POLICE POWER WHO EXERCISES POLICE POWER?

GR No. 130239, April 15, 2005MMDA vs. GARINFACTS:

Respondent Garin was issued a traffic violation receipt (TVR) and his drivers
license was confiscated for parking illegally. Garinwrote to then MMDA Chairman Prospero Oreta requesting
thereturn of his license and expressed his preference for his case tobe file in Court. Without an immediate reply
from the chairman,Garin filed for a preliminary injunction assailing among others thatSec 5 (f) of RA 7924 violates
the constitutional prohibition againstundue delegation of legislative authority, allowing MMDA to fixand impose
unspecified and unlimited fines and penalties. RTCrule in his favor, directing MMDA to return his license and for the
authority to desist from confiscating drivers license without first
giving the driver the opportunity to be heard in an appropriateproceeding. Thus this petition.
ISSUE:
WON Sec 5(f) of RA 7924 which authorizes MMDA to confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers license in the
enforcement
of traffic rules and regulations constitutional?
HELD:

The MMDA is not vested with police power. It was concluded thatMMDA is not a local government unit of a public
corporationendowed with legislative power and it has no power to enactordinances for the welfare of the
community.

Police power, as an inherent attribute of sovereignty is the power vested in the legislature to make, ordain,
establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances either with penalties of without,
not repugnant to the constitution, as theyshall judge to be for good and welfare of the commonwealth andfor
subjects of the same.

There is no provision in RA 7924 that empowers MMDA or its

council to enact ordinance, approve resolutions and appropriatefunds for the general welfare of the inhabitants of
Metro Manila. It
is an agency created for the purpose of laying down policies andcoordinating with the various national government
agencies,
Peoples Organizations, NGOs and private sector for the efficient
and expeditious delivery of services. All its functions areadministrative in nature.
LAWS
GR. No. L-38429 June 30, 1988
BALACUIT vs. CFIFACTS:

Ordinance No. 640 was passed by the Municipal Board of the City of Butuan on April 21, 1969 which penalizes
any person group of persons, entity or corporation engaged in the business of sellingadmission tickets to any
movie or other public exhibitions, games,contests or other performances to require children between seven(7) and
twelve (12) years of age to pay full payment for ticketsintended for adults but should charge only one-half of the
said ticket. The petitioners Carlos Balacuit, Lamberto Tan, and Sergio YuCarcel are managers of the Maya and
Dalisay Theaters, theCrown Theater, and the Diamond Theater,
respectively. Aggrieved by the effect of the said ordinance, they filed acomplaint before the Court of First Instance
of Agusan del Norteand Butuan City on June 30, 1969 praying that the subjectordinance be declared
unconstitutional and, therefore, void andunenforceable. Subsequently, the respondent court rendered its
decisiondeclaring Ordinance No. 640 as constitutional and valid.Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the
decision of therespondent court but was later on denied.
ISSUE:
WON Ordinance No. 640 is unconstitutional and an invalidexercise of police power.
HELD:

(A)s to the question of the subject ordinance being a validexercise of police power, the same must be resolved in
thenegative. While it is true that a business may be regulated, it isequally true that such regulation must be within
the bounds of reason, that is, the regulatory ordinance must be reasonable, andits provisions cannot be oppressive
amounting to an arbitraryinterference with the business or calling subject of regulation. Alawful business or calling
may not, under the guise of regulation,be unreasonably interfered with even by the exercise of policepower. police
measure for the regulation of the conduct, controland operation of a business should not encroach upon
thelegitimate and lawful exercise by the citizens of their propertyrights. right of the owner to fix a price at which
his property shallbe sold or used is an inherent attribute of the property itself and,as such, within the protection of
the due process clause. Hence,the proprietors of a theater have a right to manage their propertyin their own way,

to fix what prices of admission they think mostfor their own advantage, and that any person who did not
approvecould stay away.
The exercise of police power by the local government is validunless it contravenes the fundamental law of the land,
or an act of the legislature, or unless it is against public policy or isunreasonable, oppressive, partial, discriminating
or in derogationof a common right.
Ordinance No. 640 clearly invades the personal and propertyrights of petitioners for even if We could assume that,
on its face,the interference was reasonable, from the foregoingconsiderations, it has been fully shown that it is an
unwarrantedand unlawful curtailment of the property and personal rights of citizens. For being unreasonable and
an undue restraint of trade,it cannot, under the guise of exercising police power, be upheldas valid.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court in Special Civil CaseNo. 237 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a
new judgment is hereby rendered declaring Ordinance No. 640unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void. This
decision isimmediately executory.
146 SCRA 323; G.R. No. L-63419; 18 Dec 1986LOZANO VS. MARTINEZ
FACTS:
A motion to quash the charge against the petitioners for violation of theBP 22 was made, contending that no
offense was committed, as thestatute is unconstitutional. Such motion was denied by the RTC. Thepetitioners thus
elevate the case to the Supreme Court for relief. TheSolicitor General, commented that it was premature for the
accused toelevate to the Supreme Court the orders denying their motions toquash. However, the Supreme Court
finds it justifiable to intervene for the review of lower court's denial of a motion to quash.
ISSUE:
WON BP 22 is constitutional as it is a proper exercise of policepower of the State.
HELD:
The enactment of BP 22 a valid exercise of the police power andis not repugnant to the constitutional inhibition
againstimprisonment for debt.
The offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing aworthless check or a check that is dishonored
upon itspresentation for payment. It is not the non-payment of anobligation which the law punishes. The law is not
intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt.
The law punishes the act not as an offense against property, butan offense against public order. The thrust of the
law is to prohibit,under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checksand putting them in circulation. An
act may not be considered bysociety as inherently wrong, hence, not malum in se but becauseof the harm that it
inflicts on the community, it can be outlawedand criminally punished as malum prohibitum. The state can dothis in
the exercise of its police power

GR. No. 88265 December 21, 1989

DEL ROSARIO vs. BENGZON
FACTS:
This is a class suit filed by the officers of the Philippine
Medical Association, the national organization of medical doctors in thePhilippines, on behalf of their professional
brethren who are of kindred persuasion, wherein the Supreme Court is asked todeclare as unconstitutional, hence,
null and void, some provisionsof the Generics Act of 1988 (Republic Act No. 6675), and of theimplementing
Administrative Order No. 62 issued pursuantthereto.
The said law requires the use of generic terminology or genericnames in writing prescriptions by medical, dental,
and veterinarydoctors. Government health agencies and their personnel as wellas other government agencies are
likewise obliged to use generic names in all transactions related to purchasing, prescribing, dispensing and
administering of drugs and medicines. Certain penalties are imposed for violation of the said provisions of thelaw.
ISSUE:
WON the Generics Act of 1998 and its implementing Administrative Order No. 62 are unconstitutional.
HELD:
The Court has been unable to find any constitutional infirmity inthe Generics Act. It, on the contrary, implements
the constitutionalmandate for the State "to protect and promote the right to healthof the people" and "to make
essential goods, health and other social services available to all the people
at affordable cost" (Section 15, Art. II and Section 11, Art. XIII, 1987Constitution).
There is no merit in the petitioners' theory that the Generics Actimpairs the obligation of contract between a
physician and hispatient, for no contract ever results from a consultation betweenpatient and physician. A doctor
may take in or refuse a patient, just as the patient may take or refuse the doctor's advice or prescription. As aptly
observed by the public respondent, nodoctor has ever filed an action for breach of contract against apatient who
refused to take prescribed medication, undergosurgery, or follow a recommended course treatment by his
doctor ( p. 53, Rollo). In any event, no private contract between doctor and patient may be allowed to override the
power of the State toenact laws that are reasonably necessary to secure the health,safety, good order, comfort, or
general welfare of the community.This power can neither be abdicated nor bargained away. Allcontractual and
property rights are held subject to its fair exercise.
152 SCRA 730; G.R. No. 78164; 31 July 1987
TABLARIN VS. JUDGE GUTIERREZ
FACTS:
The petitioners sought to enjoin the Secretary of Education,Culture and Sports, the Board of Medical Education and
theCenter for Educational Measurement from enforcing Section 5 (a)and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended,
and MECS Order No. 52, series of 1985, dated 23 August 1985 and from requiringthe taking and passing of the
NMAT as a condition for securingcertificates of eligibility for admission, from proceeding withaccepting applications
for taking the NMAT and fromadministering the NMAT as scheduled on 26 April 1987 and in thefuture. The trial
court denied said petition on 20 April 1987. TheNMAT was conducted and administered as previously scheduled.

Republic Act 2382, as amended by Republic Acts Nos. 4224 and5946, known as the "Medical Act of 1959" defines
its basicobjectives in the following manner:"SECTION 1. Objectives.

This Act provides for andshall govern (a) the standardization and regulation of medical education; (b) the
examination for registrationof physicians; and (c) the supervision, control andregulation of the practice of medicine
in thePhilippines."
The statute, among other things, created a Board of Medical Education. Its functions as specified in Section5 of the
statute include the following:"(a) To determine and prescribe requirements for admission into a recognized college
of medicine;x x x(f) To accept applications for certification for admission to amedical school and keep a register of
those issued saidcertificate; and to collect from said applicants the amount of twenty-five pesos each which shall
accrue to the operating fund of
the Board of Medical Education; Section 7 prescribes certain minimum requirements for applicantsto medical
schools:"Admission requirements.

The medical college mayadmit any student who has not been convicted by anycourt of competent jurisdiction of
any offense involvingmoral turpitude and who presents (a) a record of completion of a bachelor's degree in science
or arts; (b)a certificate of eligibility for entrance to a medical schoolfrom the Board of Medical Education; (c) a
certificate of good moral character issued by two former professorsin the college of liberal arts; and (d) birth
certificate.Nothing in this act shall be construed to inhibit anycollege of medicine from establishing, in addition to
thepreceding, other entrance requirements that may be
deemed admissible.
MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, issued by the then Minister of Education, Culture and Sports and dated 23 August
1985,established a uniform admission test called the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) as an additional
requirement for issuanceof a certificate of eligibility for admission into medical schools of the Philippines, beginning
with the school year 1986-1987. ThisOrder goes on to state that: "2. The NMAT, an aptitude test,is considered as
an instrument toward upgrading the selection of applicants for admission into the medical schools and itscalculated
to improve the quality of medical education in thecountry. The cutoff score for the successful applicants, based
onthe scores on the NMAT, shall be determined every year by theBoard of Medical Education after consultation with
the Associationof Philippine Medical Colleges. The NMAT rating of eachapplicant, together with the other admission
requirements aspresently called for under existing rules, shall serve as a basis for the issuance of the prescribed
certificate of eligibility for admission into the medical colleges.
ISSUE:
WON Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, asamended, and MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985 are
constitutional.
HELD:
Yes. We conclude that prescribing the NMAT and requiringcertain minimum scores therein as a condition for
admission to medicalschools in the Philippines, do not constitute an unconstitutionalimposition.
The police power, it is commonplace learning, is the pervasiveand non-waivable power and authority of the
sovereign to secureand promote all the important interests and needs in a word, the public order

of the general community. An importantcomponent of that public order is the health and physical safetyand well
being of the population, the securing of which no one candeny is a legitimate objective of governmental effort
andregulation. Perhaps the only issue that needs some considerationis whether there is some reasonable relation
between theprescribing of passing the NMAT as a condition for admission tomedical school on the one hand, and
the securing of the healthand safety of the general community, on the other hand. Thisquestion is perhaps most
usefully approached by recalling thatthe regulation of the practice of medicine in all its branches haslong been
recognized as a reasonable method of protecting thehealth and safety of the public.

MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985 articulates the rationale of regulationof this type: the improvement of the professional
and technicalquality of the graduates of medical schools, by upgrading thequality of those admitted to the student
body of the medicalschools. That upgrading is sought by selectivity in the process of admission, selectivity
consisting, among other things, of limitingadmission to those who exhibit in the required degree the aptitudefor
medical studies and eventually for medical practice. The needto maintain, and the difficulties of maintaining, high
standards inour professional schools in general, and medical schools inparticular, in the current stage of our social
and economicdevelopment, are widely known. We believe that the governmentis entitled to prescribe an admission
test like the NMAT as ameans for achieving its stated objective of "upgrading theselection of applicants into [our]
medical schools" and of "improv[ing] the quality of medical education in the country. Weare entitled to hold that
the NMAT is reasonably related to thesecuring of the ultimate end of legislation and regulation in thisarea. That
end, it is useful to recall, is the protection of the publicfrom the potentially deadly effects of incompetence and
ignorancein those who would undertake to treat our bodies and minds for disease or trauma.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED and theOrder of the respondent trial court denying the
petition for a writ of preliminary injunction is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
GR No. 166494, June 29, 2007
CARLOS SUPERDRUG CORP. vs. DSWD, ET. AL
FACTS:
Petitioners, belonging to domestic corporations and proprietors operating drugstores in the Philippines, are praying
for preliminary injunction assailing the constitutionality of Section 4(a) of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 9257, otherwise known as the Expanded Senior Citizens Act of 2003. On February 26, 2004,
R.A. No. 9257,
amending R.A. No. 7432, was signed into law by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and it became effective on
March 21, 2004.Section 4(a) of the Act states: SEC. 4.
Privileges for the Senior Citizens

Thesenior citizens shall be entitled to the following:(a) the grant of twenty percent (20%) discount fromall
establishments relative to the utilization of services in hotels and similar lodging establishments,restaurants and
recreation centers, and purchase of medicines in all establishments for the exclusive useor enjoyment of senior
citizens, including funeral andburial services for the death of senior citizens;
The establishment may claim the discounts granted under (a), (f),(g) and (h) as tax deduction based on the net
cost of the goodssold or services rendered:
Provided , That the cost of the discountshall be allowed as deduction from gross income for the sametaxable year
that the discount is granted.Provided, further, That the total amount of the claimed tax deduction net of value
addedtax if applicable, shall be included in their gross sales receipts for tax purposes and shall be subject to proper
documentation and tothe provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code, asamended.

The DSWD, on May 8, 2004, approved and adopted theImplementing Rules and Regulations of RA No. 9275, Rule
VI, Article 8 which contains the proviso that the implementation of thetax deduction shall be subject to the
Revenue Regulations to beissued by the BIR and approved by the DOF. With the new law,the Drug Stores
Association of the Philippines wanted aclarification of the meaning of tax deduction. The DOF clarifiedthat under a
tax deduction scheme, the tax deduction ondiscounts was subtracted from Net Sales together with other deductions
which are considered as operating expenses beforethe Tax Due was computed based on the Net Taxable Income.On
the other hand, under a
tax credit scheme, the amount of discounts which is the tax credit item, was deducted directly fromthe tax due
amount.

The DOH issued an Administrative Order that the twenty percentdiscount shall include both prescription and nonprescriptionmedicines, whether branded or generic. It stated that suchdiscount would be provided in the purchase
of medicines from allestablishments supplying medicines for the exclusive use of thesenior citizens.

Drug store owners assail the law with the contention that grantingthe discount would result to loss of profit and
capital especiallythat such law failed to provide a scheme to justly compensate thediscount.
ISSUE:
WON Section 4(a) of the Expanded Senior Citizens Act isunconstitutional or not violative of Article 3 Section 9 of
the Constitutionwhich provides that private property shall not be taken for public usewithout just compensation and
the equal protection clause of Article 3Section 1.
HELD:
The permanent reduction in their total revenues is a forcedsubsidy corresponding to the taking of private property
for publicuse or benefit. This constitutes compensable taking for whichpetitioners would ordinarily become entitled
to a justcompensation. Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its
owner by the
expropriator. The measure is not the takers gain but the owners loss. The wordj ust is used to intensify the
meaning of the word compensation , and to convey the idea that the equivalent to berendered for the property to
be taken shall be real, substantial, fulland ample.

The law grants a twenty percent discount to senior citizens for medical and dental services, and diagnostic and
laboratory fees;admission fees charged by theaters, concert halls, circuses,carnivals, and other similar places of
culture, leisure andamusement; fares for domestic land, air and sea travel; utilizationof services in hotels and
similar lodging establishments,restaurants and recreation centers; and purchases of medicinesfor the exclusive use
or enjoyment of senior citizens. As a form of reimbursement, the law provides that business
establishmentsextending the twenty percent discount to senior citizens mayclaim the discount as a tax deduction.

The law is a legitimate exercise of police power which, similar tothe power of eminent domain, has general welfare
for its object.Police power is not capable of an exact definition, but has beenpurposely veiled in general terms to

underscore its comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and provide enough room for an efficient and flexible
response to conditions and circumstances, thus assuring the greatest benefits. Accordingly, it has been described
as the most essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers, extending as it does to all the great public
needs. It is [t]he power vested in the legislature by the constitution to make, ordain, and establish all manner
of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the
constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the
commonwealth, and of the subjects of the same.

ZONING & REGULATORY ORDINANCES

20 SCRA 849; G.R. No.L-24693; 31 July 1967
ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL AND MOTEL OPERATORS ASSO. VS.MAYOR OF MANILA
FACTS:
Petitioners Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association withone of its members, Hotel del Mar Inc., and
Go Chiu, the president andgeneral manager of the second petitioner, filed a petition for prohibitionagainst
Ordinance No. 4760 against the respondent Mayor of the Cityof Manila who was sued in his capacity as such
charged with thegeneral power and duty to enforce ordinances of the City of Manila andto give the necessary
orders for the execution and enforcement of such ordinances. It was alleged that the petitioner nonstockcorporation is dedicated to the promotion and protection of the interestof its eighteen members operating
hotels and motels, characterized aslegitimate businesses duly licensed by both national and cityauthorities and
regularly paying taxes. It was alleged that on June 13,1963, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila enacted
Ordinance No.4760, approved on June 14, 1963 by the then acting City Mayor, Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga. After
which the alleged grievances againstthe ordinance were set forth in detail. There was the assertion of itsbeing
beyond the powers of the Municipal Board of the City of Manilato enact insofar as it regulate motels, on the ground
that in the revisedcharter of the City of Manila or in any other law, no reference is madeto motels. it also
being provided that the premises and facilities of suchhotels, motels and lodging houses would be open for
inspection either by the City Mayor, or the Chief of Police, or their duly authorizedrepresentatives. The lower court
on July 6, 1963 issued a writ of preliminary injunction ordering respondent Mayor to refrain fromenforcing said
Ordinance No. 4760 from and after July 8, 1963.
ISSUE:
Whether or Not Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is unconstitutional, therefore, null and void.
HELD:
A decent regard for constitutional doctrines of a fundamental character ought to have admonished the lower
court against such a sweeping condemnation of the challenged ordinance. Its decision cannot be allowed to stand,
consistently with what has been the accepted standards of constitutional adjudication, inboth procedural
and substantive aspects.
Primarily what calls for a reversal of such a decision is theabsence of any evidence to offset the presumption of
validity thatattaches to a challenged statute or ordinance. As was expressed categorically by Justice Malcolm: "The
presumption is all in favor of validity x x x . The action of the elected representatives of thepeople cannot be lightly
set aside. The councilors must, in thevery nature of things, be familiar with the necessities of their particular
municipality and with all the facts and circumstanceswhich surround the subject and necessitate action. The
locallegislative body, by enacting the ordinance, has in effect givennotice that the regulations are essential to the
well being of thepeople x x x . The Judiciary should not lightly set aside legislativeaction when there is not a clear
invasion of personal or propertyrights under the guise of police regulation.
It admits of no doubt therefore that there being a presumption of validity, the necessity for evidence to rebut it is
unavoidable,unless the statute or ordinance is void on its face which is not thecase here. The principle has
been nowhere better expressed thanin the leading case of O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford FireInsurance Co. where
the American Supreme Court throughJustice Brandeis tersely and succinctly summed up the matter thus: The
statute here questioned deals with a subject clearlywithin the scope of the police power. We are asked to declare
itvoid on the ground that the specific method of regulationprescribed is unreasonable and hence deprives the
plaintiff of dueprocess of law. As underlying questions of fact may condition theconstitutionality of legislation of this
character, the resumption of constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factualfoundation of record for
overthrowing the statute." No such factualfoundation being laid in the present case, the lower court decidingthe
matter on the pleadings and the stipulation of facts, thepresumption of validity must prevail and the judgment
against theordinance set aside.

123 SCRA 569 (1983)

CRUZ vs. PARAS
FACTS:
Petitioners were night club operators in Bocaue Bulacan, who filed onNovember 5, 1975, two cases for prohibition
with preliminaryinjunction. They contended that the enforcement of MunicipalOrdinance no. 84, an ordinance
prohibiting the operation of nightclubs,cabarets, and dance halls in that municipality or the renewal of licenses to
operate them, should be stopped as the municipal has nopower to prohibit a lawful business and that such
ordinance is violativeto their right to due process and the equal protection of the law, as thelicense previously given
to petitioners was in effect withdrawn without judicial hearing. The lower court upheld the validity of the ordinance
inthe name of police power and dismissed the petition. Hence, thispetition for certiorari.
ISSUE:
WON a municipal corporation, Bocaue, Bulacan, representedby respondents, can, prohibit the exercise of a lawful
trade, theoperation of night clubs, and the pursuit of a lawful occupation, suchclubs employing hostesses
HELD:
Supreme Court states that reliance on the police power is insufficientto justify the enactment of the assailed
ordinance. It is to be noted thatthe municipal council shall enact such ordinances and make suchregulations, not
repugnant to law, as may be necessary to carry intoeffect and discharge the powers and duties conferred upon it
by lawand such as shall seem necessary and proper to provide for thehealth and safety, promote the prosperity, improve
the morals,peace, good order, comfort, and convenience of the municipalityand the inhabitants thereof , and for the
protection of propertytherein. However, it is only valid unless it contravenes thefundamental law of the Philippine
Islands, or an Act of the PhilippineLegislature, or unless it is against public policy, or isunreasonable, oppressive, partial,
discriminating, or in derogationof common right
. A municipal corporation, therefore, cannot prohibit the operation of nightclubs. Nightclubs may be regulated but
not prevented fromcarrying on their business. RA 938, as originally enacted,grantedmunicipalitiesthe power to
regulate the establishment,maintenance and operation of nightclubs and the like. While it is truethat on 5/21/54,
the law was amended by RA 979 w/c purported to givemunicipalities the power not only to regulate but likewise to
prohibit theoperation of nightclubs, the fact is that the title of the law remained thesame so that the power granted
to municipalities remains that of regulation, not prohibition. To construe the amendatory act as grantingmunicipal
corporations the power to prohibit the operation of nightclubswould be to construe it in a way that it
violatestheconstitutionalprovision that "every bill shall embrace only onesubject which shall be expressed in the
title thereof." Moreover, therecently-enacted LGC (BP 337) speaks simply of the power to regulatethe
establishment, and operation of billiard pools, theatricalperformances, circuses and other forms of
entertainment.Certiorari granted.
120 SCRA 568 (1983)
VELASCO VS. VILLEGAS
FACTS:
Ordinance No. 4964 was enacted for a two-fold purpose. (1) To enablethe City of Manila to collect a fee for
operating massage clinic separately from those operating barber shops and (2) To preventimmorality which might
probably arise from the construction of separate rooms. However, petitioner argues that such ordinanceamounts to
a deprivation of property of petitioners-appellants of their means of livelihood without due process of law.
ISSUE:
WON the ordinance was unconstitutional.
HELD:
Considering the two-fold purpose of the ordinance, it is clear that suchlaw is a police power measure. This Court
has been most liberal insustaining ordinances based on the general welfare clause.WHEREFORE, the appealed order
of the lower court is affirmed.
234 SCRA 255 (1994)
MAGTAJAS VS. PRYCE PROPERTIES
FACTS:
On 1992, PAGCOR decided to expand its operation in Cagayande Oro City and to this end leased a portion of a
buildingbelonging to Pryce Properties. Upon announcement of theopening of the casino, several organization in the
said area objected, including Cagayan de Oros sangguniang panglungsod who later enacted Ordinance no. 3353.
Such ordinance wasentitled, AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ISSUANCE OFBUSINESS PERMIT AND CANCELLING
EXISTING BUSINESSPERMIT TO ANY ESTABLISHMENT FOR THE USING
and ALLOWING TO BE USED ITS PREMISES OR PORTIONTHEREOF FOR THE OPERATION OF CASINO. Less than
amonth from the passage of such ordinance, the sangguniangpanglusod of Cagayan de Oro adopted a sterner
ordinance no.3375-93 which was an AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THEOPERATION OF CASINO AND PROVIDING
PENALTY FORVIOLATION THEREFORE.

Pryce assailed the ordinances before the Court of Appeals, whereit was joined by PAGCOR as intervener and
supplementalpetitioner. Their challenge succeeded. On March 31, 1993, theCourt of Appeals declared the
ordinances invalid and issued thewrit prayed for to prohibit their enforcement.
Reconsideration of this decision was denied on July 13, 1993.Cagayan de Oro Cityand its mayor are now before the
court in this petition for review.
ISSUE/S:
1.WON the ordinances enacted by the sangguniang panglusod of Cagayan de Oro are valid.
2.WON the Local Government Code should prevail over and abovean existing statute (in this case PD1869)
HELD:
First, it should be noted that the morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue. Gambling is not illegal per se .
While it isgenerally considered inimical to the interests of the people, thereis nothing in the Constitution
categorically proscribing or penalizing gambling or, for that matter, even mentioning it at all.
Inthe exercise of its own discretion, the legislature may prohibitgambling altogether or allow it without limitation or
it may prohibitsome forms of gambling and allow others for whatever reasons itmay consider sufficient.
Although it is true that local government units are authorized toprevent or suppress, among others, "gambling and
other Wprohibited games of chance, it should be understood that,obviously, this provision excludes games of
chance which are notprohibited but are in fact permitted by law.
The apparent flaw inthe ordinances in question is that they contravene P.D. 1869 andthe public policy embodied
therein insofar as they preventPAGCOR from exercising the power conferred on it to operate acasino in Cagayan de
Oro City.On the assumption of a conflict between P.D. 1869 and the Code,the proper action is not to uphold one
and annul the other but togive effect to both by harmonizing them if possible.This ispossible in the case before us.
The proper resolution of theproblem at hand is to hold that under the Local GovernmentCode, local government
units may (and indeed must) prevent andsuppress all kinds of gambling within their territories except onlythose
allowed by statutes like P.D. 1869.
Lastly,
The rationale of the requirement that the ordinancesshould not contravene a statute is obvious.
Municipalgovernments are only agents of the national government. Localcouncils exercise only delegated legislative
powers conferred onthem by Congress as the national lawmaking body. The delegatecannot be superior to the
principal or exercise powers higher thanthose of the latter. It is a heresy to suggest that the localgovernment units
can undo the acts of Congress, from which theyhave derived their power in the first place, and negate by
mereordinance the mandate of the statute.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the challengeddecision of the respondent Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED,
withcosts against the petitioners.
GR No. 110249, August 27, 1997
ALFREDOI TANO vs. GOV. SALVADOR P. SOCRATES
FACTS:
15 Dec 1992: Sangguniang Panlungsod of Puerto Princesa Cityenacted Ordinance No. 15-92 which banned the
shipment of alllive fish and lobster outside the city from 1993-1998.
22 Jan 1993: Acting Mayor Lucero issued Office Order No. 23. Itauthorized officers to inspect cargoes containing
live fish andlobster that are shipped out of Puerto Princesa. The purpose of
the inspection is to check if the shipper had the required mayors permit issued by their office.
19 February 1993: Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawanenacted Resolution No. 33 which prohibited the
catching,gathering, possession, etc. of live marine coral dwelling aquaticorganisms for a period of 5 yrs.
he respondents implemented the ordinances, depriving all thefishermen, marine merchants, and shippers of the
entire provinceof their only means of livelihood.
The petitioners directly invoked the original jurisdiction of the SCarguing as follows:1. It deprived them of due
process of law, their livelihood, andunduly restricted them from the practice of their trade,violating Section 2,
Article XII and Sections 2 and 7 of the1987 Constitution.2. Office Order No. 23 contained no regulation nor
condition under which the Mayors permit could be granted or denied;
ie. Mayor had absolute authority in issuing the permit.3. The Ordinance took away the right of the fishermen to
earntheir livelihood in lawful ways. The respondents contended that it was a valid exercise of the
Provincial Governments power under the general welfare clause

(Sec. 16 of the LGC). The Ordinance, they argued, only coveredlive marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms and
excluded thosenot dwelling in the coral reefs and that it shall only last for 5 years.The court must also distinguish
between catching live fish andselling it live and those who have no intention at all of selling it live.
ISSUE:
WON the questioned ordinances enacted in the exercise of powers under the LGC relative to the protection and
preservation of the environment are a valid exercise of the police power of a municipal corporation.
HELD:
Yes. Laws enjoy the presumption of constitutionality.
Section 5 (c) of the LGC explicitly mandates that the general welfare provisions of the LGC shall be liberally
interpreted to give more powers to the LGUs in accelerating economic developmentand upgrading the quality of life
for the people of the community.
The LGC grants municipalities the power to grant fisheryprivileges in municipal waters and to impose rentals, fees,
or charges for their use.
The sanggunians are directed to enact ordinances for the general welfare of the LGU and its inhabitants.

The centerpiece of the LGC is decentralization. Indispensable tothis is devolution. One of these powers is the
enforcement of fishery laws in municipal waters including the conservation of
mangroves. The term municipal waters includes not only
streams, lakes, and tidal waters within the municipality, but alsomarine waters included between two lines drawn
perpendicularlyto the general coastline from points where the boundary lines of the municipality or city touch the
sea at low tide and a third lineparallel with the general coastline and 15 km from it (Sec. 131 [r]LGC).
Two principal objectives of the Ordinances:
1.Establish a closed season for the species of fish covered
therein for 5 years (This falls within the devolved power toenforce fishery laws in municipal waters);
2. Protect the coral in the marine waters of the city and theprovince from further destruction due to illegal
fishingactivities (this falls within the general welfare clause of theLGC and the express mandate there to cities and
provincesto protect the environment and impose appropriate penaltiesfor acts which harm the environment.
certain types of vehicles is but one of these. None of these rulesviolates reason. The purpose of these rules and the
logic behindthem are quite evident. A toll way is not an ordinary road. Thespecial purpose for which a toll way is
constructed necessitatesthe imposition of guidelines in the manner of its use andoperation. Inevitably, such rules
will restrict certain rights. But themere fact that certain rights are restricted does not invalidate therules.
The DPWH, through the Solicitor General, maintains that the tollways were not designed to accommodate
motorcycles and thattheir presence in the toll ways will compromise safety and trafficconsiderations. The DPWH
points out that the same study thepetitioners rely on cites that the inability of other drivers to detectmotorcycles is
the predominant cause of accidents. Arguably,prohibiting the use of motorcycles in toll ways may not be the"best"
measure to ensure the safety and comfort of those who plythe toll ways.
However, the means by which the government chooses to act isnot judged in terms of what is "best," rather, on
simply whether the act is reasonable. The validity of a police power measuredoes not depend upon the absolute
assurance that the purposedesired can in fact be probably fully accomplished, or upon thecertainty that it will best
serve the purpose intended. Reason, notscientific exactitude, is the measure of the validity of thegovernmental
regulation. Arguments based on what is "best" arearguments reserved for the L
egislatures discussion. Judicial
intervention in such matters will only be warranted if the assailedregulation is patently whimsical. We do not find
the situation inthis case to be so. AO 1 is not oppressive. Petitioners are not being deprived of their right to use the
limited access facility. They are merely beingrequired, just like the rest of the public, to adhere to the rules on
how to use the facility. AO 1 does not infringe upon petitioners
right to travel but merely bars motorcycles, bicycles, tricycles,pedicabs, and any non-motorized vehicles as the
mode of traveling along limited access highways. Several cheap,accessible and practical alternative modes of
transport are opento petitioners. There is nothing oppressive in being required totak
e a bus or drive a car instead of ones scooter, bicycle, calesa ,or motorcycle upon using a toll way.

Petitioners reliance on the studies they gathered is misplaced. Police power does not rely upon the existence of
definitive studiesto support its use. Indeed, no requirement exists that the exerciseof police power must first be
conclusively justified by research. The yardstick has always been simply whether the governments
act is reasonable and not oppressive. The use of "reason" in thissense is simply meant to guard against arbitrary
and capriciousgovernment action. Scientific certainty and conclusiveness,though desirable, may not be demanded
in every situation.Otherwise, no government will be able to act in situationsdemanding the exercise of its residual
powers because it will betied up conducting studies.

A police power measure may be assailed upon proof that it undulyviolates constitutional limitations like due process
and equal protection of the law. Petitioners attempt to seek redress from themotorcycle ban under the aegis of
equal protection must fail. Petitioners contention that AO 1 unreasonably singles out
motorcycles is specious. To begin with, classification by itself isnot prohibited.
A classification can only be assailed if it is deemed invidious, thatis, it is not based on real or substantial
differences. As explainedby Chief Justice Fernando in Bautista v. Juinio
:x x x To assure that the general welfare be promoted, which isthe end of law, a regulatory measure may cut into
the rights toliberty and property. Those adversely affected may under suchcircumstances invoked the equal
protection clause only if theycan show that the governmental act assailed, far from beinginspired by the attainment
of the common weal was promptedby the spirit of hostility, or at the very least, discrimination thatfinds no support
in reason. It suffices then that the laws operateequally and uniformly on all persons under similar circumstances or
that all persons must be treated in the samemanner, the conditions not being different, both in theprivileges
conferred and the liabilities imposed. Favoritism andundue preference cannot be allowed. For the principle is
thatequal protection and security shall be given to every personunder circumstances, which if not identical is
analogous. If lawbe looked upon in terms of burden or charges, those that fallwithin a class should be treated in
the same fashion, whatever restrictions cast on some in the group equally binding the rest.

The real and substantial differences exist between a motorcycleand other forms of transport sufficient to justify its
classificationamong those prohibited from plying the toll ways. Amongst alltypes of motorized transport, it is
obvious, even to a child, that amotorcycle is quite different from a car, a bus or a truck. The mostobvious and
troubling difference would be that a two-wheeledvehicle is less stable and more easily overturned than a fourwheeled vehicle. A classification based on practical convenienceand common knowledge is not unconstitutional
simply because itmay lack purely theoretical or scientific uniformity.

Petitioners complain that the prohibition on the use of motorcyclesin toll ways unduly deprive them of their right to
travel.

A toll way is not an ordinary road. As a facility designed topromote the fastest access to certain destinations, its
use,operation, and maintenance require close regulation. Publicinterest and safety require the imposition of certain
restrictions ontoll ways that do not apply to ordinary roads. As a special kind of road, it is but reasonable that not
all forms of transport could useit.

The right to travel does not mean the right to choose any vehiclein traversing a toll way. The right to travel refers
to the right tomove from one place to another. Petitioners can traverse the tollway any time they choose using
private or public four-wheeledvehicles. Petitioners are not denied the right to move from Point Ato Point B along
the toll way. Petitioners are free to access the tollway, much as the rest of the public can. The mode by
whichpetitioners wish to travel pertains to the manner of using the tollway, a subject that can be validly limited by
regulation.

Petitioners themselves admit that alternative routes are availableto them. Their complaint is that these routes are
not the safestand most convenient. Even if their claim is true, it hardly qualifiesas an undue curtailment of their
freedom of movement and travel.The right to travel does not entitle a person to the best form of transport or to the
most convenient route to his destination. Theobstructions found in normal streets, which petitioners complain
of (i.e., potholes, manholes, construction barriers, etc.), are notsuffered by them alone. 11/30/09

Finally, petitioners assert that their possession of a drivers

license from the Land Transportation Office (LTO) and the factthat their vehicles are registered with that office
entitle them touse all kinds of roads in the country. Again, petitioners aremistaken. There exists no absolute right
to drive. On the contrary,this
privilege
, is heavily regulated. Only a qualified group isallowed to drive motor vehicles: those who pass the tests
administered by the LTO. A drivers license issued by the LTO
merely allows one to drive a particular mode of transport. It is nota license to drive or operate any form of
transportation on anytype of road. Vehicle registration in the LTO on the other handmerely signifies the
roadworthiness of a vehicle. This does notpreclude the government from prescribing which roads areaccessible to
certain vehicles.

Therefore, the petition was partly granted. DOs 74, 215 and 123of the DPWH and the Revised Rules and
Regulations on Limited Access Facilities of the Toll Regulatory Board were declared
void
AO 1 of the DOTC valid.

124 SCRA 494, 1983ANGLO-FIL TRADING VS. LAZAROFACTS:

23 contractors, among them the Philippine Integrated Port Services,Inc. (PIPSI), Anglo-Fil Trading Corporation,
Aduana Stevedoring
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IIRM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTSUNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS / ROOM 410
(2009-2010)Marianne Cabacungan11
Corporation, Anda Stevedoring Corporation, Ben Paz Port Service,Inc., Manila Stevedoring and Arrastre Services,
Inc. (members of thePhilippine Association of Stevedoring Operators and Contractors, Inc.[PASOC]), competed at
the South Harbor for the performance of stevedoring work. The licenses of these contractors had long expiredwhen
the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA, created by PresidentialDecree 505 [11 July 1974], later superseded by
Presidential Decree857 [23 December 197]5) took over the control and management of ports but they continued to
operate afterwards on the strength of temporary permits and hold-over authorities issued by PPA. On 4 May1976,
the Board of Directors of PPA passed Resolution 10, approvingand adopting a set of policies on Port Administration,
Management and Operation. The PPA adopted as its own the Bureau of Customs policy of placing on only one
organization the responsibility for the operationof arrastre and stevedoring services in one port. On 11 April
1980,President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Letter of Instruction 1005-Awhich, among other things, directed PPA to
expeditiously evaluate allrecognized cargo handling contractors and port-related serviceoperators and to determine
the qualified contractor or operator in order to ensure effective utilization of port facilities, etc. This was followed by
the Presidents memorandum to Col. Eustaquio S. Baclig Jr . dated 18 April 1980, directing submission
of a report on the integration of thestevedoring operations in Manila South Harbor and emphasizing theneed for
such integration as well as the strengthening of the PPA inorder to remedy the problems therein. On 28 April 1980,
the committeesubmitted its report recommending the award of an exclusive contractfor stevedoring services in the
South Harbor to Ocean TerminalServices, Inc. (OTSI) after finding it the best qualified among theexisting
contractors. The PPA submitted the committee report to thePresident, who, on 24 May 1980, approved the
recommendation toaward an exclusive management contract to OTSI. On 27 June 1980,PPA and OTSI entered into
a management contract which provided,among others, for a 5-year exclusive operation by OTSI of
stevedoringservices in the South Harbor, renewable for another 5 years. TheBoard of Directors of the PPA gave its
approval on 27 June 1980. On23 July 1980, PIPSI instituted an action before the Court of FirstInstance (CFI) of
Manila against PPA and OTSI for the nullification of the contract between the two, the annulment of the 10% of
grossstevedoring revenue being collected by PPA, and injunction withpreliminary injunction. An ex-parte restraining
order was issued. On 21 August 1980. with leave of court, Anglo-Fil, et al., filed their complaintin intervention. The
motion was granted and on 22 August 1980, theCFI issued another ex-parte restraining order in the case to
include Anglo-Fil et. al., under the benefits of such order. On 30 August 1980,the PPA filed an urgent motion to lift
the restraining orders in view of the long delay in the resolution of the injunction incident and the
countervailing public interest involved. On 1 September 1980, the CFI dissolved, lifted and set aside the
restraining orders without prejudiceto the Courts resolution on the propriety of issuing the writ of
preliminary injunction prayed for. On 5 September 1980, PPA sent aletter to the General Manager of PIPSI
informing him that due to the
lifting of the temporary restraining order, it was withdrawing PIPSIs
holdover authority to operate or provide stevedoring services at SouthHarbor effective 7 September 1980. AngloFil, et al., and PIPSI,therefore, filed the petitions for certiorari with preliminary injunctionalleging that the lifting of
the restraining orders ex-parte by the CFI wasclearly effected with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
of jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
Whether the issuance of a Permit to Operate (PTO) dependedon the sound discretion, and on the policies, rules and
regulationsimplemented by the latter, or whether the non-issuance thereof is anunlawful deprivation of
property rights.
HELD:
From the viewpoint of procedure, there was no grave abuse of discretion or want of jurisdiction when the CFI judge
lifted ex-parte thetemporary restraining order he had earlier issued also ex-parte.Subsequent to the issuance of the
questioned order, the CFI heard theparties on the application for a writ of preliminary injunction and, after
hearing the parties evidence and arguments, denied the application for
the writ. It is also not grave abuse of discretion when a court dissolvesex-parte abuse of discretion when a court
dissolves ex-parte arestraining order also issued ex-parte. Further, the contention that dueprocess was violated
resulting to a confiscatory effect on privateproperty is likewise without merit. In the first place, Anglo-Fil, et. al.
were operating merely on hold over permits, which were based onPPA Memorandum Order 1 (19 January
1977). All hold-over permitswere by nature temporary and subject to subsequent policy guidelinesas may be
implemented by PPA. Such should have served as sufficient notice that, at any time, PIPSIs and Anglo -Fil et.al.s
authorities may be terminated. Whether PIPSI, and Anglo-Fil, et. al.would be issued a Permit to Operate (PTO)
depended on the sounddiscretion of PPA and on the policies, rules and regulations that thelatter may implement in
accordance with the statutory grant of power.The latter, therefore, cannot be said to have been deprived of
propertywithout due process because, in this respect, what was given themwas not a property right but a mere
privilege and they should havetaken cognizance of the fact that since they have no vested right tooperate in the
South Harbor, their permits can be withdrawn anytimethe public welfare deems it best to do so. Thus, unless the

case justifies it, the judiciary will not interfere in purely administrativematters. Such discretionary power vested in
the proper administrativebody, in the absence of arbitrariness and grave abuse so as to gobeyond the statutory
authority, is not subject to the contrary judgmentor control of others. In general, courts have no supervisory power
over the proceedings and actions of the administrative departments of thegovernment. This is particularly true with
respect to acts involving theexercise of judgment or discretion, and to findings of fact.
G.R. NO. 145742 JULY 14, 2005
PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY VS. CIPRES STEVEDORINGAND ARRASTRE INC. (CISAI)
FACTS:
Petitioner PPA is a govt. entity created by virtue of P.D. no. 857and is tasked to implement an integrated program
for theplanning, development, financing, and operation of ports and portdistricts in the country. Respondent CISAI
is a domesticcorporation primarily engaged in stevedoring, arrastre, andporterage business, including cargo
handling and hauling servicesin Negros Oriental and Dumaguete and Bais. Since 1976, CISAIhad been granted
permits to operate the cargo handlingoperations in Dumaguete. In 1991, PPA awarded an 8-year contract to CISAI
to pursue its business endeavor. Upon this time,PPA Administrative Order No. 03-90 took effect providing for
theawarding of cargo handling services through public bidding.
Following the expiration of its contract, CISAI was able tocontinue with its business by virtue of hold-over permits
given byPPA. During this time, another administrative order PPA AO No.03-2000 took effect which amended PPA AO
no. 03-90 expresslyprovided that all contract for cargo handling services of morethan 3 years shall be awarded
through public bidding. CISAIinitiated an action for specific performance, injunction withapplication for preliminary
mandatory injunction, contending that
PPAs action was I derogation of their vested right over the
operation of cargo handling enterprise. The lower court granted
CISAIs prayer for a temporary restraining order. PPA filed a
motion for reconsideration which was granted by the trial courtsetting aside the injunctive writ. CISAI filed a
petition for certioraribefore the CA, and the CA granted the petition, ordering PPA todesist from conducting the
scheduled public bidding for cargohandling operations in the port of Dumaguete. Thus, this instantappeal.
ISSUE:
WON CISAI have acquired a vested right to the cargo handlingoperations at the Dumaguete Port.
HELD:
Supreme Court held that CISAI have no vested rights to the cargo handling operations because the continuance of
their businesswas due to hold over permits given by PPA, and such may berevoked anytime by the granting
authority. As held in the case of Anglo-Fil Trading Corporation vs. Lazaro, hold over permits aremerely temporary
subject to the policy and guidelines as may beimplemented by the authority granting it. Stevedoring services are
imbued with public interest and subject to the states police
power, therefore, whatever proprietary right the CISAI may haveacquired must necessarily give way to valid
exercise of policepower. PPA, being created for the purpose of promoting thegrowth of regional port bodies, it is
empowered to make portregulations. With this mandate, the decision to bid out cargoholding services is properly
within the province and discretion of
PPA. As for CISAIs claim that PPA AO No. 03
-2000 violated theconstitutional provision of non-impairment of contract, suffice it tostate that all contracts are
subject to the overriding demands,needs, interests of the greater number as the State maydetermine in the
legitimate exercise of its police power.Wherefore, Petition is granted.
G.R. No. 157036 June 9, 2004
FRANCISCO CHAVEZ VS. HON. ALBERTO ROMULO ASEXECUTIVE SECRETARY, PNP CHIEF HERMOGENES EBDANE
FACTS:
Chavez is a gun- owner who filed a petition for prohibition and injunction seeking to enjoin the implementation of
the Guidelines in the Implementation of the Ban on the Carying of Firearms Outside of Residence issued by
PNP Chief Hermogenes Ebdane, Jr. In January 2003, Pres. Arroyo delivered a speechbefore the members of the PNP
stressing the need for anationwide gun ban in all public places to avert the rising crimeincidents. She directed PNP
Chief Ebdane to suspend theissuance of permits to carry firearms outside of residence(PTCFOR). Thus, Chief
Ebdane issued the assailed Guidelines.Chavez contends that such guidelines was a derogation of hisconstitutional
right to life and to protect life as he, being a law-abiding licensed gun-owner is the only class subject to
theimplementation while leaving the law-breakers (kidnappers, MILF,hold-uppers, robbers etc.) untouched.
Petitioner also averred thatownership and carrying of firearms are constitutionally protectedproperty rights which
cannot be taken away without due processof law.

ISSUES:
1. WON the citizens right to bear arms is a constitutional right
2. WON the revocation of the PTCFOR pursuant to the assailedGuidelines is a violation of right to property
3. WON the issuance of said Guidelines is a valid exercise of Policepower
HELD:
1. SC ruled that nowhere fond in our Constitution is the provision onbearing arms as a constitutional right. The
right to bear arms,then, is a mere statutory privilege unlike in the AmericanConstitution which was the law invoked
by petitioner. Right tobear arms is a mere statutory creation as was observed by thelaws passed to regulate the
use, acquisition, transfer, importationof firearms; it cannot be considered an inalienable or absoluteright.
2. The bulk of jurisprudence is that a license authorizing a person toenjoy a certain privilege is neither a property
nor property right. Alicense is merely a privilege to do what otherwise would beunlawful, and is not a contract
between the granting authority andthe person to whom it is granted; neither is it property right nor does it create a
vested right. Such license may be revokedanytime when the authority deems it fit to do so, and suchrevocation
does not deprive the holder of any property, or immunity.
3. The test to determine the validity of police measure , thus:

The interests of the public generally, as distinguished fromthose of a particular class, require the exercise of the
policepower; and

The means employed are reasonably necessary for theaccomplishment of the purpose and not unduly
oppressiveupon individuals. It is apparent from the assailed Guidelinesthat the basis for its issuance was the need
for peace andorder in the society. Owing to the proliferation of crimes,particularly those committed by NPA, which
tends to disturbthe peace of the community, Pres. Arroyo deemed it best toimpose a nationwide gun ban.
Undeniably, the motivatingfactor in the issuance of guidelines is the interest of thepublic in general. Such means of
revocation is, thus, a validexercise of police power.

Petition is hereby dismissed.