Habeas Corpus is the Remedy for a

Person Deprived of Liberty Due to

Mistaken Identity (Sabilo vs
Warden, 2015)
Datukan Malang Salibo vs Warden, Quezon City Jail
Annex
Case Digest GR 197597 April 8 2015
Full Text
Facts:
Butukan S. Malang, one of the accused in the Maguindanao massacre, had a pending
warrant of arrest issued by the trial court in People vs Ampatuan Jr. et. al. When
Datukan Malang Salibo learned that the police officers of Datu Hofer Police Station in
Maguindanao suspected him to be Butukan S. Malang, he presented himself to clear his
name. Salibo presented to the police pertinent portions of his passport, boarding
passes and other documents tending to prove that a certain Datukan Malang Salibo was
in Saudi Arabia when the massacre happened. The authorities, however, apprehended
and detained him. He questioned the legality of his detention via Urgent Petition for
Habeas Corpus before the CA, maintaining that he is not the accused Batukan S.
Malang. The CA issued the writ, making it returnable to the judge of RTC Taguig. After
hearing of the Return, the trial court granted Salibos petition and ordered his
immediate release from detention.
On appeal by the Warden, the CA reversed the RTC ruling. The CA held that even
assuming Salibo was not the Batukan S. Malang named in the Alias Warrant of Arrest,
orderly course of trial must be pursued and the usual remedies exhausted before the
writ of habeas corpus may be invoked. Salibos proper remedy, according to the CA,
should have been a motion to quash information and/or warrant of arrest.
On the other hand, Salibo believes that the Warden erred in appealing the RTC decision
before the CA. Salibo argued that although the CA delegated to the RTC the authority to
hear the Wardens Return, the RTCs ruling should be deemed as the CA ruling, and
hence, it should have been appealed directly before the SC.
Hide
Issue 1: W/N Salibo properly availed the remedy of a petition for writ of habeas corpus

Yes. Habeas corpus is the remedy for a person deprived of liberty due to mistaken
identity. In such cases, the person is not under any lawful process and is continuously
being illegally detained.
First, it was Butukan S. Malang, not Salibo, who was charged and accused in the
Information and Alias Warrant of Arrest issued in the case of People vs Ampatuan. Based
on the evidences presented, Salibo sufficiently established that he could not have been
Butukan S. Malang. Therefore, Salibo was not arrested by virtue of any warrant charging
him of an offense, nor restrained under a lawful process or an order of a court. Second,
Salibo was not validly arrested without a warrant. When he was in the presence of
authorities, he was neither committing nor attempting to commit an offense, and the
police officers had no personal knowledge of any offense that he might have committed.
Salibo was also not an escape prisoner.
The police officers have deprived him of his liberty without due process of law.
Therefore, Salibo correctly availed himself of a Petition for Habeas Corpus.
Hide
Issue 2: W/N a motion to quash information and/or warrant of arrest is the proper
remedy in cases where a person with a mistaken identity is detained
No, the CAs contention is not correct. Salibos proper remedy is not a Motion to Quash
Information and/or Warrant of Arrest. None of the grounds for filing a Motion to Quash
Information apply to him. Even if petitioner Salibo filed a Motion to Quash, the defect
he alleged could not have been cured by mere amendment of the Information and/or
Warrant of Arrest. Changing the name of the accused appearing in the Information
and/or Warrant of Arrest from Butukan S. Malang to Datukan Malang Salibo will not
cure the lack of preliminary investigation in this case. Likewise, a motion for
reinvestigation will not cure the defect of lack of preliminary investigation.
Hide
Issue 3: W/N the Warden correctly appealed the RTC ruling on the Return before the CA
Yes. An application for a writ of habeas corpus may be made through a petition filed
before CA or any of its members, the CA or any of its members in instances authorized
by law, or the RTC or any of its presiding judges. The court or judge grants the writ and
requires the officer or person having custody of the person allegedly restrained of
liberty to file a return of the writ. A hearing on the return of the writ is then conducted.
The return of the writ may be heard by a court apart from that which issued the writ.
Should the court issuing the writ designate a lower court to which the writ is made
returnable, the lower court shall proceed to decide the petition of habeas corpus. By
virtue of the designation, the lower court acquires the power and authority to determine
the merits of the petition for habeas corpus. Therefore, the decision on the petition is a

decision appealable to the court that has appellate jurisdiction over decisions of the
lower court.

Notes:
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Distinction Between the Writ vs the Final Decision on Petition for the Issuance of the Writ
The writ of habeas corpus is different from the final decision on the petition for the
issuance of the writ. It is the writ that commands the production of the body of the
person allegedly restrained of his or her liberty. On the other hand, it is in the final
decision where a court determines the legality of the restraint.
Between the issuance of the writ and the final decision on the petition for its issuance, it
is the issuance of the writ that is essential. The issuance of the writ sets in motion the
speedy judicial inquiry on the legality of any deprivation of liberty. Courts shall liberally
issue writs of habeas corpus even if the petition for its issuance on its face is devoid of
merit. Although the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus may be suspended in cases
of invasion, rebellion, or when the public safety requires it, the writ itself may not be
suspended. ##

Habeas Corpus is the Only Means of

Giving Retroactive Effect to a Decision
Favorable to the Accused (Gumabon vs
Dir, 1971)

Gumabon vs Director of Bureau of Prisons

Case Digest GR L30026 Jan 30 1971
Full Text
Facts:

Gumabon, Bagolbagol, Agapito, Padua and Palmares were convicted of the complex
crime of rebellion with multiple murder, robbery, arson, and kidnapping. While serving
their sentences of reclusion perpetua, the SC promulgated People vs Hernandezin 1956,
ruling that there could be no complex crime of rebellion with murder, etc, as it is not
warranted under Article 134 of the RPC. Thus, Gumabon et. al invoked the Hernandez
ruling via a petition for habeas corpus. They prayed that they be released from
incarcerations based on equal protection of law and on the doctrine that judicial
decisions favoring the accused must apply retroactively.
Issue: W/N a petition for habeas corpus is the available remedy in this case
Yes. A petition for habeas corpus is the only means of benefiting the accused by the
retroactive character of a favorable decision.
Citing an American case, the Court said that the writ of habeas corpus is the
fundamental instrument for safeguarding individual freedom against arbitrary and
lawless state action. The scope and flexibility of the writ, its capacity to reach all
manner of illegal detention, its ability to cut through barriers of form and procedural
mazes have always been emphasized and jealously guarded by courts and
lawmakers. The very nature of the writ demands that it be administered with the
initiative and flexibility essential to insure that miscarriages of justice within its reach
are surfaced and corrected. ##

Dismissal of Small Claims Cases

for Lack of Cause of Action Are
Necessarily With Prejudice
(Lourdes vs Binaro, 2014)

Lourdes Suites vs Binaro

Case Digest GR 2047129 Aug 6 2014
Full Text
Facts:

Lourdes Suites filed before the MeTC a small-claims complaint against Binaro for
nonpayment of penalty charges on its rented rooms. Binaro responded with a
counterclaim. Lourdes Suites impugned the validity of Binaros pleading stating that it
did not comply with the form of an Answer as required in Rule 11, Sec 1 of the Rules of
Court.
The MeTC, after evaluating the evidence, dismissed the complaint with prejudice for
lack of cause of action. Lourdes Suites filed a certiorari before the RTC arguing that lack
of cause of action is not a valid ground for dismissal of cases, much more a dismissal
with prejudice. It contends that a complaint even after the presentation of evidence
cannot be dismissed on ground of lack of cause of action because it is not expressly
provided for under the Rules on Small Claims Cases and the Rules of Civil Procedure,
and that if there was a failure to prove a cause of action the only available remedy
would be a demurrer filed by the defendant.
The RTC ruled that there was no grave of abuse of discretion on the part of the MeTC.
The MR was also denied. Hence, Lourdes Suites brought the issue to the SC via petition
for review under Rule 45.
Issue: W/N dismissal on the ground of lack of cause of action is proper under the Rules
of Court
Yes. The courts are not precluded from dismissing a case for lack of cause of action
such as insufficiency of evidence. In civil cases, courts must determine if the plaintiff
was able to prove his case by a preponderance of evidence.
The basis of the MeTC in dismissing the complaint for lack of cause of action is the
failure of plaintiff to preponderantly establish its claim by clear and convincing
evidence. Hence, MeTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed the
Complaint for lack of cause of action, as it referred to the evidence presented and not to
the allegations in the Complaint.
The dismissal of the complaint with prejudice is likewise not an exercise of wanton or
palpable discretion. This case is an action for small claims where decisions are rendered
final and unappealable; hence, a decision dismissing it is necessarily with prejudice. ##
Notes
Hide
Failure to State a Cause of Action vs Lack of Cause of Action (Macaslang vs Zamora,
2011)

Failure to state a cause of action and lack of cause of action are really different from
each other. On the one hand, failure to state a cause of action refers to the insufficiency
of the pleading, and is a ground for dismissal under Rule 16 of the Rules of Court. On
the other hand, lack of cause of action refers to a situation where the evidence does not
prove the cause of action alleged in the pleading. Justice Regalado, a recognized
commentator on remedial law, has explained the distinction:
What is contemplated, therefore, is a failure to state a cause of action which is provided
in Sec. 1(g) of Rule 16. This is a matter of insufficiency of the pleading. Sec. 5 of Rule
10, which was also included as the last mode for raising the issue to the court, refers to
the situation where the evidence does not prove a cause of action. This is, therefore, a
matter of insufficiency of evidence.
The remedy in the failure to state a cause of action is to move for dismissal of the
pleading, while the remedy in the lack of cause of action is to demur to the evidence,
hence reference to Sec. 5 of Rule 10 has been eliminated in this section. The procedure
would consequently be to require the pleading to state a cause of action, by timely
objection to its deficiency; or, at the trial, to file a demurrer to evidence, if such motion
is warranted.
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Rule 16 Motion to Dismiss
Section 1. Grounds. Within the time for but before filing the answer to the
complaint or pleading asserting a claim, a motion to dismiss may be made on any of the
following grounds:
(a) That the court has no jurisdiction over the person of the defending party;
(b) That the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim;
(c) That venue is improperly laid;
(d) That the plaintiff has no legal capacity to sue;
(e) That there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause;
(f) That the cause of action is barred by a prior judgment or by the statute of
limitations;
(g) That the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action;
(h) That the claim or demand set forth in the plaintiffs pleading has been paid, waived,
abandoned, or otherwise extinguished;
(i) That the claim on which the action is founded is enforceable under the provisions of
the statute of frauds; and
(j) That a condition precedent for filing the claim has not been complied with.
Hide

Rule 33 Demurrer to Evidence

Section 1. Demurrer to evidence. After the plaintiff has completed the
presentation of his evidence, the defendant may move for dismissal on the ground that
upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. If his motion is
denied he shall have the right to present evidence. If the motion is granted but on
appeal the order of dismissal is reversed he shall be deemed to have waived the right to
present evidence.
Full Text
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Use of Discovery Procedures is

Directed to The Sound Discretion
of Trial Courts (Dulay vs Dulay,
2005)
Dulay vs Dulay
Case Digest GR 158857 Nov 11 2005
Full Text
Facts:
Rodrigo is a naturalized American citizen. He has a nephew Pheger who immigrated to America and
stayed with him. Because of love, trust and affection for his nephew, he opened a trust account in the
Bank of Boston and named Pheger as trustee thereof. He found out later that Pheger emptied the
account and duped him, so he filed a complaint for recovery of his bank deposits with attachment
and damages. The case was filed in the Philippines. He also filed a petition for the issuance
of letters rogatory in order to get the depositions of several witnesses residing abroad.
The American court however brushed the Letters aside, so the deposition was taken instead before
a notary public in New York. When Rodrigo submitted the deposition to the court, the other party
objected to its admissibility and moved for the dismissal of the complaint. The court however denied
the motion. The other party filed a certiorari imputing grave abuse of discretion on the trial court.
Issue: W/N the act of the court in allowing the deposition is proper
Yes. The use of discovery procedures is directed to the sound discretion of the trial courts, which, in
general, are given wide latitude in granting motions for discovery in order to enable the parties to
prepare for trial or otherwise to settle the controversy prior thereto.

While the letters rogatory issued by the trial court specifically directed the Clerk of Court of Boston to
take the depositions needed in the case, it became impossible to follow the directive since the Clerk
of Court of Boston merely brushed it aside and refused to cooperate. Respondent cannot be faulted
for the resultant delay brought about by this circumstance. Neither can the trial court be faulted for
allowing the admission of the depositions taken not in strict adherence to its original directive, nor for
directing the petitioner to have the depositions authenticated. Obviously, it was not within the trial
courts power, much less the respondents to force the Clerk of Court of Boston to have the deposition
taken before it. It would be illogical and unreasonable to expect respondent to comply with the letters
rogatory without the cooperation of the very institution or personality named in the letters rogatory
and requested to examine the witnesses. After all, while a court had the authority to entertain a
discovery request, it is not required to provide judicial assistance thereto. This reality was recognized
by the trial court when it ordered respondent to have the questioned depositions authenticated by the
Philippine consulate.
Indeed, refusing the allowance of the depositions in issue would be going directly against the
purpose of taking the depositions in the first place, that is, the disclosure of facts which are relevant
to the proceedings in court. ##
Notes
Hide
Commissions and Letters Rogatory
In our jurisdiction, depositions in foreign countries may be taken: (a) on notice before a
secretary of embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent
of the Republic of the Philippines; (b) before such person or officer as may be appointed
by commission or under letters rogatory; or (c) before any person authorized to
administer oaths as stipulated in writing by the parties. While letters rogatory are
requests to foreign tribunals, commissions are directives to officials of the issuing
jurisdiction.
Generally, a commission is an instrument issued by a court of justice, or other
competent tribunal, directed to a magistrate by his official designation or to an
individual by name, authorizing him to take the depositions of the witnesses named
therein, while a letter rogatory is a request to a foreign court to give its aid, backed by
its power, to secure desired information. Commissions are taken in accordance with the
rules laid down by the court issuing the commission, while in letters rogatory, the
methods of procedure are under the control of the foreign tribunal.
Leave of court is not required when the deposition is to be taken before a secretary of
embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice-consul or consular agent of the

Republic of the Philippines and the defendants answer has already been served.
However, if the deposition is to be taken in a foreign country where the Philippines has
no secretary of embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice-consul or consular
agent, it may be taken only before such person or officer as may be appointed by
commission or under letters rogatory.
Hide
Rule 23, Sec 11
Section 11. Persons before whom depositions may be taken in foreign
countries. In a foreign state or country, depositions may be taken (a) on notice before
a secretary of embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice-consul, or consular
agent of the Republic of the Philippines; (b) before such person or officer as may be
appointed by commission or under letters rogatory; or the person referred to in Section
14 hereof.
Hide
Rule 23, Sec 14
Section 14. Stipulations regarding taking of depositions. If the parties so
stipulate in writing, depositions may be taken before any person authorized to
administer oaths, at any time or place, in accordance with these Rules, and when so
taken may be used like other depositions.

Petition for Certiorari via Rule 65 is a

Wrong Remedy Against a Courts Final
and Appealable Order (Cajipe vs
People, 2014)

Cajipe vs People
Case Digest GR 203605 April 23 2014
Full Text
Criminal Procedure

Facts:
Before the DOJ, Lilian filed a complaint charging multiple murder against certain police
officers from the PNP-HPG and PNP-SAF who were involved in the police action that led
to the shooting of her husband and their daughter. After preliminary investigation, the
DOJ filed the Information before the RTC indicting all the police officers charged in the
complaint.
On the following day, the HPG group of accused police officers filed an omnibus motion
for judicial determination of probable cause with a prayer to hold in abeyance the
issuance of warrants for their arrest. The RTC issued warrants of arrest against the SAF
officers but dismissed the case against the HPG officers for lack of probable cause. Lilian
moved for reconsideration of the dismissal but it was denied.
For a period of 112 days after receipt of the order of dismissal by the public prosecutor,
the OSG via Rule 65 filed a petition for certiorari before the CA alleging grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the RTC. The CA granted the petition, ruling that the RTC
gravely abused its discretion and thus ordered the issuance of warrants of arrest against
the HPG officers.
Issue 1: W/N the CA is correct in granting the OSGs petition for certiorari via Rule 65
No. Considering that the RTC order of dismissal is final and appealable, the CA erred
when it granted the special civil action for certiorari filed by the OSG via Rule 65.
The RTC judge was within his powers to dismiss the case against petitioner HPG officers.
Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that the judge may
immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable
cause. The CA should have denied the Peoples petition that assails the correctness of
the order of dismissal since Section 1 of Rule 65 provides that such action is
available only when there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Section 1 of Rule 122 provides that an appeal may be taken in a criminal action from a
judgment or final order like the RTCs order dismissing the case against petitioner HPG
officers for lack of probable cause. It is a final order since it disposes of the case,
terminates the proceedings, and leaves the court with nothing further to do with respect
to the case against petitioner HPG officers. Of course, the People may refile the case if
new evidence adduced in another preliminary investigation will support the filing of a

new information against them. But that is another matter. For now, the CA clearly erred
in not denying the petition for being a wrong remedy.
Issue 2: Assuming the propriety of filing the special civil action for certiorari against the
RTCs order of dismissal, whether or not should the reckoning point of filing the action
be from the date the DOJ or the court give notice of the order of dismissal to the
OSG (The OSG based its contention on the well-established rule that only the OSG has
the authority to represent the People before the CA)
No. The contention of the OSG is not correct. There is no reason for the RTC to serve
copy of its judgments or final orders upon the OSG since the OSG does not enter its
appearance in criminal cases before the trial courts.
In case of permissible appeals from a final order in a criminal action, the public
prosecutor who appears as counsel for the People in such an action and on whom a
copy of the final order is thus served, may file a notice of appeal within the appropriate
time since it is a notice addressed to the RTC and not to the CA. Only the OSG, however,
may pursue the appeal before the CA by filing the required appellants brief or withdraw
the same.
In special civil actions such as that taken by the OSG before the CA, the public
prosecutors duty, if he believes that a matter should be brought by special civil action
before an appellate court, is to promptly communicate the facts and his
recommendation to the OSG, advising it of the last day for filing such an action. There is
no reason the OSG cannot file the petition since the People is given 60 days from notice
to the public prosecutor within which to file such an action before the CA or the SC.
Since the OSG filed its petition for certiorari under Rule 65 on behalf of the People 112
days from receipt of the dismissal order by the city prosecutor of Paraaque, the
petition was filed out of time. The order of dismissal is thus beyond appellate review.
##
Notes:
Hide
Two Grounds on Which a Special Civil Action for Certiorari May Prosper:
1.

Grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part

of the body, court, tribunal or govt agency, and

2.

There is no other appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.

No Conflict of Interest is Involved in

Notarization as It is Different from
Representation (Malabed vs De la
Pena, 2016)
Full Text
Malabed vs Atty. De la Pena
Case Digest: AC 7594 Feb 9, 2016
Facts:
In an administrative case, Atty. De la Pena was charged with dishonesty and gross misconduct for
misrepresenting that he submitted a certificate to file action when there was none, conflict of interest
for notarizing a deed of donation executed by complainants family when eventually he is a counsel
for those opposing parties in a case where complainants family is involved, and for violation of
prohibition in employment in government office after his dismissal as a judge. In his pleadings
before the IBP, Atty. De la Pena called the counsel of the complainant a silahis by nature and
complexion and also accused complainant of cohabiting with a married man before the wife of that
married man died. The IBP found that Atty. De la Pena is guilty of dishonesty and gross
misconduct, and also noted the offensive language used by the lawyer. One-year suspension from
the practice of law was recommended. The Supreme Court increased it to 2-year suspension for
repeated gross misconduct.
Issue 1: W/N there is a conflict of interest involved in the notarization of documents by a lawyer
Held:
No. Notarization is different from representation. A notary public simply performs the notarial acts
authorized by the Rules on Notarial Practice, namely, acknowledgments, oaths and affirmations,

jurats, signature witnessings, and copy certifications. Legal representation, on the other hand, refers
to the act of assisting a party as counsel in a court action.
Issue 2: W/N the accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification on reemployment in any
government agencies and GOCCs also apply to temporary designations
Held:
Yes. The prohibition on reemployment does not distinguish between permanent and temporary
appointments. Hence, that his designation was only temporary does not absolve him from liability.
Further, furnishing a copy of his designation to the OBC and MCLE office does not in any way
extinguish his permanent disqualification from reemployment in a government office. Neither does
the fact that complainant in his previous administrative case did not object to his petition for judicial
clemency.
In view of his disqualification from reemployment in any government office, respondent should have
declined from accepting the designation and desisted from performing the functions of such
positions. Clearly, Atty. De la Pena knowingly defied the prohibition on reemployment in a public
office imposed upon him by the Court.
Issue 3: W/N the lawyers use of offensive language violates the ethics of the profession
Held:
Yes. For using improper language in his pleadings, respondent violated Rule 8.01 of Canon 8 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility which states that a lawyer shall not, in his professional
dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper. While respondent is
entitled and very much expected to defend himself with vigor, he must refrain from using improper
language in his pleadings. ##

Judge Whose Criminal Conviction

Still On Appeal May Be Suspended
and Disbarred (OCA vs Ruiz, 2016)

 Full Text
Office of the Court Administrator vs Judge Ruiz
Case Digest AM RTJ 13-2361 Feb 2 2016
Facts:
In April 29, 2013, Judge Ruiz was found guilty by the Sandiganbayan of graft and malversation of
public funds which he committed while still a city mayor. His MR and MNT being denied, he brought
his case to the SC for review, then went on leave of absence and applied for optional retirement,
which is supposedly to take effect on December 2013. (The SC however did not acted on his request
because of his standing criminal convictions.)
Meanwhile, the Office of the Court Administrator recommended to the SC that its report about Judge
Ruiz conviction in the Sandiganbayan be converted to a regular administrative complaint against him
for conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. Invoking the SCs inherent power of supervision
over judges, the OCA also recommended his preventive suspension.
In his comment dated Jan 2014, Judge Ruiz posited that the administrative complaint against him is
premature because when it was filed, his Sandiganbayan convictions were not yet final. He also
argued that there was no more need to suspend him from office because he should be considered
already retired from government service when he received the SC resolution dated Nov 20,
2013 suspending him without pay and other monetary benefits.
Issue 1: W/N the Court still has jurisdiction over Judge Ruiz after his separation from the service
Yes. That a judge has retired or has otherwise been separated from the service does not necessarily
divest the Court of its jurisdiction; the jurisdiction existing at the time of the filing of the administrative
complaint was not lost by the mere fact that the respondent had ceased in office during the
pendency of his case. Nor does separation from office render a pending administrative charge moot
and academic. The Court retains jurisdiction either to pronounce the respondent public official
innocent of the charges or declare him guilty thereof.
A contrary rule would be fraught with injustice and pregnant with dreadful and dangerous
implications. If innocent, respondent public official merits vindication of his name and integrity as he
leaves the government which he has served well and faithfully; if guilty, he deserves to receive the
corresponding censure and a penalty proper and imposable under the situation. (Gallos v Cordero,
1995)
Issue 2: W/N the SC can preventively suspend a judge while the administrative complaint is still
pending
Yes. The Court possesses the power to preventively suspend an administratively charged judge until
a final decision is reached, particularly when a serious charge is involved and a strong likelihood of

guilt exists. This power is inherent in the Courts power of administrative supervision over all courts
and their personnel as a measure to allow unhampered formal investigation. It is likewise a
preventive measure to shield the public from any further damage that the continued exercise by the
judge of the functions of his office may cause.
Here, the SC placed the respondent under preventive suspension because he is alleged to have
committed transgressions violations of RA 3019 and conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude
which are classified as serious under Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court.
Issue 3: W/N the acts committed by judges or justices prior to their appointment to the judiciary
may be a basis for disciplinary measures by the SC
Yes. It is immaterial that the respondent was not yet a member of the Judiciary when he allegedly
committed the acts imputed to him; judges may be disciplined for acts committed prior to their
appointment to the judiciary.
The Rules of Court itself recognizes this situation, as it provides for the immediate forwarding to the
Supreme Court for disposition and adjudication of charges against justices and judges before the
IBP, including those filed prior to their appointment to the judiciary. It need not be shown that the
respondent continued to do the act or acts complained of; it is sufficient that the evidence on record
supports the charge/s against the respondent through proof that the respondent committed the
imputed act/s violative of Code of Judicial Conduct and the applicable provisions of the Rules of
Court.
Issue 4: W/N Judge Ruiz is administratively liable
Yes. Viewed against the positive declarations of the prosecution witnesses, which are supported by
the documents on record, his denial cannot stand. He even failed to substantiate his claim that the
charges against him had been politically motivated. Thus, by substantial evidence, it is fully
established that Judge Ruiz is guilty of the charges. Considering the nature and extent of the
charges, he is now dismissed from service and disbarred.
Hide
Ratio:
It is not sound judicial policy to await the final resolution of a criminal case before a
complaint against a lawyer may be acted upon; otherwise, this Court will be rendered
helpless to apply the rules on admission to, and continuing membership in the legal
profession during the whole period that the criminal case is pending final disposition,
when the objectives of the two proceedings are vastly disparate. Disciplinary
proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They
are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare and to save courts of justice

from persons unfit to practice law. The attorney is called to answer to the court for his
conduct as an officer of the court. (Bengco vs Bernardo, 2008)
Bersamin Dissent
The convictions are not yet final, but are in fact undergoing a timely appeal. By
pronouncing him guilty in this administrative matter as to dismiss him from the Judiciary
and to disbar him as a member of the Bar, the Majority of the Court are
likely prejudicing his appeal.
Although there is a distinction between administrative liability and criminal liability, for
the purpose of administrative proceedings is mainly to protect the public service to
enforce the constitutional tenet that a public office is a public trust, while the objective
of the criminal prosecution is the punishment of the crime, any judgment in this
administrative matter effectively removes the distinction considering that the Majority
predicate their action against the respondent on the same evidence that will be
considered in the appellate review of the convictions. Thus, the very adverse factual
findings made in the Majoritys opinion will prejudicially influence the review of the
convictions against him.
Hide
Rule 140, Sec 1 Rules of Court (as amended by A. M. No. 01-8-10-SC):
SECTION 1. How instituted. Proceedings for the discipline of Judges of regular and
special courts and Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan may be
instituted motu proprio by the Supreme Court or upon a verified complaint, supported
by affidavits of persons who have personal knowledge of the facts alleged therein or by
documents which may substantiate said allegations, or upon an anonymous complaint,
supported by public records of indubitable integrity. The complaint shall be in writing
and shall state clearly and concisely the acts and omissions constituting violations of
standards of conduct prescribed for Judges by law, the Rules of Court, or the Code of
Judicial Conduct.
Rule 140, Sec 8 Rules of Court:
SEC. 8. Serious charges. Serious charges include:
1.

Bribery, direct or indirect;

2.

Dishonesty and violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Law

(R.A. No. 3019);

3.

Gross misconduct constituting violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct;

4.

Knowingly rendering an unjust judgment or order as determined by a competent

court in an appropriate proceeding;

5.

Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude;

6.

Willful failure to pay a just debt;

7.

Borrowing money or property from lawyers and litigants in a case pending before
the court;

8.

Immorality;

9.

Gross ignorance of the law or procedure;

10.

Partisan political activities; and

11.

Alcoholism and/or vicious habits