OMAE

Speciality Symposium on
FPSO Integrity
Floating Installation
Marine System Vulnerability
Global Alert
Andrew L. Smith, Peter G. Morris,
Eoin H.S.Young & Max English
August 2004

Floating Installation Marine System

Vulnerability Global Alert

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Dr. A.L.Smith

Content

Introduction

Risks Associated with Flooded Machinery Spaces

Historical Data

Marine Regulations

Machinery Space Risk Assessment

Hazard Identification Case Studies

Risk Analysis

Integrity of Seawater Systems

Recommendations

Lessons to be learnt

Reducing the risks associated with Flooded Machinery Spaces

Conclusion

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Introduction Global Operating Areas

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Introduction Deepwater Prospects

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Introduction Market Forecasts

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Introduction Case Studies

P-36, post explosion March 2001

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P-34 after power loss and

subsequent listing October 2002

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Introduction Global Alert

Owners and operators of monohull FPSO and FSU installations

are advised to review their risk assessments for the flooding of
machinery spaces and ensure that effective means are provided
for the detection and control of flooding

Actions expected from duty holders on the UKCS are covered in

the recent UK Hazardous Installations Directorate, Offshore
Safety Division, Safety Notice 4/03 issued in December 2003

The safety barriers which represent good practice and will

protect against the flooding of machinery spaces in FPSO and
FSU installations are identified in the paper.

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Risks Associated with

Flooded Machinery Spaces

Vessel likely to assume an angle of loll [inclination] which could:

Prevent the use of the helideck for evacuation

Compromise the launching of TEMPSC

Compromise the deployment of escape systems

Make the onboard movement of personnel hazardous

Make the onboard movement of equipment hazardous

Operation of Safety Critical Systems may be impaired:

Electrical power

Fire, ballast and bilge pumps

Inert gas systems

Crude oil transfer systems

Stability and seaworthiness will be reduced with the additional

risk of progressive flooding, especially in severe weather.

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Historical Data - Interrogation

ORION UK HSE Offshore Safety Division

MAIB UK Marine Accidents Investigation Bureau

WOAD World Offshore Accident Database, DNV Norway.

Event frequencies strongly vary with the source being used

Main source for accident and incident information being available for
the UKCS offshore industry should be ORION

Large difference in number of accidents between WOAD and ORION

Increase in event frequencies when merging all databases together

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Historical Data Underlying Themes

Maritime competency: mechanical -v- marine engineers

Control instrumentation: over reliance on computer based systems

Reliance on Class: reluctance to accept technological advances

Complacency: prescriptive marine approach -v- proactive risk

assessments

Human Factors: vessel and operational management philosophy

Commissioning of seawater systems: less than adequate

Operational marine expertise: to be included from Conceptual Design

stage

Management of Change Control / Change of Use: less than adequate

Inadequate application of Hazard Identification Studies and Hazard &

Operability Studies: during vessel / marine system design or redesign.
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Marine Regulations
Shipping Safety Regime

International safety codes and regulations issued by I.M.O.

Rules for the classification of ships:

Issued by independent Classification Societies

Main purpose to protect the ship and cargo
Apply primarily to structural strength of the hull and
Reliability of its essential machinery and equipment
Originally set up by marine insures to evaluate the quality of ships
Gradually transformed into certification organisations
Ensuring ships conform to classification rules and IMO regulations

National maritime administrations set relatively few additional

requirements, reflecting the international nature of the shipping
industry and its need for uniform regulations applying to all ports

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Marine Regulations
Advantages -v- Disadvantages

Advantages:
They encapsulate the accumulated wisdom from accident
experience and from the judgement of many experts world-wide
who have contributed to refining and improving them

Disadvantages:
When performing a risk assessment the accident experience and
anticipated hazards that underpinned each rule are not recorded
and so it is very difficult to tell how safety critical a particular rule
might be for a particular installation.

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Machinery Space Risk Assessments

Identify the hazards associated with the operation of machinery

spaces on FPSOs and FSUs
Assess the risks to the individuals who work in those areas
Assess the risk of machinery space accidents developing such
that other areas and larger groups of people were affected
Identify risk reduction measures in machinery space design and
operation applicable to floating production installations
Main hazards to be recognised:

Fire / Explosion
Flooding
Energy / Pressure containment
Access / Egress

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Lighting / Ventilation
Mechanical Handling
Electricity
Pumproom hazards

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Hazard Identification Case Studies

P-36 sinking and P-34 major loss of stability incidents focussed

attention on some of the comparatively vulnerable aspects of FPSOs

HAZIDs were commissioned on several UKCS FPSOs

HAZID conducted to identify hazards and associated events that have

the potential to result in a significant consequence [Major Hazard] or
prejudice the integrity of a floating offshore installation

Understand and identify failures of large bore seawater pipework,

valves and associated control equipment of the systems located in the
various compartments of the installations, rank qualitatively the risks
from identified failures and to develop any remedial recommendations

Immediate consequences of flooding were defined as local damage,

severe damage or loss of installation

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Risk Analysis

Statistical basis for quantifying these risks to the UKCS floating

installations from other FPSO data was initially considered weak

Considered valid to look at record of trading ships

Validated by comprehensive re-evaluation of databases

Confirmed that previous accident frequency values should be

increased by a factor of ~25 than in WOAD

Total Floating Offshore Units = 2.8 per installation per year

Comparison of accident frequencies using incidents of same

severity in the new database show an increase factor of ~3 to 4

Flooding incident frequency 1980 - 2001:

Semi-submersibles = 2.2 x 10-2 per rig per annum

FPSOs

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= 1.4 x 10-2 per vessel per annum

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Risk Analysis Database Comparison

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Risk Analysis
Marine Accident Investigation Branch
British Registered Vessels >100 grt Accidents 94 - 2001
% of
Rate [per ship
Cause
total
per annum]
Capsize/Listing
0.4%
7.71E-04
Cargo Handling Failure
2.0%
3.53E-03
Collision
11.0%
1.96E-02
Contact
10.5%
1.88E-02
Escape Of Harmful Substance
8.7%
1.56E-02
Fire/Explosion
11.0%
1.97E-02
Flooding/Foundering
1.6%
2.86E-03
Grounding
7.9%
1.41E-02
Heavy Weather Damage
2.1%
3.75E-03
Machinery Failure
23.5%
4.21E-02
Man Overboard
4.4%
7.93E-03
Other
16.8%
3.00E-02
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Integrity of Seawater Systems

Comprehensive integrity management plan for pipework and fittings

in these machinery spaces is essential

Comprehensive listing of shipside valves and systems

e.g. 65 hull penetrations

Seawater leak over 105mm [~4] has the potential to overwhelm one
vessels pumping ability and so cause serous business interruption

Suitable damage control guidance

Provision and training in the use of suitable materials

Continuing maintenance and inspection

Reduce risk of machinery room flooding to an acceptable level

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Recommendations

Review the various compartment flooding cases as illustrated in the

damage stability manuals, with the respect to the availability and
operability of the safety critical systems
Seawater related systems should be part of an integrity management
system which ensures that:

Internal corrosion is monitored

Valves are fully functional, especially non-return valves
Valve control panels, powerpacks and distribution panels are assessed *
Fittings retain their strength and functionality e.g. suction strainers
Safety Management System for the installation gives full control over
status and use of both watertight doors and the opening of void spaces
All hull penetrations and their upstream / downstream pipework and
fittings should be Safety Critical Elements
Prevent the integrity of offshore floating installations being prejudiced **

Major accident should also include environmental pollution

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Lessons to be learnt

Flooding of a machinery space will result in:

Risks to persons responding to the incident

Reduced stability and seaworthiness of the installation
Probable loss of Safety Critical Systems
Availability of remaining Safety Critical Systems being limited due
to emergency power supplies ~ 24 hours

Considered unlikely that manual intervention would succeed in

securing timely closure of a relevant shipside valve, due to their
being insufficient time to respond to an alarm by way of
accessing and closing the valve, particularly when faced with
high flooding rates.

Pressurised seawater lines up to 800mm [31.5] diameter

Typical merchant shipping response time ~5 mins
Case studies highlighted night-shift response time ~ 15 to 20 mins

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Lessons to be learnt

Although damage stability capabilities can normally be expected

to prevent catastrophic loss of a unit through capsize in the
event of a major machinery space flooding incident, it may still
result in:

Vessel inclination e.g. P 34

Reduction in stability and seaworthiness
Limited functionality of Safety Critical Systems

In machinery space incidents to date, the availability of CCTV

has enabled the relevant operator to rapidly confirm the extent
of flooding and take immediate action to isolate the affected
space from the sea.

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Reducing the Risks Associated

with Flooded Machinery Spaces

Safety Notice issued by HSE in December 2003

Suitable arrangements for flooding detection require:

Availability of bilge high / high alarms giving clear and unambiguous

audible and visual signals to the control room operator

Many FPSO and FSU owners and operators have not fully adopted
these arrangements for flood detection and cannot close remotely
the safety critical shipside valves from a safe location

FPSO and FSU owners and operators should ensure that they use
information on stability, watertight integrity, ballasting and damage
control which today is often overlooked, to stimulate action that is
both suitable and sufficient for the prevention, detection, control
and mitigation of the risk from the flooding of machinery spaces

Section 31.7 Operations Manual, 4th edition Guidance Notes

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Conclusion Risks

Even with the addition of dedicated bilge pumps, floating installations

would be unable to cope with the levels of flooding that would occur
with a 150mm [6] hole in a non-isolatable pipe or shell plate area
and the compartment would become fully flooded

Flooding of compartments did not threaten life

Flooding of compartments may affect various damage case scenarios

Marine facilities

Weather heading capabilities

Turret chain tensions

Major compartment flooding would:

Require outside assistance to recover the situation

Require precautionary down-manning

Result in very significant business interruption

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Conclusion Risk Management

Safety Notice 4/03 highlights the need for safety barriers to protect
against flooding of machinery spaces below the water line

The provision of suitable systems of flood detection and remote

closure of Safety Critical Shipside Valves from a safe location are
considered to represent good practice in reducing risks A.L.A.R.P.

Owners and operators of monohull FPSO and FSU installations are

therefore requested to review their risk assessments for the flooding
of machinery spaces and ensure that effective means are provided
for the detection and control of flooding

On UKCS, should include providing an independently remotely

controlled means of closure, from a safe location i.e. from a readily
accessible position above any final water-plane, after damage

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Conclusion Risk Awareness

Marine systems where the shipside valves fail open may effect
the functionality of existing Safety Critical Systems

Flooding risk not fully appreciated due to a lack of lateral thinking

Integrated Risk Management shows that these marine systems

are also Safety, Environmental and Business Critical

On detection of system failure with significant flooding risk, they

should be closed by an independent means of isolation

The UK Health & Safety Executive

has drawn these concerns to the attention of
Classification Societies, I.A.C.S. and
Lloyds Market Association
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Conclusion Global Change

Monohull FPSO and FSU installations
at the time of build or conversion
generally followed the rules of the Classification Societies,
which may now include the above provisions,
but which are not retrospective.

A major change in philosophy is required globally.

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Conclusion Global Action

Pratibha Yamua, pump-room explosion.

May 2000

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Merchant Patriot, flooded engine-room

off Bahamas. December 1997

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