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HALILI VS CA
C O M M O N W E A LT H A C T
141
(PUBLIC LAND ACT)
We will relate our discussion on the 4 modes of concession with Section 2 of
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
AT T Y
KRISTINA
TA N
C l a s s i f i c a t i o n o f A l i e n a b l e a n d D i s p o s a b l e L a n d s . Public
Land Act classifies alienable and disposable lands, agricultural lands according
to the use and purposes as to which land may be vested. So dont confuse
yourself with the classification in 1987 Constitution, kasi ito (CA 141)
according to purpose. Yung sa 1987 Constitution, yun talaga ang classification
of Public Land. So for CA 141, according to use and purposes to have
agrcultural, residential, industrial, commercial or similar productive purposes
or educational or charitable or other similar purposes, and resevations for
townsites and for public uses.
CA 141, as we all know before that it is the President, upon the
recommendation of the DENR Secretary, who is authorize to make such
classification. The classification as to the use and purpose of such agricultural
lands. Also you must not forget that one basic 3 requisite to disposition doon
sa 4 modes of concession or disposition is that the land is a the public land
and is alienable and disposable. With the cases later, we will learn, how do we
know if a public land is already disposable and alienable. This is one of the 3
requisites. There can be no concession or disposition if it is not an alienable or
disposable agricultural public land.
HOMESTEAD
It is defined as the house and the adjoining land where the head of the
family dwells. It can be the fixed residence of the head of the family with
the land and building surrounding the main house. We will differentiate
that with the usual understanding of family home under the Civil Code.
P U R P O S E . According to the Supreme Court in Jocson v. Soriano, it is to
provide a home for each citizen of the Government, where his family may
shelter and live beyond the reach of financial misfortune, and to
inculcate in individuals those feelings of independence which are
essential to the maintenance of three institutions.
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RESTRICTIONS ON SUBSEQUENT
ALIENATIONS AND ENCUMBRANCE
Section118. Except in favor of the Government or any of
its branches, units, or institutions, lands acquired under
free patent or homestead provisions shall not be subject
to encumbrance or alienation from the date of the
approval of the application and for a term of five years
from and after the date of issuance of the patent or grant,
nor shall they become liable to the satisfaction of any
debt contracted prior to the expiration of said period, but
the improvements or crops on the land may be mortgaged
or pledged to qualified persons, associations, or
corporations.
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grounds.
AT T Y
KRISTINA
TA N
GENERAL RULE: From and after the approval of the application and 5
years from the issuance of the patent there is absolutely no alienation and
encumbrance except in favor of the Government or any of its branches, units,
or institutions.
( jurisprudence):
1. Vested rights in a homestead acquired under prior acts, not under
CA 141, which did not contain the prohibition;
2. Agreements for the partition of a homestead (agreement between
the family)
Partition is not a conveyance or alienation in legal
contemplation
Section 119. Every conveyance of land acquired under the
free patent or homestead provisions, when proper, shall
be subject to repurchase by the applicant, his widow, or
legal heirs, within a period of five years from the date of
the conveyance.
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citizens
SECOND
MODE
CONCESSION:
SALE
OF
AGRICULTURAL LAND
OF
PUBLIC
There are two personalities that may be qualified to apply for sales patent:
1. Filipino citizens of legal age who is the head of the family; and
2. Any corporation or association of which is owned by 60% Filipino
AT T Y
KRISTINA
TA N
Note that this right of redemption is not waivable. It prevails even if you waive
a portion of it.
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4.
5.
6.
7.
Filing of Application
Appraisal
Publication and Posting of the notice of sale
It fixes the date of the public bidding
Rules on bidding, Chapter V of CA 141
The Director of Lands shall announce the sale
thereof by publishing the proper notice once a week
for six consecutive weeks in the Official Gazette,
and in two newspapers one published in Manila and
the other published in the municipality or in the
province where the lands are located, or in a
neighboring province, and the same notice shall be
posted on the bulletin board of the Bureau Of Lands
in Manila, and in the most conspicuous place in the
provincial building and the municipal building of the
province and municipality, respectively, where the
land is located, and, if practicable, on the land
itself
Submission of Bids
We talk of sale bids enclosing cash or certified check,
treasury warrant, or post-office money order
The amount would be 10% of the bid and the bid price
must not be less than the appraised value of the land
Opening of the bids
Award
General Rule: It is awarded to the highest bidder
When there are two or more equal bids, the law grants
in favor of the applicants
If the applicant is not one of the highest bidders, the
applicant is given the chance to equal that of the
highest bidder.
Pay the price of the bid
The amount submitted with the bid (10% of the bid) is
applied automatically
You can pay it in full or in installments
Installments should not be more than 10 equal annual
installments
Same with other modes of concession, under CA 141 there is always this
cultivation requirement. For a sales patent, you need to have at least 1/5 of
the land which has to be cultivated within 5 years from the date of the award.
Before the issuance of the actual patent, the purchaser must show actual
occupancy, cultivation, and improvement of at least 1/5 of the land applied
until the date wherein the final payment is made.
The approval of the Sales Application merely authorizes the applicant to take
possession of the land so that he can comply with the requirements before a
final patent can be issued in his favor.
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minerals, or other substances containing minerals, guano,
gums, precious stones, coal, or coal oil contained in lands
granted thereunder. These shall remain to be property of
the State.
Sec. 112. Said land shall further be subject to a right-ofway not exceeding sixty (60) meters in width for public
highways, railroads, irrigation ditches, aqueducts,
telegraph and telephone lines, and similar works as the
Government or any public or quasi-public service or
enterprise, including mining or forest concessionaires,
may reasonably require for carrying on their business,
with damages for the improvements only. (as amended by
PD 635)
AT T Y
KRISTINA
TA N
Sec. 121. Except with the consent of the grantee and the
approval of the Secretary of Natural Resources, and solely
for commercial, industrial, educational, religious, or
charitable purposes or for a right of way, no corporation,
association, or partnership may acquire or have any right,
title, interest, or property right whatsoever to any land
granted under the free patent, homestead, or individual
sale provisions of this Act or to any permanent
improvement on such land.
Procedure is the same. You need appraisal, publication and notice, submission
of sale bids, opening of bids, and how awarded.
The term of the lease will be for a period not exceeding 25 years renewable for
another 25 years. Upon the termination of the lease, all the improvements
thereon will now be the property of the State. Same with homestead and
sales patent, there are cultivation requirements. For a lease patent, you must
have cultivated 1/3 of the land within 5 years from and after the date of the
approval of the lease.
It is the same with Sales Patent, the procedure etc., only that the mode is
lease.
QUALIFICATIONS :
Just remember where it differs from sale. Of course, since this is a sales
patent, we talk of a rent instead of a purchase price. The bid amount for your
lease patent application would be equivalent of the rental of the first three
months. Annual rents must not be less 3% of the value of the land.
F O U RT H M O D E O F
C ON C E S S I O N :
C o n fi rm a t i o n o f I m p e r f e c t
Ti t l e
TWO MODES:
1.
2.
R E P U B L I C V S R I Z A LV O
On Dec 7, 2000, respondent Teodoro P. Rizalvo, Jr. filed before the MTC
of Bauang, La Union, acting as a land registration court, an application fo
r the registration of a parcel of land, located in Bauang, La Union.
Respondent alleged thathe is the owner in fee simple of the subject
parcel of land, that he obtained title over theland by virtue of a Deed of
Transfer dated December 31, 1962, and that he is currentlyin possession
of the land. In support of his claim, he presented, among others,
TaxDeclaration for the year 1994 in his name, and Proof of Payment of
real property taxesbeginning in 1952 up to the time of filing of the
application.
On April 20, 2001, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed an
Opposition. TheMTC of Bauang, La Union, acting as a land registration
court, rendered its Decision,approving respondents application. The
Republic of the Philippines through the OSGfiled a Notice of Appeal.
However, the CA found no merit in the appeal and promulgatedthe
assailed Decision, affirming the trial courts decision.
ISSUE:
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AT T Y
KRISTINA
TA N
S P S TA N V S R E P U B L I C
Whether or not Sps Tan have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the subject property, under a
bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, since [12 June 1945], or
earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the application for
confirmation of title.
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AT T Y
Court of Appeals, the spouses Tan point out that Tax Declaration
KRISTINA
No. 4627 was not newly issued but cancelled Tax Declaration No.
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2948; and should the Court take judicial notice of the fact that
tax assessments are revised every four years, then Tax Declaration No.
2948 covering the subject property was issued as early as 1944.
Tax Declaration No. 4627 was only issued in 1948, three years after 12
June 1945, the cut-off date under the law for acquiring imperfect or
incomplete title to public land. For the Court to conclude from the face of
Tax Declaration No. 4627 alone that the subject property had been
declared for tax purposes before 12 June 1945 would already be too
much of a stretch and would require it to rely on mere presuppositions
and conjectures.
LUNINGNING VS REPUBLIC
08 Jan 1998, PETs filed an application for registration of land under (PD)
No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree. They
alleged that they acquired the Subject Property by purchase, and that
they, by themselves and through their predecessors-in-interest, had
been in actual, continuous, uninterrupted, open, public, and adverse
possession of the Subject Property in the concept of owner for more that
30 years.
The history of possession of the Subject Property back to 1958, when
the Subject Property was first declared for tax purposes by Justina
Hintog.
Teodoro Calanog came into possession of the Subject Property in 1968.
In the same year, the Subject Property was transferred to spouses
Alfredo Tonido and Agatona Calanog. Agatona Calanog allegedly inherited
the Subject Property from Teodoro Calanog, her father; on the other
hand, Alfredo Tonido supposedly purchased the same property also from
Teodoro Calanog, his father-in-law. Alfredo Tonido planted the Subject
Property with palay, sayote, coffee, guyabano and other fruit bearing
trees. After the demise of Agatona Calanog, the rest of the Tonido family,
consisting of Alfredo and his children, Samuel, Elizabeth, Benjamin,
Imelda and Esther, shared possession of the Subject Property.
21 Nov 1995, the Tonido family sold the Subject Property to PETs.
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PROPERTY
REGISTRATION
DECREE
AT T Y
KRISTINA
TA N
Both are against the whole world, both take the nature of judicial
proceedings, and the decree of registration issued for both is conclusive and
final
R O M A N C AT H O L I C V S R A M O S
On Sept 15, 1966, the RCAM filed an application for registration of title
of property, pursuant to Commonwealth Act C.A.) No. 141 (the Public
Land Act).
RCAM claimed that it owned the property; that it acquired the property
during the Spanish time; and that since then, it has been in open, public,
continuous and peaceful possession of it in the concept of an owner.
The RCAM attached the following documents to support its application:
amended plan Psu-223919; technical description of Lots 1 and 2;9
surveyor s certificate;10 and Tax Declaration No. 9551 issued on
September 6, 1966.11
Republic claimed that the property is part of the public domain and
cannot be subject to private appropriation.
Ramos filed her opposition13 to the RCAM's application. She alleged that
the property formed part of the entire property that her family owns and
has continuously possessed and occupied from the time of her
grandparents, during the Spanish time, up to the present.
The RCAM presented in evidence the following documents, in addition to
those already on record: tax declarations issued in its name in 1948,
1973, 1981, 1990, 1993, and 1999; the certified true copy of Original
Certificate of Title No. 0082 covering the lot in the name of Garcia, which
adjoins the property on the south; and the affidavit of Garcia confirming
the RCAM's ownership of the property. It likewise submitted several
testimonial evidence to corroborate its ownership and claim of
possession of the property.
Who -between the RCAM and Cresencia -is entitled to the benefits of C.A.
No. 141 and Presidential Decree No. 1529 for confirmation and
registration of imperfect title?
(3) Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act requires for judicial
confirmation of an imperfect or incomplete title the
continuous possession of the land since 12 June 1945, or
earlier, which petitioners herein failed to comply with.
NONE.
Since the RCAM filed its application on September 15, 1966 and its
amended application on October 4, 1974, Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141,
as amended by R.A. No. 1942 (which then required possession of thirty
years), governs.
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Cresencia and her family used the property for a certain period
of time, albeit, briefly and temporarily.
First, the tax declarations issued in the RCAM's name in 1948, 1966,
1977, 1984, 1990, 1993 and 1999 did not in any way prove the
character of its possession over the property. The declaration for
taxation purposes of property in the names of applicants for
registration or of their predecessors-in-interest may constitute
collaborating evidence only when coupled with other acts of possession
and ownership; standing alone, it is inconclusive.
While the RCAM asserts that it had been in possession of the property
since the Spanish time, the earliest tax declaration that it could present
was that issued in 1948. Also, when it filed its application in 1966 and
its amended application in 197 4, the RCAM presented only two tax
declarations (issued in 1948 and 1966) covering the property. And since
then, up to the issuance of the January 17, 2005 decision of the R TC,
the RCAM presented only five other tax declarations -those issued in
1977, 1984, 1990, 1993 and 1999.
Second, even if we were to consider the RCAM' s tax declarations as basis
for inferring possession, the RCAM still failed to prove actual possession
of the property for the required duration. As already noted, the earliest
tax declaration that it presented was for 1948. RCAM first declared the
property in its name only in 1948 as this tax declaration does not
appear to have cancelled any previously-issued tax declaration. Thus,
when it filed its application in 1966, it was in possession of the property
for only eighteen years, counted from 1948. Even if we were to count the
possession period from the filing of its amended application in 1974, its
alleged possession (which was only for twenty-six years counted from
1948) would still be short of the thirty-year period required by Section
48(b) of C.A. No. 141, as amended by RA No. 1942.
Third, the amended plan Psu-223919, technical description for Lots 1
and 2, and surveyor s certificate only prove the identity of the property
that the RCAM sought to register in its name.
Fourth, the RCAM did not build any permanent structure or any other
improvement that clearly announces its claim of ownership over the
property.. The "bahay ni Maria" where the RCAM conducts its fiestarelated and Lenten activities could hardly satisfy the possession
requirement of C.A. No. 141. As found out by the CA, this structure was
constructed only in 1991 and not at the time of, or prior to, the filing of
its application in 1966.
The RCAM failed to prove that the property is alienable and
disposable land of the public domain.
RCAM was bound to establish "the existence of a positive act of the
government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order;
an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands
investigators; and a legislative act or a statute." It could have also
secured a certification from the government that the property applied
for was alienable and disposable.
We also find insufficient the evidence that Cresencia presented
to prove her claimed possession of the property in the manner
and for the period required by C.A. No. 141 .
Cresencia was bound to adduce evidence that irrefutably proves her
compliance with the requirements for confirmation of title. To our mind,
she also failed to discharge this burden of proof.
First, the various pieces of documentary evidence that Cresencia
presented to support her own claim of imperfect title hardly proved her
alleged actual possession of the property. Specifically, the certificates of
marriage, birth and death did not particularly state that each of these
certified events, i.e. marriage, birth and death, in fact transpired on the
claimed property; at best, the certificates proved the occurrence of
these events in Bagumbayan, Taguig, Rizal and on the stated dates,
respectively.
The presence on the property, as shown by photographs, of Cresencia s
daughter, of the two bancas owned by her family, and of the pile of
gravel and sand they allegedly used in their gravel and sand business
also hardly count as acts of occupation, development or maintenance
that could have been sufficient as proof of actual possession. The
presence of these objects and of Cresencias daughter on the property
was obviously transient and impermanent; at most, they proved that
AT T Y
KRISTINA
TA N
Second, while Cresencia registered in her name the adjoining lot (which
they had been occupying at the time the RCAM filed its application and
where their La Compania Refreshment Store stood), she never had the
property registered in her name. Neither did Cresencia or her
predecessors-in-interest declare the property for taxation purposes nor
had the property surveyed in their names to properly identify it and to
specifically determine its metes and bounds. The declaration for taxation
purposes of property in their names would have at least served as proof
that she or her predecessors-in-interest had a claim over the property
that could be labeled as "possession" if coupled with proof of actual
possession.
L AW
D AT E
APPROVE
D
PERIOD
Since July 26 1894
CA 141
RA 1 94 2
22 June 1957
30-year period
PD 1073
25 January 1877
PD 15 29
(SEC 14)
11 June 1978
CASE
D AT E O F
A P P L I C AT
ION
L AW
APPLICA
BLE
S P S TA N
VS
REPUBLIC
2000
12 JUNE 1945
OR EARLIER
LU N I N G N I
NG VS
REPUBLIC
JAN 1998
12 JUNE 1945
OR EARLIER
ROMAN
C AT H O L I C
V S RA M OS
15 SEPT 1966
3 0 -Y E A R
PERIOD
REPUBLIC VS DE GUZMAN
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P E O P L E V. H E R B I E TO
In Naguit, the classification is only needed at the time the application for
registration was filed. The qualifying word since June 12, 1945 or simplistic
30 years is only to the occupation, not to really of the classification of
alienability. While in Herbieto, take note of section 4w. We mentioned about
the periods depending at the time where the application was filed. Kung alin
sa 3 periods (CA 141- since July 26, 1894; RA 1942- 30 years; and PD1073since June 12, 1945) ang applicable. So in that particular case, ang period
applicable is June12, 1945. Naguit is saying that the period or simplistic 30
years (depende if what is applicable), refers to the claim of ownership. So not
necessarily on the particular phrase that the land must be already alienable
and diposable. But Herbieto was saying na dapat, alienable and disposable
before your period of possession is counted. So any possession prior to the
declaration that the land is alienable and disposable should not be counted. So
dapat according to Herbieto, whenever you count, the land must be already
alienable and disposable.
Thus possession of forest lands, however long, cannot ripen into private
ownership.
Prior to its declaration as alienable land in 1965, any occupation or
possession thereon cannot be considered in the counting of the thirty
year possession requirement.
While we acknowledge the Court of Appeals' finding that private
respondents and their predecessors-in-interest have been in possession
of the subject land for sixty three (63) years at the time of the
application of their petition, our hands are tied by the applicable laws
and jurisprudence in giving practical relief to them. The fact remains
that from the time the subject land was declared alienable until the time
of their application, private respondents' occupation thereof was only
twenty six (26) years. We cannot consider their thirty seven (37) years
of possession prior to the release of the land as alienable because
absent the fact of declassification prior to the possession and
cultivation in good faith by petitioner, the property occupied by him
remained classified as forest or timberland, which he could not have
acquired by prescription. Further, jurisprudence is replete with cases
which reiterate that forest lands or forest reserves are not capable of
private appropriation and possession thereof, however long, cannot
convert them into private property. Possession of the land by private
respondents, whether spanning decades or centuries, could never ripen
into ownership.
AT T Y
KRISTINA
TA N
Any period of possession prior to the date when the subject Lots
were classified as alienable and disposable is inconsequential
and should be excluded from the computation of the period of
possession; such possession can never ripen into ownership and unless
the land had been classified as alienable and disposable, the rules on
confirmation of imperfect title shall not apply thereto.
R E P U B L I C V. N A G U I T
Atty. Tan: Basically in this case, what was applied was the classification that
the land is alienable and disposable at the time of application. So it is a relax
application of section 14(1).
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AT T Y
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FACT S TO PROVE
1.
2.
1973
CONSTITUTI
ON
1987
CONSTITUTI
ON
Agricultural
Timber
Mineral
Agricultural
Industrial
Residential
Resettlement
Mineral
Timber or forest
Grazing land
Agricultural
Timber or forest
Mineral
National parks
CA 141
Note : RA 9176 has extended the filing of applications for judicial confirmation
of imperfect title. The applicable period as of now is December 31, 2020.
AMINISTRTIVA LEGALIZATION
SEC 44. Any natural born citizen of the Philippines who is not the owner of
more than twelve hectares who for at least thirty years has continuously
occupied and cultivated, either by himself or through his predecessors-ininterest, a tract or tracts of agricultural public lands subject to disposition
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Just take note that possession and occupation requirement that at least 30
years, that is the main difference of administrative legalization.
Introduction
Although the right to a balanced and healthful ecology as stated here in the
Philippine Constitution is found in the State Policies, not really entered in the
Bill of Right, they are enforceable by themselves. In the Oposa case, it was
stated that it may not be written in the Philippine Constitution to be
enforceable because it is very fundamental.
After the pronouncement in 1993 of the case of Oposa, another landmark case
in 2008 is the Metro Manila Development Authority vs. Concerned Citizens of
Manila Bay, better known as the Manila Bay clean-up case. This is the first time
that a continuing mandamus was issued even before the enactment of the
Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases providing for the issuance of
continuing mandamus.
Before, it was asked in the bar what is a continuing mandamus with reference
to this case. But now, its different because it was specifically provided in the
Rules which was enacted on April 13, 2010 in the exercise of the Supreme
Court of its extra-ordinary constitutional powers in promulgating the said
rules. It is said that there is no other country, even the United States of
America, who has come up with this type of procedural rules. So this is the
first in the world. So after the enactment in 2010, several justices were
occasionally invited to talk about how the Supreme Court of the Philippines
came up with these particular rules specifically to govern environmental
cases.
The problem with the other countries is that they have no particular
provisions in their respective constitution as to the right to the promulgation
of their own set of rules as opposed to our 1987 constitution where it is
specifically provided.
HIGHLIGHTS OF THE
R U L E S OF P R O C E D U R E
L I B E R A L I Z E D L O C U S S TA N D I
CITIZEN SUIT
Also, there is now a specific provision on citizen suit. Meaning you can
sue as a citizen.
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AT T Y
court shall issue an order which shall contain a brief description of
KRISTINA
the cause of action and the reliefs prayed for, requiring all interested
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parties to manifest their interest to intervene in the case within
fifteen (15) days from notice thereof. The plaintiff may publish the order once
in a newspaper of a general circulation in the Philippines or furnish all affected
barangays copies of said order.
Citizen suits filed under R.A. No. 8749 and R.A. No. 9003 shall be governed by
their respective provisions.
Recall also in your constitutional law that you have this exception
that if you are suing as a taxpayer etc. etc. pwede diba. Pero here, it
is really not difficult to prove your standing as long as it is really and
environmental case because the rules itself provides for the liberal
interpretation on the requirement of legal standing. So the rules
specifically provides for citizen suit which is not really in other
instances except for a few laws enacted before the rules which
provides for citizen suit. For example, Clean Air Act, Ecological Solid
Waste Management Act, wherein may special provisions na talaga on a
citizen suit. Yung citizen suit provided in the rules will apply to all
other environmental cases na hindi Clean Air Act, Ecological Solid
Waste Management Act because prior to the enactment of the rules
may specific provision na ang citizen suit.
N o t i fi c a t i o n
A ffi d a v i t s i n l i e u o f d i r e c t
examination
Prohibited Pleadings
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(e) Reply and rejoinder; and
(f ) Third party complaint.
Part III (Special Civil Actions), Rule 7 (Writ of Kalikasan), Section 9.
Prohibited pleadings and motions. - The following pleadings and motions
are prohibited:
(a) Motion to dismiss;
(b) Motion for extension of time to file return;
(c) Motion for postponement;
(d) Motion for a bill of particulars;
(e) Counterclaim or cross-claim;
(f ) Third-party complaint;
(g) Reply; and
(h) Motion to declare respondent in default.
Wr i t o f Ka l i ka s a n
There are also special civil actions provided under the rules. This is
over and above our usual special civil actions when we reach third
year. One would be the writ of kalikasan. You study and memorize
how it is defined in the rules because you cannot find it anywhere.
Continuing Mandamus
Te m p o r a r y E n v i r o n m e n t a l P r o t e c t i o n
Order (TEPO)
The constitutional right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology shall
be given the benefit of the doubt.
Part V (Evidence), Rule 20 (Precautionary Principle) Section 2.
Standards for Application. - In applying the precautionary principle, the
following factors, among others, may be considered: (1) threats to human life
or health; (2) inequity to present or future generations; or (3) prejudice to
the environment without legal consideration of the environmental rights of
those affected.
Consent Decree
Other
Re m e d i a l
Measures
Environmental Protection Order (EPO)
AT T Y
KRISTINA
TA N
Salient
Provisions
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(i) R.A. No. 3571, Prohibition Against the Cutting, Destroying or Injuring of
Planted or Growing Trees, Flowering Plants and Shrubs or Plants of Scenic Value
along Public Roads, in Plazas, Parks, School Premises or in any Other Public
Ground;
( j) R.A. No. 4850, Laguna Lake Development Authority Act;
(k) R.A. No. 6969, Toxic Substances and Hazardous Waste Act;
(l) R.A. No. 7076, Peoples Small-Scale Mining Act;
(m) R.A. No. 7586, National Integrated Protected Areas System Act including
all laws, decrees, orders, proclamations and issuances establishing protected
areas;
(n) R.A. No. 7611, Strategic Environmental Plan for Palawan Act;
(o) R.A. No. 7942, Philippine Mining Act;
(p) R.A. No. 8371, Indigenous Peoples Rights Act;
(q) R.A. No. 8550, Philippine Fisheries Code;
(r) R.A. No. 8749, Clean Air Act;
(s) R.A. No. 9003, Ecological Solid Waste Management Act;
(t) R.A. No. 9072, National Caves and Cave Resource Management Act;
(u) R.A. No. 9147, Wildlife Conservation and Protection Act;
(v) R.A. No. 9175, Chainsaw Act;
(w) R.A. No. 9275, Clean Water Act;
(x) R.A. No. 9483, Oil Spill Compensation Act of 2007; and
(y) Provisions in C.A. No. 141, The Public Land Act; R.A. No. 6657,
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988; R.A. No. 7160, Local Government
Code of 1991; R.A. No. 7161, Tax Laws Incorporated in the Revised Forestry
Code and Other Environmental Laws (Amending the NIRC); R.A. No. 7308, Seed
Industry Development Act of 1992; R.A. No. 7900, High-Value Crops
Development
Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases Act; R.A. No. 8048, Coconut
Preservation Act; R.A. No. 8435, Agriculture and Fisheries Modernization Act of
1997; R.A. No. 9522, The Philippine Archipelagic Baselines Law; R.A. No. 9593,
Renewable Energy Act of 2008; R.A. No. 9637, Philippine Biofuels Act; and
other existing laws that relate to the conservation, development,
preservation, protection and utilization of the environment and natural
resources.
CO N S E N T DE CR E E ( S U P R A)
C O N T I N U I N G M A N DA M U S ( S U P R A ) operative term
AT T Y
respondent. The court shall require the respondent to submit periodic
KRISTINA
reports detailing the progress and execution of the judgment, and the
TA N
court may, by itself or through a commissioner or the appropriate
government agency, evaluate and monitor compliance. The petitioner may
submit its comments or observations on the execution of the judgment.
V E R I F IE D CO M P L A IN T
PAY M E N T O F F I L I N G A N D O T H E R L E G A L F E E S it is
P R E -T R I A L ( S U P R A O N C O N S E N T D E C R E E ) more or less
the same with your regular civil procedure but take note on pre-trial
conference and the possible issuance of a consent decree.
RULES 6 ON SLAPP
Part II (Civil Procedure), Rule 6 (Strategic Lawsuit Against Public
Participation)
Section 1. Strategic lawsuit against public participation (SLAPP). - A
legal action filed to harass, vex, exert undue pressure or stifle any legal
recourse that any person, institution or the government has taken or may
take in the enforcement of environmental laws, protection of the environment
or assertion of environmental rights shall be treated as a SLAPP and shall be
governed by these Rules.
Section 2. SLAPP as a defense; how alleged. - In a SLAPP filed against a
person involved in the enforcement of environmental laws, protection of the
environment, or assertion of environmental rights, the defendant may file an
answer interposing as a defense that the case is a SLAPP and shall be
supported by documents, affidavits, papers and other evidence; and, by way
of counterclaim, pray for damages, attorneys fees and costs of suit.
The court shall direct the plaintiff or adverse party to file an opposition
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showing the suit is not a SLAPP, attaching evidence in support thereof, within
a non-extendible period of five (5) days from receipt of notice that an answer
has been filed.
The defense of a SLAPP shall be set for hearing by the court after issuance of
the order to file an opposition within fifteen (15) days from filing of the
comment or the lapse of the period.
Section 3. Summary hearing. - The hearing on the defense of a SLAPP shall
be summary in nature. The parties must submit all available evidence in
support of their respective positions. The party seeking the dismissal of the
case must prove by substantial evidence that his act for the enforcement of
environmental law is a legitimate action for the protection, preservation and
rehabilitation of the environment. The party filing the action assailed as a
SLAPP shall prove by preponderance of evidence that the action is not a SLAPP
and is a valid claim.
Section 4. Resolution of the defense of a SLAPP. - The affirmative defense
of a SLAPP shall be resolved within thirty (30) days after the summary
hearing. If the court dismisses the action, the court may award damages,
attorneys fees and costs of suit under a counterclaim if such has been filed.
The dismissal shall be with prejudice.
If the court rejects the defense of a SLAPP, the evidence adduced during the
summary hearing shall be treated as evidence of the parties on the merits of
the case. The action shall proceed in accordance with the Rules of Court.
AT T Y
The return shall include affidavits of witnesses, documentary
KRISTINA
evidence, scientific or other expert studies, and if possible, object
TA N
evidence, in support of the defense of the respondent.
A general denial of allegations in the petition shall be considered as an
admission thereof.
P R E C A U T I O N A R Y P R I N C I P L E ( S U P R A ) applied in BT Talong
case. The first case wherein the precautionary principle was applied.
Usually discussed in Environmental Law class. For NatRes, you just
see how the precautionary principle is defined.
H O M E S T E A D P AT E N T
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AT T Y
KRISTINA
TA N
Section 32. Review of decree of registration; Innocent purchaser for value. The decre
reason of absence, minority, or other disability of any person adversely affected thereby, nor by
subject, however, to the right of any person, including the government and the branches thereo
by such adjudication or confirmation of title obtained by actual fraud, to file in the proper Cour
of the decree of registration not later than one year from and after the date of the entry of s
petition be entertained by the court where an innocent purchaser for value has acquired th
prejudiced. Whenever the phrase "innocent purchaser for value" or an equivalent phrase occ
SECTION 53. It shall be lawful for the Director of Lands, whenever in the opinion of the
President
the mortgagee,
public interests
shallencumbrancer
require it, to for
cause
to be
innocent
lessee,
or other
value.
filed in the proper Court of First Instance, through the Solicitor
Upon
the
expiration
of
said
period
of
one
year,
the
decree of registration and the ce
General or the officer acting in his stead, a petition against the holder, claimant, possessor, or occupant of any land who shall not have voluntarily
Anythat
person
aggrieved
by holder,
such decree
of registration
come in under the provisions of this chapter or of the Land Registration Act, stating in substance
the title
of such
claimant,
possessor, in any case may pursue his re
any other
persons
responsible
or occupant is open to discussion; or that the boundaries of any such land which has not been brought
into
court as
aforesaid for
are the
openfraud.
to question;
or that it is advisable that the title to such lands be settled and adjudicated, and praying that the title to any such land or the boundaries thereof or
the right to occupancy thereof be settled and adjudicated. The judicial proceedings under this section shall be in accordance with the laws on
adjudication of title in cadastral proceedings.
SECTION 101. All actions for the reversion to the Government of lands
of the public domain or improvements thereon shall be instituted by
Under Cadastral registration, it is the government or the State that
the Solicitor-General or the officer acting in his stead , in the proper
initiates the case. It is one way of compelling all the claimants to
courts, in the name of the Commonwealth of the Philippines.
litigate against one another regarding their respective claims of
ownership. As opposed to any other act of transfer for example
Differentiate an action Reversion vs an action for nullity . Nullity in
Judicial Confirmation, and there is an oppositor, dito, if we are talking
a generic sense (relating to patent or certificate of title), you want it
about cadastral registration, it is the government which initiated the
to be nullified. The distinction lies with the allegations in the
cadastral case and all the claimants will litigate and prove their claims
complaint. In the action for Reversion , it could admit that it is
of ownership. The aim of this procedure is:
owned by the state. There is an admission that the disputed land is
1) to settle all disputes over the land;
owned by the government. In an action for nullity, the allegation in
2) and to remove all clouds over land titles as far as practicable
the complaint is that, the plaintiff would allege ownership prior to the
issuance of the patent or certificate of title. The real party in interest
Today, the applicable law regarding cadastral poceeding is Property
in that case is NOT the state but the plaintiff who is claiming preRegistration Decree. So, it has no separate title cadastral registration
existing right of ownership. Dont be confused sa Cadastral case,
proceedings as opposed before, that there was a separate cadastral
reversion, and an action for nullity. Cadastral registration is on the
act for the process for registration but now it is provided under
registration of the land. In Reversion, the government wanted to
Property Registration Decree.
reclaim the ownership of the land. In an action for nullity, it is the
private individual who claims ownership over the property. The
plaintiff has a pre-existing right prior to the grant of patent or a
certificate of title.
C a d a s t r a l Re g i s t r a t i o n
Proceeding
REVERSION
SECTION 91. The statements made in the application shall be considered as essential conditions and parts of any concession, title, or permit issued
on the basis of such application, and any false statements therein or omission of facts altering, changing, or modifying the consideration of the
facts set forth in such statements, and any subsequent modification, alteration, or change of the material facts set forth in the application shall
ipso facto produce the cancellation of the concession, title, or permit granted. It shall be the duty of the Director of Lands, from time to time and
whenever he may deem it advisable, to make the necessary investigations for the purpose of ascertaining whether the material facts set out in the
application are true, or whether they continue to exist and are maintained and preserved in good faith, and for the purposes of such investigation,
the Director of Lands is hereby empowered to issue subpoenas and subpoenas duces tecum and, if necessary, to obtain compulsory process from the
courts. In every investigation made in accordance with this section, the existence of bad faith, fraud, concealment, or fraudulent and illegal
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