U.S. v.

Pons
G.R. No. L-11530, August 12, 1916
FACTS:
Juan Pons was convicted with the crime of illegal importation of opium. Pons appealed
and contended that Act 2381 (An Act Restricting The Use Of Opium and Repealing Act No. 1761) was
invalid for having been passed after the last allowable day of legislative session. He claimed that the
legislatures clock had been stopped at midnight on February 28, 1914, the last day of session, and it was
in fact after midnight that the statute was passed. The legislative journal, however, indicated that the
statute was passed before midnight when the legislature adjourned sine dine.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court can take judicial notice of the journal to determine the actual
date of adjournment.
HELD:
Yes. The SC looked into the Journals to ascertain the date of adjournment but the SC
refused to go beyond the recitals in the legislative Journals. The said Journals are conclusive on the
Court and to inquire into the veracity of the journals of the Philippine Legislature, when they are, as the
SC have said, clear and explicit, would be to violate both the letter and the spirit of the organic laws by
which the Philippine Government was brought into existence, to invade a coordinate and independent
department of the Government, and to interfere with the legitimate powers and functions of the
Legislature. Pons cannot be given due weight against the conclusiveness of the Journals which is an act of
the legislature. The journals say that the Legislature adjourned at 12 midnight on February 28, 1914. This
settles the question, and the court did not err in declining to go beyond these journals.
DISPOSITION:

SC affirmed the decision of the regular court.

Philconsa v. Mathay
G.R. No. L-25554, October 4, 1966

FACTS:
R.A. 4134, approved on June 10, 1964, provided for increase of salary of Senate
President, Speaker of the House and members of the Senate and House of Representatives. The
Appropriation Act (Budget) for the Fiscal Year July 1, 1965, to June 30, 1966 (R.A. 4642) for the House
of Representatives implemented the increase in salary of the Speaker and members of the House of
Representatives set by R.A. 4134. Petitioners, Philippine Constitution Association, contend that such
implementation is violative of Article VI, Section 14, of the Constitution, as amended in 1940, which
provides that No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full
term of all the Members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives approving such, increase
Hence, this petition for prohibition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Constitution require only the term of all the members of the House
before the increase becomes effective.
HELD:
No. The SC ruled that the purpose of the provision is to place "a legal bar to the
legislators yielding to the natural temptation to increase their salaries. Not that the power to provide for
higher compensation is lacking, but with the length of time that has to elapse before an increase becomes
effective, there is a deterrent factor to any such measure unless the need for it is clearly felt" (Taada &
Fernando, Constitution of the Philippines, Vol. 2, p. 867). Significantly, the constitutional provision refers
to "all the members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives" in the same sentence, as a single
unit, without distinction or separation between them. This unitary treatment is emphasized by the fact that
the provision speaks of the "expiration of the full term" of the Senators and Representatives that approved
the measure, using the singular form, and not the plural, despite the difference in the terms of office (six
years for Senators and four for Representatives thereby rendering more evident the intent to consider both
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houses for the purpose as indivisible components of one single Legislature. The use of the word "term" in
the singular, when combined with the following phrase "all the members of the Senate and of the House",
underscores that in the application of Article VI, Section 14, the fundamental consideration is that the
terms of office of all members of the Legislature that enacted the measure (whether Senators or
Representatives) must have expired before the increase in compensation can become operative. Such
disregard of the separate houses, in favor of the whole, accords in turn with the fact that the enactment of
laws rests on the shoulders of the entire Legislative body; responsibility therefor is not apportionable
between the two chambers.
DISPOSITION:
Writ of prohibition granted. The Court agrees with petitioners that the increased
compensation provided by R.A. 4134 is not operative until December 30, 1969, when the full term of all
members of the Senate and House that approved it on June 20, 1964 will have expired. Consequently,
appropriation for such increased compensation may not be disbursed until December 30, 1969. In so far
as R.A. 4642 (1965-1966 Appropriation Act) authorizes the disbursement of the increased compensation
prior to the date aforesaid, it also violates the Constitution and must be held null and void.

Ligot v. Mathay
G.R. No. L-34676, April 30, 1974
FACTS:
Benjamin Ligot (Ligot) served as a member of the House of Representatives of the
Congress of the Philippines for three consecutive four-year terms covering a twelve-year span from
December 30, 1957 to December 30, 1969. During his second term in office (1961-1965), R.A. 4134
fixing the salaries of constitutional officials and certain other officials of the national government was
enacted into law and took effect on July 1, 1964. The salaries of members of Congress (senators and
congressmen) were increased under said Act, but it was expressly provided that said increases shall take
effect in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.
Ligots term expired on December 30, 1969, so he filed a claim for retirement under
Commonwealth Act No. 186, section 12 (c) as amended by Republic Act No. 4968 which provided for
retirement gratuity of any official or employee, appointive or elective, with a total of at least twenty years
of service, the last three years of which are continuous on the basis therein provided in case of employees
based on the highest rate received and in case of elected officials on the rates of pay as provided by law.
The House of Representatives granted his petition however, Jose Velasco, the then Congress Auditor
refused to so issue certification. The Auditor General then, Ismael Mathay, also disallowed the same.
The thrust of Ligots appeal is that his claim for retirement gratuity computed on the
basis of the increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum for members of Congress (which was not applied
to him during his incumbency which ended December 30, 1969, while the Court held in Philconsa vs.
Mathay that such increases would become operative only for members of Congress elected to serve
therein commencing December 30, 1969) should not have been disallowed, because at the time of his
retirement, the increased salary for members of Congress as provided by law (under Republic Act
4134) was already P32,000.00 per annum.
ISSUE:

Whether or not Ligot is entitled to such retirement benefit.

HELD:
No. To allow Ligot a retirement gratuity computed on the basis of P32,000.00 per annum
would be a subtle way of increasing his compensation during his term of office and of achieving
indirectly what he could not obtain directly. Ligots claim cannot be sustained as far as he and other
members of Congress similarly situated whose term of office ended on December 30, 1969 are concerned
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for the simple reason that a retirement gratuity or benefit is a form of compensation within the purview of
the Constitutional provision limiting their compensation and other emoluments to their salary as
provided by law. To grant retirement gratuity to members of Congress whose terms expired on December
30, 1969 computed on the basis of an increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum (which they were
prohibited by the Constitution from receiving during their term of office) would be to pay them prohibited
emoluments which in effect increase the salary beyond that which they were permitted by the
Constitution to receive during their incumbency. As stressed by the Auditor-General in his decision in the
similar case of Ligots colleague, ex-Congressman Melanio Singson, Such a scheme would contravene
the Constitution for it would lead to the same prohibited result by enabling administrative authorities to
do indirectly what cannot be done directly.
DISPOSITION:

Petition dismissed.

People v. Jalosjos
G.R. No. 132875-76, February 3, 2000

FACTS:
The accused-appellant, Romeo F. Jaloslos is a full-pledged member of Congress who is
confined at the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape on two counts and acts of
lasciviousness on six counts1 is pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed this motion asking that he be
allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and
committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense.
ISSUE:
Whether or not accused-appellant should be allowed to discharge mandate as member of
House of Representatives.
HELD:
No. The SC ruled that the privilege of arrest has always been granted in a restrictive
sense. Privilege has to be granted by law, not inferred from the duties of a position. In fact, the higher the
rank, the greater is the requirement of obedience rather than exemption.
Section 11, Article VI, of the Constitution provides that a Senator or Member of the
House of Representatives shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be
privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session. For offenses punishable by more than six years
imprisonment, there was no immunity from arrest.
The accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the
operation of Sec. 11, Art. VI of the Constitution. The members of Congress cannot compel absent
members to attend sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The confinement of a
Congressman charged with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than six years is not merely
authorized by law, it has constitutional foundations.

One rationale behind confinement, whether pending appeal or after final conviction, is
public self-defense. Society must protect itself. It also serves as an example and warning to others. A
person charged with crime is taken into custody for purposes of the administration of justice.
DISPOSITION:

Instant motion is denied.

Jimenez v. Cabangbang
G.R. No. L-15905, August 3, 1966
FACTS:
Bartolome Cabangbang was a member of the House of Representatives and Chairman of
its Committee on National Defense. In November 1958, Cabangbang caused the publication of an open
letter addressed to the President of the Philippines. Said letter averred that there have been allegedly three
operational plans under serious study by some ambitious AFP officers, with the aid of some civilian
political strategists. That such strategists have had collusions with communists and that the Secretary of
Defense, Jesus Vargas, was planning a coup dtat to place him as the president. The planners allegedly
have Nicanor Jimenez, among others, under their guise and that Jimenez et al. may or may not be aware
that they are being used as a tool to meet such an end. The letter was said to have been published in
newspapers of general circulation. Jimenez then filed a case against Cabangbang to collect a sum of
damages against Cabangbang alleging that Cabangbangs statement is libelous. Cabangbang petitioned
for the case to be dismissed because he said that as a member of the lower house, he is immune from suit
and that he is covered by the privileged communication rule and that the said letter is not even libelous.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the open letter is covered by privilege communication endowed to
members of Congress.
HELD:
No. Article VI, Section 15 of the Constitution provides The Senators and Members of
the House of Representatives shall in all cases except treason, felony, and breach of the peace. Be
privileged from arrest during their attendance at the sessions of the Congress, and in going to and
returning from the same; and for any speech or debate therein, they shall not be questioned in any other
place.
The publication of the said letter is not covered by said expression which refers to
utterances made by Congressmen in the performance of their official functions, such as speeches
delivered, statements made, or votes cast in the halls of Congress, while the same is in session as well as
bills introduced in Congress, whether the same is in session or not, and other acts performed by
Congressmen, either in Congress or outside the premises housing its offices, in the official discharge of
their duties as members of Congress and of Congressional Committees duly authorized to perform its
functions as such at the time of the performance of the acts in question. Congress was not in session when
the letter was published and at the same time he, himself, caused the publication of the said letter. It is
obvious that, in thus causing the communication to be so published, he was not performing his official
duty, either as a member of Congress or as officer of any Committee thereof. Hence, contrary to the
finding made by the lower court the said communication is not absolutely privileged.
DISPOSITION:

The order appealed from is affirmed.

Adaza v. Pacana Jr.

G.R. No. L-68159, March 18, 1985

FACTS:
Petitioner Homobono Adaza (Adaza) and respondent Fernando Pacana Jr. (Pacana) were
elected governor and vice-governor, respectively, of the province of Misamis Oriental in the January 30,
1980 elections. Under the law, their respective terms of office would expire on March 3, 1986. In the
1984 election, petitioner, was elected as member of the Batasan Pambansa. Respondent then assumed the

governorship. Claiming to be the lawful occupant of the governors office, petitioner sued to exclude
respondent therefrom.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Adaza can serve as a member of the Batasan and as a governor of the
province simultaneously.
HELD:
No. The constitutional prohibition against a member of the Batasan Pambansa from
holding any other office or employment in the government during his tenure is clear and unambiguous.
Section 10, Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution provides that a member of the National Assembly (now
Batasan Pambansa) shall not hold any other office or employment in the government or any subdivision,
agency or instrumentality thereof, including government owned or controlled corporations, during his
tenure, except that of prime minister or member of the cabinet...
The language used in the above-cited section is plain, certain and free from ambiguity.
The only exceptions mentioned therein are the offices of prime minister and cabinet member. The wisdom
or expediency of the said provision is a matter which is not within the province of the Court to determine.
A public office is a public trust. It is created for the interest and the benefit of the people.
As such, a holder thereof "is subject to such regulations and conditions as the law may impose" and "he
cannot complain of any restrictions which public policy may dictate on his holding of more than one
office." It is therefore of no avail to petitioner that the system of government in other states allows a local
elective official to act as an elected member of the parliament at the same time. The dictate of the people
in whom legal sovereignty lies is explicit. It provides no exceptions save the two offices specifically cited
in the above-quoted constitutional provision. Thus, while it may be said that within the purely
parliamentary system of government no incompatibility exists in the nature of the two offices under
consideration, as incompatibility is understood in common law, the incompatibility herein present is one
created by no less than the constitution itself. In the case at bar, there is no question that petitioner has
taken his oath of office as an elected Mambabatas Pambansa and has been discharging his duties as such.
In the light of the oft-mentioned constitutional provision, this fact operated to vacate his former post and
he cannot now continue to occupy the same, nor attempt to discharge its functions.
DISPOSITION:

Instant petition is dismissed.

Puyat v. De Guzman
G.R. No. L-51122, March 25, 1982

FACTS:
In May 1979, Eugenio Puyat and his group were elected as directors of the International
Pipe Industries. The election was subsequently questioned by Eustaquio Acero (Puyats rival) claiming
that the votes were not properly counted hence he filed a quo warranto case before the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) on May 25, 1979. Prior to Aceros filing of the case, Estanislao Fernandez,
then a member of the Interim Batasang Pambansa purchased ten shares of stock of IPI from a member of
Aceros group. And during a conference held by SEC Commissioner Sixto de Guzman, Jr. (from May 2531, 1979) to have the parties confer with each other, Estanislao Fernandez entered his appearance as
counsel for Acero. Puyat objected as he argued that it is unconstitutional for an assemblyman to appear as
counsel (to anyone) before any administrative body (such as the SEC). This being cleared, Fernandez
inhibited himself from appearing as counsel for Acero. He instead filed an Urgent Motion for Intervention
in the said SEC case for him to intervene, not as a counsel, but as a legal owner of IPI shares and as a
person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation. The SEC Commissioner granted the motion and
in effect granting Fernandez leave to intervene.
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ISSUE:
Whether or not in intervening in the SEC Case, Assemblyman Fernandez is, in effect,
appearing as counsel, albeit indirectly, before an administrative body in contravention of Section 11,
Article VIII, of the 1973 Constitution.
HELD:
Yes. Ordinarily, by virtue of the Motion for Intervention, Assemblyman Fernandez
cannot be said to be appearing as counsel. Ostensibly, he is not appearing on behalf of another, although
he is joining the cause of the private respondents. His appearance could theoretically be for the protection
of his ownership of ten (10) shares of IPI in respect of the matter in litigation and not for the protection of
the petitioners nor respondents who have their respective capable and respected counsel.
However, certain salient circumstances militate against the intervention of Assemblyman
Fernandez in the SEC Case. He had acquired a mere P200.00 worth of stock in IPI, representing ten
shares out of 262,843 outstanding shares. He acquired them "after the fact" that is, on May 30, 1979, after
the contested election of Directors on May 14, 1979, after the quo warranto suit had been filed on May
25, 1979 before SEC and one day before the scheduled hearing of the case before the SEC on May 31,
1979. And what is more, before he moved to intervene, he had signified his intention to appear as counsel
for respondent Eustaquio T. C. Acero, but which was objected to by petitioners. Realizing, perhaps, the
validity of the objection, he decided, instead, to "intervene" on the ground of legal interest in the matter
under litigation. And it maybe noted that in the case filed before the Rizal Court of First Instance (L51928), he appeared as counsel for defendant Excelsior, co-defendant of respondent Acero therein.
Under those facts and circumstances, we are constrained to find that there has been an
indirect "appearance as counsel before ... an administrative body" and, in our opinion, that is a
circumvention of the Constitutional prohibition. The "intervention" was an afterthought to enable him to
appear actively in the proceedings in some other capacity. To believe the avowed purpose, that is, to
enable him eventually to vote and to be elected as Director in the event of an unfavorable outcome of the
SEC Case would be pure naivete. He would still appear as counsel indirectly.
A ruling upholding the "intervention" would make the constitutional provision
ineffective. All an Assemblyman need do, if he wants to influence an administrative body is to acquire a
minimal participation in the "interest" of the client and then "intervene" in the proceedings. That which
the Constitution directly prohibits may not be done by indirection or by a general legislative act which is
intended to accomplish the objects specifically or impliedly prohibited.
In brief, we hold that the intervention of Assemblyman Fernandez in SEC. No. 1747 falls
within the ambit of the prohibition contained in Section 11, Article VIII of the Constitution.
DISPOSITION:
Respondent Commissioner's Order granting Atty. Estanislao A. Fernandez leave
to intervene in SEC Case No. 1747 is reversed and set aside. The temporary Restraining Order issued is
made permanent.
Abbas v. SET
G.R. No. 83767, October 27, 1988

FACTS:
On October 1987, Firdausi Abbas et al filed before the SET an election contest against 22
candidates of the LABAN coalition who were proclaimed senators-elect in the May
11 (1987) congressional elections by the COMELEC. The SET was at the time composed of three (3)
Justices of the Supreme Court and six (6) Senators. Abbas later on filed for the disqualification of the 6
senator members from partaking in the said election protest on the ground that all of them are interested
parties to said case. Abbas argue that considerations of public policy and the norms of fair play and due
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process imperatively require the mass disqualification sought. To accommodate the proposed
disqualification, Abbas suggested the following amendment: Tribunals Rules (Section 24) requiring
the concurrence of five (5) members for the adoption of resolutions of whatever nature is a proviso that
where more than four (4) members are disqualified, the remaining members shall constitute a quorum, if
not less than three (3) including one (1) Justice, and may adopt resolutions by majority vote with no
abstentions. Obviously tailored to fit the situation created by the petition for disqualification, this would,
in the context of that situation, leave the resolution of the contest to the only three Members who would
remain, all Justices of this Court, whose disqualification is not sought. The respondents proposed
amendment of the Tribunals Rules of procedure was to permit the contest being decided only by three
Members of the Tribunal.
ISSUE:

Whether or not Abbas proposal could be given due weight.

HELD:
The petitioners proposal has cannot be given any weight. The most fundamental
objection to such proposal lies in the plain terms and intent of the Constitution itself which, in its Article
VI, Section 17, creates the Senate Electoral Tribunal, ordains its composition and defines its jurisdiction
and powers.
Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral
Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of
their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom
shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall
be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on
the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations
registered under the party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal
shall be its Chairman.
It is quite clear that in providing for a SET to be staffed by both Justices of the SC and
Members of the Senate, the Constitution intended that both those judicial and legislative components
commonly share the duty and authority of deciding all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of Senators. The legislative component herein cannot be totally excluded from participation
in the resolution of senatorial election contests, without doing violence to the spirit and intent of the
Constitution. It is not to be misunderstood in saying that no Senator-Member of the SET may inhibit or
disqualify himself from sitting in judgment on any case before said Tribunal. Every Member of the
Tribunal may, as his conscience dictates, refrain from participating in the resolution of a case where he
sincerely feels that his personal interests or biases would stand in the way of an objective and impartial
judgment. What SC is saying is that in the light of the Constitution, the SET cannot legally function as
such; absent its entire membership of Senators and that no amendment of its Rules can confer on the three
Justices-Members alone the power of valid adjudication of a senatorial election contest.
DISPOSITION: Petition for certiorari dismissed for lack of merit.