Q4.

What differences did you perceive in the behaviour of managers

versus engineers?
Managers and engineers shared radically different mental models which impeded
them to build a shared vision which was instrumental in the failure of the Columbia
mission. Managers were hard pressed to schedule the launches on time and within
strict budgets. Because of these constraints, they overlooked the severity of the
potential damage caused by the foam debris. In the Mission Evaluation Room (MER),
managers downgraded the event as of low concern even as NASA Engineers like
Rodney Rocha were extremely worried about the debris size. Due to budget cuts,
Managers had reduced the camera staff and kept poorly maintained camera lenses
to track the launches. If the camera lenses had been functioning properly it would
have been extremely easy for engineers to determine the damage caused by the
debris strike. Managers displayed an Inert culture and didnt adapt to changes in
their environment such as the large debris size. Cognitive Dissonance was impeding
Managers to ascertain the true impact of the debris strike on the wing of the
shuttle. Hence they repeatedly sought old Flight Rationales and logs to reinforce
their beliefs about things being under control. They also ignored information that
didnt subscribe to their view like the engineers concerns of the debris size. Linda
Ham abandoned efforts to get clearer pictures of the impact from the spy satellites
that the engineers were trying to pursue. Ego-Defensiveness Bias also made Linda
Ham to accept no responsibility.
The engineers on the other hand tried to look at the problem on the bases of
scientific facts. Hence they immediately began analyzing the recordings of the
launch to ascertain the impact of the debris on the wing. They tried to get more
clarity of the impact by employing the Crater algorithm. When it was clear that they
needed more facts to reach conclusions, they even requested for a way to get the
pictures of the Space Shuttle from military spy satellites. Eventually, they presented
5 impact scenarios with whatever information they could fine. However, they
displayed poor managerial skills. The Debris Assessment Team (DAT) formed was
not as effective as the Tiger Team was for the Apollo 13 mission. It was not clear
who reported to whom and they were also not sure of the procedures to get
additional data. Engineers also showed poor judgement in employing the least
experienced engineer on the Crater algorithm. They also showed low
communication skills and they were not able to effectively communicate the
severity of the problem to managers. Engineers also had the notion that they could
not challenge the conventional wisdom without a huge deal of scientific evidence.
Hence, instead of making use of their time to convince the managers of the severity
of the problem, they sought more data and performed more experiments. When
they knew that they were lacking data to prove that the impact was a threat to the
flight re-entry, they went with the conventional wisdom.