Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
ISSUE:
from
their
salaries.
Petitioners submit that any tax withheld from their emoluments or compensation
as judicial officers constitutes a decreased or diminution of their salaries, contrary
to Section 10, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not members of the Judiciary are exempt from income taxes?
impairment of security of tenure does not arise. Nonetheless, for the incumbents of
inferior courts abolished, the effect is one of separation. As to its effect, no
distinction exists between removal and the abolition of the office.
Realistically, it is devoid of significance. He ceases to be a member of the judiciary.
In the implementation of the assailed legislation, therefore, it would be in
accordance with accepted principles of constitutional construction that as far as
incumbent justices and judges are concerned, this Court be consulted and that its
view be accorded the fullest consideration. No fear need be entertained that there is
a failure to accord respect to the basic principle that this Court does not render
advisory opinions. No question of law is involved. If such were the case, certainly
this Court could not have its say prior to the action taken by either of the two
departments. Even then, it could do so but only by way of deciding a case where
the matter has been put in issue. Neither is there any intrusion into who shall be
appointed to the vacant positions created by the reorganization. That remains in the
hands of the Executive to whom it properly belongs.
There is no departure therefore from the tried and tested ways of judicial power.
Rather what is sought to be achieved by this liberal interpretation is to preclude any
plausibility to the charge that in the exercise of the conceded power of reorganizing
the inferior courts, the power of removal of the present incumbents vested in this
Tribunal is ignored or disregarded. The challenged Act would thus be free from any
unconstitutional taint, even one not readily discernible except to those predisposed
to view it with distrust. Moreover, such a construction would be in accordance with
the basic principle that in the choice of alternatives between one which would save
and another which would invalidate a statute, the former is to be preferred.
DATE:
Facts:
On October 20, 1997, ten members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Taguig, Metro
Manila file a complaint charging Judge Santiago G. Estrella of Branch 68 of the
Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region stationed in Pasig City
with serious misconduct relative to Election Protest No. 144, entitled Ricardo D.
Papa, Jr. vs. Isidro B. Garcia.
The present controversy stems from an election protest filed by then mayoral
candidate Ricardo D. Papa, Jr. against Isidro B. Garcia, the candidate proclaimed
mayor of Taguig, Metro Manila in the May 8, 1995 elections. In his protest, Papa
impugned the results of all 713 precincts in the municipality. This was filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig and eventually raffled to the sala of respondent wherein
it was docketed as Election Protest No. 144. Both parties offered their respective
exhibits, which were all admitted by respondent judge.
On February 11, 1997, respondent issued an order directing the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) to examine the contested ballots in the presence of a
representative of both parties. The pertinent portion of the order provided that so
as to enable the court to get a complete overview of the matter, it was better to
have a handwriting expert examine the questioned ballots to settle once and for all
the questions and objections relative to the ballots. On July 22, 1997, Garcia filed a
Manifestation and Formal Motion with Formal Query, praying that an order be issued
to the Branch Clerk of Court to be furnished a copy of the NBI Reports and/or allow
him to copy or review or at least to read said reports. Respondent judge denied the
motion on the same day, proclaiming that the examination of contested ballots by
the NBI was ordered, upon the instance of the court, and not by the parties, hence,
only the court was given copies of the NBI Reports.
On the same day that Garcias motion was denied, respondent also set the date of
promulgation of judgment for July 31, 1997.
motion on July 28, 1997, explaining that: To allow parties at this stage to secure
copies of the NBI report and to comment on the same before promulgating the
decision would be opening the floodgates for undue delay.
Garcia filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus, with a prayer for
restraining order and preliminary injunction with the COMELEC on July 29, 1997.
The very next day or on July 30, 1997, the COMELEC issued a Temporary Restraining
Order (TRO) enjoining respondent judge from proceeding with the scheduled
promulgation of judgment set on July 31, 1997.
The judgment was promulgated, disposing that the Court resolves to sustain the
Protest lodged by Ricardo D. Papa, Jr., and accordingly renders judgment
DECLARING the aforenamed Protestant the duly elected mayor of the Municipality of
Taguig, Metro Manila. The Counter-Protest filed by protestee Isidro B. Garcia was
dismissed. Complainants further claim that it was only after the promulgation of
judgment that Garcia was able to secure copies of the NBI Reports.
In his Comment dated December 10, 1997, respondent vehemently denied the
allegations in the complaint by addressing complainants two main issues:
(1)
whether it was proper for respondent to have designated the NBI to conduct the
necessary handwriting examination and to submit reports on the results thereof to
the court and not to the parties considering that said reports were the sole basis of
the decision rendered by the court, and (2) whether it was proper for respondent to
have granted the Motion for Execution Pending Appeal filed by the declared
winner Ricardo D. Papa, Jr., allowing him to take his oath notwithstanding the
Whether or not the respondent violated Section 3(e) of Republic Act 3019 or
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act?
officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt
practices of any public officers and are hereby declared to be unlawful: (e) Causing
undue injury to any party, including the government, or giving any private party any
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official
administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or
gross inexcusable negligence.
He was found guilty of serious misconduct, partiality, and inexcusable negligence,
and is ordered to pay a fine in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00),
with the stern warning that any similar misconduct on his part in the future will be
dealt with more severely.
In the previous report and recommendation dated February 29, 2000 submitted by
Court Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo, it was pertinently observed that
respondent gravely abused his discretion in deciding the case and in issuing the
questioned order since grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction
occurs when a board, tribunal or officer exercising judicial functions exercises its
judgment in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner, or fails to
consider the evidence adduced by the parties. The Office of the Court Administrator
echoed the COMELECs finding that respondents action showed utter disregard of
the appropriate procedure required of him, resulting in the disenfranchisement of
thousands of voters.
No less than the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that a judge should be the
embodiment of competence, integrity, and independence (Rule 1.01, Canon 1).
Indeed, in every case, a judge shall endeavor diligently to ascertain the facts and
applicable laws unswayed by partisan interests, public opinion, or fear of criticism
(Rule 3.02, Canon 3, Code of Judicial Conduct).
reminded members of the bench that The Judge should always be imbued with a
high sense of duty and responsibility in the discharge of his obligation to promptly
and properly administer justice.
FACTS:
Teodoro Santiago, Jr. was a graduating student at Sero Elementary School in
Cotabato City. Prior to the end of the school year, the said school constituted a
Committee on the Rating of Students for Honor composed of teachers of the said
school for the purpose of selecting the honor students of its graduating class. The
above-named committee deliberated and adjudged Teodoro C. Santiago, Jr. as the
third honor, the first and second place being obtained by his two other classmates,
Socoro Medina and Patricia Ligat. Three days before the date of graduation, the
third place Teodoro Santiago, Jr., represented by his mother and with his father as
counsel, sought the invalidation of the ranking of honor students by instituting an
action for certiorari, injunction and damages in the Court of First Instance of
Cotabato against the above-named committee members along with the District
Supervisor and the Academic Supervisor of the place.
The complaint alleges grave abuse of discretions and irregularities in the selection
of honor students in the said school such as the following: (a)the placing of Patricia
Ligat in the second place instead of him when in fact he had been a consistent
honor student and the former had never been his close rival before except in Grade
V wherein she ranked third; (b)the tutorial given by their teacher in English to the
first honor during summer vacation; (c)the illegal constitution of the said committee
as the same was composed of all the Grade VI teachers only, in violation of the
Service Manual for Teachers of the Bureau of Public Schools which provides that the
committee to select the honor students should be composed of all teachers in
Grades V and VI; (d)the changing of the final ratings on their grading sheets; (e)
that petitioner personally appealed the matter to the School Principal, to the District
Supervisor, and to the Academic Supervisor, but said officials passed the buck to
each other to delay his grievances, and as to appeal to higher authorities will be too
late, there is no other speedy and adequate remedy under the circumstances.
Respondents moved for the dismissal of the case on the grounds (1) that the action
for certiorari was improper, and (2) that even assuming the propriety of the action,
the question brought before the court had already become academic.
The motion to dismiss was granted.
ISSUE:
of
justifiable
controversies,
which
imply
given
right,
legally
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners removal is unconstitutional?
Whether or not the election of Sen. Cuenco and Delgado to the Electoral Tribunal is
unconstitutional?
only
also, subsequently
upon
the
initial
organization
of
the
Commission,
but
thereto.
FACTS:
Former
Bataan
Petrochemical
Corporation
(BPC),
now
Luzon
Petrochemical
Corporation, formed by a group of Taiwanese investors, was granted by the BOI its
have its plant site for the products naphta cracker and naphta to based in
Bataan. In February 1989, one year after the BPC began its production in Bataan,
the corporation applied to the BOI to have its plant site transferred from Bataan to
Batangas.
Despite vigorous opposition from petitioner Cong. Enrique Garcia and others, the
BOI granted private respondent BPCs application, stating that the investors have
the final choice as to where to have their plant site because they are the ones who
risk capital for the project.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the BOI committed a grave abuse of discretion in yielding to the
application of the investors without considering the national interest?
The Supreme Court found the BOI to have committed grave abuse of discretion in
this case, and ordered the original application of the BPC to have its plant site in
Bataan and the product naphta as feedstock maintained. The ponente, Justice
Gutierrez, Jr., first stated the Courts judicial power to settle actual controversies as
provided for by Section 1 of Article VIII in our 1987 Constitution before he wrote the
reasons as to how the Court arrived to its conclusion.
He mentioned that nothing is shown to justify the BOIs action in letting the
investors decide on an issue which, if handled by our own government, could have
been very beneficial to the State, as he remembered the word of a great Filipino
leader, to wit: .. he would not mind having a government run like hell by Filipinos
than one subservient to foreign dictation.
Justice Grio Aquino, in her dissenting opinion, argued that the petition was not
well-taken because the 1987 Investment Code does not prohibit the registration of a
certain project, as well as any decision of the BOI regarding the amended
application. She stated that the fact that petitioner disagrees with BOI does not
make the BOI wrong in its decision, and that petitioner should have appealed to the
President of the country and not to the Court, as provided for by Section 36 of the
1987
Investment
Code.
the Secretary
of
amended by Act No. 3075 and Commonwealth Act No. 180 be declared
unconstitutional on the grounds that 1) the act deprives the owner of the school and
colleges as well as teachers and parents of liberty and property without due process
of Law; 2) it will also deprive the parents of their Natural Rights and duty to
rear their children for civic efficiency and 3) its provisions conferred on the
Secretary of Education unlimited powers and discretion to prescribe rules and
standards constitute towards unlawful delegation of Legislative powers.
Section 1 of Act No. 2706It shall be the duty of the Secretary of Public Instruction
to maintain a general standard of efficiency in all private schools and colleges of the
Philippines so that the same shall furnish adequate instruction to the public, in
accordance with the class and grade of instruction given in them, and for this
purpose said Secretary or his duly authorized representative shall have authority to
advise, inspect, and regulate said schools and colleges in order to determine the
efficiency of instruction given in the same,
The petitioner also complain that securing a permit to the Secretary of Education
before opening a school is not originally included in the original Act 2706. And in
support to the first proposition of the petitioners they contended that the
Constitution guaranteed the right of a citizen to own and operate a school and any
law requiring previous governmental approval or permit before such person could
exercise the said right On the other hand, the defendant Legal Representative
submitted
a memorandum
needs no argument to show that abuse by officials entrusted with the execution of
the statute does not per se demonstrate the unconstitutionality of such statute.
On
this
phase
of
the
litigation
the
court
conclude
that
there
has been no undue delegation of legislative power even if the petitioners appended
a list of circulars and memoranda issued by the Department of Education they fail to
indicate which of such official documents was constitutionally objectionable for
being capricious
or pain
nuisance.
Therefore,
the petition
for prohibition.
Constitution and Republic Act 6132, to consider, discuss and adopt proposals which
seek to revise the present Constitution through the adoption of a form of
government other than the form now outlined in the present Constitution [the
Convention being] merely empowered to propose improvements to the present
Constitution without altering the general plan laid down therein." 2 Such a plea of
the utmost seriousness was sought to be compressed in a five-page pleading. It is
understandable, therefore, why the petition could hardly be characterized as
possessed of merit.
Accordingly, on October 8, 1971, this Court issued a resolution dismissing it. Then
came on the last day of that month a printed thirty-two page motion for
reconsideration. It is evident that petitioners took some pains this time, although
the main reliance seems to be on a secondary authority, American Jurisprudence. 3
The show of diligence is impressive but the persuasive quality is something else. A
perusal thereof yields the conclusion that petitioners are oblivious of the
authoritative precedents in this jurisdiction. The approach is not distinguished by its
conformity with the law as it stands. In this sphere as elsewhere, new cults may be
eroding considering, however, the compulsion of the ancient faiths.
ISSUES:
of the Constitution. Sec. 4 provides that any retired elective provincial or municipal
official who has received payments of retirement benefits and shall have been 65
years of age at the commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be
elected, shall not be qualified to run for the same elective local office from which he
has retired. According to Dumlao, the provision amounts to class legislation.
Petitioners Igot and Salapantan Jr. also assail the validity of Sec. 4 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 52, which states that any person who has committed any act of
disloyalty to the State, including those amounting to subversion, insurrection,
rebellion, or other similar crimes, shall not be qualified for any of the offices covered
by the act, or to participate in any partisan activity therein: provided that a
judgment of conviction of those crimes shall be conclusive evidence of such fact
and the filing of charges for the commission of such crimes before a civil court or
military tribunal after preliminary investigation shall be prima facie evidence of such
fact.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the aforementioned statutory provisions violate the
Constitution and thus and will be declared null and void?
THE COURTS RULING:
In regards to the unconstitutionality of the provisions, Sec. 4 of BP Blg. 52 remains
constitutional and valid. The constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws
is subject to rational classification. One class can be treated differently from another
class. In this case, employees 65 years of age are classified differently from younger
employees. The purpose of the provision is to satisfy the need for new blood in
the workplace. In regards to the second paragraph of Sec. 4, it should be declared
null and void for being violative of the constitutional presumption of innocence
guaranteed to an accused. Explicit is the constitutional provision that, in all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel (Article IV,
section 19, 1973 Constitution). An accusation, according to the fundamental law, is
not synonymous with guilt. The challenged proviso contravenes the constitutional
presumption of innocence, as a candidate is disqualified from running for public
office on the ground alone that charges have been filed against him before a civil or
military tribunal. It condemns before one is fully heard. In ultimate effect, except as
to the degree of proof, no distinction is made between a person convicted of acts of
disloyalty and one against whom charges have been filed for such acts, as both of
them would be ineligible to run for public office. A person disqualified to run for
public office on the ground that charges have been filed against him is virtually
placed in the same category as a person already convicted of a crime with the
penalty of arresto, which carries with it the accessory penalty of suspension of the
right to hold office during the term of the sentence (Art. 44, Revised Penal Code).
And although the filing of charges is considered as but prima facie evidence, and
therefore, may be rebutted, yet there is "clear and present danger" that because of
the proximity of the elections, time constraints will prevent one charged with acts of
disloyalty from offering contrary proof to overcome the prima facie evidence against
him.
Additionally, it is best that evidence pro and con of acts of disloyalty be aired before
the Courts rather than before an administrative body such as the COMELEC. A
highly possible conflict of findings between two government bodies, to the extreme
detriment
of
a person
charged,
will
thereby be
avoided.
Furthermore,
FACTS:
The petition at bar is a commendable effort on the part of Senator Blas F. Ople to prevent the
shrinking of the right to privacy, which the revered Mr. Justice Brandeis considered as "the most
comprehensive of rights and the rightmost valued by civilized men." Petitioner Ople prays that
we invalidate Administrative Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of a National Computerized
Identification Reference System" on two important constitutional grounds, (1)it is a usurpation
of the power of Congress to legislate, and(2)it impermissibly intrudes on our
citizenry's protected zone of privacy.
We grant the petition for the rights sought to be vindicated by the petitioner need stronger
barriers against further erosion. A.O. No. 308 was published in four newspapers of general
circulation on January 22, 1997 and January 23, 1997. On January 24, 1997, petitioner filed the
instant petition against respondents, then Executive Secretary Ruben Torres and the heads of the
government agencies, who as members of the Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee, are
charged with the implementation of A.O. No. 308. On April 8, 1997, we issued a temporary
restraining order enjoining its implementation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner has the stand to assail the validity of A.O. No. 308?
fact that the implementing rules of A.O. No. 308 have yet to be promulgated. Petitioner Ople
assails A.O. No. 308 as invalid per se and as infirmed on its face.
His action is not premature for the rules yet to be promulgated cannot cure its fatal defects.
Moreover, the respondents themselves have started the implementation of A.O. No. 308 without
waiting for the rules. As early as January 19, 1997, respondent Social Security System (SSS)
caused the publication of a notice to bid for the manufacture of the National Identification (ID)
card. Respondent Executive Secretary Torres has publicly announced that representatives from
the GSIS and the SSS have completed the guidelines for the national identification system. All
signals from the respondents show their unswerving will to implement A.O. No. 308 and we need
not wait for the formality of the rules to pass judgment on its constitutionality. In this light, the
dissenters insisted that weights the rule on standing is not a commendable stance as its result
would be to throttle an important constitutional principle and a fundamental right.
FACTS:
The Government and the MILF were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement
on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on
Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. The GRP-MILF agreement is the result of a
formal peace talks between the parties in Tripoli, Libya in 2001. The pertinent
provisions in the MOA-AD provides for the establishment of an associative
relationship between the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) and the Central
Government.
It speaks of the relationship between the BJE and the Philippine government as
associative, thus implying an international relationship and therefore suggesting
an autonomous state. Furthermore, under the MOA-AD, the GRP Peace Panel
guarantees that necessary amendments to the Constitution and the laws will
eventually be put in place.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the said MOA-AD constitutional?
Panel nor the President herself is authorized to make such a guarantee. Upholding
such an act would amount to authorizing a usurpation of the constituent
powers vested only in Congress, a Constitutional Convention, or the people
themselves through the process of initiative, for the only way that the Executive can
ensure the outcome of the amendment process is through an undue influence or
interference with that process. While the MOA-AD would not amount to an
international agreement or unilateral declaration binding on the Philippines under
international law, respondents act of guaranteeing amendments is, by itself,
already a constitutional violation that renders the MOA-AD fatally defective.
Justice Santiago said, among others, that the MOA-AD contains provisions which
are repugnant to the Constitution and which will result in the virtual surrender of
part of the Philippines territorial sovereignty. She further said that had the MOA-AD
been signed by parties, would have bound the government to the creation of a
separate Bangsamoro state having its own territory, government, civil institutions,
and armed forces. The sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Philippines would
have been compromised.
In this case, The Court explained that the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process
committed grave abuse of discretion when he failed to carry out the pertinent
consultation process, as mandated by EO No. 3, RA 7160, and RA 8371.
EO No. 3 is replete with mechanics for continuing consultations on both national and
local levels and for a principal forum for consensus-building.
R.A. 7160 (the Local Government Code of 1991) requires all national offices to
conduct consultations before any project or program critical to the environment and
human ecology including those that may call for the eviction of a particular group of
people residing in such locality, is implemented therein. The MOA-AD is one peculiar
program that unequivocally and unilaterally vests ownership of a vast territory to
the Bangsamoro people, which could pervasively and drastically result to the
diaspora or displacement of a great number of inhabitants from their total
environment.
R.A. 8371 (the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997) provides for clear-cut
procedure for the recognition and delineation of ancestral domain, which entails,
among other things, the observance of the free and prior informed consent (FPIC) of
the Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples.
FACTS:
Pursuant to Section 1 of the charter of the PCSO (R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P.
Blg. 42) which grants it the authority to hold and conduct charity sweepstakes
races, lotteries and other similar activities, the PCSO decided to establish an online lottery system for the purpose of increasing its revenue base and diversifying
its sources of funds. Sometime before March 1993, after learning that the PCSO was
interested in operating an on-line lottery system, the Berjaya Group Berhad, a
multinational company and one of the ten largest public companies in Malaysia,
became interested to offer its services and resources to PCSO. As an initial step,
Berjaya Group Berhad (through its individual nominees) organized with some Filipino
investors in March 1993 a Philippine corporation known as the Philippine Gaming
Management Corporation (PGMC), which was intended to be the medium through
which the technical and management services required for the project would be
offered and delivered to PCSO.
Before August 1993, the PCSO formally issued a Request for Proposal (RFP) for the
Lease Contract of an on-line lottery system for the PCSO. On 15 August 1993, PGMC
submitted its bid to the PCSO. On 21 October 1993, the Office of the President
announced that it had given the respondent PGMC the go-signal to operate the
countrys on-line lottery system and that the corresponding implementing contract
would be submitted not later than 8 November 1993 for final clearance and
approval by the Chief Executive.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the petitioners have locus standi?
Whether or the Contract of Lease in the light of Section 1 of R.A. No. 1169, as
amended by B.P. Blg. 42, which prohibits the PCSO from holding and conducting
lotteries in collaboration, association or joint venture with any person, association,
company or entity, whether domestic or foreign. is legal and valid?
G.R.
NO.
118910
FACTS:
In Jan. 25, 1995, PCSO and PGMC signed an Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA)
wherein PGMC leased online lottery equipment and accessories to PCSO. (Rental of
4.3% of the gross amount of ticket or at least P35,000 per terminal annually). 30%
of the net receipts is allotted to charity. Term of lease is for 8 years. PCSO is to
employ its own personnel and responsible for the facilities. Upon the expiration of
lease, PCSO may purchase the equipment for P25 million. Feb. 21, 1995. A petition
was filed to declare ELA invalid because it is the same as the Contract of Lease
Petitioner's Contention: ELA was same to the Contract of Lease.
It is still violative of PCSO's charter. It is violative of the law regarding public bidding.
It violates Sec. 2(2) of Art. 9-D of the 1987 Constitution. Standing can no longer be
questioned because it has become the law of the case Respondent's reply: ELA is
different from the Contract of Lease. There is no bidding required. The power to
FACTS:
The
Republic
of
the
Philippines
through
the
PCGG
entered
into
ISSUE:
Whether or not PCGG has jurisdiction and authority to enter into an agreement with
Christies of New York for the sale of the artworks?
The rule is settled that no question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law
or governmental act may be heard and decided by the court unless there is
compliance with the legal requisites for judicial inquiry, namely: that the question
must be raised by the proper party; that there must be an actual case or
controversy; that the question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity;
and, that the decision on the constitutional or legal question must be necessary to
the determination of the case itself. But the most important are the first two (2)
requisites.
On the first requisite, we have held that one having no right or interest to protect
cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as party-plaintiff in an action. This is
premised on Sec. 2, Rule 3, of the Rules of Court which provides that every action
must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party-in-interest, and that
all persons having interest in the subject of the action and in obtaining the relief
demanded shall be joined as plaintiffs. The Court will exercise its power of judicial
review only if the case is brought before it by a party who has the legal standing to
raise the constitutional or legal question. "Legal standing" means a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain
direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The term
"interest" is material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by the decree,
as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental
interest. Moreover, the interest of the party plaintiff must be personal and not one
based on a desire to vindicate the constitutional right of some third and related
party.
There are certain instances however when this Court has allowed exceptions to the
rule on legal standing, as when a citizen brings a case for mandamus to procure the
enforcement of a public duty for the fulfillment of a public right recognized by the
Constitution, and when a taxpayer questions the validity of a governmental act
authorizing the disbursement of public funds.
Petitioners claim that as Filipino citizens, taxpayers and artists deeply concerned
with the preservation and protection of the country's artistic wealth, they have the
legal personality to restrain respondents Executive Secretary and PCGG from acting
contrary to their public duty to conserve the artistic creations as mandated by the
1987 Constitution, particularly Art. XIV, Secs. 14 to 18, on Arts and Culture, and R.A.
4846 known as "The Cultural Properties Preservation and Protection Act," governing
the preservation and disposition of national and important cultural properties.
Petitioners also anchor their case on the premise that the paintings and silverware
are public properties collectively owned by them and by the people in general to
view and enjoy as great works of art. They allege that with the unauthorized act of
PCGG in selling the art pieces, petitioners have been deprived of their right to public
property without due process of law in violation of the Constitution.
Petitioners' arguments are devoid of merit. They lack basis in fact and in law. They
themselves allege that the paintings were donated by private persons from different
parts of the world to the Metropolitan Museum of Manila Foundation, which is a nonprofit and non-stock corporations established to promote non-Philippine arts. The
foundation's chairman was former First Lady Imelda R. Marcos, while its president
was Bienvenido R. Tantoco. On this basis, the ownership of these paintings legally
belongs to the foundation or corporation or the members thereof, although the
public has been given the opportunity to view and appreciate these paintings when
they
were
placed
on
exhibit.
Similarly, as alleged in the petition, the pieces of antique silverware were given to
the Marcos couple as gifts from friends and dignitaries from foreign countries on
their silver wedding and anniversary, an occasion personal to them. When the
Marcos administration was toppled by the revolutionary government, these
paintings and silverware were taken from Malacaang and the Metropolitan Museum
of Manila and transferred to the Central Bank Museum. The confiscation of these
properties by the Aquino administration however should not be understood to mean
that the ownership of these paintings has automatically passed on the government
without complying with constitutional and statutory requirements of due process
and just compensation. If these properties were already acquired by the
government, any constitutional or statutory defect in their acquisition and their
subsequent disposition must be raised only by the proper parties the true owners
thereof whose authority to recover emanates from their proprietary rights which
are protected by statutes and the Constitution. Having failed to show that they are
the legal owners of the artworks or that the valued pieces have become publicly
owned, petitioners do not possess any clear legal right whatsoever to question their
alleged unauthorized disposition.
Further, although this action is also one of mandamus filed by concerned citizens, it
does not fulfill the criteria for a mandamus suit. In Legaspi v. Civil Service
Commission, this Court laid down the rule that a writ of mandamus may be issued
to a citizen only when the public right to be enforced and the concomitant duty of
the state are unequivocably set forth in the Constitution. In the case at bar,
petitioners are not after the fulfillment of a positive duty required of respondent
officials under the 1987 Constitution. What they seek is the enjoining of an official
act because it is constitutionally infirmed. Moreover, petitioners' claim for the
continued enjoyment and appreciation by the public of the artworks is at most a
privilege and is unenforceable as a constitutional right in this action for mandamus.
Neither can this petition be allowed as a taxpayer's suit. Not every action filed by a
taxpayer can qualify to challenge the legality of official acts done by the
government. A taxpayer's suit can prosper only if the governmental acts being
questioned involve disbursement of public funds upon the theory that the
expenditure of public funds by an officer of the state for the purpose of
administering an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds,
which may be enjoined at the request of a taxpayer. Obviously, petitioners are not
challenging any expenditure involving public funds but the disposition of what they
allege to be public properties. It is worthy to note that petitioners admit that the
paintings and antique silverware were acquired from private sources and not with
public
money.
For a court to exercise its power of adjudication, there must be an actual case of
controversy one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite
legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution; the case must not be moot or
academic or based on extra-legal or other similar considerations not cognizable by a
court of justice. A case becomes moot and academic when its purpose has become
stale, such as the case before us. Since the purpose of this petition for prohibition is
to enjoin respondent public officials from holding the auction sale of the artworks on
a particular date 11 January 1991 which is long past, the issues raised in the
petition have become moot and academic.
At this point, however, we need to emphasize that this Court has the discretion to
take cognizance of a suit which does not satisfy the requirements of an actual case
or legal standing when paramount public interest is involved. We find however that
there is no such justification in the petition at bar to warrant the relaxation of the
rule.
FACTS:
The Public Estates Authority is the central implementing agency tasked to
undertake reclamation projects nationwide. It took over the leasing and selling
functions of the DENR insofar as reclaimed or about to be reclaimed foreshore lands
are concerned.
PEA sought the transfer to AMARI, a private corporation, of the ownership of 77.34
hectares of the Freedom Islands. PEA also sought to have 290.156 hectares of
submerged areas of Manila Bay to AMARI.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the transfer is valid?
flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. With the
exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated.
The exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under
the full control and supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake such
activities, or it may enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing
agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at least sixty per
centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be for a
period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five
years, and under such terms and conditions as may be provided by law. In cases of
water rights for irrigation, water supply fisheries, or industrial uses other than the
development of water power, beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the
grant.
The State shall protect the nations marine wealth in its archipelagic waters,
territorial sea, and exclusive economic zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment
exclusively to Filipino citizens.
The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by
Filipino citizens, as well as cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence
fishermen and fish workers in rivers, lakes, bays, and lagoons.
The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving
either technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and
utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils according to the general
terms and conditions provided by law, based on real contributions to the economic
growth and general welfare of the country. In such agreements, the State shall
promote the development and use of local scientific and technical resources.
The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in accordance
with this provision, within thirty days from its execution.
FACTS:
Petitioner Ramon Gonzales, in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer, assails the
constitutionality of the creation of the Preparatory Commission on Constitutional
Reform (PCCR) and of the positions of presidential consultants, advisers and
assistants.
The PCCR was created by Pres. Estrada by virtue of EO 43 in order to study and
recommend proposed amendments and/or revisions to the Constitution, and the
manner
of
implementing
them.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner has legal standing to file the case?
THE COURTS RULING:
In assailing the constitutionality of EO 43, petitioner asserts his interest as a citizen
and
taxpayer.
A citizen acquires standing only if he can establish that he has suffered some actual
or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government;
the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the injury is likely to be
addressed by a favorable action.
Petitioner has not shown that he has sustained or in danger of sustaining any
personal injury attributable to the creation of the PCCR and of the positions of
presidential consultants, advisers and assistants.
Neither does he claim that his rights or privileges have been or are in danger of
being violated, nor that he shall be subjected to any penalties or burdens as a result
of the issues raised. In his capacity as a taxpayer, a taxpayer is deemed to have the
standing to raise a constitutional issue when it is established that public funds have
disbursed in alleged contravention of the law or the Constitution.
Thus, payers action is properly brought only when there is an exercise by Congress
of its taxing or spending power. In the creation of PCCR, it is apparent that there is
no exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending power. The PCCR was created by
the President by virtue of EO 43 as amended by EO 70. The appropriations for the
PCCR were authorized by the President, not by Congress.
The funds used for the PCCR were taken from funds intended for the Office of the
President, in the exercise of the Chief Executives power to transfer funds pursuant
to Sec. 25(5) of Art. VI of the Constitution. As to the creation of the positions of
presidential consultants, advisers and assistants, the petitioner has not alleged the
necessary facts so as to enable the Court to determine if he possesses a taxpayers
interest in this particular issue.
FACTS:
Osmundo Umali the petitioner was appointed Regional Director of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue by Pres Fidel V. Ramos. He assigned him in Manila, November 29,
1993 to March 15, 1994 and Makati, March 16, 1994 to August 4, 1994. On August
1, 1994, President Ramos received a confidential memorandum against the
petitioner for alleged violations of internal revenue laws, rules and regulations
during his incumbency as Regional Director, more particularly the following
malfeasance, misfeasance and nonfeasance.
Upon receipt of the said confidential memorandum, former President authorized the
issuance of an Order for the preventive suspension of the petitioner and
immediately
referred the
Complaint against
the
latter
to
the
Presidential
Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 152 dismissing petitioner from the service,
with forfeiture of retirement and all benefits under the law.
ISSUES:
Whether or Not AO No. 152 violated petitioner's Right to Security of Tenure?
Whether or Not Petitioner was denied due process of law?
Whether or Not the PCAGC is a validly Constituted government agency and whether
the petitioner can raise the issue of constitutionality belatedly in its motion for
reconsideration of the trial courts decision?
Whether or Not the ombudsman's resolution dismissing the charges against the
petitioner is still basis for the petitioner's dismissal with forfeiture of benefits as
ruled in AO No. 152?
motion for reconsideration before the Regional Trial Court of Makati. It was certainly
too late to raise for the first time at such late stage of the proceedings. As to last
issue, it is worthy to note that in the case under consideration, the administrative
action against the petitioner was taken prior to the institution of the criminal case.
The charges included in Administrative Order No. 152 were based on the results of
investigation conducted by the PCAGC and not on the criminal charges before the
Ombudsman.
In sum, the petition is dismiss on the ground that the issue posted by the petitioner
dont constitute a valid legal basis for overturning the finding and conclusion arrived
at by the Court of Appeals.
However,
taking
into
account
the
antecedent
facts
and
circumstances
aforementioned, the Court, in the exercise of its equity powers, has decided to
consider the dismissal of the charges against petitioner before the Ombudsman, the
succinct and unmistakable manifestation by the Commissioner of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue that his office is no longer interested in pursuing the case, and the
position
taken
that
there
is no more
basis for
Administrative Order No. 152, as effective and substantive supervening events that
cannot be overlooked.
FACTS:
Petitioners seek to stop the Philippine Government to sell the Roppongi Property,
which is located in Japan. It is one of the properties given by the Japanese
Government as reparations for damage done by the latter to the former during the
war.
Petitioner argues that under Philippine Law, the subject property is property of
public dominion. As such, it is outside the commerce of men. Therefore, it cannot be
alienated.
Respondents aver that Japanese Law, and not Philippine Law, shall apply to the case
because the property is located in Japan. They posit that the principle of lex situs
applies.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the subject property cannot be alienated?
Whether or not Philippine Law applies to the case at bar?
shown
that
the
property
has
become
patrimonial.
This,
the
respondents have failed to do. As property of public dominion, the Roppongi lot is
outside the commerce of man. It cannot be alienated.
We see no reason why a conflict of law rule should apply when no conflict of law
situation exists. A conflict of law situation arises only when: (1) There is a dispute
over the title or ownership of an immovable, such that the capacity to take and
transfer immovables, the formalities of conveyance, the essential validity and effect
of the transfer, or the interpretation and effect of a conveyance, are to be
determined; and (2) A foreign law on land ownership and its conveyance is asserted
to conflict with a domestic law on the same matters. Hence, the need to determine
which law should apply.
In the instant case, none of the above elements exists.
The issues are not concerned with validity of ownership or title. There is no question
that the property belongs to the Philippines. The issue is the authority of the
respondent officials to validly dispose of property belonging to the State. And the
validity of the procedures adopted to effect its sale. This is governed by Philippine
Law. The rule of lex situs does not apply.
The assertion that the opinion of the Secretary of Justice sheds light on the
relevance of the lex situs rule is misplaced. The opinion does not tackle the
alienability of the real properties procured through reparations nor the existence in
what body of the authority to sell them. In discussing who are capable of acquiring
the lots, the Secretary merely explains that it is the foreign law which should
determine who can acquire the properties so that the constitutional limitation on
acquisition of lands of the public domain to Filipino citizens and entities wholly
owned by Filipinos is inapplicable.
FACTS:
ISSUES:
Whether or not the Doctrine of Operative Fact is available in this case?
Whether or not Sec. 31 of RA 6657 unconstitutional?
Whether or not the Court order that DARs compulsory acquisition of Hacienda
Lusita cover the full 6,443 hectares allegedly covered by RA 6657 and previously
held by Tarlac Development Corporation (Tadeco), and not just the 4,915.75
hectares covered by HLIs SDP?
Whether or not the date of the taking (for purposes of determining the just
compensation payable to HLI) November 21, 1989, when PARC approved HLIs SDP?
Whether or not the 10-year period prohibition on the transfer of awarded lands
under RA 6657 lapsed on May 10, 1999 (since Hacienda Luisita were placed under
CARP coverage through the SDOA scheme on May 11, 1989), and thus the qualified
FWBs should now be allowed to sell their land interests in Hacienda Luisita to third
parties, whether they have fully paid for the lands or not?
THE CRUCIAL ISSUE: Whether or not the ruling in the July 5, 2011 Decision that the
qualified FWBs be given an option to remain as stockholders of HLI be reconsidered?
agricultural lands of Hacienda Luisita per qualified FWB, and considering that
matters involving strictly the administrative implementation and enforcement of
agrarian reform laws are within the jurisdiction of the DAR, it is the latter which shall
determine the area with which each qualified FWB will be awarded.
On the other hand, the majority likewise reiterated its holding that the 500-hectare
portion of Hacienda Luisita that have been validly converted to industrial use and
have been acquired by intervenors Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC)
and Luisita Industrial Park Corporation (LIPCO), as well as the separate 80.51hectare SCTEX lot acquired by the government, should be excluded from the
coverage of the assailed PARC resolution. The Court however ordered that the
unused balance of the proceeds of the sale of the 500-hectare converted land and
of the 80.51-hectare land used for the SCTEX be distributed to the FWBs.
For the purpose of determining just compensation, the date of taking is November
21, 1989 (the date when PARC approved HLIs SDP) since this is the time that the
FWBs were considered to own and possess the agricultural lands in Hacienda
Luisita. To be precise, these lands became subject of the agrarian reform coverage
through the stock distribution scheme only upon the approval of the SDP, that is, on
November 21, 1989. Such approval is akin to a notice of coverage ordinarily issued
under compulsory acquisition. On the contention of the minority (Justice Sereno)
that the date of the notice of coverage [after PARCs revocation of the SDP], that is,
January 2, 2006, is determinative of the just compensation that HLI is entitled to
receive, the Court majority noted that none of the cases cited to justify this position
involved the stock distribution scheme. Thus, said cases do not squarely apply to
the instant case. The foregoing notwithstanding, it bears stressing that the DAR's
land valuation is only preliminary and is not, by any means, final and conclusive
upon the landowner. The landowner can file an original action with the RTC acting as
a special agrarian court to determine just compensation. The court has the right to
review with finality the determination in the exercise of what is admittedly a judicial
function.
Under RA 6657 and DAO 1, the awarded lands may only be transferred or conveyed
after 10 years from the issuance and registration of the emancipation patent (EP) or
certificate of land ownership award (CLOA). Considering that the EPs or CLOAs have
not yet been issued to the qualified FWBs in the instant case, the 10-year
prohibitive period has not even started. Significantly, the reckoning point is the
issuance of the EP or CLOA, and not the placing of the agricultural lands under CARP
coverage. Moreover, should the FWBs be immediately allowed the option to sell or
convey their interest in the subject lands, then all efforts at agrarian reform would
be rendered nugatory, since, at the end of the day, these lands will just be
transferred to persons not entitled to land distribution under CARP.
The Court reconsidered its earlier decision that the qualified FWBs should be given
an option to remain as stockholders of HLI, inasmuch as these qualified FWBs will
never gain control over the subject lands]given the present proportion of
shareholdings in HLI. The Court noted that the share of the FWBs in the HLI capital
stock is just 33.296%. Thus, even if all the holders of this 33.296% unanimously
vote to remain as HLI stockholders, which is unlikely, control will never be in the
hands of the FWBs.
Control means the majority of [sic] 50% plus at least one share of the common
shares and other voting shares. Applying the formula to the HLI stockholdings, the
number of shares that will constitute the majority is 295,112,101 shares
(590,554,220 total HLI capital shares divided by 2 plus one [1] HLI share). The
118,391,976.85 shares subject to the SDP approved by PARC substantially fall short
of the 295,112,101 shares needed by the FWBs to acquire control over HLI.
FACTS:
Petitioners Liban, et al., who were officers of the Board of Directors of the Quezon
City Red Cross Chapter, filed with the Supreme Court what they styled as Petition
to Declare Richard J. Gordon as Having Forfeited His Seat in the Senate against
respondent Gordon, who was elected Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross
(PNRC) Board of Governors during his incumbency as Senator.
Petitioners alleged that by accepting the chairmanship of the PNRC Board of
Governors, respondent Gordon ceased to be a member of the Senate pursuant to
Sec. 13, Article VI of the Constitution, which provides that [n]o Senator . . . may
hold any other office or employment in the Government, or any subdivision, agency,
or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations
or their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat. Petitioners cited
the
case
of Camporedondo
vs.
NLRC, G.R.
No.
129049,
decided August
6,
1999, which held that the PNRC is a GOCC, in supporting their argument that
respondent Gordon automatically forfeited his seat in the Senate when he accepted
and held the position of Chairman of the PNRC Board of Governors.
Formerly, in its Decision dated July 15, 2009, the Court, voting 7-5, held that the
office of the PNRC Chairman is NOT a government office or an office in a GOCC for
purposes of the prohibition in Sec. 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. The PNRC
Chairman is elected by the PNRC Board of Governors; he is not appointed by the
President or by any subordinate government official. Moreover, the PNRC is NOT a
GOCC because it is a privately-owned, privately-funded, and privately-run charitable
organization and because it is controlled by a Board of Governors four-fifths of which
are private sector individuals. Therefore, respondent Gordon did not forfeit his
legislative seat when he was elected as PNRC Chairman during his incumbency as
Senator.
The Court however held further that the PNRC Charter, R.A. 95, as amended
by PD 1264 and 1643, is void insofar as it creates the PNRC as a private corporation
since Section 7, Article XIV of the 1935 Constitution states that the Congress shall
not, except by general law, provide for the formation, organization, or regulation of
private corporations, unless such corporations are owned or controlled by the
Government or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof. The Court thus directed
the PNRC to incorporate under the Corporation Code and register with the Securities
and Exchange Commission if it wants to be a private corporation. The fall of the
Decision read:
WHEREFORE, we declare that the office of the Chairman of the Philippine National
Red Cross is not a government office or an office in a government-owned or
controlled corporation for purposes of the prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the
1987 Constitution. We also declare that Sections 1, 2, 3, 4(a), 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11,
12, and 13 of the Charter of the Philippine National Red Cross, or Republic Act No.
95, as amended by Presidential Decree Nos. 1264 and 1643, are VOID because they
create the PNRC as a private corporation or grant it corporate powers.
Respondent Gordon filed a Motion for Clarification and/or for Reconsideration of
the Decision. The PNRC likewise moved to intervene and filed its own Motion for
Partial Reconsideration. They basically questioned the second part of the Decision
with
regard
to
the
pronouncement
on
the nature
of
the
PNRC and
ISSUES:
Whether or not it is correct for the Court to have passed upon and decided on the
issue of the constitutionality of the PNRC charter?
Corollarily: What is the nature of the PNRC?
very lis mota of the case. We have reiterated the rule as to when the Court will
consider the issue of constitutionality in Alvarez v. PICOP Resources, Inc., thus:
This Court will not touch the issue of unconstitutionality unless it is the very lis
mota. It is a well-established rule that a court should not pass upon a constitutional
question and decide a law to be unconstitutional or invalid, unless such question is
raised by the parties and that when it is raised, if the record also presents some
other ground upon which the court may [rest] its judgment, that course will be
adopted and the constitutional question will be left for consideration until such
question will be unavoidable.
This
Court should
not have
declared
void
certain
sections
of
the
PNRC
Charter. Instead, the Court should have exercised judicial restraint on this matter,
especially since there was some other ground upon which the Court could have
based its judgment. Furthermore, the PNRC, the entity most adversely affected by
this declaration of unconstitutionality, which was not even originally a party to this
case, was being compelled, as a consequence of the Decision, to suddenly
reorganize and incorporate under the Corporation Code, after more than sixty (60)
years of existence in this country.
Since its enactment, the PNRC Charter was amended several times, particularly on
June 11, 1953, August 16, 1971, December 15, 1977, and October 1, 1979, by virtue
of R.A. No. 855, R.A. No. 6373, P.D. No. 1264, and P.D. No. 1643, respectively. The
passage of several laws relating to the PNRCs corporate existence notwithstanding
the effectivity of the constitutional proscription on the creation of private
corporations by law is a recognition that the PNRC is not strictly in the nature of a
private corporation contemplated by the aforesaid constitutional ban.
A closer look at the nature of the PNRC would show that there is none like it, not just
in terms of structure, but also in terms of history, public service and official status
accorded to it by the State and the international community. There is merit in
PNRCs contention that its structure is sui generis. It is in recognition of this sui
generis character of the PNRC that R.A. No. 95 has remained valid and effective
from the time of its enactment in March 22, 1947 under the 1935 Constitution and
during the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution and the 1987 Constitution. The PNRC
Charter and its amendatory laws have not been questioned or challenged on
constitutional grounds, not even in this case before the Court now.
This Court must recognize the countrys adherence to the Geneva Convention and
respect the unique status of the PNRC in consonance with its treaty obligations. The
Geneva Convention has the force and effect of law. Under the Constitution, the
Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of
the law of the land. This constitutional provision must be reconciled and harmonized
with Article XII, Section 16 of the Constitution, instead of using the latter to negate
the former. By requiring the PNRC to organize under the Corporation Code just like
any other private corporation, the Decision of July 15, 2009 lost sight of the PNRCs
special status under international humanitarian law and as an auxiliary of the State,
designated to assist it in discharging its obligations under the Geneva Conventions.
The PNRC, as a National Society of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent
Movement, can neither be classified as an instrumentality of the State, so as not to
lose its character of neutrality as well as its independence, nor strictly as a private
corporation since it is regulated by international humanitarian law and is treated as
an auxiliary of the State.
Although the PNRC is neither a subdivision, agency, or instrumentality of the
government, nor a GOCC or a subsidiary thereof so much so that respondent, under
the Decision, was correctly allowed to hold his position as Chairman thereof
concurrently while he served as a Senator, such a conclusion does not ipso
facto imply that the PNRC is a private corporation within the contemplation of the
provision of the Constitution, that must be organized under the Corporation
Code. The sui generis character of PNRC requires us to approach controversies
involving the PNRC on a case-to-case basis.
In sum, the PNRC enjoys a special status as an important ally and auxiliary of the
government in the humanitarian field in accordance with its commitments under
international law. This Court cannot all of a sudden refuse to recognize its
existence, especially since the issue of the constitutionality of the PNRC Charter was
never raised by the parties. It bears emphasizing that the PNRC has responded to
almost all national disasters since 1947, and is widely known to provide a
substantial portion of the countrys blood requirements. Its humanitarian work is
unparalleled. The Court should not shake its existence to the core in an untimely
and drastic manner that would not only have negative consequences to those who
depend on it in times of disaster and armed hostilities but also have adverse effects
on the image of the Philippines in the international community. The sections of the
PNRC Charter that were declared void must therefore stay.
Thus, R.A. No. 95 remains valid and constitutional in its entirety. The Court
MODIFIED the dispositive portion of the Decision by deleting the second sentence,
to now read as follows:
WHEREFORE, we declare that the office of the Chairman of the Philippine National
Red Cross is not a government office or an office in a government-owned or
controlled corporation for purposes of the prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the
1987 Constitution.
FACTS:
Agbayani obtained a loan P450 from PNB secured by a REM, which was to mature 5
years later. Fifhteen years later, PNB sought to foreclose the REM.
He filed a
complaint claiming that it was barred by prescription. She also claims that she
obtained an injunction against the sheriff.
PNB argued that the claim has not yet prescribed if the period from the time of
issuance of EO32 to the time when RA 342 was issued should be deducted. E0 32
was issued in 1945 providing for debt moratorium and RA 342 was issued in 1948
- extension of the debt moratorium.
The RA 342 was declared void and since it was an extension of EO 32, EO 32 was
likewise nullified. Here, RA 342 (the debt moratorium law) continued EO 32,
suspending the payment of debts by war sufferers. However RA 342 could not pass
the test of validity. (I think what Justice Fernando was saying is that the law was
later
declared
unconstitutional
because
it
violates
the
non-impairment
of
ISSUE:
Whether or not the action is prescribe?
During the 8 year period that EO 32 and RA 342 were in force, prescription did not
run. Thus, the prescriptive period was tolled in the meantime prior to such
adjudication of invalidity.
FACTS:
Rosalie Tesoro of Pasay City in a sworn statement filed with the POEA, charged
petitioner with illegal recruitment. Public respondent Atty. Ferdinand Marquez sent
petitioner a telegram directing him to appear to the POEA regarding the complaint
against him. On the same day, after knowing that petitioner had no license to
operate a recruitment agency, public respondent Administrator Tomas Achacoso
issued a Closure and Seizure Order No. 1205 to petitioner. It stated that there will a
seizure of the documents and paraphernalia being used or intended to be used as
the means of committing illegal recruitment, it having verified that petitioner has
(1) No valid license or authority from the Department of Labor and Employment to
recruit and deploy workers for overseas employment; (2) Committed/are committing
acts prohibited under Article 34 of the New Labor Code in relation to Article 38 of
the same code.
A team was then tasked to implement the said Order. The group, accompanied by
mediamen and Mandaluyong policemen, went to petitioners residence. They served
the order to a certain Mrs. For a Salazar, who let them in. The team confiscated
assorted costumes. Petitioner filed with POEA a letter requesting for the return of
the seized properties, because she was not given prior notice and hearing. The said
Order violated due process. She also alleged that it violated sec 2 of the Bill of
Rights, and the properties were confiscated against her will and were done with
unreasonable force and intimidation.
ISSUE:
Whether or Not the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (or the
Secretary of Labor) can validly issue warrants of search and seizure (or arrest)
under Article 38 of the Labor Code?
power of the President to order the arrest of aliens for deportation is, obviously,
exceptional. It (the power to order arrests) cannot be made to extend to other
cases, like the one at bar. Under the Constitution, it is the sole domain of the
courts. Furthermore, the search and seizure order was in the nature of a general
warrant. The court held that the warrant is null and void, because it must identify
specifically the things to be seized.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Article 38, paragraph (c) of the Labor Code is
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL and null and void. The respondents are ORDERED to
return all materials seized as a result of the implementation of Search and Seizure
Order No. 1205.
FACTS:
October 16, 1995 Elizabeth T. Ramos filed a criminal complaint for rape against
Feliciano M. Ramos. It was alleged that the appellant was able to perpetrate the
felony against the minor through the use of force and intimidation in its execution
Elizabeth Ramos, a minor of 14 years old, was raped by her father while her
brothers and sisters were sleeping nearby. She was warned not to report the matter
to anyone or else he would kill her.
suffered an abortion of the fetus that she was carrying in her womb.
Upon filing of the charges in the RTC Feliciano changed his residence to Tuai,
Cagayan and an alias warrant of arrest was issued. March 26, 1996 Feliciano was
arrested in Tuao, Cagayan while he was feeding the ducks.
After the prosecution has presented their evidence Feliciano wanted to change his
plea to guilty and he was allowed by the court to do so. Feliciano Ramos was
sentenced to death by the RTC of Pangasinan.
ISSUES:
Whether or not he can claim the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender?
Whether or not his plea of guilty can be taken as a mitigating circumstance?
Whether or not the 7 new attendant circumstances instituted by RA 7659 can be
considered as aggravating circumstance?
Whether or not the accused can be convicted for qualified rape?
arrested and he was actually taken and held in custody under the authority of the
law.
NO. His plea of guilty was made after the evidence against him was presented. It
was made out of fear of conviction & not based on his conscience. A plea of guilty
must be made at the first opportunity, indicating repentance on the part of the
accused.
A plea of guilty made after the arraignment and after the trial had begun does not
entitle the accused to have such plea considered as a mitigating circumstance
NO. RA 7659 in A335 in the RPC provided for the 7 new attendant circumstances.
People vs. Garcia attendant circumstance partake the nature of qualifying
circumstances and not merely aggravating circumstance, since they increase the
penalties by the degrees. Aggravating circumstance affect only the period of the
penalty and does not increase it to a higher degree.
People vs. Bayot qualifying circumstance or an inherent aggravating circumstance
should not be mistaken for a generic aggravating circumstance in the crime of
robbery. Generic aggravating circumstance, not offset by mitigating circumstance,
increases the penalty which should be imposed upon the accused to the maximum
period, but without exceeding the limit prescribed by law. A qualifying circumstance
gives the crime its proper and exclusive name but also imposes on the author
thereof no other penalty but that specially prescribed by law for said crimes.
Rape with the concurrence of minority of the victim and her relationship with the
aggressor gives a different character of rape which raised the imposable penalty
from reclusion perpertua to the higher and supreme penalty of death.
Result:
minority of the offended party and relationship to the offender special qualifying
circumstance.
NO. Cannot be convicted of qualified rape because he wasnt properly informed that
he is being accused of qualified rape.
Every element which the offense is composed must be alleged in the complaint or
information. Person cannot be convicted of an offense higher than that which he is
charged in the complaint or information on which he is tried.
In Garcia it was held that it would be a denial of the right of the accused to be
informed of the charges against him and, consequently, a denial of due process, if
he is charged with simple rape and be convicted of its qualified form punishable
with death although the attendant circumstance qualifying the offense and resulting
in capital punishment was not alleged in the indictment on which he was arraigned.
The general principles of criminal law provide that aggravating circumstances, even
if not alleged in the information, may be proven during the trial over objection of
the defense and may be appreciated in imposing the sentence. Such evidence
merely forms part of the proof of the actual commission of the offense and its
consideration by the courts do not violate the constitutional right of the accused to
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
TITLE: PEOPLE VS. MATEO
CITATAION: G.R. NO. 147678-87
DATE: JULY 7, 2004
FACTS:
Where life and liberty are at stake, all possible avenues to determine his guilt or
innocence must be accorded an accused, and no care in the evaluation of the facts
can ever be overdone. A prior determination by the Court of Appeals on,
particularly, the factual issues, would minimize the possibility of an error of
judgment. If the Court of Appeals should affirm the penalty of death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, it could then render judgment imposing the
corresponding penalty as the circumstances so warrant, refrain from entering
judgment and elevate the entire records of the case to the Supreme Court for its
final disposition.
On October 30, 1996, ten (10) informations, one for each count of rape, were filed
against appellant Efren Mateo. The lower court found Mateo guilty beyond
reasonable doubt, imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The Solicitor General,
however, assails the factual findings of the trial court and recommends an acquittal
of the appellant.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the case should directly be forwarded to the Supreme Court by
virtue of the express provision in the constitution on automatic appeal where the
penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment or death?
Up until now, the Supreme Court has assumed the direct appellate review over all
criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment (or lower but involving offenses committed on the same occasion or
arising out of the same occurrence that gave rise to the more serious offense for
which the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment is imposed).
The practice finds justification in the 1987 Constitution Article VIII, Section 5. The
Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or
the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:
(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher.
The same constitutional article has evidently been a thesis for Article 47 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 22 of Republic Act No. 7659, as well as
procedural rules contained in Section 3 of Rule 122, Section 10 of Rule 122, Section
13 of rule 124 and Section 3 of Rule 125 of the Rules of Court. It must be stressed,
however, that the constitutional provision is not preclusive in character, and it does
not necessarily prevent the Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, from
adding an intermediate appeal or review in favor of the accused.
In passing, during the deliberations among the members of the Court, there has
been a marked absence of unanimity on the crucial point of guilt or innocence of
herein appellant. Some are convinced that the evidence would appear to be
sufficient to convict; some would accept the recommendation of acquittal from the
Solicitor General on the ground of inadequate proof of guilt
beyond reasonable
doubt. Indeed, the occasion best demonstrates the typical dilemma, i.e., the
RECENT JURISPRUDENCE CRIMINAL LAW determination and appreciation of
primarily factual matters, which the Supreme Court has had to face with in
automatic review cases; yet, it is the Court of Appeals that has aptly been given the
direct mandate to review factual issues.
While the Fundamental Law requires a mandatory review by the Supreme Court of
cases where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment, or death,
nowhere, however, has it prescribed an intermediate review. If only to ensure
utmost circumspection before the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment is imposed, the Court now deems it wise and compelling to provide in
these cases a review by the Court of Appeals before the case is elevated to the
Supreme Court. Where life and liberty are at stake, all possible avenues to
determine his guilt or innocence must be accorded an accused, and no care in the
evaluation of the facts can ever be overdone. A prior determination by the Court of
Appeals on, particularly, the factual issues, would minimize the possibility of an
error of judgment. If the Court of Appeals should affirm the penalty of death,
FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, in
relation to Sec. 27 of RA 6770 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989), seeking the
annulment of the Memorandum] of the Deputy Ombudsman-Visayas dated 17 July
1997, in Adm. Case No. OMB-VIS-ADM-95-0088, approved by the Ombudsman,
which recommended the dismissal of petitioner from the Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes Office (PCSO), Cebu, as well as the order dated 30 January 1998
denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner Douglas R. Villavert is a Sales & Promotion Supervisor of PCSO Cebu
Branch responsible for the sale and disposal of PCSO sweepstakes tickets withdrawn
by him, which are already considered sold. As Villavert is not expected to sell all
withdrawn tickets on his own, he is allowed by the PCSO to consign tickets to ticket
outlets and/or to engage the help of sales agents, usually sidewalk peddlers and
hawkers.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Sec. 30 Art. VI violates the Constitution?
Any appeal by way of petition for review from a decision or final resolution or order
of the Ombudsman in administrative cases, or special civil action relative to such
decision, resolution or order filed with the Court after 15 March 1999 shall no longer
be referred to the Court of Appeals, but must be forthwith DENIED or DISMISSED,
respectively.
As the instant petition was filed prior to 15 March 1999, its referral for final
disposition to the Court of Appeals is still in order.
The case was REFERRED to the Court of Appeals as a petition for review under Rule
43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure to be disposed of in accordance with law.
FACTS:
In 1973, Constancio Maglana, president of Prime White Cement Corporation, sent an
offer letter to Yao Ka Sin Trading. The offer states that Prime White is willing to sell
45,000 bags of cement at P24.30 per bag. The offer letter was received by Yao Ka
Sins manager, Henry Yao. Yao accepted the letter and pursuant to the letter, he
sent a check in the amount of P243,000.00 equivalent to the value of 10,000 bags
of cement. However, the Board of Directors of Prime White rejected the offer letter
sent by Maglana but it considered Yaos acceptance letter as a new contract offer
hence the Board sent a letter to Yao telling him that Prime White is instead willing to
sell only 10,000 bags to Yao Ka Sin and that he has ten days to reply; that if no reply
is made by Yao then they will consider it as an acceptance and that thereafter Prime
White shall deposit the P243k check in its account and then deliver the cements to
Yao Ka Sin. Henry Yao never replied.
Later, Yao Ka Sin sued Prime White to compel the latter to comply with what Yao Ka
Sin considered as the true contract, i.e., 45,000 bags at P24.30 per bag. Prime
White in its defense averred that although Maglana is empowered to sign contracts
in behalf of Prime White, such contracts are still subject to approval by Prime
Whites Board, and then it still requires further approval by the National Investment
and Development Corporation (NIDC), a government owned and controlled
corporation because Prime White is a subsidiary of NIDC.
Henry Yao asserts that the letter from Maglana is a binding contract because it was
made under the apparent authority of Maglana. The trial court ruled in favor of Yao
Ka Sin. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the president of a corporation is clothed with apparent
authority to enter into binding contracts with third persons without the authority of
the Board.
FACTS:
Sometime in February 1981, private respondents Godofredo De la Paz and his sister
Manuela De la Paz, married to Maximo Hipolito, entered into an oral contract with
petitioner Rev. Fr. Dante Martinez, then Assistant parish priest of Cabanatuan City,
for the sale of Lot No. 1337-A-3 at the Villa Fe Subdivision in Cabanatuan City for the
sum of P15,000.00. The lot is located along Maharlika Road near the Municipal Hall
of Cabanatuan City. At the time of the sale, the lot was still registered in the name
of Claudia De la Paz, mother of private respondents, although the latter had already
sold it to private respondent Manuela de la Paz by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale
dated May 26, 1976 (Exh. N/Exh. 2-Veneracion).
ISSUE:
Whether or not private respondents Veneracion are buyers in good faith of the
lot in dispute as to make them the absolute owners thereof in accordance with
Art. 1544 of the Civil Code on double sale of immovable property?
Whether or not payment of the appellate docket fee within the period to appeal
is not necessary for the perfection of the appeal after a notice of appeal has
been filed within such period?
Whether or not the resolution of the Court of Appeals denying petitioners motion
for reconsideration is contrary to the constitutional requirement that a denial of
a motion for reconsideration must state the legal reasons on which it is based?
and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (g)
when the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (h)
when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on
which they are based; (i) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the
petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; (j) when the
finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the supposed absence of
evidence but is contradicted by the evidence on record; and (k) when the Court of
Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and
which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.
In this case, the Court of Appeals based its ruling that private respondents
Veneracion are the owners of the disputed lot on their reliance on private
respondent Godofredo De la Pazs assurance that he would take care of the matter
concerning petitioners occupancy of the disputed lot as constituting good faith.
This case, however, involves double sale and, on this matter, Art. 1544 of the Civil
Code provides that where immovable property is the subject of a double sale,
ownership shall be transferred (1) to the person acquiring it who in good faith first
recorded it to the Registry of Property; (2) in default thereof, to the person who in
good faith was first in possession; and (3) in default thereof, to the person who
presents the oldest title. The requirement of the law, where title to the property is
recorded in the Register of Deeds, is two-fold: acquisition in good faith and
recording in good faith. To be entitled to priority, the second purchaser must not
only prove prior recording of his title but that he acted in good faith, i.e., without
knowledge or notice of a prior sale to another. The presence of good faith should be
ascertained from the circumstances surrounding the purchase of the land.
a. With regard to the first sale to private respondents Veneracion, private
respondent Reynaldo Veneracion testified that on October 10, 1981, 18 days before
the execution of the first Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase, he inspected the
premises and found it vacant. However, this is belied by the testimony of Engr. Felix
D. Minor, then building inspector of the Department of Public Works and Highways,
that he conducted on October 6, 1981 an ocular inspection of the lot in dispute in
the performance of his duties as a building inspector to monitor the progress of the
construction of the building subject of the building permit issued in favor of
petitioner on April 23, 1981, and that he found it 100 % completed (Exh. V). In the
absence of contrary evidence, he is to be presumed to have regularly performed his
official duty. Thus, as early as October, 1981, private respondents Veneracion
already knew that there was construction being made on the property they
purchased.
b. The Court of Appeals failed to determine the nature of the first contract of sale
between the private respondents by considering their contemporaneous and
subsequent acts. More specifically, it overlooked the fact that the first contract of
sale between the private respondents shows that it is in fact an equitable mortgage.
The requisites for considering a contract of sale with a right of repurchase as an
equitable mortgage are (1) that the parties entered into a contract denominated as
a contract of sale and (2) that their intention was to secure an existing debt by way
of mortgage. A contract of sale with right to repurchase gives rise to the
presumption that it is an equitable mortgage in any of the following cases: (1) when
the price of a sale with a right to repurchase is unusually inadequate; (2) when the
vendor remains in possession as lessee or otherwise; (3) when, upon or after the
expiration of the right to repurchase, another instrument extending the period of
redemption or granting a new period is executed; (4) when the purchaser retains for
himself a part of the purchase price; (5) when the vendor binds himself to pay the
taxes on the thing sold; (6) in any other case where it may be fairly inferred that the
real intention of the parties is that the transaction shall secure the payment of a
debt or the performance of any other obligation. In case of doubt, a contract
purporting to be a sale with right to repurchase shall be construed as an equitable
mortgage.
In this case, the following circumstances indicate that the private respondents
intended the transaction to be an equitable mortgage and not a contract of sale: (1)
Private respondents Veneracion never took actual possession of the three lots; (2)
Private respondents De la Paz remained in possession of the Melencio lot which was
co-owned by them and where they resided; (3) During the period between the first
sale and the second sale to private respondents Veneracion, they never made any
effort to take possession of the properties; and (4) when the period of redemption
had expired and private respondents Veneracion were informed by the De la Pazes
that they are offering the lots for sale to another person for P200,000.00, they never
objected.
when they found that a certain Mr. Tecson was prepared to purchase it for the same
amount. Thus, it is clear from these circumstances that both private respondents
never intended the first sale to be a contract of sale, but merely that of mortgage to
secure a debt of P150,000.00.
With regard to the second sale, which is the true contract of sale between the
parties, it should be noted that this Court in several cases, has ruled that a
purchaser who is aware of facts which should put a reasonable man upon his guard
cannot turn a blind eye and later claim that he acted in good faith. Private
respondent Reynaldo himself admitted during the pre-trial conference in the MTC in
Civil Case No. 9523 (for ejectment) that petitioner was already in possession of the
property in dispute at the time the second Deed of Sale was executed on June 1,
1983 and registered on March 4, 1984. He, therefore, knew that there were already
occupants on the property as early as 1981. The fact that there are persons, other
than the vendors, in actual possession of the disputed lot should have put private
respondents on inquiry as to the nature of petitioners right over the property. But
he never talked to petitioner to verify the nature of his right. He merely relied on the
assurance of private respondent Godofredo De la Paz, who was not even the owner
of the lot in question, that he would take care of the matter. This does not meet the
standard of good faith.
c. The appellate courts reliance on Arts. 1357 and 1358 of the Civil Code to
determine private respondents Veneracions lack of knowledge of petitioners
ownership of the disputed lot is erroneous.
Art. 1357 and Art. 1358, in relation to Art. 1403(2) of the Civil Code, requires that
the sale of real property must be in writing for it to be enforceable. It need not be
notarized. If the sale has not been put in writing, either of the contracting parties
can compel the other to observe such requirement. This is what petitioner did when
he repeatedly demanded that a Deed of Absolute Sale be executed in his favor by
private respondents De la Paz.
appeal with the MTC on March 3, 1987 without paying the appellate docket fee. He
avers that the trial courts denial of his motion is contrary to this Courts ruling in
the cases of Republic v. Director of Lands, and Aranas v. Endona in which it was held
that where the appellate docket fee is not paid in full within the reglementary
period, the decision of the MTC becomes final and not appealable as the payment of
docket fee is not only a mandatory but also a jurisdictional requirement.
Petitioners contention has no merit. The case of Republic v. Director of Lands deals
with the requirement for appeals from the Courts of First Instance, the Social
Security Commission, and the Court of Agrarian Relations to the Court of Appeals.
The case of Aranas v. Endona, on the other hand, was decided under the 1964 Rules
of Court and prior to the enactment of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1981 (B.P.
Blg. 129) and the issuance of its Interim Rules and Guidelines by this Court on
January 11, 1983. Hence, these cases are not applicable to the matter at issue.
On the other hand, in Santos v. Court of Appeals, it was held that although an
appeal fee is required to be paid in case of an appeal taken from the municipal trial
court to the regional trial court, it is not a prerequisite for the perfection of an
appeal under 20 and 23[44] of the Interim Rules and Guidelines issued by this
Court on January 11, 1983 implementing the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1981
(B.P. Blg. 129).
Under these sections, there are only two requirements for the
perfection of an appeal, to wit: (a) the filing of a notice of appeal within the
reglementary period; and (b) the expiration of the last day to appeal by any party.
Even in the procedure for appeal to the regional trial courts, nothing is mentioned
about the payment of appellate docket fees.
Indeed, this Court has ruled that, in appealed cases, the failure to pay the appellate
docket fee does not automatically result in the dismissal of the appeal, the dismissal
being discretionary on the part of the appellate court. Thus, private respondents
Veneracions failure to pay the appellate docket fee is not fatal to their appeal.
3.Petitioner contends that the resolution of the Court of Appeals denying his motion
for reconsideration was rendered in violation of the Constitution because it does not
state the legal basis thereof.
This contention is likewise without merit.
Art. VIII, Sec. 14 of the Constitution provides that No petition for review or motion
for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be refused due course or denied
without stating the basis therefor. This requirement was fully complied with when
the Court of Appeals, in denying reconsideration of its decision, stated in its
resolution that it found no reason to change its ruling because petitioner had not
raised
anything
new.
Thus,
its
resolution
denying
petitioners
motion
for
reconsideration states:
For resolution is the Motion for Reconsideration of Our Decision filed by the
petitioners.
Evidently, the motion poses nothing new. The points and arguments raised by the
movants have been considered and passed upon in the Decision sought to be
reconsidered. Thus, We find no reason to disturb the same.
WHEREFORE, the motion is hereby DENIED.
FACTS:
Respondent Napoleon Abiera of PAO filed a complaint before the Office of
the Ombudsman against petitioner RTC Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda. Respondent
Abiera alleged that petitioner Maceda has falsified his certificate of service by
certifying that all civil and criminal cases which have been submitted for decision
for a period of 90 days have been determined and decided on or before January 31,
1989, when in truth and in fact, petitioner Maceda knew that no decision had been
rendered in 5 civil and 10 criminal cases that have beensubmitted for decision.
Respondent Abiera alleged that petitioner Maceda falsified his certificates of service
for 17 months.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the investigation made by the Ombudsman constitutes
an encroachment into the SCs constitutional duty of supervision over all inferior
courts?
In the absence of any administrative action taken against him by the Court with
regard to his certificates of service, the investigation being conducted by
the Ombudsman encroaches into the Courts power of administrative supervision
over all courts and its personnel, in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers.
Art. VIII, Sec. 6 of the Constitution exclusively vests in the SC administrative
supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the CA
down to the lowest municipal trial court clerk. By virtue of this power, it is only the
SC that can oversee the judges and court personnels compliance with all laws, and
take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation
thereof.
No
other
branch
of government may
intrude
into
this
power,
Where a criminal complaint against a judge or other court employee arises from
their administrative duties, the Ombudsman must defer action on said complaint
and refer the same to the SC for determination whether said judge or court
employee had acted within the scope of their administrative duties.
FACTS:
Noblejas was the commissioner of land registration. Under RA 1151, he is entitled to
the same compensation, emoluments, and privileges as those of a Judge of CFI. He
approved a subdivision plan covering certain areas that are in excess of those
covered by the title.
The Secretary of Justice, Teehankee, sent a letter to Noblejas, requiring him to
explain. Noblejas answered, arguing that since he has a rank equivalent to that of a
Judge, he could only be suspended and investigated in the same manner as an
ordinary Judge, under the Judiciary Act. He claims that he may be investigated only
by the Supreme Court.
Nevertheless, he was suspended by the Executive Secretary (ES). Noblejas filed this
case claiming the lack of jurisdiction of the ES and his abuse of discretion.
ISSUE:
Whether the Commissioner of Land Registration may only be investigated by the
Supreme Court (in view of his having a rank equivalent to a judge)?
If the law had really intended to include the general grant of rank and privileges
equivalent to Judges, the right to be investigated and be suspended or removed
only by the Supreme Court, then such grant of privileges would be unconstitutional,
since it would violate the doctrine of separation of powers because it would charge
the Supreme Court with an administrative function of supervisory control over
executive officials, simultaneously reducing pro tanto, the control of the Chief
Executive over such officials.
There is no inherent power in the Executive or Legislative to charge the Judiciary
with administrative functions except when reasonable incidental to the fulfillment of
judicial duties.
The judiciary cannot give decisions which are merely advisory, nor can it exercise or
participate in the exercise of functions which are essentially legislative or
administrative. The Supreme Court and its members should not and cannot be
required to exercise any power or to perform any trust or to assume any duty not
pertaining to or connected with the administration of judicial functions.
As such, RA 1151 while conferring the same privileges as those of a judge, did not
include and was not intended to include, the right to demand investigation by the
Supreme Court, and to be suspended or removed only upon the Courts
recommendation. Said rights would be violative of the Constitution.
The suspension of Noblejas by the Executive Secretary valid.
Also, the resolution of the consult a by a Register of Deeds is NOT a judicial function,
but an administrative process. It is conclusive and binding only upon the Register of
Deeds, NOT the parties themselves. Even if the resolution is appealable, it does not
automatically mean that they are judicial in character. Still, the resolution of the
consult are a minimal portion of the administrative or executive functions.
FACTS:
The preliminary and basic question presented by the petition of the Manila Electric
Company, requesting the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of
arbitrators, to fix the terms upon which certain transportation companies shall be
permitted to use the Pasig bridge of the Manila Electric Company and the
compensation to be paid to the Manila Electric Company by such transportation
companies, relates to the validity of section 11 of Act No. 1446 and to the legal right
of the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, to act on the
petition. Act No. 1446 above referred to is entitled.
"An Act granting a franchise to Charles M. Swift to construct, maintain, and operate
an electric railway, and to construct, maintain, and operate an electric light, heat,
and power system from a point in the City of Manila in an easterly direction to the
town of Pasig, in the Province of Rizal." Opposition was entered to the petition by a
number of public utility operators.
ISSUE:
Whether or not SEC. 11 of ACT No. 1446 is valid?
speaks of the exercise of "jurisdiction" by the Supreme Court, it could not only mean
the exercise of "jurisdiction" by the Supreme Court acting as a court, and could
hardly mean the exercise of "jurisdiction" by the members of the Supreme Court,
sitting as a board of arbitrators. There is an important distinction between the
Supreme Court as an entity and the members of the Supreme Court. A board of
arbitrators is not a "court" in any proper sense of the term, and possesses none of
the jurisdiction which the Organic Act contemplates shall be exercised by the
Supreme Court.lawph aw Confirming the decision to the basic question at issue, the
Supreme Court holds that section 11 of Act No. 1446 contravenes the maxims which
guide the operation of a democratic government constitutionally established, and
that it would be improper and illegal for the members of the Supreme Court, sitting
as a board of arbitrators, the decision of a majority of whom shall be final, to act on
the petition of the Manila Electric Company. As a result, the members of the
Supreme Court decline to proceed further in the matter.
FACTS:
In 1981, BP 129, entitled An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating Funds
therefore and for Other Purposes, was passed. De la Llana was assailing its validity
because, first of all, he would be one of the judges that would be removed because
of the reorganization and second, he said such law would contravene the
constitutional provision which provides the security of tenure of judges of the
courts, He averred that only the SC can remove judges NOT Congress.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Judge De La Llana can be validly removed by the legislature by such
statute (BP 129)?
148
SCRA
659
The petitioner sued for recovery, and the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City issued a
writ of replevin upon his filing of a supersedes bond of P12,000.00. After considering
the merits of the case, the court sustained the confiscation of the carabaos and,
since they could no longer be produced, ordered the confiscation of the bond. The
court also declined to rule on the constitutionality of the executive order, as raise by
the petitioner, for lack of authority and also for its presumed validity.
The petitioner appealed the decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court,3 which
upheld the trial court, and he has now come before us in this petition for review on
certiorari.
ISSUES:
Whether or not executive order no. 626-A is unconstitutional due misapplication of
police power, violation of due process, and undue delegation of legislative power?
THE COURTS RULING:
The protection of the general welfare is the particular function of the police power
which both restraints and is restrained by due process. The police power is simply
defined as the power inherent in the State to regulate liberty and property for the
promotion of the general welfare. It is this power that is now invoked by the
government to justify Executive Order No. 626-A, amending the basic rule in
Executive Order No. 626, prohibiting the slaughter of carabaos except under certain
conditions. To justify the State in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the
public, it must appear, first, that the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require such interference; and
second, that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the
purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
In the light of the tests mentioned, we hold with the Toribio Case that there is no
doubt that by banning the slaughter of these animals except where they are at least
seven years old if male and eleven years old if female upon issuance of the
necessary permit, the executive order will be conserving those still fit for farm work
or breeding and preventing their improvident depletion.
But while conceding that the amendatory measure has the same lawful subject as
the original executive order, we cannot say with equal certainty that it complies
with the second requirement, viz., that there be a lawful method. We note that to
strengthen the original measure, Executive Order No. 626-A imposes an absolute
ban not on the slaughter of the carabaos but on their movement, providing that "no
carabao regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose (sic) and no carabeef
shall be transported from one province to another." The object of the prohibition
escapes us. The reasonable connection between the means employed and the
purpose sought to be achieved by the questioned measure is missing.
We do not see how the prohibition of the inter-provincial transport of carabaos can
prevent their indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they can be killed anywhere,
with no less difficulty in one province than in another. Obviously, retaining the
carabaos in one province will not prevent their slaughter there, any more than
moving them to another province will make it easier to kill them there. As for the
carabeef, the prohibition is made to apply to it as otherwise, so says executive
order, it could be easily circumvented by simply killing the animal. However, if the
movement of the live animals for the purpose of preventing their slaughter cannot
be prohibited, it should follow that there is no reason either to prohibit their transfer
as, not to be flippant dead meat.
Even if a reasonable relation between the means and the end were to be assumed,
we would still have to reckon with the sanction that the measure applies for
violation of the prohibition. The penalty is outright confiscation of the carabao or
carabeef being transported, to be meted out by the executive authorities, usually
the police only. In the Toribio Case, the statute was sustained because the penalty
prescribed was fine and imprisonment, to be imposed by the court after trial and
conviction of the accused. Under the challenged measure, significantly, no such trial
is prescribed, and the property being transported is immediately impounded by the
police and declared, by the measure itself, as forfeited to the government. This
measure deprives the individual due process as granted by the Constitution.
The due process clause was kept intentionally vague so it would remain also
conveniently resilient. This was felt necessary because due process is not, like some
provisions of the fundamental law, an "iron rule" laying down an implacable and
immutable command for all seasons and all persons. Flexibility must be the best
virtue of the guaranty. The very elasticity of the due process clause was meant to
make it adapt easily to every situation, enlarging or constricting its protection as the
changing times and circumstances may require.
Aware of this, the courts have also hesitated to adopt their own specific description
of due process lest they confine themselves in a legal straitjacket that will deprive
them of the elbow room they may need to vary the meaning of the clause whenever
indicated. The minimum requirements of due process are notice and hearing which,
generally speaking, may not be dispensed with because they are intended as a
safeguard against official arbitrariness. It is a gratifying commentary on our judicial
system that the jurisprudence of this country is rich with applications of this
guaranty as proof of our fealty to the rule of law and the ancient rudiments of fair
play.
It has already been remarked that there are occasions when notice and hearing may
be validly dispensed with notwithstanding the usual requirement for these minimum
guarantees of due process. It is also conceded that summary action may be validly
taken in administrative proceedings as procedural due process is not necessarily
judicial only. In the exceptional cases accepted, however if there is a justification for
the omission of the right to a previous hearing, to wit, the immediacy of the problem
sought to be corrected and the urgency of the need to correct it.
In the case before us, there was no such pressure of time or action calling for the
petitioner's peremptory treatment. The properties involved were not even inimical
per se as to require their instant destruction. There certainly was no reason why the
offense prohibited by the executive order should not have been proved first in a
court of justice, with the accused being accorded all the rights safeguarded to him
under the Constitution. Considering that, as we held in Pesigan v. Angeles, 21
Executive Order No. 626-A is penal in nature, the violation thereof should have been
pronounced not by the police only but by a court of justice, which alone would have
had the authority to impose the prescribed penalty, and only after trial and
conviction of the accused.
To sum up then, we find that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the
police power because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not
reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive.
Due process is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the
right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and punished. The
conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of
the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates
against the doctrine of separation of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid
delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who are granted
unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken. For these
reasons, we hereby declare Executive Order No. 626-A unconstitutional.
CITATION:
121
SCRA
51
FACTS:
On 04 Aug 1975, Marcelino was convicted for rape. On the same date, the attorneys
of both parties in the criminal case moved for time within which to submit their
respective memoranda. On the date set for promulgation of the decision in its
finality, Marcelinos counsel moved for postponement. The court ignored his motion.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Judge Cruz had resolved the case within the allotted period?
parties. The certification shall state why a decision or resolution has not been
rendered or issued within said period.
(4) Despite the expiration of the applicable mandatory period, the court, without
prejudice to such responsibility as may have been incurred in consequence thereof,
shall decide or resolve the case or matter submitted thereto for determination,
without further delay.
ART. XVIII, Section 12. The Supreme Court shall, within one year after the ratification
of this Constitution, adopt a systematic plan to expedite the decision or resolution of
cases or matters pending in the Supreme Court or the lower courts prior to the
effectivity of this Constitution. A similar plan shall be adopted for all special courts
and quasi-judicial bodies.
Section 13. The legal effect of the lapse, before the ratification of this Constitution,
of the applicable period for the decision or resolution of the cases or matters
submitted for adjudication by the courts, shall be determined by the Supreme Court
as soon as practicable.
Section 14. The provisions of paragraphs (3) and (4), Section 15 of Article VIII of this
Constitution shall apply to cases or matters filed before the ratification of this
Constitution, when the applicable period lapses after such ratification.
FACTS:
Candeleria De Roma adopted two daughters, Buhay and Rosalinda. She died
intestate. When administration proceedings was ongoing, Buhay was appointed
administratrix and filed an inventory of the estate. Opposed by Rosalinda on the
ground that certain properties donated by their mother to Buhay and fruits thereof
had not been included. The Parcels of Land totaled P10,297.50 and the value is not
disputed.
The TC issued an order in favor of Buhay because when Candelaria donated the
properties to Buhay she said in the Deed of Donation sa pamamagitan ng
pagbibigay na din a mababawing muli which the TC interpreted as a prohibition to
collate and besides the legitimes of the two daughters were not impaired.
On appeal, it was reversed as it merely described the donation as irrevocable not an
express prohibition to collate.
ISSUE:
Whether or not these lands are subject to collation?
Art. 1062. Collation shall not take place among compulsory heirs if the donor
should have so expressly provided, or if the donee should repudiate the inheritance,
unless the donation should be reduced as inofficious. (1036)
The SC affirmed the appellate courts decision and that it merely described the
donation as irrevocable. The Fact that a donation is irrevocable does not necessarily
exempt the donated properties from collation as required under the provisions of
the NCC.
Given the precise language of the deed of donation the decedent donor would have
included an express prohibition to collate if that had been the donors intention.
Absent such indication of that intention, the rule not the exemption should be
applied.