice and the Future of the Anti-Nuclear Movement. 15 An interview with a Japanese student from Nagasaki. 16 French, Teaching
Youth To Start Worrying About The Bomb. 17 Ibid. New Voices Volume 2 186 Peace Education and Pacifism Having explored the
significance of the popular desire that never again should they relive the horrors of war as the driving force behind pacifism in Japan,
it is also imperative to examine another pillar of the development of pacifism in post-war Japan, namely the importance of peace
peace education could be viewed through the lens of the dwindling influence and membership of the Nikkyoso, the guardian angel
of peace education, coupled with a general retreat from the post-war educational goals of democracy and peace, which contributed
to the gradual decay of pacifist sentiment, especially among the younger generation.
has been a fellow Fordham University School of Law - Center on National Security
for nearly 5 years. http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/fukushima-anniversary/japanhas-nuclear-bomb-basement-china-isnt-happy-n48976 //MTB)
No nation has suffered more in the nuclear age than Japan, where atomic bombs flattened two cities in World War II and three
fall. Japan signed the international Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which bans it from developing nuclear weapons, more than 40
had more than five to 10 kilograms of plutonium, the amount needed for a single weapon, it had already gone over the threshold,
and had a nuclear deterrent. Japan now has 9 tons of plutonium stockpiled at several locations in Japan and another 35 tons stored
in France and the U.K. The material is enough to create 5,000 nuclear bombs. The country also has 1.2 tons of enriched uranium.
Technical ability doesnt equate to a bomb, but experts suggest getting from
raw plutonium to a nuclear weapon could take as little as six months after the
political decision to go forward. A senior U.S. official familiar with
Japanese nuclear strategy said the six-month figure for a country with
Japans advanced nuclear engineering infrastructure was not out of the
ballpark, and no expert gave an estimate of more than two years . In fact, many of
Japans conservative politicians have long supported Japans nuclear power program because of its military potential. The
hawks love nuclear weapons, so they like the nuclear power program as
the best they can do, said Jeffrey Lewis, director of the East Asia Non-Proliferation Program at the Monterey Institute
of International Studies in California. They dont want to give up the idea they have, to use
it as a deterrent. Many experts now see statements by Japanese politicians about the potential military use of the
nations nuclear stores as part of the bomb in the basement strategy, at least as much about celebrating Japans abilities and
keeping its neighbors guessing as actually building weapons. But pressure has been growing on Japan to dump some of the
trappings of its deterrent regardless. The U.S. wants Japan to return 331 kilos of weapons grade plutonium enough for between 40
and 50 weapons that it supplied during the Cold War. Japan and the U.S. are expected to sign a deal for the return at a nuclear
security summit next week in the Netherlands. Yet Japan is sending mixed signals. It also has plans to open a new fast-breeder
plutonium reactor in Rokkasho in October. The reactor would be able to produce 8 tons of plutonium a year, or enough for 1,000
Nagasaki-sized weapons. China seems to take the basement bomb seriously. It has taken advantage of the publicity over the
pending return of the 331 kilos to ask that Japan dispose of its larger stockpile of plutonium, and keep the new Rokkasho plant offline. Chinese officials have argued that Rokkasho was launched when Japan had ambitious plans to use plutonium as fuel for a whole
new generation of reactors, but that those plans are on hold post-Fukushima and the plutonium no longer has a peacetime use. In
February, the official Chinese news agency Xinhua published a commentary that said if a country "hoards far more nuclear materials
than it needs, including a massive amount of weapons grade plutonium, the world has good reason to ask why." Steve Fetter,
formerly the Obama White Houses assistant director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy, thinks China's concerns are not
purely political. "I've had private discussions with China in which they ask, 'Why does Japan have all this plutonium that they have
no possible use for?' I say they made have made a mistake and are left with a huge stockpile," said Fetter, now a professor at the
University of Maryland. "But if you were distrustful, then you see it through a different lens." For at least four or five years, said
Leonard Spector, deputy director of the Center for Non-Proliferation Studies in Monterey, the Japanese plutonium stockpile has been
mentioned as a threat in Chinese defense white papers. Japan, of course, has its own security concerns with China and North Korea.
North Korea's nuclear weapons program is a direct threat to Japan. Some of its Nodong missiles, with a range capability of hitting
anywhere in Japan, are believed to be nuclear-armed. "Nodong is a Japan weapon," said Spector. There have been confrontations
between China and Japan over small islands north of Taiwan. The dispute has recently escalated. In October, state-controlled media
in China warned "a war looms following Japan's radical provocation," Tokyo's threat to shoot down Chinese drones.
Most
experts agree that China is the greater threat, because as one expert said,
"If North Korea attacked Japan, the U.S. would flatten it"-- and thus China
is the country Japanese officials, particularly the right, want to impress
with their minimal deterrence. But experts also note that another nation in the region seems to have been
impressed by the Japanese bomb in the basement strategy, not as a threat but as a model. There are fears that if
Japan opens the Rakkosho plant, it will encourage South Korea to go the
same route as its neighbor. The U.S. and South Korea have been negotiating a new civilian nuclear cooperation
pact. The South wants to reprocess plutonium, but the U.S. is resisting providing cooperation or U.S. nuclear materials. Jeffrey
Lewis believes that the South Koreans want to emulate Japan , and says there is a
bigger bomb constituency in South Korea , about 10 to 20 percent [of the population], than in Japan. " The least of my
concerns is that Japan would get a nuclear weapon," said Fetter. "But
China and South Korea will use this as an excuse, each in their own way ."
And, in fact, not everyone believes that Japan COULD go all the way. Jacques Hymans, a professor of international relations at the
University of Southern California, believes the process would be thwarted by what he calls "veto players," that is, government
officials who would resist a secret program and reveal it before it reached fruition. He wrote recently that Japan has more levels of
nuclear bureaucracy than it once had, as well as more potential veto players inside that bureaucracy because of Fukushima. He
said that any attempt to make a bomb would be "swamped by the intrusion of other powerful actors with very different
motivations.
A2 no prolif
Japan can overcome public opposition & nuclear taboo to
rearm assumes the Non-Proliferation Treaty and
Article 9.
Dower 14 John W. Dower, emeritus professor of history at the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology, 2014 ("The San Francisco System: Past, Present, Future in
U.S.-Japan-China Relations," The Asia Pacific Journal, February 23rd Available Online
at http://apjjf.org/2014/12/8/John-W.-Dower/4079/article.html, Accessed 7-27-2016)
From the 1950s on, Japan's conservative leaders have been caught
between a rock and a hard place where nuclear policy is concerned . Beginning in
the 1960s, they responded to domestic opposition to nuclear weapons with
several grand gestures designed to associate the government itself with
the ideal of nuclear disarmament. These included the highly publicized "three non-nuclear principles"
introduced by Prime Minister Sat Eisaku in 1967 and endorsed in a Diet resolution four years later (pledging not to possess or
officials accompanied the government's public expressions of concern over U.S. thermonuclear tests with private assurances to their
American counterparts that these should be understood as merely "a sop to the opposition parties in the Diet and primarily for
domestic consumption." Their public protests, they explained confidentially, were just "going through the motions."26 When the
mutual security treaty was renewed under Prime Minister Kishi in 1960, a secret addendum (dating from 1959) referred to
consultation between the two governments concerning "the introduction into Japan of nuclear weapons including intermediate and
long-range missiles, as well as the construction of bases for such weapons."27 Similarly, the reversion of Okinawa to Japanese
sovereignty in 1972 was accompanied by a prior secret agreement between Sat and President Richard Nixon (in November 1969),
stating that the United States could reintroduce nuclear weapons in Okinawa in case of emergency, and also sanctioning "the
standby retention and activation in time of great emergency of existing nuclear storage locations in Okinawa: Kadena, Naha, Henoko
"nuclear allergy." In May 1957, for example, Prime Minister Kishi told a parliamentary committee that the
constitution did not bar possession of nuclear weapons "for defensive
purposes." Four years later, in a November 1961 meeting with the U.S. secretary of state, Kishi's successor Ikeda Hayato
wondered out loud whether Japan should possess its own nuclear arsenal. (He was told that the United States opposed nuclear
proliferation.) In December 1964, two months after China tested its first atomic bomb, Prime Minister Sat informed the U.S.
ambassador in Tokyo that Japan might develop nuclear weapons. A month later, Sat told the U.S. secretary of state that if war
Despite having
signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty, moreover, Japanese politicians and
planners have secretly examined the feasibility of Japan acquiring tactical
nuclear weapons. Over the course of recent decades, various conservative
politicians and officials have publicly stated that this would be
constitutionally permissible and strategically desirable. 29
broke out with China, Japan expected the United States to retaliate immediately with nuclear weapons.
International Peace, PhD in International Public Policy from Osaka University, served
as a member of the Advisory Panel of Experts on Nuclear Disarmament and NonProliferation for Japans Minister of Foreign Affairs, 2016 ("Confronting plutonium
nationalism in Northeast Asia," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, June 30th, Available
Online at http://thebulletin.org/confronting-plutonium-nationalism-northeastasia9617, Accessed 7-27-2016)
Although President Obama trumpeted his commitment to nuclear disarmament at this years Washington Nuclear
Security Summit and more recently during his visit to Hiroshima, the White House has so far only discussed in
A2 sanctions
Sanctions dont deter
Pape 97 (A. Robert, Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago
specializing in international security affair. Why Economic Sanctions do not Work
International Security Volume 22, Issue 2, 1997 //LP)
Even if sanctions become somewhat more effective after the Cold War, they still have far to go before they can be a reliable
Although the withdrawal of international trade increases the pool of skilled labor (including managerial and entrepreneurial skills),
unskilled labor is typically far more abundant, with the effect that the real incomes of unskilled labor fall more than those of skilled
workers. Given that the most skilled workers tend also to be the most powerful in states targeted by sanctions, politically weak
groups tend not to be compensated for their relatively greater loss, and are subject to having their income lowered further to protect
the incomes of more powerful groups. Thus it was possible for economic sanctions to cause the incomes of blacks in Rhodesia to fall
concede I stratified the entire recoded HSE data set into high and low economic impact categories, setting the dividing line at a 4.6
percent reduction in target state GNP.
Japan has risked sanctions before for whaling and trade not
deterred by international taboos
ABC 15 (Japan Risks Sanctions For Whaling Mission ABC News 7/29/15
http://abcnews.go.com/International/story?id=83019 //LP)
Risking U.S. trade sanctions, Japan sent out ships today to expand its
research whaling operations, a news report said. In what critics say is a cover for banned commercial whaling,
four Japanese whaling vessels set sail for the northwest Pacific Ocean to
spend two months catching about 160 sperm whales, Brydes whales and
others, the Kyodo News agency said, quoting unidentified officials from
the Fisheries Agency. Scientists will examine the catch to collect data on the whales habitats, diets and migration
patterns, the report said. As is usual with such missions, the meat will be sold in stores. The expedition comes
after the International Whaling Commission passed a resolution earlier
this month rejecting Japans rationale for expanding whaling. Commercial
whaling has been banned by the commission for almost 15 years, but a limited
amount of whale hunting for research purposes is allowed. Japan, a country that has hunted whales for thousands of years, killed
more than 400 minke whales last year, and wants to hunt Brydes whales and sperm whales as well. Officials at the Fisheries Agency
or at the port where the ships were to depart were unavailable today to confirm the report. Whale meat is a delicacy in Japan, and
oils from sperm whales can be used for cosmetics and perfume. Officials here say bans on hunting species such as minke whales
and humpback whales ignore evidence showing that their numbers are increasing to levels that can be sustained for a century or
2nc impact
A Chinese threat will lead to rapid prolif in East Asia North
Korea, South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan will be drawn in.
Lankov 16 Andrei Lankov, Russian scholar of Asia and a specialist in Korean
studies, 2016 ("A nuclear arms race in East Asia?," Al Jazeera, June 3rd, Available
Online at http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2016/06/nuclear-arms-raceeast-asia-160602091442504.html, Accessed 7-27-2016)
Nuclear arms race? And, surely, there is the "China factor" - the rising
superpower is, to put it mildly, quite unpopular among its neighbours, from
Vietnam to Japan. In the changing strategic situation, many such countries can
choose nuclear weapons as a way to deter China which - due to its sheer
size and economic might - can hardly be deterred by conventional
weapons. Indeed, the eventual deployment of the North Korean nucleararmed missiles, combined with signs of US indecisiveness, might easily
push South Korea towards acquiring its own nuclear deterrent.
Technically, acquiring nuclear weapons would not cost much money or
take much time for a highly developed nation such as South Korea . If it
happens, the probability of a nuclear Japan will increase, and Taiwan , as
well as more advanced countries of South East Asia , might start
wondering why they should be left behind. Usually, such columns are
supposed to end with some positive suggestions, but in this case there is hardly
anything optimistic to say. North Koreans are determined to maintain and improve
their nuclear deterrent, and given their strategic situation, they can hardly be
blamed for such an attitude. However, their actions increase the risk to
security in this vital region, and perhaps the entire world.
aff
for Japan to develop its own independent capability . Another wild card is the
likelihood that Japan will face a major demographic challenge because of its rapidly ageing population: such a
shock could either drive Japan closer to the United States because of heightened insecurity, or could spur
nationalism that may lean toward developing more autonomy.
program, and knows many U.S. officials. A weak yen has been a key element of Abenomics
and the Bank of Japans efforts to stoke inflation and help revive the economy with extraordinary monetary easing. The currency fell
sharply after the program was launched in early 2013, an indirect result of the easing, but rebounded during the first quarter of this
year, hitting corporate profits and inflation expectations. Officials in Tokyo have repeatedly suggested in recent weeks that Japan
may intervene to stop the yens rise if it is deemed excessive, but
addition, officials from the Fed and the U.S. Council of Economic Advisers appear concerned that Japanese intervention would offer
members of the U.S. Congress who oppose the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade deal an opportunity to shoot it down, Mr. Hamada
said. However volatile [exchange rates] may become, if you conduct intervention, youll be accused of waging a currency war,
strengthening opposition to the deal, he said.
arrangement which sees Komeito voters supply between 5 and 20 per cent of the votes LDP candidates receive in single-seat districts in both houses in
exchange for influence as a ruling party. Many LDP politicians' seats would be under serious threat if this deal came unstuck.
Komeito was
a political offshoot of the Nichiren Buddhist movement Soka Gakkai (literally value creation
study association). Its founders, Tsunesaburo Makiguchi and Josei Toda, were arrested by the wartime military government for speaking out against the
LDP in order to permit the dispatch of the SDF to the Indian Ocean to refuel US ships on route to Afghanistan under the 2001 Anti-Terrorism Special
Measures Law and to Iraq in 2003 to carry out humanitarian operations such as building schools and water purification. Most recently Komeito supported
the Abe cabinet's reinterpretation of Article 9 to permit limited forms of collective self-defence in July 2014 and the security-related bills last year that
enabled this cabinet decision. Komeito's rhetoric stalled the LDP and squeezed it for concessions by emphasising the need for long and wide debates
rooted in concrete proposals and the need to bring the people along with these changes. This allowed it to shift the focus of the conditions under which
collective self-defence a concept which is primarily focused on threats against targets other than one's own country so it could be exercised only in
response to attacks that threaten the survival of Japan and the Japanese people's constitutional right to "life, liberty and pursuit of happiness". This focus
on attacks threatening Japan contrasts sharply with the report in May 2014 by Abe's hand-picked advisory group, which recommended a less restrained
conception of the exercise of collective self-defence, before Komeito influence came to bear. Komeito justified its stance to its support base by
emphasising that it is a serious party and coalition partner willing to make compromises to exercise power and to continue to act as a brake on the LDP's
policy excesses. It maintained that the compromises made were better than the alternative of working from opposition. In a nutshell, Komeito brands itself
as "the opposition within the government". Yet all of Komeito's support for LDP security policies thus far has been justified within the framework of Article
9. A common rebuttal of critics who accuse Komeito of betraying its pacifist principles is that it has simply updated its pacifism to contemporary
circumstances and in practical ways. If Article 9 were to be amended, one option Komeito could possibly get behind would be to revise the second
paragraph, which forbids the maintenance of "land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential" in order to affirm explicitly the constitutionality of
the SDF, while maintaining the first paragraph under which the Japanese people renounce "the threat or use of force as means of settling international
talking about during the campaign period. Given strong public opposition,
the government may focus on Abenomics economic policy for now and
return to constitutional issues later in Abe's remaining two years