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1. RUBI VS PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO, G.R. NO. L-14078; MARCH 7,


1919; 39 PHIL 660
Facts:
The provincial board, by Resolution No. 25, selected a site in the sitio of Tigbao on Naujan Lake for the
permanent settlement of Mangyanes in Mindoro. Pursuant to the provisions of section 2145 of the revised
Administrative Code, all the Mangyans in the vicinities of the townships of Naujan and Pola and the Mangyans east of
the Baco River including those in the districts of Dulangan and Rubis place in Calapan are directed to take up their
habitation on the site of Tigbao, Naujan Lake.
The case is an application for habeas corpus in favor of Rubi and other Manguianes of the Province of
Mindoro. It is alleged that the Maguianes are being illegally deprived of their liberty by the provincial officials of that
province. Rubi and his companions are said to be held on the reservation established at Tigbao, Mindoro, against their
will, and one Dabalos is said to be held under the custody of the provincial sheriff in the prison at Calapan for having
run away from the reservation.
The provincial governor of Mindoro and the provincial board thereof directed the Manguianes in question
to take up their habitation in Tigbao, a site on the shore of Lake Naujan, selected by the provincial governor and
approved by the provincial board. The action was taken in accordance with section 2145 of the Administrative Code of
1917, and was duly approved by the Secretary of the Interior as required by said action.
SEC. 2145. Establishment of non-Christian upon sites selected by provincial governor. With the prior
approval of the Department Head, the provincial governor of any province in which non-Christian
inhabitants are found is authorized, when such a course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and
order, to direct such inhabitants to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be
selected by him an approved by the provincial board.
Petitioners, however, challenge the validity of this section of the Administrative Code.
Issues:
(1)Does section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 constitute an unlawful delegation of legislative power by the
Philippine Legislature to a provincial official and a department head, therefore making it unconstitutional?
(2)Whether or not the said law is not in line with the constitutional provision of freedom of religion.
(3) Whether Section 2145 of the Administrative Code deprives a person of his liberty of abode and is therefore
unconstitutional
Ruling:
(1) No. The Philippine Legislature has here conferred authority upon the Province of Mindoro, to be exercised by the
provincial governor and the provincial board.
In determining whether the delegation of legislative power is valid or not, the distinction is between the
delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an
authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done;
to the later no valid objection can be made. Discretion may be committed by the Legislature to an executive

department or official. The Legislature may make decisions of executive departments of subordinate official thereof, to
whom it has committed the execution of certain acts, final on questions of fact. The growing tendency in the decision
is to give prominence to the "necessity" of the case.
In enacting the said provision of the Administrative Code, the Legislature merely conferred upon the
provincial governor, with the approval of the provincial board and the Department Head, discretionary authority as to
the execution of the law. This is necessary since the provincial governor and the provincial board, as the official
representatives of the province, are better qualified to judge when such as course is deemed necessary in the interest
of law and order. As officials charged with the administration of the province and the protection of its inhabitants,
they are better fitted to select sites which have the conditions most favorable for improving the people who have the
misfortune of being in a backward state.
Hence, Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is not an unlawful delegation of legislative power by
the Philippine Legislature to provincial official and a department head.
(2) No. By a vote of five to four, the Supreme Court sustained the constitutionality of this section of the Administrative
Code. Among other things, it was held that the term non-Christian should not be given a literal meaning or a
religious signification, but that it was intended to relate to degrees of civilization. The term non-Christian it was
said, refers not to religious belief, but in a way to geographical area, and more directly to natives of the Philippine
Islands of a low grade of civilization. On the other hand, none of the provisions of the Philippine Organic Law could
have had the effect of denying to the Government of the Philippine Islands, acting through its Legislature, the right to
exercise that most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers, the sovereign police power, in the promotion of the
general welfare and the public interest. when to advance the public welfare, the law was found to be a legitimate
exertion of the police power, And it is unnecessary to add that the prompt registration of titles to land in the
Philippines constitutes an advancement of the public interests, for, besides promoting peace and good order among
landowners in particular and the people in general, it helps increase the industries of the country, and makes for the
development of the natural resources, with the consequent progress of the general prosperity. And these ends are
pursued in a special manner by the State through the exercise of its police power. The Supreme Court held that the
resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro was neither discriminatory nor class legislation, and stated among other
things: . . . one cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered with when the degree of civilization of
the Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for their own good and the general good of the Philippines. Nor
can one say that due process of law has not been followed. To go back to our definition of due process of law and
equal protection of the laws, there exists a law; the law seems to be reasonable; it is enforced according to the regular
methods of procedure prescribed; and it applies alike to all of a class.
(3) No. Section 2145 of the Administrative Code does not deprive a person of his liberty without due process of law
and does not deny to him the equal protection of the laws, and that confinement in reservations in accordance with
said section does not constitute slavery and involuntary servitude. The court further ruled that section 2145 of the
Administrative Code is a legitimate exertion of the police power and thus constitutional.
Petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their liberty. Habeas corpus can, therefore, not
issue.
One cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered with when the degree of civilization of
the. Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for their own good and the general good of the Philippines. Nor
can one say that due process of law has not been followed. To go back to our definition of due process of law and
equal protection of the laws, there exists a law; the law seems to be reasonable; it is enforced according to the regular
methods of procedure prescribed; and it applies alike to all of a class.
The public policy of the Government of the Philippine Islands is shaped with a view to benefit the Filipino
people as a whole. The Manguianes, in order to fulfill this governmental policy, must be confined for a time, as we
have said, for their own good and the good of the country.

2. OPLE V. TORRES, GR NO. 127685, July 23, 1998


Facts: Administrative Order No 308, otherwise known as Adoption of a National Computerized Identification
Reference System was issued by President Fidel Ramos on 12 December 1996. Senator Blas Ople filed a petition to
invalidate the said order for violating the right to privacy. He contends that the order must be invalidated on two
constitutional grounds, (1) that it is a usurpation of the power to legislate; and (2) that it intrudes the citizens right to
privacy.
Issue: Whether or not A.O. 308 will pave the way for government authorities to evade the right against unreasonable
searches and seizures?
Ruling: A.O. 308 falls short of assuring that personal information which will be gathered about our people will only be
processed for unequivocally specified purposes. The lack of proper safeguards in this regard of A.O. 308 may interfere
with the individuals liberty of abode and travel by enabling authorities to track down his movement; it may also
enable unscrupulous persons to access confidential information and circumvent the right against self-incrimination; it
may pave the way for fishing expeditions by government authorities and evade the right against unreasonable
searches and seizures. The possibilities of abuse and misuse of the PRN, biometrics and computer technology are
accentuated when we consider that the individual lacks control over what can be read or placed on his ID, much less
verify the correctness of the data encoded. They threaten the very abuses that the Bill of Rights seeks to prevent.

3. US VS. SANCHEZ, 27 PHIL 442, G.R. NO. 9294, MARCH 30, 1914
Facts:
The municipal president and the sergeant of police, had information a robbery had occurred in a boat on
the Maypajo River. The boatman had presented himself to the sergeant and indicated as one of the assailants of the
boat an individual who was the son of one Eto and who had been in a billiard room the same night. On August 12, the
sergeant of police directed and ordered all the patrolmen, including Eulogio Sanchez, to look for a certain Benigno
Aranzanso in order that he might be identified by the boatmen. By virtue of said order and because the description
that was given of the person who had been in the billiard room fitted Aranzanso, the defendant Eulogio Sanchez
proceeded to arrest him in the cockpit on August 13, and took him to the town hall. Aranzanso remained in
confinement until before nightfall of the same day. He was not identified because when the sergeant of police arrived
at the station he had already been set at liberty. No warrant was previously issued for his detention because the fact
had not been reported to the justice of the peace and that August 13, 1912 was a legal holiday. Sanchez was accused of
the crime of illegal detention, provided for and punished in Article 200 of the Penal Code, for having detained
Aranzanso by keeping him in the municipal jail for a period of less than 3 days. Sanchez was adjudged guilty of said
crime. From this judgment, the defendant appealed.
Issue: Whether or not Sanchez was guilty of the crime of illegal detention?
Ruling:

No. Sanchez acted in compliance with the orders of his chief, the sergeant of police, in arresting Aranzanso;
the detention was justified because it was for the purpose of identifying his person, since, according to the sergeant
himself, reasonable grounds existed for believing in the existence of a crime and suspicion, pointing to Aranzanso.

One of the duties of the police is to arrest lawbreakers in order to place them at the disposal of the judicial
or executive authorities, whose duty is to investigate the act constituting the violation of the law. And one of the
means conducing to these ends, is the identification of the person of the alleged criminal or lawbreaker; which duty
directly devolves upon the police to make the arrests or detentions for the purposes of such investigation. This duty of
the police officer cannot be questioned. The mere fact that an officer of the law compelled a person to appear before
the chief of the department to establish or prove his identity does not justify the classification of illegal detention. It
was merely in the nature of an administrative measure, justified by the suspicion that he may have committed acts in
violation of the law. It is, therefore, beyond dispute that the defendant Eulogio Sanchez did not commit the crime
charged against him in the complaint.

4. PEOPLE V. MOLEDA, G.R. NO. L-34248, NOVEMBER 21, 1978


FACTS:
The accused Molleda, Baluyot and Nicolas were found guilty by the trial court of the crime of murder,
qualified by taking advantage of superior strength and with the aggravating circumstance of "deceit", and sentenced,
each and all, to death. On appeal, Molleda claims that his extra-judicial confession is not admissible because he was
not afforded the right to counsel during the interrogation; and, that, having been allegedly illegally arrested, his
statement is inadmissible in evidence. Baluyot and Nicolas also claims that their extra-judicial confession (Exhibits "H"
and "I", respectively) were obtained thru maltreatment, torture and intimidation and should have been rejected.
ISSUES:
1) Whether the testimony of prosecution witness Ramon Ching should not have been accorded belief because
it was unnatural for a woman (Evelyn Duave in this case) to be standing amidst the mauling.
2) Whether the extrajudicial confessions of accused Molleda, Nicolas, and Baluyot are admissible in evidence.
3) Whether the extra-judicial confessions of Molleda, Nicolas, and Baluyot should not have been accorded
belief and credence and that the same are not admissible as against co-accused Evelyn Duave.
4) Whether accused were denied due process when they were given only one day to prepare their defense.
RULING:
1) The assigned error is without merit. As a matter of established jurisprudence, the findings of the trial court on the
credibility of a witness are not disturbed on appeal unless it is shown that it failed to consider certain facts and
circumstances which would change the same. The trial court held the eye and ear-witness account of witness Ching as
credible because he "... testified in a natural, systematic, straight-forward and logical manner with marked fluency and
ease.
The bare, self-serving assertion of appellant Duave, which is a mere generalized hypotheses, i.e., that as a
woman she could not have committed the acts imputed to her, cannot prevail over the positive and categorical
testimony of Ching (witness) on a matter of fact, which was able to withstand the cross-examination of appellant's
counsel. In addition, as the trial court observed, appellant Duave could not point to any evil or bad motive on the part
of Ching to testify in the manner that he did, positively naming the herein accused Duave as having taken an active
part in mauling the victim. In a clash between a fact, as testified to by a credible witness, and a self-serving
hypotheses, as alleged by the accused herself, the trial court cannot be faulted for electing to accord credence to the
former and disbelieving the latter. This is specially so where, as in the case at bar, the eye-witness account is
corroborated by other evidence on record, consisting of confessions of her co-conspirators and now, co-accused.
2) Yes. Molleda's claim that he is entitled to counsel is without merit. The right to be represented by counsel at
custodial investigation became effective and enforceable only after the enactment of the Constitution on January 17,

1973. The investigations of the accused-appellants having taken place much earlier or in April 1971, the right to
counsel was not applicable in their case.
Further, appellants Nicolas' and Baluyot's claim that their EJ confessions were obtained thru force, violence,
and coercion is bereft of any evidentiary support apart from their own testimonies to this effect. The records show that
they never complained to anyone that they were maltreated or tortured in the course of their investigations. Upon the
other hand, the trial court's finding that the statements were voluntarily executed, is premised on the facts that the
accused were investigated in the open and before several witnesses; that they were thereafter brought in the presence
of the Inquest Fiscal before whom they signed and affirmed to the truth of their statements; and that the same contain
details which could have been given only by the accused themselves. The trial court, therefore as maintained by the
Solicitor General in his reply briefs correctly concluded that the same were voluntarily given and consequently are
admissible in evidence.
Lastly, Molledas claim that his statement is inadmissible in evidence because it is the fruit of an illegal
arrest is also not well-taken. Accused-appellants were apprehended by the Anti-Hoodlum Unit of the Manila Police
Department while in hiding in Olongapo City on April 5, 1971, pursuant to an alarm flashed after they were Identified
and verified to be the perpetrators of the killing of Alfredo Bocaling on the evening of January 7, 1971. Upon being
discovered in their hideouts in Olongapo, they were invited by the Anti-Hoodlum Unit for investigation on wellgrounded suspicions for their part in the killing. The justification for arrests on reasonable suspicion that a person has
committed an offense has been stated.
In point of fact, they were transported from Olongapo City to Precinct 9 at Sta. Ana of the Manila Police
Department, which had police jurisdiction over the place where the offense was committed. In the course of their
investigations, all the three accused in the presence of several witnesses including their co-accused, Evelyn Duave
who, it should be noted, did not give any statement confessed freely and voluntarily to the commission of the
offense in Exhibits "G", "H" and "I". Their statements, as observed by the trial court, are rich in details which
corroborate each other, and thus show the earmarks of a free and voluntary statement. Their claim now that they have
been illegally arrested is rather late in the day and is clearly an after-thought, a transparent defense gimmick, to delay
the trial and postpone their punishment.
3) This, obviously is without merit. The confessions having been voluntary and freely given are admissible in
evidence. That they are rich in details which only the accused themselves could have given to the police rendered each
and every statement not merely competent but also relevant and credible. Finally, the statements are corroborated by
other evidence on record.
With respect to the claim that the same is not admissible against accused Evelyn Duave, the general rule is
"... that an extra-judicial confession is admissible against the maker; it is incompetent evidence against his co-accused,
with respect to whom it is hearsay." This general rule is not without its exceptions. Thus, it is now settled that "extrajudicial confessions independently made without collusion which are identical with each other in their essential
details and are corroborated by other evidence on record are admissible, as circumstantial evidence, against the
person implicated to show the probability of the latter's actual Participation in the commission of the crime." (Doctrine
of interlocking confessions)
In addition, the records show that accused-appellant Evelyn Duave was present personally when their
statements were taken from each of the affiants, Molleda, Baluyot and Nicolas. In each instance, the affiants pointed to
Duave as a participant in the killing of the victim. Appellant Duave, thus acquiesced to these statements, because she
did not contradict the same during the investigation. The same are, therefore, admissible in evidence even as against
her.
4) No. A review of the records, on the other hand, shows that the trial court gave full consideration to the rights of the
accused-appellants to be assisted by counsel; to be informed of the nature and the charge against them; and to be

confronted by the witnesses who were cross-examined by their counsel. If appellants believed that one day was not
sufficient for them to prepare for their defense, they should have moved for a longer period within which to present
their evidence, which they did not.

5. PEOPLE vs. OLIVARES, G.R. No. 77865 December 4, 1998


FACTS: Involved in this case is the crime of robbery with homicide committed during the season of yuletide.
Prosecution witness Cpl. Tomas Juan testified that in the morning of December 28, 1981, he was assigned by
his station commander to follow-up the robbery with homicide that took place. He learned from Patrolman Bote that a
regular employee of the Cardinal Plastic Industries (where the crime was committed) had not yet reported for work.
They proceeded to the business establishment and were able to confirm from the workers that appellant Arellano
failed to report for work since the commission of the crime, Salle (cousin of appellant Arellano) volunteered to bring
them to Arellano in a factory. Thereat, Salle was able to secure information from the "barkada" of Arellano who turned
out to be appellant Olivares, Jr. Olivares accompanied them where they found Arellano. After being asked about the
incident that took place, Arellano readily admitted to the police authorities his participation in the crime. Thereafter, t
Arellano was invited to the police station. On further direct examination, Cpl. Juan identified in open court the Sanyo
cassettes, the tapes and the wristwatch they recovered from the place where appellant Arellano pointed to them. Said
items were turned over to the police station.
Prosecution witness Macaoili testified that he came to know that the wristwatch, the cassettes, and other
personal items of the victims were missing when appellants were apprehended. He knew the cassette and the
wristwatch because said items had been used by the victim. He testified that appellant Olivares, Jr. twice visited the
factory and he saw him two or three weeks before. He also saw appellant Arellano inside the compound on December
25, 1981. Appellant Arellano resides inside the compound of the factory staying in the other room with other coworkers apart from the room of Mr. Macaoili.
Prosecution witness, Sgt. Eduardo Marcelo testified that he conducted an investigation on the person of
Rafael Olivares, Jr. at about 10:45 o'clock in the morning of December 29, 1981. Sgt. Marcelo apprised him of his
constitutional rights. When informed, appellant Olivares, Jr. declined any assistance of a lawyer during the
investigation considering that he will tell the truth about the incident. Salle and the chief of Sgt. Marcelo were present
during the police investigations. Sgt. Marcelo prepared a statement signed by appellant Olivares, Jr. relative to the
investigation.
For the death of the two victims and the loss of some items, appellants were charge with the complex crime of
"robbery with double homicide."
ISSUE: Whether or not appellants should be held liable for the crime charged?
HELD: NO. In this case, there were no eyewitnesses to the killing and robbery and; thus, no direct evidence points to
appellants criminal liability. The prosecution's principal evidence against them is based solely on the testimony of the
police officers who arrested, investigated and subsequently took their confession. Such evidence when juxtaposed
with appellants' constitutional rights concerning arrests and the taking of confessions leads to a conclusion that they
cannot he held liable for the offense charged despite the inherent weakness of their defenses of denial and alibi, not
because they are not guilty but because the evidence adduced against them are inadmissible to sustain a criminal
conviction.
First, appellants were arrested without a valid warrant of arrest and their arrest cannot even be justified
under any of the recognized exceptions for a valid warrantless arrest mentioned in Section 6, (now section 5) Rule 113
of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, which prior to its amendment in 1998 15 provides:
Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or private person may, without a warrant, arrest a

person:
a) when the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is about to commit an offense in
his presence;
b) when the offense has in fact been committed, and he has reasonable ground to believe that the person to
be arrested has committed it;
c) when the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or/place where
he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.
None of the foregoing exceptions for a valid warrantless arrest concurs herein. At the time appellants were
apprehended, two days had already lapsed after the discovery of the crime they were not doing nor had just done
any criminal act. Neither were they caught in flagrante delicto or had escaped from confinement. Probably aware of the
illegality of the arrest they made the arresting officers testified that appellants were merely invited to the police
precinct. Such invitation, however when construed in the light of the circumstances is actually in the nature of an
arrest designed for the purpose of conducting an interrogation. Mere invitation is covered by the proscription on a
warrantless arrest because it is intended for no other reason than to conduct an investigation. Thus, pursuant to
Section 4(2), Article IV of the 1973 Constitution which was in effect at that time, "any evidence" obtained in violation
of their right under Section 3, Article IV (pertaining to invalid warrantless arrests) "shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding." By virtue of said constitutional protection any evidence obtained, including all the things
and properties alleged to be stolen by appellants which were taken by the police from the place of the illegal arrest
cannot be used as evidence for their conviction.
Even assuming arguendo that by entering a plea without first questioning the legality of their arrest,
appellants are deemed to have waived any objection concerning their arrest: yet the extrajudicial confession of
appellant Olivares, Jr. on which the prosecution relies, is likewise inadmissible in evidence. Under the Constitution,
any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right, among other to have a counsel,
which right can be validly waived. In this case, the said confession was obtained during custodial investigation but the
confessant was not assisted by counsel. Consequently, the valid waiver of the right to counsel during custodial
investigation makes the uncounselled confession, whether verbal or non-verbal, 23 obtained in violation thereof as also
"inadmissible in evidence" 24 under Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution 25 which provides:. . . . Any person
under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be
informed of such right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be
used aginst him. Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence.
Under the present laws, a confession to be admissible must be: 26
1.) express and categorical; 27
2.) given voluntarily, 28 and intelligently where the accused realizes the legal significance of his act; 29
3.) with assistance of competent and independent counsel; 30
4.) in writing; and in the language known to and understood by the confessant; 31 and
5.) signed, or if the confessant does not know how to read and write thumbmarked by him. 32
In this case, the absence of the third requisite above makes the confession inadmissible. The purpose of
providing counsel to a person under custodial investigation is to curb the uncivilized practice of extracting confession
even by the slightest coercion 33 as would lead the accused to admit something false. 34 What is sought to be avoided is
the "evil of extorting from the very mouth of the person undergoing interrogation for the commission of an offense,
the very evidence with which to prosecute and thereafter convict him. 35 With the inadmissibility of the material
circumstancial evidence which were premised on the likewise extrajudicial confession upon which both the
prosecution and the lower court relied to sustain appellants' conviction the remaining circumstances cannot produce a
logical conclusion to establish their guilt. WHEREFORE, both are ACQUITTED for the crime charged.

6. PEOPLE V. ANCHETA, GR NO. 46250, July 26, 1939


Facts: Ancheta ordered the arrest of Bibiana Sanson upon the belief that she had taken part in the assault committed
upon him by the Sanson brothers, Rufo and Cirilo and by justice of the peace Guillermo Salazar. The assault
committed by the Sanson brothers and justice of the peace Salazar upon the accused-appellant took place immediately
after the latter had been approached by Bibiana Sanson in the middle of the street, while he was passing in front of the
store situated under the house owned by the Sansons. Under said circumstances, the appellant undoubtedly had well
founded reasons to believe that Bibiana Sanson was not innocent of said aggression: first, because it was strange for
her, to approach him in the middle of the street feigning friendship, a thing she had never done before, and her
brothers, Rufo and Cirilo and justice of the peace Salazar, immediately afterwards and knowing him to be a peace
officer, to fall upon him and assault him, punching and kicking him until he fell to the ground, and at the same time
wresting from him the revolver which he carried in his belt; second, because the four of them harbored a grudge
against him, and he knew it, by reason of his break with Bibiana and of the slander of which she had allegedly been
informed and which she had reached the ears of the Sansons thereby naturally offending them, that he had been
spreading the news that she had in his possession some of the Bibiana's innermost garments, and by reason of having
complained of the behaviour and investigated the conduct of justice of the peace Salazar in various cases in which the
latter had intervened as such justice of the peace; third because Bibiana made no efforts to prevent her brothers and
said justice of the peace from maltreating as they in fact maltreated him; and lastly, because after the assault, all the
four went up the house of the Sansons, locking up themselves therein until they were compelled to surrender by the
Constabulary.
Issue: Whether or not peace officers are empowered to make arrests without warrant when they have reasonable cause
to believe that an offense or violation of law has been committed?
Ruling: Yes. The obligation of an agent of authority to make an arrest by reason of a crime, does not presuppose as a
necessary requisite for the fulfillment thereof, the indubitable existence of a crime. For the detention to be perfectly
legal, it is sufficient that the agent or person in authority making the arrest has reasonably sufficient grounds to
believe the existence of an act having the characteristics of a crime and that the same grounds exist to believe that the
person sought to be detained participated therein. The reasonable or probable cause which must exist to justify an
arrest without warrant consists in a ground sufficient in itself to convince a reasonable man to believe that the person
arrested by him is guilty; and that, besides reasonable ground of suspicion, action in good faith is another protective
bulwark for the peace officer making the arrest. Even if the suspected person is later found to be innocent, the peace
officer who arrested him is not liable, adding that one should not expect too much of a policeman, and the same is true
with a constabulary officer as the appellant, because both are not presumed to have the training and preparation of a
judicial officer, not having as they do not often have the opportunity to make proper investigation but must act in
haste on their own belief to prevent the escape of the criminal.

7. ROAN V. GONZALES, 145 SCRA 687 (1986)


FACTS: The challenged search warrant was issued by the respondent judge on May 10, 1984. The petitioner's house
was searched two days later but none of the articles listed in the warrant was discovered. However, the officers
conducting the search found in the premises one Colt Magnum revolver and eighteen live bullets which they
confiscated. They are now the bases of the charge against the petitioner.
Respondent Judge said that when PC Capt. Mauro P. Quinosa personally filed his application for a search
warrant on May 10, 1984, he appeared before him in the company of his two (2) witnesses, Esmael Morada and Jesus
Tohilida, both of whom likewise presented to him their respective affidavits taken by Pat. Josue V. Lining, a police

investigator. As the application was not yet subscribed and sworn to, he proceeded to examine Captain Quillosa on the
contents thereof to ascertain, among others, if he knew and understood the same. Afterwards, he subscribed and
swore to the same before him.
ISSUE: Whether the Respondent Judge failed to comply with the proper procedure in issuing the Search Warrant.
RULING: Yes, mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient. The examining Judge has to
take depositions in writing of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce and attach them to the record. Such
written deposition is necessary in order that the Judge may be able to properly determine the existence or nonexistence of the probable cause, to hold liable for perjury the person giving it if it will be found later that his
declarations are false. We, therefore, hold that the search warrant is tainted with illegality by the failure of the Judge to
conform with the essential requisites of taking the depositions in writing and attaching them to the record, rendering
the search warrant invalid. (See Rule 126, Sec 4) The respondent judge also declared that he "saw no need to have
applicant Quillosa's deposition taken considering that he was applying for a search warrant on the basis of the
information provided by the witnesses whose depositions had already been taken by the undersigned. In other words,
the applicant was asking for the issuance of the search warrant on the basis of mere hearsay and not of information
personally known to him, as required by settled jurisprudence.

8. BENITO SY y ONG vs. PEOPLE and CA, G.R. No. L-85785 April 24, 1989
FACTS: Convicted of Estafa under Article 315, Paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code by three (3) Courts, namely,
the Metropolitan Trial Court, Caloocan City, Branch 52; the Regional Trial Court of the same City, Branch 129 ; and
respondent Court of Appeals, petitioner now seeks to break the chain of convictions. Indictment against PetitionerAccused reads:
On or about and during the month of January 1986 in Caloocan City, Metro Manila and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused (herein petitioner) received from the Panama Sawmill Inc.,
represented in this case by TE PENG MEN, PBC Check No. 291616 dated January 15, 1986 for P6,000.00
which check was subsequently encashed by said accused for the purpose of and under the express
obligation on his part to use the said amount in securing a Marine Insurance coverage for P3,000,000.00 on a
shipment of logs owned by Panama Sawmill, Inc. but said accused with abuse of trust and confidence
reposed upon him far from complying with his obligation and with intent to deceive and defraud said
corporation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously receive a Marine Insurance coverage
for only Pl,000,000.00 to cover said shipment of logs, paying therefor only the amount of P2,712.50 as
insurance premium without the knowledge and consent of said Panama Sawmill, Inc., and thereafter, said
accused misappropriated and converted to his own personal use and benefit the balance of P3,287.50, and
despite repeated demands upon him, said accused refused and failed to account for said sum of P3,287.50 to
the damage and prejudice of said Panama Sawmill Inc., in the aforestated amount of P3,287.50.
The MTC of Caloocan City found the accused Benito Sy guilty of violating Art. 315, Par. 3 of the Revised Penal Code,
he is sentenced to a straight penalty of FOUR (4) MONTHS imprisonment, to reimburse or give restitution in the
amount of THREE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED EIGHTY SEVEN (3,287.50) PESOS AND 50/100 CENTAVOS and
to pay costs.
ISSUE: Is the accused guilty of Estafa committed through misappropriation under paragraph l(b), Article 315 of the
Revised Penal Code?
RULING: Yes. The accused is guilty of Estafa committed through misappropriation.

ART. 315. Swindling (estafa). Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned herein-below shall
be punished by:
xxxxxxxxx
(b) By appropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money, goods, or any other personal
property received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for administration, or under any other
obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same, even though such obligation be
totally or partially guaranteed by a bond or by denying having received such money, goods, or other
property.
For the crime of Estafa through misappropriation to exist the following elements must be present:
1. That money, goods or other personal property is received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or
for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return, the
same;
2. That there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender, or denial on
his part of such receipt;
3. That such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and
4. That there is a demand made by the offended party to the offender.
Upon the established facts, there can be no dispute that petitioner received a check in the amount of
P6,000.00 from "Panama" for the particular purpose of securing a marine insurance coverage of P3M. That marked the
creation of a fiduciary relation between them, the existence of which, either in the form of a trust or under any other
obligation involving the duty to make delivery of the same, is an essential element of the crime of Estafa by
misappropriation or conversion. The first element of the crime of Estafa, therefore, is satisfied.
To "convert" connotes the act of using or disposing of another's property as if it were one's own. And to
"misappropriate" means to own, to take something for one's own benefit. That there was conversion or
misappropriation by petitioner is immediately shown by the fact that, as admitted by him on cross-examination, he
had deposited the "Panama" check of P6,000.00 payable to "Oriental" in his own personal account even though he was
not authorized to do so by "Oriental" being merely an ordinary, not a special agent, as testified to by the underwriting
agent of "Oriental". Petitioner assumed the right to dispose of it as if it were his, thus committing conversion with
unfaithfulness and a clear breach of trust. A check while not regarded as legal tender is normally, under commercial
usage, a substitute for cash. The credit represented by it in stated monetary value is properly capable of appropriation
The third element of Estafa is likewise present. The misappropriation or conversion resulted in prejudice to
"Panama" which had believed all along that its shipment was insured for P3M. There was disturbance in its property
rights, and, although temporary, is sufficient to constitute injury within the meaning of Article 315(1-b) of the Revised
Penal Code.
As to the fourth essential element, that of demand made by the offended party to the offender, which
petitioner claims is wanting in this case, suffice it to state that demand is not necessary when there is evidence of
misappropriation as in this case.
All the essential elements of Estafa through misappropriation or conversion being present, we do not see
our way clear to breaking the chain of convictions by the other Courts before us. The guilt of petitioner-accused has
been proven beyond reasonable doubt.

9. MALACAT VS. CA, GR NO. 123595, DEC. 12, 1987


Facts: In an Information filed on 30 August 1990, in Criminal Case No. 90-86748 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Manila, Branch 5, petitioner Sammy Malacat y Mandar was charged with violating Section 3 of Presidential Decree
No. 1866. Yu of the Western Police District, Metropolitan Police Force of the Integrated National Police, Police Station

No. 3, Quiapo, Manila, testified that on 27 August 1990, at about 6:30 p.m., in response to bomb threats reported seven
days earlier, he was on foot patrol with three other police officers (all of them in uniform) along Quezon Boulevard,
Quiapo, Manila, near the Mercury Drug store at Plaza Miranda. They chanced upon two groups of Muslim-looking
men, with each group, comprised of three to four men, posted at opposite sides of the corner of Quezon Boulevard
near the Mercury Drug Store. These men were acting suspiciously with [t]heir eyes moving very fast.
Yu and his companions positioned themselves at strategic points and observed both groups for about thirty
minutes. The police officers then approached one group of men, who then fled in different directions. As the
policemen gave chase, Yu caught up with and apprehended petitioner. Upon searching petitioner, Yu found a
fragmentation grenade tucked inside petitioners front waist line. Yus companion, police officer Rogelio Malibiran,
apprehended Abdul Casan from whom a .38 caliber revolver was recovered. Petitioner and Casan were then brought
to Police Station No. 3 where Yu placed an X mark at the bottom of the grenade and thereafter gave it to his
commander.
Issue: WON the arrest and search of petitioner in this case were valid

Ruling: Even granting ex gratia that petitioner was in possession of a grenade, the arrest and search of petitioner were
invalid, as will be discussed below.
The general rule as regards arrests, searches and seizures is that a warrant is needed in order to validly effect the
same.[31] The Constitutional prohibition against unreasonable arrests, searches and seizures refers to those effected
without a validly issued warrant, [32] subject to certain exceptions. As regards valid warrantless arrests, these are found
in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, which reads, in part:

In the instant petition, the trial court validated the warrantless search as a stop and frisk with the seizure of the
grenade from the accused [as] an appropriate incident to his arrest, hence necessitating a brief discussion on the
nature of these exceptions to the warrant requirement.
At the outset, we note that the trial court confused the concepts of a "stop-and-frisk" and of a search incidental
to a lawful arrest. These two types of warrantless searches differ in terms of the requisite quantum of proof before they
may be validly effected and in their allowable scope.
In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the validity of the incidental search,
the legality of the arrest is questioned in a large majority of these cases, e.g., whether an arrest was merely used as a
pretext for conducting a search.[36] In this instance, the law requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a search
can be made -- the process cannot be reversed. [37] At bottom, assuming a valid arrest, the arresting officer may search
the person of the arrestee and the area within which the latter may reach for a weapon or for evidence to destroy, and
seize any money or property found which was used in the commission of the crime, or the fruit of the crime, or that
which may be used as evidence, or which might furnish the arrestee with the means of escaping or committing
violence.
Here, there could have been no valid in flagrante delicto or hot pursuit arrest preceding the search in light of the
lack of personal knowledge on the part of Yu, the arresting officer, or an overt physical act, on the part of petitioner,
indicating that a crime had just been committed, was being committed or was going to be committed. Having thus
shown the invalidity of the warrantless arrest in this case, plainly, the search conducted on petitioner could not have
been one incidental to a lawful arrest.
Also, stop and frisk is not justified. There are at least three (3) reasons why the stop-and-frisk was invalid:

Sec. 5. -- Arrest, without warrant; when lawful -- A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating
that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped ***
A warrantless arrest under the circumstances contemplated under Section 5(a) has been denominated as one " in
flagrante delicto," while that under Section 5(b) has been described as a "hot pursuit" arrest.
Turning to valid warrantless searches, they are limited to the following: (1) customs searches; (2) search of
moving vehicles; (3) seizure of evidence in plain view; (4) consent searches;[33] (5) a search incidental to a lawful arrest;
[34]
and (6) a "stop and frisk."[35]

First, we harbor grave doubts as to Yus claim that petitioner was a member of the group which attempted to
bomb Plaza Miranda two days earlier. This claim is neither supported by any police report or record nor corroborated
by any other police officer who allegedly chased that group. Aside from impairing Yu's credibility as a witness, this
likewise diminishes the probability that a genuine reason existed so as to arrest and search petitioner. If only to further
tarnish the credibility of Yu's testimony, contrary to his claim that petitioner and his companions had to be chased
before being apprehended, the affidavit of arrest (Exh. "A") expressly declares otherwise, i.e., upon arrival of five (5)
other police officers, petitioner and his companions were "immediately collared."
Second, there was nothing in petitioners behavior or conduct which could have reasonably elicited even mere
suspicion other than that his eyes were moving very fast an observation which leaves us incredulous since Yu and his
teammates were nowhere near petitioner and it was already 6:30 p.m., thus presumably dusk. Petitioner and his
companions were merely standing at the corner and were not creating any commotion or trouble, as Yu explicitly
declared on cross-examination:
Q And what were they doing?
A They were merely standing.

Q You are sure of that?


A Yes, sir.
Q And when you saw them standing, there were nothing or they did not create any commotion?
A None, sir.
Q Neither did you see them create commotion?
A None, sir.
Third, there was at all no ground, probable or otherwise, to believe that petitioner was armed with a deadly
weapon. None was visible to Yu, for as he admitted, the alleged grenade was discovered inside the front waistline of
petitioner, and from all indications as to the distance between Yu and petitioner, any telltale bulge, assuming that
petitioner was indeed hiding a grenade, could not have been visible to Yu. In fact, as noted by the trial court:
When the policemen approached the accused and his companions, they were not yet aware that a handgrenade
was tucked inside his waistline. They did not see any bulging object in [sic] his person. What is unequivocal then in
this case are blatant violations of petitioners rights solemnly guaranteed in Sections 2 and 12(1) of Article III of the
Constitution.

Batch 2
11. NOLASCO VS PANO, 147 SCRA 509
Facts: ROQUE was accused of the crime of Rebellion in a prior case, she was AT LARGE at the time she was arrested.
NOLASCO and TOLENTINO were also arrested due to a WARRANT which they challenged as being null and void.
Along with the arrest, there were many articles seized as a result of the search that followed the arrest.
Issues: Validity of the search warrant. Validity of the arrest, search and seizure. WON the things that were seized by
an illegal search warrant should be returned.
Ruling: Section 3, Article IV of the Constitution, guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose. It also
specifically provides that no Search Warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the Judge or
such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to
be seized.

10. PEOPLE V. CUIZON 256 SCRA 320


FACTS:
Vuizon and his wife arrived from Hong Kong, at the arrival area they allegedly handed four (4) bags to Paul Lee and
Steve Pua who boarded a taxi immediately after the event. The NBI agents were observing the activities because of the
earlier tip given to them. Because of some uncontrolled event they were not able to apprehend Lee and Pua so they
decided to pursue them, based on the tips given to them that the two (2) will be staying at ManilaPeninsula Hotel.
They apprehended Lee and Pua inside their hotel room confiscating the four bags and was opened in the presence of
Col. Regino Arellano, Chief security of the hotel. Consequently, Cuizon was also apprehended in his house at
Caloocan that same day. They were brought to the NBI headquarters and subsequently referred to the prosecution
division of the DOJ for Inquest. And was charged violating Section 15 of RA 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous
Drug Act of 1972. Appellant Cuiszon challenges the validity and legality of his warrantless arrest and the search and
seizure incidental thereto.
ISSUE: W/N the accused were caught in flagrante delicto, justifying the search without a warrant.
RULING: The SC did not agree that the accused were caught in flagrante delicto. The requirements stated in Section 5
of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court on lawful arrest without warrant are not present in the case at bar, for at the time of
their arrest, appellants Pua and Lee were merely resting in the hotel room, and appellant Cuizon for his part was in
bed resting with his wife and child. No offense had just been committed or being actually committed or being
attempted by any of the accused in the presence of the lawmen. It is well entrenched in this country is the rule that no
arrest, search and seizure can be made without a valid warrant issued by a competent judicial authority, guaranteed
by section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constituiton. It is evident and clear that the NBI agents gravely mishandled the
drug bust operation and in the process violated the constitutional guarantees against unlawful arrests and illegal
searches and seizures.
The Search Warrant authorizes the seizure of personal properties vaguely described and not particularized.
It is an all- embracing description which includes everything conceivable regarding the Communist Party of the
Philippines and the National Democratic Front. It does not specify what the subversive books and instructions are;
what the manuals not otherwise available to the public contain to make them subversive or to enable them to be used
for the crime of rebellion. It is in the nature of a general warrant and infringes on the constitutional mandate requiring
particular description of the things to be seized.
The lack of particularization is also evident in the examination of the witness presented by the applicant for
Search Warrant. The questions propounded by respondent Executive Judge to the applicant's witness are not
sufficiently searching to establish probable cause. The "probable cause" required to justify the issuance of a search
warrant comprehends such facts and circumstances as will induce a cautious man to rely upon them and act in
pursuant thereof.
Notwithstanding the irregular issuance of the Search Warrant and although, ordinarily, the articles seized
under an invalid search warrant should be returned, they cannot be ordered returned in the case at bar to AGUILARROQUE. Some searches may be made without a warrant. Thus, Section 12, Rule 126, Rules of Court, explicitly
provides:
Section 12. Search without warrant of person arrested.A person charged with an offense may be
searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of
the offense.
The provision is declaratory in the sense that it is confined to the search, without a search warrant, of a
person who had been arrested. It is also a general rule that, as an incident of an arrest, the place or premises where the
arrest was made can also be search without a search warrant. In this latter case, "the extent and reasonableness of the

search must be decided on its own facts and circumstances, and it has been stated that, in the application of general
rules, there is some confusion in the decisions as to what constitutes the extent of the place or premises which may be
searched. "What must be considered is the balancing of the individual's right to privacy and the public's interest in
the prevention of crime and the apprehension of criminals."
Considering that AGUILAR-ROQUE has been charged with Rebellion, which is a crime against public
order; that the warrant for her arrest has not been served for a considerable period of time; that she was arrested
within the general vicinity of her dwelling; and that the search of her dwelling was made within a half hour of her
arrest, we are of the opinion that in her respect, the search at No. 239-B Mayon Street, Quezon City, did not need a
search warrant; this, for possible effective results in the interest of public order. Such being the case, the personalities
seized may be retained. by CSG, for possible introduction as evidence in the Rebellion Case, leaving it to AGUILARROQUE to object to their relevance and to ask Special Military Commission No.1 to return to her any and all irrelevant
documents and articles.
Wherefore, while Search Warrant No. 80-84 issued on August 6, 1984 by respondent Executive Judge Ernani
Cruz Pao is hereby annulled and set aside, and the Temporary Restraining Order enjoining respondent from
introducing evidence obtained pursuant to the Search Warrant in the Subversive Documents case hereby made
permanent, the, personalities seized may be retained by the Constabulary Security Group for possible introduction as
evidence in Criminal Case No. SMC-1-1, pending before Special Military commission No. 1, without prejudice to
petitioner Mila Aguilar-Roque objecting to their relevance and asking said Commission to return to her any and all
irrelevant documents and articles.

12. PADILLA v. CA, G. R. No. 121917 July 31, 1996


FACTS:
Appellant Robin C. Padilla was charged with violation of PD. No. 1866 for the illegal possession of firearms. Pending
trial, appellant was released on bail. Appellant was then convicted and meted an indeterminate penalty of 17 years, 4
months and 1 day as minimum to 21 years of reclusion perpetua. He appealed but was denied by the Court of
Appeals (CA) Appellant's bail bond was cancelled and his arrest was ordered. Appellant filed a petition with an
application for bail. Appellant moved for the separate resolution of his bail application.
ISSUE: Whether or not appellant is entitled to bail.
RULING: No. Appellant is not entitled to bail. As held by the Court in People v Nitcha, when the accused is charged
with a capital offense, or an offense punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, and evidence of guilt is
strong, bail shall be denied. Section 7 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court provides that capital offense or an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment is not bailable. DOCTRINE: Capital offense or an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment is not bailable.

13. PEOPLE VS. DEL ROSARIO, GR 127755, 14 APRIL 1999


Facts: On 13 May 1996 between 6:00 and 6:30 p.m., Paul Vincent Alonzo stopped his tricycle by the side of Nita's
Drugstore, General Luna St., Cabanatuan City, when three women flagged him. Parked at a distance of about 1
meters in front of him was a tricycle driven by Joselito del Rosario y Pascual. At that point, Alonzo saw 2 men and a
woman (Virginia Bernas) grappling for possession of a bag. After taking hold of the bag one of the two men (Ernesto
"Jun" Marquez) armed with a gun started chasing a man who was trying to help the woman, while the other snatcher
("Dodong" Bisaya) kicked the woman sending her to the ground. Soon after, the armed man returned and while the
woman was still on the ground he shot her on the head. The bag taken by the man was brought to the tricycle of del

Rosario where someone inside (Virgilio "Boy" Santos) received the bag. The armed man then sat behind the driver
while his companion entered the sidecar. When the tricycle sped away Alonzo gave chase and was able to get the plate
number of the tricycle. He also recognized the driver, after which he went to the nearest police headquarters and
reported the incident. Upon finding the name of the owner of the tricycle, SP04 Geronimo de Leon and his team
proceeded to Bakod Bayan in the house of the barangay captain where the owner of the tricycle was summoned and
who in turn revealed the driver's name and was invited for interview. Del Rosario volunteered to name his passengers
on 13 May 1996. On the way to the police station, del Rosario informed them of the bag and lunch kit's location and
the placewhere the hold-uppers may be found and they reported these findings to their officers, Capt. Biag and Capt.
Cruz. After lunch, they proceeded to Brgy. Dicarma composed of 15 armed men where a shoot-out transpired that
lasted from 1:00 to 4:00 p.m.
After a brief encounter, they went inside the house where they found Marquez dead holding a magazine
and a gun. While all of these were happening, del Rosario was at the back of the school, handcuffed by the police
because allegedly they had already gathered enough evidence against him and they were afraid that he might attempt
to escape. After the encounter, they went back to the police station. The investigator took the statement of del Rosario
on 14 May 1996, and was only subscribed on 22 May 1996. All the while, he was detained in the police station as
ordered by the Fiscal. His statements were only signed on 16 May 1996. He also executed a waiver of his detention. His
Sinumpaang Salaysay was done with the assistance of Ex-Judge Talavera. Del Rosario, on the other hand, claimed that
he was hired for P120.00 by "Boy" Santos to drive him to a cockpit at the Blas Edward Coliseum but was directed him
to proceed to the market place to fetch "Jun" Marquez and "Dodong" Bisaya; where the robbery homicide occurred. He
claimed that the 3 men alighted and warned del Rosario not to inform the police authorities about the incident
otherwise he and his family would be harmed. Del Rosario then went home. Because of the threat, however, he did not
report the matter to the owner of the tricycle nor to the barangay captain and the police. Del Rosario, Marquez, Santos,
and John Doe alias "Dodong" were charged with the special complex crime of Robbery with Homicide for having
robbed Virginia Bernas, a 66-year old businesswoman, of P200,000.00 in cash and jewelry and on the occasion thereof
shot and killed her. While del Rosario pleaded not guilty, Santos and alias "Dodong" remained at large.
Thus, only del Rosario was tried. The trial court found del Rosario guilty as co-principal in the crime of
Robbery with Homicide and sentencing him to death, and to pay the heirs of victim Virginia Bernas P550,000.00 as
actual damages and P100,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages. Hence, the automatic review.
Issue: Whether del Rosario was deprived of his rights during custodial investigation at the time he was invited for
questioning at the house ofthe barangay captain.
Ruling: Del Rosario was deprived of his rights during custodial investigation. From the time he was invited" for
questioning at the house of the barangay captain, he was already under effective custodial investigation, but he was
not apprised nor made aware thereof by the investigating officers. The police already knew the name of the tricycle
driver and the latter was already a suspect in the robbing and senseless slaying of Virginia Bernas. Since the
prosecution failed to establish that del Rosario had waived his right to remain silent, his verbal admissions on his
participation in the crime even before his actual arrest were inadmissible against him, as the same transgressed the
safeguards provided by law and the Bill of Rights. Herein, like victim Virginia Bernas, del Rosario too was a hapless
victim who was forcibly used by other persons with nefarious designs to perpetrate a dastardly act. Del Rosario's
defense of "irresistible force" has been substantiated by clear and convincing evidence. Del Rosario was threatened
with a gun. He could not therefore be expected to flee nor risk his life to help a stranger. A person under the same
circumstances would be more concerned with his personal welfare and security rather than the safety of a person
whom he only saw for the first time that day. On the other hand, conspiracy between him and his co-accused was not
proved beyond a whimper of a doubt by the prosecution, thus clearing del Rosario of any complicity in the crime
charged.

14. People v. Rodriguez; G.R. No. 79965; May 25, 1994

FACTS: The facts, as found by the trial court and presented by the Solicitor General, are as follows:
On July 21, 1981, at about 3:00 o'clock (sic) in the afternoon, the Tabaco Police Station received a report from
an unidentified telephone caller that somebody was selling marijuana inside the Wonder Dog Circus. Forthwith, Pats.
Rogelio Gonzales and Benito Bongalos proceeded to the Wonder Dog Circus near the public market of Tabaco, to
verify the report. Arriving at the place, they spotted appellant Pablo Rodriquez and Gregorio Abrera acting
suspiciously. Abrera was putting marijuana inside his pocket. Accordingly, Pats. Gonzales and Bongalos approached
appellant and Abrera and, after introducing themselves as police officers, placed the two under arrest. Pat. Gonzales
found a small packet containing marijuana (Exhibit "B") inside the right side pocket of appellant's pants. Upon the
other hand, Abrera voluntarily handed over a plastic tea bag containing marijuana (Exhibit "C") to Pat. Gonzales.
Appellant and Abrera were then brought to the police station where they, as well as the items confiscated from them,
were turned over to Cpl. Santos Colarina, Chief Investigator of the Tabaco Police Station. When investigated, Abrera
voluntarily admitted having possessed the marijuana confiscated from him but pointed at appellant as the one who
gave him the marijuana and blamed appellant for it (Exhibit "D"). Even as appellant heard Abrera making said
statements, appellant kept silent and failed to react. Lt. Lorlie Arroyo, Forensic Chemist of the PC Crime Laboratory,
Camp Bagong Ibalon, Legaspi City, conducted an examination on the items seized from the appellant and Abrera and
found them to be positive of marijuana. Consequently, appellant was charged with violating Section 4, Article II, of R.
A. No. 6425, as amended. Abrera, upon the other hand, was not similarly charged presumably because he was a user.
Anyway, it was allegedly the Station Commander of the Tabaco Police Station who opted not to press charges against
Abrera.

ISSUE: WON the accused has been wrongly convicted based on the marijuana seized by the arresting officers without
a warrant.

suspicion that he is engaged in some felonious enterprise, and in order to discover if he has indeed committed a crime,
it is not only the arrest which is illegal but also, the search on the occasion thereof as being "the fruit of the poisonous
three" (In that event, any evidence taken, even if confirmatory of the initial suspicion, is inadmissible "for any purpose
in any proceeding". The marijuana supposedly confiscated from appellant is therefore inadmissible in evidence for
having been taken in violation of his constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures.

15. PEOPLE v. CLAUDIO, 160 SCRA 648

FACTS: On July 21 1981, Anita Claudio, without being lawfully authorized, transported 1.1 kilos of Marijuana dried
leaves, which are prohibited drugs for the purpose of selling the same from Baguio City to Olongapo City. The lower
court established her guilt beyond reasonable doubt on the basis of the prosecution's evidence. However, upon appeal,
she challenged, among others, the legality of the warrantless search and seizure.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was a valid warrantless search and seizure.
RULING: The warrantless search and seizure was valid applying the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. 1 Claudio was
caught transporting prohibited drugs hence there was no need for a warrant to arrest Claudio as the latter was caught
in flagrante delicto. The warrantless search being an incident to a lawful arrest is in itself lawful. (Nolasco v. Pano, 147
SCRA 509). Therefore, there was no infirmity in the seizure of the 1.1 kilos of marijuana. The court had carefully
examined the records of the case and found no ground to alter the trial court's findings and appreciation of the
evidence presented. Credence was accorded to the prosecution's evidence, more so as it consisted mainly of
testimonies of policemen. Law enforcers are presumed to have regularly performed their duty in the absence of proof
to the contrary (People v. De Jesus, 145 SCRA 521). The court also found no reason from the records why the
prosecution witnesses should fabricate their testimonies and implicate appellant in such a serious crime (See People v.
Bautista, 147 SCRA 500). The accused testified that she was not on that bus that came from Baguio City but rather she
was in Olongapo City all that time. She alleged that she was arrested by Pat. Obia for no reason at all. However, alibi
does not deserve much credit as it was established only by the accused herself (People v. De la Cruz, 148 SCRA 582).
Moreover, it is a well-established rule that alibi cannot prevail over positive testimony (People v. De La Cruz,supra).

1 Rule 113, Sec. 5(a): A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:(a)
RULING: YES. Admittedly, Pat. Gonzales searched appellant without a warrant. It is contended however that the
warrantless search was incidental to a lawful arrest. The arrest of appellant itself was also made without a warrant of
arrest. In such a case, the arrest can be justified only if there was a crime committed in the presence of the arresting
officers. The arresting officers went to the "Wonder Dog Circus" to verify a telephone call that a person with a
knapsack had marijuana in his possession. Pat. Gonzales admitted that they arrested appellant because he acted
suspiciously. Pat. Bongalos also admitted that he did not personally know whether appellant was in possession of the
prohibited drug. There is no evidence to show that appellant was committing any crime at the time of his arrest. The
cardinal rule is that no person may be subjected by the police to a search of his house, body or personal belonging
except by virtue of a search warrant or on the occasion of a lawful arrest. "If a person is searched without a warrant, or
under circumstances other than those justifying an arrest without warrant in accordance with law, merely on

When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense.

Rule 126, Sec. 12:Search incident to lawful arrest. A person lawfully arrested may be searched for
dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a
search warrant. (12a)

16. PEOPLE VS MARIBEL LAGMAN, G.R. NO. 168695, DECEMBER 8, 2008


FACTS: After receiving reports of clandestine operation of shabu laboratories in Pampanga, the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) conducted in January 1996 surveillance of a piggery farm in Porac which was reportedly being
used as a front therefor. It was gathered that three Chinese nationals, namely Zeng Wa Shui (Zeng), Li Wien Shien (Li)
and Jojo Gan (Gan) occupied the farm, and Maribel frequented the place while Zeng and Li would go over to her
rented house in 2609 San Francisco, Balibago, Angeles City which she was sharing with her Chinese common-law
husband, Jose Bobby Yu. In the early morning of March 14, 1996, two NBI teams, armed with search warrants,
simultaneously raided the Porac farm and the Balibago residence.
The search of the farm, covered by Search Warrant No. 96-102, yielded no person therein or any tell-tale
evidence that it was being used as a shabu laboratory. Only pigs in their pens, and two (2) containers or drums the
contents of which when field-tested on-the-spot by NBI chemist Januario Bautista turned out to be acetone and ethyl,
were found.
Li arrived around 10am and search of Lis vehicle, a blue Toyota Corolla sedan, yielded a digital weighing
scale and a packet with crystalline substance weighing approximately 317.60 grams which when field-tested by NBI
Chemist Januario Bautista, was found positive for shabu. At around 12:00 noon, Zeng arrived at the farm on board an
L-300 Mitsubishi van bearing a blue drum containing liquid which, when field-tested on the spot also by NBI Chemist
Bautista, was found positive for shabu.
With respect to the search of the Balibago residence by the other NBI team by virtue of Search Warrant No.
96-101, since Maribel was out, she was fetched from her place of business. They found two padlocked rooms inside the
house, but with Maribel claiming that she did not have any keys thereto, the team forcibly opened the rooms which
yielded 18 big plastic containers containing liquid substance, sacks containing a white powdery substance, 10 plastic
containers also containing a white powdery substance, plastic gallons, a refrigerator, a big blower, pails, plastic bags, a
big glass flask, and a .25 caliber handgun.
The liquid substance contained in of the 18 plastic containers was subjected to a chemical field-test and was
found positive for shabu. The contents of the drums turned out to be alcohol solvents; the powder in the sacks was
determined to be ephedrine hydrochloride; and the liquid in the plastic containers was determined to be sodium
hydroxide. These chemicals are used in the manufacture of shabu.
Li, Zeng and Lagman were all charged in violation of RA 7659 (Dangerous Drug Act). Only Zeng and
Lagman were convicted.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Search Warrant No. 96-101 is invalid for not having identified Lagman with particularity.
(Lagmans contention)
2. Whether or not the blue drum was admissible since it was not included as subject of Search Warrant No. 96102. (Zengs contention)
RULING:
1.

No. Under Sec. 3, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, the requirements for the issuance of a valid search
warrant are:
Sec. 3. Requisites for issuing search warrant.
A search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with
one specific offense to be determined by the judge or such other responsible officer
authorized by law after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and
the things to be seized.

The Rule does not require that the search warrant should identify with particularity the person
against whom it is directed. It suffices that the place to be searched and things to be seized are described. In
this case, the wording of Search Warrant No. 96-101 sufficiently complies with the requirement for a valid
search warrant as it describes the place to be searched and the items to be seized.
2.

No. the Constitution prohibits search and seizure without a judicial warrant, and any evidence
obtained without such warrant is inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. The prohibition is
not absolute, however. Search and seizure may be made without a warrant and the evidence obtained
therefrom may be admissible in the following instances: (1) search incident to a lawful arrest; (2) search
of a moving motor vehicle; (3) search in violation of customs laws; (4) seizure of evidence in plain view;
and (5) when the accused himself waives his right against unreasonable searches and seizures.

The search made on the van driven by Zeng falls within the purview of the plain view doctrine.
Objects falling in plain view of an officer who has a right to be in a position to have that view are subject to
seizure even without a search warrant and may be introduced in evidence. The 'plain view' doctrine applies
when the following requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior
justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of
evidence in plain view is inadvertent; (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes
may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. The law enforcement officer must
lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly be in a position from which he can particularly view the
area. In the course of such lawful intrusion, he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating
the accused. The object must be open to eye and hand and its discovery inadvertent.
Search Warrant No. 96-102 named Zeng, a.k.a. Alex Chan, as one of the subjects thereof. When he
arrived in his L-300 van at the piggery during the NBIs stakeout, he came within the area of the search. The
drum alleged to have contained the methamphetamine was placed in the open back of the van, hence, open
to the eye and hand of the NBI agents. The liquid-filled drum was thus within the plain view of the NBI
agents, hence, a product of a legal search.

17. PEOPLE V MALASUGUI, G.R. NO. L-44335 JULY 30, 1936


FACTS:
Tan Why, a Chinese merchant, was found lying on the ground;
he received a wound on the upper part of his forehead, which necessarily proved fatal because it fractured his skull.
The death of Tan Why was imputed to the herein accused who was charged with the crime of robbery with homicide.
He was convicted of said crime and sentenced to reclusion perpetua. When Tan Why was found on the morning in
question, he was still alive and able to answer laconically Kagui!, when Moro Alamada, was among the first to
approach him, asked who had attacked him. Whereupon Lieutenant Jacaria of the Constabulary ordered his
immediate arrest. The accused was arrested shortly in th emorning of the same day, and after he had been brought to
Lieutenant Jacaria, who had already been informed, that he had just redeemed two pairs of bracelets from some
pawnshops of Cotabato and that he carried money, said lieutenant asked him for the bracelets and he then voluntarily
and without protest produced what now appear in the record as Exhibit A. He was later searched, without opposition
or protest on his part, and it was discovered that he also had the pocketbook Exhibit B, containing P92 in bills Exhibit
C, Tan Whys identification card and a memorandum of amounts with some Chinese characters Exhibit D. The
appellant testified at the trial that Lieutenant Jacaria and Sergeant Urangut had forcibly and through intimidation
taken from him the materials seized.

10

ISSUE: Whether he was subjected to the rigor of an unreasonable search to dispossess him of his effects without
judicial warrant
HELD: The appellant permitted them to search his person and to take from him the articles in question to be used as
evidence against him in due time; at least, he neither made any objection nor even muttered a bit of protest. When one
voluntarily submits to a search or consents to have it made of his person or premises, he is precluded from later
complaining thereof. (Cooley, Constitutional imitations, 7th ed., vol. 8 page 9) The right to be secure
from unreasonable search may, like every right, be waived and such waiver may be made either expressly
or impliedly. On the other hand, the appellant was then charged with the crime, imputed to him by Tan Why before
the latters death, of having assaulted the deceased; that he was then also known to be carrying much money; and that
a few moments before he was brought to Lieutenant Jacaria, and shortly after the assault on Tan Why, he was able to
redeem two pairs of bracelets from two persons to whom he had pledge them several months before. These are
circumstances which undoubtedly warranted his arrest without a previous judicial warrant, only upon a verbal order
from said officer to Sergeant Urangut, or of the latters own will, inasmuch as he had direct knowledge of the
aggression committed on the person of Tan Why, his violent death, the revelation made by Tan Why before his death
naming the appellant as the author of the of the aggression, and the other circumstances already stated. This is
so because under the law, members of Consular Police or Constabulary as well as those of the municipal police and of
chartered cities like Manila and Baguio, and even of may make arrests without judicial warrant, not only when a crime
is committed or about to be committed in their presence but also when there is reason to believe or sufficient round to
suspect that one has been committed and that it was committed by the person arrested by them. Section 105 of
General Orders No 58 reads as a person charged with a crime may be marched for dangerous weapons or anything
which may be used as proof of the commission of the crime. Article 2, section 1, paragraph 3, of our Constitution is
identical in all respects to the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States; and said constitutional
precept has been interpreted as not prohibiting arrests, searches and seizures without judicial warrant, but only
those that are unreasonable. When the search of the person detained or arrested and the seizure of the effects found in
his possession are incidental to an arrest made in conformity with the law, they cannot be considered unreasonable,
much less unlawful. This case is so plain that it suffices to say so. His testimony cannot prevail against nor is it
sufficient to counteract that of the government witnesses, Lieutenant Jacaria and Sergeant Urangut. Also the effects
found in his possession of a person detained or arrested are perfectly admissible as evidence against him, if they
constitute the corpus delicti or are pertinent or relevant thereto.

18. People v. Musa, G.R. No. 96177, January 27, 1993


Facts: In the morning of December 13, 1989, T/Sgt. Belarga, leader of a NARCOTICS COMMAND (NARCOM) team
instructed Sgt. Ani to conduct surveillance and test buy on a certain Mari Musa. An information was received from a
civilian informer that Musa was engaged in selling marijuana. So Sgt. Ani proceeded to Musas house and was able to
buy one newspaper-wrapped dried marijuana for P10.00. Sgt. Ani returned to the NARCOM office and turned over
the newspaper-wrapped marijuana to T/Sgt. Jesus Belarga. Sgt. Belarga inspected the stuff turned over to him and
found it to be marijuana.
The next day, December 14, 1989, about 1:30 P.M., a buy-bust was planned. Sgt. Ani was assigned as the
poseur buyer for which purpose he was given P20.00 by Belarga. Sgt. Ani proceeded to the house of Musa, while the
rest of the NARCOM group positioned themselves at strategic places about 90 to 100 meters from Musa's house.
T/Sgt. Belarga could see what went on between Ani and suspect Musa from where he was. The selling of the item
took place. And after Sgt. Ani was convinced that the contents were marijuana, Ani walked back towards his
companions and raised his right hand as a signal to his companions. The NARCOM team then went to Musas house.
Sgt. Belarga frisked Musa but could not find the P20.00 marked money with him. Musa was then asked where the
P20.00 was and he told the NARCOM team he has given the money to his wife (who had slipped away). Sgt. Belarga

however, found a plastic bag containing dried marijuana inside it, somewhere in the kitchen. Musa was then placed
under arrest and brought to the NARCOM office.
As a defense, Musa narrated that the three NARCOM agents did not ask permission to enter the house but
simply announced that they were NARCOM agents. The NARCOM agents searched his house without a search
warrant.
Issue:
(1)
(2)

Whether or not Musa is guilty of selling marijuana in violation of Article II, Section 4 of Republic Act No.
6425?
Whether or not the plastic bag containing marijuana is admissible as evidence?

Ruling:
1)
Yes. Musa, is guilty of selling marijuana in violation of Art. II, Sec. 4 of R.A. 6425. Musas contention that he
could not have transacted with Sgt. Ani because they do not know each other is w/o merit. The Court has held that
what matters is not an existing familiarity between the buyer and the seller, for quite often, the parties to the
transaction may be strangers, but their agreement and the acts constituting the sale and delivery of the marijuana.
Also, Musas reasoning, that he could not have sold the marijuana because his family was present is w/o merit. The
Court ruled that the fact that the other people inside the appellant's house are known to the appellant may have given
him some assurance that these people will not report him to the authorities. Musas reasoning that T/Sgt. Belarga
could not have possibly witnessed the sale of the marijuana because they were far away from the scene, is also w/o
merit. The Court has ruled that the fact that the police officers who accompanied the poseur-buyer were unable to see
exactly what the appellant gave the poseur-buyer because of their distance or position will not be fatal to the
prosecution's case provided there exists other evidence, direct or circumstantial, e.g., the testimony of the poseurbuyer, which is sufficient to prove the consummation of the sale of the prohibited drug.
2)

No. However, the seizure and admission as evidence of the plastic bag containing marijuana which the NARCOM
agents found in the appellant's kitchen, was completely wrong. The marijuana is inadmissible as evidence. Built into
the Constitution are guarantees on the freedom of every individual against unreasonable searches and seizures as
provided for in Article III, Section 2. The doctrine laid down in Stonehill v. Diokno, declares inadmissible, any evidence
obtained in violation of the freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures. There are however exceptions.
In Alvero v. Dizon, the Court stated that the most important exception to the necessity for a search warrant is the right
of search and seizure as an incident to a lawful arrest as provided in Rule 126, Section 12 of the Rules of Court. The
Court has ruled that an officer making an arrest may take from the person arrested any money or property found
upon his person which was used in the commission of the crime or was the fruit of the crime or which might furnish
the prisoner with the means of committing violence or of escaping, or which may be used as evidence in the trial of
the cause. Hence, in a buy-bust operation conducted to entrap a drug-pusher, the law enforcement agents may seize
the marked money found on the person of the pusher immediately after the arrest even without arrest and search
warrants.
The warrantless search and seizure, as an incident to a suspect's lawful arrest, may extend beyond the
person of the one arrested to include the premises or surroundings under his immediate control. The U.S. Supreme
Court ruled that the warrantless seizure of the marijuana was legal on the basis of the "plain view" doctrine and
upheld the admissibility of the seized drugs as part of the prosecution's evidence. The "plain view" doctrine is usually
applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes
across an incriminating object. What the "plain view" cases have in common is that the police officer in each of them
had a prior justification for an intrusion in the course of which he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence

11

incriminating the accused. The "plain view" doctrine may not be used to extend a general exploratory search from one
object to another until something incriminating at last emerges.
It has also been suggested that even if an object is observed in "plain view," the "plain view" doctrine will
not justify the seizure of the object where the incriminating nature of the object is not apparent from the "plain view"
of the object. The plastic bag was not within their "plain view" when they arrested the appellant as to justify its
seizure. The NARCOM agents had to move from one portion of the house to another before they sighted the plastic
bag. The NARCOM agents in this case went from room to room with the obvious intention of fishing for more
evidence. Moreover, when the NARCOM agents saw the plastic bag hanging in one corner of the kitchen, they had no
clue as to its contents. They had to ask the appellant what the bag contained. The NARCOM agents in this case could
not have discovered the inculpatory nature of the contents of the bag had they not forcibly opened it. Even assuming
then, that the NARCOM agents inadvertently came across the plastic bag because it was within their "plain view,"
what may be said to be the object in their "plain view" was just the plastic bag and not the marijuana. The plastic bag
was therefore seized illegally and cannot be presented in evidence pursuant to Article III, Section 3(2) of the
Constitution.
The exclusion of this particular evidence does not, however, diminish, in any way, the damaging effect of the
other pieces of evidence presented by the prosecution to prove that the appellant sold marijuana, in violation of
Article II, Section 4 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. By virtue of the testimonies of Sgt. Ani and T/Sgt. Belarga
and the two wrappings of marijuana sold by the appellant to Sgt. Ani, among other pieces of evidence, the guilt of the
appellant of the crime charged has been proved beyond reasonable doubt. Musa is still therefore guilty of the crime.

Issue: Whether the seized homemade firearm was admissible in evidence.

Held: Yes. Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, however, accused-appellant's arguments are hardly tenable.
He and his companions' drunken actuations aroused the suspicion of SPO3 Nio's group, as well as the fact that he
himself was attired in a camouflage uniform or a jungle suit and that upon espying the peace officers, his companions
fled. It should be noted that the peace officers were precisely on an intelligence mission to verify reports that armed
persons were roaming around the barangays of Caibiran.

The case herein constitutes an instance where a search and seizure may be effected without first making an arrest.
There was justifiable cause to "stop and frisk" Solayao when his companions fled upon seeing the government agents.
Under the circumstances, the government agents could not possibly have procured a search warrant first. Thus, there
was no violation of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures. Nor was there error on
the part of the trial court when it admitted the homemade firearm as evidence.

20. PEOPLE vs. ARUTA, G.R. No. 120915 April 3, 1998


19. PEOPLE V. SOLAYAO, 262 SCRA 255, GR 119220, SEPTEMBER 20, 1996

Facts: On June 9, 1992, CAFGU members, headed by SPO3 Nino, were conducting an intelligence patrol to verify
reports on the presence of armed persons roaming around the barangays of Caibiran. In Baragay Onion, they met the
5-man group of accused Nilo Solayao, who was also wearing a camouflage uniform. His companions, upon seeing the
government agents, fled. SPO3 Nio told Salayao not to run away and introduced himself as "PC," after which he
seized the dried coconut leaves which the latter was carrying and found wrapped in it a 49-inch long homemade
firearm locally known as "latong." When he asked Salayao who issued him a license to carry said firearm or whether
he was connected with the military or any intelligence group, the latter answered that he had no permission to
possess the same. Thereupon, SPO3 Nio confiscated the firearm and turned him over to the custody of the policemen
of Caibiran who subsequently investigated him and charged him with illegal possession of firearm. Salayao did not
contest the confiscation of the shotgun but averred that this was only given to him by one of his companions,
Hermogenes Cenining, when it was still wrapped in coconut leaves, which they were using the coconut leaves as a
torch. Salayaos claim was corroborated by one Pedro Balano. On August 15, 1994, the RTC of Naval Biliran (Branch 16)
found Salayao guilty of illegal possession of firearm under Section 1 of PD 1866 and imposed upon him the penalty of
imprisonment ranging from reclusion temporal maximum to reclusion perpetua. The trial court, having found no
mitigating but one aggravating circumstance of nighttime, sentenced accused-appellant to suffer the prison term of
reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties provided by law. Salayao appealed to the Supreme Court.

FACTS: Accused-appellant was arrested and charged with violating Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425 or
the Dangerous Drugs Act.
On December 13, 1988, P/Lt. Abello was tipped off by his informant that a certain "Aling Rosa" would be
arriving from Baguio City the following day with a large volume of marijuana. Acting on said tip, P/Lt. Abello
assembled a team composed of P/Lt. Jose Domingo, Sgt. Angel Sudiacal, Sgt. Oscar Imperial, Sgt. Danilo Santiago and
Sgt. Efren Quirubin. Said team proceeded at around 4:00 in the afternoon and deployed themselves near the PNB
building, dividing themselves into two groups. While thus positioned, a Victory Liner Bus stopped in front of the PNB
building at around 6:30 in the evening where two females and a male got off. It was at this stage that the informant
pointed out to the team "Aling Rosa" who was then carrying a traveling bag. The team approached her and introduced
themselves as NARCOM agents. When P/Lt. Abello asked "Aling Rosa" about the contents of her bag, the latter
handed it to the former. Upon inspection, the bag was found to contain dried marijuana leaves packed in a plastic bag
marked "Cash Katutak." The team confiscated the bag together with the Victory Liner bus ticket to which Lt. Domingo
affixed his signature. Accused-appellant was then brought to the NARCOM office for investigation where a Receipt of
Property Seized was prepared for the confiscated marijuana leaves. The RTC convicted accused-appellant.
ISSUE: Whether or not the warrantless search resulting to the arrest of accused-appellant violated the latter's
constitutional rights.
RULING: YES. In the instant case, the NARCOM agents were admittedly not armed with a warrant of arrest. To
legitimize the warrantless search and seizure of accused-appellant's bag, accused-appellant must have been validly
arrested under Section 5 of Rule 113 which provides inter alia:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person:

12

(a) When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense;
xxx xxx xxx
Accused-appellant Aruta cannot be said to be committing a crime. Neither was she about to commit one nor
had she just committed a crime. Accused-appellant was merely crossing the street and was not acting in any manner
that would engender a reasonable ground for the NARCOM agents to suspect and conclude that she was committing
a crime. It was only when the informant pointed to accused-appellant and identified her to the agents as the carrier of
the marijuana that she was singled out as the suspect. The NARCOM agents would not have apprehended accusedappellant were it not for the furtive finger of the informant because, as clearly illustrated by the evidence on record,
there was no reason whatsoever for them to suspect that accused-appellant was committing a crime, except for the
pointing finger of the informant. This the Court could neither sanction nor tolerate as it is a clear violation of the
constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure. Neither was there any semblance of any compliance
with the rigid requirements of probable cause and warrantless arrests.

Batch 3
21. SAYO VS. CHIEF OF POLICE, 80 PHIL 859
Facts: Bernardino Malinao filed a complaint of robbery against Melencio Sayo and Joaquin Mostero. In view of the
complaint, Benjamin Dumlao, a policeman of the City of Manila, arrested Sayo and Mostero, and presented a
complaint against them with the city fiscal's office of Manila. When the petition for habeas corpus was heard, Sayo and
Moster were still detained or under arrest, and the city fiscal had not yet released or filed charges against them with
the proper courts justice.

Consequently, there was no legal basis for the NARCOM agents to effect a warrantless search of accusedappellant's bag, there being no probable cause and the accused-appellant not having been lawfully arrested. Stated
otherwise, the arrest being incipiently illegal, it logically follows that the subsequent search was similarly illegal, it
being not incidental to a lawful arrest. The constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure must
perforce operate in favor of accused-appellant. As such, the articles seized could not be used as evidence against
accused-appellant for these are "fruits of a poisoned tree" and, therefore, must be rejected, pursuant to Article III, Sec.
3(2) of the Constitution.
In fine, there was really no excuse for the NARCOM agents not to procure a search warrant considering that
they had more than twenty-four hours to do so. Obviously, this is again an instance of seizure of the "fruit of the
poisonous tree," hence illegal and inadmissible subsequently in evidence. The exclusion of such evidence is the only
practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizure. The nonexclusionary rule is contrary to the letter and spirit of the prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures.
For lack of evidence to establish her guilt beyond reasonable doubt, accused-appellant ROSA ARUTA Y
MENGUIN is hereby ACQUITTED and ordered RELEASED from confinement.
2. No. A peace officer has no power or authority to arrest or detain a person charged with an offense upon complaint
of the offended party even though, after investigation, he becomes convinced that the accused is guilty of the offense
charged. What he or the complainant may do in such a case is to file a complaint with the city fiscal of Manila, or
directly with the justice of the peace of courts. If no charge is filed by the fiscal in court within six hours, the arresting
officer must release the detainee; otherwise, he will be guilty under Article 125.
3. Yes. Article 125 of the RPC punishes any public officer or employee who, after detaining a person, "shall fail to
deliver such person to the proper judicial authorities within the period of six hours." In the case at bar, the arresting
officer did not deliver Sayo and Mostero to any authority, and much less to any judicial authority. Their filing of a
complaint with the office of the fiscal of Manila is not a delivery of the persons of petitioners. The continued detention
and confinement of petitioners for more than six hours is a clear violation under Article 125 of the RPC. Hence, Sayo
and Mostero were immediately released.

Issues:
1. Is the city fiscal of Manila a judicial authority within the meaning of the provisions of article 125 of the Revised
Penal Code?

22. US V SANTOS, 36 PHIL 852, 1917

3. Was there any failure of delivery of the petitioners to the proper judicial authorities?

FACTS: Dionisio Santos, a policeman of Pateros, Province of Rizal, acting under the orders of his chief who desired to
put a stop to pilfering in a certain locality, patrolled this district, and about midnight, seeing two persons in front of an
uninhabited house and then entering an uninhabited camarin, arrested them without warrant, although no crime had
been committed, and took them to the municipal presidencia where they were detained in the jail for six or seven
hours when they were released.

Ruling:

ISSUE: Did the police officer make a valid warrantless arrest?

1. No. The words "judicial authority", as used in said article, mean the courts of justices or judges of said courts vested

RULING: YES. A peace officer can justify an arrest without warrant if there is reasonable ground of suspicion tending
to show that a person has committed or is about to commit any crime or breach of the peace, and if he acts in good
faith. Under such conditions, even if the suspected person is later found to be innocent, he peace officer is not liable.
The courts should not expect too much of an ordinary policeman. So a policeman, acting under the order of his chief
who desires to put a stop to pilfering in a certain locality, patrolled this district and about midnight seeing two persons
in front of an uninhabited house and then entering an uninhabited camarin, arrested them without warrant, although
no crime had been committed, is not guilty of coercion or arbitrary detention.

2. Does the peace officer have the authority to arrest a person without a warrant upon complaint?

with judicial power to order the temporary detention or confinement of a person charged with having committed a
public offense, that is, "the Supreme Court and such inferior courts as may be established by law". Judicial authority
mentioned in Article 125 of the RPC cannot be considered to include the fiscal of the City of Manila or any other city,
because they cannot issue a warrant of arrest or of commitment or temporary confinement of a person surrendered to
legalize the detention of a person arrested without warrant.

Judgment is reversed and the defendant and appellant (Santos) acquitted.

13

23. UMIL V. RAMOS, 202 SCRA


Facts: The case is composed of 8 petitions for habeas corpus which assails the validity of the arrest and searches made by
the military on petitioners. The arrests relied on the confidential information that the authorities received. Except for one case
where inciting to sedition was charged, the rest are charged with subversion for being a member of the New Peoples Army.
ISSUE: Whether or not the warrantless arrests and searches were valid.
RULING: There can be no dispute that, as a general rule, no peace officer or person has the power or authority to arrest
anyo without a warrant of arrest, except in those cases express authorized by law.In this case, the arrests were legal under
Section 5, paragraph (b), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, which requires two (2) conditions for a valid arrestt without
warrant: first, that the person to be arrested has just committed an offense, and second, that the arresting peace officer
or private person has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested is the one who committed
the offense. Section 5(b), Rule 113, it will be noted, refers to arrests without warrant, based on "personal knowledge of
facts" acquired by the arresting officer or private person.
Regarding the subversion (membership of the NPA) cases, the arrests were legal since subversion is a form of a continuing crime
together with rebellion, conspiracy or proposal to commit rebellion/subversion, and crimes committed in furtherance thereof or in
connection therewith. On the inciting to sedition case, the arrest was legal since an information was filed prior to his arrest. Lastly,
the arrests were not fishing expeditions but a result of an in-depth surveillance of NPA safe houses pinpointed by none other than
members of the NPA.
The right to preliminary investigation should be exercised by the offender as soon as possible. Otherwise, it would be considered as
impliedly waived and the filing of information can proceed. This sort of irregularity is not sufficient to set aside a valid judgment
upon a sufficient complaint and after a trial free from error.

24. PEOPLE VS TANGLIBEN, G.R. NO. 63630, 184 SCRA 220, APRIL 6, 1990
FACTS:

Tangliben was then taken to the the police headquarters in San Fernando, Pampanga;

The test conducted on the marijuana leaves yielded positive results;

Tangliben was found guilty of illegal possession of prohibited drugs (marijuana leaves).

ISSUE: Whether or not the marijuana allegedly seized from the accused was a product of an unlawful search without warrant and is
therefore inadmissible in evidence.
RULING: No. One of the exceptions to the general rule requiring a search warrant is a search incident to a lawful arrest. Thus, Section
12 of Rule 126 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:
Section 12. Search incident to a lawful arrest. A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or
anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant.
Meanwhile, Rule 113, Sec. 5(a) provides:
. . . A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense.
Accused was caught in flagrante, since he was carrying marijuana at the time of his arrest. This case therefore falls squarely within the
exception. The warrantless search was incident to a lawful arrest and is consequently valid. Also, the case presented urgency on the
part of the arresting police officers. There was an informer who pointed to the accused-appellant as carrying marijuana. Faced with
such on-the-spot information, the police officers had to act quickly. There was not enough time to secure a search warrant.

25. PP V MALBUENO ET AL. G.R. NO. 87179. DECEMBER 14, 1994

Patrolmen Silverio Quevedo and Romeo L. Punzalan were conducting surveillance mission at the Victory Liner Terminal
compound located at Barangay San Nicolas, San Fernando, Pampanga;

The surveillance was aimed not only against persons who may commit misdemeanors at the said place but also on persons
who may be engaging in the traffic of dangerous drugs based on informations supplied by informers;

Around 9:30 in the evening that said Patrolmen noticed a person carrying a traveling bag who was acting suspiciously;

They confronted him and requested him to open the red traveling bag but the person refused, only to accede later on when
the patrolmen identified themselves;

Found inside the bag were marijuana leaves wrapped in a plastic wrapper and weighing one kilo, more or less;

The person was asked of his name and the reason why he was at the said place and he gave his name as Medel Tangliben
and explained that he was waiting for a ride to Olongapo City to deliver the marijuana leaves;

Nature of the case: the accused-appellants filed an appeal on their conviction sentencing them to "suffer the penalty
of reclusion Perpetua contending that they were illegally arrested and searched.
FACTS: On July 18, 1987, the Special Operative Division of the Anti-Narcotics Unit of the Eastern Police District, Pasig,
received an information by telephone regarding the rampant peddling of marijuana in the vicinity of the Herbosa
Compound, Barangay Parang, Marikina. Thereafter the team conducted a surveillance in the place and the
surveillance yielded positive results finding three suspected drug pushers namely: Arturo Merabueno, Emmanuel F.
Trinidad and Fernando F. Basilio as the suspected pushers.
A buy bust operation was conducted, with Pat. Romeo Cavizo was as the poseur-buyer. When he spotted Merabueno
standing beside a tree near a store, he approached him as asked if he could "iskor ng damo" (buy marijuana) worth
P20.00. Merabueno agreed and accepted the money. Merabueno headed towards Trinidad to whom he gave the
marked twenty-peso bill. Trinidad handed him a packet, the size of a tea bag. After Merabueno left, Pat. Jocson and his
teammates accosted Trinidad.
After such incident, the police team secretly followed Balbueno to the town. They saw Merabueno talking with Basilio.
They surrounded the two and ordered the three suspects to empty their pockets. Two tea bags of marijuana were

14

recovered from Merabueno; one tea bag of marijuana from Basilio and the marked twenty-peso bill from
Trinidad.cThe police officers then arrested the trio and brought them to the police station. At the police station, Basilio
pin-pointed CRUZ to be the source of the marijuana.

ensued. The marked bills were never recovered. Thereafter, the NARCOM team conducted a search of the premises. The search yielded
5 items containing or relating to marijuana. Catan, in the same criminal prosecution, was charged with and convicted of two (2)
separate offenses of sale of a prohibited drug punished by Section 4 of the Dangerous Drugs Act and of possession of a prohibited drug
punished under Section 6 of the same law.

At about 7:00 P.M. of the same day, the team went back to Antipolo with Basilio. On their way, they met Cruz, who
was carrying a dark-blue bag.The police arrested CRUZ.

Issue # 1: Whether or not Catan is guilty for violating Sec. 4 of RA 6425 (selling of prohibited drugs)?

All the appellants were apprised of their constitutional rights during their investigation, Cruz, with the assistance of
his counsel, Atty. Edith Pio of the CLAO, voluntarily executed a written sworn statement dated August 5, 1987,
wherein he admitted that he sold P50.00 worth of marijuana to Basilio. However, during the trial, the trio denied that
there was a BUY BUST OPERATION while CRUZ, he was illegally searched in his house for marijuana and forced to
sign the a document and was demanded 5000 to white wash the case.

Ruling # 1: Yes. The element of sale was unequivocally established. He had sold, delivered and given away to 2 undercover agents
approximately 300 grams of marijuana in exchange for P450.00. What the law proscribes is not only the act of selling but also, albeit not
limited to, the act of delivering. The commission of the offense of illegal sale of marijuana requires merely the consummation of the
selling transaction. In a "buy-bust" operation, such as in the case at bar, what is important is the fact that the poseur-buyer received the
marijuana from the appellant and that the same was presented as evidence in Court. Proof of the transaction suffices.

ISSUE: Whether or not, blatant violation of the accused constitutional rights when they were arrested and searched
without a warrant? Whether or not CRUZ was validly arrested under the Hot Pursuit doctrine so as to make his
warrantless arrest valid?
RULING:
1.

NO. Under rule 113, Section 5 the law allows arrest without warrant when the person is (a) When in his presence, the
person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b)When an offense has
in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed
it.

Appellants Merabueno, Trinidad and Basilio were caught in flagrante delicto, in the act of committing drug
trafficking. As a consequence of the arrest, the three were searched and were found to be in possession of
marijuana. Since the arrests were lawfully made, it follows that the searches made incidental thereto were also
valid.
2.

NO. On the part of Cruz, it was only discovered by the police during the investigation of Merabueno that he was the source.
Thereafter the police returned to the place at around 7PM and caught Cruz on their way to his house. Certainly, the arrest
was not made in the course of a "hot pursuit" of Cruz, because he was not in Marikina during the "buy-bust" operation. In
such a case, the police should have first secured a warrant of arrest and a search warrant before they arrested and bodily
searched Cruz.

However, since CRUZ did not TIMELY raised his objection to the arrest and the search on his person and the
seizure of the marijuana, the objection was deemed waived. As a matter of fact, he made an extrajudicial
confession with the assistance of counsel. There is no legal basis to set aside said confession.
Appealed decision is affirmed with modification. The trio were sentenced to six months imprisonment
while CRUZ was sentenced to suffer life imprisonment.

26. PEOPLE v. CATAN, G.R. No. 92928 January 21, 1992


Facts: On April 8, 1989, the Special Action Team, NARCOM, decided to conduct a "buy-bust" operation in San Juan, Metro Manila. A
team of operatives was dispatched to the place. 2 members of the team, Crisostomo and Bascuna, acted as poseur-buyers. Inside the
latter's house, they negotiated for the purchase of 300 grams of marijuana worth P450.00. The other members of the team positioned
themselves outside. Crisostomo and Bascuna gave the amount of P500.00 to Catan consisting of 5 marked P100.00 bills. Catan then gave
them the change of P50.00 and the 300 grams of marijuana. After receiving the marijuana from Catan, Crisostomo and Bascuna went
out and signaled to their companions who were waiting outside. The other team members rushed inside the house and arrested Catan.
Catan, however, was able to pass the marked bills to a companion inside the house who was able to escape during the commotion that

Issue # 2: Whether or not the arrest upon Catan is valid?


Ruling # 2: Yes. Catan was legally arrested. Appellant was arrested in flagrante delicto in the act of selling and delivering marijuana to
the poseur-buyers. His case therefore falls under the category of a valid warrantless arrest (Sec. 5, Rule 113, 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure). The subsequent search of his house which immediately followed yielding other incriminating evidence, and which became
the basis of his conviction for possession of a prohibited drug, was a search contemporaneously made and as an incident to a valid
warrantless arrest in the immediate vicinity where the arrest was made; that is a recognized exception to the general rule that any
search and seizure must be supported by a valid warrant. The inclusion of the seized items, therefore, as evidence for the prosecution,
was in conformity with the provision on lawful searches.
Issue # 3: Whether or not, Catan can be charged for 2 offenses found in the same law in one case?
Ruling # 3: Yes. Possession of marijuana is generally inherent in the crime of selling them and that conviction for both offenses is not
feasible. However, as held also in People v. Manalansan, the rule that the possession of marijuana is absorbed in the sale thereof is true
only with respect to the marijuana delivered to the poseur-buyer and not to the marijuana found in the seller's possession, not covered
by the sale and probably intended for a different purpose like another sale, or its direct use by the possessor. Consequently, appellant
can be convicted separately of the offense of selling a prohibited drug in connection with the marijuana sold by him to the poseurbuyers under Section 4 of Rep. Act No. 6425, as amended, and of the crime of possession of marijuana under Section 8 of the same law,
with respect to the marijuana found in his premises after this arrest. The fact that appellant was charged with the two offenses in one
Information does not alter the conclusion arrived at. Firstly, appellant was not denied his right to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation against him and to fully defend himself. The Information filed against him clearly and distinctly charged two separate
offenses. Secondly, the general rule is that an Information must charge only one offense. However, "when two (2) or more offenses are
charged in a single Information and the accused fails to object to it before trial, the Court may convict him of as many offenses as are
charged and proved, and impose on him the penalty for each and every one of them setting out separately the findings of fact and law
in each case. In the proceedings at bar, the records do not show that Appellant seasonably objected to the two offenses charged in a
single Information.

27. PEOPLE V. ENRILE, G.R. NO. 74189, MAY 26, 1993

Facts: In the evening of Oct. 25, 1985, a buy-bust team was dispatched to entrap Abugatal. Two of the policemen said that during the
entrapment, they saw the poseur-buyer hand over to Abugatal the marked money representing payment for the mock transaction.

15

Abugatal left with the money and returned 10 minutes later with a wrapped object which he gave to the poseur-buyer. The two
policemen then approached Abugatal and placed him under arrest, at the same time confiscating the wrapped object (marijuana).
Thereafter, Abugatal led the policemen to a house in Quezon City, where he pointed Enrile as the source of the marijuana. The
policemen immediately arrested and frisked Enrile. They found in the right front pocket of his trousers the marked money earlier
delivered to Abugatal, with Serial No. PJ966425. At the police headquarters, Abugatal signed a sworn confession affirming the above
narration. Enrile refused to make any statement pending consultation with a lawyer. The present case deals only with Enrile because
Abugatal was killed during an attempted jailbreak.

police station as if he had been caught in flagrante delicto. The discovery of the marked money on him did not mean he was caught in
the act of selling marijuana. The marked money was not prohibited per se. Even if it were, that fact alone would not retroactively
validate the warrantless search and seizure. The principle has been honored through the ages in all liberty-loving regimes that a man's
house is his castle that not even the mighty monarch, with all its forces, may violate.

28. US V. VALERIANO DELOS REYES AND GABRIELA ESGUERRA, G.R. L6800, NOVEMBER 16, 1911
Issue # 1: Whether or not the sworn statement of Abugatal was admissible against him and Enrile?

Ruling # 1:
No. It was not admissible against both of them. It was made without compliance with the requisites of a custodial investigation,
including the right to the assistance of counsel. The confession was clearly inadmissible. It did not follow the correct procedure:
At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform him of the reason for the arrest and he
must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any. He shall be informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel,
and that any statement he might make could be used against him. The person arrested shall have the right to communicate
with his lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses by the most expedient means by telephone if possible or by letter or
messenger. It shall be the responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that this is accomplished. No custodial
investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged by the person arrested, by any person on
his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee himself or by anyone on his behalf. The right to
counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. Any statement
obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid down, whether exculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in
evidence.
Even under the old doctrine, it was not enough then to inform the suspect of his constitutional rights. The trial court had to ascertain
for itself that the accused clearly understood the import and consequences of his confession and had the intelligence and mental
capacity to do so. There is no showing in the record that this was done, short of the statement in the decision that Abugatal had been
informed of his rights and had validly waived the assistance of counsel. If the sworn statement of Abugatal was inadmissible against
him, much less was it admissible against Enrile.

Issue # 2: Whether or not the arrest and search upon Enrile was valid?

Ruling # 2: No. The warrantless arrest and search upon Enrile was invalid. It did not fall under the enumeration of valid warrantless
arrest found in Rule 113, Section 5, of the Rules of Court. What the policemen should have done was secure a search warrant on the
basis of the information supplied by Abugatal, and then, with such authority, proceeded to search and, if the search was fruitful, arrest
Enrile. They had no right to simply force themselves into his house on the bare allegations of Abugatal and bundle Enrile off to the

FACTS: A few days prior to November 5, 1910, the appellant Gabriela Esguerra, who lived in San Miguel de Mayumo,
being a friend of the family of the other appellant, Valeriano de los Reyes, came to visit him and his wife at their home
in the city of Manila. On the said day, and while Gabriela was still there, certain revenue officials went to the house of
the accused Valeriano to search for opium; that having arrived there, they were refused admission to the house by
Valeriano upon the ground that they were not authorized to search his premises, they having no search warrant
authorizing them to do so. After a few moments' conversation, and upon their assertion that they were officers of the
law, while not consenting, he offered no physical resistance to their entry, and the search for the drug began. While
some of the officers were in the house prosecuting the search therein, others were outside watching to see that no one
left the house. During the progress of the search in the front part of the house, one of the officers outside saw the
accused Gabriela throw a package from the window of the kitchen into the grass behind the house; that upon
recovering the package, it was found to contain a considerable quantity of morphine.
It is conceded that at the time the drug was discovered, the defendant Valeriano was in the front part of the house,
while the accused Gabriela was in a room in the rear used as a kitchen. There is no direct evidence of any kind
showing that the accused Valeriano had any knowledge whatever of the fact that the accused Gabriela had possession
of the drug. It is substantially admitted by the court in its opinion convicting Valeriano that the only evidence relative
to his knowledge that the opium was in his house is derived from the fact that he refused permission to the officials to
search his premises, the inference being drawn from such refusal that the accused had knowledge of the fact that the
contraband drug was located in his house, otherwise he would have offered no objection to the search.
ISSUE: W/N the fact of refusal to search for his premises, in the absence of a valid search warrant, is sufficient proof
that he had knowledge that the contraband was in his house.
RULING: No. The accused Gabriela was only a visitor in the house of Valeriano. She had been there but a short time.
At the time of the search the morphine was found exclusively in her possession and under her control. It nowhere
appears that any member of the family of Valeriano had the slightest knowledge of its existence. It was only when the
accused herself was about to be searched that she relinquished possession and control of the drug in an effort to
protect herself against the consequences of the search. Rather than indicate that anyone else had knowledge of her
possession of the drug, the proofs seem to suggest that it was her effort to keep knowledge of such possession from
every other person, including Valeriano and his family.
The fact that Valeriano refused the officers permission to search his house for opium cannot be taken against him. No
public official or other person in any country where that portion of the Constitution of the United States against
searches and seizures or similar provisions is in force, has the right to enter the premises of another without his
consent for the purpose of search or seizure without first being provided with the proper search warrant for the
purpose, obtained in the manner provided by law. The maxim that "every man's house is his castle," is made a part of

16

our constitutional law in the clauses prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures, and has always been looked
upon as of high value to the citizen.
The warrant is not allowed for the purpose of obtaining evidence of an intended crime; but only after lawful evidence
of an offense actually committed. Nor even then is it allowable to invade one's privacy for the sole purpose of
obtaining evidence against him, except in a few special cases where that which is the subject of the crime is supposed
to be concealed, and the public or the complainant has an interest in it for in its destruction.
The occupant of a house has a perfect right to demand that the authorities explain to him the reason for and the object
of the search to be made therein; he has a right to present for the consideration of the authorities the reasons which he
may have for objecting to the search as a whole or for requesting that the same be restricted to the necessities of the
case; and if his objections should be entirely disregarded, he has the right to immediately protest against the search
and to require the same be made a matter of record. He has the right to be present during the search of his house and
to respectfully request the authorities that the persons assisting the latter should enter in an open manner and
undisguised, so as to prevent any abuse which might otherwise result; and that in making the search they avoid any
unnecessary inspections and that all necessary precautions be taken so as to avoid injuring his reputation. A public
official would create a bad impression in regard to his authority if he should refuse to grant such just and due
demands, his conduct being always taken into consideration for the purpose of determining the degree of any abuse
in substance or form committed by him, and which the penal law would not allow to go unpunished.
The poorest man may, in his cottage, bid defiance to all the forces of the Crown. It may be frail; its roof may shake; the wind may
blow through it; the storm may enter; the rain may enter; but the King of England may not enter; all his force dares not cross the
threshold of the ruined tenement.
Thus, the only evidence against the defendant Valeriano being an inference drawn from the exercise of a legal right,
we declare the evidence insufficient to support the conviction. We accordingly reverse the judgment below as to him
and acquit him of the charge embraced in the information.

As to the accused Gabriela Esguerra, we have no doubt of her guilt. The evidence clearly demonstrates her possession
of the morphine and her attempt to rid herself of its possession before discovery by the officers. We have carefully
examined the evidence in the case and, notwithstanding the able arguments of her counsel, we are convinced that she
is guilty.

29. PEOPLE vs. PANFILO CABILES alias "NONOY", GR No. 112035, January 16,
1998

front of her. Luzviminda likewise later identified the man as accused-appellant. The man then went to the store and ransacked the
same. Thereafter, he took a bottle of beer from the refrigerator and began drinking. Afterwards, he returned to the room and sat beside
Luzviminda and tapped Luzviminda's thigh. He started removing Luzviminda's pants and underwear while still holding the knife
with his right hand. The man then rolled down his short pants to his thighs. He poked the knife on Luzviminda's right side and despite
the latter's resistance, he succeeded in inserting his sexual organ into Luzviminda's private parts after forcibly lying on top of her.
Luzviminda struggled and kicked, accidentally hitting with her right foot the knife thus causing her injury. All the while, Marites was
witnessing Luzviminda being raped by the man. While on top of Luzviminda and continuously doing the sexual act, the man uttered:
"Isusunod ko ang Ate mo pagkatapos ko sa iyo." Upon hearing those words, Marites tried to escape by asking permission to prepare
milk for her baby. While carrying her child, Marites was able to run to the house of her neighbor, Arnel Cericos, from whom she asked
for help. When Cericos entered the room, the man was still on top of Luzviminda. However, upon seeing Cericos, the man stood up
right away and stabbed Cericos four times. Afterwards, they chased each other outside the house. Meanwhile Luzviminda ran toward
Cericos' house.
Later, on November 8, 1989, Corporal Luciano Caeda and Pcf. Manuel Rodriguez of the Kalookan City Police Station, along with
Romeo Nas, brother of Marites, went to a sash factory warehouse at the Marivic Compound, Kalookan City. They saw accusedappellant sleeping on a bench. Romeo Nas saw that accused-appellant was wearing a bracelet which the former recognized as the
bracelet taken from Marites. Upon being awakened, accused-appellant, told the three men that the other things he took from Marites
were inside a plastic bag at the factory building. Consequently, Pcf. Rodriguez went inside the building to get the plastic bag and it was
found to contain a woman's undershirt, a light blue shirt, and a wristwatch with the brand name "Chanel" which was the one taken
from Marites. The following day, Marites saw accused-appellant at the Kalookan City Police Station. The latter admitted his guilt and
pointed to Jaime Mabingnay, Marites' brother-in-law, as the one who asked him to commit the crime.
Accused-appellant, on the other hand, relied and banked on denial and alibi. He denied even having gone to Amparo Village,
Kalookan City and denied having raped Luzviminda Aquino. He said that the first time he ever saw Marites was at the Police Station.
As to accused-appellant's arrest, he testified that he was lying on a bench at the Marivic Compound when three men in civilian clothes
arrived. He did not know the reason for his arrest. He, however, admitted that a "Chanel" lady's watch was recovered from him at the
time of the arrest but insisted that he owns the watch, the same having been pledged to him by his cousin and which was later sold to
him. He denied that a plastic bag with stolen contents was recovered from him. He said he only saw the contents of the bag when he
was under detention. As regards his sworn statement containing a confession to the commission of the crime, he said he was forced by
the policemen at the station to execute the same. He did not read it and was just forced to sign it. He was not assisted by counsel during
that time.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE ACCUSEDS CONFESSIONS ARE ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE
RULING: As regards the evidentiary weight of accused-appellant's sworn statement wherein he confessed to the crime charged, and
his verbal confession made before robbery victim, Marites Atienza, we rule against the validity of the written confession but uphold the
admissibility of the verbal confession. In People vs. Deniega, 251 SCRA 626 [1995], we laid down the four fundamental requirements
needed for admissibility of a confession, to wit: (1) the confession must be voluntary; (2) the confession must be made with the
assistance of competent and independent counsel; (3) the confession must be express; and (4) the confession must be in writing.

NATURE OF THE CASE: ROBBERY WITH RAPE


FACTS: On the eve of November 5, 1989, Marites Atienza was asleep with her daughter. At around 1:15 a.m., a man suddenly barged
into her house. The man suddenly poked a 6-inch kitchen knife on the right side of Marites' neck. She was told not to shout, otherwise
she would be killed. Then the man placed masking tape on her mouth and ordered her to bring out her money and jewelry. Marites
went to the cabinet outside the room, took cash amounting to P1,000, a Seiko watch, a lady's wristwatch with the trademark "Chanel", a
bracelet, and a ring, and gave them to the man. Marites later identified the man as accused-appellant. Meanwhile, Luzviminda,
Marites housemaid, was awakened by the crying of Marites' baby. When she was about to shout, the man poked the knife on her left
side, causing her an injury. The man also placed masking tape on Luzviminda's mouth. Thereafter, he forcibly held both of her arms in

Accused-appellant testified that he was forced to execute the sworn statement containing his confession. Although this assertion is
uncorroborated, his free will and volition in signing his confession will not cure the defect that it was made without assistance of
counsel. An admission made without the assistance of counsel during custodial investigation is inadmissible in evidence. (People vs.
Cascalla, 240 SCRA 482 [1995]). Even if the confession of an accused speaks the truth, if it was made without the assistance of counsel,
it is inadmissible in evidence regardless of the absence of coercion or even if it had been voluntarily given (People vs. Agustin, 240
SCRA 541 [1995]). An uncounselled extrajudicial confession without a valid waiver of the right to counsel that is, in writing and in
the presence of counsel is inadmissible in evidence (People vs. Cabintoy, 241 SCRA 442 [1995]).

17

In contrast, accused-appellant's verbal confession before Marites Nas Atienza is, however, admissible in evidence. The case in point
is People vs. Andan (G.R. No. 116437, March 3, 1997) where we ruled that the accused's verbal confession made in a private meeting with
the municipal mayor, spontaneously, fully and voluntarily done, is admissible in evidence since it is not covered by the requirements of
Section 12(1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution. When said accused talked with the mayor as a confidant and not as a law
enforcement officer, his uncounselled confession did not violate his constitutional rights. Constitutional procedures on custodial
investigation do not apply to a spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities, but given in an ordinary
manner whereby the accused orally admitted having committed the crime as in the case at bar.

Ruling:
1.

those justifying a warrantless arrest. Clearly, their warrantless arrests violated the Constitution. However, jurisprudence is
settled that an accused may be estopped from assailing the illegality of his arrest if he fails to move for the quashing of the
Information against him before his arraignment. In the case at bar, by entering a plea of not guilty and participating in the
2.

30. PEOPLE V. HERNANDEZ, GR 117624, DEC 4, 1987


Facts: On January 21, 1992, at about 3:30 p.m., accused Lorenzo drove Eva to the Immaculate Concepcion Academy to
get Sharleen. He parked the car in the school's parking lot. Minutes later, Eva and Sharleen returned to the car. While

There is no question that appellants were arrested without the benefit of a warrant and under circumstances other than

trial, appellants waived their right to challenge the legality of their warrantless arrests.
The extrajudicial confessions are admissible in evidence. It bears emphasis that extrajudicial confessions are presumed to be
voluntary for no sane person would confess to a crime unless he has committed it. Thus, the burden is on the accused to
prove the involuntariness of his confession, which the appellants did not satisfactorily discharge this burden.
The constitutional requirement on assistance of a competent and independent counsel was not violated. The fact that Atty.
Villanueva is a retired member of the Judge Advocate's Office should not cast doubt on his impartiality in assisting

Eva was starting to board beside Sharleen, an unidentified man sits beside her and warned her not to shout. After 20

appellants during their custodial investigation. There is no concrete evidence of bias on the part of Atty. Villanueva. In

minutes, the car slowed down in front of an iron gate and the man in the front seat and Sharleen got out of the car.

People v. Aquino, we disabused the mind of the public regarding the prevalent misconception that the role of a lawyer in

After a couple of minutes, the man releases the nanny to inform her employer of Sharleen's ransom. Eva called up her
employer and was fetch minutes later by Samson Cheng, Sharleen's uncle.
Sharleen's father received a call from one of the kidnappers demanding a 10M ransom. They haggled in the amount
and reached no agreement. The police then left Tan's house. Thereafter, the kidnappers made several phone calls to
the Tan family. Jacinto asked for a lower ransom in the amount of 409,000 wherein the kidnappers agreed and

criminal investigation under the right to counsel provision of the Constitution is to prevent an accused from incriminating
himself. We explained in explicit terms that the right to counsel is designed to preclude the slightest coercion as would lead
the accused to admit something, which is false. It ought to follow that a lawyer should never prevent an accused from freely
and voluntarily telling the truth whether in an extrajudicial statement or testimony in open-court. While our litigation is
adversarial in nature, its purpose is always to ascertain the truth for justice is not justice unless predicated on truth. The
accused under investigation is assisted by counsel to avoid the pernicious practice of extorting false or coerced admissions

instructed Jacinto to leave the money in a garbage can in front of the Town and Country Lodge in Old Sta. Mesa,

or confessions from them.


In this case, appellants waived their rights to remain silent and to counsel in the presence and with the assistance of Atty.

Manila. Jacinto complied and then returned to his house to await the call of the kidnappers on Sharleen's release. A

Villanueva. Atty. Villanueva cannot be faulted when he did not prevent appellants from truthfully answering the questions

week later, the kidnappers called and informed Jacinto that they had released Sharleen and left her at the Perpetual

propounded by the investigators. For allowing the free flow of truth, Atty. Villanueva cannot be deemed as an incompetent

Help Hospital in Espaa, Manila. Jacinto rushed to the hospital and found Sharleen who was extremely traumatized
by the incident. Jacinto himself suffered from nervous breakdown.
An intensive manhunt was launched to capture the kidnappers of Sharleen. CIS Chief Inspector Major Ruben Zacarias
organized two teams to conduct the hunt. The team composed of SPO3 Gregorio Cuachon and SPO1Danilo T. Salas
and headed by Inspector Warlito Platon was directed to verify the information that Sharleen was hidden by accused
Alfredo Tumaneng in a house at #15 Kennedy Street, Road 20, Project 8, Quezon City. Officers Cuachon and Salas
conducted a discreet surveillance of the area and were able to verify the information. They also found out that accused
Tumaneng had left the safe house and has transferred to Mayupis, Malabon, Metro Manila. Seven suspects were
identified by the CIS. Five of them, namely, Hernandez, Tumaneng, Lorenzo, Jacoband Famodulan, were captured by
the CIS operatives. Each executed an extrajudicial confession, which became the basis of the criminal charge against
them. Upon arraignment, the five accused pleaded not guilty. During pendency of the trial, accused Hernandez and
Jacob escaped from detention. They were tried in absentia. Appellant Tumaneng and Lorenzo contends that their
warrantless arrest was illegal and their extrajudicial confession were obtained without the benefit of a competent and
independent counsel of their own choice. While appellant Famodulan contends that he was not positively identified as

counsel. A lawyer's oath binds him to prevent falsehood and not to suppress truth.

31. PEOPLE VS. BARROS; 231 SCRA 557; 1994


FACTS: That on September 6, 1987, M/Sgt. Francis Yag-as and S/Sgt. James Ayan, both members of the P.C. Mountain Province
Command, rode the Dangwa Bus bearing Plate No. ABZ-242 bound for Sabangan, Mountain Province. Upon reaching Chackchakan,
Bontoc, Mountain Province, the bus stopped and both M/Sgt. Yag-as and S/Sgt. Ayan, who were seated at the back, saw accused
carrying a carton, board the bus and seated himself on seat No. 18 after putting the carton under his seat. Thereafter, the bus continued
and upon reaching Sabangan, M/Sgt. Yag-as and S/Sgt. Ayan before they alighted, it being their station, called C2C [Fernando]
Bongyao to inspect the carton under seat No. 18. After C2C Bongyao inspected the carton, he found out that it contained marijuana and
he asked the passengers [who] the owner of the carton [was] but nobody answered. Thereafter, C2C Bongyao alighted with the carton
and S/Sgt. Ayan and C2C Bongyao invited the herein accused to the detachment for questioning as accused was the suspected owner
of the carton containing marijuana. As both P.C. officers Yag-as and Ayan saw accused, Bonifacio Barros carrying that same carton
when he boarded the bus at Chackchakan. That upon entering the detachment the carton was opened in the presence of accused and
accused Bonifacio Barros was asked if he owned the carton of marijuana and accused denied [this]. That when accused denied
ownership of the carton of marijuana, the P.C. officers called for the bus conductor who pinpointed to Bonifacio Barros as the owner of
the carton of marijuana. That during the oral investigation of accused, he finally admitted ownership of the carton (Exhibit "B")
containing [four] 4 paper-wrapped packages of dried marijuana. (Exhibits "B-1", "B-2", "B-3" and "B-4").

one of the conspirators and he was arrested and investigated in violation of his constitutional rights.
Issues:
1.
2.

Whether or not the warrantless arrests were illegal.


Whether or not the extrajudicial confessions obtained were without the benefit of a competent and independent counsel of
their own choice.

. . . [A]fter he was orally investigated, [the accused] was brought to the Abatan General Hospital, Bauko, Mountain Province, for
physical examination and a Medico Legal Certificate was issued (Exhibits "F" and "F-1"), indicating that accused suffered no physical
injuries and that accused was probably under the influence of marijuana. That Dra. Danna Aleta inquired from accused Bonifacio
Barros if he smoked marijuana and accused admitted having smoked marijuana. That after accused was medically examined, he was
escorted by three members of the P.C. to the P.C. detachment at Tadian, Mountain Province, where the carton of marijuana (Exhibit "B")
was also brought. That at Tadian, a seizure receipt was made together with a certification (Exhibit "C") pointing out to the fact that

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approximately 4 kilos of dried marijuana leaves were from accused Bonifacio Barros and which certification was signed by the accused
(Exhibit "C-1") and subscribed before Judge Romualdo P. Awisan (Exhibit "C-2"). That in connection with the confiscation of the
marijuana subject of the instant case and the apprehension of accused Bonifacio Barros, the P.C. officers who figured in this case
namely M/Sgt. Yag-as and S/Sgt. Ayan and C2C Bongyao have correspondingly executed their sworn statements.
. . . [S]amples of the marijuana were taken from each of the four packages marked Exhibits "B-1", "B-2", "B-3", and "B-4" and placed in
four separate envelopes, following an order of the court to that effect and were hand-carried by Police Officer Jack Masilian to Camp
Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet for laboratory test. That Capt. Carlos Figueroa, the Forensic Expert conducted two kinds of test on the
four samples sent by the court and found them to be positive of marijuana as per his report No. D-011-88.
ISSUE: WON his constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizures was violated.

RULING: YES. The general rule is that a search and seizure must be carried out through or with a judicial warrant;
otherwise such search and seizure becomes "unreasonable" within the meaning of the above quoted constitutional
provision. The evidence secured thereby i.e., the "fruits" of the search and seizure will be inadmissible in
evidence "for any purpose in any proceeding. The requirement that a judicial warrant must be obtained prior to the
carrying out of a search and seizure is, however, not absolute. There are certain exceptions recognized in our law, one
of which relates to the search of moving vehicles. Peace officers may lawfully conduct searches of moving vehicles
automobiles, trucks, etc. without need of a warrant, it not being practicable to secure a judicial warrant before
searching a vehicle, since such vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant
may be sought. In carrying out warrantless searches of moving vehicles, however, peace officers are limited to routine
checks, that is, the vehicles are neither really searched nor their occupants subjected to physical or body searches, the
examination of the vehicles being limited to visual inspection.
In the case at bar, however, we have been unable to find in the record of this case any circumstance which constituted or could have
reasonably constituted probable cause for the peace officers to search the carton box allegedly owned by appellant Barros. The carrying
of such a box by appellant onto a passenger bus could not, by itself, have convinced M/Sgt. Francis Yag-as and S/Sgt. James Ayan either
that the appellant was a law violator or the contents of the box were instruments or the subject matter or proceeds of some criminal
offense. The carrying of carton boxes is a common practice among our people, especially those coming from the rural areas since such
boxes constitute the most economical kind of luggage possible. The peace officers here involved had not received any information or
"tip-off" from an informer; no such a "tip-off" was alleged by the police officers before or during the trial. The police officers also did not
contend that they had detected the odor of dried marijuana, or appellant Barros had acted suspiciously in the course of boarding the
bus and taking a seat during the trip to Sabangan, nor in the course of being asked whether he owned the carton box later ascertained
to contain four (4) kilos of marijuana. The testimony of the law enforcement officers who had apprehended the accused (M/Sgt. Francis
Yag-as and S/Sgt. James Ayan), and who had searched the box in his possession, (C2C Fernando Bongyao), simply did not suggest or
indicate the presence of any such probable cause.

32. PEOPLE V. BAGISTA, 214 SCRA 63


FACTS: Appeal by accused-appellant Elsie Bagista from the decision dated September 26, 1988 of the Regional Trial
Court of La Trinidad, Benguet, Branch 10, finding her guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 4, Article II
of Republic Act No. 6425, and sentencing her to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P20,000.00,
with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
The facts of the case are as follows: On July 4, 1988, at around 8:00 o'clock in the morning, the Narcotics Command
(NARCOM) Detachment Office located at the Arix Building, Bokawkan Road, Baguio City, received information from
one of its regular informants that a certain woman, 23 years of age, with naturally curly hair, and with a height of 5'2"

or 5'3", would be transporting marijuana from up north. Acting upon this piece of information, Sgt. Oscar Parajas
testified that he, Sgt. Godofredo Fider and a civilian NARCOM agent proceeded to Km. 16, Acop, Tublay, Benguet.
Upon arriving at said location at around 11:00 o'clock that same morning, they established a checkpoint and flagged
down all vehicles, both private and public, coming from the north to check if any of these vehicles were carrying
marijuana leaves on board.
After about 4 1/2 hours, the NARCOM agents stopped a Dangwa Tranco bus with Plate No. AVD 938 and body
number 428, which came from Lepanto, Benguet. Sgts. Parajas and Fider boarded the bus and thereupon Sgt. Parajas
announced to the passengers that they were NARCOM agents and that they were going to search their baggages. Sgt.
Parajas then proceeded to the rear of the bus while Sgt. Fider began inspecting the bags in the front.
While at the back, Sgt. Parajas noticed a woman with curly hair seated at the right side (as one is facing the driver) of
the last seat of the bus, with a travelling bag with black and orange stripes on her lap. Sgt. Parajas inspected the bag
and discovered three (3) bundles of marijuana leaves covered by assorted clothing. The bag and the contents thereof
were confiscated and the woman arrested; she was later brought to the NARCOM office in Baguio City where she was
booked and investigated. The woman was then identified as accused-appellant. The confiscated bundles were
subjected to laboratory examination, and found positive for marijuana.
Accused-appellant's defense rests solely on denial. She claimed that she was engaged in the buying and selling of
vegetables, particularly cabbages. On the day in question, she boarded the Dangwa Tranco bus at Abatan, Benguet,
bringing with her ten (10) sacks of cabbages which she intended to sell to a certain Maria Opino in Baguio City. While
inside the bus, she approached the conductor for her ticket to cover the fare for her sacks of cabbages, but was told by
the latter that he would attend to her later.
ISSUE: WON the search and seizure on Bagista was valid?
RULING: YES.
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT AGAINST UNREASONABLESEARCH AND SEIZURE;
RULE. The general rule regarding searches and seizures can be stated in this manner: no person shall be subjected
to a search of his person,personal effects or belongings, or his residence except by virtue of a search warrant or on the
occasion of a lawful arrest. The basis for the rule can be found in Article III,Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. Art. III,
Section 3 (2) further ordains that any evidence obtained in violation of the aforementioned right shall, among others,
"be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding."
2. SEARCH OF A MOVING VEHICLE, AN EXCEPTION. Thec onstitutional proscription against warrantless
searches and seizures admits of certain exceptions. Aside from a search incident to a lawful arrest, a warrantless
search had been upheld in cases of a moving vehicle, and the seizure of evidence in plain view. With regard to the
search of moving vehicles, this had been justified on the ground that the mobility of motor vehicles makes it possible
for the vehicle to be searched to move out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.
.3. REQUISITE. This in no way, however, gives the policeo fficers unlimited discretion to conduct warrantless
searches of automobiles in the absence of probable cause. When a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive
search, such a warrantless search has been held to be valid only as long as the o fficers conducting the search have
reasonable or probable cause to believe before the search that they will find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining
to a crime,in the vehicle to be searched

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.4. APPLICATION IN CASE AT BAR. The NARCOM officers in the case at bar had probable cause to stop and
search all vehicles coming from the north at Acop, Tublay, Benguet in view of the confidential information they
received from their regular informant that a woman having the same appearance as that of accused-appellant would
be bringing marijuana from up north. They likewise have probable cause to search accused-appellant's belongings
since she fits the description given by the NARCOM informant. Since there was a valid warrantless search by the
NARCOM agents, any evidence obtained during the course of said search is admissible against accused-appellant.

33. PEOPLE V. MELOSANTOS, GR 115304, JULY 3, 1995


FACTS: The theory of the People is to the effect that accused-appellant's apprehension was preceded by a buy-bust
operation on October 10, 1992 during which occasion, accused-appellant was caught in the process of transacting the
sale of 1 kilogram of "shabu" with the arresting team. To buttress this general proposition, SPO1 Jeremias Manlatao of
the Narcotics Command was offered as the first witness of the prosecution. His essential testimony is to the effect that
he was the poseur-buyer; that he was at the Shell Gas Station infront of Unimart, Greenhills around 9:30 o'clock in the
morning together with Supt. Elenzano, SPO4 Velasco, including the confidential informer, waiting for accusedappellant who had previously agreed, through the confidential informer, to sell 1 kilogram of shabu at P450.00 per
gram; that when accused-appellant arrived on the designated time and place on board a red Mitsubishi Lancer, he
disembarked from the car and asked for the payment to which request the witness acceded.
To corroborate the fact of arrest, SPO1 Osmundo Filomeno next sat on the witness stand and offered the information that the proposal
to buy 1 kilogram of shabu, relayed through an Easy Call Unit, emanated from SPO1 Manlatao; he further declared that when the
poseur-buyer showed the money to the suspect, both the poseur-buyer and suspect went to the car where the shabu was shown to the
poseur-buyer and that when the pre-arranged signal was given, the group approached and apprehended the suspect.
The examination-in-chief of Pedro Velasco, who was presented as the third witness of the People, was geared towards establishing the
investigation he conducted relative to the suspect's apprehension. In line with his duty, this witness stated before the trial court that he
asked the arresting officer what transpired during the operation in question whose response was made formal by Velasco via a joint
affidavit of arrest.
In decreeing the criminal accountability of accused-appellant, the trial judge made the initial observation that the absence of ill-motive
on the part of prosecution witnesses to fabricate the buy-bust operation, as well as the presumption under adjective law towards the
regularity in the performance of the law enforcers' duty are sufficient factors to incline one to a judgment of conviction. And in
response to the serious contradictions allegedly committed by the People's witnesses, the magistrate below explained that he saw no
irreconcilable differences on material points, and that rather, the divergence of perception on certain details typifies truthfulness, apart
from the undeniable circumstance that the suspect was caught in flagrante.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in convicting the accused applying the statutory presumption that law
enforcers are presumed to have regularly performed their duty.
RULING: Yes. At this juncture, it is significant to recall to mind the proposition of the principal witnesses of the prosecution in their
joint affidavit of arrest to the effect that the buy-bust operation was concocted on account of the implicit confession from an arrested
suspect in the person of Virgilio 'TENG" Carlos that herein accused-appellant was the source of the drugs. It is also interesting to note
that the so-called arrested person who pointed the accusing finger at Melosantos was never presented as a witness for the People.
Given these considerations, we cannot help observing that the incriminating statement in the joint affidavit of arrest against Melosantos
linking him to the pernicious activity must be disregarded, nay, struck down inasmuch as the import thereof is hearsay in character.
The second-hand information of Carlos implicating Melosantos as the brains of the illegal peddling narrated to, and conveyed by SPO1
Manlatao before the court a quo must similarly be jettisoned as a breach of the hearsay rule.

Indeed, any oral or documentary evidence is hearsay by nature if its probative value is not based on the personal knowledge of the
witness but on the knowledge of some other person not on the witness stand. By virtue of this legal aphorism, no probative value can
attach to the alleged confession of Carlos albeit no objection thereto was interposed by the defense. Verily, in criminal cases the
admission of hearsay evidence would be a violation of the constitutional provision that the accused shall enjoy the right of being
confronted with the witnesses testifying against him and to cross-examine them. Moreover, the court is without opportunity to test the
credibility of hearsay statements by observing the demeanor of the person who supposedly made them.
The defense of accused-appellant appears to be shallow, yet the absence of depth would not warrant his conviction if, in the first place,
the evidence of the People is anchored on a shaky foundation. This is but the necessary consequence of the adjective norm that the
prosecution has the onus probandi of establishing the guilt of the accused. At any rate, the presumption that official duty has been
regularly performed cannot by itself, prevail against the constitutional presumption of innocence accorded the accused.

34. ALANA V. PEOPLE, GR 173612, MARCH 2008


FACTS: In the evening of 28 May 2000, Vicente, his wife, Betty, Suzette, and the latters infant daughter, Jenny Rose de
la Cruz (Jenny), were asleep inside their house in San Jose del Monte, Bulacan. Vicente and Betty slept at the living
room, while Suzette and Jenny occupied the bedroom.
Vicente testified that at around 11:30 p.m., he was awakened by the sound of dogs barking. He saw the kitchen door of
their house on fire. Vicente woke Betty and told her to fetch help. As Betty opened the main door of their house,
Dominador, Rodel, and a third man whom he identified as Ronnie Malana, suddenly appeared and entered the house.
Since these individuals had previously threatened to kill Vicente and his entire family, due to their belief that he was
in the practice of witchcraft by which he had caused the deaths of Rodels parents-in-law, Vicente, upon seeing them,
ran through the burning kitchen door and out of the house to seek help from his brother-in-law, Roberto Oredero,
whose house was merely 30 meters away. After escaping several meters from his house, Vicente heard an explosion
and saw the fire engulf his entire house.
Suzette testified that the third man carried a round one-gallon container with a wick of three to four inches in length.
Rodel lit the wick with a match, and the third man threw the container into Suzettes bedroom. After that, the three
men simultaneously ran away. The explosion killed Betty instantly, blowing apart her legs and one of her arms. The
explosion also shattered and exposed the bone of Suzettes left leg and knocked her front teeth out. Had it not been for
the prompt medical attention she received, Suzette would have died from the injuries she had sustained from the
explosion. Jenny survived the blast with barely any injury.
Appellants proffered the defenses of denial and alibi.
ISSUE: WON appellants should be acquitted under the equipoise rule.
RULING: There is no merit in appellants assiduous assertion that they should be acquitted under the equipoise rule in
view of what to them are doubts as to their guilt. This rule provides that where the evidence of the parties in a
criminal case is evenly balanced, the constitutional presumption of innocence should tilt the scales in favor of the
accused. There is, therefore, no equipoise if the evidence is not evenly balanced. Said rule is not applicable in the case
before us because the evidence here presented is not equally weighty. The equipoise rule cannot be invoked where the
evidence of the prosecution is overwhelming.

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35. MUPAS V. PEOPLE, GR 172834, FEB 6, 2008


Facts: - Rogelio testified that at around 7:30 in the morning of 18 February 1993, he was walking to school with his
companion Eduardo Murao, Jr. when Jun suddenly stopped and stabbed him using a 29-inch Batangas knife.
Meantime, Banjo bodily restrained him but luckily Rogelio was able to avoid the blow. Next, Banjo and Jun hurled
stones at him and hit him on the leg while Rogelio was running eastward. Rogelio then flagged down a motorized
tricycle but the two assailants continued to pursue him. While inside the tricycle, Banjo held Rogelio by his neck and
punched him while Jun stabbed him several times. Then, Rogelio alighted from the tricycle and ran home. Afterwards,
his father and mother accompanied him to the hospital. There, Dr. Martinez attended to Rogelio, the wound, which
was only 2-3 cm long and whose depth he did not indicate, could have been caused by a rough or sharp object not
necessarily a knife. And in the medical certificate he issued, he reported that the wounds sustained by Rogelio would
take two (2) weeks to heal.
- For the defense, Jun testified that on the same morning, he was watering the plants in front of Gils house when he
accidentally sprayed water on Rogelio who was passing by. Rogelio scolded him and Jun immediately apologized.
Rogelio then challenged Jun to a fistfight which Jun accepted. After that, Rogelio ran away, picked up big stones and
threw them at Gils house. Jun gave chase and was able to catch up with Rogelio. They both boarded a tricycle and
continued their fighting inside. One of the passengers of the tricycle, Josefina Mendoza, pacified the two men. Banjo
arrived only when the fighting ceased.
-Petitioners Jun and Gil Mupas were found guilty of frustrated homicide rendered by the Regional Trial Court of
Malaoan, La Union. CA Affirmed + P4000 Temperate Damages.
Issue: Won Rogelio is guilty of the crime frustrated homicide?
Ruling: No. The trial court solely hinged its judgment of conviction on the victim Rogelios lone and uncorroborated
testimony. While it is true that the testimony of one witness is sufficient to sustain a conviction if such testimony

establishes the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, the Court rules that the testimony of one witness in this
case is not sufficient for this purpose.
- It can be safely deduced that a fistfight occurred only between Jun and Rogelio which continued inside a tricycle. Rogelios allegations
of Banjos participation in the incident and that Jun carried with him a bolo are uncorroborated and bereft of any proof. Absent proof of
Gil alias Banjos involvement in the incident.
- Assuming that Gil alias Banjo had any participation, there is likewise no evidence that he or Jun had intent to kill Rogelio. Intent to
kill is the principal element of homicide or murder, in whatever stage of commission. Such intent must be proved in a clear and evident
manner to exclude every possible doubt as to the homicidal intent of the aggressor.
- Notably, Dr. Martinez, Rogelios attending physician, opined that if Rogelios wound was left untreated it could lead to his death, but
at the same time he also testified that such wound merely required suturing. He also testified that the wound, which was only 2-3 cm
long and whose depth he did not indicate, could have been caused by a rough or sharp object not necessarily a knife.
- Although the Information charged petitioners with frustrated homicide, a finding of guilt for the lesser offense of less serious physical
injuries may be made considering that the latter offense is necessarily included in the former, and since the essential ingredients of
physical injuries constitute and form part of those constituting the offense of homicide. WHEREFORE, Petitioner Jun Mupas is found
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Less Serious Physical Injuries + P4000 temperate damages + P5000 Moral Damages.

Doctrine:The Constitution mandates that an accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proven beyond
reasonable doubt. The prosecution has the burden to overcome such presumption of innocence by presenting the
quantum of evidence required. In addition, the prosecution must rest on its own merits and must not rely on the
weakness of the defense. In fact, if the prosecution fails to meet the required quantum of evidence, the defense may
logically not even present evidence on its own behalf. In which case, the presumption of innocence shall prevail and
hence, the accused shall be acquitted. However, once the presumption of innocence is overcome, the defense bears the
burden of evidence to show reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused. Reasonable doubt is that doubt
engendered by an investigation of the whole proof and an inability after such investigation to let the mind rest each
upon the certainty of guilt. Absolute certainty of guilt is not demanded by the law to convict a criminal charge, but
moral certainty is required as to every proposition of proof requisite to constitute the offense.

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