RULE 113

(1) OCAMPO vs. ABANDO

FACTS:
On August 2006, mass graves were found at
Leyte by the Philippine Army, supposedly done
by elements of the NPA under Operation
Venereal Disease to purge the latters ranks of
suspected military informers. The site was then
investigated to determine the identities of the
skeletal remains found at the site.
Relatives later came forward, alleging that the
victims-relatives were either abducted by or
were last seen with the NPA and were never
seen again. The relatives also claim that the
execution was ordered by the CPP/NPA/NDF and
that the skeletal remains found at the mass
grave belong to their deceased relatives.

>Statutory right
>Substantive right and a component of due
process in the administration of criminal
justice, particularly the right to be heard.
Prosecutor may resolve the complaint based on
evidence before him if a respondent could not
be subpoenaed.
o
>Sec. 3(d), Rule 112, Rules of Court
>As long as efforts to reach a respondent were
made, and he was given an opportunity to
present
countervailing
evidence,
the
preliminary investigation remains valid.
>The rule was put in place in order to foil
underhanded attempts of a respondent to
delay the prosecution of offenses.
>Efforts to serve subpoenas at last known
addresses enough compliance to due process.

Ocampo went to the SC under special civil

action for certiorari and prohibition under Rule
65, claiming that a case for rebellion was filed
against them @ RTC Makati, and that under the
political offense doctrine, common crimes such
as murder are already absorbed under the
crime of rebellion.

All 3 petitioners were assured of due process in

the preliminary investigation.
o
>In particular, Ladlads failure to file their
counter-affidavit was of his own doing. Ladlads
counsel filed a formal entry of appearance (in
spite of Ladlad not receiving any subpoena).
Petitioner Ladlad, through his counsel, had
every opportunity to secure copies of the
complaint after his counsels formal entry of
appearance and, thereafter, to participate fully
in the preliminary investigation. Instead, he
refused to participate.

Ocampos case was later consolidated with the

petitions of Baylosis, Echasis, and Ladlad.

There was DUE PROCESS in the issuance of the

warrant of arrest.

ISSUE:

Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution provides

that "no search warrant or warrant of arrest
shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may
produce."

Information filed for 15 counts of multiple

murder vs petitioners, at RTC Hilongos, Leyte.
Judge found probable cause.

Whether or not the cases vs. petitioners should

be dismissed on the ground of denial of due
process and on the basis of the political offense
doctrine.
HELD: NO
There was DUE PROCESS during the
preliminary investigation.
Purpose of preliminary investigation.
>Not just a casual affair.
>Protect civilians from embarrassment,
expense, anxiety of public trial.
Nature of preliminary investigation.

Determination of Probable Cause does not

require a hearing
>Probable cause refers to "such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that an
offense has been committed by the person
sought to be arrested."
>However, it is enough that the judge
personally evaluates the prosecutors report
and supporting documents showing the
existence of probable cause for the indictment

and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of

arrest. No hearing necessary
>In fact, the judges personal examination of
the complainant and the witnesses is not
mandatory and indispensable for determining
the aptness of issuing a warrant of arrest.
Determination of Probable Cause addressed to
the sound discretion of the trial judge.
>The trial court's exercise of its judicial
discretion should not, as a general rule, be
interfered with in the absence of grave abuse
of discretion.
>He sufficiently complies with the requirement
of personal determination if he reviews the
information and the documents attached
thereto, and on the basis thereof, forms a belief
that the accused is probably guilty of the crime
with which he is being charged.
o
>Whether or not there is probable cause for
the issuance of warrants for the arrest of the
accused is a question of fact based on the
allegations in the Information, the Resolution of
the Investigating Prosecutor, including other
documents and/or evidence appended to the
Information.
Trial judge complied with the constitutional
requirement.
>His March 2007 order clearly states that:
On the evaluation of the Resolution and its
Information as submitted and filed by the
Provincial Prosecution of Leyte Province
supported by the following documents: x x x,
this court has the findings [sic] of probable
cause in the commission by all mentioned
accused of the crime charged.
(2) Borlongan vs. Pena
FACTS:
Atty. Magdaleno M. Pea (Atty. Pea)
instituted a civil case for recovery of agent's
compensation and expenses, damages, and
attorney's fees against Urban Bank and herein
petitioners, before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Negros Occidental, Bago City. Atty.
Pea based his claim on the Contract of Agency
allegedly entered into with the petitioners,
wherein the former prevented any intruder and
squatter from unlawfully occupying Urban
Bank's property located along Roxas Boulevard,
Pasay City. Petitioners on the other hand,
presented documents as evidence. Atty. Pea

filed a complaint for said documents were

falsified and that the signatories were neither
stockholders nor officers and employees of
ISCI. Four (4) counts of the crime of
Introducing Falsified Documents were filed
upon the findings of the City Prosecutor of
probable cause. Petitioners filed an Omnibus
Motion to Quash, Recall Warrants of Arrest
and/or For Reinvestigation for the trial court
judge merely relied on the complaint-affidavit
and attachments of the respondent in issuing
warrant of arrest since no counter-affidavit and
supporting documents were submitted. MTCC
denied the motion while CA denied the same.
While Mr. Ben Lim, Jr. was mentioned in
the affidavit-complaint as one of the
board members but in the accusatory
portion, he was not included.
ISSUE:
Did the judge err in accusing and issuing
a warrant of arrest against Mr. Ben Lim, Jr?
HELD: YES
What tainted the procedure further was
that the Judge issued a warrant for the arrest of
the petitioners, including, Mr. Ben Lim, Jr.
despite the filing of the Omnibus Motion to
Quash, Recall Warrants of Arrest and/or For
Reinvestigation raising among others the issue
that Mr. Ben Lim, Jr., was not even a member of
the board of directors.
We said in Soliven v. Makasiar that it
does not thereby mean that judges are obliged
to conduct the personal examination of the
complainant and his witnesses themselves. To
require thus would be to unduly laden them
with
preliminary
examinations
and
investigations of criminal complaints instead of
concentrating on hearing and deciding cases
filed before them. Rather, what is emphasized
merely is the exclusive and personal
responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy
himself as to the existence of probable cause.
To this end, he may: (a) personally evaluate the
report
and
the
supporting
documents
submitted by the prosecutor regarding the
existence of probable cause and, on the basis
thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (b) if on
the basis thereof he finds no probable cause,
disregard the prosecutor's report and require
the submission of supporting affidavits of
witnesses to aid him in determining its
existence. What he is never allowed to do is to
follow blindly the prosecutor's bare
certification as to the existence of

probable cause. Much more is required by the

constitutional provision. Judges have to go
over the report, the affidavits, the
transcript of stenographic notes if any,
and other documents supporting the
prosecutor's certification. Although the
extent of the judge's personal examination
depends on the circumstances of each case, to
be sure, he cannot just rely on the bare
certification alone but must go beyond it.
This is because the warrant of arrest issues not
on the strength of the certification standing
alone but because of the records which sustain
it. He should even call for the complainant and
the witnesses to answer the court's probing
questions when the circumstances warrant.
[35]An arrest without a probable cause is an
unreasonable seizure of a person, and violates
the privacy of persons which ought not to be
intruded by the State.
Petition is hereby GRANTED

(3) COLORADO VS. AGAPITO

FACTS:
Miguel E. Colorado accuses that Judge Ricardo
Agapito has committed Gross Ignorance of the
Law and Grave Abuse of Authority relative to
Criminal Case Nos. 3461-G and 3462-G,
entitled People v. Miguel Colorado, with Grave
Slander and Grave Threats against the couple
Urbano.
Colorado alleges that the cases were directly
filed with the the court without first passing the
Office of the Barangay Chairman although he
and private complainants are permanent
residents of Barangay Bagong Sikat, Gabaldon,
Nueva Ecija claiming that the respondent Judge
Agapito ignored the deficiency, the judge
approved two warrants for the arrest of
Colorado for the crimes aforementioned.
Complainant is charged with grave slander, the
maximum penalty for which is 2 years and 4
months under Article 358 of the Revised Penal
Code
Colorado was arrested on a Friday and was
jailed for 2 days and nights. He posted bail and
filed a motion to inhibit respondent from
hearing the case, but the same was not acted
upon.

Colorado faults respondent for causing him to

languish in jail for two days and two nights.
Colorado received an envelope from the court
with nothing inside and found out later that the
same was supposed to be a notice of hearing;
thus, he was ordered arrested in view of his
non-appearance in court.
On February 22, 2001, respondent compulsorily
retired from the judiciary.
With the 1st Indorsement dated June 8, 2001,
respondent was directed to file his comment on
the complaint. A 1st Tracer dated October 17,
2001 was sent and another on July 30, 2002
but no comment was filed.
Respondent failed to respond to the Courts
requirement for him to manifest why he did not
respond to the court for his comment thus
fined P1,000.00 and deemed respondent to
have waived the filing of a comment on the
complaint.
October 12, 2005, the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) found respondent guilty as
charged and recommended that he be fined in
the amount of (P20,000.00) to be deducted
from his retirement benefits.
On November 8, 2005, respondent paid the
fine of P1,000.00 imposed on him in the
Resolution of August 24, 2005 and submitted
his Comment on the complaint, denying the
allegations made against him.
Respondent Judge claims that he acted in good
faith and within the scope of his duties. He
further states that the crimes committed by
the accused are not within the Katarungan
Pambarangay Law because the imposable
penalty exceeds 1 year, and that There is no
law or circular issued by this Court that a court
cannot issue a warrant of arrest on Friday.
Concerning the empty envelope he received
the respondent answers that Colorado should
have said something to the court so the proper
remedy would have been applied to the matter.
ISSUE:
W/N the arrest on Friday was proper?
HELD: YES

The arrest on a Friday was a proper one for as

the respondent Judge has stated there was no
law prohibiting an arrest to be made on a
Friday.
Also Section 6, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure provides that an arrest may
be made on any day and at any time of the day
or night.
Colorado was not without recourse, as he could
have posted bail for his temporary liberty in
view of Supreme Court Circular No. 95-96[10]
dated December 5, 1996, providing for a
skeletal force on a Saturday from 8:00 a.m. to
1:00 p.m. primarily to act on petitions for bail
and other urgent matters. And on Saturday
afternoons, Sundays and non-working holidays,
any judge may act on bailable offenses.
Thus, we agree with the OCA that respondent
did not commit grave abuse of authority for
issuing the warrant of arrest on a Friday, the
same not being prohibited by law.
The judge was only found liable for his inaction
concerning the motion for inhibition, the same
is tantamount to gross inefficiency.
Respondents explanation that despite the fact
that the motion was set for hearing several
times, complainant repeatedly failed to appear
thereat, is untenable. Respondent must know
that he may act motu proprio on the motion for
inhibition without requiring the attendance of
complainant.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent
Judge Ricardo M. Agapito guilty of gross neglect
and is FINED in the amount of Twenty Thousand
Pesos (P20,000.00). The withheld amount of
Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.0) from
respondents retirement benefits is considered
as payment of the fine.
(4) AMBRE VS. PEOPLE
FACTS:
On or about April 20, 2005, the Caloocan Police
Station Anti-Illegal Drug-Special Operation Unit
conducted a buy-bust operation pursuant to a
tip from a police informant that a certain
Abdullah Sultan and his wife Ina Aderp was
engaged in the selling of dangerous drugs at a
residential compound in Caloocan City; that
buy-bust operation resulted in the arrest of

Aderp and a certain Moctar Tagoranao; that

Sultan run away from the scene of the
entrapment operation and PO3 Moran, PO2
Masi and PO1 Mateo, pursued him; that in the
course of the chase, Sultan led the said police
officers to his house; that inside the house, he
police operatives found Ambre, Castro and
Mendoza having a pot session; that Ambre in
particular, was caught sniffing what was
suspected to be a shabu in a rolled up alumni
foil; and that PO3 Moran ran after Sultan while
PO2 Masi and PO1 Mateo arrested Ambre,
Castro and Mendoza for illegal use of shabu.
ISSUE:
WON the arrest of and search done against
petitioner is valid.
HELD: YES

Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal

Procedure provides three (3) instances when
warrantless arrest may be lawfully effected: (a)
arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto; (b)
arrest of a suspect where, based on personal
knowledge of the arresting officer, there is
probable cause that said suspect was the
perpetrator of a crime which had just been
committed; (c) arrest of a prisoner who has
escaped from custody serving final judgment or
temporarily confined during the pendency of
his case or has escaped while being transferred
from one confinement to another.

In arrest in flagrante delicto, the accused is

apprehended at the very moment he is
committing or attempting to commit or has just
committed an offense in the presence of the
arresting officer. Clearly, to constitute a valid in
flagrante delicto arrest, two requisites must
concur: (1) the person to be arrested must
execute an overt act indicating that he has just
committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such
overt act is done in the presence or within the
view of the arresting officer.
In the case at bench, there is no gainsaying
that Ambre was caught by the police officers in
the act of using shabu and, thus, can be
lawfully arrested without a warrant. PO1 Mateo
positively identified Ambre sniffing suspected
shabu from an aluminum foil being held by

Castro. Hence, the arrest of and search done

against the petitioner is valid.
HELD: YES

(5) PEOPLE VS. USMAN

FACTS:
That on or about 17 December 2003 in Manila,
respondent was caught illegally selling
shabu, a dangerous drug, during a buy-bust
operation conducted by the police.
During
the
operation,
the
respondent
approached the Confidential Informant and
asked him if he is going to get, meaning if he is
going to buy shabu. Instead of answering, the
confidential
informant
pointed
to
the
undercover police officer who was beside him
at that time.
The undercover police officer showed the
marked money and the respondent took them.
Respondent turned his back a little and got
something from his right pocket and passed to
him a plastic sachet containing white
crystalline substance suspected to be shabu.
Upon receipt he grabbed the respondent and
introduced himself as a police officer.
He
informed the respondent of his constitutional
rights and the law he violated (Sec. 5 of RA
9165).
Respondent resisted but other
policemen rushed to assist. The police officer
kept possession of the evidence from place of
arrest and upon arriving in the police station,
he marked the same with the accuseds initials
MUG.
Respondent claimed that he was a victim of
frame-up by the arresting officers. He claims
that his warrantless arrest was illegal. That he
was not apprised of his rights under Sections 2
and 3 of R. A. No. 7438 and that there were
serious lapses in the procedure mandated by R.
A. No. 9165 in the handling of the seized
shabu, as well as non-compliance with the
chain of custody rule, resulting in the
prosecutions failure to properly identify the
shabu offered in court as the same drugs
seized from accused-appellant.
ISSUES:
Whether or not respondents arrest was lawful
and valid.

Respondent was caught in flagrante delicto of

selling illegal drugs to an undercover police
officer in a buy-bust operation. His arrest, thus,
falls within the ambit of Section 5 (a), Rule 113
of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure
when an arrest made without warrant is
deemed lawful. A buy-bust operation is a
legally effective and proven procedure,
sanctioned by law, for apprehending drug
peddlers and distributors. Respondent was
caught in the act and had to be apprehended
on the spot.
With the arrest being valid, we also hold that
the subsequent warrantless seizure of the
illegal drugs from his person is equally valid.
The legitimate warrantless arrest also cloaks
the arresting police officer with the authority to
validly search and seize from the offender
those that may be used to prove the
commission of the offense.
The Court laid down the essential elements to
be duly established for prosecution of offenses
involving the illegal sale of dangerous or
prohibited drugs, like shabu, to wit: (1) the
identity of the buyer and the seller, the object
of the sale, and the consideration; and (2) the
delivery of the thing sold and payment
therefor. Briefly, the delivery of the illicit drug
to the poseur-buyer and the receipt of the
marked money by the seller successfully
consummate the buy-bust transaction. What is
material, therefore, is the proof that the
transaction or sale transpired, coupled with the
presentation in court of the corpus delicti.
As to the fact that PO1 Sta. Maria was able to
mark the seized sachet only at the police
station, marking of the seized substance
immediately upon arrival at the police station
qualified as a compliance with the marking
requirement. Such can also be said here in
light of the fact that the reason why PO1 Sta.
Maria was unable to immediately mark the
seized sachet was due to the respondents
resistance to arrest and, as at that time, he did
not know respondents name yet.
There is no showing that the trial court
overlooked or misinterpreted some material
facts or that it gravely abused its discretion,
the Court will not disturb the trial courts

assessment of the facts and the credibility of

the witnesses since the RTC was in a better
position to assess and weigh the evidence
presented during trial. Settled too is the rule
that the factual findings of the appellate court
sustaining those of the trial court are binding
on this Court, unless there is a clear showing
that
such
findings
are
tainted
with
arbitrariness, capriciousness or palpable error.
In the case at bar, the Court sees no
justification for overturning the findings of fact
of the RTC and CA.
(6) PEOPLE VS. AZARA

testify against Araza. The RTC rejected Arazas

alibi as a feeble defense that cannot prevail
over the positive testimony of PO1 Talacca.
Araza appealed to the CA, contending mainly
that the shabu was confiscated from his pocket
and not in plain view, such is inadmissible in
evidence since it was illegally seized, having
been taken from his pocket and not as an
incident of an arrest in flagrante delicto.
The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC, stating
that Araza was estopped from assailing the
legality of his arrest for his failure to move to
quash the Information against him prior to
arraignment.

FACTS:
On August 15, 2003, an Information for
violation of Section 11, Article II, Republic Act
No. 9165 (RA 9165) otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002
was filed against Araza for having in his
possession 0.06 gram of methamphetamine
hydrochloride (shabu), to which he pleaded
not guilty.
Version of Prosecution:
On August 28, 2002, PO1 Talacca along with
the Barangay Chairman and several others,
while confiscating video karera machine inside
the house of Alejandro Sacdo, saw nine
persons, including Araza, sniffing shabu or
engaging in a pot session inside the house of
Sacdo. He arrested and frisked them and
ecovered from the pocket of Araza a small
heat-sealed
transparent
plastic
sachet
containing white crystalline substance which he
suspected
to
be
shabu.
PO1
Talacca
immediately seized said sachet and brought
Araza and his companions to the police station.
Version of the Defense:
Araza testified that he was sleeping inside a
room in the house of Sacdo when PO1 Talacca
suddenly woke him up and frisked him. PO1
Talacca confiscated his wallet that contained
coins then took him to the police station and
charged him with illegal possession of
prohibited drugs.
RTC ruled that the prosecution was able to
establish the guilt of Araza beyond reasonable
doubt. It gave credence to the testimony of
PO1 Talacca since he is presumed to have
regularly performed his duties and there was
no evidence that he had any motive to falsely

ISSUE:
Whether or not the shabu confiscated was
illegally seized and therefore, inadmissible as
evidence against araza.
HELD: NO
The offense of illegal possession of dangerous
drugs has been established.
The prosecution satisfied the following
elements during trial:
(1) the accused is in possession of an item or
object which is identified to be a prohibited
drug;
(2) such possession is not authorized by law;
and
(3) the accused freely and consciously
possessed the drug."
The narration of the incident by a police officer,
"buttressed by the presumption that they have
regularly performed their duties in the absence
of convincing proof to the contrary, must be
given weight." His testimony, the physical
evidence and the facts stipulated upon during
trial were consistent with each other.
The Constitution states that failure to secure a
judicial warrant prior to the actual search and
consequent
seizure
would
render
it
unreasonable and any evidence obtained
therefrom shall be inadmissible for any purpose
in
any
proceeding.
This
constitutional
prohibition, however, admits of the following
exceptions:

1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful

arrest;
2. Search of evidence in "plain view";
3. Search of a moving vehicle;
4. Consented warrantless search;
5. Customs search;
6. Stop and Frisk; and
7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.
In this case, there is sufficient evidence to
prove that the warrantless search of Araza was
effected as an incident to a lawful arrest under
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A
peace officer or a private person may, without
a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be
arrested
has
committed,
is
actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed
and he has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances
that the person to be arrested has committed
it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a
prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final
judgment or temporarily confined while his
case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.
Wherefore, the appeal is DISMISSED. The
Decision dated October 14, 2009 of the Court
of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
(7) PEOPLE VS. ADRIANO
FACTS:
Edward Adriano y Sales was found guilty of the
crime of illegal sale of shabu punishable under
section 5, article II of R.A No. 9165 otherwise
known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs
Act of 2002.
During trial in the RTC, the prosecution
presented PO1 Morales who testified that
acting on a report received from a barangay
official and an informant that Adriano was
selling drugs, Police Chief Inspector Porforio
Calagan formed a team to conduct a buy-bust
operation to entrap Adriano. PO1 Morales was
the poseur-buyer, and marking the buy-bust
money consisting of ten P100.00 bills with the
initials PC. The operation was successful in

apprehending Adriano and confiscating the

drugs he was selling. The PNP Crime laboratory
confirmed the presence of methamphetamine
hydrochloride in the substance confiscated.
In Adrianos defense, he testified that on
October 22, 2008, at around 10:00 p.m., he
was at home, putting his nephews to sleep
when two armed men barged into the house
and dragged him outside and forcibly took him
to the police station. It was only when they
arrived at the police station when he learned
that he was arrested for illegal sale of shabu.
The RTC found Adriano guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged and
sentenced him to life imprisonment and a fine
of P500,00.00.
Adriano appealed to the CA arguing that the
shabu
seized
from
his
possession
is
inadmissible because :
The warrantless arrest on his person is invalid;
The arresting officers violated section 21 of
R.A. No. 9165
The CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC. Ruling
that the prosecution established the elements
of the crime of illegal sale of shabu. Even if the
prosecution failed to comply with the
requirements provided in Sec. 21 of R.A. No.
9165, such noncompliance did not render the
seized items inadmissible in evidence.
Adriano appealed to the SC.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the lower courts gravely erred
in not finding the warrantless arrest on the
person of Adriano is illegal and in convicting
Adriano
despite
the
police
officers
noncompliance with Section 21 of R.A. No.
9165.
HELD:
The SC affirmed the CA and dismissed the
appeal.
In prosecutions for illegal sale of dangerous
drugs, the following two elements must be duly
established: 1. Proof that the transaction or
sale took place; and 2. The presentation in
court of corpus delicti or the illicit drug as
evidence.
The
prosecution
successfully
established these two elements:

PO1 Morales narrated the transaction in a clear

and direct manner;
The seized illegal drugs and marked money
were presented before the trial court as proof
of the identity of the object of the crime and of
the corpus delicti.
The implementing Rules of R.A. No. 9165 offer
some measure of flexibility through the
proviso,
non-compliance
with
these
requirements under justifiable grounds, as long
as the integrity and the evidentiary value of
the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer/team, shall not render
void and invalid such seizures of and custody
over said terms. Non-compliance does not
invalidate the seizure or render the arrest of
the accused illegal or the items seized from
him as inadmissible as long as the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized items are
preserved. Despite the arresting officers failure
to strictly observe the requirements of Section
21 on the custody and disposition of the seized
items, the violation of the CDDA of 2002 was
duly proven. The arresting officers duly
recorded the movements and custody of the
seized
items
from
the
time
of
seizure/confiscation to receipt by the forensic
laboratory to safekeeping up to presentation in
court.
With regard to the warrantless arrest, Adriano
was arrested pursuant to Section 5(a), Rule 113
of the Rules on Criminal procedure, which
provides that a person may be arrested without
a warrant if he has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense. Adriano was caught in the act of
committing an offense, in flagrante delicto,
when Adriano was caught selling illegal shabu
through a buy-bust operation, within the plain
view of the arresting officers.
A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment
which in recent years has been accepted as a
valve and effective mode of apprehending drug
pushers. In a buy-bust operation, the idea to
commit a crime originates from the offender,
without anybody inducing or prodding him to
commit the offense. If carried out with due
regard for constitutional and legal safeguards,
a buy-bust operation deserves judicial sanction.
(8) & (028) SANCHEZ VS. PEOPLE
FACTS:

Sanchez was charged with violation of Section

11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, otherwise known
as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002, in the Information,5 dated March 20,
2003, filed before the RTC of Imus, Cavite,
Branch 20.
When arraigned, Sanchez pleaded not guilty to
the offense charged. During the pre-trial, the
prosecution and the defense stipulated on the
existence and due execution of the following
pieces of evidence: 1] the request for
laboratory examination; 2] certification issued
by the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI);
3] Dangerous Drugs Report; and 4] transparent
plastic sachet containing small transparent
plastic
sachet
of
white
crystalline
substance.6 Thereafter, trial on the merits
ensued.
Prosecution and Defense presented
respective version of the events.

their

The RTC rendered its decision finding that

Sanchez was caught in flagrante delicto,in
actual possession of shabu. It stated that the
police operatives had reasonable ground to
believe that Sanchez was in possession of the
said dangerous drug and such suspicion was
confirmed when the match box Sanchez was
carrying was found to contain shabu.
RTC convicted him, to suffer imprisonment from
twelve (12) to fifteen (15) years and to pay a
fine of Php300,000.00.
Unfazed, Sanchez appealed the RTC judgment
of conviction before the CA. He faulted the RTC
for giving undue weight on the testimony of
SPO1 Amposta anchored merely on the
presumption of regularity in the performance of
duty of the said arresting officer. He insisted
that the prosecution evidence was insufficient
to establish his guilt.
CA AFFIRMED the decision of the RTC stating
that there was probable cause for the police
officers to believe that Sanchez was then and
there committing a crime considering that he
was seen leaving the residence of a notorious
drug dealer where, according to a tip they
received, illegal drug activities were being
perpetrated. It concluded that the confiscation
by the police operative of the subject narcotic
from Sanchez was pursuant to a valid search.

Sanchez filed a motion for reconsideration of

the July 25, 2012 Decision, but it was denied by
the CA in its November 20, 2012 Resolution.
Sanchez insists on his acquittal. He argues that
the warrantless arrest and search on him were
invalid due to the absence of probable cause
on the part of the police officers to effect an in
flagrante delicto arrest under Section 15, Rule
113 of the Rules of Court. He also contends
that the failure of the police operatives to
comply with Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II
of R.A. No. 9165 renders the seized item
inadmissible
in
evidence
and
creates
reasonable doubt on his guilt.

The OSG prays for the affirmance of the

challenged July 25, 2012 decision of the CA.
The OSG submits that the warrantless search
and seizure of the subject narcotic were
justified under the plain view doctrine where a
police officer is not searching for evidence
against
the
accused,
but
nonetheless
inadvertently comes across an incriminating
object.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

A search as an incident to a lawful arrest

is sanctioned by the Rules of Court.
It bears emphasis that the law requires that the
search be incidental to a lawful arrest.
Therefore it is beyond cavil that a lawful arrest
must precede the search of a person and his
belongings; the process cannot be reversed.
Here, the search preceded the arrest of
Sanchez. There was no arrest prior to the
conduct of the search. The evidence on record
reveals that no overt physical act could be
properly attributed to Sanchez as to rouse
suspicion in the minds of the police operatives
that he had just committed, was committing, or
was about to commit a crime. Sanchez was
merely seen by the police operatives leaving
the residence of a known drug peddler, and
boarding a tricycle that proceeded towards the
direction of Kawit, Cavite. Such acts cannot in
any way be considered criminal acts.
In fact, even if Sanchez had exhibited unusual
or strange acts, or at the very least appeared
suspicious, the same would not have been
considered overt acts in order for the police
officers to effect a lawful warrantless arrest
under paragraph (a) of Section 5, Rule 113 (in
flagrante delicto arrest). The police officers in
this case had no inkling whatsoever as to what
Sanchez did inside the house of the known
drug dealer.

2. NO. The Court disagrees.

WON the Search made by the Police to Sanchez

was INVALID.
WON The OSG is correct to characterize the
seizure of the subject shabu from Sanchez as
seizure of evidence in plain view.

HELD:

1. YES. The law requires that there first be

a lawful arrest before a search can be
made -- the process cannot be reversed.

Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in

the plain view of an officer who has a right to
be in the position to have that view are subject
to seizure and may be presented as
evidence.34 The plain view doctrine applies
when the following requisites concur: (1) the
law enforcement officer in search of the
evidence has a prior justification for an
intrusion or is in a position from which he can
view a particular area; (2) the discovery of the
evidence in plain view is inadvertent; and (3) it
is immediately apparent to the officer that the
item he observes may be evidence of a crime,
contraband or otherwise subject to seizure.

Measured against the foregoing standards, it is

readily apparent that the seizure of the subject
shabu does notfall within the plain view
exception. First, there was no valid intrusion. As
already discussed, Sanchez was illegally
arrested. Second, subject shabu was not
inadvertently discovered, and third, it was not
plainly exposed to sight. Here, the subject
shabu was allegedly inside a match box being
thenheld by Sanchez and was not readily
apparent or transparent to the police officers.

Petitioner
Rizaldy
Sanchez
y
ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt.

Cajili

is

Andaya appealed in the CA, arguing that the

Prosecutions
non-presentation
of
the
confidential informant was adverse to the
Prosecution, indicating that his guilt was not
proved beyond reasonable doubt. However, the
CA still affirmed the assailed decision in toto.
ISSUE:

W/N the search of Andayas house and his

person and his arrest by the police officers
violated his constitutional right against
unreasonable searches and seizures.

HELD: YES

(9) PEOPLE VS. ANDAYA

FACTS:
An information was filed against Andaya for
violation of Section 5 of RA 9165. A team
composed of SPO1 Aguila, SPO1 Cabungcal,
Eric de Chavez, PO1 Lindberg Yap, Edwalberto
Villar and asset Bagsit was constituted to
conduct a buy-bust. In the said operation,
Andaya was caught with more or less 0.09
grams crystalline substance which was later
confirmed
in
a
laboratory
test
as
Methampethamine Hydrochloride or shabu, a
dangerous
drug.
Accused-appellant
denied
the
charge,
contending that on that fateful night, police
officers arrived in his house and one poked his
gun at him. He was then handcuffed and
brought outside but he refused to negotiate
and asked for a warrant. The policemen
searched the house, turned over the beddings
and uncovered their furniture. No gun nor
shabu was found. He was brought to the police
station and detained for three days. His wife
Crisanta, corroborated appellants' testimony.
The RTC convicted Andaya.

To secure the conviction of the accused who is

charged with the illegal sale of dangerous
drugs as defined and punished by Section 5,
Article
II
of
Republic
Act
No.
9165
(Comprehensive Drugs Act of 2002), the State
must establish the concurrence of the following
elements, namely: (a) that the transaction or
sale took place between the accused and the
poseur buyer; and (b) that the dangerous drugs
subject of the transaction or sale is presented
in court as evidence of the corpus delicti.
A buy-bust operation is a valid and legitimate
form of entrapment of the drug pusher. The
justification that underlies the legitimacy of the
buy-bust operation is that the suspect is
arrested in flagranti delicto, that is, the suspect
has just committed, or is in the act of
committing, or is attempting to commit the
offense in the presence of the arresting police
officer or private person. The arresting police
officer or private person is favored in such
instance with the presumption of regularity in
the performance of official duty.
Proof of the transaction must be credible and
complete. In every criminal prosecution, it is
the State, and no other, that bears the burden
of proving the illegal sale of the dangerous
drug beyond reasonable doubt. Here, the
confidential informant was not a police officer.
He was designated to be the poseur buyer
himself. It is notable that the members of the
buy-bust team arrested Andaya on the basis of
the pre-arranged signal from the poseur buyer.
However, the State did not present the
confidential informant/ poseur buyer during the
trial to describe how exactly the transaction

10

between him and Andaya had taken place.

There would have been no issue against that,
except that none of the members of the buybust team had directly witnessed the
transaction, if any. Without the poseur buyer's
testimony, the State did not credibly
incriminate.
(10) PEOPLE VS. COGAED
FACTS:
Police Senior Inspector Sofronio Bayan (PSI
Bayan) of the San Gabriel Police Station in San
Gabriel,La Union, "received a text message
from an unidentified civilian informer"2 that one
Marvin Buya (also known as Marvin Bugat)
"[would]be
transporting
marijuana"3 from
Barangay LunOy, San Gabriel, La Union to the
Poblacion of San Gabriel, La Union.4

PSI Bayan organized checkpoints in order "to

intercept the suspect."5 PSI Bayan ordered
SPO1 Jaime Taracatac, Jr. (SPO1 Taracatac), a
member of the San Gabriel Police, to set up a
checkpoint in the waiting area of passengers
from San Gabriel bound for San Fernando
City.6 A passenger jeepney from Barangay LunOy
arrived
at
SPO1
Taracatacs
checkpoint.7 The jeepney driver disembarked
and signalled to SPO1 Taracatac indicating the
two male passengers who were carrying
marijuana.8 SPO1 Taracatac approached the
two male passengers who were later identified
as Victor RomanaCogaed and Santiago Sacpa
Dayao.9 Cogaed was carrying a blue bag and a
sack while Dayao was holding a yellow bag.10

SPO1 Taracatac asked Cogaed and Dayao

about the contents of their bags.11 Cogaed and
Dayao told SPO1 Taracatac that they did not
know since they were transporting the bags as
a
favor
for
their
barriomatenamed
Marvin.12 After this exchange, Cogaed opened
the blue bag, revealing three bricks of what
looked like marijuana.13 Cogaed then muttered,
"Marvin is a fool, this is what [is] contained in
the bag."14 "SPO1 Taracatac arrested [Cogaed]
and . . . Dayao and brought them to the police
station."15 Cogaed and Dayao "were still
carrying their respective bags"16inside the
station.

ISSUES:
Was the arrest valid?
Was the search and seizure of marijuana valid?
HELD:
No.
"Stop and frisk"searches are conducted to
prevent the occurrence of a crime. For
instance, the search in Posadas v. Court of
Appeals65 was similar "to a stop and frisk
situation whose object is either to determine
the identity of a suspicious individual or to
maintain the status quomomentarily while the
police
officer
seeks
to
obtain
more
66
information." This court stated that the "stop
and frisk" search should be used "[w]hen
dealing with a rapidly unfolding and potentially
criminal situation in the city streets where
unarguably there is no time to secure . . . a
search warrant."67

The search involved in this case was initially a

"stop and frisk" search, but it did not comply
with all the requirements of reasonability
required by the Constitution.

"Stop and frisk" searches (sometimes referred

to as Terrysearches68) are necessary for law
enforcement. That is, law enforcers should be
given the legal arsenal to prevent the
commission of offenses. However, this should
be balanced with the need to protect the
privacy of citizens in accordance with Article III,
Section 2 of the Constitution.

The
balance
lies
in
the
concept
of"suspiciousness" present in the situation
where the police officer finds himself or herself
in. This may be undoubtedly based on the
experience ofthe police officer. Experienced
police officers have personal experience
dealing with criminals and criminal behavior.
Hence, they should have the ability to discern
based on facts that they themselves observe
whether an individual is acting in a
suspicious manner. Clearly, a basic criterion

11

would be that the police officer, with his or her

personal knowledge, must observe the facts
leading to the suspicion of an illicit act.

In Manalili v. Court of Appeals,69 the police

officers were initially informed about a place
frequented by people abusing drugs.70 When
they arrived, one of the police officers saw a
man with "reddish eyes and [who was] walking
in
a
swaying
manner."71 The
suspicion
increased when the man avoided the police
officers.72 These observations led the police
officers to conclude that the man was high on
drugs.73 These were sufficient facts observed
by the police officers "to stop[the] petitioner
[and] investigate."74

In People v. Solayao,75 police officers noticed a

man who appeared drunk.76 This man was also
"wearing a camouflage uniform or a jungle
suit."77 Upon seeing the police, the man
fled.78 His flight added to the suspicion. 79After
stopping him, the police officers found an
unlicensed
"homemade
firearm"80 in
his
81
possession. This court ruled that "[u]nder the
circumstances, the government agents could
not possibly have procured a search warrant
first."82 This was also a valid search.

In these cases, the police officers using their

senses observed facts that led to the suspicion.
Seeing a man with reddish eyes and walking in
a swaying manner, based on their experience,
is indicative of a person who uses dangerous
and illicit drugs. A drunk civilian in guerrilla
wear is probably hiding something as well.

The case of Cogaed was different. He was

simply a passenger carrying a bag and
traveling aboarda jeepney. There was nothing
suspicious, moreover, criminal, about riding a
jeepney or carrying a bag. The assessment of
suspicion was not made by the police officer
but by the jeepney driver. It was the driver who
signalled to the police that Cogaed was
"suspicious."

(11) PESTILLOS VS. GENEROSO

FACTS:
On February 20, 2005, at around 3:15 AM, an
altercation ensued between the petitioners and
Atty. Moreno Generoso (Atty. Generoso) at
Kasiyahan Street, Barangay Holy Spirit, Quezon
City where the petitioners and Atty. Generoso
reside.

Atty. Generoso called the Central Police District,

Station 6 (Batasan Hills Police Station) to report
the incident. Acting on this report, Desk Officer
SPO1 Primitivo Monsalve (SPO1 Monsalve)
dispatched SP02 Dominador Javier (SP02
Javier) to go to the scene of the crime and to
render assistance. SP02 Javier, together with
augmentation personnel from the Airforce, A2C
Alano Sayson and Airman Ruel Galvez, arrived
at the scene of the crime less than one hour
after the alleged altercation and they saw Atty.
Generoso badly beaten. Atty. Generoso then
pointed to the petitioners as those who mauled
him. This prompted the police officers to
"invite" the petitioners to go to Batasan Hills
Police Station for investigation. The petitioners
went with the police officers to Batasan Hills
Police Station. At the inquest proceeding, the
City Prosecutor of Quezon City found that the
petitioners stabbed Atty. Generoso with a
bladed weapon. Atty. Generoso fortunately
survived the attack.
In an Information dated February 22, 2005, the
petitioners were indicted for attempted murder.

On March 7, 2005, the petitioners filed an

Urgent
Motion
for
Regular
Preliminary
Investigation on the ground that they had not
been lawfully arrested. They alleged that no
valid warrantless arrest took place since the
police officers had no personal knowledge that
they were the perpetrators of the crime. They
also claimed that they were just "invited" to the
police station. Thus, the inquest proceeding
was improper, and a regular procedure for
preliminary investigation should have been
performed pursuant to Rule 112 of the Rules of
Court. On March 16, 2005, the RTC issued its
order denying the petitioners' Urgent Motion
for Regular Preliminary Investigation. The court

12

likewise denied the petitioners' motion for

reconsideration.

The petitioners challenged the lower court's

ruling before the CA on a Rule 65 petition for
certiorari. They attributed grave abuse of
discretion, amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, on the R TC for the denial of their
motion for preliminary investigation. On
January 21, 2008, the CA issued its decision
dismissing the petition for lack of merit. The CA
ruled that the word "invited" in the Affidavit of
Arrest executed by SP02 Javier carried the
meaning of a command. The arresting officer
clearly meant to arrest the petitioners to
answer for the mauling of Atty. Generoso. The
CA also recognized that the arrest was
pursuant to a valid warrantless arrest so that
an inquest proceeding was called for as a
consequence. Thus, the RTC did not commit
any grave abuse of discretion in denying the
Urgent
Motion
for
Regular
Preliminary
Investigation.

The CA saw no merit in the petitioners'

argument that the order denying the Urgent
Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation is
void for failure to clearly state the facts and the
law upon which it was based, pursuant to Rule
16, Section 3 of the Revised Rules of Court. The
CA found that the RTC had sufficiently
explained the grounds for the denial of the
motion.

The petitioners moved for reconsideration, but

the CA denied the motion in its Resolution of
April 17, 2008; hence, the present petition.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the petitioners were validly
arrested without a warrant.
HELD:

We find the petition unmeritorious and thus

uphold the RTC Order. The criminal proceedings
against the petitioners should now proceed.
Thus, under the present rules and
jurisprudence, the arresting officer should base
his determination of probable cause on his
personal knowledge of facts and circumstances
that the person sought to be arrested has
committed the crime; the public prosecutor
and the judge must base their determination
on the evidence submitted by the parties. In
other words, the arresting officer operates on
the basis of more limited facts, evidence or
available information that he must personally
gather within a limited time frame.

In other words, the clincher in the

element of ''personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances" is the required element of
immediacy within which these facts or
circumstances should be gathered. This
required time element acts as a safeguard to
ensure that the police officers have gathered
the facts or perceived the circumstances within
a very limited time frame. This guarantees that
the police officers would have no time to base
their probable cause finding on facts or
circumstances obtained after an exhaustive
investigation.

The reason for the element of the

immediacy is this - as the time gap from the
commission of the crime to the arrest widens,
the pieces of information gathered are prone to
become contaminated and subjected to
external factors, interpretations and hearsay.
On the other hand, with the element of
immediacy imposed under Section 5(b), Rule
113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
the police officer's determination of probable
cause would necessarily be limited to raw or
uncontaminated
facts
or
circumstances,
gathered as they were within a very limited
period of time. The same provision adds
another safeguard with the requirement of
probable cause as the standard for evaluating
these facts of circumstances before the police
officer could effect a valid warrantless arrest.

13

We hold that the following must be

present for a valid warrantless arrest: 1) the
crime should have been just committed; and 2)
the arresting officer's exercise of discretion is
limited by the standard of probable cause to be
determined from the facts and circumstances
within
his
personal
knowledge.
The
requirement of the existence of probable cause
objectifies
the
reasonableness
of
the
warrantless arrest for purposes of compliance
with the Constitutional mandate against
unreasonable arrests.

Hence, for purposes of resolving the issue

on the validity of the warrantless arrest of the
present petitioners, the question to be resolved
is whether the requirements for a valid
warrantless arrest under Section 5(b), Rule 113
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure were
complied with, namely: 1) has the crime just
been committed when they were arrested? 2)
did the arresting officer have personal
knowledge of facts and circumstances that the
petitioners committed the crime? and 3) based
on these facts and circumstances that the
arresting officer possessed at the time of the
petitioners' arrest, would a reasonably discreet
and prudent person believe that the attempted
murder of Atty. Generoso was committed by
the petitioners? We rule in the affirmative.

Application of Section 5(b), Rule 113 of

the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
in the present case: there was a valid
warrantless arrest

From a review of the records of the CA, we

conclude that the police officers had personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances upon
which they had properly determined probable
cause in effecting a warrantless arrest against
the petitioners. We note, however, that the
determination of the facts in the present case
is purely limited to the resolution of the issue
on the validity of the warrantless arrests of the
petitioners.

Based on the police blotter entry taken at

4:15 a.m. on February 20, 2005, the date that
the alleged crime was committed, the
petitioners were brought in for investigation at
the Batasan Hills Police Station. The police
blotter stated that the alleged crime was
committed at 3:15 a.m. on February 20, 2005,
along Kasiyahan St., Brgy. Holy Spirit, Quezon
City. The time of the entry of the complaint in
the police blotter at 4:15 a.m., with Atty.
Generoso and the petitioners already inside the
police station, would connote that the arrest
took place less than one hour from the time of
the occurrence of the crime. Hence, the CA
finding that the arrest took place two (2) hours
after the commission of the crime is
unfounded.

The arresting officers' personal observation

of Atty. Generoso's bruises when they arrived
at the scene of the crime is corroborated by the
petitioners' admissions that Atty. Generoso
indeed
suffered
blows
from
petitioner
Macapanas
and
his
brother
Joseph
Macapanas, although they asserted that they
did it in self-defense against Atty. Generoso.
Atty. Generoso's bruises were also corroborated
by the Medico-Legal Certificate that was issued
by East Avenue Medical Center on the same
date of the alleged mauling. The medical
check-up of Atty. Generoso that was made
about 8:10 a.m. on the date of the incident.

To summarize, the arresting officers went to

the scene of the crime upon the complaint of
Atty. Generoso of his alleged mauling; the
police officers responded to the scene of the
crime less than one (1) hour after the alleged
mauling; the alleged crime transpired in a
community where Atty. Generoso and the
petitioners reside; Atty. Generoso positively
identified the petitioners as those responsible
for his mauling and, notably, the petitioners
and Atty. Generoso lived almost in the same
neighborhood; more importantly, when the
petitioners were confronted by the arresting
officers, they did not deny their participation in
the incident with Atty. Generoso, although they
narrated a different version of what transpired.

14

With these facts and circumstances that the

police officers gathered and which they have
personally observed less than one hour from
the time that they have arrived at the scene of
the crime until the time of the arrest of the
petitioners, we deem it reasonable to conclude
that the police officers had personal knowledge
of facts or circumstances justifying the
petitioners'
warrantless
arrests.
These
circumstances were well within the police
officers' observation, perception and evaluation
at the time of the arrest. These circumstances
qualify as the police officers' personal
observation, which are within their personal
knowledge, prompting them to make the
warrantless arrests.

Similar to the factual antecedents in Jayson,

the police officers in the present case saw Atty.
Generoso in his sorry bloodied state. As the
victim, he positively identified the petitioners
as the persons who mauled him; however,
instead of fleeing like what happened in Jayson,
the petitioners agreed to go with the police
officers. This is also similar to what happened
in People v. Tonog, Jr. where Tonog did not flee
but voluntarily went with the police officers.
More than this, the petitioners in the present
case even admitted to have been involved in
the incident with Atty. Generoso, although they
had another version of what transpired.

In determining the reasonableness of the

warrantless arrests, it is incumbent upon the
courts to consider if the police officers have
complied with the requirements set under
Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal
Procedure,
specifically,
the
requirement of immediacy; the police officer's
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances;
and lastly, the propriety of the determination of
probable cause that the person sought to be
arrested committed the crime.

The records show that soon after the report

of the incident occurred, SPO1 Monsalve
immediately dispatched the arresting officer,
SP02 Javier, to render personal assistance to
the victim. This fact alone negates the
petitioners' argument that the police officers

did not have personal knowledge that a crime

had been committed - the police immediately
responded and had personal knowledge that a
crime had been committed.
To reiterate, personal knowledge of a crime
just committed under the terms of the abovecited provision, does not require actual
presence at the scene while a crime was being
committed; it is enough that evidence of the
recent commission of the crime is patent (as in
this case) and the police officer has probable
cause to believe based on personal knowledge
of facts or circumstances, that the person to be
arrested has recently committed the crime.

Considering the circumstances of the

stabbing, particularly the locality where it took
place, its occasion, the personal circumstances
of the parties, and the immediate on-the-spot
investigation that took place, the immediate
and warrantless arrests of the perpetrators
were proper. Consequently, the inquest
proceeding that the City Prosecutor conducted
was appropriate under the circumstances.

(12) DELA CRUZ VS. PEOPLE

FACTS:
Petitioner Jaime D. dela Cruz was charged with
violation of Section 15, Article II of Republic Act
No. (R.A.) 9165, or The Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, by the Graft
Investigation and Prosecution Officer of the
Office of the Ombudsman Visayas.
JAIME D. DE LA CRUZ, a public officer, having
been duly appointed and qualified to such
public position as Police Officer 2 of the PNP
assigned in the Security Service Group of the
Cebu City Police Office, after having Been
arrested by agents of the NBI in an entrapment
operation, was found positive for use of
METHAMPHETAMINE
HYDROCHLORIDE
commonly known as "Shabu", the dangerous
drug after a confirmatory test conducted on
said accused.
PROSECUTION
The NBI received a complaint from
Corazon and Charito which claimed that,
Ariel, the live-in partner of Corazon and
son of Charito, was picked up by several

15

unknown male persons believed to be

police officers for allegedly selling drugs.
An errand boy gave a number to the
complainants, and when the latter gave
the number a ring, they were instructed
to proceed to the Gorordo Police Office
located along Gorordo Avenue, Cebu
City. In the said police office, they met
"James" who demanded from them
P100,000, later lowered to P40,000, in
exchange for the release of Ariel. After
the
meeting,
the
complainants
proceeded to the NBICEVRO to file a
complaint
and
narrate
the
circumstances of the meeting to the
authorities. While at the NBI-CEVRO,
Charito even received calls supposedly
from "James" instructing her to bring the
money as soon as possible.
A team was immediately formed to
implement an entrapment operation,
which took place inside a Jollibee branch
at the corner of Gen. Maxilom and
Gorordo Avenues, Cebu City. The officers
were able to nab Jaime dela Cruz by
using a pre-marked 500 bill dusted with
fluorescent powder, which was made
part of the amount demanded by
"James" and handed by Corazon.
Petitioner was later brought to the
forensic laboratory of the NBI CEVRO
where forensic examination was done by
forensic chemist Rommel Paglinawan.
Petitioner was required to submit his
urine for drug testing. It later yielded a
positive result for presence of dangerous
drugs as indicated in the confirmatory
test result labeled as Toxicology.
DEFENSE
Presented petitioner as the lone witness.
He denied the charges and testified that
while eating at the said Jollibee branch,
he was arrested allegedly for extortion
by NBI agents. When he was at the NBI
Office, he was required to extract urine
for drug examination, but he refused
saying he wanted it to be done by the
Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime
Laboratory and not by the NBI. His
request was, however, denied. He also
requested to be allowed to call his
lawyer prior to the taking of his urine
sample, to no avail.

RTC guilty; violation of Section

15, Article II of R.A. 9165 and sentenced him to
suffer the penalty of compulsory rehabilitation
for a period of not less than 6 months at the
Cebu Center for the Ultimate Rehabilitation of
Drug Dependents.
The petitioner filed an appeal; RTC erred in the
validation of the result of the urine test despite
its dubiousness having been admitted in spite
of the lack of legal basis for its admission.
He alleged that, first, the forensic laboratory
examination was conducted despite the fact
that he was not assisted by counsel, in clear
violation of his constitutional right. Secondly,
he was allegedly held guilty beyond reasonable
doubt notwithstanding the lack of sufficient
basis to convict him.
CA appeal devoid and affirmed the RTC.
MR denied; argued that the CA overlooked
prevailing jurisprudence, which states that drug
testing conducted under circumstances similar
to his would violate a persons right to privacy.
Petitioner petition for review on certiorari;
the use of hearsay evidence as basis for his
conviction and the questionable circumstances
surrounding his arrest and drug test.
Respondent - petitioners arguments cannot be
the subject of a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45, as they involve questions of
facts, which may not be the subject thereof;
after his arraignment, he can no longer contest
the validity of his arrest, less so at this stage of
the proceedings; his guilt has been adequately
established by direct evidence; and the manner
in which the laboratory examination was
conducted was grounded on a valid and
existing law.
ISSUES:
WON the drug test conducted upon the
petitioner is legal.
HELD: NO; petitioner is acquitted.
Elements of Sec. 15 of
RA 9165: (1) the
accused was arrested; (2) the accused was
subjected to drug test; and (3) the
confirmatory test shows that he used a
dangerous drug.
The drug test in Section 15 does not cover

16

persons apprehended or arrested for any

unlawful act, but only for unlawful acts listed
under Article II of R.A. 9165 - "importation,"9
"sale, trading, administration, dispensation,
delivery,
distribution
and
transportation",10"manufacture"11
and
"possession"12 of dangerous drugs and/or
controlled precursors and essential chemicals;
possession thereof "during parties, social
gatherings or meetings"13 ; being "employees
and visitors of a den, dive or resort";14
"maintenance of a den, dive or resort";15
"illegal chemical diversion of controlled
precursors and essential chemicals"16 ;
"manufacture or delivery"17 or "possession"18
of equipment, instrument, apparatus, and other
paraphernalia for dangerous drugs and/or
controlled precursors and essential chemicals;
possession of dangerous drugs "during parties,
social
gatherings
or
meetings"19
;
"unnecessary"20 or "unlawful"21 prescription
thereof; "cultivation or culture of plants
classified as dangerous drugs or are sources
thereof";22 and "maintenance and keeping of
original records of transactions on dangerous
drugs and/or controlled precursors and
essential chemicals.
HENCE, "[a] person apprehended or arrested"
cannot literally mean any person apprehended
or arrested for any crime.
In the case at bench, the presence of
dangerous drugs was only in the form of
residue on the drug paraphernalia, and the
accused were found positive for use of
dangerous drugs. Granting that the arrest was
legal, the evidence obtained admissible, and
the chain of custody intact, the law enforcers
should have filed charges under Sec. 15, R.A.
No. 9165 or for use of dangerous drugs and, if
there was no residue at all, they should have
been charged under Sec. 14 (Possession of
Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus and Other
Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs During
Parties, Social Gatherings or Meetings).
In order to effectively fulfill the intent of the
law to rehabilitate drug users, this Court thus
calls on law enforcers and prosecutors in
dangerous drugs cases to exercise proper
discretion in filing charges when the presence
of dangerous drugs is only and solely in the
form of residue and the confirmatory test
required under Sec. 15 is positive for use of
dangerous drugs.

In such cases, to afford the accused a chance

to be rehabilitated, the filing of charges for or
involving possession of dangerous drugs should
only be done when another separate quantity
of dangerous drugs, other than mere residue, is
found in the possession of the accused as
provided for in Sec. 15.
Moreover, the drug test is not covered by
allowable non-testimonial compulsion.
The petitioner never raised the alleged
irregularity of his arrest; thus, he is deemed to
have waived his right to question the validity of
his arrest curing whatever defect may have
attended his arrest.
However, "a waiver of an illegal warrantless
arrest does not mean a waiver of the
inadmissibility of evidence seized during an
illegal warrantless arrest." Cases where nontestimonial compulsion has been allowed
reveal, however, that the pieces of evidence
obtained were all material to the principal
cause of the arrest.
In the instant case, we fail to see how a urine
sample could be material to the charge of
extortion. The RTC and the CA, therefore, both
erred when they held that the extraction of
petitioners urine for purposes of drug testing
was "merely a mechanical act, hence, falling
outside
the
concept
of
a
custodial
investigation."
The drug test was a violation of petitioners
right to privacy and right against selfincrimination.
The face of these constitutional guarantees, we
cannot condone drug testing of all arrested
persons regardless of the crime or offense for
which the arrest is being made.

(13) ANTIQUERA vs. PEOPLE

FACTS:
PO1 Gregorio Recio, PO1 Laurence Cabutihan,
P/Insp. Eric Ibon, PO1 Rodelio Rania, and two
civilian operatives on board a patrol car and a
tricycle were conducting a police visibility
patrol on David Street, Pasay City, when they
saw two unidentified men rush out of house
and immediately boarded a jeep.

17

Suspecting that a crime had been

committed, the police officers approached
the house from where the men came and
peeked through the partially opened door
and saw accused Antiquera holding an
improvised tooter and a pink lighter.
Beside him was his live-in partner, Cruz,
who was holding an aluminum foil and an
improvised burner.

The police entered the house, introduce

themselves, arrested Antiquera and Cruz, and
confiscated all the drug paraphernalia used by
the two and those found in the house.

Petitioners were brought to the Drug

Enforcement Unit of the Philippine National
Police in Pasay City for further investigation
and testing, and resulted to negative. While the
paraphernalia were on examined by forensic
chemical officer to be positive for traces of
methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu.

On July 30, 2004 the RTC rendered a

Decision that found accused Antiquera and
Cruz guilty of the crime charged (violation
of Section 12, RA 9165 Illegal
possession of drug paraphernalia in
Comprehensive Drugs Act of 2002) and
sentenced them to a prison term ranging from
six months and one day to two years and four
months, and to pay a fine of P10,000.00 each
and the costs of the suit.

The trial court gave no weight to accused

Antiqueras claim of illegal arrest, given PO1
Recio and PO1 Cabutihans credible testimony
that, prior to their arrest, they saw Antiquera
and Cruz in a pot session at their living room
and in possession of drug paraphernalia. The
police officers were thus justified in arresting
the two without a warrant pursuant to Section
5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered a

Decision affirming in full the decision of the
trial
court.
The
accused
moved
for
reconsideration but the CA denied it. The
accused is now before this Court seeking
acquittal.

ISSUE:
WON accused Antiquera and Cruz guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of illegal
possession of drug paraphernalia based
on the evidence of the police officers that
they saw him and Cruz in the act of
possessing drug paraphernalia.
HELD:
No. The attending circumstances in this
from the facts do not make out a case of
arrest made in flagrante delicto.
Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure or Arrest in flagrante
delicto provides that a "peace officer or a
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person when, in his presence, the person to be
arrested
has
committed,
is
actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense." The overt act constituting the crime is
done in the presence or within the view of the
arresting officer.

But the circumstances here do not

make out a case of arrest made in
flagrante delicto.
1. The police officers claim that they
were alerted when they saw two
unidentified men suddenly rush
out of 107 David Street, Pasay
City. Since they suspected that a
crime had been committed, the
natural thing for them to do was
to give chase to the jeep that the
two fleeing men boarded, given
that the officers were in a patrol
car and a tricycle. Running after
the fleeing suspects was the
more urgent task but the
officers instead gave priority
to the house even when they
heard no cry for help from it.

18

2. Admittedly, the police officers

did not notice anything amiss
going on in the house from
the street where they stood.
Indeed, even as they peeked
through its partially opened door,
they
saw
no
activity
that
warranted their entering it.

Clearly,
no
crime
was
plainly
exposed to the view of the
arresting officers that authorized
the arrest of accused Antiquera
without warrant under the abovementioned rule. Considering that his
arrest was illegal, the search and seizure
that resulted from it was likewise
illegal.Consequently, the various drug
paraphernalia that the police officers
allegedly found in the house and seized
are inadmissible, having proceeded from
an invalid search and seizure. Since the
confiscated drug paraphernalia is the
very corpus delicti of the crime charged,
the Court has no choice but to
acquit the accused.

The failure of the accused to object to the

irregularity of his arrest by itself is not enough
to sustain his conviction. A waiver of an illegal
warrantless arrest does not carry with it a
waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized
during the illegal warrantless arrest.
(14) ROALLOS VS. PEOPLE
FACTS:
Vivencio Roallos, a retired officer of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, was the Executive
Director of the Aguinaldo Vets and Associates
Credit Cooperative (AVACC). BBB, AAAs
mother, worked as the secretary and treasurer
of Roallos. On April 15, 2002, at around 1:00
p.m., AAA went to BBBs office at Camp
Aguinaldo, Quezon City; BBB, however, was
then out running office errands. AAA decided to
stay in her mothers office and wait for the
latter to return. While waiting, AAA alleged that
Roallos touched her right breast and mashed it.
AAA asked why he is touching her but instead
of answering, Roallos touched her left breast
and he abdomen. AAA protested. Roallos then
left the office.

Thinking that her mother would soon return,

AAA stayed inside the office. However, Roallos
returned to the office. He then asked AAA if she
was hungry and then offered to give money to
AAA for her to buy food, but AAA refused the
offer. AAA then felt Roallos body pressing
against her back. Thereafter, Roallos attempted
to kiss AAA. AAA was unable to escape,she just
turned her face to avoid his kiss. But he pulled
her face towards him, and kissed her left
cheek. AAA then tried to free herself from the
grasp of Roallos. Roallos then left the office.
This time, AAA decided to stay outside the
AVACC office and wait for her mother to return.
Upon her return to the office, BBB saw AAA
crying. She asked AAA why she was crying.
AAA then relayed what Roallos did to her. BBB
then confronted Roallos about the incident.
Roallos, however, denied having done anything
to AAA. BBB and AAA thereafter left the office.
However, BBB saw that Roallos was following
them. Fearing that Roallos would do something
to harm them, BBB and AAA immediately
entered the office of the Department of
National Defense (DND) in Camp Aguinaldo.
They were then advised by the employees
therein to go to DNDs legal department office,
where they were advised to report the incident
to
the
police
authorities.
AAA and BBB went to the police station where
a report regarding the incident was prepared.
They then referred the report to the provost
marshal for proper coordination and to effect
the arrest of the accused. Thereafter, the police
and the provost marshal brought Roallos to the
police
station
for
investigation.
In his defense, Roallos denied that he molested
AAA. He claimed that, on the date of the
incident, he merely stayed with AAA in the
AVACC office while the latter waited for her
mother; that he went out of the office twice to
meet clients of AVACC. Roallos further claimed
that his arrest was illegal since the same was
effected sans any warrant of arrest. He likewise
averred that he was not informed of his rights
when he was arrested nor was he made to
undergo
any
preliminary
investigation.
The RTC found Roallos guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violation of Section 5(b),
Article III of R.A. No. 7610 (Special Protection of
Children Against Abuse, Exploitation, and
Discrimination Act). His MR was denied by the

19

RTC. On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of

the RTC. Hence, this petition for review on
certiorari.

timely raised and must not have

been waived. This is to allow the trial
court to hold the case in abeyance and
conduct its own investigation or require
the prosecutor to hold a reinvestigation,
which, necessarily involves a reexamination and re-evaluation of the
evidence already submitted by the
complainant and the accused, as well as
the initial finding of probable cause
which led to the filing of the
Informations
after
the
requisite
preliminary
investigation.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Roallos was denied due process
since he was not afforded a preliminary
investigation and was arrested without any
warrant of arrest.
HELD: NO
Roallos claim that he was denied due process
since he was not afforded a preliminary
investigation and that he was arrested without
warrant of arrest is untenable.

Here, it is conceded that Villarin raised

the issue of lack of a preliminary
investigation
in
his
Motion
for
Reinvestigation. However, when the
Ombudsman denied the motion, he
never raised this issue again. He
accepted the Ombudsmans verdict,
entered a plea of not guilty during his
arraignment and actively participated in
the trial on the merits by attending the
scheduled hearings, conducting crossexaminations and testifying on his own
behalf. It was only after the trial court
rendered judgment against him that he
once again assailed the conduct of the
preliminary investigation in the Motion
for Reconsideration. Whatever argument
Villarin may have regarding the alleged
absence of a preliminary investigation
has
therefore
been
mooted. By
entering his plea, and actively
participating in the trial, he is
deemed to have waived his right to
preliminary investigation.

In Miclat, Jr. v. People, the Court emphasized

that the accused is estopped from assailing any
irregularity attending his arrest should he fail to
move for the quashal of the information against
him on this ground prior to arraignment, viz:
At the outset, it is apparent that
petitioner raised no objection to the
irregularity of his arrest before his
arraignment. Considering this and
his active participation in the trial
of the case, jurisprudence dictates
that petitioner is deemed to have
submitted to the jurisdiction of the
trial court, thereby curing any
defect in his arrest. An accused is
estopped from assailing any irregularity
of his arrest if he fails to raise this issue
or to move for the quashal of the
information against him on this ground
before arraignment. Any objection
involving a warrant of arrest or the
procedure by which the court acquired
jurisdiction over the person of the
accused must be made before he enters
his plea; otherwise, the objection is
deemed waived.
In Villarin v. People, the Court stressed that the
absence of a proper preliminary investigation
must be timely raised. The accused is deemed
to have waived his right to a preliminary
investigation by entering his plea and actively
participating in the trial without raising the lack
of a preliminary investigation. Thus:
Moreover, the absence of a proper
preliminary investigation must be

It is undisputed that, at the time of his

arraignment, Roallos did not raise any
objection to the supposed illegality of his arrest
and the lack of a proper preliminary
investigation. Indeed, he actively participated
in the proceedings before the RTC. Thus, he is
deemed to have waived any perceived
irregularity in his arrest and has effectively
submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the RTC.
He is likewise deemed to have waived his right
to preliminary investigation.
The

SC

denied

the

petition.

(15) LEVISTE VS. ALAMEDA

FACTS:

20

Jose Antonio C. Leviste (petitioner) was

charged with homicide for the death of Rafael
de las Alas on January 12, 2007 before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City.
Branch 150 to which the case was raffled,
presided by Judge Elmo Alameda, forthwith
issued a commitment order against petitioner
who was placed under police custody while
confined at the Makati Medical Center. After
petitioner posted a P40,000 cash bond which
the trial court approved, he was released from
detention, and his arraignment was set on
January 24, 2007.
The private complainants-heirs of De las Alas
filed, with the conformity of the public
prosecutor,
an
Urgent
Omnibus
Motion praying, inter alia, for the deferment of
the proceedings to allow the public prosecutor
to re-examine the evidence on record or to
conduct a reinvestigation to determine the
proper
offense.
The RTC thereafter issued an Order deferring
petitioners arraignment and allowing the
prosecution to conduct a reinvestigation to
determine the proper offense, and another
order denying reconsideration of the first order.
Leviste assailed these orders via certiorari and
prohibition before the CA.
Meantime, petitioner filed an Urgent ExParte Manifestation and Motion before the trial
court to defer acting on the public prosecutor's
recommendation on the proper offense until
after the appellate court resolves his
application
for
injunctive
reliefs,
or
alternatively, to grant him time to comment on
the
prosecutor's
recommendation
and
thereafter set a hearing for the judicial
determination of probable cause. Petitioner
also separately moved for the inhibition of
Judge Alameda with prayer to defer action on
the admission of the Amended Information.
The trial court nonetheless issued the other
assailed orders, which, first, admitted the
Amended Information for murder and directed
the issuance of a warrant of arrest; and second,
set the arraignment on February 13, 2007.
Leviste questioned these two orders via a
supplemental petition before the appellate
court.
The CA dismissed Levistes petition hence this
petition for review was filed before the SC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent Judge Alameda
erred in granting the reinvestigation and
admitting State Prosecutor Velascos amended
information.
Whether or not by applying for bail, Leviste
waived his right to object to an illegal arrest.

HELD:
No. Since a reinvestigation may entail a
modification of the criminal information as
what happened in the present case, the Court's
holding is bolstered by the rule on amendment
of an information under Section 14, Rule 110 of
the Rules of Court:
A complaint or information may be
amended, in form or in substance,
without leave of court, at any time
before the accused enters his plea.
After the plea and during the trial, a
formal amendment may only be made
with leave of court and when it can be
done without causing prejudice to the
rights
of
the
accused.
However, any amendment before plea,
which downgrades the nature of the
offense charged in or excludes any
accused
from
the
complaint
or
information, can be made only upon
motion by the prosecutor, with notice to
the offended party and with leave of
court. The court shall state its reasons in
resolving the motion and copies of its
order shall be furnished all parties,
especially
the
offended
party.
If it appears at any time before
judgment that a mistake has been made
in charging the proper offense, the court
shall dismiss the original complaint or
information upon the filing of a new one
charging
the
proper
offense
in
accordance with section 11, Rule 119,
provided the accused would not be
placed in double jeopardy. The court
may require the witnesses to give bail
for their appearance at the trial.

21

In fine, before the accused enters a plea, a

formal or substantial amendment of the
complaint or information may be made without
leave of court. After the entry of a plea, only a
formal amendment may be made but with
leave of court and only if it does not prejudice
the rights of the accused. After arraignment, a
substantial amendment is proscribed except if
the same is beneficial to the accused.
It must be clarified though that not all defects
in an information are curable by amendment
prior to entry of plea. An information which is
void ab initio cannot be amended to obviate a
ground for quashal. An amendment which
operates to vest jurisdiction upon the trial court
is
likewise
impermissible.
Considering the general rule that an
information may be amended even in
substance and even without leave of court at
any time before entry of plea, does it mean
that the conduct of a reinvestigation at that
stage
is
a
mere
superfluity?
It

is

not.

Any remedial measure springing from the

reinvestigation - be it a complete disposition or
an intermediate modification of the charge - is
eventually addressed to the sound discretion of
the trial court, which must make an
independent evaluation or assessment of the
merits of the case. Since the trial court would
ultimately make the determination on the
proposed course of action, it is for the
prosecution
to
consider
whether
a
reinvestigation is necessary to adduce and
review the evidence for purposes of buttressing
the appropriate motion to be filed in court.
More importantly, reinvestigation is required in
cases involving a substantial amendment of
the information. Due process of law demands
that no substantial amendment of an
information
may
be
admitted
without
conducting another or a new preliminary
investigation. In Matalam v. The 2nd Division
of the Sandiganbayan, the Court ruled that a
substantial amendment in an information
entitles
an
accused
to
another
preliminary investigation, unless the
amended information contains a charge
related to or is included in the original
Information.

The question to be resolved is whether

the amendment of the Information from
homicide to murder is considered a
substantial amendment, which would
make it not just a right but a duty of the
prosecution to ask for a preliminary
investigation.
The Court answers in the affirmative.
A substantial amendment consists of the
recital of facts constituting the offense
charged
and
determinative
of
the
jurisdiction of the court. All other matters
are merely of form. The following have been
held to be mere formal amendments: (1)
new allegations which relate only to the range
of the penalty that the court might impose in
the event of conviction; (2) an amendment
which does not charge another offense
different or distinct from that charged in the
original one; (3) additional allegations which do
not alter the prosecution's theory of the case
so as to cause surprise to the accused and
affect the form of defense he has or will
assume; (4) an amendment which does not
adversely affect any substantial right of the
accused; and (5) an amendment that
merely adds
specifications
to
eliminate
vagueness in the information and not to
introduce new and material facts, and merely
states with additional precision something
which is already contained in the original
information and which adds nothing essential
for conviction for the crime charged.
The test as to whether a defendant is
prejudiced by the amendment is whether
a defense under the information as it
originally stood would be available after
the amendment is made, and whether any
evidence defendant might have would be
equally applicable to the information in
the one form as in the other. An
amendment to an information which does not
change the nature of the crime alleged therein
does not affect the essence of the offense or
cause surprise or deprive the accused of an
opportunity to meet the new averment had
each been held to be one of form and not of
substance.
Matalam adds that the mere fact that the two
charges are related does not necessarily or
automatically deprive the accused of his right
to another preliminary investigation. Notatu
dignum is the fact that both the original

22

Information and the amended Information

in Matalam were similarly charging the accused
with violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft
and
Corrupt
Practices
Act.

petitioner was placed on guard to defend

himself from the charge of murder after the
claimed circumstances were made known to
him
as
early
as
the
first
motion.

In one case, it was squarely held that the

amendment of the Information from homicide
to murder is "one of substance with very
serious
consequences." The
amendment
involved in the present case consists of
additional averments of the circumstances of
treachery, evident premeditation, and cruelty,
which qualify the offense charged from
homicide to murder. It being a new and
material element of the offense, petitioner
should be given the chance to adduce evidence
on the matter. Not being merely clarificatory,
the
amendment
essentially
varies
the
prosecution's original theory of the case and
certainly affects not just the form but the
weight of defense to be mustered by petitioner.

Petitioner did not, however, make much of the

opportunity to present countervailing evidence
on the proposed amended charge. Despite
notice of hearing, petitioner opted to merely
observe the proceedings and declined to
actively participate, even with extreme caution,
in the reinvestigation. Mercado v. Court of
Appeals states that the rules do not even
require, as a condition sine qua non to the
validity of a preliminary investigation, the
presence of the respondent as long as efforts
to reach him were made and an opportunity to
controvert the complainant's evidence was
accorded
him.

The Court distinguishes the factual milieus

in Buhat v. CA and Pacoy v. Cajigal, wherein the
amendment of the caption of the Information
from homicide to murder was not considered
substantial because there was no real change
in the recital of facts constituting the offense
charged as alleged in the body of the
Information, as the allegations of qualifying
circumstances were already clearly embedded
in the original Information. Buhat pointed out
that the original Information for homicide
already alleged the use of superior strength,
while Pacoy states that the averments in the
amended Information for murder are exactly
the same as those already alleged in the
original Information for homicide. None of
these peculiar circumstances obtains in the
present
case.
Considering that another or a new
preliminary investigation is required, the
fact that what was conducted in the
present case was a reinvestigation does
not invalidate the substantial amendment
of
the
Information.
There
is no
substantial
distinction
between
a
preliminary
investigation
and
a
reinvestigation since both are conducted
in the same manner and for the same
objective of determining whether there
exists sufficient ground to engender a
well-founded belief that a crime has been
committed
and
the
respondent
is
probably guilty thereof and should be
held for trial. What is essential is that

Whether or not by applying for bail,

Leviste waived his right to object to an
illegal arrest.
Waiver on the part of the accused must
be distinguished from mootness of the
petition, for in the present case, petitioner did
not, by his active participation in the trial,
waive
his
stated
objections.
Section 26, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court
provides:
SEC. 26. Bail not a bar to objections on illegal
arrest, lack of or irregular preliminary
investigation. - An application for or admission
to bail shall not bar the accused from
challenging the validity of his arrest or the
legality of the warrant issued therefor, or from
assailing the regularity or questioning the
absence of a preliminary investigation of the
charge against him, provided that he raises
them before entering his plea. The court shall
resolve the matter as early as practicable but
not later than the start of the trial of the case.
By applying for bail, petitioner did not waive his
right to challenge the regularity of the
reinvestigation of the charge against him, the
validity of the admission of the Amended
Information, and the legality of his arrest under
the Amended Information, as he vigorously
raised them prior to his arraignment.
During the arraignment on March 21, 2007,
petitioner refused to enter his plea since the
issues he raised were still pending resolution
by the appellate court, thus prompting the trial

23

court to enter a plea of "not guilty" for him.

The principle that the accused is precluded
after arraignment from questioning the illegal
arrest or the lack of or irregular preliminary
investigation applies
"only
if
hevoluntarily enters his plea and participates
during trial, without previously invoking his
objections thereto." There must be clear and
convincing proof that petitioner had an actual
intention to relinquish his right to question the
existence of probable cause. When the only
proof of intention rests on what a party does,
his act should be so manifestly consistent with,
and indicative of, an intent to voluntarily and
unequivocally relinquish the particular right
that no other explanation of his conduct is
possible.
From the given circumstances, the Court
cannot reasonably infer a valid waiver on the
part of petitioner to preclude him from
obtaining a definite resolution of the objections
he so timely invoked. Other than its allegation
of active participation, the OSG offered no clear
and
convincing
proof
that
petitioner's
participation in the trial was unconditional with
the intent to voluntarily and unequivocally
abandon his petition.
(16) RET. SPO4 LAUD VS. PEOPLE
FACTS:
Assailed in this petition for review on
certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated April 25,
2011 and the Resolution3 dated October 17,
2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP.
No. 113017 upholding the validity of Search
Warrant No. 09-14407.4
On July 10, 2009, the Philippine National Police
(PNP), through Police Senior Superintendent
Roberto B. Fajardo, applied with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 50 (ManilaRTC) for a warrant to search three (3) caves
located inside the Laud Compound in Purok 3,
Barangay Ma-a, Davao City, where the alleged
remains of the victims summarily executed by
the so-called "Davao Death Squad" may be
found.
In support of the application, a certain Ernesto
Avasola (Avasola) was presented to the
RTC(MANILA) and there testified that he
personally witnessed the killing of six (6)

persons in December 2005, He was part of the

group that buried the victims.
Judge William Simon P. Peralta (Judge Peralta),
acting as Vice Executive Judge of the ManilaRTC, found probable cause for the issuance of a
search warrant, and thus, issued Search
Warrant No. 09-144077 which was later
enforced by the elements of the PNP-Criminal
Investigation
and
Detection
Group,
in
coordination with the members of the Scene of
the Crime Operatives on July 15, 2009.
The search of the Laud Compound caves
yielded positive results for the presence of
human remains.
Petitioner, retired SPO4 Bienvenido Laud
(Laud), filed an Urgent Motion to Quash and to
Suppress Illegally Seized Evidence premised on
the following grounds :
Judge Peralta had no authority to act on
the application for a search warrant
since he had been automatically
divested of his position as Vice
Executive
Judge
when
several
administrative penalties were imposed
against him by the Court;
The Manila-RTC had no jurisdiction to
issue Search Warrant No. 09-14407
which was to be enforced in Davao City;
The human remains sought to be seized
are not a proper subject of a search
warrant;
The police officers are mandated to
follow the prescribed procedure for
exhumation of human remains;
The search warrant was issued despite
lack of probable cause;
The rule against forum shopping was
violated;
There was a violation of the rule
requiring one specific offense and
The proper specification of the place to
be searched and the articles to be
seized.
MANILA-RTC GRANTED THE MOTION OF
LAUD.
Respondent, the People of the Philippines (the
People), filed a Motion for Reconsideration
which was denied for :
The People failed to show any
compelling reason to justify the issuance
of a search warrant by the Manila RTC
which was to be implemented in Davao
City where the offense was allegedly

24

committed, in violation of Section 2,

Rule 126 of the Rules of Court; the fact
that the alleged offense happened
almost four (4) years before the search
warrant application was filed rendered
doubtful the existence of probable
cause;
The applicant, i.e., the PNP, violated the
rule against forum shopping as the
subject matter of the present search
warrant application is exactly the same
as the one contained in a previous
application before the RTC of Davao.

The People filed a petition for certiorari

before the CA.
CA GRANTED THE PEOPLES PETITION
annulling and setting aside the Orders of the
Manila-RTC for having been tainted with grave
abuse of discretion. The CA found that :
The requirements for the issuance of a search
warrant were satisfied for the application
involved a heinous crime, such as Murder
which results in an exception to the
compelling reasons requirement under
Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court
(explicitly recognized in A.M. No. 99-20-09SC25 and reiterated in A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC,26
provided that the application is filed by the
PNP, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI),
the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task
Force (PAOC-TF) or the Reaction Against Crime
Task Force (REACT-TF),27 with the endorsement
of its head, before the RTC of Manila or Quezon
City, and the warrant be consequently issued
by the Executive Judge or Vice-Executive Judge
of either of the said courts).
Probable cause was established since,
among others, witness Avasola deposed and
testified that he personally witnessed the
murder of six (6) persons in December 2005
and was actually part of the group that buried
the victims.
The court deemed that the physical evidence
of a protruding human bone in plain view in
one of the caves, and Avasolas first-hand eye
witness account both concur and point to the
only reasonable conclusion that the crime
of Murder had been committed and that
the human remains of the victims were located
in the Laud Compound.

Manila-RTC failed to consider the fear of

reprisal and natural reluctance of a witness to
get involved in a criminal case, considering the
fear of reprisal and natural reluctance of the
witness sufficient reasons to justify the delay
attending the application of a search warrant.
The CA found no forum shopping the first
filed in Davao-RTC was based on facts and
circumstances different from those in the
application filed before the Manila-RTC.
Dissatisfied, Laud moved for reconsideration
which was denied.
ISSUE:
W/N the requisites for issuing a search warrant
were complied with in this case?
W/N the warrant in question was a scattershot
warrant?
W/N Forum shopping was committed in this
case?
HELD:
YES. First Lauds contention that Judge Peralta
did not have authority is false for Judge Peralta
acted as a De Facto officer1. The abstraction of
1 A de facto officer is one who derives his
appointment from one having colorable authority
to appoint, if the office is an appointive office,
and whose appointment is valid on its face. He
may also be one who is in possession of an office,
and is discharging [his] duties under color of
authority, by which is meant authority derived
from an appointment, however irregular or
informal, so that the incumbent is not a mere
volunteer. Consequently, the acts of the de facto
officer are just as valid for all purposes as those
of a de jure officer, in so far as the public or third
persons who are interested therein are
concerned.
The treatment of a de facto officers acts is
premised on the reality that third persons cannot
always investigate the right of one assuming to
hold an important office and, as such, have a
right to assume that officials apparently qualified
and in office are legally such.38 Public interest
demands that acts of persons holding, under
color of title, an office created by a valid statute
be, likewise, deemed valid insofar as the public
as distinguished from the officer in question is
concerned.39 Indeed, it is far more cogently
acknowledged that the de facto doctrine has
been formulated, not for the protection of the de
facto officer principally, but rather for the
protection of the public and individuals who get
involved in the official acts of persons discharging

25

such authority would not, by and of itself,

result in the invalidity of Search Warrant. The
court decides that the De Facto Doctrine is
for the protection of the public and individuals
who get involved in the official acts of persons
discharging the duties of an office without
being lawful officers.
3 elements are needed for the doctrine to
apply :
There must be a de jure office; there
must be color of right or general
acquiescence by the public; and there
must be actual physical possession of
the office in good faith.
All of the elements are present in the
case for there is de jure office of a 2nd
Vice-Executive Judge.
The Judge had a colorable right to the
said office as he was duly appointed to
such position and was only divested of
the same by virtue of a supervening
legal technicality. And lastly Good faith
is presumed for the contrary was not
established.

Therefore Judge Peralta is with authority and

thus his actions are valid.
Secondly Manila RTC has Jurisdiction for the
case involved a special criminal case, Murder.
Section 12, Chapter V of AM No. 03-8-02-SC
provides the requirements for the exception
towards the Compelling Reasons Requirement
Under Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.
The case involves heinous crimes;
Search warrant applications may be filed
by "the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI), the Philippine National Police(PNP)
and the Anti-Crime Task Force (ACTAF),"
and "personally endorsed by the heads
of such agencies."; warrant applications
shall particularly describe therein the
places to be searched and/or the
property or things to be seized as
prescribed in the Rules of Court;
Whenever the Executive Judges are on
official leave of absence or are not
physically present in the station, the
Vice-Executive Judges" are authorized to
act on such applications and "shall issue
the warrants, if justified, which may be
the duties of an office without being lawful
officers

served in places outside the territorial

jurisdiction of the said courts.
The court finds that the requirements are
complied with.
Thirdly concerning the probable cause needed
the
court
finds
that
the
facts
and
circumstances established from the testimony
of Avasola who was personally examined by
the Judge sufficiently show that more likely
than not the crime of Murder was perpetrated
and that the human remains in connection with
the same are in the place sought to be
searched. The quantum of evidence to
establish probable cause had been met here.
To the Courts mind, the supposed delay in the
search warrants application does not dilute the
probable cause finding made herein.
Fourthly concerning (A) the requirement of
particularly describing the place to be searched
and persons or things to be seized the court
deems the requirement to have been met here.
The warrant approved complies with the
courts standard of a warrant that is
constitutional the description of a place to be
searched is sufficient if the officer with the
warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain
and identify the place intended and distinguish
it from other places in the community. Any
designation or description known to the locality
that points out the place to the exclusion of all
others, and on inquiry leads the officers
unerringly to it
(B) concerning the petitioners contention that
the human remains are not personal property
the court states that Considering that human
remains can generally be transported from
place to place, as is stated in Article 416 (Civil
Code) and considering further that they qualify
under the phrase "subject of the offense" given
that they prove the crimes corpus delicti,56 it
follows that they may be valid subjects of a
search warrant under Sec. 3 of Rule 126 (Rules
of Court). the Court sees it, the description
points to no other than the things that bear a
direct relation to the offense committed, i.e., of
Murder.
If the articles desired to be seized have any
direct relation to an offense committed, the
applicant
must
necessarily
have
some
evidence, other than those articles, to prove
the said offense; and the articles subject of
search and seizure should come in handy

26

merely to strengthen such evidence, as is with

the account of Avasola.
NO. Concerning the one-specific-offense rule
under Section 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court,
intended to prevent the issuance of scattershot
warrants, or those which are issued for more
than one specific offense. The court finds that
the rule on one specific offense was not
violated for it only concerns Murder.
NO. Forum shopping cannot be said to have
been committed in this case considering the
various points of divergence attending the
search warrant application before the ManilaRTC and that before the Davao-RTC. For one,
the witnesses presented in each application
were different. Likewise, the application filed in
Manila was in connection with Murder, while
the one in Davao did not specify any crime.
Finally, and more importantly, the places to be
searched were different that in Manila sought
the search of the Laud Compound caves, while
that in Davao was for a particular area in the
Laud Gold Cup Firing Range. There being no
identity of facts and circumstances between
the two applications, the rule against forum
shopping was therefore not violated.

(17) PLDT COMPANY VS. ALVAREZ

FACTS:
To prevent or stop network fraud, PLDTs ACP
Detection Division (ACPDD) regularly visits
foreign countries to conduct market research
on various prepaid phone cards offered abroad
that allow their users to make overseas calls to
PLDT subscribers in the Philippines at a
cheaper
rate.
The ACPDD bought The Number One prepaid
card a card principally marketed to Filipinos
residing in UK for calls to the Philippines to
make test calls using two telephone lines: the
dialing phone an IDDcapable telephone
line which makes the call and through which
the access number and the PIN number printed
at the back of the card are entered; and the
receiving phone a caller identification
(caller id) unitequipped telephone line which
would receive the call and reflect the incoming

callers

telephone

number.

During a test call placed at the PLDTACPDD

office, the receiving phone reflected a PLDT
telephone number (28243285) as the calling
number used, as if the call was originating
from a local telephone in Metro Manila. Upon
verification
with
the
PLDTs
Integrated
Customer Management (billing) System, the
ACPDD learned that the subscriber of the
reflected telephone number is Abigail R. Razon
Alvarez, with address at 17 Dominic Savio St.,
Savio Compound, Barangay Don Bosco,
Paraaque City. It further learned that several
lines are installed at this address with Abigail
and Vernon R. Razon (respondents), among
others, as subscribers.
The same test calls were conducted by ACPDD
on November 5, 2003 at the premises of the
NTC in Quezon City (and in the presence of an
NTC representative) using the same prepaid
card (validation test). The receiving phone at
the NTC premises reflected the telephone
numbers registered in the name of Abigail as
the calling number from the United Kingdom.
Similar test calls subsequently conducted using
the prepaid cards Unity Card and IDT
Supercalling Card revealed the same results.
The
calleridequipped
receiving
phone
reflected telephone numbers13 that are in the
names of Experto Enterprises and Experto
Phils, as subscribers, with a common address
at No. 38 Indonesia St., Better Living
Subdivision, Barangay Don Bosco, Paraaque
City. It turned out that the actual occupant of
these premises is also Abigail. Subsequently, a
validation test was also conducted, yielding
several telephone numbers registered in the
name of Experto Phils./Experto Enterprises as
the calling numbers supposedly from the
United
Kingdom.
According to PLDT, had an ordinary and
legitimate call been made, the screen of the
calleridequipped receiving phone would not
reflect a local number or any number at all. In
the cards they tested, however, once the caller
enters the access and pin numbers, the
respondents would route the call via the
internet to a local telephone number (in this
case, a PLDT telephone number) which would
connect the call to the receiving phone. Since
calls through the internet never pass the toll
center of the PLDTs IGF, users of these prepaid
cards can place a call to any point in the

27

Philippines (provided the local line is NDD

capable) without the call appearing as coming
from
abroad.15

communications and documents relating to

securing and using telephone lines and/or
equipment.

On November 6, 2003 and November 19, 2003,

Mr. Lawrence Narciso of the PLDTs Quality
Control Division, together with the operatives
of the Philippine National Police (PNP),
conducted an ocular inspection at 17 Dominic
Savio St., Savio Compound and at No. 38
Indonesia St., Better Living Subdivision both
in Barangay Don Bosco, Paranaque City and
discovered that PLDT telephone lines were
connected to several pieces of equipment.

On the same date, the PNP searched the

premises indicated in the warrants. On
December 10, 2003, a return was made with a
complete inventory of the items seized. On
January 14, 2004, the PLDT and the PNP filed
with the Department of Justice a joint
complaintaffidavit for theft and for violation of
PD No. 401 against the respondents.

Four search warrants were issued for violations

of Article 308, in relation to Article 309, of the
RPC (SW A1 and SW A2) and of PD No. 401,
as amended (SW B1 and SW B2) for the ISR
activities being conducted at 17 Dominic Savio
St., Savio Compound and at No. 38 Indonesia
St., Better Living Subdivision, both in Barangay
Don Bosco, Paranaque City. The four search
warrants enumerated the objects to be
searched and seized as follows:1. MERIDIAN
SUBSCRIBERS UNIT AND PLDT DSL LINES
and/or CABLES AND ANTENNAS and/or similar
equipment or device capable of transmitting air
waves or frequency, such as a Meridian
Subscribers
Unit,
Broadband
DSL
and
telephone lines; 2. PERSONAL COMPUTERS or
any similar equipment or device capable of
accepting information applying the prescribed
process of the information and supplying the
result of this process; 3. NOKIA MODEM or any
similar equipment or device that enables data
terminal equipment such as computers to
communicate with other data
terminal
equipment via a telephone line; 4. QUINTUM
Equipment or any similar equipment capable of
receiving digital signals from the internet and
converting those signals to voice; 5. QUINTUM,
3COM AND CISCO Routers or any similar
equipment capable of switching packets of
data to their assigned destination or addresses;
6. LINKS DSL SWITCH or any similar equipment
capable of switching data; 7.COMPUTER
PRINTERS AND SCANNERS or any similar
equipment or device used for copying and/or
printing data and/or information; 8. SOFTWARE,
DISKETTES, TAPES or any similar equipment or
device
used
for
recording
or
storing
information;
and
9. Manuals, phone cards, access codes, billing
statements, receipts, contracts, checks, orders,
communications and documents, lease and/or
subscription
agreements
or
contracts,

The respondents filed with the RTC a motion to

quash the search warrants essentially on the
following grounds: first, the RTC had no
authority to issue search warrants which were
enforced in Paraaque City; second, the
enumeration of the items to be searched and
seized lacked particularity; and third, there was
no probable cause for the crime of theft.
RTC denied the respondents' motion to quash.
The CA rendered the assailed decision and
resolution, granting the respondents' petition
for certiorari. The CA quashed SW Al and
SW A2 (for theft) on the ground that they
were issued for nonexistent crimes. Relying
on this Courts decision in Laurel v. Judge
Abrogar, the CA ruled that the respondents
could not have possibly committed the crime of
theft because PLDTs business of providing
telecommunication services and these services
themselves are not personal properties
contemplated under Article 308 of the RPC.
With respect to SW Bl and SW B2 (for
violation of PD No. 401), the CA upheld
paragraphs one to six of the enumeration of
items subject of the search. The CA nullified
the ensuing paragraphs, 7, 8 and 9, for lack of
particularity and ordered the return of the
items seized under these provisions.
ISSUE:
WON the search warrant is valid.
HELD:
The constitutional requirement for the issuance
of a search warrant is reiterated under Sections
4 and 5, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure. These sections lay down
the following requirements for the issuance of a
search warrant: (1) the existence of probable

28

cause; (2) the probable cause must be

determined personally by the judge; (3) the
judge must examine, in writing and under oath
or affirmation, the complainant and the
witnesses he or she may produce; (4) the
applicant and the witnesses testify on the facts
personally known to them; and (5) the warrant
specifically describes the place to be searched
and the things to be seized. Should any of
these requisites be absent, the party aggrieved
by the issuance and enforcement of the search
warrant may file a motion to quash the search
warrant with the issuing court or with the court
where the action is subsequently instituted.
Reviewing the RTCs denial of the motion
to quash SWAl and SW A2
In the present case, the issue is whether the
commission of an ISR activity, in the manner
that PLDTs evidence shows, sufficiently
establishes probable cause for the issuance
of search warrants for the crime of theft.
Unlike in Savage, the Court in Laurel was not
confronted with the issue of decriminalization
(which is a legislative prerogative) but whether
the commission of an ISR activity meets the
elements of the offense of theft for purposes of
quashing an information. Since the Court, in
Laurel, ultimately ruled then an ISR activity
justifies the elements of theft that must
necessarily be alleged in the information a
fortiori, the RTCs determination should be
sustained on certiorari.
The requirement of particularity in SWB1
and SWB2
According to PLDT, it corroborates the fact that
the respondents have made a business out of
their illegal connections to its telephone lines.
We disagree with PLDT. The fact that the
printers and scanners are or may be connected
to the other illegal connections to the PLDT
telephone lines does not make them the
subject of the offense or fruits of the offense,
much less could they become a means of
committing an offense.
It is clear from PLDTs submission that it
confuses the crime for which SW Bl and SW
B2 were issued with the crime for which SW
Al and SWA2 were issued: SW Bl and SW
B2 were issued for violation of PD No. 401, to
be enforced in two different places as identified
in the warrants. The crime for which these
search warrants were issued does not pertain

to the crime of theft where matters of

personal property and the taking thereof with
intent to gain become significant but to PD
No.
401.
These items could not be the subject of a
violation of PD No. 401 since PLDT itself does
not claim that these items themselves
comprise the unauthorized installations. For
emphasis, what PD No. 401 punishes is the
unauthorized
installation
of
telephone
connection without the previous consent of
PLDT. In the present case, PLDT has not shown
that connecting printers, scanners, diskettes or
tapes to a computer, even if connected to a
PLDT telephone line, would or should require its
prior
authorization.
Neither could these items be a means of
committing a violation of PD No. 401 since
these copying, printing and storage devices in
no way aided the respondents in making the
unauthorized connections. While these items
may be accessory to the computers and other
equipment linked to telephone lines, PD No.
401 does not cover this kind of items within the
scope of the prohibition. To allow the seizure of
items under the PLDTs interpretation would, as
the CA correctly observed, allow the seizure
under the warrant of properties for personal
use
of
the
respondents.
If PLDT seeks the seizure of these items to
prove that these installations contain the
respondents'
financial
gain
and
the
corresponding business loss to PLDT, then that
purpose is served by SW Al and SW A2 since
this is what PLDT essentially complained of in
charging the respondents with theft. However,
the same reasoning does not justify its seizure
under a warrant for violation of PD No. 401
since these items are not directly connected to
the PLDT telephone lines and PLDT has not
even claimed that the installation of these
items requires prior authorization from it.
WHEREFORE,
premises
considered,
the
petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The decision
and the resolution of the Court of Appeals in
CAG.R. SP No. 89213 are hereby MODIFIED in
that SW Al and SW A2 are hereby declared
valid and constitutional.
(18) CENTURY CHINESE MEDICINE CO.
VS. PEOPLE
FACTS:

29

PETITIONERS CLAIMS
Petitioners contend that the products seized
from their respective stores cannot be the
subject of the search warrants and seizure as
those Top Gel products are not fruits of any
crime, infringed product not intended to be
used in any crime; that they are legitimate
distributors who are authorized to sell the
same, since those genuine top gel products
bore the original trademark/tradename of TOP
GEL MCA, owned and distributed by Yu.
Petitioners also claim that despite the RTC's
order to release the seized TOP GEL products,
not one had been returned; that one or two
samples from each petitioner's' drugstore
would have sufficed in case there is a need to
present them in a criminal prosecution, and
that confiscation of thousands of these
products was an overkill. Petitioners also argue
that the issue that the RTC erred in applying
the rules of search and seizure in anticipation
of a civil action was never raised in the RTC.
RESPONDENTS CLAIMS
Respondent Ling Na Lau, doing business under
the name and the style Worldwide Pharmacy, is
the sole distributor and registered trademark
owner of TOP GEL T.G. & DEVICE OF A LEAF
papaya whitening soap for a period of ten
years from 2003. Respondent claims that the
petitioners in this case were selling counterfeit
whitening papaya soaps bearing the general
appearance of their products. There was an
investigation, which led to seizures of the
petitioner's products because the NBI ruled
that it was counterfeit.
ISSUES:
WON the CA erred in reversing the RTC's
quashal of the assailed search warrants
HELD:
The applications for the issuance of the
assailed search warrants were for violations of
Sections 155 and 168, both in relation to
Section 170 of Republic Act (RA) No. 8293,
otherwise known as the Intellectual Property
Code of the Philippines. Section 155, in relation
to
Section
170,
punishes
trademark
infringement; while Section 168, in relation to
Section 170, penalizes unfair competition.

The SC agrees with the CA that A.M. No. 02-106-SC, which provides for the Rules on the
Issuance of the Search and Seizure in Civil
Actions for Infringement of Intellectual Property
Rights, is not applicable in this case as the
search warrants were not applied based
thereon, but in anticipation of criminal actions
for violation of intellectual property rights
under RA 8293. - It was established that
respondent had asked the NBI for assistance to
conduct an investigation and search warrant
implementation for the possible apprehension
of several drugstore owners selling imitation or
counterfeit TOP GEL T.G. & DEVICE OF A LEAF
papaya whitening soap.
Also, in his affidavit to support his application
for the issuance of the search warrants, NBI
Agent Furing stated that "the items to be
seized will be used as relevant evidence in the
criminal actions that are likely to be instituted."
Hence, Rule 126 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure applies. - The affidavits of NBI Agent
Furing and his witnesses, Esmael and Ling,
clearly showed that they are seeking protection
for the trademark "TOP GEL T.G. and DEVICE
OF A LEAF" registered to respondent by the IPO
on 2003. While petitioners claim that the
product they are distributing was owned by Yu
with the trademark TOP GEL MCA and MCA
DEVISE, it was different from the trademark
TOP GEL T.G. and DEVICE OF A LEAF subject of
the application.
(19) DEL CASTILLO VS. PEOPLE
FACTS:
Police Officers headed by SPO3 Bienvenido
Masnayon went to serve a search warrant from
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) to Petitioner
Ruben Del Castillo in search of illegal drugs.
Upon arrival, somebody shouted raid which
prompted the police officers to immediately
disembark from the jeep they were riding and
go directly to Del Castillos house and cordoned
it off. Police men found nothing incriminating in
Del Castillos residence, but one of the
barangay tanods was able to confiscate from
the hut several articles including four (4)
plastic
packs
of
methamphetamine
hydrochloride, or shabu.
An Information was filed before RTC against Del
Castillo, charging him with violation of Section
16, Article III of R.A. 6425 (The Dangerous

30

Drugs Act of 1972). During the arraignment,

Del Castillo pleaded not guilty.
The RTC found Del Castillo guilty beyond
reasonable of the charge against him in the
information. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed
the decision.
Del Castillo appealed his case to the CA: There
was a violation of his constitutional guaranty
against unreasonable searches and seizure.
OSG argued that the constitutional guaranty
against unreasonable searches and seizure is
applicable only against government authorities.
Hence, assuming that the items seized were
found in another place not designated in the
search warrant, the same items should still be
admissible as evidence because the one who
discovered them was a barangay tanod who is
a private individual.
ISSUES:
WON there was a violation of Del Castillos
right against unreasonable searches and
seizure.
Thus,
rendering
the
evidence
inadmissible.
HELD: There was a violation. Evidence must be
inadmissible.
It must be remembered that the warrant issued
must particularly describe the place to be
searched and persons or things to be seized in
order for it to be valid. A designation or
description that points out the place to be
searched to the exclusion of all others, and on
inquiry unerringly leads the peace officers to it,
satisfies the constitutional requirement of
definiteness.

designated in the search warrant, the same

items should still be admissible as evidence
because the one who discovered them was a
barangay tanod who is a private individual, the
constitutional guaranty against unreasonable
searches and seizure being applicable only
against government authorities. The contention
is devoid of merit. It was testified to during trial
by the police officers who effected the search
warrant that they asked the assistance of the
barangay tanods. Having been established that
the assistance of the barangay tanods was
sought by the police authorities who effected
the search warrant, the same barangay tanods
therefore acted as agents of persons in
authority.
Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code defines
persons in authority and agents of persons in
authority as any person directly vested with
jurisdiction, whether as an individual or as a
member of some court or governmental
corporation, board or commission, shall be
deemed a person in authority. A barangay
captain and a barangay chairman shall also be
deemed a person in authority. A person who,
by direct provision of law or by election or by
appointment by competent authority, is
charged with the maintenance of public order
and the protection and security of life and
property, such as barrio councilman, barrio
policeman and barangay leader, and any
person who comes to the aid of persons in
authority, shall be deemed an agent of a
person in authority.

The confiscated items, having been found in

a place other than the one described in
the search warrant, can be considered as
fruits of an invalid warrantless search, the
presentation of which as an evidence is a
violation of Del Castillos constitutional
guaranty against unreasonable searches and
seizure.

The Local Government Code also contains a

provision which describes the function of a
barangay tanod as an agent of persons in
authority. Section 388 of the Local Government
Code reads: For purposes of the Revised Penal
Code, the punong barangay, sangguniang
barangay members, and members of the
lupong tagapamayapa in each barangay shall
be deemed as persons in authority in their
jurisdictions, while other barangay officials and
members who may be designated by law or
ordinance and charged with the maintenance
of public order, protection and security of life
and property, or the maintenance of a
desirable and balanced environment, and any
barangay member who comes to the aid of
persons in authority, shall be deemed agents of
persons in authority.

The OSG argued that, assuming that the items

seized were found in another place not

By virtue of the above provisions, the police

officers, as well as the barangay tanods were

In the present case, the search warrant

specifically designates or describes the
residence of the petitioner as the place to be
searched. Incidentally, the items were seized
by a barangay tanod in a nipa hut, 20 meters
away from the residence of the Del Castillo.

31

acting as agents of a person in authority during

the conduct of the search. Thus, the search
conducted
was
unreasonable
and
the
confiscated items are inadmissible in evidence.
(20) PEOPLE VS. CALANTIAO
FACTS:
The accused was charged before the RTC of
violation of Sec. 11, Art. II of RA 9165 in a
information filed - That on or about the 11th
day of November, 2003 in Caloocan City, the
accused, without any authority of law, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
have in his possession, custody and control two
(2) bricks of dried marijuana fruiting tops with
a total weight of 997 .9 grams, knowing the
same to be a dangerous drug.
In the afternoon of November 12, 2003, while
PO1 Mariano and PO3 Ramirez were on duty,
Lojera arrived at their office and asked police
assistance regarding a shooting incident that
while driving a towing truck and traversing
along EDSA Balintawak, he had a traffic dispute
with a taxi which he followed the taxi until it
reached C-3 Road, Caloocan City; that the
passengers of the taxi (calantiao), alighted and
fired their guns; that he was surprised thus he
continued his driving until he reached a police
station nearby.
PO1 Mariano and PO3 Ramirez immediately
responded to the place where the taxi was
found, and while approaching the same, 2
armed men alighted and fired their guns
towards them and ran away. Thus, they chased
them but they were subdued. A black bag
containing 2 bricks of marijuana and a
magazine of super 38 stainless with ammos
and .38 revolver was recovered from them.
Defense:
The case originated from a traffic mishap
where the taxi almost collided with another car;
Reyes opened the window and made a FU
sign against the persons on board of the
another car; this prompted the latter to chase
them and when they were caught in traffic,
PO1 Mariano, who boarded the other car,
alighted and kick the taxi where PO1 uttered
PI mo bakit mo ako pinakyu hindi mo ba ako
kilala? and that he poked his gun to Reyes and
Calantiao and gun fired. Then they were
handcuffed and brought to the police station.
They were framed up of using drugs.

RTC guilty; illegal drug seized was admissible

in evidence as it was discovered during a body
search after Calantiao was caught in flagrante
delicto of possessing a gun and firing at the
police officers. Moreover, the RTC found all the
elements of the offense to have been duly
established by the prosecution.
CA affirmed RTC; there was sufficient reason
to justify a warrantless arrest, as the police
officers were acting on a legitimate complaint
and had a reasonable suspicion that the
persons identified at the scene were the
perpetrators of the offense; hat the search and
subsequent seizure of the marijuana in
question was lawful and valid, being incidental
to a lawful arrest.
ISSUES:
WON the arrest and search was done lawfully.
HELD: YES
Search and Seizure of Marijuana valid
Section 13, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure - Search incident to lawful
arrest. A person lawfully arrested may be
searched for dangerous weapons or anything
which may have been used or constitute proof
in the commission of an offense without a
search warrant.
The purpose of allowing a warrantless search
and seizure incident to a lawful arrest is "to
protect the arresting officer from being harmed
by the person arrested, who might be armed
with a concealed weapon, and to prevent the
latter from destroying evidence within reach.
It is therefore a reasonable exercise of the
States police power to protect (1) law
enforcers from the injury that may be inflicted
on them by a person they have lawfully
arrested; and (2) evidence from being
destroyed by the arrestee. It seeks to ensure
the safety of the arresting officers and the
integrity of the evidence under the control and
within the reach of the arrestee.
Moreover, in lawful arrests, it becomes both the
duty and the right of the apprehending officers
to conduct a warrantless search not only on the
person of the suspect, but also in the
permissible area within the latters reach.

32

Otherwise stated, a valid arrest allows the

seizure of evidence or dangerous weapons
either on the person of the one arrested or
within the area of his immediate control. The
phrase "within the area of his immediate
control" means the area from within which he
might gain possession of a weapon or
destructible evidence. A gun on a table or in a
drawer in front of one who is arrested can be as
dangerous to the arresting officer as one
concealed in the clothing of the person
arrested.
In the case at bar, the marijuana was found in
a black bag in Calantiaos possession and
within his immediate control. He could have
easily taken any weapon from the bag or
dumped it to destroy the evidence inside it. As
the black bag containing the marijuana was in
Calantiaos possession, it was within the
permissible area that the apprehending officers
could validly conduct a warrantless search.
Calantiaos argument that the marijuana
cannot be used as evidence against him
because its discovery was in violation of the
Plain View Doctrine, is misplaced.
The Plain View Doctrine is actually the
exception to the inadmissibility of evidence
obtained in a warrantless search incident to a
lawful arrest outside the suspects person and
premises under his immediate control. This is
so because "[o]bjects in the plain view of an
officer who has the right to be in the position to
have that view are subject to seizure and may
be presented as evidence."
The Plain View Doctrine thus finds no
applicability in Calantiaos situation because
the police officers purposely searched him
upon his arrest. The police officers did not
inadvertently come across the black bag, which
was in Calantiaos possession; they deliberately
opened it, as part of the search incident to
Calantiaos lawful arrest.
Inventory and Chain of Custody of Evidence
This Court has held that the failure to strictly
comply with Section 21, Article II of Republic
Act No. 9165, such as immediately marking
seized drugs, will not automatically impair the
integrity of chain of custody because what is of
utmost importance is the preservation of the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the
seized items, as these would be utilized in the

determination of the guilt or innocence of the

accused.
Section 21 and its IRR do not even mention
"marking." What they require are (1) physical
inventory, and (2) taking of photographs.
The prosecution was able to establish the chain
of custody of the seized marijuana from the
time the police officers confiscated it, to the
time it was turned over to the investigating
officer, up to the time it was brought to the
forensic chemist for laboratory examination.
This Court has no reason to overrule the RTC
and the Court of Appeals, which both found the
chain of custody of the seized drugs to have
not been broken so as to render the marijuana
seized from Calantiao inadmissible in evidence.
Furthermore, unless it can be shown that there
was bad faith, ill will, or tampering of the
evidence, the presumption that the integrity of
the evidence has been preserved will remain.
The burden of showing the foregoing to
overcome the presumption that the police
officers handled the seized drugs with
regularity, and that they properly discharged
their duties is on Calantiao. Unfortunately,
Calantiao failed to discharge such burden.

(21) SANTOS VS. PRYCE GASES, INC.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on the decision of
Court of Appeals to reversed the twin orders of
RTC Iloilo City quashing the warrant it issued
and ordering the return of LPG cylinders seized
from petitioner.
Pryce is a domestic corporation engaged in
manufacturing and distributing industrial gases
and LPG products. In 2002, Pryce noticed the
decline of return of LPG cylinders for refilling.
Pryce employees suspected that LPG cylinders
had been removed from market circulation and
refilled by their competitors, one of whoom is
Sun Gas and Santos as the manager.
Figueroa, Pryce's sales manger for Panay
sought the assistance of CIDG to recoverLPG
cylinders allegedly in posession of Sun Gas.
Criminal Investigation and Detection Group
(CIDG)
conducted
surveillance
on
the

33

warehouse of Sun Gas then later requested the

Bureau of Fire Protection (BFP) to conduct a
routine fire inspection at Sun Gas. CIDG
operatives entered the warehouse and were
able to take photographs of LPG cylinders
(PO@ Demandara).
Demandara applied before RTC Iloilo for a
warrant to search the premises with the
allegation that Pryce LPG cylinders were
tampered and replaced with Sun Gas marking,
averred also that Sun Gas is distributing Pryce
LPG products without the consent of Pryce. RTC
issued the search warrant with the authority to
seize the following items:
1. Assorted sizes of PRYCE LPG GAS TANKS
CYLINDERS in different kilograms.
2. Suspected LPG gas tanks cylinders with
printed/mark SUN GAS INC., trademark and
embossed Pryce Gas Trademark scrapped off.
3. Other materials used in tampering the PRYCE
LPG GAS TANKS cylinders. The authorities have
seize a number of Pryce LPG tanks.
Santos then filed for motion to quash the
search warrant on the grounds of lack of
probable cause as well as deception and fraud
in obtaining evidence in support of the
application, violating article 3, section 2 of
constitution and Rule 126 of rules of court.

petitioners personality to file the motion to

quash.
On 16 January 2004, the Court of Appeals
rendered the assailed Decision, which set aside
the two orders of the trial court. The appellate
court also ordered the return of the seized
items
to
respondent.
Petitioner
sought
reconsideration but was denied in an order
dated 16 July 2004.
ISSUES:
(1) WON petitioner has authority to seek the
quashal of the search warrant;
(2) WHO has proper custody of the seized
items; and
(3) WON respondent correctly availed of the
special civil action for certiorari to assail the
quashal of the search warrant.
HELD:

On the same day, CIDG filed a criminal

complaint before the office of City Prosecutor of
Iloilo against Santos, charging him with
violation of RA No. 632.

1. The Court of Appeals ruled against petitioner

and reversed the trial courts quashal of the
search warrant solely on the ground that
petitioner, being a mere manager of Sun Gas,
Inc., failed to show his authority to act on
behalf of the corporation and, therefore, had no
legal personality to question the validity of the
search warrant. Thus, it concluded that the trial
court committed grave abuse of discretion in
entertaining
and
subsequently
granting
petitioners motion to quash.

After hearing, RTC granted the motion to quash

, stating that the probable cause as found by it
at the time of the application for search
warrant fell short of the requisite probable
cause necessary to sustain the validity of the
search warrant.

Well-settled is the rule that the legality of a

seizure can be contested only by the party
whose rights have been impaired thereby, and
the objection to an unlawful search and seizure
is purely personal and cannot be availed of by
third parties.

Respondent filed a manifestation and motion to

hold in abeyance the release of the seized
items. It also filed a motion for reconsideration
of the 16 July 2002 Order but was denied in an
Order dated 9 August 2002.

2. In quashing the search warrant, it would

appear that the trial court had raised the
standard of probable cause to whether there
was sufficient cause to hold petitioner for trial.
In so doing, the trial court committed grave
abuse of discretion.

Respondent elevated the matter to the Court of

Appeals via a special civil action for certiorari,
arguing that the trial court committed grave
abuse of discretion in quashing the search
warrant. The petition essentially questioned the
quashal of the search warrant despite a prior
finding of probable cause and the failure of
petitioner to prove that he bought the seized
items from respondent. It also challenged

Probable cause for a search warrant is defined

as such facts and circumstances which would
lead a reasonably discrete and prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed
and that the objects sought in connection with
the offense are in the place sought to be
searched. A finding of probable cause needs
only to rest on evidence showing that, more

34

likely than not, a crime has been committed

and that it was committed by the accused.
Probable cause demands more than bare
suspicion; it requires less than evidence which
would justify conviction.
3.The Court of Appeals, however, erred in
ordering the return of the seized items to
respondent. Section 4, Rule 126 of the Revised
Criminal Procedure expressly mandates the
delivery of the seized items to the judge who
issued the search warrant to be kept in
custodia legis in anticipation of the criminal
proceedings against petitioner. The delivery of
the items seized to the court which issued the
warrant together with a true and accurate
inventory thereof, duly verified under oath, is
mandatory in order to preclude the substitution
of said items by interested parties.
The judge who issued the search warrant is
mandated to ensure compliance with the
requirements for (1) the issuance of a detailed
receipt for the property received, (2) delivery of
the seized property to the court, together with
(3) a verified true inventory of the items
seized.
Any violation of the foregoing
constitutes contempt of court.
The seized items should remain in the custody
of the trial court which issued the search
warrant pending the institution of criminal
action against petitioner.
Petition denied.
(22) HPS
SOFTWARE
AND
COMMUNICATION CORP. VS. PLTD
COMPANY
FACTS:
Complainant PAOCTF filed two applications for
the issuance of search warrant against HPS
Software and Communication Corporation for
violation of Art. 308 of the Revised Penal Code
for Theft of Telephone Services and for violation
of P.D. 401 for unauthorized installation of
telephone commmunication equipments. The
alleged theft was committed by HPS Software
using International Simple Resale. This is a
method of routing and completing international
long distance call using pre-paid card which
HPS Corporation are selling in the States. These
calls are made through access number and by
passes the PLDT International Gate Way
Facilities and by passes the monitoring system,

thus making the international long distance

calls appear as local calls, to the damage and
prejudice of PLDT which is deprived of
revenues as a result thereof.
Complainants witnesses Richard Dira and
Reuben Hinagdanan testified that by making
test calls they were able to discover that calls
from the US to the Philippines were made to
appear as local call only using the Mabuhay
Card.
Satisfied with the complainant witnesses
testimony, the court issued 2 search warrants
to seize the instruments of the crime.
The search warrants were implemented and
the articles specified in the search warrant
were seized from HPS Corporation.
After
preliminary
investigation
conducted by the Asst. City Prosecutor Yope M.
Cotecson, a resolution was issued finding that
there is probable cause that all the crimes
charged were committed by Philip Yap, Hyman
Yap, Stanley Yap, Elaine Joy Yap, Julie Y. Sy, as
well as Gene Frederick Boniel, Michael Vincent
Pozon, John Doe and Jane Doe.
Philip Yap and Hyman Yap filed a Motion
to Quash and/or Suppress Illegally Seized
Evidence. Then on December 11, 2000, HPS
Corporation filed a Motion to Quash Search
Warrant and Return of the Things Seized. Both
pleadings sought to quash the search warrants
at issue on the grounds that the same did not
refer to a specific offense; that there was no
probable cause; and that the search warrants
were general warrants and were wrongly
implemented. In response, PLDT formally
opposed the aforementioned pleadings through
the filing of a Consolidated Opposition.
Trial court granted the motion to quash the
search warrants and return the things seized.
ISSUE:
WON the granting of Motion to Quash the
Search warrant is correct.
HELD: NO

This Court has consistently held that the

validity of the issuance of a search warrant
rests upon the following factors: (1) it must be

35

issued upon probable cause; (2) the

probable cause must be determined by the
judge himself and not by the applicant or any
other person; (3) in the determination of
probable cause, the judge must examine,
under oath or affirmation, the complainant and
such witnesses as the latter may produce; and
(4) the warrant issued must particularly
describe the place to be searched and persons
and things to be seized.

Probable cause, as a condition for the issuance

of a search warrant, is such reasons supported
by facts and circumstances as will warrant a
cautious man to believe that his action and the
means taken in prosecuting it are legally just
and proper. It requires facts and circumstances
that would lead a reasonably prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed
and that the objects sought in connection with
that offense are in the place to be searched.

LDT submitted the following to the trial court,

during the application for the subject search
warrants and during the hearing on HPS
Corporation, et al.s motion to suppress the
evidence:

a. The affidavit56 and testimony57 of PLDT

employee Engr. Reuben C. Hinagdanan (Engr.
Hinagdanan) which was given during the
application for the issuance of the subject
search warrants. In his affidavit and testimony,
Engr. Hinagdanan averred that PLDT conducted
surveillance on the ISR activities of HPS
Corporation, et al. and that the said
surveillance operation yielded positive results
that PLDT telephone lines subscribed by Philip
Yap and/or HPS Corporation were being utilized
for illegal ISR operations.

b. The call detail records58 which are attached

as Annex "C" to Engr. Hinagdanans affidavit
which indicated that test calls were made by
Engr. Hinagdanan using the Mabuhay card with
PIN code number 332 1479224. The said
document also indicated that even if the calls
originated from the United States of America,
the calling party reflected therein are local

numbers of telephone lines which PLDT had

verified as the same as those subscribed by
Philip Yap and/or HPS Corporation.

c. The affidavit59 and testimony60 of PLDT

employee Engr. Richard L. Dira (Engr. Dira)
which was given during the application for the
issuance of the subject search warrants. In his
affidavit and testimony, Engr. Dira averred that
he personally conducted an ocular inspection in
the premises of HPS Corporation and that the
said inspection revealed that all PLDT lines
subscribed
by
Philip
Yap
and/or
HPS
Corporation were illegally connected to various
telecommunications and switching equipment
which were used in illegal ISR activities
conducted by HPS Corporation, et al.

d. The testimony61 and investigation report62 of

Engr. Tolentino which details the test calls he
made using Mabuhay card with PIN code
number 349 4374802. This is a different
Mabuhay card than what was used by PLDT in
its application for the subject search warrants.
According to his investigation report, the
telephone lines subscribed by Philip Yap and/or
HPS Corporation were indeed utilized for illegal
ISR operations.

e. The testimony63 of Police Officer Narciso

Ouano, Jr. (Officer Ouano) of the Legal and
Investigation Division of the PAOCTF given
during the hearing on the application for the
issuance of the subject search warrants
wherein Officer Ouano averred that, upon
complaint of PLDT, the PAOCTF conducted
surveillance operations which yielded positive
results that HPS Corporation, et al. were
engaged in illegal ISR activities.

f. The results of a traffic study64 conducted by

PLDT on the twenty (20) direct telephone lines
subscribed
by
Philip
Yap
and/or
HPS
Corporation which detailed the extent of the
losses suffered by PLDT as a result of the illegal
ISR activities conducted by HPS Corporation, et
al.

36

Taken together, the aforementioned pieces of

evidence are more than sufficient to support a
finding that test calls were indeed made by
PLDTs witnesses using Mabuhay card with PIN
code number 332 1479224 and, more
importantly, that probable cause necessary to
engender a belief that HPS Corporation, et al.
had probably committed the crime of Theft
through illegal ISR activities exists. To reiterate,
evidence to show probable cause to issue a
search warrant must be distinguished from
proof beyond reasonable doubt which, at this
juncture of the criminal case, is not required.

exchanges,
trade
companies, public
schools; and

houses,
credit
card
utilities, hospitals, and

5. Communicate in writing or by voice with

any person through his e-mail address or
telephone.
The cyberspace is a boon to the need of the
current generation for greater information and
facility of communication. But all is not well
with the system since it could not filter out a
number of persons of ill will who would want to
use cyberspace technology for mischiefs and
crimes.
And because linking with the internet opens up
a user to communications from others, the illmotivated can use the cyberspace for
committing
theft
by
hacking
into
or
surreptitiously accessing his bank account or
credit card or defrauding him through false
representations.

(23) DISINI, JR. VS. THE SECRETARY OF

JUSTICE
FACTS:
These consolidated petitions seek to declare
several provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) 10175,
the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012,
unconstitutional and void.
The cybercrime law aims to regulate access to
and use of the cyberspace. Using his laptop or
computer, a person can connect to the
internet, a system that links him to other
computers and enable him, among other
things, to:
1. Access virtual libraries and
encyclopedias for all kinds of information that
he
needs for research, study, amusement,
upliftment, or pure curiosity;
2. Post billboard-like notices or messages,
including pictures and videos, for the general
public or for special audiences like associates,
classmates, or friends and read postings from
them;
3. Advertise and promote goods or services
and make purchases and payments;
4. Inquire and do business with institutional
entities like government agencies, banks, stock

For this reason, the government has a

legitimate right to regulate the use of
cyberspace
and
contain
and
punish
wrongdoings, hence the Cybercrime Prevention
Act.
But petitioners claim that the means adopted
by the cybercrime law for regulating
undesirable
cyberspace
activities
violate
certain of their constitutional rights. The
government of course asserts that the law
merely seeks to reasonably put order into
cyberspace activities, punish wrongdoings, and
prevent hurtful attacks on the system.
Pending hearing and adjudication of the issues
presented in these cases, on February 5, 2013
the Court extended the original 120-day
temporary restraining order (TRO) that it earlier
issued on October 9, 2012, enjoining
respondent
government
agencies
from
implementing The cybercrime law until further
orders.
ISSUE:
WON
the
following
provisions
are
unconstitutional:
a. Section 4(a)(1) on Illegal Access;
b. Section 4(a)(3) on Data
Interference;
c. Section 4(a)(6) on Cyber-squatting;
d. Section 4(b)(3) on Identity Theft;

37

e. Section 4(c)(1) on Cybersex;

f. Section 4(c)(2) on Child
Pornography;
g. Section 4(c)(3) on Unsolicited
Commercial Communications;
h. Section 4(c)(4) on Libel;
i. Section 5 on Aiding or Abetting and
Attempt in the Commission of Cybercrimes;
j. Section 6 on the Penalty of One
Degree Higher;
k. Section 7 on the Prosecution under
both the Revised Penal Code (RPC)
and R.A.
10175;
l. Section 8 on Penalties;
m. Section 12 on Real-Time Collection
of Traffic Data;
n. Section 13 on Preservation of
Computer Data;
o. Section 14 on Disclosure of
Computer Data;
p. Section 15 on Search, Seizure and
Examination of Computer Data;
q. Section 17 on Destruction of
Computer Data;
r. Section 19 on Restricting or Blocking
Access to Computer Data;
s. Section 20 on Obstruction of Justice;
t. Section 24 on Cybercrime
Investigation and Coordinating Center (CICC);
u. Section 26(a) on CICCs Powers and
Functions.

creating a chilling and deterrent effect on these

guaranteed freedoms.

HELD:

The challenge to the constitutionality of Section

4(a)(6) on ground of denial of equal protection
is baseless.

a.No. (VALID AND CONSTITUTIONAL)

Petitioners contend that Section 4(a)(1) fails to
meet the strict scrutiny standard required of
laws that interfere with the fundamental rights
of the people and should thus be struck down.
In the cases before it, the Court finds nothing in
Section 4(a)(1) that calls for the application of
the
strict
scrutiny
standard
since
no
fundamental freedom, like speech, is involved
in punishing what is essentially a condemnable
act accessing the computer system of
another without right. It is a universally
condemned conduct.
b. No. (VALID AND CONSTITUTIONAL)
Petitioners claim that Section 4(a)(3) suffers
from overbreadth in that, while it seeks to
discourage data interference, it intrudes into
the area of protected speech and expression,

Under the overbreadth doctrine, a proper

governmental purpose, constitutionally subject
to state regulation, may not be achieved by
means that unnecessarily sweep its subject
broadly, thereby invading the area of protected
freedoms.
But Section 4(a)(3) does not encroach on these
freedoms at all. It simply punishes what
essentially is a form of vandalism, the act of
willfully destroying without right the things that
belong to others, in this case their computer
data, electronic document, or electronic data
message. Such act has no connection to
guaranteed freedoms. There is no freedom to
destroy other peoples computer systems and
private documents.
Besides, the overbreadth challenge places on
petitioners the heavy burden of proving that
under no set of circumstances will Section 4(a)
(3) be valid. Petitioner has failed to discharge
this burden.
c. No. (VALID AND CONSTITUTIONAL)
Petitioners claim that Section 4(a)(6) or cybersquatting violates the equal protection clause.

d. No. (VALID AND CONSTITUTIONAL)

Petitioners claim that Section 4(b)(3) violates
the constitutional rights to due process and to
privacy and correspondence, and transgresses
the freedom of the press.
Two constitutional guarantees create these
zones of privacy: (a) the right against
unreasonable searches and seizures, which is
the basis of the right to be let alone, and (b)
the right to privacy of communication and
correspondence. In assessing the challenge
that the State has impermissibly intruded into
these zones of privacy, a court must determine
whether a person has exhibited a reasonable
expectation of privacy and, if so, whether that
expectation has been violated by unreasonable
government intrusion.

38

Petitioners simply fail to show how government

effort to curb computer-related identity theft
violates
the
right
to
privacy
and
correspondence as well as the right to due
process of law.
Also, the charge of invalidity of this section
based on the overbreadth doctrine will not hold
water since the specific conducts proscribed do
not intrude into guaranteed freedoms like
speech. Clearly, what this section regulates are
specific actions: the acquisition, use, misuse or
deletion of personal identifying data of another.
There is no fundamental right to acquire
anothers personal data.
e. No. (VALID AND CONSTITUTIONAL)
Petitioners claim that the Sec. 4(c)(1) violates
the freedom of expression clause of the
Constitution.
The understanding of those who drew up the
cybercrime law is that the element of
"engaging in a business" is necessary to
constitute the illegal cybersex.mThe Act
actually seeks to punish cyber prostitution,
white slave trade, and pornography for favor
and consideration. This includes interactive
prostitution and pornography, i.e., by webcam.
The Court weighed the property rights of
individuals against the public welfare. Private
property, if containing pornographic materials,
may be forfeited and destroyed. Likewise,
engaging in sexual acts privately through
internet connection, perceived by some as a
right, has to be balanced with the mandate of
the State to eradicate white slavery and the
exploitation of women.
The Court will not declare Section 4(c)(1)
unconstitutional where it stands a construction
that makes it apply only to persons engaged in
the business of maintaining, controlling, or
operating, directly or indirectly, the lascivious
exhibition of sexual organs or sexual activity
with the aid of a computer system as Congress
has intended.
f. No. (VALID AND CONSTITUTIONAL)
It seems that the above merely expands the
scope of the Anti-Child Pornography Act of
2009 (ACPA) to cover identical activities in
cyberspace. Actually, ACPAs definition of child
pornography already embraces the use of

"electronic,
mechanical,
digital,
optical,
magnetic or any other means." Notably, no one
has questioned this ACPA provision.
For now the Court must
constitutionality of Section
successfully challenged.
g.
Yes.
(VOID
UNCONSTITUTIONAL)

hold that
4(c)(2) is
FOR

the
not

BEING

Sec. 4(c)(3) penalizes the transmission of

unsolicited commercial communications, also
known as "spam."
The Government, represented by the Solicitor
General, points out that unsolicited commercial
communications or spams are a nuisance that
wastes the storage and network capacities of
internet service providers, reduces the
efficiency of commerce and technology, and
interferes with the owners peaceful enjoyment
of his property. Transmitting spams amounts to
trespass to ones privacy since the person
sending out spams enters the recipients
domain without prior permission. The OSG
contends that commercial speech enjoys less
protection in law.
But, firstly, the government presents no basis
for holding that unsolicited electronic ads
reduce the "efficiency of computers." Secondly,
people, before the arrival of the age of
computers, have already been receiving such
unsolicited ads by mail. These have never been
outlawed as nuisance since people might have
interest in such ads. What matters is that the
recipient has the option of not opening or
reading these mail ads. That is true with
spams. Their recipients always have the option
to delete or not to read them.
To prohibit the transmission of unsolicited ads
would deny a person the right to read his
emails, even unsolicited commercial ads
addressed to him. Unsolicited advertisements
are legitimate forms of expression.
h. VALID AND CONSTITUTIONAL with
respect to the original author. VOID AND
UNCONSTITUTIONAL
with
respect
to
others who simply receives post and react
to it.
Petitioners dispute the constitutionality of both
the penal code provisions on libel as well as

39

Section 4(c)(4) of the Cybercrime Prevention

Act on cyberlibel.

"aiding or abetting" libel on the cyberspace is a

nullity.

Since the penal code and implicitly, the

cybercrime law, mainly target libel against
private persons, the Court recognizes that
these laws imply a stricter standard of "malice"
to convict the author of a defamatory
statement where the offended party is a public
figure. Societys interest and the maintenance
of good government demand a full discussion
of public affairs.

In this case, the particularly complex web of

interaction on social media websites would give
law enforcers such latitude that they could
arbitrarily or selectively enforce the law.

Free speech is not absolute. It is subject to

certain restrictions, as may be necessary and
as may be provided by law.
The Court agrees with the Solicitor General that
libel is not a constitutionally protected speech
and that the government has an obligation to
protect private individuals from defamation.
Indeed, cyberlibel is actually not a new crime
since Article 353, in relation to Article 355 of
the penal code, already punishes it. In effect,
Section 4(c)(4) above merely affirms that
online defamation constitutes "similar means"
for committing libel.
i. Yes. UNCONSTITUTIONAL with respect
to
Section
4(c)(4).
VALID
AND
CONSTITUTIONAL with respect to Sec.
4(a)(2), Sec. 4(a)(3) and Sec. 4(a)(4).
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of
Section 5 that renders criminally liable any
person who willfully abets or aids in the
commission or attempts to commit any of the
offenses enumerated as cybercrimes. It suffers
from overbreadth, creating a chilling and
deterrent effect on protected expression.
In the cyberworld, there are many actors: a)
the blogger who originates the assailed
statement; b) the blog service provider like
Yahoo; c) the internet service provider like
PLDT, Smart, Globe, or Sun; d) the internet caf
that may have provided the computer used for
posting the blog; e) the person who makes a
favorable comment on the blog; and f) the
person who posts a link to the blog site.
The terms "aiding or abetting" constitute broad
sweep that generates chilling effect on those
who express themselves through cyberspace
posts, comments, and other messages. Hence,
Section 5 of the cybercrime law that punishes

Both the penal code and the cybercrime law

clearly
punish
authors
of
defamatory
publications. Make no mistake, libel destroys
reputations that society values. Allowed to
cascade in the internet, it will destroy
relationships and, under certain circumstances,
will generate enmity and tension between
social or economic groups, races, or religions,
exacerbating
existing
tension
in
their
relationships.
Section 5 with respect to Section 4(c)(4) is
unconstitutional. Section 5 with respect to
Section
4(c)(4)
is
unconstitutional.
Its
vagueness raises apprehension on the part of
internet users because of its obvious chilling
effect on the freedom of expression, especially
since the crime of aiding or abetting ensnares
all the actors in the cyberspace front in a fuzzy
way. What is more, as the petitioners point out,
formal crimes such as libel are not punishable
unless consummated. In the absence of
legislation tracing the interaction of netizens
and their level of responsibility such as in other
countries, Section 5, in relation to Section 4(c)
(4) on Libel, Section 4(c)(3) on Unsolicited
Commercial Communications, and Section 4(c)
(2) on Child Pornography, cannot stand
scrutiny.
But the crime of aiding or abetting the
commission of cybercrimes under Section 5
should be permitted to apply to Section 4(a)(1)
on Illegal Access, Section 4(a)(2) on Illegal
Interception,
Section
4(a)(3)
on
Data
Interference, Section 4(a)(4) on System
Interference, Section 4(a)(5) on Misuse of
Devices, Section 4(a)(6) on Cyber-squatting,
Section 4(b)(1) on Computer-related Forgery,
Section 4(b)(2) on Computer-related Fraud,
Section 4(b)(3) on Computer-related Identity
Theft, and Section 4(c)(1) on Cybersex. None of
these offenses borders on the exercise of the
freedom of expression.
j. No. (VALID AND CONSTITUTIONAL)
Section 6 merely makes commission of existing
crimes through the internet a qualifying

40

circumstance. As the Solicitor General points

out, there exists a substantial distinction
between crimes committed through the use of
information and communications technology
and similar crimes committed using other
means. In using the technology in question, the
offender often evades identification and is able
to reach far more victims or cause greater
harm. The distinction, therefore, creates a basis
for higher penalties for cybercrimes.
k. (COURT RESOLVES
DETERMINATION
OF
APPLICATION)

TO LEAVE THE
THE
CORRECT

The Solicitor General points out that Section 7

merely expresses the settled doctrine that a
single set of acts may be prosecuted and
penalized simultaneously under two laws, a
special law and the Revised Penal Code. When
two different laws define two crimes, prior
jeopardy as to one does not bar prosecution of
the other although both offenses arise from the
same fact, if each crime involves some
important act which is not an essential element
of the other. With the exception of the crimes
of online libel and online child pornography, the
Court would rather leave the determination of
the correct application of Section 7 to actual
cases.
Online libel is different. There should be no
question that if the published material on print,
said to be libelous, is again posted online or
vice versa, that identical material cannot be
the subject of two separate libels. The two
offenses, one a violation of Article 353 of the
Revised Penal Code and the other a violation of
Section 4(c)(4) of R.A. 10175 involve
essentially the same elements and are in fact
one and the same offense. Indeed, the OSG
itself claims that online libel under Section 4(c)
(4) is not a new crime but is one already
punished under Article 353. Section 4(c)(4)
merely establishes the computer system as
another means of publication. Charging the
offender under both laws would be a blatant
violation of the proscription against double
jeopardy.
l. No. (VALID AND CONSTITUTIONAL)
Section 8 provides for the penalties for the
following crimes: Sections 4(a) on Offenses
Against the Confidentiality, Integrity and
Availability of Computer Data and Systems;
4(b) on Computer-related Offenses; 4(a)(5) on

Misuse of Devices; when the crime punishable

under 4(a) is committed against critical
infrastructure; 4(c)(1) on Cybersex; 4(c)(2) on
Child Pornography; 4(c)(3) on Unsolicited
Commercial Communications; and Section 5 on
Aiding or Abetting, and Attempt in the
Commission of Cybercrime.
The matter of fixing penalties for the
commission of crimes is as a rule a legislative
prerogative. Here the legislature prescribed a
measure of severe penalties for what it regards
as deleterious cybercrimes. They appear
proportionate to the evil sought to be
punished. The power to determine penalties for
offenses is not diluted or improperly wielded
simply because at some prior time the act or
omission was but an element of another
offense or might just have been connected with
another crime. Judges and magistrates can
only interpret and apply them and have no
authority to modify or revise their range as
determined by the legislative department.
The courts should not encroach
prerogative of the lawmaking body.
m.
Yes.
(VOID
UNCONSTITUTIONAL)

FOR

on

this

BEING

Petitioners assail the grant to law enforcement

agencies of the power to collect or record
traffic data in real time as tending to curtail
civil liberties or provide opportunities for official
abuse. Petitioners invoke the right of every
individual to privacy and to be protected from
government snooping into the messages or
information that they send to one another.
Whether or not Section 12 has a proper
governmental purpose since a law may require
the disclosure of matters normally considered
private but then only upon showing that such
requirement has a rational relation to the
purpose of the law,79 that there is a
compelling State interest behind the law, and
that the provision itself is narrowly drawn
Indeed, as Chief Justice Sereno points out, the
Budapest Convention on Cybercrimes requires
signatory countries to adopt legislative
measures to empower state authorities to
collect or record "traffic data, in real time,
associated with specified communications."
And this is precisely what Section 12 does. It
empowers law enforcement agencies in this
country to collect or record such data.

41

But is not evidence of yesterdays traffic data,

like the scene of the crime after it has been
committed, adequate for fighting cybercrimes
and, therefore, real-time data is superfluous for
that purpose?
Evidently, it is not. Those who commit the
crimes of accessing a computer system without
right,
transmitting
viruses,
lasciviously
exhibiting sexual organs or sexual activity for
favor or consideration; and producing child
pornography could easily evade detection and
prosecution by simply moving the physical
location of their computers or laptops from day
to day. Evidently, it is only real-time traffic data
collection or recording and a subsequent
recourse to court-issued search and seizure
warrant that can succeed in ferreting them out.
Section
12
does
not
permit
law
enforcement authorities to look into the
contents of the messages and uncover
the identities of the sender and the
recipient.
Section 12 empowers law enforcement
authorities, "with due cause," to collect or
record by technical or electronic means traffic
data in real-time. Petitioners point out that the
phrase "due cause" has no precedent in law or
jurisprudence and that whether there is due
cause or not is left to the discretion of the
police. Replying to this, the Solicitor General
asserts that Congress is not required to define
the meaning of every word it uses in drafting
the law.
Indeed, courts are able to save vague
provisions
of
law
through
statutory
construction. But the cybercrime law, dealing
with a novel situation, fails to hint at the
meaning it intends for the phrase "due cause."
Due cause is also not descriptive of the
purpose for which data collection will be used.
The authority that Section 12 gives law
enforcement agencies is too sweeping and
lacks restraint.
Section 12, of course, limits the collection of
traffic data to those "associated with specified
communications." But this supposed limitation
is no limitation at all since, evidently, it is the
law enforcement agencies that would specify
the target communications. The power is
virtually limitless, enabling law enforcement
authorities to engage in "fishing expedition,"

choosing whatever specified communication

they want. This evidently threatens the right of
individuals to privacy.
The Solicitor General points out that Section 12
needs to authorize collection of traffic data "in
real time" because it is not possible to get a
court warrant that would authorize the search
of what is akin to a "moving vehicle." But
warrantless search is associated with a police
officers determination of probable cause that a
crime has been committed, that there is no
opportunity for getting a warrant, and that
unless the search is immediately carried out,
the thing to be searched stands to be removed.
These preconditions are not provided in Section
12.
The Court must ensure that laws seeking to
take advantage of these technologies be
written with specificity and definiteness as to
ensure respect for the rights that the
Constitution guarantees.
n. No. (VALID AND CONSTITUTIONAL)
Petitioners in G.R. 20339197 claim that Section
13 constitutes an undue deprivation of the
right to property. They liken the data
preservation order that law enforcement
authorities are to issue as a form of
garnishment of personal property in civil
forfeiture proceedings. Such order prevents
internet users from accessing and disposing of
traffic data that essentially belong to them.
No doubt, the contents of materials sent or
received through the internet belong to their
authors or recipients and are to be considered
private communications. But it is not clear that
a service provider has an obligation to
indefinitely keep a copy of the same as they
pass its system for the benefit of users. By
virtue of Section 13, however, the law now
requires service providers to keep traffic data
and
subscriber
information
relating
to
communication services for at least six months
from the date of the transaction and those
relating to content data for at least six months
from receipt of the order for their preservation.
The process of preserving data will not
unduly hamper the normal transmission
or use of the same.
o. No. (VALID AND CONSTITUTIONAL)

42

The process envisioned in Section 14 is being

likened to the issuance of a subpoena.
Petitioners objection is that the issuance of
subpoenas is a judicial function. But it is wellsettled that the power to issue subpoenas is
not exclusively a judicial function. Executive
agencies have the power to issue subpoena as
an adjunct of their investigatory powers.
Besides, what Section 14 envisions is merely
the enforcement of a duly issued court warrant,
a function usually lodged in the hands of law
enforcers to enable them to carry out their
executive functions. The prescribed procedure
for disclosure would not constitute an unlawful
search or seizure nor would it violate the
privacy
of
communications
and
correspondence. Disclosure can be made only
after judicial intervention.
p. No. (VALID AND CONSTITUTIONAL)
Petitioners challenge Section 15 on the
assumption that it will supplant established
search and seizure procedures.
On its face, however, Section 15 merely
enumerates the duties of law enforcement
authorities that would ensure the proper
collection, preservation, and use of computer
system or data that have been seized by virtue
of a court warrant. The exercise of these duties
do not pose any threat on the rights of the
person from whom they were taken. Section 15
does not appear to supersede existing search
and seizure rules but merely supplements
them.
q. No. (VALID AND CONSTITUTIONAL)
Petitioners claim that such destruction of
computer data subject of previous preservation
or examination violates the users right against
deprivation of property without due process of
law.
But, as already stated, it is unclear that the
user has a demandable right to require the
service provider to have that copy of the data
saved indefinitely for him in its storage system.
If he wanted them preserved, he should have
saved them in his computer when he
generated the data or received it. He could also
request the service provider for a copy before it
is deleted.

r.
Yes.
(VOID
UNCONSTITUTIONAL)

FOR

BEING

Petitioners contest Section 19 in that it stifles

freedom of expression and violates the right
against unreasonable searches and seizures.
Section 19 operates as a restriction on the
freedom of expression over cyberspace.
Not only does Section 19 preclude any judicial
intervention,
but
it
also
disregards
jurisprudential
guidelines
established
to
determine the validity of restrictions on
speech. Restraints on free speech are generally
evaluated on one of or a combination of three
tests: the dangerous tendency doctrine, the
balancing of interest test, and the clear and
present danger rule. Section 19, however,
merely requires that the data to be blocked be
found prima facie in violation of any provision
of the cybercrime law. Taking Section 6 into
consideration, this can actually be made to
apply in relation to any penal provision. It does
not take into consideration any of the three
tests mentioned above.
The Court is therefore compelled to strike down
Section 19 for being violative of the
constitutional guarantees to freedom of
expression and against unreasonable searches
and seizures.
s. No. (VALID AND CONSTITUTIONAL)
Petitioners challenge Section 20, alleging that
it is a bill of attainder. The argument is that the
mere failure to comply constitutes a legislative
finding of guilt, without regard to situations
where non-compliance would be reasonable or
valid.
But since the non-compliance would be
punished as a violation of Presidential Decree
(P.D.) 1829, Section 20 necessarily incorporates
elements of the offense which are defined
therein. If Congress had intended for Section
20 to constitute an offense in and of itself, it
would not have had to make reference to any
other statue or provision.
Thus, the act of non-compliance, for it to be
punishable, must still be done "knowingly or
willfully." There must still be a judicial
determination of guilt, during which, as the
Solicitor General assumes, defense and
justifications for non-compliance may be

43

raised. Thus, Section 20 is valid insofar as

it applies to the provisions of Chapter IV
which are not struck down by the Court.

sufficient standard. Hence, Sections 24 and

26(a) are likewise valid.

t. No.
and u. No. (BOTH VALID AND
CONSTITUTIONAL)
Petitioners mainly contend that Congress
invalidly delegated its power when it gave the
Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating
Center (CICC) the power to formulate a
national cybersecurity plan without any
sufficient standards or parameters for it to
follow.
In order to determine whether there is undue
delegation of legislative power, the Court has
adopted two tests: the completeness test
and the sufficient standard test. Under the
first test, the law must be complete in all its
terms and conditions when it leaves the
legislature such that when it reaches the
delegate, the only thing he will have to do is to
enforce it. The second test mandates
adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to
determine the boundaries of the delegates
authority and prevent the delegation from
running riot.
Here, the cybercrime law is complete in
itself when it directed the CICC to
formulate and implement a national
cybersecurity plan. Also, contrary to the
position of the petitioners, the law gave
sufficient standards for the CICC to follow
when
it
provided
a
definition
of
cybersecurity.
Cybersecurity refers to the collection of tools,
policies, risk management approaches, actions,
training, best practices, assurance and
technologies that can be used to protect cyber
environment and organization and users
assets. This definition serves as the parameters
within which CICC should work in formulating
the cybersecurity plan.
Further, the formulation of the cybersecurity
plan is consistent with the policy of the
law to "prevent and combat such [cyber]
offenses by facilitating their detection,
investigation, and prosecution at both the
domestic and international levels, and by
providing arrangements for fast and
reliable international cooperation." This
policy is clearly adopted in the interest of law
and order, which has been considered as

(24) TAN VS. TIONG GUE

FACTS:
Petitioner (Romer Sy Tan) filed a criminal case
against respondents (Tiong Gue, et al.). The
Respondents moved for the withdrawal of the
information which was subsequently granted
by the RTC on the ground that the information
for robbery did not contain the essential
elements of robbery as decided upon by the
Court of Appeals on an prior complaint. Hence
the case was dismissed. Now the petitioner,
seeking shelter from the Supreme Court
contended that he filed information for
qualified theft based on the same subject
matter of the dismissed robbery and would like
to use the item seized in the previously
conducted search for the new information of
qualified theft.
ISSUES:

44

Can the items seized in the previously

conducted search warrant issued by the court
for robbery be included and used for the filing
of for an information for qualified theft?
HELD: NO
Section 4. Requisites for issuing search
warrant. A search warrant shall not issue
except upon probable cause in connection with
one specific offense to be determined
personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched
and the things to be seized which may be
anywhere in the Philippines.
Thus, as search warrant may be issued only if
there is probable cause in connection with only
one specific offense alleged in an application
on the basis of the applicant's personal
knowledge and his or her witnesses. Therefore,
petitioner cannot utilize the evidence seized by
virtue of the search warrant issued in
connection with the case of robbery in a
separate case of qualified theft, even if both
cases emanated form the same incident. Also,
the withdrawal of the information was
justifiable, since there was no probable cause
as to indict respondents of the crime of robbery
since unlawful taking which is an essential
element for Robbery and likewise for Qualified
Theft is not present.

(25) PEOPLE VS. NUEVAS

FACTS:
PO3 Fami testified that he and SPO3 Cabling
conducted a stationary surveillance and
monitoring of illegal drug trafficking in,
Barangay Pag-asa, Olongapo City. They had
received information that a certain male
person, would make a delivery of marijuana
dried leaves. While stationed thereat, they saw
a male person who fit the description, carrying
a plastic bag, later identified as Jesus Nuevas
(Nuevas), alight from a motor vehicle. They
accosted Nuevas and informed him that they

are police officers. Fami asked Nuevas where

he was going.
Nuevas informed him that there were other
stuff in the possession of a certain Vangie, an
associate, and two other male persons. Nuevas
voluntarily pointed to the police officers a
plastic bag which, when opened, contained
marijuana dried leaves and bricks wrapped in a
blue cloth. Shortly, in his bid to escape
charges, Nuevas disclosed where the two (2)
other male persons would make the delivery of
marijuana weighing more or less five (5) kilos.7
Fami and Cabling, together with Nuevas, then
proceeded where his two (2) companions, Din
and Inocencio, could be located. From there,
they saw and approached two (2) persons
along the National Highway, introducing
themselves as police officers. Din was carrying
a light blue plastic bag. When asked, Din
disclosed that the bag belonged to Nuevas.
Fami then took the bag and upon inspection
found inside it "marijuana packed in newspaper
and wrapped therein."8 After confiscating the
items, Fami and Cabling brought Nuevas, Din
and Inocencio to the police office at Purok III for
proper documentation
On cross-examination, Fami revealed that when
the receipt of evidence seized was prepared, all
three (3) accused were not represented by
counsel. He likewise disclosed that he was the
one who escorted all the accused during their
physical examination. He also escorted all
three to the Fiscals office where the latter were
informed of the charges against them
Jesus Nuevas y Garcia (Nuevas) was charged
before the RTC of Olongapo City, Branch 75,
with illegal possession of marijuana in violation
of Section 8, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425 2
as amended
Upon arraignment, Nuevas, Din and Inocencio
pleaded not guilty to the charges.4 As the
evidence in the cases was common and the
prosecution would utilize the same witnesses,
the cases were consolidated.
The RTC found the three accused guilty and
sentenced them to Reclusion Perpetua.
The judgment of conviction was elevated to the
Court for automatic review. However, Nuevas
filed a manifestation and motion to withdraw
appeal.20
The
Court
granted
Nuevass
withdrawal of appeal and considered the case
closed and terminated as to him.
As for Din and Inocencio, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision of the trial court

45

ISSUES:
WON the warrantless arrest and seizure was
valid.
HELD: NO
In this case, Nuevas, Din and Inocencio were
not committing a crime in the presence of the
police officers. Moreover, police officers Fami
and Cabling did not have personal knowledge
of the facts indicating that the persons to be
arrested had committed an offense.
Reliable information alone is not sufficient to
justify a warrantless arrest under Section
5(a), Rule 113. The rule requires, in addition,
that the accused perform some overt act that
would indicate that he "has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense."
Neither could the searches be justified under
the plain view doctrine.
Where the object seized was inside a closed
package, the object itself is not in plain view
and therefore cannot be seized without a
warrant.Records show that the dried marijuana
leaves were inside the plastic bags that Nuevas
and Din were carrying and were not readily
apparent or transparent to the police officers.
The Court finds that the search conducted in
Nuevass case was made with his consent. In
Dins case, there was none.
The prosecution failed to clearly show that Din
intentionally surrendered his right against
unreasonable searches. There was no mention
of any permission made by the police officers
to get or search the bag or of any consent
given by Din for the officers to search it. It is
worthy to note that in cases where the Court
upheld the validity of consented search, the
police authorities expressly asked, in no
uncertain terms, for the consent of the accused
to be searched. And the consent of the accused
was established by clear and positive proof.
Turning to Inocencios case, the Court likewise
finds that he was wrongly convicted of the
crime
charged.
Inocencios
supposed
possession of the dried marijuana leaves was
sought to be shown through his act of looking
into the plastic bag that Din was carrying. The
prosecution failed to show by convincing proof
that Inocencio knew of the contents of the bag
and that he conspired with Din to possess the
illegal items.
In this case, an acquittal is warranted despite
the prosecutions insistence
that the appellants have effectively waived any
defect in their arrest by entering their plea and

by their active participation in the trial of the

case. Be it stressed that the legality of an
arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court
over the person of the accused. Inspite of any
alleged waiver, the dried marijuana leaves
cannot be admitted in evidence against the
appellants. A waiver of an illegal warrantless
arrest does not also mean a waiver of the
inadmissibility of evidence seized during an
illegal warrantless arrest.
(26) PEOPLE VS. COLLADO
FACTS:
On October 14, 2004, appellants Marcelino
Collado (Marcelino) and Myra Collado (Myra)
were charged with the crimes of sale of
dangerous drugs and maintenance of a den,
dive or resort in violation of Sections 5 and 6 of
Article II, RA 9165 (Dangerous Drugs Act)
docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 13781-D and
13782-D.
The case was presented through the versions
of the two opposing sides:
Prosecutions version (as told by PO2
Richard Noble-PO2 Noble; and SPO2
Bernardo Cruz-SPO2 Cruz).
On October 9, 2004, PO2 Noble received
information from a civilian asset that spouses
Marcelino and Myra were engaged in selling
shabu and that drug users, including out-ofschool youth, were using their residence in
Pasig City, for their drug sessions. After
confirming the reported activities, SPO2 Cruz
looked for an asset who could introduce them
to Marcelino and Myra in the ensuing buy-bust
operation.
The asset introduced PO2 Noble to Marcelino as
a regular buyer of shabu .200 pesos worth of
shabu was bought. But when PO2 Noble was
handing over the marked money to Marcelino,
the latter motioned that the same be given to
his wife, Myra, who accepted the money.
Marcelino then took from his pocket a small
metal container from which he brought out a
small plastic sachet containing white crystalline
substance and gave the same to PO2 Noble.
While PO2 Noble was inspecting its contents,
he noticed smoke coming from a table inside
the house of the couple around which were
seven persons.When PO2 Noble gave the prearranged signal, the backup team rushed to the
scene. Simultaneously, PO2 Noble introduced

46

himself as a policeman and arrested Marcelino.

He frisked him and was able to confiscate the
metal container that contained another sachet
of white crystalline substance. PO2 Noble wrote
the markings "MCC-RNN October 9, 2004"
on both the plastic sachets of white substance
sold to him by Marcelino and the one found
inside the metal container.

When the officers frisked all the accused,

Marcelino claimed that nothing illegal nor
incriminating was recovered from them.

Meanwhile, SPO2 Cruz and another police

officer went inside the house of Marcelino and
Myra, where they found Apelo, Cipriano,
Ranada, Abache, Sumulong, Madarang and
Latario gathered around a table littered with
various drug paraphernalia such as an
improvised water pipe, strips of aluminum foil
with traces of white substance, disposable
lighters, and plastic sachets. A strip of
aluminum foil used for smoking marijuana was
recovered from Ranada. The buy-bust team
arrested all these persons, and brought them
to police headquarters for investigation and
drug testing.

ISSUE:

A chemistry report on all the seized items

yielded positive results for methylamphetamine
hydrochloride and showed Marcelino, Apelo,
Cipriano, and Ranada positive for drug use
while Myra, Abache, Sumulong, Madarang, and
Latario were found negative.
Defenses
Version
(testimonies
Marcelino, Myra, and Ranada)

of

Marcelino and Myra owned an electronics and

appliance repair shop annexed to their house.
In the evening of October 9, 2004, Marcelino
was in the living room with his children and
nieces fixing a VCD player. Apelo, their
househelp, was in the kitchen preparing food
while Ranada, their repairman, was outside the
house fixing Sumulongs motorcycle. Cipriano
and Madarang were also present at the shop,
the former to redeem his car stereo and the
latter to borrow a play station CD. Latario, a
housemate of Marcelino and Myra, was also
present at the time.
Marcelino suddenly heard someone say
"Walang tatakbo!" Four armed men rushed
inside the house and pointed their guns at him
and said "Wag ka nang pumalag." He was
thereafter dragged outside where he saw the
other accused already in handcuffs. Marcelino
was later informed that they were being
arrested for selling shabu. Marcelino protested
and disclaimed any knowledge about drugs.

When Myra arrived at the scene, she was

shocked to see her husband being arrested.
The police officers then brought all the accused
to the police station for further questioning.

Whether or not the arrest is invalid, on the

ground that the defendants were arrested
without a warrant.
HELD: YES.
An exception was provided by Rule 113
regarding arrest outside the virtue of a warrant.
Rule 113, Section 5. Arrest without
warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person:
(a) When, in his presence, the
person to be arrested has
committed,
is
actually
committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense; x x x x x
(emphasis supplied ). This is
pertaining to flagrante delicto or
caught in the act.
For this type of warrantless arrest to be valid,
two requisites must concur: "(1) the person
to be arrested must execute an overt act
indicating that he has just committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to
commit a crime; and, (2) such overt act is done
in the presence or within the view of the
arresting officer."A common example of an
arrest in flagrante delicto is one made after
conducting a buy-bust operation.
This is precisely what happened in the present
case. The arrest of the appellants was an arrest
in flagrante delicto made in pursuance of Sec.
5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. The arrest
was effected after Marcelino and Myra
performed the overt act of selling to PO2 Noble
the sachet of shabu and Ranada of having in
his
control
and
custody
illegal
drug
paraphernalia.
Moreover, assuming that irregularities indeed
attended the arrest of appellants, they can no
longer question the validity thereof as

47

there is no showing that they objected to

the same before their arraignment. By
this omission, any objections on the legality of
their arrest are deemed to have been waived
by them.
The arrest of the appellants was lawful. Under
Section 13, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, "[a]
person lawfully arrested may be searched for
dangerous weapons or anything which may
have been used or constitute proof in the
commission of an offense without a search
warrant." The factual milieu of this case clearly
shows that the search was made after
appellants were lawfully arrested. Pursuant to
the above-mentioned rule, the subsequent
search and seizure made by the police officers
were likewise valid. Hence, appellants claim of
unreasonable search and seizure must fail.

came out, Malou handed to him the marked

money. Botong then gave Malou a plastic
sachet which she handed to PO2 Damasco.
After examining the plastic sachet, PO2
Damasco immediately gave the pre-arranged
signal to the other members of the team who
thereafter rushed to the scene. PO2 Damasco
arrested Malou while SPO2 Zigapan arrested
Botong.
SPO2 Zigapan recovered from Botong the
marked P100 bill and after frisking him, the
police officer found in Botongs pocket one
plastic sachet of what looked like marijuana
and eight plastic sachets containing white
crystalline substance.
The accused were charged of the violation of
Sec. 5 and 11 of Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002
before the RTC.
RTC found the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt on the ground that defense
of denial, frame-up, forcible entry, and
extortion could not prevail over the positive
identification by the prosecution witnesses.
Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused were illegally
arrested.
Whether or not the seized items are admissible
as evidence.

(27) PEOPLE VS. ARANETA

FACTS:
On July 5, 2002, an informant arrived at Station
Drug Police Unit (SDPU) of Pasig Police Station
and reported the alleged peddling of illegal
drugs of live-in couple of Rolando Araneta aka
Botong and Marilou Santos aka Malou.
They immediately formed a team and conduct
a buy-bust operation. PO2 Damasco was
designated as the poseur-buyer.
At the target place, PO2 Damasco and the
informant went near the appellants who were
standing just outside their house. The
informant and appellants exchanged greetings.
After a short conversation, Botong went inside
their house. The informant introduced PO2
Damasco to Malou by saying, I-score itong
kaibigan ko. Baka meron ka dyan. Malou then
asked PO2 Damasco, I-score ka na ba. After
Malou asked PO2 Damasco, Magkano, the latter
immediately gave her the marked P100
bill.Malou called Botong and when the latter

HELD:
The absence of warrant in a buy-bust operation
does not make the arrest illegal.
The Court holds that the seized items were
admissible. A search warrant or warrant of
arrest was not needed because it was a buybust operation and the accused were caught
in flagrante delicto in possession of, and
selling, dangerous drugs to the poseur-buyer. It
was definitely legal for the buy-bust team to
arrest, and search, them on the spot because a
buy-bust operation is a justifiable mode of
apprehending
drug
pushers. A
buy-bust
operation is a form of entrapment whereby
ways and means are resorted to for the
purpose of trapping and capturing the
lawbreakers in the execution of their criminal
plan.
Also, the issues on the corpus delicti and
compliance with Sec. 21 of R.A. No. 9165 i.e.
police officers failed to make an inventory and
photograph the same in their presence were
not raised in the accused appellants brief. It

48

was only pointed out in the

reconsideration before the CA.

motion

for

Hence, the Court cannot act, much less, rule on

said new points. To do so would violate basic
rules on fair play and due process. In People v.
Hernandez, we held that objection to the
admissibility of evidence cannot be raised for
the first time on appeal; when a party desires
the court to reject the evidence offered, he
must so state in the form of objection. Without
such objection, he cannot raise the question for
the first time on appeal.
Note:
Elements of illegal sale of dangerous drugs,
namely: 1) the identity of the buyer and seller;
2) the identity of the object of the sale and the
consideration; and 3) the delivery of the thing
sold upon payment.

(28) SANCHEZ VS. PEOPLE

SAME CASE UNDER NO. 8

On October 26, 2005, in the evening, the San

Gabriel Police Station of San Gabriel, La Union,
conducted a checkpoint near the police station
at the poblacion to intercept a suspected
transportation of marijuana from Barangay
Balbalayang, San Gabriel, La Union. The group
at the checkpoint was composed of PO2 Lunes
B. Pallayoc ("PO2 Pallayoc"), the Chief of Police,
and other policemen. When the checkpoint did
not yield any suspect or marijuana, the Chief of
Police instructed PO2 Pallayoc to proceed to
Barangay Balbalayang to conduct surveillance
operation.
At dawn on October 27, 2005, in Barangay
Balbalayang, PO2 Pallayoc met with a secret
agent of the Barangay Intelligence Network
who informed him that a baggage of marijuana
had been loaded on a passenger jeepney that
was about to leave for the poblacion. The
agent mentioned three (3) bags and one (1)
blue plastic bag. Further, the agent described a
backpack bag with an "O.K." marking. PO2
Pallayoc then boarded the said jeepney and
positioned himself on top thereof. While the
vehicle was in motion, he found the black
backpack with an "O.K." marking and peeked
inside its contents. PO2 Pallayoc found bricks of
marijuana wrapped in newspapers. He then
asked the other passengers on top of the
jeepney about the owner of the bag, but no
one knew.
When the jeepney reached the poblacion, PO2
Pallayoc alighted together with the other
passengers. Unfortunately, he did not notice
who took the black backpack from atop the
jeepney. He only realized a few moments later
that the said bag and three (3) other bags,
including a blue plastic bag, were already being
carried away by two (2) women. He caught up
with the women and introduced himself as a
policeman. He told them that they were under
arrest, but one of the women got away.

(29) PEOPLE VS. MARIACOS

FACTS:
Before this Court is an appeal from the
Decision of the Court of Appeals finding
appellant Belen Mariacos guilty of violating
Article II, Section 5 of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
9165, or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs
Act of 2002.

PO2 Pallayoc brought the woman, who was

identified as herein accused-appellant Belen
Mariacos, and the bags to the police station. At
the police station, the investigators contacted
the Mayor of San Gabriel to witness the
opening of the bags. When the Mayor arrived
about fifteen (15) minutes later, the bags were
opened and three (3) bricks of marijuana
wrapped in newspaper, two (2) round bundles
of marijuana, and two (2) bricks of marijuana
fruiting tops, all wrapped in a newspaper, were

49

recovered.
Thereafter,
the
investigators
marked,
inventoried and forwarded the confiscated
marijuana to the crime laboratory for
examination. The laboratory examination
showed that the stuff found in the bags all
tested positive for marijuana, a dangerous
drug.
Accused-appellant Belen Mariacos was charged
in an Information, dated November 7, 2005 of
violating Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No.
9165, allegedly transported 7,030.3 grams of
dried marijuana fruiting tops.
When arraigned on December 13,
accused-appellant pleaded not guilty.

2005,

On January 31, 2007, the RTC promulgated a

decision, finding the accused Belen Mariacos
GUILTY as charged and sentences her to suffer
the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a
fine of P500,000.00.
Appellant appealed her conviction to the CA.
Argument of BELEN MARIACOS
Mariacos argued that the trial court erred in
considering the evidence of the prosecution
despite its inadmissibility. She claimed that her
right against an unreasonable search was
flagrantly violated by PO2 Pallayoc when the
latter searched the bag, assuming it was hers,
without a search warrant and with no
permission from her. She averred that PO2
Pallayocs purpose for apprehending her was to
verify if the bag she was carrying was the same
one he had illegally searched earlier. Moreover,
appellant contended that there was no
probable cause for her arrest.
Further, appellant claimed that the prosecution
failed to prove the corpus delicti of the
crime. She alleged that the apprehending
police officers violated Dangerous Drugs Board
Regulation No. 3, Series of 1979, as amended
by Board Regulation No. 2, Series of 1990,
which prescribes the procedure in the custody
of seized prohibited and regulated drugs,
instruments, apparatuses, and articles. The
said regulation directs the apprehending team
having initial custody and control of the drugs
and/or paraphernalia, immediately after seizure
or confiscation, to have the same physically
inventoried and photographed in the presence
of appellant or her representative, who shall be
required to sign copies of the inventory. The

failure to comply with this directive, appellant

claimed, casts a serious doubt on the identity
of the items allegedly confiscated from her.
She, likewise, averred that the prosecution
failed to prove that the items allegedly
confiscated were indeed prohibited drugs, and
to establish the chain of custody over the
same.
Argument of the People throughThe Office of
the Solicitor General
The People, through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), argued that the warrantless
arrest of appellant and the warrantless seizure
of marijuana were valid and legal, justified as a
search of a moving vehicle. It averred that PO2
Pallayoc had reasonable ground to believe that
appellant had committed the crime of
delivering dangerous drugs based on reliable
information from their agent, which was
confirmed when he peeked into the bags and
smelled the distinctive odor of marijuana. The
OSG also argued that appellant was now
estopped from questioning the illegality of her
arrest since she voluntarily entered a plea of
"not guilty" upon arraignment and participated
in the trial and presented her evidence. The
OSG brushed aside appellants argument that
the bricks of marijuana were not photographed
and inventoried in her presence or that of her
counsel
immediately
after
confiscation,
positing that physical inventory may be done
at the nearest police station or at the nearest
office of the apprehending team, whichever
was practicable.
In a Decision dated January 19, 2009, the CA
dismissed appellants appeal and affirmed the
RTC decision in toto. It held that the
prosecution had successfully proven that
appellant carried away from the jeepney a
number of bags which, when inspected by the
police, contained dangerous drugs. The CA
ruled that appellant was caught in flagrante
delicto of "carrying and conveying" the bag
that contained the illegal drugs, and thus held
that appellants warrantless arrest was valid.
Appellant is now before this Court, appealing
her conviction.
ISSUES:
WHETHER OR NOT THERE WAS A VALID
EXERCISE OF A WARRANTLESS SEARCH
AND SEIZURE
WON OWNER IP IS MATERIAL TO THE CRIME

50

WON FAILURE OF THE OFFICERS TO AUSTERELY

FOLLOW PROCEDURE RENDER ARREST AS
ILLEGAL
HELD:
YES. The search of a moving vehicle is one of
the doctrinally accepted exceptions to the
Constitutional mandate that no search or
seizure shall be made except by virtue of a
warrant issued by a judge after personally
determining the existence of probable cause.
This had been justified on the ground that the
mobility of motor vehicles makes it possible for
the vehicle to be searched to move out of the
locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant
must be sought.
A search warrant may readily be obtained
when the search is made in a store,
dwelling
house
or
other
immobile
structure. But it is impracticable to obtain
a warrant when the search is conducted
on a mobile ship, on an aircraft, or in
other motor vehicles since they can
quickly be moved out of the locality or
jurisdiction where the warrant must be
sought.
This in no way, however, gives the police
officer
unlimited
discretion
to
conduct
warrantless searches of automobiles in the
absence of probable cause. The essential
requisite of probable cause must be satisfied
before a warrantless search and seizure can be
lawfully conducted. Without probable cause,
the articles seized cannot be admitted in
evidence against the person arrested.
II. NO. Appellants alleged lack of knowledge
does not constitute a valid defense. Lack of
criminal intent and good faith are not
exempting circumstances where the crime
charged is malum prohibitum, as in this
case. Mere possession and/or delivery of a
prohibited drug, without legal authority, is
punishable under the Dangerous Drugs Act.
III. NO. In all prosecutions for violation of the
Dangerous Drugs Act, the existence of all
dangerous drugs is a sine qua non for
conviction. The dangerous drug is the very
corpus delicti of that crime. It is admitted that
there were no photographs taken of the drugs
seized, that appellant was not accompanied by
counsel, and that no representative from the
media and the DOJ were present. However, this
Court has already previously held that noncompliance with Section 21 is not fatal and will

not render an accuseds arrest illegal, or make

the items seized inadmissible. What is of
utmost importance is the preservation of the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized
items.
Even assuming that the police officers failed to
abide by Section 21, appellant should have
raised this issue before the trial court. She
could have moved for the quashal of the
information at the first instance. But she did
not. Hence, she is deemed to have waived any
objection on the matter.
Further, the actions of the police officers, in
relation to the procedural rules on the chain of
custody, enjoyed the presumption of regularity
in the performance of official functions. Courts
accord credence and full faith to the
testimonies of police authorities, as they are
presumed to be performing their duties
regularly, absent any convincing proof to the
contrary.
WHEREFORE,
Appeal
is
conviction must be AFFIRMED

DISMISSED;

(30) ABENES VS. CA

FACTS:
Petitioner (Abenes) was charged in Danlugan,
Pagadian, City of the offense of ILLEGAL
POSSESSION OF HIGH POWERED FIREARM &
ITS AMMUNITIONS (Violation of P.D. No. 1866,
as amended by R.A. No. 8294)
three days prior to the May 11, 1998 national
and local elections, the PNP of Pagadian City
establish a checkpoint in Barangay Danlugan,
for the purpose of enforcing the Gun Ban which
was then being implemented by the COMELEC.
SPO3 Cipriano Q. Pascua was the designated
team leader.
At about 10:30 in the morning of the same day,
a red Tamaraw FX trying to pass through the
check point was stopped by the team and
directed to park at the side of the road. As the
occupants within the vehicle could not be seen
through its tinted windows, SPO1 Eliezer
Requejo, knocked on the vehicles window and
requested the occupants to step down for a
routine inspection. The eight occupants, which
included the accused-appellant Rodolfo Abenes
who is the Barangay Chairman of Tawagan

51

Norte, Labangan, Zamboanga Del Sur, alighted

from the vehicle. At this juncture, SPO1
Requejo and SPO3 Pascua noticed that a
holstered firearm was tucked at the right waist
of Abenes. The firearm was readily visible to
the policemen; it was not covered by the shirt
worn by Abenes. Abenes was then asked by
SPO3 Pascua whether he had a license and
authority to carry the firearm, and whether his
possession was exempted from the Gun Ban
being enforced by the COMELEC. Accused
answered in the affirmative. The policemen
then demanded for the pertinent documents to
be shown to support Abenes claim. He could
not
show
any.
Hence,
SPO1
Requejo
confiscated Abenes firearm, which was later
identified as a Norinco .45 caliber pistol
bearing Serial No. 906347, including its
magazine containing seven live ammunitions.
Subsequently SPO3 Pascul brought Abenes to
the PNP Headquarters at Camp Abelon in
Pagadian City. And upon investigation, it was
revealed that Abenes was not a registered nor
a licensed firearm holder.
After the prosecution presented its evidence,
accused-appellant tried to establish that the
firearm did not belong to and was not
recovered from him; that the firearm was
recovered by the policemen from the floor of
the vehicle inside a clutch bag which was
allegedly left by an unidentified person who
hitched a ride somewhere along the national
highway of Tawagan Norte Zamboanga Del Sur
and alighted near the Mabuhay Bazaar in
Pagadian City
the RTC rendered its decision convicting the
petitioner on both charges
The petitioner appealed to the CA claiming that
the checkpoint was not shown to have been
legally set up, and/or that the frisking of the
petitioner who was ordered to alight from the
Tamaraw FX, along with his companions in the
vehicle, violated his constitutional right against
unlawful search and seizure; and, that the trial
court erred in believing the version of the
incident as testified to by the policemen
instead of the version presented by the
defenses witness which is more consistent
with truth and human experience.7

Hence, the petitioner is now before this Court,

raising the following issues:
I.
Given the circumstances, and the
evidence adduced, was the check-point
validly established?
II.
Given the circumstances, and the
evidence adduced, was the petitioners
constitutional right against unlawful
search and seizure violated?
III.
Given the circumstances, and the
evidence
adduced,
did
not
the
honorable court of appeals commit a
grave abuse of discretion for adopting
the trial courts unsubstantiated findings
of fact?
IV.
Given the circumstances, and the
evidence adduced, is not the petitioner
entitled to an acquittal, if not on the
ground that the prosecution failed to
prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt, on
the ground of reasonable doubt itself . . .
as to where the gun was taken: from the
floor of the vehicle or from the waist of
petitioner?

ISSUES:
WON the check-point validly established.

HELD: YES
In the present case, the production of the
mission order is not necessary in view of the
fact that the checkpoint was established three
days before the May 11, 1998 elections; and,
the circumstances under which the policemen
found the gun warranted its seizure without a
warrant.

The CA, however affirmed the decision of the

RTC.

52

In People v. Escao,16 the Court, through the

ponencia of Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.,
held:
Accused-appellants assail the manner by
which the checkpoint in question was
conducted. They contend that the checkpoint
manned by elements of the Makati Police
should have been announced. They also
complain of its having been conducted in an
arbitrary and discriminatory manner.
We take judicial notice of the existence
of the COMELEC resolution imposing a gun ban
during the election period issued pursuant to
Section 52(c) in relation to Section 26(q) of the
Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Blg.
881). The national and local elections in 1995
were held on 8 May, the second Monday of the
month. The incident, which happened on 5
April 1995, was well within the election period.
This Court has ruled that not all
checkpoints are illegal. Those which are
warranted by the exigencies of public order
and are conducted in a way least intrusive to
motorists are allowed. For, admittedly, routine
checkpoints do intrude, to a certain extent, on
motorists right to "free passage without
interruption," but it cannot be denied that, as a
rule, it involves only a brief detention of
travelers during which the vehicles occupants
are required to answer a brief question or two.
For as long as the vehicle is neither searched
nor its occupants subjected to a body search,
and the inspection of the vehicle is limited to a
visual search, said routine checks cannot be
regarded as violative of an individuals right
against unreasonable search. In fact, these
routine checks, when conducted in a fixed area,
are even less intrusive.
The checkpoint herein conducted was in
pursuance of the gun ban enforced by the
COMELEC. The COMELEC would be hard put to
implement the ban if its deputized agents were
limited to a visual search of pedestrians. It
would also defeat the purpose for which such
ban was instituted. Those who intend to bring a
gun during said period would know that they
only need a car to be able to easily perpetrate
their malicious designs.
The facts adduced do not constitute a
ground for a violation of the constitutional
rights of the accused against illegal search and

seizure. PO3 Suba admitted that they were

merely stopping cars they deemed suspicious,
such as those whose windows are heavily
tinted just to see if the passengers thereof
were carrying guns. At best they would merely
direct their flashlights inside the cars they
would stop, without opening the cars doors or
subjecting its passengers to a body search.
There is nothing discriminatory in this as this is
what the situation demands.

(31) PEOPLE VS. VICENERAO

FACTS:
On the night of April 10, 1995, at around 10:45
p.m., as about fifteen police officers were
manning a checkpoint at Ulas, Davao City
pursuant to the COMELEC gun ban, a
motorcycle with three men on board sped past
them. One of the police officers blew his
whistle and ordered them to return to the
checkpoint.
Obliging, the three men (Vinecario, Roble and
Wates) aboard the motorcycle returned to the
checkpoint. The police found a suspicious
looking military backpack, which was found out
to be containing marijuana.
Subsequently,
Informations
against
the
accused were filed violation of Article IV of
Republic Act No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972)
After trial, the Trial Court found all the accused
guilty beyond reasonable doubt and ointly
sentence them to suffer the supreme penalty
of death by lethal injection. Upon motion for
reconsideration, the conviction was affirmed
but the penalty was reduced to Reclusion
perpetua.
Vinecario argues that the prosecution failed to
show that the search conducted by the police
officers was incident to a lawful arrest; that he
could not have been deemed to have
consented to the search as any such consent
was given under intimidating or coercive
circumstances; and that there existed no
probable cause to justify the search and seizure
of the backpack, hence, the marijuana is
inadmissible in evidence, it being a product of
illegal search.
Vinecario adds that the police officers who
arrested and investigated him failed to inform

53

him of his rights to remain silent and to have

competent and independent counsel of his
choice, thereby violating Section 12(1), Article
III of the Constitution.
ISSUE:
WON the search made by the police is violative
of the Constitutional prohibition against illegal
arrest, searches and seizures.
WON the police violated the accused Miranda
Rights.
HELD:

No. The constitutional proscription against

warrantless searches and seizures admits of
certain exceptions. Search and/or seizure may
be made without a warrant and the evidence
obtained therefrom may be admissible in the
following instances: (1) search incident to a
lawful arrest; (2) search of a moving motor
vehicle; (3) search in violation of customs laws;
(4) seizure of evidence in plain view; (5) when
the accused himself waives his right against
unreasonable searches and seizures; and (6)
stop-and-frisk situations.]Searches conducted in
checkpoints are valid for as long as they are
warranted by the exigencies of public order
and are conducted in a way least intrusive to
motorists. For as long as the vehicle is neither
searched nor its occupants subjected to a body
search, and the inspection of the vehicle is
limited to a visual search, said routine checks
cannot be regarded as violative of an
individuals right against unreasonable search.
Although the general rule is that motorists and
their vehicles as well as pedestrians passing
through checkpoints may only be subjected to
a routine inspection, vehicles may be stopped
and extensively searched when there is
probable cause which justifies a reasonable
belief of the men at the checkpoints that either
the motorist is a law offender or the contents of
the vehicle are or have been instruments of
some offense.

No.
As to Vinecarios allegation that his
constitutional rights were violated during the
custodial investigation conducted by the police
officers, the same is relevant and material only
when an extrajudicial admission or confession
extracted from an accused becomes the basis
of his conviction. In the case at bar, the trial
court convicted appellants on the basis of the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.

(32) MICLAT, JR. VS. PEOPLE

FACTS:
At about 1:00pm of November 8, 2002, P/Insp.
Jose Valencia of the Caloocan City Police
Station-SDEU called upon his subordinates
after the receiving an INFOREP Memo from
Camp Crame relative to the illicit and downright drug-trading activities being undertaken
along Palmera Spring II, Bagumbong, Caloocan
City involving Abe Miclat (petitioner/accused),
Wily alias Bokbok and one Mic or Jojo.
Immediately, P/Insp. Valencia formed a
surveillance team headed by SPO4 Ernesto
Palting and is composed of 5 more operatives
from the Drug Enforcement Unit, namely: PO3
Pagsolingan, PO2 Modina, PO2 De Ocampo, and
PO3 Antonio.
After a short briefing at their station, the team
boarded a rented passenger jeepney and
proceeded to the target area to verify the said
informant and/or memorandum.
When the group of SPO4 Palting arrived at
Palmera Spring II, Caloocan City at around
3:50pm that same afternoon, they were at
once led by their informant to the house of one
Alias Abe (accused).
PO3 Antonio then positioned himself at the
perimeter of the house, while the rest of the
members of the group deployed themselves
nearby.
Thru a small opening in the curtain-covered
window, PO3 Antonio peeped inside and there
at a distance of one and one-half meters, he
saw accused arranging several pieces of small
plastic sachets which he believed to be
containing shabu. Slowly, said operative inched
his way in by gently pushing the door as well
as the plywood covering the same.

54

Upon gaining entrance, PO3 Antonio forthwith

introduced himself as a police officer while
accused, on the other hand, after being
informed of such authority, voluntarily handed
over to the former the 4 pieces of small plastic
sachets the latter was earlier sorting out.

may produce, and particularly

describing the place to be
searched and the persons or
things to be seized.

PO3 Antonio immediately placed the suspect

(accused) under arrest and brought him and
the 4 pieces of plastic sachets containing white
crystalline substance to their headquarters and
turned them over to PO3 Fernando Moran for
proper disposition.

However, a settled exception to the right

guaranteed by the above-stated provision is
that of an arrest made during the commission
of a crime, which does not require a previously
issued warrant. Such warrantless arrest is
considered reasonable and valid under Sec. 5
(a), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure, to wit:

Upon
arraignment,
accused,
with
the
assistance of counsel pleaded not guilty to the
crime charged. Consequently, trial on the
merits ensued.

Sec.5.Arrest without warrant;

when lawful.a peace office of a
private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:

On July 28, 2004, the Regional Trial Court (RTC),

after finding that the prosecution has
established all the elements of the offense
charged, rendered a Decision convicting
accused of Violation of Section 11, Article 2 of
R.A. No. 9165.

a)When, in his presence, the

person to be arrested has
committed,
is
actually
committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;

Aggrieved, accused sought recourse before the

Court of Appeals (CA). On October 13, 2006,
the CA rendered a Decision affirming in toto the
decision of the RTC.
ISSUES:
Whether or not there was a valid warrantless
arrest and seizure in this case.
Whether or not the seized shabu is admissible
as evidence.
HELD:
1. Yes. Sec. 2, Art. III of the 1987 Constitution
provides:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to
be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches
and seizures of whatever nature
and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant
or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the
judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he

For the exception in Section 5 (a), Rule 113 to

operate, the Court has ruled that 2 elements
must be present: (1) the person to be arrested
must execute an overt act indicating that he
has just committed, is actually committing, or
is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such
overt act is done in the presence or within the
view of the arresting officer.
In the instant case, accused was caught in
flagrante delicto and the police authorities
effectively made a valid warrantless arrest. The
established facts reveal that on the date of the
arrest, agents of the Station Drug Enforcement
Unit (SDEU) of the Caloocan City Police Station
were conducting a surveillance operation in the
area of Palmera Spring II to verify the reported
drug-related activities of several individuals,
which included the accused. During the
operation, PO3 Antonio, through accuseds
window, saw the latter arranging several
plastic sachets containing what appears to be
shabu in the living room of their home. The
plastic sachets and its suspicious contents
were plainly exposed to the view of PO3
Antonio, who was only about one and one-half
meters from where accused was seated. PO3
Antonio then inched his way in the house by
gently pushing the door. Upon gaining
entrance, the operative introduced himself as a
police officer. After which, the accused
voluntarily handed over to PO3 Antonio the

55

small plastic sachets. PO3 Antonio then placed

accused under arrest and, contrary to the
latters contention, PO3 Antonio informed him
of his constitutional rights. PO3 Antonio then
took the accused and the 4 pieces of plastic
sachets to their headquarters and turned them
over to PO3 Moran.
Thereafter, the evidence were marked AMC 14, the initials of the name of the accused. The
heat-sealed transparent sachets containing
white crystalline substance were submitted to
the
PNP
Crime
Laboratory
for
drug
examination, which later yielded positive
results for the presence of methamphetamine
hydrochloride, a dangerous drug under RA No.
9165.
Considering the circumstances immediately
prior to and surrounding the arrest of the
accused, the latter was clearly arrested in
flagrante delicto as he was then committing a
crime, violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act,
within the view of the arresting officer.
2. Yes. The Court said as to the admissibility of
the seized drugs in evidence, it too falls within
the established exceptions.
The 1987 Constitution mandates that a search
and consequent seizure must be carried out
with a judicial warrant; otherwise, it becomes
unreasonable, and any evidence obtained
therefrom shall be inadmissible for any purpose
in any proceeding. The right against
warrantless searches and seizure, however, is
subject to legal and judicial exceptions,
namely:
1.Warrantless search incidental to a lawful
arrest;
2.Search of evidence in plain view;
3.Search of a moving vehicle;
4.Consented warrantless search;
5.Customs search;
6.Stop and Frisk; and
7.Exigent and emergency circumstances.
What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable
warrantless search or seizure is purely a
judicial question, determinable from the
uniqueness of the circumstances involved,
including the purpose of the search or seizure,
the presence or absence of probable cause, the
manner in which the search and seizure was
made, the place or thing searched, and the
character of the articles procured.

It is to be noted that accused was caught in the

act of arranging the heat-sealed plastic sachets
in plain sight of PO3 Antonio and accused
voluntarily surrendered them to the latter upon
learning that he is a police officer. The seizure
made by PO3 Antonio of the 4 plastic sachets
from the accused was not only incidental to a
lawful arrest, but it also falls within the purview
of the plain view doctrine.
Objects falling in plain view of an officer
who has a right to be in a position to have that
view are subject to seizure even without a
search warrant and may be introduced in
evidence. The plain view doctrine applies
when the following requisites concur: (a) the
law enforcement officer in search of the
evidence has a prior justification for an
intrusion or is in a position from which he can
view a particular area; (b) the discovery of
evidence in plain view is inadvertent; (c) it is
immediately apparent to the officer that the
item he observes may be evidence of a crime,
contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. The
law enforcement officer must lawfully make an
initial intrusion or properly be in a position from
which he can particularly view the area. In the
course of such lawful intrusion, he came
inadvertently across a piece of evidence
incriminating the accused. The object must be
open to eye and hand and its discovery
inadvertent.
It is clear, therefore, that an object is in plain
view if the object itself is plainly exposed to
sight. Since accuseds arrest is among the
exceptions to the rule requiring a warrant
before effecting an arrest and the evidence
seized from the accused was the result of a
warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest,
which incidentally was in plain view of the
arresting officer, the results of the ensuing
search and seizure were admissible in evidence
to prove accuseds guilt of the offense charged.

(33) VELAROSO VS. CA

FACTS:
A Letter-Appeal was filed by Valeroso before
the Supreme Court to reconsider the decision
and its Motion for Reconsideration against him,
convicting him with the crime of illegal

56

possession of firearms and ammunition. The

information that was filed against him stated
that he have in his possession and custody and
control a firearm and ammunition.
The prosecution's witnesses stated that they
received an order to serve a Warrant of Arrest
issued by Judge Ignacio Salvador, against
Valeroso for a case of kidnapping with ransom.
After a briefing, the team conducted the
necessary surveillance on Valeroso and
eventually, the team members proceeded to
Valeroso about to board a tricyle. The team
approached Valeroso. They put him under
arrest, informed him of his constitutional rights,
and bodily searched him. They found a Charter
Arms revolver, bearing Serial No. 52315, with
five pieces of live ammunition, tucked in his
waist. Valeroso was then brought to the police
station for questioning. Upon verification in
Camp Crame, they presented a certification
that the subject firearm was not issued to
Valeroso, but was licensed to another person.
On the other hand, the defense testified that
on July 10, 1996, Valeroso was sleeping inside a
room in the boarding house of his children. He
was awakened by four heavily armed men in
civilian attire who pointed their guns at him
and pulled him out of the room. The raiding
team tied his hands and placed him near the
faucet (outside the room) then went back
inside, searched and ransacked the room.
Moments later, an operative came out of the
room and exclaimed," Hoy, may nakuha akong
baril sa loob!" They informed Valeroso that
there was a standing warrant for his arrest.
However, the raiding team was not armed with
a search warrant.
The RTC convicted Valeroso as charged and
sentenced him. The CA affirmed the RTC
decision but the minimum term of the
indeterminate penalty was lowered to four (4)
years and two (2) months. On petition for
review, the SC affirmed the CA decision.
Valeroso filed a Motion for Reconsideration
which was denied with finality on June 30,
2008.

Valeroso came again to the court by this LetterAppeal imploring this Court to once more take
a contemplative reflection and deliberation on
the
case,
focusing
on
his
breached
constitutional rights against unreasonable
search and seizure. Meanwhile, in its
Manifestation, the OSG changed its previous
position and now recommends Valerosos
acquittal. After a second look at the evidence
presented, the OSG considers the testimonies
of the witnesses for the defens more credible
and thus concludes that Valeroso was arrested
in a boarding house. More importantly, the OSG
agrees with Valeroso that the subject firearm
was obtained by the police officers in violation
of Valerosos constitutional right against illegal
search and seizure, and should thus be
excluded
from
the
evidence
for
the
prosecution. Lastly, assuming that the subject
firearm was admissible in evidence, still,
Valeroso could not be convicted of the crime,
since he was able to establish his authority to
possess the gun through the Memorandum
Receipt issued by his superiors.
The Court notes that the version of the
prosecution, as to where Valeroso was arrested,
is different from the version of the defense. The
prosecution claims that Valeroso was arrested
near the INP Central Police Station in Culiat,
Quezon City, while he was about to board a
tricycle. After placing Valeroso under arrest, the
arresting officers bodily searched him, and they
found the subject firearm and ammunition. The
defense, on the other hand, insists that he was
arrested inside the boarding house of his
children. After serving the warrant of arrest
(allegedly for kidnapping with ransom), some
of the police officers searched the boarding
house and forcibly opened a cabinet where
they discovered the subject firearm.
The Court have more credence on the defense
because Valeroso invoked his constitutional
right against unreasonable searches and
seizures. Also, the court laid down the
exceptions where a valid search may be made
without a warrant to wit:

57

1.
Warrantless search incidental to a lawful
arrest;
2.
[Seizure] of evidence in plain view.
3.
Search of a moving vehicle;
4.
Consented warrantless search;
5.
Customs search; 6.
Stop and Frisk;
7.
Exigent and emergency circumstances.
8.
Search of vessels and aircraft; [and]
9.
Inspection of buildings and other
premises for the enforcement of fire, sanitary
and building regulations.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the warrantless search and
seizure of the firearm and ammunition valid?
HELD: NO
For one, the warrantless search could not be
justified as an incident to a lawful arrest. Under
Section 13, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court,
which reads:
SEC. 13. Search incident to lawful arrest. A
person lawfully arrested may be searched for
dangerous weapons or anything which may
have been used or constitute proof in the
commission of an offense without a search
warrant.
Past decisions of the SC
laid down the
parameters of a valid warrantless search and
seizure as an incident to a lawful arrest. When
an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the
arresting officer to search the person arrested
in order to remove any weapon that the latter
might use in order to resist arrest or effect his
escape. Otherwise, the officers safety might
well be endangered, and the arrest itself
frustrated. In addition, it is entirely reasonable
for the arresting officer to search for and seize
any evidence on the arrestee's person in order
to prevent its concealment or destruction.
Moreover, in lawful arrests, it becomes both the
duty and the right of the apprehending officers
to conduct a warrantless search not only on the
person of the suspect, but also in the
permissible area within the latter's reach.
Otherwise stated, a valid arrest allows
the seizure of evidence or dangerous

weapons either on the person of the one

arrested or within the area of his
immediate control. The phrase within the
area of his immediate control means the area
from within which he might gain possession of
a weapon or destructible evidence.
From the foregoing narration of facts, the SC
concluded that the arresting officers served the
warrant of arrest without any resistance from
Valeroso. They placed him immediately under
their control by pulling him out the bed, and
bringing him out of the room with his hands
tied. To be sure, the cabinet which, according
to Valeroso, was locked, could no longer be
considered as an area within his immediate
control because there was no way for him to
take any weapon or to destroy any evidence
that could be used against against him. Nor
can the arresting officers invoke the plain view
doctrine. In this case, the police officers did not
just accidentally discover the subject firearm
and ammunition; they actually searched for
evidence against Valeroso which violated his
constitutional right and thus the evidence
presented is inadmissible against him.
Valeroso is acquitted.
Note: The Letter-Appeal is actually in the
nature of a second motion for reconsideration.
While a second motion for reconsideration is,
as a general rule, a prohibited pleading, it is
within the sound discretion of the Court to
admit the same, provided it is filed with prior
leave whenever substantive justice may be
better served thereby.
(34) ESQUILLO VS. PEOPLE
FACTS:

Petitioner challenges the Decision of the Court

of Appeals which affirmed the Decision of
Regional Trial Court of Pasay City which
convicted petitioner for violation of the
Comprehensive Drugs Act or RA No. 9165.

58

Two police officers were on a surveillence on

the activities of an alleged snacther in Malibay,
Pasay City. As one of the police officers alighted
the vehicle, he glanced in the direction of
petitioner who was standing three meters
aways and seen placing inside a yellow
cigarette case what appeared to be a small
heated-sealed transparent plastic sachet
containing white subtance. He became
suspicious so he approache and introduced
himself to the petitioner as a police officer and
inquired about the plastic sachet. Instead of
replying, petitioner attempted to flee but was
timely restrained by police officer and
requested to take out the transparent plastic
which turned out to be shabu. The police officer
confiscated it and petitioner was brought for
investigation.

3. Search and seizure should precede the

arrest.

What is essential is that a genuine reason must

exist to warrant the belief that the person who
manifests unusual suspicious conduct has
weapons or contraband concealed about him. It
has a dual purpose: general interest of
effective crime prevention and detection and
safety and self-preservation of police officer.

(35) SALVADOR VS. PEOPLE

FACTS:

ISSUE:

Whether or not police officers had probable

cause to search petitioner under the stop-andfrisk concept.

HELD: YES

The circumstances under which petitioner was

arrested engender the belief that a search on
her was warranted. It was in plain view when
one of the police officers saw petitioner placing
the shabu-containing plastic.

Requisite s of stop-and-frisk:
1. Police officer should properly introduce
himself, make initial inquiries, approach
and restrain a person who manifests
suspicious conduct;
2. Genuine reason, in accordance with the
police officers experience and the
surrounding conditions.

A Special Mission Group from the PAF Special

Operations
Squadron
conducted
routine
surveillance operations at the Manila Domestic
Airport to check on reports of alleged drug
trafficking and smuggling being facilitated by
certain PAL personnel.
They were ordered to keep close watch on the
second airplane, an Airbus 300 parked inside
the Domestic Airport terminal. At around 11:30
that same evening, three (3) persons had
boarded the Airbus 300. The team did not
move, but continued its surveillance.
At 12:15 a.m. the team leader reported that
the three (3) persons who earlier boarded the
Airbus 300 had disembarked with their
abdominal areas bulging and then boarded an
airplane tow truck with its lights off. At the
Lima Gate of the Domestic Airport, the team
blocked and stopped the tow truck.
The team leader (Sgt. Teves) identified himself
and asked the four (4) persons on board to
alight. They were later identified as Tomas
Salvador, petitioner, Aurelio Mandin, Danilo
Santos and Napoleon Clamor, the driver of the
tow truck. Sgt. Teves approached Aurelio
Mandin whose uniform was partly open,
showing a girdle. Then, a package wrapped in
brown packaging tape fell. Suspecting that the
package contained smuggled items, the leader
yelled to his teammates, Positive! Thereupon,
the rest of the team surrounded petitioner and

59

his two co-accused who surrendered without a

fight.
The team searched their bodies and found that
the three were wearing girdles beneath their
uniforms, all containing packets wrapped in
packaging tape. Mandin yielded five (5)
packets, while petitioner and Santos had four
(4) each. The team confiscated the packets and
brought all the accused to the PAFSECOM
Office. The Bureau of Customs found 248
pieces of assorted watches and fourteen karat
(14K) gold jewelries
The Investigating State Prosecutor conducted
an inquest and thereafter recommended that
petitioner and his co-accused be charged with
violating Section 3601 of the Tariff and
Customs Code. The Information was filed with
the RTC.
The accused filed a Joint Demurrer to Evidence.
However, the TC denied the demurrer.
TC convicted all the accused of the offense
charged. CA affirmed the decision of the TC.
Only Tomas Salvador elevates his case to SC by
way of the instant petition for review
on certiorari.
ISSUE:
WON the
evidence.

seized

items

are

admissible

in

* Petitioner contends that the warrantless

search and seizure conducted by the PAF
operatives is illegal. Thus, the seized items
should not have been admitted in evidence
against him.
HELD: YES

Here, it should be noted that during the

incident in question, the special mission of the
PAF operatives was to conduct a surveillance
operation to verify reports of drug trafficking
and smuggling by certain PAL personnel in the
vicinity of the airport. In other words, the
search made by the PAF team on petitioner and
his co-accused was in the nature of a customs
search. As such, the team properly effected the
search and seizure without a search warrant
since it exercised police authority under the
customs law. Law enforcers who are tasked to
effect the enforcement of the customs and
tariff laws are authorized to search and seize,
without a search warrant, any article, cargo or
other movable property when there is
reasonable cause to suspect that the said
items have been introduced into the Philippines
in violation of the tariff and customs law. They
may likewise conduct a warrantless search of
any vehicle or person suspected of holding or
conveying the said articles, as in the case at
bar.
At the time of the search, petitioner and his coaccused were on board a moving PAL aircraft
tow truck. The search of a moving vehicle is
recognized in this jurisdiction as a valid
exception to the requirement for a search
warrant. A search warrant may readily be
obtained when the search is made in a store,
dwelling house or other immobile structure.
But it is impracticable to obtain a warrant when
the search is conducted in a mobile ship,
aircraft or other motor vehicle since they can
quickly be moved out of the locality or
jurisdiction where the warrant must be sought.
Verily, we rule that the Court of Appeals
committed no reversible error in holding that
the articles involved in the instant controversy
were validly seized by the authorities even
without a search warrant, hence, admissible in
evidence against petitioner and his co-accused.

Our jurisprudence provides for privileged areas

where searches and seizures may lawfully be
effected sans a
search
warrant.
These
recognized exceptions include: (1) search of
moving vehicles; (2) search in plain view; (3)
customs searches; (4) waiver or consented
searches; (5) stop-and-frisk situations; and (6)
search incidental to a lawful arrest.

60