January 12, 2016

G.R. No. 201614

SHERYL M. MENDEZ, Petitioner,
vs.
Shari'a District Court, 5th Shari'a District, Cotabato City, Rasad G. Balindong (Acting
Presiding Judge); 1st Shari'a Circuit Court, 5th Shari'a District, Cotabato City, Montano
K. Kalimpo (Presiding Judge); and DR. JOHN O. MALIGA, Respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, assailing the March 30, 2012 Decision1 of the Shari' a District Court, 5th Shari'a
District, Cotabato City (ShDC), in ShDC Appealed Case No. 2011-19. The assailed
decision affirmed the August 19, 2011 Order2 of the 1st Shari'a Circuit Court, Cotabato
City (ShCC), in ShCC Civil Case No. 2010-559, confirming the talaq3 (divorce) between
petitioner Sheryl M. Mendez (Mendez) and private respondent Dr. John O. Maliga
(Maliga); awarding the custody of their minor child to Maliga; and ordering him to give a
mut'a (consolatory gift) to Mendez.
The Facts
From the records, it appears that on April 9, 2008, Mendez and Maliga were married
under Muslim rites. Prior to their marriage, the couple was already blessed with a
daughter, Princess Fatima M. Maliga (Princess Fatima). Their marriage, however,
soured shortly after their wedding.
On November 2, 2010, Maliga filed with the ShCC a petition4 for the judicial
confirmation of talaq from Mendez, with a prayer for the grant of probational custody of
their minor child pending the resolution of the case. According to Maliga, Mendez was a
Roman Catholic and she only embraced the Islamic faith on the date of their marriage.
Shortly after being married, he claimed that he started to doubt the sincerity of his wife's
submission to Islam, having noticed no changes in her moral attitude and social lifestyle
despite his guidance. Maliga added that despite his pleas for her to remain faithful to the
ways of Islam, she remained defiant. He alleged that sometime in December 2008,
Mendez reverted to Christianity. Maliga went on to add that she went to Manila a few
days after their wedding and brought Princess Fatima with her without his knowledge
and consent. In Manila, she taught their daughter how to practice Christianity by
enrolling her in a Catholic school. Maliga, thus, prayed for probational custody
considering the unsafe religious growth and values repugnant to Islam.
Before Mendez could file her answer, Maliga filed his urgent motion5 reiterating his plea
to be awarded temporary custody of Princess Fatima. He claimed that considering such

factors as moral values, social upliftment, behavioral growth, and religious

consideration, he should have custody of their child.
On November 12, 2010, the ShCC issued the order6 granting Maliga's urgent motion.
The ShCC deemed it proper for Princess Fatima to stay with her father because of his
social, financial and religious standing, and considering that she was then under his
custody; that he raised her as a good Muslim daughter as evidenced by her
appearance; and that her parents were married under Islamic rites.
On November 18, 2010, Mendez filed her Answer.7 She alleged that she followed the
religion of her Muslim grandfather, and denied Maliga's allegations that she was not
sincere in her practice of Islam. She averred that she became pregnant before she
married Maliga and had been raising their daughter on her own since her birth and that
he had been totally remiss in his material and moral obligations to support her and their
child. She opposed his prayer for custody, arguing that she had been raising Princess
Fatima since she was born; that Maliga had several wives and three other children and
was very busy with his profession as a physician; and that the custody of children below
seven years old should belong to the mother.
Mendez added that on October 21, 2010, she left their daughter in Maliga' s custody for
a visit, with the understanding that he would bring her back the following day. On
October 22, 2010, she went with her cousin to fetch her daughter but Maliga threatened
to kill them and displayed his bodyguards clad in police uniforms and firearms. This
prompted her to file a complaint-affidavit for kidnapping and failure to return a minor with
the National Bureau of Investigation.8
On November 22, 2010, Mendez filed her opposition9 to Maliga's urgent motion for
issuance of temporary custody. She argued that the motion did not contain the requisite
notice of hearing and was, therefore, a mere scrap of paper. She pointed out that the
motion was filed on October 9, 2010, prior to the filing of the main case on November 2,
2010. She contended that she never received the summons in connection with the
urgent motion and, furthermore, she never received a copy of the November 12, 2010
Order granting temporary custody to Maliga, which she had only picked up from the
court herself on November 18, 2010, the day she filed her answer.
In its Order,10 dated December 3, 2010, the ShCC partially reconsidered its initial order
awarding temporary custody to Maliga by granting the right of visitation to Mendez, as
follows:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, PRINCESS FATIMA, daughter of the herein
parties is hereby ordered be placed under the CARE and CUSTODY of the Petitioner,
DR. JOHN O. MALIGA, pending the resolution of the above-entitled case, effective
immediately, WITH THE RIGHT OF VISITATION BY THE RESPONDENT, SHERYL M.
MENDEZ TO HER DAUGHTER PRINCESS FATIMA M. MALIGA, ANY REASONABLE
TIME OF THE DAY AND NIGHT, AND/OR BORROW HER (PRINCESS FATIMA M.
MALIGA) PROVIDED THAT IT MUST BE ONLY WITHIN THE VICINITY OF COTABATO

CITY AND THEREAFTER, RETURN HER TO THE PETITIONER, DR. JOHN O.

MALIGA, UPON PROPER COORDINATION AND ARRANGEMENT FROM THE
ABOVE-NAMED PETITIONER OR HIS DULY AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE.
SO ORDERED.11
Mendez filed a motion for reconsideration of the December 3, 2010 order, arguing that
the question of custody was within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the ShDC, and
not the Sh CC, and praying that the said order be declared null and void.12
On January 19, 2011, the ShCC constituted an Agama Arbitration Council13 which, after
its own hearing and meeting, submitted the case for hearing on the merits because the
parties failed to arrive at an amicable settlement and because "the [d]ivorce was moot
and academic."14
The Ruling of the Shari 'a Circuit Court
On August 19, 2011, the Sh CC issued the order15 confirming the talaq pronounced by
Maliga against Mendez and awarded to him the care and custody of Princess Fatima. In
the same order, the ShCC granted visitation rights to Mendez and ordered Maliga to
give her a mut'a (consolatory gift) in the amount of P24,000.00. Thus:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, it is hereby ORDERED, that:
1. The pronounced Talaq (Divorce) by herein Petitioner DR. JOHN O. MALIGA against
respondent SHERYL M. MENDEZ is hereby CONFIRMED and considering that the
Iddah (cooling-off/waiting period) had long been lapsed, she may now be allowed to use
her former maiden name in all personal and official transactions;
2. The care and custody of the PARTIES' minor daughter PRINCESS FATIMA shall
remain with Petitioner DR. JOHN O. MALIGA with a right of visitation by respondent
SHERYL M. MENDEZ any reasonable time of the day and night and/or borrow her and
thereafter, return her (PRINCESS FATIMA) to petitioner DR. JOHN O. MALIGA,
provided it is only within the vicinity of Cotabato City and provided further that there
should be a proper coordination with the above-named Petitioner, and the petitioner is
hereby ordered to observe such rights of visitation and/ or borrow of by the respondent
SHERYL M. MENDEZ; and
3. Petitioner DR. JOHN O. MALIGA is hereby ordered upon receipt hereof, to give
consolatory gift (mut'a) to respondent SHERYL M. MENDEZ in the amount of TWENTY
FOUR THOUSAND PESOS (Php. 24,000.00) as provided by law as contained in the
petitioner's prayer which amounts of money must be coursed/ consigned to this Court.
Let the copy of this Order be furnished to the Office of the Shari'a Circuit Registrar of
this Court for record and registration purposes, and/or ANNOTATION of the PARTIES'
marriage contract as DIVORCED.

SO ORDERED.16
In its ruling, the ShCC noted that Mendez never questioned the validity of the talaq and
found that it was caused by the irreconcilable religious differences between the spouses
as to the upbringing of their daughter. For said reason, it ruled that, in the best interest
of the child in all aspects of life - economic, social and religious, the care and custody of
Princess Fatima should remain with Maliga.17
The Ruling of the Shari 'a District Court
Mendez appealed the ShCC order to the ShDC only with respect to the ruling on
custody. In her memorandum18 before the ShDC, Mendez argued that the order of the
ShCC was null and void for its failure to state the facts and law on which its findings
were based in accordance with Section 1, Rule 36 of the Rules of Court. She reiterated
that the urgent motion filed by Maliga did not contain the requisite notice of hearing, and
that the mother had the right of custody if the child was under seven years of age. She
asserted that the question of custody was within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
ShDC only, and that an order of a court not vested with jurisdiction was null and void.19
On March 30, 2012, the ShDC issued the assailed decision,20 affirming the August 19,
2011 Order of the Sh CC. Giving credence to Maliga's allegation that Mendez had
reverted to Christianity, the ShDC ruled that in Shari'a Law, a mother might be legally
disentitled to the custody of her child if she turned apostate, and disqualified until she
returned to the Islamic faith; and that the father, as a Muslim, was in a better position to
take care of the child's well-being and raise her as a Muslim. Affirming the ShCC ruling,
the ShDC found that Princess Fatima should remain with her father for her best interest
in all aspects of life, economically, socially and religiously.
Hence, this petition where Mendez argues the following:
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
A. THE HONORABLE PRESIDING JUDGE OF 1 ST SHARI' A CIRCUIT, COTABATO
CITY, 5 SHARIA [DISTRICT], MONTANO K. KALIMPO, GRAVELY AND SERIOUSLY
ERRED IN DECIDING IN FAVOR OF THE PETITIONERAPPELLEE IN SHCC CIVIL
CASE NO. 2010-559, DR. JOHN O. MALIGA FOR CARE AND CUSTODY [OF] MINOR
CHILD AGAINST HEREIN RESPONDENT-APPELLANT AS THE HONORABLE
JUDGE, GRAVELY ABUSES HIS AUTHORITY AMOUNTED TO LACK OF
JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE.
B. WERE THE ORDER OF THE HONORABLE PRESIDING JUDGE MONTANO K.
KALIMPO OF 1 ST SHARI' A CIRCUIT COURT, COTABATO CITY DATED NOVEMBER
12, 2010 AND DECEMBER 03, 2010 AWARDED THE CARE AND CUSTODY IN
FAVOR OF PETITIONER-APPELLEE SHCC CIVIL CASE NO. 2010-559 FOR BEING
UNREASONABLE, IN VIOLATION OF RULE 15, SECTIONS 4, 5, 6 REVISED RULES

OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 1997, ARTICLE 143, PAR. 1, SECTION a OF THE P.D. 1083,
ARTICLE 78, P.D. 1083 AS WELL AS JURISDICTION.
C. WERE THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE SHARI' A DISTRICT COURT, 5
SHARI'A DISTRICT COTABATO CITY, PROMULGATED ON MARCH 30, 2011,
AFFIRMED ASSAILED ORDER DA TED AUGUST 19, 2011 OF THE SHARI'A CIRCUIT
COTABATO CITY, FOR BEING UNREASONABLE. 21
Mendez argues that the ShCC acted in excess of jurisdiction when it ruled on Maliga's
urgent motion for issuance of temporary custody, considering that the motion was a
mere scrap of paper for lack of notice of hearing. She reiterates that she never received
any summons in connection with the urgent motion. She never received a copy of the
ShCC order granting the said motion either.22
Mendez goes on to contend that the ShCC had no jurisdiction to hear, try and decide
the issue of Princess Fatima's custody, considering that under Article 143(l)(a) of
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1083,23 it is the ShDC which has the exclusive original
jurisdiction over all cases involving custody. She argues the rule that any decision
rendered without jurisdiction is a total nullity and may be struck down at any time, even
on appeal.24
Finally, she asserts that she should have been awarded custody under Article 7 8 of
P .D. No. 1083 ,. as Princess Fatima was not above seven years old at the time the
ShCC order was promulgated. As to Maliga's claim that she was disqualified to have
custody over Princess Fatima for becoming apostate to the Islamic faith, Mendez
argues that while the same may be a ground for disinheritance under the Muslim Law,
the same law does not provide that being apostate is a ground to be denied of the care
and custody of her minor child.25 Besides, she professes that she is still a Muslim.
In the July 9, 2012 Resolution,26 the Court initially denied the subject petition for
various procedural defects.
On November 12, 2012, acting on the motion for reconsideration filed by Mendez, the
Court reinstated the petition.27 Thereafter, Maliga and Mendez filed their respective
pleadings.
In his Comment,28 dated January 17, 2013, Maliga countered that a mother may be
deprived of the custody of her child below seven years of age for compelling reasons.
He alleged that Mendez was unemployed and was financially dependent on him for all
the needs of Princess Fatima since her conception. He reiterated that a Muslim mother
may be legally disentitled to the custody of her minor child if she turned apostate and
should remain disqualified until she return to the Islamic faith. Maliga noted that
although the Family Code would now apply to Mendez, who was no longer a Muslim,
the application of the Family Code would defeat the purpose of the Muslim law on
disqualification to inheritance by virtue of apostasy. Finally, he claimed that he was fit
and qualified to have custody of his child as he was a prominent medical practitioner

with resources to meet all her needs. He pointed out that, under his care, Princess
Fatima's academic performance dramatically improved from the lowest ranking to the
top six in her 3rd grade class.
In her Reply,29 dated April 26, 2013, Mendez countered that Maliga only filed his
petition for talaq when he discovered that she had filed a complaint-affidavit against him
for kidnapping and failure to return a minor;30 that he had been totally remiss in his
material and moral obligations to his daughter;31 that he was unfit to take care of
Princess Fatima as his numerous wives had been confusing the child;32 and that she
was not unemployed as she was a registered nurse who could provide for all the needs
of her child and who, in fact, had cared for her from birth until she was six (6) years old
and sent her to an exclusive school, all without the assistance of Maliga.33
ISSUES
As can be gleaned from the pleadings, the issues at hand are the following:
1. Whether or not the ShCC erred in acting on Maliga's urgent motion for issuance of
temporary custody;
2. Whether or not the ShCC and the ShDC had jurisdiction to rule on the issue of
custody; and
3. Whether or not custody was properly granted to Maliga.
Opinion of Amicus Curiae
On March 11, 2014, the Court appointed Secretary-CEO Mehol K. Sadain (Secretary
Sadain) of the National Commission on Muslim Filipinos (NCMF) and Dr. Hamid A.
Barra of the King Faisal Center for Islamic, Arabic and Asian Studies, as amici curiae,
and directed them to submit their respective opinions on the matter of jurisdiction with
respect to the issue of custody,34 in view of the fact that the exclusive original
jurisdiction over divorce and custody pertains to two separate courts, namely, the ShCC
and the ShDC, respectively.
In compliance, Secretary Sadain submitted his opinion,35 calling on the Court to apply
the darurah-oriented principle of liberal construction in order to promote the objective of
securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding, in
accordance with the Rules of Court, which applies to P.D. No. 1083 in a suppletory
manner. He explained that Islamic law subscribes to the same objective of dispensing
speedy and equitable justice, as well as its own darurah-oriented liberal construction for
the sake of promoting equitable or weighty public interests. He elucidated that under the
doctrine of darurah (necessity), prohibited actions may be allowed or restrictive rules
may be relaxed if such would serve a greater and more primordial interest, such as the
preservation of life and property, or the higher pursuit of justice. He cited as an example
the prohibition on the eating of pork by a Muslim which could be temporarily set aside if

he was faced with the choice of starving to death or eating pork to survive. Another
example given was the allowance of the internal use of alcohol-based products if
ingested in the form of life-preserving medicine.
In consonance with the above principles, Secretary Sadain was of the view that strict
procedural requirements could be relaxed if such would result in a speedy, fair and
beneficial disposition of a pending legal question. He noted that determining the custody
of a child was an ancillary matter, which unavoidably would arise in divorce
proceedings, and would usually involve delving into matters of child welfare and
interest, as well as the fitness of the person/s seeking custody. He noted that the
speedy resolution of divorce and custody proceedings had an effect on the general
welfare of the child and was in the child's best interest. He cited that the Islamic legal
jurisdiction in Pakistan had ruled that, in guardianship proceedings, the Court exercised
parental jurisdiction, and technicalities of pleadings or strict formalities need not be
enforced because the State took charge of the rights of the child to safeguard their
welfare by deciding the question of custody as expeditiously as possible.
Secretary Sadain, thus, opined that the rule on jurisdiction under P.D. No. 1083 may be
relaxed considering that the issue of custody arose as an ancillary matter in the divorce
proceedings, which must be addressed in the same court in order to protect the welfare,
rights and interest of the child as expeditiously as possible. He also pointed out that
allowing the ShCC to decide on the matter of custody would avoid multiplicity of suits
and delay in the judicial proceedings. Lastly, he noted that because the ShDC had
passed judgment on the case appealed from the ShCC, the need for a separate case
had been moot and the jurisdictional and procedural defects had been cured.
Dr. Hamid Barra, despite repeated requests, did not submit an opinion.36
The Ruling of the Court
Appellate Jurisdiction of the Court in Shari 'a Cases
At the outset, the Court notes that this petition has been correctly instituted with this
Court. It has been recognized that decades after the 1989 enactment of the law37
creating the Shari' a Appellate Court and after the Court authorized its creation in
1999,38 it has yet to be organized. Pending the organization of the Shari'a Appellate
Court, appeals or petitions from final orders or decisions of the ShDC shall be filed with
the Court of Appeals (CA) and referred to a Special Division to be organized in any of
the CA stations preferably to be composed of Muslim CA Justices. For cases where only
errors or questions of law are raised or involved, the appeal shall be to this Court via a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court pursuant to Article .
VIII, Section 5 of the Constitution and Section 2 of Rule 41 of the Rules.39 As the
present petition involves only questions of law, it has been properly filed before this
Court.
Jurisdiction of Shari 'a Courts

Jurisdiction is the power and authority of a court to hear, try and decide a case.40 In
order for the court to have authority to dispose of a case on the merits, it must acquire
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties.41 The Congress has the power to
define, prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction of various courts,42 and courts are
without authority to act where jurisdiction has not been conferred by law.43 Jurisdiction
is conferred only by the Constitution or the law. It cannot be acquired through a waiver
or enlarged by the omission of the parties or conferred by the acquiescence of the court,
and may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even for the first time on appeal.44
The law which confers jurisdiction on the Shari'a courts is P.D. No. 1083. The pertinent
articles of the law as to the original jurisdiction of the Shari'a courts are as follows:
Art. 143. Original jurisdiction. (1) The Shari'a District Court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over:
(a) All cases involving custody, guardianship, legitimacy, paternity and filiation arising
under this Code;
(b) All cases involving disposition, distribution and settlement of the estate of deceased
Muslims, probate of wills, issuance of letters of administration or appointment of
administrators or executors regardless of the nature or the aggregate value of the
property;
(c) Petitions for the declaration of absence and death and for the cancellation or
correction of entries in the Muslim Registries mentioned in Title VI of Book Two of this
Code;
(d) All actions arising from customary contracts in which the parties are Muslims, if they
have not specified which law shall govern their relations; and
(e) All petitions for mandamus, prohibition, injunction, certiorari, habeas corpus, and all
other auxiliary writs and processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
(2) Concurrently with existing civil courts, the Shari'a District Court shall have original
jurisdiction over:
(a) Petitions by Muslims for the constitution of a family home, change of name and
commitment of an insane person to an asylum;
(b) All other personal and real actions not mentioned in paragraph 1 (d) wherein the
parties involved are Muslims except those for forcible entry and unlawful detainer, which
shall fall under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Municipal Circuit Court; and

(c) All special civil actions for interpleader or declaratory relief wherein the parties are
Muslims or the property involved belongs exclusively to Muslims.
xxxx
Art. 155. Jurisdiction. - The Shari'a Circuit Courts shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction over:
(1) All cases involving offenses defined and punished under this Code.
(2) All civil actions and proceedings between parties who are Muslims or have been
married in accordance with Article 13 involving disputes relating to:
(a) Marriage;
(b) Divorce recognized under this Code;
(c) Betrothal or breach of contract to marry;
(d) Customary dower (mahr);
(e) Disposition and distribution of property upon divorce;
(f) Maintenance and support, and consolatory gifts, (mut'a); and
(g) Restitution of marital rights.
(3) All cases involving disputes relative to communal properties.
[Emphases and Underscoring Supplied]
It is clear that the ShCC has exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions between
parties who have been married in accordance with the Muslim law, involving disputes
relating to divorce under P.D. No. 1083. There is, therefore, no doubt that the ShCC had
jurisdiction to confirm the talaq between Mendez and Maliga.
Jurisdiction in Custody Case
Article 143 above, however, clearly provides that the ShDC has exclusive original
jurisdiction over all cases involving custody under P.D. No. 1083. Exclusive jurisdiction
is the power of the court to take cognizance of and decide certain cases to the exclusion
of any other courts.45 Original jurisdiction is the power of the court to take judicial
cognizance of a case instituted for judicial action for the first time under conditions
provided by law.

On the other hand, appellate jurisdiction is the authority of a court higher in rank to reexamine the final order of judgment of a lower court which tried the case now elevated
for judicial review.46 Since the two jurisdictions are exclusive of each other, each must
be expressly conferred by law. One does not flow from, nor is inferred from the other.47
Implication of Article 54
As opined by Secretary Sadain.48 the ShCC does seem to have ancillary jurisdiction
over custody issues as they relate to a divorce decree. Under Article 155, it is provided
that the SHCC shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all civil actions and
proceedings involving disputes relating to divorce. To quote once more:
Article 155. Jurisdiction. The Shari'a Circuit Court shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction over
(1) All cases involving offenses defined and punished under this Code.
(2) All civil actions and proceedings between parties who are Muslims or have been
married in accordance with Article 13 involving disputes relating to:
(a) xx x.
(b) Divorce recognized under this Code.
xxxx
Clearly, the provision above clothes the ShCC with power to hear and decide civil
actions relating to a talaq or divorce. It cannot be denied that the issue of custody is a
necessary consequence of a divorce proceeding. As Article 54 of P.D. No. 1083
provides:
Article 54. Effects of irrevocable talaq or faskh. A talaq or faskh, as soon as it becomes
irrevocable, shall have the following effects:
(a) The marriage bond shall be severed and the spouses may contract another
marriage in accordance with this Code;
(b) The spouses shall lose their mutual rights of inheritance;
(c) The custody of children shall be determined in accordance with Article 78 of this
Code;
(d) The wife shall be entitled to recover from the jusband her whole dower in case the
talaq has been effected after the consummation of the marriage, or one-half thereof if
effected before its consummation;

(e) The husband shall not be discharged from his obligation to give support in
accordance with Article 67; and
(f) The conjugal partnership, if stipulated in the marriage settlements, shall be dissolved
and liquidated.
Though Article 54 does not directly confer jurisdiction to the ShCC to rule on the issue of
custody, the Court, nevertheless grants the ShCC ancillary jurisdiction to resolve issues
related to divorce. The above-quoted provision states categorically that as a consequent
effect of divorce, the custody of children shall be determined in accordance with Article
78 of the Code. In tum, Article 78 states that the care and custody of children below
seven whose parents are divorced shall belong to the mother, and the minor above
seven but below the age of puberty may choose the parent with whom he/she wants to
stay.49
To rule that the ShCC is without jurisdiction to resolve issues on custody after it had
decided on the issue of divorce, simply because it appears to contravene Article 143 of
P.D. No. 1083, would be antithetical to the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction. "While a
court may be expressly granted the incidental powers necessary to effectuate its
jurisdiction, a grant of jurisdiction, in the absence of prohibitive legislation, implies the
necessary and usual incidental powers essential to effectuate it, and, subject to existing
laws and constitutional provisions, every regularly constituted court has power to do all
things that are reasonably necessary for the administration of justice within the scope of
its jurisdiction and for the enforcement of its judgments and mandates. Hence,
demands, matters or questions ancillary or incidental to, or growing out of, the main
action, and coming within the above principles, may be taken cognizance of by the court
and determined, since such jurisdiction is in aid of its authority over the principal matter,
even though the court may thus be called on to consider and decide matters which, as
original causes of action, would not be within its cognizance."50
Following the doctrine, the ShCC, in cases involving divorce, possesses the power to
resolve the issue of custody, it being a related issue to the main cause of action.
At this juncture, the question must be asked: By recognizing the power of the ShCC to
rule on the issue of custody, would this effectively render Article 143 of P.D. No. 1083
meaningless, considering that the same is unequivocal in providing that the ShDC has
the exclusive original jurisdiction to decide on all cases involving custody?
The Court rules in the negative.
A distinction must be made between a case for divorce wherein the issue of custody is
an ancillary issue and a case where custody is the main issue. Jurisdiction in the former,
as discussed above, lies with the ShCC, as the main cause of action is divorce. The
latter on the other hand, where the main cause of action is one of custody, the same
must be filed with the ShDC, pursuant to Article 143 of P.D. No. 1083.

Violation of Due Process; No Notice of Hearing; and Absence of Hearing

Notwithstanding the foregoing, the award of custody to Maliga by the ShCC was void as
it was rendered in violation of the constitutional right of Mendez to due process.
Mendez pointed out that Maliga's urgent motion for issuance of temporary custody was
filed on October 9, 2010, even before the main petition for talaq was filed on November
2, 2010, and that she never received a summons pertaining to the urgent motion.
Indeed, a review of the records reveals that the date of filing was handwritten on the
said motion as "October 9, 2010." The motion itself and the registry receipt attached
thereto, however, were dated "November 9, 2010." The Court is, thus, of the view that
the month "October" was mistakenly written by the receiving clerk instead of
"November," and that the motion was filed subsequent to the main petition for talaq as
an ancillary matter.
The Court, nonetheless, agrees with Mendez that the urgent motion lacked the requisite
notice of hearing. It is immediately evident from the face of the motion that it did not
contain the notice of hearing required by the Rules of Court which has suppletory
application to the present case. Section 4 of Rule 15 provides that every written motion
shall be set for hearing by the applicant. Every written motion is required to be heard
and the notice of hearing shall be served in such manner as to insure its receipt by the
other party at least three (3) days before the date of hearing, unless the court for good
cause sets the hearing on shorter notice.51 The notice of hearing is intended to prevent
surprise and to afford the adverse party a chance to be heard before the motion is
resolved by the court. A seasonable service of a copy of the motion on the adverse
party with a notice of hearing indicating the time and place of hearing is a mandatory
requirement that cannot be dispensed with as this is the minimum requirement of
procedural due process.52
A motion that does not contain a notice of hearing is a mere scrap of paper and
presents no question which merits the attention and consideration of the court.1wphi1
It is not even a motion for it does not comply with the rules, and, hence, even the clerk
has no right to receive it.53
Award of Custody; No Basis
Not only was the award of custody violative of the constitutional right of Mendez to due
process, but also both the orders of the ShCC and the ShDC awarding custody of
Princess Fatima to Maliga were without evidentiary basis because no hearing was
actually conducted prior to the issuance of the order granting the urgent motion.
Moreover, there was no explanation given as to why the motion was resolved without
notice to, or the participation of, Mendez.
In awarding custody to Maliga, the ShCC merely wrote:

On the issue of CARE AND CUSTODY of the PARTIES' minor daughter PRINCESS
FATIMA, this Court after closely scrutinizing the evidence on hand, deemed it just and
proper and/ or is convinced that it should be under status quo, remains (sic) with
Petitioner DR. JOHN 0. MALIGA, for her (PRINCESS FATIMA) best interest in all
aspects of life, economically, socially and religiously etc WITHOUT prejudice of the
rights of visitation of respondent SHERYL M. MENDEZ any reasonable time of the day
and right (sic), and borrow her (PRINCESS FATIMA) provided that it is only within the
vicinity of Cotabato City and thereafter, return her, with proper coordination with
Petitioner DR. JOHN O. MALIGA, and the latter (DR. JOHN O. MALIGA) is hereby
ordered to observe such rights afforded to respondent SHERYL M. MENDEZ.54
Although the ShCC stated that, in deciding on the custody case, it scrutinized the
evidence on hand, it was remiss in its duty to state the precise factual and legal basis
on which its ruling awarding custody to Maliga was based. Section 14, Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution mandates that decisions must clearly and distinctly state the facts and
the law on which they are based. The decisions of courts must be able to address the
issues raised by the parties through the presentation of a comprehensive analysis or
account of factual and legal findings of the court.55 It is evident that the ShCC failed to
comply with these requirements. It merely stated that it was in Princess Fatima's "best
interest in all aspects of life, economically, socially and religiously" that custody be
awarded to her father. There was no express finding that Mendez was unfit in any way,
or a hint of an explanation as to why Maliga was in a better position to take custody of
Princess Fatima.
The ShDC, on the other hand, in affirming the findings of the ShCC, stated that Mendez
was disentitled to custody because she had turned apostate, and held that she would
remain disqualified until she return to the Islamic faith in accordance with the Muslim
Law. It appears, however, that disqualification due to apostasy under the Muslim Code
pertains to disinheritance under Article 93 of the Muslim Code,56 and not to the custody
of children.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The following are declared NULL
and VOID:
1. the November 12, 2010 and December 3, 2010 Orders of the Shari'a Circuit Court in
ShCC Civil Case No. 2010-559, insofar as the ruling on custody and visitation is
concerned;
2. the August 19, 2011 Order of the Shari'a Circuit Court in ShCC Civil Case No. 2010559, insofar as the ruling on custody is concerned; and
3. the March 30, 2012 Decision of the Shari'a District Court in SDC Appealed Case No.
2011-19, insofar as the ruling on custody is concerned.
In the August 19, 2011 Order of the Shari'a Circuit Court in ShCC Civil Case No. 2010559, confirming the pronouncement of Talaq (Divorce) by petitioner Dr. John O. Maliga

against respondent Sheryl M. Mendez and the giving of consolatory gift (mut 'a) to her in
the amount of P24,000.00 is maintained.
The records of the case are hereby ordered REMANDED to the Shari' a Circuit Court for
appropriate proceedings on the motion of Dr. John O. Maliga for the determination of
custody of Princess Fatima M. Maliga.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 169766

March 30, 2011

ESTRELLITA JULIANO-LLAVE, Petitioner,

vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, HAJA PUTRI ZORAYDA A. TAMANO and ADIB
AHMAD A. TAMANO, Respondents.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
A new law ought to affect the future, not what is past. Hence, in the case of subsequent
marriage laws, no vested rights shall be impaired that pertain to the protection of the
legitimate union of a married couple.
This petition for review on certiorari assails the Decision1 dated August 17, 2004 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 61762 and its subsequent Resolution2 dated
September 13, 2005, which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Quezon City, Branch 89 declaring petitioner Estrellita Juliano-Llaves (Estrellita)
marriage to Sen. Mamintal A.J. Tamano (Sen. Tamano) as void ab initio.
Factual Antecedents
Around 11 months before his death, Sen. Tamano married Estrellita twice initially
under the Islamic laws and tradition on May 27, 1993 in Cotabato City3 and,
subsequently, under a civil ceremony officiated by an RTC Judge at Malabang, Lanao
del Sur on June 2, 1993.4 In their marriage contracts, Sen. Tamanos civil status was
indicated as divorced.
Since then, Estrellita has been representing herself to the whole world as Sen.
Tamanos wife, and upon his death, his widow.
On November 23, 1994, private respondents Haja Putri Zorayda A. Tamano (Zorayda)
and her son Adib Ahmad A. Tamano (Adib), in their own behalf and in behalf of the rest
of Sen. Tamanos legitimate children with Zorayda,5 filed a complaint with the RTC of
Quezon City for the declaration of nullity of marriage between Estrellita and Sen.
Tamano for being bigamous. The complaint6 alleged, inter alia, that Sen. Tamano
married Zorayda on May 31, 1958 under civil rites, and that this marriage remained
subsisting when he married Estrellita in 1993. The complaint likewise averred that:

11. The marriage of the deceased and Complainant Zorayda, having been celebrated
under the New Civil Code, is therefore governed by this law. Based on Article 35 (4) of
the Family Code, the subsequent marriage entered into by deceased Mamintal with
Defendant Llave is void ab initio because he contracted the same while his prior
marriage to Complainant Zorayda was still subsisting, and his status being declared as
"divorced" has no factual or legal basis, because the deceased never divorced
Complainant Zorayda in his lifetime, and he could not have validly done so because
divorce is not allowed under the New Civil Code;
11.1 Moreover, the deceased did not and could not have divorced Complainant Zorayda
by invoking the provision of P.D. 1083, otherwise known as the Code of Muslim
Personal Laws, for the simple reason that the marriage of the deceased with
Complainant Zorayda was never deemed, legally and factually, to have been one
contracted under Muslim law as provided under Art. 186 (2) of P.D. 1083, since they
(deceased and Complainant Zorayda) did not register their mutual desire to be thus
covered by this law;7
Summons was then served on Estrellita on December 19, 1994. She then asked from
the court for an extension of 30 days to file her answer to be counted from January 4,
1995,8 and again, another 15 days9 or until February 18, 1995, both of which the court
granted.10
Instead of submitting her answer, however, Estrellita filed a Motion to Dismiss11 on
February 20, 1995 where she declared that Sen. Tamano and Zorayda are both
Muslims who were married under the Muslim rites, as had been averred in the latters
disbarment complaint against Sen. Tamano.12 Estrellita argued that the RTC has no
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case because under Presidential Decree (PD) No.
1083, or the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines (Muslim Code), questions
and issues involving Muslim marriages and divorce fall under the exclusive jurisdiction
of sharia courts.
The trial court denied Estrellitas motion and asserted its jurisdiction over the case for
declaration of nullity.13 Thus, Estrellita filed in November 1995 a certiorari petition with
this Court questioning the denial of her Motion to Dismiss. On December 15, 1995, we
referred the petition to the CA14 which was docketed thereat as CA-G.R. SP No.
39656.
During the pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. 39656, the RTC continued to try the case since
there can be no default in cases of declaration of nullity of marriage even if the
respondent failed to file an answer. Estrellita was allowed to participate in the trial while
her opposing parties presented their evidence. When it was Estrellitas turn to adduce
evidence, the hearings set for such purpose15 were postponed mostly at her instance
until the trial court, on March 22, 1996, suspended the proceedings16 in view of the
CAs temporary restraining order issued on February 29, 1996, enjoining it from hearing
the case.17

Eventually, however, the CA resolved the petition adverse to Estrellita in its Decision
dated September 30, 1996.18 Estrellita then elevated the appellate courts judgment to
this Court by way of a petition for review on certiorari docketed as G.R. No. 126603.19
Subsequent to the promulgation of the CA Decision, the RTC ordered Estrellita to
present her evidence on June 26, 1997.20 As Estrellita was indisposed on that day, the
hearing was reset to July 9, 1997.21 The day before this scheduled hearing, Estrellita
again asked for a postponement.22
Unhappy with the delays in the resolution of their case, Zorayda and Adib moved to
submit the case for decision,23 reasoning that Estrellita had long been delaying the
case. Estrellita opposed, on the ground that she has not yet filed her answer as she still
awaits the outcome of G.R. No. 126603.24
On June 29, 1998, we upheld the jurisdiction of the RTC of Quezon City,25 stating as
one of the reasons that as sharia courts are not vested with original and exclusive
jurisdiction in cases of marriages celebrated under both the Civil Code and PD 1083,
the RTC, as a court of general jurisdiction, is not precluded from assuming jurisdiction
over such cases. In our Resolution dated August 24, 1998,26 we denied Estrellitas
motion for reconsideration27 with finality.
A few days before this resolution, or on August 18, 1998, the RTC rendered the
aforementioned judgment declaring Estrellitas marriage with Sen. Tamano as void ab
initio.28
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
The RTC, finding that the marital ties of Sen. Tamano and Zorayda were never severed,
declared Sen. Tamanos subsequent marriage to Estrellita as void ab initio for being
bigamous under Article 35 of the Family Code of the Philippines and under Article 83 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines.29 The court said:
A comparison between Exhibits A and B (supra) immediately shows that the second
marriage of the late Senator with [Estrellita] was entered into during the subsistence of
his first marriage with [Zorayda]. This renders the subsequent marriage void from the
very beginning. The fact that the late Senator declared his civil status as "divorced" will
not in any way affect the void character of the second marriage because, in this
jurisdiction, divorce obtained by the Filipino spouse is not an acceptable method of
terminating the effects of a previous marriage, especially, where the subsequent
marriage was solemnized under the Civil Code or Family Code.30
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In her appeal,31 Estrellita argued that she was denied her right to be heard as

the RTC rendered its judgment even without waiting for the finality of the Decision of the
Supreme Court in G.R. No. 126603. She claimed that the RTC should have required her
to file her answer after the denial of her motion to dismiss. She maintained that Sen.
Tamano is capacitated to marry her as his marriage and subsequent divorce with
Zorayda is governed by the Muslim Code. Lastly, she highlighted Zoraydas lack of legal
standing to question the validity of her marriage to the deceased.
In dismissing the appeal in its Decision dated August 17, 2004,32 the CA held that
Estrellita can no longer be allowed to file her answer as she was given ample
opportunity to be heard but simply ignored it by asking for numerous postponements.
She never filed her answer despite the lapse of around 60 days, a period longer than
what was prescribed by the rules. It also ruled that Estrellita cannot rely on her pending
petition for certiorari with the higher courts since, as an independent and original action,
it does not interrupt the proceedings in the trial court.
As to the substantive merit of the case, the CA adjudged that Estrellitas marriage to
Sen. Tamano is void ab initio for being bigamous, reasoning that the marriage of
Zorayda and Sen. Tamano is governed by the Civil Code, which does not provide for an
absolute divorce. It noted that their first nuptial celebration was under civil rites, while
the subsequent Muslim celebration was only ceremonial. Zorayda then, according to the
CA, had the legal standing to file the action as she is Sen. Tamanos wife and, hence,
the injured party in the senators subsequent bigamous marriage with Estrellita.
In its September 13, 2005 Resolution,33 the CA denied Estrellitas Motion for
Reconsideration/Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration where it debunked the
additional errors she raised. The CA noted that the allegation of lack of the public
prosecutors report on the existence of collusion in violation of both Rule 9, Section 3(e)
of the Rules of Court34 and Article 48 of the Family Code35 will not invalidate the trial
courts judgment as the proceedings between the parties had been adversarial,
negating the existence of collusion. Assuming that the issues have not been joined
before the RTC, the same is attributable to Estrellitas refusal to file an answer. Lastly,
the CA disregarded Estrellitas allegation that the trial court erroneously rendered its
judgment way prior to our remand to the RTC of the records of the case ratiocinating
that G.R. No. 126603 pertains to the issue on the denial of the Motion to Dismiss, and
not to the issue of the validity of Estrellitas marriage to Sen. Tamano.
The Parties Respective Arguments
Reiterating her arguments before the court a quo, Estrellita now argues that the CA
erred in upholding the RTC judgment as the latter was prematurely issued, depriving
her of the opportunity to file an answer and to present her evidence to dispute the
allegations against the validity of her marriage. She claims that Judge Macias v.
Macias36 laid down the rule that the filing of a motion to dismiss instead of an answer
suspends the period to file an answer and, consequently, the trial court is obliged to
suspend proceedings while her motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction
has not yet been resolved with finality. She maintains that she merely participated in the

RTC hearings because of the trial courts assurance that the proceedings will be without
prejudice to whatever action the High Court will take on her petition questioning the
RTCs jurisdiction and yet, the RTC violated this commitment as it rendered an adverse
judgment on August 18, 1998, months before the records of G.R. No. 126603 were
remanded to the CA on November 11, 1998.37 She also questions the lack of a report
of the public prosecutor anent a finding of whether there was collusion, this being a
prerequisite before further proceeding could be held when a party has failed to file an
answer in a suit for declaration of nullity of marriage.
Estrellita is also steadfast in her belief that her marriage with the late senator is valid as
the latter was already divorced under the Muslim Code at the time he married her. She
asserts that such law automatically applies to the marriage of Zorayda and the
deceased without need of registering their consent to be covered by it, as both parties
are Muslims whose marriage was solemnized under Muslim law. She pointed out that
Sen. Tamano married all his wives under Muslim rites, as attested to by the affidavits of
the siblings of the deceased.38
Lastly, Estrellita argues that Zorayda and Adib have no legal standing to file suit
because only the husband or the wife can file a complaint for the declaration of nullity of
marriage under Supreme Court Resolution A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.39
Refuting the arguments, the Solicitor General (Sol Gen) defends the CAs reasoning and
stresses that Estrellita was never deprived of her right to be heard; and, that filing an
original action for certiorari does not stay the proceedings of the main action before the
RTC.
As regards the alleged lack of report of the public prosecutor if there is collusion, the Sol
Gen says that this is no longer essential considering the vigorous opposition of Estrellita
in the suit that obviously shows the lack of collusion. The Sol Gen also supports private
respondents legal standing to challenge the validity of Estrellitas purported marriage
with Sen. Tamano, reasoning that any proper interested party may attack directly or
collaterally a void marriage, and Zorayda and Adib have such right to file the action as
they are the ones prejudiced by the marital union.
Zorayda and Adib, on the other hand, did not file any comment.
Issues
The issues that must be resolved are the following:
1. Whether the CA erred in affirming the trial courts judgment, even though the latter
was rendered prematurely because: a) the judgment was rendered without waiting for
the Supreme Courts final resolution of her certiorari petition, i.e., G.R. No. 126603; b)
she has not yet filed her answer and thus was denied due process; and c) the public
prosecutor did not even conduct an investigation whether there was collusion;

2. Whether the marriage between Estrellita and the late Sen. Tamano was bigamous;
and
3. Whether Zorayda and Adib have the legal standing to have Estrellitas marriage
declared void ab initio.
Our Ruling
Estrellitas refusal to file an answer eventually led to the loss of her right to answer; and
her pending petition for certiorari/review on certiorari questioning the denial of the
motion to dismiss before the higher courts does not at all suspend the trial proceedings
of the principal suit before the RTC of Quezon City.
Firstly, it can never be argued that Estrellita was deprived of her right to due process.
She was never declared in default, and she even actively participated in the trial to
defend her interest.
Estrellita invokes Judge Macias v. Macias40 to justify the suspension of the period to file
an answer and of the proceedings in the trial court until her petition for certiorari
questioning the validity of the denial of her Motion to Dismiss has been decided by this
Court. In said case, we affirmed the following reasoning of the CA which, apparently, is
Estrellitas basis for her argument, to wit:
However, she opted to file, on April 10, 2001, a Motion to Dismiss, instead of filing an
Answer to the complaint. The filing of said motion suspended the period for her to file
her Answer to the complaint. Until said motion is resolved by the Respondent Court with
finality, it behooved the Respondent Court to suspend the hearings of the case on the
merits. The Respondent Court, on April 19, 2001, issued its Order denying the Motion
to Dismiss of the Petitioner. Under Section 6, Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure [now Section 4], the Petitioner had the balance of the period provided for in
Rule 11 of the said Rules but in no case less than five (5) days computed from service
on her of the aforesaid Order of the Respondent Court within which to file her Answer to
the complaint: x x x41 (Emphasis supplied.)
Estrellita obviously misappreciated Macias. All we pronounced therein is that the trial
court is mandated to suspend trial until it finally resolves the motion to dismiss that is
filed before it. Nothing in the above excerpt states that the trial court should suspend its
proceedings should the issue of the propriety or impropriety of the motion to dismiss be
raised before the appellate courts. In Macias, the trial court failed to observe due
process in the course of the proceeding of the case because after it denied the wifes
motion to dismiss, it immediately proceeded to allow the husband to present evidence
ex parte and resolved the case with undue haste even when, under the rules of
procedure, the wife still had time to file an answer. In the instant case, Estrellita had no
time left for filing an answer, as she filed the motion to dismiss beyond the extended
period earlier granted by the trial court after she filed motions for extension of time to file
an answer.

Estrellita argues that the trial court prematurely issued its judgment, as it should have
waited first for the resolution of her Motion to Dismiss before the CA and, subsequently,
before this Court. However, in upholding the RTC, the CA correctly ruled that the
pendency of a petition for certiorari does not suspend the proceedings before the trial
court. "An application for certiorari is an independent action which is not part or a
continuation of the trial which resulted in the rendition of the judgment complained of."42
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is explicit in stating that "[t]he petition shall not interrupt
the course of the principal case unless a temporary restraining order or a writ of
preliminary injunction has been issued against the public respondent from further
proceeding in the case."43 In fact, the trial court respected the CAs temporary
restraining order and only after the CA rendered judgment did the RTC again require
Estrellita to present her evidence.
Notably, when the CA judgment was elevated to us by way of Rule 45, we never issued
any order precluding the trial court from proceeding with the principal action. With her
numerous requests for postponements, Estrellita remained obstinate in refusing to file
an answer or to present her evidence when it was her turn to do so, insisting that the
trial court should wait first for our decision in G.R. No. 126603. Her failure to file an
answer and her refusal to present her evidence were attributable only to herself and she
should not be allowed to benefit from her own dilatory tactics to the prejudice of the
other party. Sans her answer, the trial court correctly proceeded with the trial and
rendered its Decision after it deemed Estrellita to have waived her right to present her
side of the story. Neither should the lower court wait for the decision in G.R. No. 126603
to become final and executory, nor should it wait for its records to be remanded back to
it because G.R. No. 126603 involves strictly the propriety of the Motion to Dismiss and
not the issue of validity of marriage.
The Public Prosecutor issued a report as
to the non-existence of collusion.
Aside from Article 48 of the Family Code and Rule 9, Section 3(e) of the Rules of Court,
the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC)44 also requries the participation of the public
prosecutor in cases involving void marriages. It specifically mandates the prosecutor to
submit his investigation report to determine whether there is collusion between the
parties:
Sec. 9. Investigation report of public prosecutor.(1) Within one month after receipt of
the court order mentioned in paragraph (3) of Section 8 above, the public prosecutor
shall submit a report to the court stating whether the parties are in collusion and serve
copies thereof on the parties and their respective counsels, if any.
(2) If the public prosecutor finds that collusion exists, he shall state the basis thereof in
his report. The parties shall file their respective comments on the finding of collusion

within ten days from receipt of a copy of the report. The court shall set the report for
hearing and if convinced that the parties are in collusion, it shall dismiss the petition.
(3) If the public prosecutor reports that no collusion exists, the court shall set the case
for pre-trial. It shall be the duty of the public prosecutor to appear for the State at the
pre-trial.
Records show that the trial court immediately directed the public prosecutor to submit
the required report,45 which we find to have been sufficiently complied with by Assistant
City Prosecutor Edgardo T. Paragua in his Manifestation dated March 30, 1995,46
wherein he attested that there could be no collusion between the parties and no
fabrication of evidence because Estrellita is not the spouse of any of the private
respondents.
Furthermore, the lack of collusion is evident in the case at bar. Even assuming that
there is a lack of report of collusion or a lack of participation by the public prosecutor,
just as we held in Tuason v. Court of Appeals,47 the lack of participation of a fiscal does
not invalidate the proceedings in the trial court:
The role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal in annulment of marriage and legal
separation proceedings is to determine whether collusion exists between the parties
and to take care that the evidence is not suppressed or fabricated. Petitioner's
vehement opposition to the annulment proceedings negates the conclusion that
collusion existed between the parties. There is no allegation by the petitioner that
evidence was suppressed or fabricated by any of the parties. Under these
circumstances, we are convinced that the non-intervention of a prosecuting attorney to
assure lack of collusion between the contending parties is not fatal to the validity of the
proceedings in the trial court.48
The Civil Code governs the marriage of Zorayda and the late Sen. Tamano; their
marriage was never invalidated by PD 1083. Sen. Tamanos subsequent marriage to
Estrellita is void ab initio.
The marriage between the late Sen. Tamano and Zorayda was celebrated in 1958,
solemnized under civil and Muslim rites.49 The only law in force governing marriage
relationships between Muslims and non-Muslims alike was the Civil Code of 1950,
under the provisions of which only one marriage can exist at any given time.50 Under
the marriage provisions of the Civil Code, divorce is not recognized except during the
effectivity of Republic Act No. 39451 which was not availed of during its effectivity.
As far as Estrellita is concerned, Sen. Tamanos prior marriage to Zorayda has been
severed by way of divorce under PD 1083,52 the law that codified Muslim personal
laws. However, PD 1083 cannot benefit Estrellita. Firstly, Article 13(1) thereof provides
that the law applies to "marriage and divorce wherein both parties are Muslims, or
wherein only the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in accordance
with Muslim law or this Code in any part of the Philippines." But we already ruled in G.R.

No. 126603 that "Article 13 of PD 1083 does not provide for a situation where the
parties were married both in civil and Muslim rites."53
Moreover, the Muslim Code took effect only on February 4, 1977, and this law cannot
retroactively override the Civil Code which already bestowed certain rights on the
marriage of Sen. Tamano and Zorayda. The former explicitly provided for the
prospective application of its provisions unless otherwise provided:
Art. 186 (1). Effect of code on past acts. Acts executed prior to the effectivity of this
Code shall be governed by the laws in force at the time of their execution, and nothing
herein except as otherwise specifically provided, shall affect their validity or legality or
operate to extinguish any right acquired or liability incurred thereby.
It has been held that:
The foregoing provisions are consistent with the principle that all laws operate
prospectively, unless the contrary appears or is clearly, plainly and unequivocably
expressed or necessarily implied; accordingly, every case of doubt will be resolved
against the retroactive operation of laws. Article 186 aforecited enunciates the general
rule of the Muslim Code to have its provisions applied prospectively, and implicitly
upholds the force and effect of a pre-existing body of law, specifically, the Civil Code in
respect of civil acts that took place before the Muslim Codes enactment.54
An instance of retroactive application of the Muslim Code is Article 186(2) which states:
A marriage contracted by a Muslim male prior to the effectivity of this Code in
accordance with non-Muslim law shall be considered as one contracted under Muslim
law provided the spouses register their mutual desire to this effect.
Even granting that there was registration of mutual consent for the marriage to be
considered as one contracted under the Muslim law, the registration of mutual consent
between Zorayda and Sen. Tamano will still be ineffective, as both are Muslims whose
marriage was celebrated under both civil and Muslim laws. Besides, as we have already
settled, the Civil Code governs their personal status since this was in effect at the time
of the celebration of their marriage. In view of Sen. Tamanos prior marriage which
subsisted at the time Estrellita married him, their subsequent marriage is correctly
adjudged by the CA as void ab initio.
Zorayda and Adib, as the injured parties, have the legal personalities to file the
declaration of nullity of marriage. A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, which limits to only the
husband or the wife the filing of a petition for nullity is prospective in application and
does not shut out the prior spouse from filing suit if the ground is a bigamous
subsequent marriage.
Her marriage covered by the Family Code of the Philippines,55 Estrellita relies on A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC which took effect on March 15, 2003 claiming that under Section

2(a)56 thereof, only the husband or the wife, to the exclusion of others, may file a
petition for declaration of absolute nullity, therefore only she and Sen. Tamano may
directly attack the validity of their own marriage.
Estrellita claims that only the husband or the wife in a void marriage can file a petition
for declaration of nullity of marriage. However, this interpretation does not apply if the
reason behind the petition is bigamy.
In explaining why under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC only the spouses may file the petition to
the exclusion of compulsory or intestate heirs, we said:
The Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, Legal Separation and Provisional Orders explicates
on Section 2(a) in the following manner, viz:
(1) Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file petitions for annulment of voidable
marriages and declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such petitions cannot
be filed by the compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. [Section 2;
Section 3, paragraph a]
Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for annulment of voidable
marriages or declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such petition cannot be
filed by compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. The Committee is
of the belief that they do not have a legal right to file the petition. Compulsory or
intestate heirs have only inchoate rights prior to the death of their predecessor, and
hence can only question the validity of the marriage of the spouses upon the death of a
spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in
the regular courts. On the other hand, the concern of the State is to preserve marriage
and not to seek its dissolution.57
Note that the Rationale makes it clear that Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC refers
to the "aggrieved or injured spouse." If Estrellitas interpretation is employed, the prior
spouse is unjustly precluded from filing an action. Surely, this is not what the Rule
contemplated.
The subsequent spouse may only be expected to take action if he or she had only
discovered during the connubial period that the marriage was bigamous, and especially
if the conjugal bliss had already vanished. Should parties in a subsequent marriage
benefit from the bigamous marriage, it would not be expected that they would file an
action to declare the marriage void and thus, in such circumstance, the "injured spouse"
who should be given a legal remedy is the one in a subsisting previous marriage. The
latter is clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not only threatens the
financial and the property ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it
causes an emotional burden to the prior spouse. The subsequent marriage will always
be a reminder of the infidelity of the spouse and the disregard of the prior marriage
which sanctity is protected by the Constitution.

Indeed, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC precludes the son from impugning the
subsequent marriage.1wphi1 But in the case at bar, both Zorayda and Adib have legal
personalities to file an action for nullity. Albeit the Supreme Court Resolution governs
marriages celebrated under the Family Code, such is prospective in application and
does not apply to cases already commenced before March 15, 2003.58
Zorayda and Adib filed the case for declaration of nullity of Estrellitas marriage in
November 1994. While the Family Code is silent with respect to the proper party who
can file a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage prior to A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, it
has been held that in a void marriage, in which no marriage has taken place and cannot
be the source of rights, any interested party may attack the marriage directly or
collaterally without prescription, which may be filed even beyond the lifetime of the
parties to the marriage.59 Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply, Adib, as one of
the children of the deceased who has property rights as an heir, is likewise considered
to be the real party in interest in the suit he and his mother had filed since both of them
stand to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit.60
Since our Philippine laws protect the marital union of a couple, they should be
interpreted in a way that would preserve their respective rights which include striking
down bigamous marriages. We thus find the CA Decision correctly rendered.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed August 17, 2004 Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 61762, as well as its subsequent Resolution issued
on September 13, 2005, are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 193902

June 1, 2011

ATTY. MARIETTA D. ZAMORANOS, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and SAMSON R. PACASUM, SR., Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 193908
ATTY. MARIETTA D. ZAMORANOS, Petitioner,
vs.
SAMSON R. PACASUM, SR., Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 194075
SAMSON R. PACASUM, SR., Petitioner,
vs.
ATTY. MARIETTA D. ZAMORANOS, Respondent.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
These are three (3) consolidated petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, assailing the Decision1 dated July 30, 2010 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. SP No. 03525-MIN, dismissing the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner
Atty. Marietta D. Zamoranos (Zamoranos) in G.R. No. 193902, thus, affirming the
Order2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 6, Lanao del Norte, in Criminal Case
No. 06-12305 for Bigamy filed by petitioner Samson R. Pacasum, Sr. in G.R. No.
194075.
Before anything else, we disentangle the facts.
On May 3, 1982, Zamoranos wed Jesus de Guzman, a Muslim convert, in Islamic rites.
Prior thereto, Zamoranos was a Roman Catholic who had converted to Islam on April
28, 1982. Subsequently, on July 30, 1982, the two wed again, this time, in civil rites
before Judge Perfecto Laguio (Laguio) of the RTC, Quezon City.

A little after a year, on December 18, 1983, Zamoranos and De Guzman obtained a
divorce by talaq. The dissolution of their marriage was confirmed by the Sharia Circuit
District Court, 1st Circuit, 3rd District, Isabela, Basilan, which issued a Decree of
Divorce on June 18, 1992, as follows:
DECREE OF DIVORCE
This is a case for divorce filed by the herein complainant Marietta (Mariam) D.
Zamoranos de Guzman against her husband, the herein respondent, on the ground that
the wife, herein complainant, was previously given by her husband the authority to
exercise Talaq, as provided for and, in accordance with Presidential Decree No. 1083,
otherwise known as the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines.
When this case was called for hearing[,] both parties appeared and herein respondent,
Jesus (Mohamad) de Guzman[,] interposes no objection to confirm their divorce, which
they have freely entered into on December 18, 1983.
This Court, after evaluating the testimonies of the herein parties is fully convinced that
both the complainant and the respondent have been duly converted to the faith of Islam
prior to their Muslim wedding and finding that there is no more possibility of
reconciliation by and between them, hereby issues this decree of divorce.
WHEREFORE, premises considered and pursuant to the provisions of the Code of
Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, this petition is hereby granted. Consequently,
the marriage between Marietta (Mariam) D. Zamoranos de Guzman and Jesus
(Mohamad) de Guzman is hereby confirmed dissolved.
Issued this 18th day of June, 1992, at Isabela, Basilan Province, Philippines.
(signed)
HON. KAUDRI L. JAINUL
Presiding Judge3
Now it came to pass that Zamoranos married anew on December 20, 1989. As she had
previously done in her first nuptial to De Guzman, Zamoranos wed Samson Pacasum,
Sr. (Pacasum), her subordinate at the Bureau of Customs where she worked, under
Islamic rites in Balo-i, Lanao del Norte. Thereafter, on December 28, 1992, in order to
strengthen the ties of their marriage, Zamoranos and Pacasum renewed their marriage
vows in a civil ceremony before Judge Valerio Salazar of the RTC, Iligan City. However,
unlike in Zamoranos first marriage to De Guzman, the union between her and Pacasum
was blessed with progeny, namely: Samson, Sr., Sam Jean, and Sam Joon.

Despite their three children, the relationship between Zamoranos and Pacasum turned
sour and, in 1998, the two were de facto separated. The volatile relationship of
Zamoranos and Pacasum escalated into a bitter battle for custody of their minor
children. Eventually, on October 18, 1999, Zamoranos and Pacasum arrived at a
compromise agreement which vested primary custody of the children in the former, with
the latter retaining visitorial rights thereto.
As it turned out, the agreement rankled on Pacasum. He filed a flurry of cases against
Zamoranos, to wit:
1. Petition for Annulment of Marriage filed on March 31, 2003 before the RTC, Branch 2,
Iligan City, docketed as Civil Case No. 6249. Subsequently, on May 31, 2004, Pacasum
amended the petition into one for Declaration of a Void Marriage, alleging, among other
things, that: (a) Zamoranos, at the time of her marriage to Pacasum, was already
previously married to De Guzman on July 30, 1982; (b) Zamoranos first marriage,
solemnized before the RTC, Quezon City, presided over by Judge Laguio, subsisted at
the time of the celebration of Zamoranos and Pacasums marriage; (c) Zamoranos and
Pacasums marriage was bigamous and void ab initio; and (d) thus, Zamoranos, as the
guilty spouse, should forfeit: (i) custody of her minor children to their father, who should
have sole and exclusive custody; (ii) her share in the community property in favor of the
children; and (iii) her inheritance from Pacasum by testate or intestate succession.
2. Criminal complaint for Bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC),
filed on October 25, 2004.
3. Separate administrative cases for Zamoranos dismissal from service and disbarment
before the Civil Service Commission (CSC), the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and
the Bureau of Finance Revenue Integrity Protection Service, respectively.
Parenthetically, the administrative cases were dismissed in due course. However, as of
the date of the assailed CA Decision, Pacasums appeal from the CSCs dismissal of the
administrative case was still pending resolution.
Quite ironically, soon after amending his petition in Civil Case No. 6249, Pacasum
contracted a second marriage with Catherine Ang Dignos on July 18, 2004.4
Meanwhile, on the criminal litigation front, the Office of the City Prosecutor, through
Prosecutor Leonor Quiones, issued a resolution dated February 2, 2005, finding prima
facie evidence to hold Zamoranos liable for Bigamy.5 Consequently, on February 22,
2006, an Information for Bigamy was filed against Zamoranos before the RTC, Branch
6, Iligan City, docketed as Criminal Case No. 06-12305.6
Zamoranos filed a motion for reconsideration of the City Prosecutors February 2, 2005
resolution. As a result, the proceedings before the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, were
temporarily suspended. On April 29, 2005, the City Prosecutor of Ozamis City, the
acting City Prosecutor of Iligan City at the time, issued a resolution granting Zamoranos
motion for reconsideration and dismissing the charge of Bigamy against Zamoranos.7

Not unexpectedly, Pacasum moved for reconsideration of the April 29, 2005 resolution
of the City Prosecutor, which was denied in a resolution dated August 15, 2005.8
Posthaste, Pacasum filed a Petition for Review before the Office of the Secretary of
Justice, assailing the dismissal of his criminal complaint for Bigamy against
Zamoranos.9
In yet another turn of events, the Secretary of Justice, on February 7, 2006, issued a
resolution granting Pacasums Petition for Review and reversed the February 2, 2005
and April 29, 2005 resolutions of the City Prosecutor.10 Zamoranos immediately filed an
Omnibus Motion and Supplement to the Urgent Omnibus Motion: (1) for
Reconsideration; (2) to Hold in Abeyance Filing of the Instant Case; and (3) to Hold in
Abeyance or Quash Warrant of Arrest, respectively dated February 20, 2006 and
February 24, 2006, before the Secretary of Justice.11 Unfortunately for Zamoranos, her
twin motions were denied by the Secretary of Justice in a resolution dated May 17,
2006.12
Zamoranos second motion for reconsideration, as with her previous motions, was
likewise denied.
On the other civil litigation front on the Declaration of a Void Marriage, docketed as Civil
Case No. 6249, the RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, rendered a decision in favor of
Zamoranos, dismissing the petition of Pacasum for lack of jurisdiction. The RTC, Branch
2, Iligan City, found that Zamoranos and De Guzman are Muslims, and were such at the
time of their marriage, whose marital relationship was governed by Presidential Decree
(P.D.) No. 1083, otherwise known as the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the
Philippines:
From the foregoing uncontroverted facts, the Court finds that the allegation of
[Pacasum] to the effect that his marriage with [Zamoranos] on December 28, 1992 is a
bigamous marriage due to the alleged subsisting previous marriage between
[Zamoranos] and Jesus de Guzman is misplaced. The previous marriage between
Jesus de Guzman and [Zamoranos] has long been terminated [and] has gone with the
wind. The fact that divorce by Talaq was entered into by [Zamoranos] and her first
husband in accordance with PD 1083, x x x their marriage is dissolved and
consequently thereof, [Zamoranos] and Jesus de Guzman can re-marry. Moreover, the
second marriage entered into by [Zamoranos] and her first husband Jesus de Guzman
under the Family Code on July 30, 1982 is merely ceremonial, being unnecessary, it
does not modify/alter or change the validity of the first marriage entered into by them
under PD 1083.
Likewise, in the case of [Pacasum] and [Zamoranos], their second marriage on
December 28, 1992 under the Family Code does not in any way modify, alter or change
the validity of the first marriage on December 20, 1989 entered into by [Pacasum] and
[Zamoranos] under PD 1083, as amended. In fact, according to Ghazali, one of the
renowned Muslim author and jurist in Islamic Law and Jurisprudence and concurred in

by retired Justice Ra[s]ul of the Court of Appeals and also a Professor on Islamic Law
and Jurisprudence, in the case of combined marriage[s], the first marriage is to be
considered valid and effective as between the parties while the second marriage is
merely ceremonial, being a surplusage and unnecessary. Therefore, the divorce by
Talaq dissolved the marriage between [Zamoranos] and her first husband[,de Guzman,]
being governed by PD 1083, x x x.
Article 13, Chapter I, Title II of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws, provides x x x:
"Application
The provisions of this title shall apply to marriage and divorce wherein both parties are
Muslims[,] or wherein only the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in
accordance with Muslim law or this Code in any part of the Philippines."
Accordingly, matters relating to the marriages and divorce of [Zamoranos] and her first
husband, Jesus de Guzman[,] shall be governed by the Muslim Code and divorce
proceedings shall be properly within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sharia
Circuit Court.
Art. 155, Chapter 2, Title II, Book 4 of the Muslim code, provides x x x:
"Jurisdiction The Sharia Circuit Courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over:
xxxx
2. All civil actions and proceedings between parties who are Muslims or have been
married in accordance with Article 13 involving disputes relating to:
a) Marriage;
b) Divorce recognized under this Code;
x x x x"
The above provision of law clearly shows no concurrent jurisdiction with any civil courts
or other courts of law. And any divorce proceeding undertaken before the Shari[a] Court
is valid, recognized, binding and sufficient divorce proceedings.
Moreover, the instant case is one of the several cases filed by [Pacasum] against
[Zamoranos] such as complaints for disbarment, for immorality, for bigamy and
misconduct before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) and in the Civil Service
Commission which were all similar or [based on] the same set of facts. A pure and
simple harassment.

In the light of the foregoing findings, the Court is of the considered view and so hold that
this Court has no jurisdiction to hear and decide the above-entitled case for annulment
of marriage entered into under PD 1083, x x x. It is the Sharia Circuit Court that has the
exclusive original jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the affirmative defenses which are in the nature of
motion to dismiss is hereby granted.
The above-entitled case is hereby dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED.13
On separate appeals, the CA and the Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of Civil
Case No. 6249 by the RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City. On April 3, 2009, the denial by the
Supreme Court of Pacasums appeal became final and executory and was recorded in
the Book of Entries of Judgments.14
In the meantime, on August 7, 2009, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, upon motion of
Pacasum, issued an Order reinstating Criminal Case No. 06-12305 for Bigamy against
Zamoranos.15
Not surprisingly, Zamoranos filed a Motion to Quash the Information, arguing that the
RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, had no jurisdiction over her person and over the offense
charged. Zamoranos asseverated, in the main, that the decision of the RTC, Branch 2,
Iligan City, in Civil Case No. 6249 categorically declared her and Pacasum as Muslims,
resulting in the mootness of Criminal Case No. 06-12305 and the inapplicability of the
RPC provision on Bigamy to her marriage to Pacasum. In all, Zamoranos claimed that
Criminal Case No. 06-12305 ought to be dismissed.16
On December 21, 2009, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, denied Zamoranos Motion to
Quash the Information. Zamoranos motion for reconsideration thereof was likewise
denied.17
Undaunted, Zamoranos filed a petition for certiorari for the nullification and reversal of
the December 21, 2009 Order of the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City. As previously adverted
to, the CA dismissed Zamoranos petition. The CA dwelt on the propriety of a petition for
certiorari to assail the denial of a Motion to Quash the Information:
A petition for certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion is an extraordinary remedy. As
such, it is confined to extraordinary cases wherein the action of the inferior court is
wholly void. The aim of certiorari is to keep the inferior court within the parameters of its
jurisdiction. Hence, no grave abuse of discretion may be imputed to a court on the basis
alone of an alleged misappreciation of facts and evidence. To prosper, a petition for
certiorari must clearly demonstrate that the lower court blatantly abused its authority to
a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice.

Simply put, in a petition for certiorari, the jurisdiction of the appellate court is narrow in
scope. It is limited to resolving only errors of jurisdiction. It is not to stray at will and
resolve questions or issues beyond its competence, such as an error of judgment which
is defined as one in which the court or quasi-judicial body may commit in the exercise of
its jurisdiction; as opposed to an error of jurisdiction where the acts complained of were
issued without or in excess of jurisdiction.
xxxx
In the present case, [w]e have circumspectly examined [Zamoranos] Motion to Quash
Information and the action taken by the [RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City] in respect thereto,
and [w]e found nothing that may constitute as grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the [RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City]. The Order dated December 21, 2009, which first denied
[Zamoranos] [M]otion to [Q]uash Information meticulously explained the factual and
legal basis for the denial of the issues raised by [Zamoranos] in said motion. We find the
[RTC, Branch 6, Iligan Citys] stance in upholding the sufficiency of the Information for
bigamy and taking cognizance of Criminal Case No. 06-12305 to be well within the
bounds of its jurisdiction. Even assuming arguendo that the denial of petitioners motion
to quash is erroneous, such error was, at worst, an error of judgment and not of
jurisdiction.18
Interestingly, even Pacasum was not satisfied with the CAs dismissal of Zamoranos
petition for certiorari. Hence, these separate appeals by Zamoranos and Pacasum.
We note that Zamoranos is petitioner in two separate cases, filed by her two counsels,
docketed as G.R. Nos. 193902 and 193908, respectively, which assail the same CA
Decision. However, upon motion of counsel for Zamoranos, to obviate confusion and
superfluity, we have allowed Zamoranos to withdraw her petition in G.R. No. 193908
and for her earlier petition in G.R. No. 193902 to remain.
Zamoranos posits that it was grievous error for the CA to ignore the conclusions made
by the RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, and affirmed by the CA and this Court, to wit:
1. Zamoranos is a Muslim and was validly married to another Muslim, De Guzman,
under Islamic rites;
2. Zamoranos and De Guzmans marriage ceremony under civil rites before Judge
Laguio did not remove their marriage from the ambit of P.D. No. 1083;
3. Corollary to paragraph 1, Zamoranos divorce by talaq to De Guzman severed their
marriage ties;
4. "Accordingly, matters relating to the marriages and divorce of [Zamoranos] and her
first husband, Jesus de Guzman[, are] governed by the Muslim Code and [the] divorce
proceedings properly within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sharia Circuit
Court."

5. Zamoranos remarried Pacasum, another Muslim, under Islamic rites; and

6. On the whole, regular courts, in particular, RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, have no
jurisdiction to hear and decide the case for declaration of nullity of marriage entered into
under P.D. No. 1083 because it is the Sharia Circuit Court that has original jurisdiction
over the subject matter.
For his part, Pacasum, although he agrees with the dismissal of Zamoranos petition,
raises a quarrel with the aforementioned conclusions of the CA. Pacasum vehemently
denies that Zamoranos is a Muslim, who was previously married and divorced under
Islamic rites, and who entered into a second marriage with him, likewise under Islamic
rites.
We impale the foregoing issues into the following:
1. Whether the CA correctly dismissed Zamoranos petition for certiorari; and
2. Whether the RTCs, Branch 2, Iligan City and the CAs separate factual findings that
Zamoranos is a Muslim are correct.
As a rule, certiorari lies when: (1) a tribunal, board, or officer exercises judicial or quasijudicial functions; (2) the tribunal, board, or officer has acted without or in excess of its
or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law.19
The writ of certiorari serves to keep an inferior court within the bounds of its jurisdiction
or to prevent it from committing such a grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess
or lack of jurisdiction, or to relieve parties from arbitrary acts of courtsacts which
courts have no power or authority in law to perform.20
The denial of a motion to quash, as in the case at bar, is not appealable. It is an
interlocutory order which cannot be the subject of an appeal.21
Moreover, it is settled that a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition is not the
proper remedy to assail the denial of a motion to quash an information. The established
rule is that, when such an adverse interlocutory order is rendered, the remedy is not to
resort forthwith to certiorari or prohibition, but to continue with the case in due course
and, when an unfavorable verdict is handed down, to take an appeal in the manner
authorized by law.22
However, on a number of occasions, we have recognized that in certain situations,
certiorari is considered an appropriate remedy to assail an interlocutory order,
specifically the denial of a motion to quash. We have recognized the propriety of the
following exceptions: (a) when the court issued the order without or in excess of

jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion; (b) when the interlocutory order is patently
erroneous and the remedy of appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious relief;
(c) in the interest of a "more enlightened and substantial justice";23 (d) to promote
public welfare and public policy;24 and (e) when the cases "have attracted nationwide
attention, making it essential to proceed with dispatch in the consideration thereof."25
The first four of the foregoing exceptions occur in this instance.
Contrary to the asseverations of the CA, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, committed an
error of jurisdiction, not simply an error of judgment, in denying Zamoranos motion to
quash.
First, we dispose of the peripheral issue raised by Zamoranos on the conclusiveness of
judgment made by the RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, which heard the petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage filed by Pacasum on the ground that his marriage to
Zamoranos was a bigamous marriage. In that case, the decision of which is already
final and executory, the RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, dismissed the petition for declaration
of nullity of marriage for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter by the regular civil
courts. The RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, declared that it was the Sharia Circuit Court
which had jurisdiction over the subject matter thereof.
Section 47, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides for the principle of res judicata. The
provision reads:
SEC. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. The effect of a judgment or final order
rendered by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or
final order, may be as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or final order against a specific thing, or in respect to the
probate of a will, or the administration of the estate of a deceased person, or in respect
to the personal, political, or legal condition or status of a particular person or his
relationship to another, the judgment or final order is conclusive upon the title to the
thing, the will or administration, or the condition, status or relationship of the person;
however, the probate of a will or granting of letters of administration shall only be prima
facie evidence of the death of the testator or intestate.
The requisites for res judicata or bar by prior judgment are:
(1) The former judgment or order must be final;
(2) It must be a judgment on the merits;
(3) It must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter
and the parties; and
(4) There must be between the first and second actions, identity of parties, subject
matter, and cause of action.26

The second and fourth elements of res judicata are not present in this case. Suffice it to
state that the judgment rendered by RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, was not a judgment on
the merits. The lower court simply dismissed the petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage since it found that the Sharia Circuit Court had jurisdiction to hear the
dissolution of the marriage of Muslims who wed under Islamic rites.
Nonetheless, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, which heard the case for Bigamy, should
have taken cognizance of the categorical declaration of the RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City,
that Zamoranos is a Muslim, whose first marriage to another Muslim, De Guzman, was
valid and recognized under Islamic law. In fact, the same court further declared that
Zamoranos divorce from De Guzman validly severed their marriage ties. Apart from
that, Zamoranos presented the following evidence:
1. Affidavit of Confirmation27 executed by the Ustadz, Abdullah Ha-Ja-Utto, who
solemnized the marriage of Zamoranos and De Guzman under Islamic rites, declaring
under oath that:
1. I am an Ustadz, in accordance with the Muslim laws and as such, authorized to
solemnize the marriages among Muslims;
2. On May 3, 1982, after I was shown the documents attesting that both parties are
believers of Islam, I solemnized the marriage of Jesus (Mohamad) de Guzman and
Marietta (Mariam) Zamoranos in accordance with Muslim Personal Laws in Isabela,
Basilan;
3. Sometime in 1992[,] Mr. Mohamad de Guzman and his former wife, Mariam
Zamoranos came to see me and asked my assistance to have their marriage and the
subsequent Talaq by the wife, which divorce became irrevocable pursuant to the
provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1083; registered [by] the Sharia Circuit Court in
the province of Basilan; and, after I was convinced that their divorce was in order, I
accompanied them to the [C]lerk of [C]ourt of the Sharia Circuit Court;
4. Satisfied that their marriage and the subsequent divorce were in accordance with
Muslim personal laws, the Clerk of Court registered their documents;
5. In June of 1993, the old Capitol building, where the Sharia Circuit Court was housed,
was razed to the ground; and, I found out later that all the records, effects and office
equipments of the Sharia Circuit Court were totally lost [in] the fire;
6. This is executed freely and voluntarily in order to establish the above statements of
fact; and
7. This is issued upon the request of Mr. De Guzman for whatever legal purposes it may
serve.

2. Certification28 issued by Judge Kaudri L. Jainul (Judge Jainul), which confirmed the
divorce agreement between Zamoranos and De Guzman.
3. Affidavit29 executed by Judge Uyag P. Usman (Judge Usman), former Clerk of Court
of Judge Jainul at the time of the confirmation of Zamoranos and De Guzmans divorce
agreement by the latter. Judge Usmans affidavit reads, in pertinent part:
1. I am the presiding Judge of the Sharias Circuit Court in the City of Pagadian;
2. The first time that a Sharias Circuit court was established in the Island Province of
Basilan was in 1985, with the Honorable Kaudri L. Jainul, as the Presiding Judge, while
I was then the First Clerk of Court of the Basilan Sharias Circuit Court;
3. The Sharias Circuit Council in the Island Province of Basilan was housed at the old
Capitol Building, in the City of Isabela, Basilan, Philippines;
4. As the Clerk of Court of the Sharias Circuit Court since 1985, I can recall that in
1992, Mr. Jesus (Mohamad) de Guzman, who is a province mate of mine in Basilan,
and his former wife, Marietta (Mariam) Zamoranos, jointly asked for the confirmation of
their Talaq, by the wife; which divorce became irrevocable pursuant to the provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 1083;
5. In June of 1993, all the records of the Sharias Circuit Court were lost by reason of
the fire that gutted down the old Capitol Building in the City of Isabela;
6. This is executed freely and voluntarily in order to establish the above statements of
fact.
From the foregoing declarations of all three persons in authority, two of whom are
officers of the court, it is evident that Zamoranos is a Muslim who married another
Muslim, De Guzman, under Islamic rites. Accordingly, the nature, consequences, and
incidents of such marriage are governed by P.D. No. 1083.
True, the Sharia Circuit Court is not vested with jurisdiction over offenses penalized
under the RPC. Certainly, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, is correct when it declared
that:
The Regional Trial Courts are vested the exclusive and original jurisdiction in all criminal
cases not within the exclusive original jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, or body. [Sec.
20 (b), BP Blg. 129] The Code of Muslim Personal Laws (PD 1083) created the Sharia
District Courts and Sharia Circuit Courts with limited jurisdiction. Neither court was
vested jurisdiction over criminal prosecution of violations of the Revised Penal Code.
There is nothing in PD 1083 that divested the Regional Trial Courts of its jurisdiction to
try and decide cases of bigamy. Hence, this Court has jurisdiction over this case.30

Nonetheless, it must be pointed out that even in criminal cases, the trial court must have
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the offense. In this case, the charge of Bigamy
hinges on Pacasums claim that Zamoranos is not a Muslim, and her marriage to De
Guzman was governed by civil law. This is obviously far from the truth, and the fact of
Zamoranos Muslim status should have been apparent to both lower courts, the RTC,
Branch 6, Iligan City, and the CA.
The subject matter of the offense of Bigamy dwells on the accused contracting a second
marriage while a prior valid one still subsists and has yet to be dissolved. At the very
least, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, should have suspended the proceedings until
Pacasum had litigated the validity of
Zamoranos and De Guzmans marriage before the Sharia Circuit Court and had
successfully shown that it had not been dissolved despite the divorce by talaq entered
into by Zamoranos and De Guzman.
Zamoranos was correct in filing the petition for certiorari before the CA when her liberty
was already in jeopardy with the continuation of the criminal proceedings against her.
In a pluralist society such as that which exists in the Philippines, P.D. No. 1083, or the
Code of Muslim Personal Laws, was enacted to "promote the advancement and
effective participation of the National Cultural Communities x x x, [and] the State shall
consider their customs, traditions, beliefs and interests in the formulation and
implementation of its policies."
Trying Zamoranos for Bigamy simply because the regular criminal courts have
jurisdiction over the offense defeats the purpose for the enactment of the Code of
Muslim Personal Laws and the equal recognition bestowed by the State on Muslim
Filipinos.
Article 3, Title II, Book One of P.D. No. 1083 provides:
TITLE II.
CONSTRUCTION OF CODE AND DEFINITION OF TERMS
Article 3. Conflict of provisions.
(1) In case of conflict between any provision of this Code and laws of general
application, the former shall prevail.
(2) Should the conflict be between any provision of this Code and special laws or laws
of local application, the latter shall be liberally construed in order to carry out the former.
(3) The provisions of this Code shall be applicable only to Muslims and nothing herein
shall be construed to operate to the prejudice of a non-Muslim.

In Justice Jainal Rasul and Dr. Ibrahim Ghazalis Commentaries and Jurisprudence on
the Muslim Code of the Philippines, the two experts on the subject matter of Muslim
personal laws expound thereon:
The first provision refers to a situation where in case of conflict between any provision of
this Code and laws of general application, this Code shall prevail. For example, there is
conflict between the provision on bigamy under the Revised Penal Code which is a law
of general application and Article 27 of this Code, on subsequent marriage, the latter
shall prevail, in the sense that as long as the subsequent marriage is solemnized "in
accordance with" the Muslim Code, the provision of the Revised Penal Code on bigamy
will not apply. The second provision refers to a conflict between the provision of this
Code which is a special law and another special law or laws of local application. The
latter should be liberally construed to carry out the provision of the Muslim Code.31
On Marriage, Divorce, and Subsequent Marriages, P.D. No. 1083 provides:
TITLE II. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE
Chapter One
APPLICABILITY CLAUSE
Article 13. Application.
(1) The provisions of this Title shall apply to marriage and divorce wherein both parties
are Muslims, or wherein only the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is solemnized
in accordance with Muslim law or this Code in any part of the Philippines.
(2) In case of marriage between a Muslim and a non-Muslim, solemnized not in
accordance with Muslim law or this Code, the Civil Code of the Philippines shall apply.
xxxx
Chapter Two
MARRIAGE (NIKAH)
Section 1. Requisites of Marriage.
xxxx
Section 3. Subsequent Marriages
xxxx
Article 29. By divorcee.

(1) No woman shall contract a subsequent marriage unless she has observed an idda
of three monthly courses counted from the date of divorce. However, if she is pregnant
at the time of the divorce, she may remarry only after delivery.
xxxx
Chapter Three
DIVORCE (TALAQ)
Section 1. Nature and Form
Article 45. Definition and forms. Divorce is the formal dissolution of the marriage bond in
accordance with this Code to be granted only after the exhaustion of all possible means
of reconciliation between the spouses. It may be effected by:
(a) Repudiation of the wife by the husband (talaq);
xxxx
Article 46. Divorce by talaq.
(1) A divorce by talaq may be effected by the husband in a single repudiation of his wife
during her non-menstrual period (tuhr) within which he has totally abstained from carnal
relation with her. Any number of repudiations made during one tular shall constitute only
one repudiation and shall become irrevocable after the expiration of the prescribed
idda.
(2) A husband who repudiates his wife, either for the first or second time, shall have the
right to take her back (ruju) within the prescribed idda by resumption of cohabitation
without need of a new contract of marriage. Should he fail to do so, the repudiation shall
become irrevocable (talaq bain sugra).
xxxx
Article 54. Effects of irrevocable talaq; or faskh. A talaq or faskh, as soon as it becomes
irrevocable, shall have the following effects:
(a) The marriage bond shall be severed and the spouses may contract another
marriage in accordance with this Code;
(b) The spouses shall lose their mutual rights of inheritance;
(c) The custody of children shall be determined in accordance with Article 78 of this
Code;

(d) The wife shall be entitled to recover from the husband her whole dower in case the
talaq has been effected after the consummation of the marriage, or one-half thereof if
effected before its consummation;
(e) The husband shall not be discharged from his obligation to give support in
accordance with Article 67; and
(f) The conjugal partnership if stipulated in the marriage settlements, shall be dissolved
and liquidated.
For our edification, we refer once again to Justice Rasul and Dr. Ghazalis
Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Muslim Code of the Philippines:
If both parties are Muslims, there is a presumption that the Muslim Code or Muslim law
is complied with. If together with it or in addition to it, the marriage is likewise
solemnized in accordance with the Civil Code of the Philippines, in a so-called
combined Muslim-Civil marriage rites whichever comes first is the validating rite and the
second rite is merely ceremonial one. But, in this case, as long as both parties are
Muslims, this Muslim Code will apply. In effect, two situations will arise, in the
application of this Muslim Code or Muslim law, that is, when both parties are Muslims
and when the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in accordance with
Muslim Code or Muslim law. A third situation occur[s] when the Civil Code of the
Philippines will govern the marriage and divorce of the parties, if the male party is a
Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in accordance with the Civil Code.32
Moreover, the two experts, in the same book, unequivocally state that one of the effects
of irrevocable talaq, as well as other kinds of divorce, refers to severance of matrimonial
bond, entitling one to remarry.331avvphi1
It stands to reason therefore that Zamoranos divorce from De Guzman, as confirmed by
an Ustadz and Judge Jainul of the Sharia Circuit Court, and attested to by Judge
Usman, was valid, and, thus, entitled her to remarry Pacasum in 1989. Consequently,
the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, is without jurisdiction to try Zamoranos for the crime of
Bigamy.
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 193902 is GRANTED. The petition in G.R. No.
194075 is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 03525-MIN
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Motion to Quash the Information in
Criminal Case No. 06-12305 for Bigamy is GRANTED.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 191425

September 7, 2011

ATILANO O. NOLLORA, JR., Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
G.R. No. 191425 is a petition for review1 assailing the Decision2 promulgated on 30
September 2009 as well as the Resolution3 promulgated on 23 February 2010 by the
Court of Appeals (appellate court) in CA-G.R. CR No. 31538. The appellate court
affirmed the 19 November 2007 Decision4 of Branch 215 of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City (trial court) in Criminal Case No. Q-04-129031.
The trial court found accused Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. (Nollora) guilty of bigamy under
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code and sentenced him to suffer imprisonment. Coaccused Rowena Geraldino (Geraldino) was acquitted for the prosecutions failure to
prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The Facts
The appellate court recited the facts as follows:
On August 24, 2004, Assistant City Prosecutor Raymond Jonathan B. Lledo filed an
Information against Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. ("Nollora") and Rowena P. Geraldino
("Geraldino") for the crime of Bigamy. The accusatory portion of the Information reads:
"That on or about the 8th day of December 2001 in Quezon City, Philippines, the abovenamed accused ATILANO O. NOLLORA, JR., being then legally married to one
JESUSA PINAT NOLLORA, and as said marriage has not been legally dissolved and
still subsisting, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a
subsequent or second marriage with her [sic] co-accused ROWENA P. GERALDINO,
who knowingly consented and agreed to be married to her co-accused ATILANO O.
NOLLORA, JR. knowing him to be a married man, to the damage and prejudice of the
said offended party JESUSA PINAT NOLLORA."

Upon his arraignment on April 18, 2005, accused Nollora assisted by counsel, refused
to enter his plea. Hence, a plea of not guilty was entered by the Court for him. Accused
Geraldino, on the other hand, entered a plea of not guilty when arraigned on June 14,
2005. On even date, pre-trial conference was held and both the prosecution and
defense entered the following stipulation of facts:
"1. the validity of the first marriage between Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. and Jesusa Pinat
Nollora solemnized on April 6, 1999 at Sapang Palay, San Jose del Monte;
2. that Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. contracted the second marriage with Rowena P. Geraldino
on December 8, 2001 in Quezon City;
3. that in the Counter-Affidavit of Atilano O. Nollora, Jr., he admitted that he contracted
the second marriage to Rowena P. Geraldino;
4. that Rowena P. Geraldino attached to her Counter-Affidavit the Certificate of Marriage
with Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. dated December 8, 2001;
5. the fact of marriage of Rowena P. Geraldino with Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. as admitted in
her Counter-Affidavit."
The only issue thus proffered by the prosecution for the RTCs resolution is whether or
not the second marriage is bigamous. Afterwards, pre-trial conference was terminated
and the case was set for initial hearing. Thereafter, trial ensued.
Evidence for the Prosecution
As culled from the herein assailed Decision, the respective testimonies of prosecution
witnesses were as follows:
"xxx (W)itness Jesusa Pinat Nollora xxx testified that she and accused Atilano O.
Nollora, Jr. met in Saudi Arabia while she was working there as a Staff Midwife in King
Abdulah Naval Base Hospital. Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. courted her and on April 6, 1999,
they got married at the [IE]MELIF Chruch [sic] in Sapang Palay, San Jose del Monte,
Bulacan (Exhibit A). While working in said hospital, she heard rumors that her husband
has another wife and because of anxiety and emotional stress, she left Saudi Arabia
and returned to the Philippines (TSN, October 4, 2005, page 10). Upon arrival in the
Philippines, the private complainant learned that indeed, Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.
contracted a second marriage with co-accused Rowena P. Geraldino on December 8,
2001 (Exhibit B) when she secured a certification as to the civil status of Atilano O.
Nollora, Jr. (Exhibit C) from the National Statistics Office (NSO) sometime in November
2003.
Upon learning this information, the private complainant confronted Rowena P. Geraldino
at the latters workplace in CBW, FTI, Taguig and asked her if she knew of the first
marriage between complainant and Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. to which Rowena P. Geraldino

allegedly affirmed and despite this knowledge, she allegedly still married Atilano O.
Nollora, Jr. because she loves him so much and because they were neighbors and
childhood friends. Private complainant also knew that Rowena P. Geraldino knew of her
marriage with Atilano O. Nollora, Jr., because when she (private complainant) was
brought by Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. at the latters residence in Taguig, Metro Manila and
introduced her to Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.s parents, Rowena P. Geraldino was there in the
house together with a friend and she heard everything that they were talking about.
Because of this case, private complainant was not able to return to Saudi Arabia to work
as a Staff Midwife thereby losing income opportunity in the amount of P34,000.00 a
month, more or less. When asked about the moral damages she suffered, she declared
that what happened to her was a tragedy and she had entertained [thoughts] of
committing suicide. She added that because of what happened to her, her mother died
and she almost got raped when Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. left her alone in their residence in
Saudi Arabia. However, she declared that money is not enough to assuage her
sufferings. Instead, she just asked for the return of her money in the amount of
P50,000.00 (TSN, July 26, 2005, pages 4-14).
Prosecution witness Ruth Santos testified that she knew of the marriage between the
private complainant and Atilano O. Nollora, Jr., because she was one of the sponsors in
said wedding. Sometime in November 2003, she was asked by the private complainant
to accompany the latter to the workplace of Rowena P. Geraldino in FTI, Taguig, Metro
Manila. She declared that the private complainant and Rowena P. Geraldino had a
confrontation and she heard that Rowena P. Geraldino admitted that she (Rowena)
knew of the first marriage of Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. and the private complainant but she
still went on to marry Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. because she loves him very much (TSN,
October 24, 2005, pages 3-5).
Evidence for the Defense
The defenses version of facts, as summarized in the herein assailed Decision, is as
follows:
"Accused Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. admitted having contracted two (2) marriages, the first
with private complainant Jesusa Pinat and the second with Rowena P. Geraldino. He,
however, claimed that he was a Muslim convert way back on January 10, 1992, even
before he contracted the first marriage with the private complainant. As a [M]uslim
convert, he is allegedly entitled to marry four (4) wives as allowed under the Muslim or
Islam belief.
To prove that he is a Muslim convert even prior to his marriage to the private
complainant, Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. presented a Certificate of Conversion dated August
2, 2004 issued by one Hadji Abdul Kajar Madueo and approved by one Khad Ibrahim
A. Alyamin wherein it is stated that Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. allegedly converted as a
Muslim since January 19, 1992 (Exhibit 2, 3 and 4). Aside from said certificate, he

also presented a Pledge of Conversion dated January 10, 1992 issued by the same
Hadji Abdul Kajar Madueo and approved by one Khad Ibrahim A. Alyamin (Exhibit 7).
He claimed that the private complaint knew that he was a Muslim convert prior to their
marriage because she [sic] told this fact when he was courting her in Saudi Arabia and
the reason why said private complainant filed the instant case was due to hatred having
learned of his second marriage with Rowena P. Geraldino. She [sic] further testified that
Rowena P. Geraldino was not aware of his first marriage with the private complainant
and he did not tell her this fact because Rowena P. Geraldino is a Catholic and he does
not want to lose her if she learns of his first marriage.
He explained that in his Marriage Contract with Jesusa Pinat, it is indicated that he was
a Catholic Pentecostal but that he was not aware why it was placed as such on said
contract. In his Marriage Contract with Rowena P. Geraldino, the religion Catholic was
also indicated because he was keeping as a secret his being a Muslim since the society
does not approve of marrying a Muslim. He also indicated that he was single despite
his first marriage to keep said first marriage a secret (TSN, January 30, 2006, pages 213).
Defense witness Hadji Abdul Qasar Madueo testified that he is the founder and
president of Balik Islam Tableegh Foundation of the Philippines and as such president,
he has the power and authority to convert any applicant to the Muslim religion. He
alleged that sometime in 1992, he met accused Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. in Mabini (Manila)
who was then going abroad. Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. applied to become a Muslim (Exhibit
14) and after receiving the application, said accused was indoctrinated regarding his
obligations as a Muslim. On January 10, 1992, Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. embraced the
Muslim faith. He was then directed to report every Sunday to monitor his development.
In the year 2004, Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. visited him and asked for a certification because
of the filing of the instant case. On October 2, 2004, he issued a Certificate of
Conversion wherein it is stated that Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. is a Muslim convert since
January 10, 1992. Apart from the above-mentioned document, their Imam also issued
a Pledge of Conversion (Exhibit 7). He declared that a Muslim convert could marry
more than one according to the Holy Koran. However, before marrying his second, third
and fourth wives, it is required that the consent of the first Muslim wife be secured.
Thus, if the first wife is not a Muslim, there is no necessity to secure her consent (TSN,
October 9, 2006, pages 2-12).
During his cross-examinations, he declared that if a Muslim convert gets married not in
accordance with the Muslim faith, the same is contrary to the teachings of the Muslim
faith. A Muslim also can marry up to four times but he should be able to treat them
equally. He claimed that he was not aware of the first marriage but was aware of the
second. Since his second marriage with Rowena P. Geraldino was not in accordance
with the Muslim faith, he advised Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. to re-marry Rowena P. Geraldino
in accordance with Muslim marriage celebration, otherwise, he will not be considered as
a true Muslim (TSN, June 25, 2007, pages 3-7).

Accused Rowena P. Geraldino alleged that she was only a victim in this incident of
bigamous marriage. She claimed that she does not know the private complainant
Jesusa Pinat Nollora and only came to know her when this case was filed. She insists
that she is the one lawfully married to Atilano O. Nollora, Jr., having been married to the
latter since December 8, 2001. Upon learning that Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. contracted a
first marriage with the private complainant, she confronted the former who admitted the
said marriage. Prior to their marriage, she asked Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. if he was single
and the latter responded that he was single. She also knew that her husband was a
Catholic prior to their marriage but after she learned of the first marriage of her
husband, she learned that he is a Muslim convert. She also claimed that after learning
that her husband was a Muslim convert, she and Atilano O. Nollora, Jr., also got married
in accordance with the Muslim rites. She also belied the allegations of the private
complainant that she was sought by the private complainant and that they had a
confrontation where she admitted that she knew that Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. was married
to the private complainant and despite this knowledge, she went on to marry him
because she loved him very much. She insisted that she only came to know the private
complainant when she (private complainant) filed this case (TSN, August 14, 2007,
pages 2-8)."5
The Trial Courts Ruling
In its Decision6 dated 19 November 2007, the trial court convicted Nollora and acquitted
Geraldino.
The trial court stated that there are only two exceptions to prosecution for bigamy:
Article 417 of the Family Code, or Executive Order No. 209, and Article 1808 of the
Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, or Presidential Decree No. 1083. The
trial court also cited Article 27 of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines,
which provides the qualifications for allowing Muslim men to have more than one wife:
"[N]o Muslim male can have more than one wife unless he can deal with them in equal
companionship and just treatment as enjoined by Islamic Law and only in exceptional
cases."
In convicting Nollora, the trial courts Decision further stated thus:
The principle in Islam is that monogamy is the general rule and polygamy is allowed
only to meet urgent needs. Only with the permission of the court can a Muslim be
permitted to have a second wife subject to certain requirements. This is because having
plurality of wives is merely tolerated, not encouraged, under certain circumstances
(Muslim Law on Personal Status in the Philippines by Amer M. Bara-acal and
Abdulmajid J. Astir, 1998 First Edition, Pages 64-65). Arbitration is necessary. Any
Muslim husband desiring to contract subsequent marriages, before so doing, shall notify
the Sharia Circuit Court of the place where his family resides. The clerk of court shall
serve a copy thereof to the wife or wives. Should any of them objects [sic]; an Agama
Arbitration Council shall be constituted. If said council fails to secure the wifes consent

to the proposed marriage, the Court shall, subject to Article 27, decide whether on [sic]
not to sustain her objection (Art. 162, Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines).
Accused Atilano Nollora, Jr., in marrying his second wife, co-accused Rowena P.
Geraldino, did not comply with the above-mentioned provision of the law. In fact, he did
not even declare that he was a Muslim convert in both marriages, indicating his criminal
intent. In his converting to the Muslim faith, said accused entertained the mistaken belief
that he can just marry anybody again after marrying the private complainant. What is
clear, therefore, is [that] a Muslim is not given an unbridled right to just marry anybody
the second, third or fourth time. There are requirements that the Sharia law imposes,
that is, he should have notified the Sharia Court where his family resides so that copy
of said notice should be furnished to the first wife. The argument that notice to the first
wife is not required since she is not a Muslim is of no moment. This obligation to notify
the said court rests upon accused Atilano Nollora, Jr. It is not for him to interpret the
Sharia law. It is the Sharia Court that has this authority.
In an apparent attempt to escape criminal liability, the accused recelebrated their
marriage in accordance with the Muslim rites. However, this can no longer cure the
criminal liability that has already been violated.
The Court, however, finds criminal liability on the person of accused Atilano Nollora, Jr.,
only. There is no sufficient evidence that would pin accused Rowena P. Geraldino down.
The evidence presented by the prosecution against her is the allegation that she knew
of the first marriage between private complainant and Atilano Nollora, Jr., is
insufficient[,] being open to several interpretations. Private complainant alleged that
when she was brought by Atilano Nollora, Jr., to the latters house in Taguig, Metro
Manila, Rowena P. Geraldino was there standing near the door and heard their
conversation. From this incident, private complainant concluded that said Rowena P.
Geraldino was aware that she and Atilano Nollora, Jr., were married. This conclusion is
obviously misplaced since it could not be reasonably presumed that Rowena P.
Geraldino understands what was going on between her and Atilano Nollora, Jr. It is
axiomatic that "(E)very circumstance favoring accuseds innocence must be taken into
account, proof against him must survive the test of reason and the strongest suspicion
must not be permitted to sway judgment" (People vs. Austria, 195 SCRA 700). This
Court, therefore, has to acquit Rowena P. Geraldino for failure of the prosecution to
prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered, as follows:
a) Finding accused ATILANO O. NOLLORA, JR. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Bigamy punishable under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. This court
hereby renders judgment imposing upon him a prison term of two (2) years, four (4)
months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum of his indeterminate
sentence, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, plus
accessory penalties provided by law.

b) Acquitting accused ROWENA P. GERALDINO of the crime of Bigamy for failure of the
prosecution to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Costs against accused Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.
SO ORDERED.9
Nollora filed a notice of appeal and moved for the allowance of his temporary liberty
under the same bail bond pending appeal. The trial court granted Nolloras motion.
Nollora filed a brief with the appellate court and assigned only one error of the trial
court:
The trial court gravely erred in finding the accused-appellant guilty of the crime charged
despite the prosecutions failure to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.10
The Appellate Courts Ruling
On 30 September 2009, the appellate court dismissed Nolloras appeal and affirmed the
trial courts decision.11
The appellate court rejected Nolloras defense that his second marriage to Geraldino
was in lawful exercise of his Islamic religion and was allowed by the Quran. The
appellate court denied Nolloras invocation of his religious beliefs and practices to the
prejudice of the non-Muslim women who married him pursuant to Philippine civil
laws.1avvphi1 Nolloras two marriages were not conducted in accordance with the Code
of Muslim Personal Laws, hence the Family Code of the Philippines should apply.
Nolloras claim of religious freedom will not immobilize the State and render it impotent
in protecting the general welfare.
In a Resolution12 dated 23 February 2010, the appellate court denied Nolloras motion
for reconsideration. The allegations in the motion for reconsideration were a mere
rehash of Nolloras earlier arguments, and there was no reason for the appellate court
to modify its 30 September 2009 Decision.
Nollora filed the present petition for review before this Court on 6 April 2010.
The Issue
The issue in this case is whether Nollora is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of bigamy.
The Courts Ruling
Nolloras petition has no merit. We affirm the rulings of the appellate court and of the
trial court.

Elements of Bigamy
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Art. 349. Bigamy. The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person
who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has
been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively
dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.
The elements of the crime of bigamy are:
1. That the offender has been legally married.
2. That the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is
absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code.
3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage.
4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.13
The circumstances in the present case satisfy all the elements of bigamy. (1) Nollora is
legally married to Pinat;14 (2) Nollora and Pinats marriage has not been legally
dissolved prior to the date of the second marriage; (3) Nollora admitted the existence of
his second marriage to Geraldino;15 and (4) Nollora and Geraldinos marriage has all
the essential requisites for validity except for the lack of capacity of Nollora due to his
prior marriage.16
The marriage certificate17 of Nollora and Pinats marriage states that Nollora and Pinat
were married at Sapang Palay IEMELIF Church, Sapang Palay, San Jose del Monte,
Bulacan on 6 April 1999. Rev. Jonathan De Mesa, Minister of the IEMELIF Church
officiated the ceremony. The marriage certificate18 of Nollora and Geraldinos marriage
states that Nollora and Geraldino were married at Maxs Restaurant, Quezon Avenue,
Quezon City, Metro Manila on 8 December 2001. Rev. Honorato D. Santos officiated the
ceremony.
A certification dated 4 November 2003 from the Office of the Civil Registrar General
reads:
We certify that ATILANO JR O. NOLLORA who is alleged to have been born on
February 22, 1968 from ATILANO M. NOLLORA SR and FLAVIANA OCLARIT, appears
in our National Indices of Marriage for Groom for the years 1973 to 2002 with the
following information:
Date of Marriage

Place of Marriage

a) April 06, 1999

b) SAN JOSE DEL MONTE, BULACAN

a) December 08, 2001

b) QUEZON CITY, METRO MANILA (2nd District)19
Before the trial and appellate courts, Nollora put up his Muslim religion as his sole
defense. He alleged that his religion allows him to marry more than once. Granting
arguendo that Nollora is indeed of Muslim faith at the time of celebration of both
marriages,20 Nollora cannot deny that both marriage ceremonies were not conducted in
accordance with the Code of Muslim Personal Laws, or Presidential Decree No. 1083.
The applicable Articles in the Code of Muslim Personal Laws read:
Art. 14. Nature. - Marriage is not only a civil contract but a civil institution. Its nature,
consequences and incidents are governed by this Code and the Sharia and not subject
to stipulation, except that the marriage settlements to a certain extent fix the property
relations of the spouses.
Art. 15. Essential Requisites. - No marriage contract shall be perfected unless the
following essential requisites are complied with:
(a) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;
(b) Mutual consent of the parties freely given;
(c) Offer (ijab) and acceptance (qabul) duly witnessed by at least two competent
persons after the proper guardian in marriage (wali) has given his consent; and
(d) Stipulation of the customary dower (mahr) duly witnessed by two competent
persons.
Art. 16. Capacity to contract marriage. - (1) Any Muslim male at least fifteen years of
age and any Muslim female of the age of puberty or upwards and not suffering from any
impediment under the provisions of this Code may contract marriage. A female is
presumed to have attained puberty upon reaching the age of fifteen.
x x x.
Art. 17. Marriage Ceremony. - No particular form of marriage ceremony is required but
the ijab and the qabul in marriage shall be declared publicly in the presence of the
person solemnizing the marriage and the two competent witnesses. The declaration
shall be set forth in an instrument in triplicate, signed or marked by the contracting
parties and said witnesses, and attested by the person solemnizing the marriage. One
copy shall be given to the contracting parties and another sent to the Circuit Registrar
by the solemnizing officer who shall keep the third.
Art. 18. Authority to solemnize marriage. - Marriage maybe solemnized:
(a) By the proper wali by the woman to be wedded;

(b) Upon the authority of the proper wali, by any person who is competent under Muslim
law to solemnize marriage; or
(c) By the judge of the Sharia District Court or Sharia Circuit Court or any person
designated by the judge, should the proper wali refuse without justifiable reason, to
authorize the solemnization.
Art. 19. Place of solemnization. - Marriage shall be solemnized publicly in any mosque,
office of the Sharia judge, office of the Circuit Registrar, residence of the bride or her
wali, or at any other suitable place agreed upon by the parties.
Art. 20. Specification of dower. - The amount or value of dower may be fixed by the
contracting parties (mahr-musamma) before, during or after the celebration of marriage.
If the amount or the value thereof has not been so fixed, a proper dower (mahr-mithl)
shall, upon petition of the wife, be determined by the court according to the social
standing of the parties.
Indeed, Article 13(2) of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws states that "[i]n case of a
marriage between a Muslim and a non-Muslim, solemnized not in accordance with
Muslim law or this Code, the [Family Code of the Philippines, or Executive Order No.
209, in lieu of the Civil Code of the Philippines] shall apply." Nolloras religious affiliation
is not an issue here. Neither is the claim that Nolloras marriages were solemnized
according to Muslim law. Thus, regardless of his professed religion, Nollora cannot
claim exemption from liability for the crime of bigamy.21
Nollora asserted in his marriage certificate with Geraldino that his civil status is "single."
Moreover, both of Nolloras marriage contracts do not state that he is a Muslim.
Although the truth or falsehood of the declaration of ones religion in the marriage
certificate is not an essential requirement for marriage, such omissions are sufficient
proofs of Nolloras liability for bigamy. Nolloras false declaration about his civil status is
thus further compounded by these omissions.
[ATTY. CALDINO:]
Q: In your marriage contract, Mr. Witness, with Jesusa Pinat, you indicated here as your
religion, Catholic Pentecostal, and you were saying that since January 10, 1992, you
are already a [M]uslim convert. . . you said, Mr. Witness, that you are already a [M]uslim
convert since January 10, 1992. However, in your marriage contract with Jesusa Pinat,
there is no indication here that you have indicated your religion. Will you please go over
your marriage contract?
[NOLLORA:]
A: When we got married, they just placed there Catholic but I didnt know why they did
not place any Catholic there.

xxx
Q: Now, Mr. Witness, I would like to call your attention with respect to your marriage
contract with your co-accused in this case, Rowena Geraldino, x x x will you please tell
us, Mr. Witness, considering that you said that you are already a [M]uslim convert on
January 10, 1992, why in the marriage contract with Rowena Geraldino, you indicated
there your religion as Catholic, Mr. Witness?
A: Since I was a former Catholic and since I was then keeping, I was keeping it as a
secret my being my Balik-Islam, thats why I placed there Catholic since I know that the
society doesnt approve a Catholic to marry another, thats why I placed there Catholic
as my religion, sir.
Q: How about under the column, "civil status," why did you indicate there that youre
single, Mr. Witness?
A: I also kept it as a secret that I was married, earlier married.22 (Emphasis supplied)
xxx
[PROSECUTOR TAYLOR:]
Q: Would you die for your new religion, Mr. Nollora?
A: Yes, maam.
Q: If you would die for your new religion, why did you allow that your faith be indicated
as Catholic when in fact you were already as you alleged [M]uslim to be put in your
marriage contract?
xxx
[A:] I dont think there is anything wrong with it, I just signed it so we can get married
under the Catholic rights [sic] because after that we even got married under the
[M]uslim rights [sic], your Honor.
xxx
Q: Under your Muslim faith, if you marry a second wife, are you required under your
faith to secure the permission of your first wife to get married?
A: Yes, maam.
Q: Did you secure that permission from your first wife, Jesusa Nollora?

A: I was not able to ask any permission from her because she was very mad at me, at
the start, she was always very mad, maam.23
In his petition before this Court, Nollora casts doubt on the validity of his marriage
Geraldino.1avvphi1 Nollora may not impugn his marriage to Geraldino in order
extricate himself from criminal liability; otherwise, we would be opening the doors
allowing the solemnization of multiple flawed marriage ceremonies. As we stated
Tenebro v. Court of Appeals:24

to
to
to
in

There is therefore a recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage, although
void ab initio, may still produce legal consequences. Among these legal consequences
is incurring criminal liability for bigamy. To hold otherwise would render the States penal
laws on bigamy completely nugatory, and allow individuals to deliberately ensure that
each marital contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus escape the consequences
of contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless women with the
promise of futurity and commitment.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR No. 31538 promulgated on 30 September 2009 and the Resolution promulgated on
23 February 2010 are AFFIRMED. Petitioner Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of Bigamy in Criminal Case No. Q-04-129031 and is sentenced to
suffer the penalty of imprisonment with a term of two years, four months and one day of
prision correccional as minimum to eight years and one day of prision mayor as
maximum of his indeterminate sentence, as well as the accessory penalties provided by
law.
Costs against petitioner Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.
SO ORDERED.