CASE TITLE: Senator Jinggoy Ejercito Estrada v.

Bersamin
DATE: January 21, 2015
CRIME CHARGED: Plunder
WHERE FILED: Ombudsman
DOCTIRNE: Accused, in a preliminary investigation, does not have the right to
cross-examine the witnesses which the complaint may present.
FACT:
The Ombudsman filed several complaints which reiterated that the criminal
proceeding for Plunder against him be conducted. Eighteen of Sen. Estradas corespondents in the two complaints filed their counter-affidavits between 9
December 2013 and 14 March 2014. On 20 March 2014, Sen. Estrada filed his
Request to be Furnished with Copies of Counter-Affidavits of the Other Respondents,
Affidavits of New Witnesses and Other Filings (Request).
Sen. Estradas request was made "pursuant to the right of a respondent to examine
the evidence submitted by the complainant which he may not have been furnished
(Section 3[b], Rule 112 of the Rules of Court) and to have access to the evidence on
record (Section 4[c], Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman)."
On 27 March 2014, the Ombudsman issued the assailed Order. The pertinent
portions of the assailed Order read:
This Office finds however finds [sic] that the foregoing provisions [pertaining to
Section 3[b], Rule 112 of the Rules of Court and Section 4[c], Rule II of the Rules of
Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman] do not entitle respondent [Sen. Estrada]
to be furnished all the filings of the respondents.
Further to quote the rule in furnishing copies of affidavits to parties under the Rules
of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman [Section 4 of Rule II of Administrative
Order No. 07 issued on April 10, 1990]:
a) If the complaint is not under oath or is based only on official reports, the
investigating officer shall require the complainant or supporting witnesses to
execute affidavits to substantiate the complaints.
b) After such affidavits have been secured, the investigating officer shall
issue an order, attaching thereto a copy of the affidavits and other supporting
documents, directing the respondents to submit, within ten (10) days from
receipt thereof, his counter-affidavits and controverting evidence with proof
of service thereof on the complainant. The complainant may file reply
affidavits within ten (10) days after service of the counter-affidavits.
It can be gleaned from these aforecited provisions that this Office is required to
furnish [Sen. Estrada] a copy of the Complaint and its supporting affidavits and
documents; and this Office complied with this requirement when it furnished [Sen.

Estrada] with the foregoing documents attached to the Orders to File CounterAffidavit dated 19 November 2013 and 25 November 2013.
It is to be noted that there is no provision under this Offices Rules of Procedure
which entitles respondent to be furnished all the filings by the other parties because
they are all respondents in these cases. Under the Rules of Court as well as the
Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, the respondents are only
required to furnish their counter-affidavits and controverting evidence to the
complainant, and not to the other respondents.
To reiterate, the rights of respondent [Sen.] Estrada in the conduct of the
preliminary investigation depend on the rights granted to him by law and these
cannot be based on whatever rights he believes [that] he is entitled to or those that
may be derived from the phrase "due process of law." Thus, this Office cannot grant
his motion to be furnished with copies of all the filings by the other parties.
Nevertheless, he should be furnished a copy of the Reply of complainant NBI as he
is entitled thereto under the rules; however, as of this date, no Reply has been filed
by complainant NBI.

ISSUE:
WON Sen. Estradas right to due process was violated due to the denial of his
request to be furnished with the counter affidavits of his co-accused.
HELD:
No. Sen. Estrada claims that the denial of his Request for the counter affidavits of
his co-respondents violates his constitutional right to due process. Sen. Estrada,
however, fails to specify a law or rule which states that it is a compulsory
requirement of due process in a preliminary investigation that the Ombudsman
furnish a respondent with the counter-affidavits of his co-respondents. Neither
Section 3(b), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure nor Section 4(c),
Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman supports Sen.
Estradas claim. What the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman
require is for the Ombudsman to furnish the respondent with a copy of the
complaint and the supporting affidavits and documents at the time the order to
submit the counter-affidavit is issued to the respondent. This is clear from Section
4(b), Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman when it
states, "[a]fter such affidavits [of the complainant and his witnesses] have been
secured, the investigating officer shall issue an order, attaching thereto a copy of
the affidavits and other supporting documents, directing the respondent to submit,
within ten (10) days from receipt thereof, his counter-affidavits x x x." At this point,
there is still no counter-affidavit submitted by any respondent. Clearly, what Section
4(b) refers to are affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses, not the affidavits
of the co-respondents. Obviously, the counter-affidavits of the co-respondents are
not part of the supporting affidavits of the complainant. No grave abuse of
discretion can thus be attributed to the Ombudsman for the issuance of the 27
March 2014 Order which denied Sen. Estradas Request.
Although Section 4(c), Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman provides that a respondent "shall have access to the evidence on

record," this provision should be construed in relation to Section 4(a) and (b) of the
same Rule, as well as to the Rules of Criminal Procedure. First, Section 4(a) states
that "the investigating officer shall require the complainant or supporting witnesses
to execute affidavits to substantiate the complaint." The "supporting witnesses" are
the witnesses of the complainant, and do not refer to the co-respondents.

CASE TITLE: Felilibeth Aguinaldo and Benjamin Perez v. Reynaldo P. Ventus and Jojo
B. Joson
DATE: March 11, 2015
CRIME CHARGED: Estafa
WHERE FILED: RTC of Manila
DOCTRINE: After the period of 60 days. The trial court is bound to arraign the
accused or to deny the motion to defer arraignment.
FACTS:
On December 2, 2002, private respondents Reynaldo P. Ventus and Jojo B. Joson
filed a Complaint-Affidavit for estafa against petitioners Aguinaldo and Perez before
the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of Manila. Claiming to be business partners in
financing casino players, private respondents alleged that sometime in March and
April 2002, petitioners connived in convincing them to part with their Two Hundred
Sixty Thousand (P260,000.00) Pesos in consideration of a pledge of two motor
vehicles which the latter had misrepresented to be owned by Aguinaldo, but turned
out to be owned by one Levita De Castro, manager/operator of LEDC Rent-A-Car.
On July 16, 2003, an Information charging petitioners with the crime of estafa under
Article 315, paragraph 2 (a) of the RPC was filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Manila.
On July 31, 2003, Perez was arrested, so he filed an Urgent Motion for Reduction of
Bail to be Posted in Cash, which the public respondent granted in an Order of even
date.
On August 4, 2003, petitioners jointly filed with the OCP of Manila their "Motion for
Reconsideration and Motion for the Withdrawal of the Information Prematurely Filed
With the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8, City of Manila." Citing the Counter-Affidavit
and Rejoinder-Affidavit of Perez, Aguinaldo asserted, among others, that no deceit or
false pretenses was committed because private respondents were fully aware that
she does not own the pledged motor vehicles.
On August 9, 2003, petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for Cancellation of
Arraignment, pending resolution of their motion for reconsideration filed with the
OCP of Manila. Upon the prosecution's motion, the public respondent ordered the
proceedings to be deferred until the resolution of petitioners' motion for
reconsideration.
Acting on the prosecution's recommendation for the denial of petitioners' motions
for reconsideration and withdrawal of the information, and its motion to set the case
for trial, the public respondent issued an Order dated March 15, 2004 directing the
issuance of a warrant of arrest against Aguinaldo and the setting of the case for
arraignment.
On March 26, 2004, petitioners filed an Urgent Motion to Cancel Arraignment and
Suspend Further Proceedings, until their petition for review before the DOJ is
resolved with finality. Petitioners reiterated the same prayer in their Urgent Motion
for Reconsideration of the Order dated March 15, 2004.

On April 16, 2004, the public respondent granted petitioners' urgent motion to
cancel arraignment and suspend proceedings, and motion for reconsideration.
On June 23, 2004, Levita De Castro, through the Law Firm of Lapea and Associates,
filed a Motion to Reinstate Case and to Issue Warrant of Arrest. De Castro alleged
that she was the private complainant in the estafa case that had been ordered
archived. Petitioners filed an Opposition with Motion to Expunge, alleging that De
Castro is not a party to the said case, which is in active file, awaiting the resolution
of their petition for review before the DOJ.
On October 15, 2004, De Castro filed a Manifestation informing the public
respondent that the DOJ had already promulgated a Resolution dated September 6,
2004 denying petitioners' petition for review for the case of estafa, entitled "Levita
De Castro v. Felilibeth Aguinaldo."
On May 16, 2005, the public respondent issued an Order granting the Motion to
Reinstate Case and to Issue Warrant of Arrest

ISSUES and HELD:

I.
WON the procedural technicality that the suspension allowed for
arraignment is already beyond the 60-day period may be relaxed in the
interest of an orderly and speedy administration of justice.
The Court disagrees with petitioners' contention that the provision of
Section 11 (c),33 Rule 116 of the Rules of Court limiting the suspension for
arraignment to only sixty (60) days is merely directory; thus, the estafa
case against them cannot proceed until the DOJ resolves their petition for
review with finality.
In the case at bar, the petitioners' petition for review was filed with the
Secretary of Justice on February 27, 2004. As early as April 16, 2004, upon
the petitioners' motion, the arraignment of the petitioners herein was
ordered deferred by the public respondent. We believe that the period of
one year and one month from April 16, 2004 to May 16, 2005 when the
public respondent ordered the issuance of a warrant for the arrest of
petitioner Aguinaldo, was more than ample time to give the petitioners
the opportunity to obtain a resolution of their petition for review from the
DOJ. The petitioners though submitted a Certification from the DOJ dated
May 30, 2005 stating that their petition for review is pending resolution by
the Department as of May 27, 2005. However, such delay in the resolution
does not extend the period of 60 days prescribed under the afore-quoted
Section 11(c), Rule 116 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.
Besides, the petitioners may be faulted for the delay in the resolution of
their petition. According to their counsel, she received the letter dated
April 15, 2004 from the DOJ requiring her to submit the pertinent
pleadings relative to petitioners' petition for review; admittedly, however,
the same was complied with only on October 15, 2004. We therefore find

that the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
assailed orders.
II.

WON the preliminary investigation by the City Prosecutor of Manila has

not yet been completed.
The Court is likewise unconvinced by petitioners' argument that the
precipitate filing of the Information and the issuance of a warrant of arrest
put petitioners at the risk of incarceration without the preliminary
investigation having been completed because they were not afforded their
right to file a motion for reconsideration of the DOJ resolution.
While they are correct in stating that the right to preliminary investigation
is a substantive, not merely a procedural right, petitioners are wrong in
arguing that the Information filed, without affording the respondent his
right to file a motion for reconsideration of an adverse DOJ resolution, is
fatally premature. In support of their argument, petitioners cite Sales v.
Sandiganbayan wherein it was held that since filing of a motion for
reconsideration is an integral part of the preliminary investigation proper,
an Information filed without first affording the accused his right to a
motion for reconsideration, is tantamount to a denial of the right itself to a
preliminary investigation.
The Court finds petitioners' reliance on Sales as misplaced. A closer look
into said case would reveal that the accused therein was denied his right
to move for a reconsideration or a reinvestigation of an adverse resolution
in a preliminary investigation under the Rules of Procedure of the
Ombudsman before the filing of an Information. In contrast, petitioners in
this case were afforded their right to move for reconsideration of the
adverse resolution in a preliminary investigation when they filed their
"Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for the Withdrawal of Information
Prematurely Filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8, City of Manila,"
pursuant to Section 3 of the 2000 National Prosecution Service (NPS Rule
on Appeal) and Section 56 of the Manual for Prosecutors
PETITION DENIED, CA AFFIRMED.

CASE TITLE: ER Ejercito v. COMELEC

DATE: November 25, 2014
CRIME CHARGED: Disqualification for the gubernatorial race
WHERE FILED: COMELEC
DOCTRINE: The conduct of preliminary investigation is not required in the
resolution of the electoral aspect of a disqualification case.
FACTS:
Edgar san Luis filed a disqualification case against ER Ejercito. They were both
candidates for the gubernatorial race in Laguna during the 2013 Provincial
elections. San Luis alleges that Ejercito was giving away Orange Cards for the
purpose of coercing the voters to vote for him and that Ejercito spent over and
beyond the allocated budget thus further strengthening his claim the Ejercito must
be disqualified. On the other hand, Ejercito considers the disqualification case filed
against him as mere harassment and thus with no clear basis. Upon deliberation the
COMELEC agreed to disqualify Ejercito and forward the matter to the COMELEC Law
Department for the conduct of preliminary investigation into the alleged violations.
ISSUE:
WON preliminary investigation should have been conducted prior to the decision of
the COMELEC.
HELD:
No. Where the inquiry results in a finding before the election, the COMELEC shall
order the candidates disqualification. In case the complaint was not resolved before
the election, the COMELEC may motu propio or on motion of any of the parties, refer
the said complaint to the Law Department of the COMELEC for preliminary
investigation.
The petition for disqualification against Ejercito for campaign over-spending before
the Commission is heard and resolved pursuant to the electoral aspect of Section 68
of the OEC. It is an administrative proceeding separate and distinct from the
criminal proceeding through which Ejercito may be made to undergo in order to
determine whether he can be held criminally liable for the same act of overspending. It is through this administrative proceeding that this Commission, initially
through its divisions, makes a factual determination on the veracity of the parties
respective allegations in a disqualification case. There is no need for a preliminary
investigation finding on the criminal aspect of the offenses in Section 68 before the
Commission can act on the administrative or electoral aspect of the offense. All that
is needed is a complaint or a petition. As enunciated in Lanot v. COMELEC "(a)n
erring candidate may be disqualified even without prior determination of probable
cause in a preliminary investigation. The electoral aspect may proceed
independently of the criminal aspect, and vice-versa."