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The formal, institutionalized and legal practices of human rights reflect and sustain the

interests of a dominant group in the existing order (Evans, 2001: 18).

Discuss
Introduction
A rich body of research suggests that the formal, institutionalized and legal practices of
human rights are deeply embedded within current international political frameworks. This
essay offers a critical exploration of the extent to which these seemingly entrenched human
rights practices function to sustain the interests of the dominant social and political order. I
will focus specifically on the hegemonic interests of international institutions, including
human rights legal institutions and human rights NGOs, in order to explore whether these
institutions are inherently exclusionary in their practices. I will examine whether these
practices may be appropriated by minorities and non-hegemonic groups to achieve their aims,
or whether these groups remain wholly excluded from the formal processes of human rights. I
will argue that as a result of Western, liberal origins and universalist philosophy of rights,
certain human rights practices inherently privilege a neoliberal, globalized ideology which
serves the hegemonic interests of the current world order. Accordingly, there remains a
historic emphasis on both civil and political rights and humanitarian interventionism within
the institutionalized practices of human rights. However, I will also examine the ways in
which these practices may be strategically appropriated by non-hegemonic groups to further
their own agendas through a human rights framework.
I will firstly provide a brief overview of the history of the human rights project, as a means of
providing a historical normative context for contemporary formal, institutionalized and legal
human rights practices. Within this account, I will focus specifically on arguments which

delineate and subsequently question Western, liberal conceptions of the human rights project,
as well as the universalist philosophy of rights embedded within these ideas. I will introduce
arguments surrounding the privileging of civil and political rights over social, economic and
cultural rights within formal human rights practices, including international law and human
rights NGOs. I will argue specifically that the rights discourse which underpins international
rights practices traditionally privileges civil and political rights for ideological purposes, and
thus non-hegemonic groups are often exposed to, rather than protected from, human rights
abuses.
However, I will also acknowledge the ways in which minority and non-hegemonic groups,
through strategic activism, have successfully navigated existing rights frameworks, and
utilized related human rights practices to draw attention to and advance alternative
conceptions of rights. This engagement suggests that human rights is an evolving project, and
as such rights discourse may be appropriated through activism by marginalized groups.
Therefore I will argue that while hegemonic structures are evident within often unequal and
contingent human rights practices, these structures can be critically acknowledged and
accordingly adapted. Nonetheless, I will also acknowledge the limits of these navigable
frameworks, and hence suggest credence in alternative political frameworks, as per the
discourse school of human rights orthodoxy.
From origins to eminence: the ascendancy human rights practices
While the philosophy which underpins human rights can be traced as far back as the
seventeenth century (Mahoney 2007: 5), the formal institutions and practices of the human
rights project emerged and became legally enshrined following the Second World War with
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) (Evans 2001; Douzinas 2000: 9). While
the scope and size of these institutions and practices has since grown rapidly and

dramatically (Cmiel 2004: 117), their Western origins remain largely undisputed (Waltz
2002: 437). Furthermore, these institutions and practices have become deeply embedded in a
new international order and in understandings of the concept of human rights more broadly
(Chandler 2012: 110). For, as Langlois contends, Western society is now in the Age of
Rights (Langlois 2012: 558). As such, formal non-state and transnational actors (Goodale
2009: 8) exert ever-growing influence over international affairs. In an increasingly globalized
world, human rights practices and the institutions which enact and govern them have become
entrenched within political institutions and civil society. Non-state actors have therefore
gained prominence in global governance, and the discourse and practices of human rights has
become the lingua franca (Moyn 2012: 172) in which these actors converse. Furthermore,
these practices have become seemingly inextricable from the human rights which they
purport to enforce.
The politics of human rights
While the eminence of existing human rights practices is widely acknowledged, their
respectability and legitimacy (Langlois 2012: 558) is problematised by some scholars,
primarily through an acknowledgement of the politics of human rights (Lloyd 2007: 92).
Citing the disassociation between human rights institutions and anticolonial movements,
Moyn (2012) contends, in contrast to the normative teleological historiography of human
rights, that the project initially failed to be embedded in global ideology (Moyn 2012: 162).
Instead, Moyn connects the ascendancy of human rights with foreign policy ideals which
were necessary to maintain Western hegemony in the period following the Cold War. In this
account, the importance of human rights institutions is therefore only one appealing ideology
among others (Moyn 2012: 160). As such, the importance of rights practices should be
critically examined as a political narrative, rather than an absolute truth.

Furthermore, Evans questions the intent behind the foregrounding of the human rights
narrative on the global political agenda, arguing it to be a political maneuver which served
the hegemonic interests of the United States (Evan 2001: 31). Historically, it is argued that
this politicization of human rights institutions crystallized in the Cold War, as evidenced in
Chandlers review of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)
(Chandler 2012: 111). Chandler maintains that in all case but one, the OSCE was used for
geo-political disputes, directly relative to Cold War-era foreign policy. As a result, human
rights and the institutions which impose and govern them were used as political tools or
weapons (Chandler 2012: 112) to underpin foreign policy and to attempt to maintain
Western hegemony through transnational means.
In addition to transnational political organizations it is also argued that civil society
organizations may be complicit in foregrounding conceptions of human rights to fuel specific
hegemonic political ideologies. In his examination of the Commission Study of the
Organization of Peace (CSOP), Mitoma argues that civil society organisations have the
ability, through carefully constructed public relations strategy to affect political discourse.
This is typified in the case of the CSOP, which succeeded in using international human rights
as an essential tool for enlisting the support of the American public for an expanded US role
in the world. (Mitoma 2012: 610). The formal practices of human rights in both political and
civil society are thus argued to be a means of perpetuating a particular political agenda.
Civil and political rights over social, economic and cultural rights
The use of human rights practices to sustain hegemony is evident in the emphasis of civil and
political rights, over social, economic and cultural rights, within human rights institutions.
The debate, particularly within United Nations and nongovernmental organization circles
(Howard 1983: 468) as to whether civil and political rights deserve privilege over social,

economic and cultural rights has long been a contentious issue. Social, economic and cultural
rights are oft regarded as second generation (Freeman 2011: 193) rights which have been
historically marginalized in favour of civil and political rights. This denigration (Grovogui
2009: 43) of social, cultural and economic rights is commonly attributed to the neoliberal
political ideology, which is hegemonically bolstered by rights frameworks. For Freeman
(2011), while the human rights movement is part of globalization, the two are poorly
integrated (Freeman 2011: 177). As a result, the private economic actors of neoliberalism are
able to relegate social, economic and cultural rights which are incompatible with the the
unfettered state mediation required by neoliberalism (Speed 2007: 174). In this view, both
historically and philosophically, the rise of transnational and non-state practices of human
rights is inextricable from the rise of globalization, neoliberalism or post-democratic
governance (Douzinas 2013: 51). Human rights institutions and their practices have therefore
been deliberately bound with the neoliberal and globalized ideology, since, as Evans argues,
these practices were established to bolster a new post-war order, safe for the American
export of good and capital (Evans 2001: 35).
According to former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Mary Robinson, some
progress has been made in the acknowledgement of social, economic and cultural rights as a
deserving facet of human rights in both UN Commissions and major international NGOS
(Robinson 2004) However, while a wide range of research (Freeman 2012; Grovogui 2009;
acknowledges the privileging of the civil and political over social, economic and cultural
rights, scholars such as Howard (1983) maintain that civil and political rights are essential
forebearers for social, economic and cultural rights.
Manufacturing consensus through discourse

Scholars argue that the development of a discourse of rights has played a key role in the
foregrounding of human rights, and specifically in the dissemination of neoliberal ideology.
As a means of embedding human rights within wider society, the formal practices of human
rights have been couched in the transformative language (Pedersen & Murray 2012: 12) of
universal values. As such, human rights and the practices bound with them are demarcated by
an appeal to historic ideas of natural and inalienable freedoms. Presently, this universalized
view of rights remains at the heart of human rights orthodoxy (Dembour 2010: 1; Ackerley
2008). This is exemplified in the UDHR, which Stearns (2012) asserts was originally drafted
as a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations (Stearns 2012: 127).
Thus the international legal and political practices which govern and enforce human rights
today are argued to be inextricably linked to a universal, transcendent view of human rights.
Moreover, as Pederson & Murray contend, despite the transcendental language of human
rights the operationalised reality of human rights appears to be rather more prosaic.
(Pederson & Murray 2012:12). In this view, there exists a disjuncture between the universal
and transcendent values of human rights, and the formal structures which govern and enforce
them internationally. For, as Chandler asserts, while the term human belongs to abstract
universal ethicsrights belongs to the concrete legal and political sphere. (Chandler 2012:
110). Yet, for Chris Brown, the universalized nature of human rights as offered in the
Universal Declaration has depoliticizing consequences. The ivory tower of human rights has
no ontological basis, and as such a common morality, which is actually common to all
societies, is an uncritical notion. (Brown 2016: 59). Arguing for a more relativistic
conception of rights, Brown contends that universal human rights are decontextualized and
depoliticized (Brown 2016: 60), so that liberal democracy appears the only compatible
political structure with rights frameworks. That this universalist conception of rights has been
historically embedded within human rights practices means that the human rights institutions

and practices are not only bound with neoliberalism, but also mask and enable imperalism.
For, as Wendy Brown argues, universal human rights are the guise in which superpower
global domination drapes itself; the guise in which the globalization of capital drapes itself
(Brown 2004: 453).
The paradox of human rights: agency and interventionism
It is in light of this manufactured consensus of universal rights and push towards
neoliberalism and imperialism within globally embedded institutions that we see what
Chandler terms as the paradox of human rights (Chandler 2012: 113). Human rights
institutions and practices separate the rights bearer (Chandler 2012: 113) from the process
of rights itself, by making claims to rights and legally enforcing these on the rights bearers
behalf. Chandler acknowledges evidence of this paradox in all international human rights
practices, including international human rights NGOs. He argues that the humanitarian
interventionism which has come to characterize human rights NGOs in recent years creates a
unequal power structures, in distinctions between the vulnerable subjects and their rescuers.
Echoing Saids concept of Orientalism (Said 1979), which proffers that the West creates a
positive conception of itself through fictitious binary representations of the East, Chandler
asserts that humanitarian interventionism, far from enabling agency and rights in Third World
countries, serves primarily to create build an idea the West, and justify neoliberal
international intervention in these counties. For Chandler, interventionism was developed
because we wanted to show the world that the West meant something (Chandler 2012: 119).
A similarly pessimistic view of the capacities for non-hegemonic groups is evident in Zizeks
relativistic polemic against the human rights project Against Human Rights (2005). Zizek
contends that

Human rights of Third World suffering victims effectively means today, in the
predominant discourse, is the right of Western powers themselves to intervene
politically, economically, culturally and militarily in the Third World countries of their
choice, in the name of defending human rights (Zizek 2005: 127).
Both Chandler and Zizek therefore critique the univeralist philosophy of rights as a tool for
neoliberal self-construction, which paradoxically creates further inequalities through both
legal practices and humanitarian interventionism. Furthermore, while legal and political
institutions may address individual cases of human rights violations do little to it address the
structural issues of rights violations. In focusing on victims (Speed 2007: 198), human
rights practices both denies agency of such subjects, and justifies intervention.
Appropriating human rights
While the dominance of a liberal, universalised ideology in institutionalised human rights
practices may appear to hold bleak prospects for the rights of minorities and other
marginalized groups, a body of criticism argues that human rights practices may be
successfully navigated by such groups. Scholars such as Kelly (2015) argue that human rights
discourse may be appropriated by non-hegemonic groups specifically to advance social and
cultural rights. In an examination of the use of feminist activism to mainstream womens
rights, Kelly contends that the language and practices of human rights may be effectively
engaged with in order to make gains for previously excluded groups, citing CEDAW as a
significant gain for the feminist rights movement. For Kelly, rights language is a possible
way to transcend differences and achieve agreed goals (Kelly 2015: 490). This claim is
supported by arguments from the deliberative school of human rights orthodoxy (Dembour
2010). Deliberative scholars acknowledge that while human rights may not be natural or
universal concepts, human rights practices provide an adequate political and legal framework
for rights through agreed upon (Dembour 2010: 15) ideas. Accordingly, while human rights
practices and frameworks should be critically assessed in terms of their limitations. they

presently offer the most viable rhetorical structure currently availablefor making social
and erotic justice claims and seeking redress or accountability (Correa 2008: 205). This
therefore suggests that while rights practices may privilege civil and political rights due to
their neoliberal ideology, this imbalance can be addressed through strategic activism and
engagement.
However, the potential for transformative engagement within existing rights frameworks is
complicated if we return to Chandlers paradox of human rights. Highlighting the capacity for
neoliberal rights frameworks to create vulnerable populations (Cheng 2013), Cheng puts
forward the test case of migrant sex workers to suggest that even within ostensibly successful
engagement between womens rights activism and human rights practices, individuals may be
rendered either targets or instruments of the criminal law (Cheng 2013). This argument is
given further credence in Warrens exploration of the development of the UN Protocol against
Trafficking in Persons (Warren 2007). Warren argues that while the Protocol against
Trafficking in Persons represented the foregrounding of an ostensibly minority issue,
normative, hegemonic assumptions were present in both the collaborative process of
assembling the protocol, and in the protocol itself. Despite the input of organized sex workers
in constructing the protocol, it largely delineated sex workers as trafficked victims. Warrens
argument therefore echoes Merrys assertion that a denigration of agency and emphasis on
vulnerability within human rights often produces multiple and conflicting (Merry 2007:
202). Consequently, appropriating rights frameworks for claims within marginalized groups
is of limited use
Thus, as Warren asserts, in order to address the imbalance within human rights, we must
acknowledge the complex transnational context historical, organizational, political and
ideological that influenced the crafting and interpretation of these norms (Warren 2007:
252). Whilst minority and non-hegemonic groups may become part of the process of human

rights practices, they may also encounter resistance and hegemonic structures within these
practices, which must be further navigated. Even when the rights of marginalized groups are
successfully foregrounded, the neoliberal structures of are so deeply embedded within human
rights practices that these groups remain, as Brown argues, a disenfranchised people (Brown
2004: 461). Therefore I would argue that while a deliberative approach to human rights and
its associated practices may yield positive results for marginalized groups to some, their
value, as they exist presently, remains limited. Thus, I would agree with Browns assertion
that to address imbalance within existing human rights frameworks, we must concede other
international justice frameworks, including more substantive democratization of power,
towards a reevaluation of human rights (Brown 2004: 462).
Conclusion
In conclusion, it can be argued that to some extent the formal and institutionalized practices
of human rights sustain the interests of dominant social and political order. This sustainment
of interests occurs for a number of reasons. Firstly, human rights practices have become
deliberately embedded within the emergent globalized political order, partly due to strategic
political moves from the dominant Western hegemony. Furthermore, these institutions are
often inextricable from universalized concepts of rights. Thus, Moreover, at present, these
eminent human rights practices and the transnational institutions which enforce and govern
them are underpinned by a univeralist conception of rights. As a result of both the universalist
ideas behind these practices, as well as their Western neoliberal ideological origins, current
human rights frameworks often serve to privilege civil and political rights which fit within
these neoliberal and natural conceptions of rights.
The denigration of social, economic and cultural rights is further emphasized by Chandlers
paradox of human rights, in which formal human rights practices serve to disconnect and

often expose the rights bearer to abuse by legally enforcing rights. While a deliberative
orthodoxy assesses successful attempts to mainstream minority or non-hegemonic group
rights as evidence of the positive capacity for human rights practices, this is critiqued by
work on the neoliberal ideology of rights and ideas of agency and vulnerability. Looking
specifically at the test case of sex workers rights, it is evident that a navigation of human
rights frameworks is of limited to use to groups which are subject to the interventionist
approach of rights. Therefore I would argue that a re-evaluation of rights, as proffered by the
discourse school of human rights orthodoxy and specifically discourse scholar Wendy Brown,
is the most effective avenue for the pursuing inclusive practices of rights in the future.

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