Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 132518

March 28, 2000

GAVINA MAGLUCOT-AW, CATALINA ORCULLO, RICHARD ESTANO, NIDA MAGLUCOT, MELANIA

MAGLUCOT-CATUBIG, EMILIANO CATUBIG, LADISLAO SALMA, petitioners,
vs.
LEOPOLDO MAGLUCOT, SEVERO MAGLUCOT, WILFREDA MAGLUCOT-ALEJO and CONSTANCIO
ALEJO,respondents.

KAPUNAN, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari assails the Decision, dated 11 November 1997, of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CV No. 48816 which reversed and set aside the Decision, dated 13 December 1994, of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 30 of Dumaguete City, Negros Oriental in an action for recovery of possession and damages.
The core issue in this case is whether a partition of Lot No. 1639 had been effected in 1952. Petitioners contend that
there was already a partition of said lot; hence, they are entitled to exclusive possession and ownership of Lot No.
1639-D which originally formed part of Lot No. 1639 until its partition. Private respondents, upon the other hand,
claim that there was no partition; hence, they are co-owners of Lot No. 1639-D. Notably, this case presents a unique
situation where there is an order for partition but there is no showing that the sketch/subdivision plan was submitted
to the then Court of First Instance for its approval or that a decree or order was registered in the Register of Deeds.
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
Petitioners filed with the RTC a complaint for recovery of possession and damages alleging, inter alia, that they are
the owners of Lot No. 1639-D. Said lot was originally part of Lot No. 1639 which was covered by Original Certificate
Title No. 6775 issued in the names of Hermogenes Olis, Bartolome Maglucot. Pascual Olis, Roberto Maglucot,
Anselmo Lara and Tomas Maglucot on 16 August 1927. 1 On 19 April 1952, Tomas Maglucot, one of the registered
owners and respondents predecessors-in-interest, filed a petition to subdivide lot No. 1639. 2Consequently, on 13
May 1952, then CFI of Negros Oriental issued an order 3 directing the parties to subdivide said lot into six portions
as follows:
a) Hermogenes Olis lot 1639-A
b) Pascual Olis lot 1639-B
c) Bartolome Maglucot lot 1639-C
d) Roberto (Alberto) Maglucot lot 1639-D
e) Anselmo Lara lot 1639-E
f) Tomas Maglucot lot 1639-F. 4
Sometime in 1963, Guillermo Maglucot rented a portion of Lot No. 1639-D (subject lot). Subsequently, Leopoldo and
Severo, both surnamed Maglucot, rented portions of subject lot in 1964 and 1969, respectively, and each paying
rentals therefor. Said respondents built houses on their corresponding leased lots. They paid the rental amount of
P100.00 per annum to Mrs. Ruperta Salma, who represented the heirs of Roberto Maglucot, petitioners
predecessors-in-interest. In December 1992, however, said respondents stopped paying rentals claiming ownership
over the subject lot. Petitioners thus filed the complaint a quo.
After trail, the lower court rendered judgment in favor of petitioners. The RTC found the existence of tax declarations
in the names of Hermogenes Olis and Pascual Oils (purported owners of Lot Nos. 1639-A and 1639-B,

respectively) 5 as indubitable proof that there was a subdivision of Lot No. 1639. It likewise found that Tomas
Maglucot, respondents' predecessors-in-interest, took active part in the partition as it was he, in fact, who
commenced the action for partition. 6 The court a quo cited Article 1431 of the Civil Code which states that "[t]hrough
estoppel an admission or representation is rendered conclusive upon the person making it, and cannot be denied or
disproved as against the person relying thereon." Applying said provision of law, it held that while there was no court
order showing that Lot No. 1639 was partitioned, its absence could not be used by Tomas Maglucot, or respondents
as his successors-in-interest, to deny the existence of an approved partitioned against the other co-owners who
claim that there was one. 7 Said court, likewise, ruled that the tax declarations 8 over the houses of respondents,
expressly stating that the same are constructed on the lots of Roberto Maglucot, constitute a conclusive admission
by them of the ownership of the subject lot by the latter. 9
The dispositive portion of the lower court's decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, on the basis of the foregoing discussion, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
plaintiffs against the defendants ordering the latter:
1. To demolish their houses inside lot 1639-D, vacate the premises thereof and deliver the
possession of the same to Plaintiffs;
2. To jointly and solidarily pay plaintiffs the sum of P15,000.00 for attorney's fees:
3. To each pay plaintiffs the sum of P100.00 every year from 1993 for actual damages
representing the amount of unpaid rentals up to the time they actually vacate the premises in
question;
4. To pay the costs. 10
On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC. The appellate court ruled that the sketch plan and tax
declarations relied upon by petitioners are not conclusive evidence of partition. 11 The CA likewise found that the
prescribed procedure under Rule 69 of the Rules of Court was not followed. It thus declared that there was no
partition of Lot No. 1639.
Petitioners filed this petition for review on certiorari alleging that the CA committed the following reversible errors:
I
IN VIOLATING THE LAW ON ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION PLAINTIFFS HAVING POSSESSED LOT
1639-D SINCE 1946;
II
IN VIOLATING THE LAW ON ESTOPPEL, THE FACT OF PAYMENT OF RENTALS AND OFFER TO BUY
THE DEFENDANTS IS ADMISSION THAT THE AREA IN LOT 1639-D. HAD LONG BEEN ADJUDICATED
TO PLAINTIFFS;
III
IN DECLARING THAT THERE WAS NO PRIOR PARTITION, CONTRARY TO THE FINDINGS OF THE
TRIAL COURT, AND AGAINST THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD, OF WHICH IF PROPERLY CONSIDERED
WOULD CHANGE THE OUTCOME OF THE CASE;
IV
IN DECLARING THAT THERE IS NO LAW OR JURISPRUDENCE APPLICABLE UNDER THE PREMISES;
THIS WOULD ONLY SHOW THAT THE RECORD OF THE CASE WAS NOT PROPERLY SCRUTINIZED,
AND THE LAW WAS NOT PROPERLY STUDIED; ESPECIALLY IN THE CASE AT BENCH THAT THE
ORAL AND MUTUAL PARTITION HAPPENED DURING THE REGIME OF THE OLD RULES OF
PROCEDURE; 12
Petitioners maintain that Lot No. 1639 was mutually partitioned and physically subdivided among the co-owners and
that majority of them participated in the actual execution of the subdivision. Further, the co-owners accepted their
designated shares in 1946 as averred by Tomas Maglucot in his petition for partition. 13 Petitioners opine that in

1952, Tomas Maglucot himself initiated a court proceeding for a formal subdivision of Lot No. 1639. In said petition,
he averred that only Hermogenes Olis and the heirs of Pascual Olis were not agreeable to the partition. 14 Petitioners
further contend that respondents admitted in their tax declarations covering their respective houses that they are
"constructed on the land of Roberto Maglucot." 15 Simply put, petitioners vigorously assert that respondents are
estopped from claiming to be co-owners of the subject lot in view of the mutual agreement in 1946, judicial
confirmation in 1952, and respondents' acquiescence because they themselves exclusively exercised ownership
over Lot No. 1639-A beginning 1952 up to the present. 16
For their part, respondents posit three points in support of their position. First, they emphasize that petitioners failed
to show that the interested parties were apprised, or notified of the tentative subdivision contained in the sketch and
that the CFI subsequently confirmed the same. 17 Second, they point to the fact that petitioners were unable to show
any court approval of any partition. 18 Third, they maintain that Lot No. 1639 remain undivided since to date, OCT
No. 6275 is still an existing and perfectly valid title, containing no annotation of any encumbrance or partition
whatsoever. 19
After a careful consideration of the pleadings filed by the parties and the evidence on record, we find that the
petition is meritorious. As stated earlier, the core issue in this case is whether there was a valid partition in 1952.
Preliminary, this Court recognizes that "the jurisdiction of this Court in cases brought before it from the Court of
Appeals via Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is limited to reviewing errors of law. Findings of fact of the latter are
conclusive, except in the following instances: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises,
or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (3) when there is grave
abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are
conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings
are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to those of
the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based;
(9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the
respondent; and (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted
by the evidence on record." 20 This case falls under exceptions (7), (8) and (10) in that the findings of facts of the CA
are in conflict with that of the RTC, are mere conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are
based and are premised on absence of evidence but are contradicted by the evidence on record. For these
reasons, we shall consider the evidence on record to determine whether indeed there was partition.
In this jurisdiction, an action for partition is comprised of two phases: first, an order for partition which determines
whether a co-ownership in fact exists, and whether partition is proper, and, second, a decision confirming the sketch
or subdivision submitted by the parties or the commissioners appointed by the court, as the case may be. 21 The first
phase of a partition and/or accounting suit is taken up with the determination of whether or not a co-ownership in
fact exists, (i.e., not otherwise legally proscribed) and may be made by voluntary agreement of all the parties
interested in the property. This phase may end with a declaration that plaintiff is not entitled to have a partition either
because a co-ownership does not exist, or partition is legally prohibited. It may end, upon the other hand, with an
adjudgment that a co-ownership does in truth exist, partition is proper in the premises and an accounting of rents
and profits received by the defendant from the real estate in question is in order. In the latter case, "the parties may,
if they are able to agree, make partition among themselves by proper instruments of conveyance, and the court
shall confirm the partition so agreed upon. In either case i.e., either the action is dismissed or partition and/or
accounting is decreed the order is a final one, and may be appealed by any party aggrieved thereby. 22 The
second phase commences when it appears that "the parties are unable to agree upon the partition" directed by the
court. In that event, partition shall be done for the parties by the court with the assistance of not more than three (3)
commissioners. This second stage may well also deal with the rendition of the accounting itself and its approval by
the court after the parties have been accorded opportunity to be heard thereon, and an award for the recovery by
the party or parties thereto entitled of their just share in the rents and profits of the real estate in question." Such an
order is, to be sure, final and appealable. 23
The present rule on the question of finality and appealability of a decision or order decreeing partition is that it is
final and appealable. 23 The order of partition is a final determination of the co-ownership over Lot No. 1639 by the
parties and the propriety of the partition thereof. Hence, if the present rule were applied, the order not having been
appealed or questioned by any of the parties to the case, it has become final and executory and cannot be
disturbed.
The true test to ascertain whether or not an order or a judgment is interlocutory or final is: Does it leave something
to be done in the trial court with respect to the merits of the case? If it does, it is interlocutory; if it does not, it is final.
The key test to what is interlocutory is when there is something more to be done on the merits of the case. 24 An

order for partition is final and not interlocutory and, hence, appealable because it decides the rights of the parties
upon the issue submitted. 25
However, this Court notes that the order of partition was issued when the ruling in Fuentebella
vs. Carrascoso, 26which held that the order of partition is interlocutory, was controlling. In addition, the reports of the
commissioners not having been confirmed by the trial court are not binding. 27 In this case, both the order of partition
and the unconfirmed sketch plan are, thus, interlocutory. Nevertheless, where parties do not object to the
interlocutory decree, but show by their conduct that they have assented thereto, they cannot thereafter question the
decree, 28especially, where, by reason of their conduct, considerable expense has been incurred in the execution of
the commission. 29 Respondents in this case have occupied their respective lots in accordance with the
sketch/subdivision plan. They cannot after acquiescing to the order for more than forty (40) years be allowed to
question the binding effect thereof.
This case is to be distinguished from the order in the action for partition in Arcenas vs. Cinco. 30 In that case, the
order was clearly interlocutory since it required the parties "to submit the corresponding deed of partition to the
Court for its approval." Here, the order appointed two commissioners and directed them merely to approve the
sketch plan already existing and tentatively followed by the parties.
Under the present rule, the proceedings of the commissioners without being confirmed by the court are not binding
upon the parties. 31 However, this rule does not apply in case where the parties themselves actualized the
supposedly unconfirmed sketch/subdivision plan. The purpose of the court approval is to give effect to the
sketch/subdivision plan. In this case, the parties themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest implemented
the sketch plan made pursuant to a court order for partition by actually occupying specific portions of Lot No. 1639
in 1952 and continue to do so until the present until this case was filed, clearly, the purpose of the court approval
has been met. This statement is not to be taken to mean that confirmation of the commissioners may be dispensed
with but only that the parties herein are estopped from raising this question by their own acts of ratification of the
supposedly non-binding sketch/subdivision plan.
The records of the case show that sometime in 1946 there was a prior oral agreement to tentatively partition Lot No.
1639. 32 By virtue of this agreement, the original co-owners occupied specific portions of Lot No. 1639. 33 It was only
in 1952 when the petition to subdivide Lot No. 1639 was filed because two of the co-owners, namely Hermogenes
Olis and heirs of Pascual Olis, refused to have said lot subdivided and have separate certificates of title.
Significantly, after the 1952 proceedings, the parties in this case by themselves and/or through their predecessorsin-interest occupied specific portions of Lot No. 1639 in accordance with the sketch plan. Such possession remained
so until this case arose, or about forty (40) years later.
From its order in 1952, it can be gleaned that the CFI took notice of the tentative subdivision plan by oral partition of
the parties therein. Further, it appears that the court was aware that the parties therein actually took possession of
the portions in accordance with the sketch/subdivision plan. With the factual backdrop, said court ordered the
partition and appointed two (2) commissioners to approve the tentative sketch/subdivision plan. It would not be
unreasonable to presume that the parties therein, having occupied specific portions of Lot No. 1639 in accordance
with the sketch/subdivision plan, were aware that it was that same sketch/subdivision plan which would be
considered by the commissioners for approval. There is no showing that respondents by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest raised any objections. On the contrary, the records show that the parties continued their
possession of the specific portions of Lot No. 1639 pursuant to the sketch/subdivision plan.
It has been previously held that a co-owner, who, though not a party to a partition accepts the partition allotted to
him, and holds and conveys the same in severalty, will not be subsequently permitted to avoid partition. 34 It follows
that a party to a partition is also barred from avoiding partition when he has received and held a portion of the
subdivided land especially in this case where respondents have enjoyed ownership rights over their share for a long
time.
Parties to a partition proceeding, who elected to take under partition, and who took possession of the portion allotted
to them, are estopped to question title to portion allotted to another party. 35 A person cannot claim both under and
against the same instrument. 36 In other words, they accepted the lands awarded them by its provisions, and they
cannot accept the decree in part, and repudiate it in part. They must accept all or none. 37Parties who had received
the property assigned to them are precluded from subsequently attacking its validity of any part of it. 38 Here,
respondents, by themselves and/or through their predecessors-in-interest, already occupied of the lots in
accordance with the sketch plan. This occupation continued until this action was filed. They cannot now be heard to
question the possession and ownership of the other co-owners who took exclusive possession of Lot 1639-D also in
accordance with the sketch plan.

In technical estoppel, the party to be estopped must knowingly have acted so as to mislead his adversary, and the
adversary must have placed reliance on the action and acted as he would otherwise not have done. Some
authorities, however, hold that what is tantamount to estoppel may arise without this reliance on the part of the
adversary, and this is called, ratification or election by acceptance or benefits, which arises when a party, knowing
that he is not bound by a defective proceeding, and is free to repudiate it if he will, upon knowledge, and while under
no disability, chooses to adopt such defective proceeding as his own. 39 Ratification means that one under no
disability voluntarily adopts and gives sanction to some unauthorized act or defective proceeding, which without his
sanction would not be binding on him. It is this voluntary choice, knowingly made, which amounts to ratification of
what was therefore unauthorized, and becomes the authorized act of the party so making the ratification. 40
The records show that respondents were paying rent for the use of a portion of Lot No. 1639-D. Had they been of
the belief that they were co-owners of the entire Lot No. 1639 they would not have paid rent. Respondents
attempted to counter this point by presenting an uncorroborated testimony of their sole witness to the effect that the
amount so paid to Roberto Maglucot and, subsequently, to Ruperta Salma was for the payment of real property
taxes. We are not persuaded. In its quite improbable that the parties would be unaware of the difference in their
treatment of their transactions for so long a time. Moreover, no evidence was ever presented to show that a tax
declaration for the entire Lot No. 1639 has ever been made. Replete in the records are tax declarations for specific
portions of Lot 1639. It is inconceivable that respondents would not be aware of this. With due diligence on their
part, they could have easily verified this fact. This they did not do for a period spanning more than four decades.
The payment of rentals by respondents reveal that they are mere lessees. As such, the possession of respondents
over Lot No. 1639-D is that of a holder and not in the concept of an owner. One who possesses as a mere holder
acknowledges in another a superior right which he believes to be ownership, whether his belief be right or
wrong. 41 Since the possession of respondents were found to be that of lessors of petitioners, it goes without saying
that the latter were in possession of Lot No. 1639-D in the concept of an owner from 1952 up to the time the present
action was commenced.
Partition may be inferred from circumstances sufficiently strong to support presumption. 42 Thus, after a long
possession in severalty, a deed of partition may be presumed. 43 It has been held that recitals in deeds, possession
and occupation of land, improvements made thereon for a long series of years, and acquiescence for 60 years,
furnish sufficient evidence that there was an actual partition of land either by deed or by proceedings in the probate
court, which had been lost and were not recorded. 44 And where a tract of land held in common has been subdivided
into lots, and one of the lots has long been known and called by the name of one of the tenants in common, and
there is no evidence of any subsequent claim of a tenancy in common, it may fairly be inferred that there has been a
partition and that such lot was set off to him whose name it bears. 45
Respondents insist that the absence of any annotation in the certificate of title showing any partition of Lot No. 1639
and that OCT No. 6725 has not been canceled clearly indicate that no partition took place. The logic of this
argument is that unless partition is shown in the title of the subject property, there can be no valid partition or that
the annotation in the title is the sole evidence of partition.
Again, we are not persuaded. The purpose of registration is to notify and protect the interests of strangers to a given
transaction, who may be ignorant thereof, but the non-registration of the deed evidencing such transaction does not
relieve the parties thereto of their obligations thereunder. 46 As originally conceived, registration is merely a species
of notice. The act of registering a document is never necessary in order to give it legal effect as between the
parties. 47 Requirements for the recording of the instruments are designed to prevent frauds and to permit and
require the public to act with the presumption that recorded instrument exist and are genuine. 48
It must be noted that there was a prior oral partition in 1946. Although the oral agreement was merely tentative, the
facts subsequent thereto all point to the confirmation of said oral partition. By virtue of that agreement, the parties
took possession of specific portions of the subject lot. The action for partition was instituted because some of the coowners refused to have separate titles issued in lieu of the original title. In 1952, an order for partition was issued by
the cadastral court. There is no evidence that there has been any change in the possession of the parties. The only
significant fact subsequent to the issuance of the order of partition in 1952 is that respondents rented portions of Lot
No. 1639-D. It would be safe to conclude, therefore, that the oral partition as well as the order of partition in 1952
were the bases for the finding of actual partition among the parties. The legal consequences of the order of partition
in 1952 having been discussed separately, we now deal with oral partition in 1946. Given that the oral partition was
initially tentative, the actual possession of specific portions of Lot No. 1639 in accordance with the oral partition and
the continuation of such possession for a very long period indicate the permanency and ratification of such oral
partition. The validity of an oral partition is already well-settled. InEspina vs. Abaya, 49 we declared that an oral
partition is valid. In Hernandez vs. Andal, 50 reiterated in Tan vs.Lim, 51 this Court has ruled, thus:

On general principle, independent and in spite of the statute of frauds, courts of equity have enforce oral
partition when it has been completely or partly performed.
Regardless of whether a parol partition or agreement to partition is valid and enforceable at law, equity will
proper cases where the parol partition has actually been consummated by the taking of possession in
severalty and the exercise of ownership by the parties of the respective portions set off to each, recognize
and enforce such parol partition and the rights of the parties thereunder. Thus, it has been held or stated in a
number of cases involving an oral partition under which the parties went into possession, exercised acts of
ownership, or otherwise partly performed the partition agreement, that equity will confirm such partition and
in a proper case decree title in accordance with the possession in severalty.
In numerous cases it has been held or stated that parol partition may be sustained on the ground of estoppel
of the parties to assert the rights of a tenant in common as to parts of land divided by parol partition as to
which possession in severalty was taken and acts of individual ownership were exercised. And a court of
equity will recognize the agreement and decree it to be valid and effectual for the purpose of concluding the
right of the parties as between each other to hold their respective parts in severalty.
A parol partition may also be sustained on the ground that the parties thereto have acquiesced in and ratified
the partition by taking possession in severalty, exercising acts of ownership with respect thereto, or
otherwise recognizing the existence of the partition.
A number of cases have specifically applied the doctrine of part performance, or have stated that a part
performance is necessary, to take a parol partition out of the operation of the statute of frauds. It has been
held that where there was a partition in fact between tenants in common, and a part performance, a court of
equity would have regard to enforce such partition agreed to by the parties.
Two more points have constrained this Court to rule against respondents. First, respondents Wilfreda MaglucotAlejo and Constancio Alejo offered to buy the share of Roberto Maglucot. Second, the tax declarations contain
statements that the houses of respondents were built on the land owned by Roberto Maglucot.
On the first point, petitioners presented Aida Maglucot who testified that after respondents were informed that
petitioners were going to use Lot No. 1639-D belonging to Roberto Maglucot, respondents Wilfreda Maglucot-Alejo
and Constancio Alejo went to the house of said witness and offered to buy the share of Roberto Maglucot. 52 Aida
Maglucot further testified that they refused the offer because they also intend to use the lot for a residential
purpose. 53 This testimony of Aida Maglucot is unrebutted by respondents, and the CA did not touch upon this finding
of fact. Hence, the offer to buy has been established by the unrebutted evidence of the petitioners. Why would they
give such offer if they claim to be at least a co-owner of the said lot? In effect, respondents impliedly admit the title
of the petitioners and that they are not co-owners, much less the sole owners, of Lot No. 1639-D.
On the second point, the existence of Tax Declaration No. 04-557 in the names of Constancio Alejo and Godofreda
Maglucot, 54 Tax Declaration No. 04-87-13 in the names of Leopoldo Maglucot and Regina Barot, 55Tax Declaration
No. 04-593 in the names of Severo Maglucot and Samni Posida 56 showing that the houses of the above-mentioned
persons are constructed on the land of Roberto Maglucot 57 constitute incontrovertible evidence of admission by the
same persons of the ownership of the land by Roberto Maglucot. Tax Declarations are public documents. Unless
their veracity is directly attacked, the contents therein are presumed to be true and accurate. 58 The lone testimony
of Severo Maglucot that Roberto Maglucot was only made to appear as owner of the land in their respective
declarations because he was the administrator of Lot No. 1639 is uncorroborated and not supported by any other
evidence.
No injustice is dealt upon respondents because they are entitled to occupy a portion of Lot No. 1639, particularly Lot
No. 1639-A, in their capacity as heirs of Tomas Maglucot, one of the original co-owners of Lot No. 1639 in
accordance with the sketch plan of said lot showing the partition into six portions. 59
Finally, this Court takes notice of the language utilized by counsel for petitioners in their petition for review
oncertiorari. Thrice in the petition, counsel for petitioners made reference to the researcher of the CA. First, he
alluded to the lack of scrutiny of the records and lack of study of the law "by the researcher." 60 Second, he cited the
researcher of the CA as having "sweepingly stated without reference to the record" 61 that "[w]e have scanned the
records on hand and found no evidence of any partition." Finally, counsel for petitioners assailed the CA decision,
stating that "this will only show that there was no proper study of the case by the researcher." 62
1wphi1

Any court when it renders a decision does so as an arm of the justice system and as an institution apart from the
persons that comprise it. Decisions are rendered by the courts and not the persons or personnel that may

participate therein by virtue of their office. It is highly improper and unethical for counsel for petitioners to berate the
researcher in his appeal. Counsel for petitioner should be reminded of the elementary rules of the legal profession
regarding respect for the courts by the use of proper language in its pleadings and admonished for his improper
references to the researcher of the CA in his petition. A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive, or menacing
language or behavior before the courts. 63
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE and the decision of
the Regional Trial Court is hereby REINSTATED.
1wphi1.nt

SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Pardo and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
A.C. No. 4646

April 6, 2000

ROSITA S. TORRES, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. AMADO D. ORDEN, respondent.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
Complainant Rosita S. Torres engaged the services of respondent Atty. Amado D. Orden to represent her in Civil
Case No. 1928-R for the recovery of possession of a market stall from spouses Prudencio and Victorina Gayo
before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 6, of Baguio City. In time, a decision was rendered in favor of Torres. The
Gayo spouses appealed the case to the Court of Appeals. Respondent lawyer failed to submit an appellee's brief
before the appellate court; hence, the resolution, dated 05 July 1994, of the Court of Appeals"No appellee's brief having been filed per JRD Report of June 16, 1994, the Court resolved to submit the case for
decision sans appellee's brief. Let the case be re-raffled for study and report."1
On 25 September 1995, the Court of Appeals issued a decision in favor of the spouses Prudencio and Victorina
Gayo.
On 12 October 1995, respondent lawyer filed with this Court a Notice of Petition for Review on Certiorari. On 15
January 1996, no Petition for Review on Certiorari having theretofore been filed, this Court issued a resolution
declaring the case terminated and the judgment of the Court of Appeals final and executory. Thus"It appearing that petitioner failed to file the intended petition for review on certiorari within the reglementary period,
the Court further resolved to DECLARE THIS CASE TERMINATED AND DIRECT the Clerk of Court to INFORM the
parties that the judgment sought to be reviewed has become final and executory, no appeal therefrom having been
timely perfected."2
Complainant thereupon filed the instant Administrative Complaint against respondent for the latter's failure to
properly discharge his duty as such counsel despite his having allegedly received the amount of Twenty-Five
Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) for court expenses and attorney's fees. 3
In a manifestation, dated 11 January 1997, to this Court, respondent explained that"x x x when undersigned filed his Notice for Review on Certiorari, he had then expected to receive a notice for the
payment of fees and thereupon the number of days within which to file his brief"Scjj
xxx

xxx

xxx

"x x x had undersigned been given notice to pay the fees and file the brief for the complainant within such time as
this Honorable Court may have directed, undersigned would have paid such fees and filed the said brief." 4
In its resolution of 17 February 1997, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines ("IBP") for
investigation, report and recommendation. The IBP Investigating Commissioner, Attorney Renato G. Cunanan,
submitted in due time the results of his investigation. The report dated 07 November 1998, adopted and approved
by the IBP Board of Governors in its resolution of 19 June 1999, contained the salient findings of the Investigating
Commissioner.5
"We note that inspite of Atty. Orden's repeated declarations which would create the unmistakable impression that he
had in fact prepared and completed his client's brief, no such brief was ever submitted to the Supreme Court, either
in connection with his Motion for Reconsideration dated March 22, 1996, or his Manifestation of January 11, 1997.

"We are convinced that Atty. Amado Orden, despite his avowals has not prepared any such brief. Worse, we are just
as convinced that Atty. Orden has displayed a glaring ignorance of procedures and a grossly negligent failure to
keep abreast of the latest resolution and circulars of the Supreme Court and the Appellate Court in regard to
appeals. To be sure as a practitioner, Atty. Orden ought to have kept himself attuned to the Rules of Court and the
latest jurisprudence and rulings of the Supreme Court. Briefly stated, respondent Atty. Orden has not been honest
with the Supreme Court. Worse, he has not been honest with his client and worst with himself.
"We recommend that Atty. Amado D. Orden be suspended from the practice of law for at least one year." 6
It does look apparent that Attorney Amado D. Orden has fallen far too short of the circumspection required of every
member of the Bar. Jjsc
A counsel must constantly keep in mind that his actions or omissions, even malfeasance or nonfeasance, would be
binding on his client.7 Verily, a lawyer owes to the client the exercise of utmost prudence and capability in that
representation.8 Lawyers are expected to be acquainted with the rudiments of law and legal procedure, and anyone
who deals with them has the right to expect not just a good amount of professional learning and competence but
also a whole-hearted fealty to the client's cause.9
1wphi1

Upon appeal, the appellate court, not being in a position to hear firsthand the testimony of the parties, can only
place great reliance on the briefs and memoranda of parties. The failure to submit these pleadings could very well
be fatal to the cause of a client. Respondent's failure to submit the brief to the appellate court within the
reglementary period entails disciplinary action.10 Not only is it a dereliction of duty to his client but also to the court as
well.11 His shortcomings before the Court of Appeals is, in itself, already deplorable but to repeat that same infraction
before this Court constitutes negligence of contumacious proportions. It is even worse that respondent has
attempted to mitigate his liability by professing ignorance of appellate procedures, a matter that, too, is inexcusable.
Regrettably, the Court is constrained to affirm the aptly considered recommendation of the IBP on the matter.12
WHEREFORE, this Court so finds respondent Atty. Amado Orden remiss in his sworn duty to his client, and to the
Bar and the Bench as well, and imposes upon him the penalty of SUSPENSION from the practice of law for a period
of one (1) year immediately effective upon his receipt of this judgment.
Let a copy of this decision be entered in the personal records of respondent as an attorney and as a member of the
Bar, and furnish the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Court Administrator for circulation
to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Panganiban, Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur. Edpmis

EN BANC

[A.C. No. 4748. August 4, 2000]

VICTORIA V. RADJAIE, complainant, vs. ATTY. JOSE O. ALOVERA, respondent.

DECISION
PER CURIAM:

Atty. Jose O. Alovera, former Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Roxas City, Branch
17, faces disbarment for having penned a Decision [1] dated January 30, 1995 long after his retirement
from the Judiciary on January 31, 1995 which ultimately divested complainant Victoria V. Radjaie of
her property in Panay, Capiz.
In an Affidavit-Complaint[2] filed before the Office of the Bar Confidant on April 21, 1997,
[3]
complainant sought the disbarment of respondent enumerating the following particulars to support
her contention that the questioned January 30, 1995 decision was prepared after the retirement of
respondent:
a) Almost all orders issued by then Judge Alovera prior to his retirement bear the stamp "RECEIVED"
by Branch 17 of RTC-Roxas City, with the initial of the one who received it for filing with the courtrecord except the Order of January 25, 1995 (p. 87 records) admitting, and the Decision dated
January 30, 1995 (pp. 88-93, ibid.).
b) It can also be seen that all the orders issued prior to the retirement were all type-written in the
same type-[writer] except the January 25, 1995 Order (p. 87) and the Decision (pp. 88-93) and
these two (2) documents appear to have been type-written on the same type-[writer].
c) It is also a source of wonder why plaintiffs formally offered their evidence one year after the last
witness was presented last December 10, 1993.

xxx xxx xxx

Plaintiffs had until January 20, 1994 to formally offer their evidence but it took them one
(1) year and five (5) days to file such a simple pleading. It goes against the normal human
experience when plaintiffs who are allowed to present evidence ex-parte are usually very
quick in having things done because there is no opposition but in this case it took plaintiffs
a while to formally rest which was only fifteen (15) days prior to the retirement of Mr.
Alovera. This timing is highly suspect.
d) Even plaintiffs' formal offer of evidence showed badges of fraud. It was not received by the trial
court. Page 67 shows this clearly. It would not be surprising if the same was also inserted into the
records on a much later date and Atty. Alberto Villaruz must be made to explain this too.

It was dated January 20, 1995 but the date of the Professional Tax Receipt (PTR) of Atty.
Alberto A. Villaruz, counsel for the plaintiffs, was issued only on January 31, 1995. This is
shown on Page 71 of the records.
e) There is no showing that the January 25, 1995 Order (p. 87) admitting the formal offer was even
received by a Court staff for filing with the records.
f) The same can be said of the January 30, 1995 Decision (pp. 88-93) which was allegedly decided
five (5) days after the Order admitting the evidence (p. 87) was allegedly issued. What a swift
action from a retiring judge.
g) A copy of the Decision was not even sent to the counsel for the plaintiffs but is shown to have been
received by one of the plaintiffs only on August 1, 1995 (p. 93).
h) Again, it is beyond the normal experience for a lawyer such as Atty. Villaruz who is a practitioner in
the locality and who is in Court almost everyday that he will not follow up if there is already a
decision rendered in a case where he was allowed to present evidence ex-parte or even be told
about it.

i) The records show that all orders after the retirement of Mr. Alovera bear the stamp "RECEIVED" by
the Court staff who received them for filing in the court records.

Traversing the allegations of the Affidavit-Complaint as purely speculative and not based on
personal knowledge, the respondent, in his Comment [4] dated August 20, 1997, further assailed as
simply self-serving complainant's Affidavit-Complaint alleging that a careful scrutiny of the expediente
of Civil Case No. V-6186 would reveal that respondent observed due process when he resolved the
said case against complainant. [5] It was only when Judge Julius Abela, who succeeded him in RTC,
Br. 17, Roxas City, annulled, through a resolution, the questioned January 30, 1995 decision, which
ostensibly having become final was also executed, did the matter get out of hand. [6] His said decision,
respondent argued, may only be impeached, annulled or otherwise set aside under three (3) modes,
[7]
all of which were either not availed of by complainant for lapse of time, or like an action to annul the
judgment, though still available, should not have been filed in the same court, which rendered the
questioned decision, but should have been filed, instead, in the Court of Appeals. [8] As to the absence
of stamp "RECEIVED" on the questioned decision, respondent shifted the blame to the then OIC
Clerk of Court of the said court, Mrs. Nenita Aluad, contending that after the decision was rendered
on January 30, 1995, he lost control of it and he surmised that Mrs. Aluad, who had the duty to
receive and record the decision, might have lost it "momentarily." [9]
In a Resolution[10] dated October 22, 1997, this Court referred the instant case to the Office of the
Bar Confidant for investigation, report and recommendation. While in the process of investigation,
three (3) incidents occurred, namely:
1. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Capiz Chapter, approved Resolution No. 9, Series of
1997 on December 17, 1997, questioning the order, dated November 28, 1997, of the Regional
Trial Court, Br. 17, Roxas City, which ordered the suspension from the practice of law of herein
respondent and Atty. Alberto Villaruz;
2. The Court En Banc, in its Resolution of December 22, 1997, resolved to issue a temporary
restraining order (TRO) in G.R. No. 131505, entitled "Atty. Alberto A. Villaruz vs. Honorable Julius
L. Abela," ordering the respondent judge therein to cease and desist from enforcing and/or
implementing his questioned order dated November 28, 1997 in Civil Case No. V-6186, which
ordered the suspension of Atty. Villaruz; and,
3. Respondent Alovera filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court, entitled "Jose Alovera
vs. Victoria Villariez-Radjaie and Judge Julius L. Abela," under G.R. No. 131768, which, at the time
was still pending, questioning the Order of November 28, 1997 which ordered respondent's
suspension from the practice of law.

Thus, necessitated the filing of the Manifestation [11] by the Office of the Bar Confidant on January 27,
1998, inquiring from the Court whether to proceed with the investigation of the case in view of the
aforementioned incidents.
On February 18, 1998, the Court directed the Office of the Bar Confidant to proceed with the
investigation of the instant case.[12]
Judge Julius Abela, Nenita M. Aluad, legal researcher, Teresita V. Bauzon, court stenographer,
Concepcion Alcazar, clerk-in-charge of civil cases and special proceedings, all of Regional Trial
Court, Br. 17, Roxas City, Rosa Dapat, court stenographer of Regional Trial Court, Br. 15, Roxas City
and the complainant herself testified as witnesses for the complainant.
The respondent presented as his lone witness, Mrs. Rosa Dapat, who merely testified on the
January 10, 1993 proceedings inside his chambers. Respondent himself did not testify and neither
did any other witness testify for him, despite the issuance of subpoenaad testificandum on Ireneo
Borres and Ludovico Buhat, who both failed to appear at the investigation. In lieu of their oral
testimonies, respondent offered and presented their respective affidavits. [13] Complainant chose not to
object thereto and even waived her right, through her counsel, to cross-examine them.
The established facts, as quoted from the Report dated November 17, 1999 of the Office of the
Bar Confidant, are as follows:

On July 2, 1992, the heirs of the late Faustina Borres, Segundina Borres, Felisa Borres,
Micaela Borres, Maria Bores, and Sixto Borres (hereinafter "Borres heirs") through their
counsel, Atty. Alberto A. Villaruz, filed an action for Partition and Accounting, docketed as
Civil Case No. V-6186, with the Regional Trial Court, Br. 15, Roxas City, against herein
complainant, Victoria V. Radjaie, who was presumably an heir of the late Faustina Borres.
The action sought, among others, the cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-

24150 in the name of herein complainant covering a parcel of land with an area of
215,777 square meters situated in Panay, Capiz, and the declaration of the said parcel of
land as property commonly owned by the Borres heirs.
On July 16, 1993, Br. 17, to which Civil Case No. V-6186 was re-raffled, declared herein
complainant in default and ordered the Borres heirs to present their evidence on July 30,
1993.[14]
It was only after three (3) postponements that the Borres heirs were able to start
presenting their evidence ex-parte on October 8, 1993. For lack of material time, however,
the presentation of evidence was again reset to November 22, 1993, which again was
postponed and reset to December 10, 1993.[15]
On December 10, 1993, there were several criminal and civil actions scheduled for trial,
which commenced at about 10:00 in the morning, before Br. 17, including Civil Case No.
V-6186, which was listed number four in the court calendar. Judge Alovera presided over
the hearing and Teresita V. Bauzon, court stenographer of Br. 17, took down notes of the
Proceedings. Atty. Villaruz appeared for the accused in a criminal case[16] before Br. 17 at
the time. The court had a recess at 11:10 and resumed at 11:35 in the morning. After the
hearing of criminal cases was through, Civil Case No. V-6186 was called at about 11:55 in
the morning, but the plaintiffs as well as their counsel, Atty. Villaruz, were no longer inside
the courtroom. The session thus adjourned at 11:57 in the morning without Civil Case No.
V-6186 being heard.[17]
At about 11:30 in the morning of the same date, Atty. Villaruz approached Rosa Dapat,
who was the court stenographer at the time of RTC, Br. 15, Roxas City, while she was in
her office. Atty. Villaruz told her that Judge Alovera was requesting her to assist in the
proceedings of Civil Case No. V-6186. At first she was hesitant to accede to the request
as Br. 17 had also its own court stenographer. She relented though when told that Br. 17
as well as the other branches had no available court stenographer. She then went to Br.
17 and saw Atty. Villaruz standing by the door of the chambers of Judge Alovera. Atty.
Villaruz motioned her to enter the chambers, which is separate from the courtroom. While
inside the chambers, she saw Judge Alovera behind his desk and other people whom she
did not know. Upon being told that Mrs. Dapat would be the stenographer, Judge Alovera
told Atty. Villaruz to start the proceedings. Following the manifestation made by Atty.
Villaruz, a witness, whom she later recognized to be Atty. Arturo Agudo, was called. At that
instant Judge Alovera stood up and said, "All right, you just continue," and then went out
of the chambers.[18] Judge Alovera would occasionally return to the chambers in the course
of the proceedings, but he would just sit down and listen while Atty. Villaruz was
conducting his direct examination of the witness and presenting documentary evidence.
[19]
The proceedings lasted up to 12:10 in the afternoon, with Judge Alovera making only
two rulings in the course thereof, including the one he made at the end when he ordered
the plaintiffs to file their written offer of evidence on January 20, 1994.[20]
From this point on, complainant would establish how the January 30, 1995 decision of
Judge Alovera in Civil Case No. V-6186 came about.
Prior to his retirement from the judiciary on January 31, 1995, or on January 5, 1995,
Judge Alovera designated his legal researcher, Mrs. Nenita Aluad, to be the OIC Branch
Clerk of Court.[21] As part of her functions as such OIC, all decisions, orders and resolutions
of Br. 17 would first be received by her from the judge, and would stamp them
"RECEIVED" and put thereon the date of receipt as well as her initial or signature.[22] This is
in accordance with Sec. 1, Rule 36 of the Rules of Court.[23]
Sometime in February of 1995, Mrs. Teresita V. Bauzon, court stenographer of Br. 17
since 1993, was asked to type the draft decision in Civil Case No. V-6186 in Judge

Alovera's house. When she inquired if he can still do it, Judge Alovera told her that he had
one (1) year more to decide cases. With this assurance, she typed the draft decision on a
single bond paper without a duplicate as Judge Alovera was dictating it.[24]
On August 1, 1995 at about 9:30 in the morning, retired Judge Alovera came to Br. 17,
with a man and a woman, later identified as the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. V-6186, behind
him. While he was approaching Nenita Aluad, he uttered to the latter, "Receive this,
receive this, " referring to the questioned January 30, 1995 decision, which he was
holding. As he spread the decision on her table, he continued, "Because I will defend you
even up to the Plaza Miranda. And give copies to these two, pointing to the plaintiffs who
were at his back.[25] Almost instantaneously, Mrs. Aluad replied, " I would not receive it
because it is already August 1, 1995," and she did not argue with him anymore so as not
to embarrass him for being her former superior.[26] She then went out of the office while
retired Judge Alovera, as well as the two plaintiffs were still inside.[27] At about the same
time, Mrs. Concepcion Alcazar, another employee of Br. 17 and the clerk-in-charge of civil
cases and special proceedings therein, saw Judge Alovera inside the office of Br. 17 while
trying to have her co-employees receive the questioned decision. Nobody, however,
received the same because it was already seven (7) months after his retirement.[28] A little
later, she found the questioned decision, together with the formal offer of exhibits of
January 20, 1995 and the order of January 25, 1995, on the top of her table. Although she
noticed that these records were not stamped "RECEIVED" as a matter of procedure, she
went on to attach the said records to the expediente of Civil Case No. V-6186.[29] She even
gave a copy of the questioned decision to one of the plaintiffs, Ireneo Borres, and to Atty.
Villaruz, which was received for him by Ireneo Borres.[30] After keeping the expediente, she
then entered the questioned decision in her logbook.[31]
The Borres heirs succeeded in having the questioned decision executed when, on
January 31, 1996, the lessee of the property, which is the subject matter of Civil Case No.
V-6186, surrendered possession of the said property in favor of the Borres heirs,[32] Said
transfer of possession was made pursuant to the writ of execution issued on January 19,
1996 by the Acting Presiding Judge of Br. 17, Hon. Delano F. Villaruz, through Clerk of
Court Susan Mendoza Arce.[33]
Meanwhile, complainant, who had been working in Japan together with his husband who
is employed at the Turkish Embassy in Tokyo, Japan, learned of what happened to her
property in Panay, Capiz.[34] She was thus prompted to come back to the Philippines, which
resulted in losing her job in Japan.
Back home, complainant, on March 5, 1996, filed a Petition for Relief from Order,
questioning the January 30, 1995 decision and the January 19, 1996 Writ of Execution.
[35]
She also prayed "that disciplinary and contempt proceedings be taken against those
involved in the perfidious anomaly to tamper with the administration of justice."[36]
Judge Julius L. Abela took cognizance of Civil Case No. V-6186 as he was the acting
presiding judge of Br. 17 at the time of the filing of said petition for relief from order.[37] In
the course of the proceedings thereof, he noticed that the Formal Offer of Exhibits
purportedly filed by the plaintiffs, i.e., Borres heirs, was dated January 20, 1995, while the
PTR of their counsel, Atty. Alberto Villaruz, was issued on January 31, 1995. He concluded
then that the said offer could not have been filed on January 20, 1995. When he asked
Atty. Villaruz about it, the latter refused to answer and just kept quiet. [38] He likewise
observed that there was no order in Civil Case No. V-6186 submitting the same for
decision, except for the order made by Judge Alovera on December 10, 1993 during the
"simulated proceedings" inside his chambers, where he directed the counsel for the
plaintiffs to file his offer of exhibits.[39] Mrs. Rosa Dapat, who took down notes during the
said proceedings and who was not a member of the staff of Br. 17, was not even
acknowledged on the records as the official stenographer in the course thereof.[40] Thus, in

his resolution of September 25, 1997, Judge Abela granted the petition for relief filed by
complainant and the latter was ordered reinstated to the possession of the property in
question. In the same resolution, Judge Abela declared the January 30, 1995 decision null
and void, the same not being filed with the clerk of court and not properly rendered in
accordance with Section 1, Rule 36, Rules of Court.[41]
Prompted by what he considered to be anomalous proceedings, coupled with the prayer
of complainant in her petition for relief "that disciplinary and contempt proceedings be
taken against those involved in the perfidious anomaly to tamper with the administration of
justice," Judge Abela conducted an investigation into the said anomaly.[42] After considering
the testimonies of Misses Aluad, Dapat, Bauzon and Alcazar during the investigation,
together with the documentary evidence presented, he concluded, thus:
From the foregoing facts and circumstances the following facts are established that:
1) Civil Case No. V-6186 was not tried on December 10, 1993. What transpired was a mock or
simulated trial inside the chamber of Judge Alovera where only Atty. Alberto Villaruz, the plaintiffs
and Mrs. Rosa Dapat, a court stenographer from another court, were present. No Judge or RTC
Branch 17 court personnel were present as there was actual court session in open court going on
at that time.
2) The records of Civil Case No. V-6186 were with Judge Jose O. Alovera and remained with him
even after his retirement on January 31, 1995. He did not return the record to Mrs. Concepcion
Alcazar, Court Clerk III in Charge of Civil Cases.
3) The record of Civil Case No. V-6186 turned up on the table of Mrs. Alcazar together with the "Offer
of Exhibits" of Atty. Villaruz dated January 20, 1995 and the "Order" dated January 25, 1995, after
the retirement of Judge Alovera. Both the Offer and the Order admitting the exhibits were not
properly filed and do not bear markings of having been received by the court.
4) The "decision" of Judge Jose O. Alovera, though dated January 30, 1995, was filed with the court
on August 1, 1995 by former Judge Alovera himself and because he was no longer a judge his
submission was refused.

- CONCLUSIONS The "Offer of Exhibits" of Atty. Alberto Villaruz though dated January 20, 1995
bears signature and PTR No. issued on January 31, 1995. This simply means that the
pleadings (were) ante dated. It is impossible for Atty. Villaruz to affix his PTR No. dated
January 31, 1995 or any date prior to its issuance. The Offer of Exhibits could have been
made only on January 31, 1995 or later. Because this is so, the Order of Judge Alovera
dated January 25, 1995 is also ante dated and could have been made only on a date
beyond the filing of the Offer of Exhibits. So also with the decision of former Judge Alovera
dated January 30, 1995.
xxx xxx xxx

The Order admitting the exhibits and the decision were made after the retirement of Judge
Alovera. He was no longer a judge.
The acts of Attys. Alberto Villaruz and Jose O. Alovera constitute deceit, malpractice,
serious and grave misconduct as lawyer justifying their suspension from the practice of
law and ultimately their disbarment.[43]
Based on the foregoing findings, the Bar Confidant recommended the disbarment of respondent,
declaring that it found more than sufficient evidence to sustain complainant's charge against
respondent that, indeed, the January 30, 1995 decision in Civil Case No. V-6186, which divested
complainant of her property in Panay, Capiz, was penned by respondent after his retirement from the
judiciary on January 31, 1995.

This Court finds the recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant to be well-taken.
Respondent has thus sufficiently demonstrated that he is morally and legally unfit to remain in the
exclusive and honorable fraternity of the legal profession.
In his long years as a lawyer, respondent has forgotten his sworn pledge as a lawyer. It is time
once again that the Court inculcate in the hearts of all lawyers that pledge; thus -

LAWYER'S OATH
" I, x x x, do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines; I will support and defend its Constitution and obey the laws as well as the
legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood nor consent to
its commission; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or
unlawful suit nor give aid nor consent to the same; I will not delay any man's cause for
money or malice and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my
knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients and I
impose upon myself this obligation voluntary, without any mental reservation or purpose of
evasion.
SO HELP ME GOD.
This oath to which all lawyers have subscribed in solemn agreement to dedicate themselves to
the pursuit of justice, is not a mere ceremony or formality for practicing law [44] to be forgotten
afterwards nor is it mere words, drift and hollow, but a sacred trust that every lawyer must uphold and
keep inviolable at all times.[45] This oath is firmly echoed and reflected in the Code of Professional
Responsibility, the particular provisions of which are applicable to the case at bar, provide, to wit:
CANON 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for
law and for legal processes.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Rule 1.02 - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening
confidence in the legal system.

xxx xxx xxx

CANON 7 - A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and
support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law,
nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the
discredit of the legal profession.

xxx xxx xxx

CANON 10 - A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he
mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice.

All of these underscore the role of the lawyer as the vanguard of our legal system. When respondent
took the oath as a member of the legal profession, he made a solemn promise to so stand by his
pledge.[46] In this covenant, respondent miserably failed.
The testimonies of Nenita M. Aluad, Teresita V. Bauzon and Concepcion Alcazar were all quite
telling on how respondent acted in a grossly reprehensible manner in having the questioned decision
dated January 30, 1995 come to fore, leading ultimately to its execution divesting the complainant of
her property. Respondent gravely abused his relationship with his former staff, pompously flaunting
his erstwhile standing as a judge. Respondent disregarded his primary duty as an officer of the court,
who is sworn to assist the courts and not to impede or pervert the administration of justice to all and
sundry.[47] In so doing, he made a mockery of the judiciary and eroded public confidence in courts and
lawyers.
This Court has been nothing short of exacting in its demand for integrity and good moral
character from members of the Bar. By swearing the lawyer's oath, an attorney becomes a guardian
of truth and the rule of law, and an indispensable instrument in the fair and impartial administration of
justice - a vital function of democracy a failure of which is disastrous to society. Any departure from

the path which a lawyer must follow as demanded by the virtues of his profession shall not be
tolerated by this Court as the disciplining authority [48] for there is perhaps no profession after that of
the sacred ministry in which a high-toned morality is more imperative than that of law.[49]
Despite the opportunities accorded to respondent to present substantial defense to refute the
charges against him, he failed neither to do so nor to offer a valid explanation. When the integrity of a
member of the bar is challenged, it is not enough that he denies the charges against him; he must
meet the issue and overcome the evidence against him. He must show proof that he still maintains
that degree of morality and integrity which at all times is expected of him. [50]
Given the peculiar factual circumstances prevailing in this case, the Court finds as appropriate the
recommended penalty of the Office of the Bar Confidant in its Report. Such gross misconduct of the
respondent brings intolerable dishonor to the legal profession and calls for the severance of
respondents privilege to practice law for life.
WHEREFORE, respondent JOSE O. ALOVERA is hereby DISBARRED. The Office of the Clerk
of Court is directed to strike out his name from the Roll of Attorneys and to inform all courts of this
Decision.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Melo, Puno, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena,
Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Bellosillo, J., on leave.
Vitug, and Kapunan, JJ., took no part due to close relation to a party.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 133625

September 6, 2000

REMEDIOS F. EDRIAL, MAURO EDRIAL JR., MARYLENE EDRIAL, ILDEFONSO EDRIAL, ROSALIND EDRIAL,
MARY JEAN EDRIAL, and SUSAN EDRIAL-VALENZUELA, petitioners,
vs.
PEDRO QUILAT-QUILAT, GABRIELA QUILAT-QUILAT, ISIDRA QUILAT-QUILAT, and ESTANISLAO QUILATQUILAT, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Parties who prayed for and were granted several postponements and caused repeated delays cannot ask for the
reopening of the trial for the purpose of presenting additional evidence. After squandering several opportunities
given them to ventilate their claims, they can no longer complain of alleged violation of their right to due process.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, assailing the October 17, 1997 Decision1 and the March 19, 1998
Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA)3 in CA-GR SP No. 42660. The CA affirmed the Order of the trial court,
which had denied their Motion to Reopen the Case and to allow them to complete the presentation of their evidence.
The assailed Decision disposed as follows:4
"WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED."
The Resolution denied reconsideration of the challenged Decision.
The Facts
Respondents Pedro, Gabriela, Isidra and Estanislao - all surnamed Quilat-Quilat -- filed an action for recovery of a
parcel of land against Petitioners Remedios, Mauro Jr., Marylene, Idelfonso, Rosalind, Mary Jean -- all surnamed
Edrial -- and Susan Edrial-Valenzuela. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 6315 and raffled to Branch 39 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dumaguete City.5 The Court of Appeals presented the facts of this case as follows:
"Atty. Gerardo Lituanas, a lawyer of the LAPIL (IBP) Negros Oriental, who was also an [e]lection [r]egistrar of the
COMELEC, filed the complaint in 1975;
Atty. Lituanas was able to present evidence on the following dates:
July 10, 1981
First plaintiffs' witness Atilano Ramirez, 73 years old, was presented;
July 16, 1981
Continuation of the testimony of Atilano Ramirez;
August 24, 1982
Continuation of the testimony of Atilano Ramirez;
November 20, 1984
Continuation of the testimony of Atilano Ramirez;
February 28, 1984

Direct Examination of 2ndPlaintiffs' witness Ignacio Tomias. Cross-examination was waived.

August 21, 1985
Plaintiff Pedro Quilat-Quilat was presented on direct examination.
"On December 16, 1986, the Citizen Legal Assistance Office (CLAO) entered its appearance as new [private
respondents'] counsel after Atty. Gerardo Lituanas has filed his withdrawal. The subsequent events are as follows:
February 23, 1987
The case was set for hearing on April 21, 1987.
April 21, 1987
The hearing was reset due to the projected amendment of the complainant to implead Primitiva Torrecampo.
June 19, 1987
The third amended complaint was admitted.
September 9, 1987
Hearing was postponed at the instance of the defendants [herein petitioners].
October 22, 1987
The hearing was suspended for the reason that the Court would require the [private respondents] to submit a
certification from the Bureau of Forest Development that the land involved in this case [was] not a part of the public
forest.
December 17, 1987
The hearing was postponed at the request of [private respondents'] counsel for the reason that she [would] be
attending [a] conference in Cebu City.
March 18, 1988
The hearing was aborted due to the fact that the Bureau of Forest Development report ha[d] not yet been finished.
July 5, 1988
The hearing [was] reset upon agreement of both counsel.
September 15, 1988
The hearing [was] reset upon the Court's instance.
December 8, 1988
No hearing was held as the certification from the Bureau of Forest Development [was] being awaited.
March 16, 1989
The said certification [was] still being awaited.
May 25, 1989
The testimony of [Private Respondent] Pedro Quilat-Quilat [was] suspended after a question was [propounded] that
would require him to use reading eyeglasses which he did not have at the moment.
December 14, 1989

Hearing [was] reset due to the illness of [private respondents'] counsel.

September 20, 1990
Atty. Eleccion, [petitioners'] counsel did not appear despite due notice. At this time, the [private respondents] rested
their case.
October 15, 1990
Atty. Eleccion [private respondents'] counsel did not appear. Hearing [was] reset to October 16, 1990.
October 16, 1990
Atty. Eleccion did not appear. Hearing [was] reset to December 10, 11 and 12.
December 10, 1990
Atty. Eleccion asked for postponement. Hearing [was] reset to December 11, 1990.
December 11, 1990
Atty. Eleccion did not appear. The case [was] submitted for decision as of th[at] day.
August 21, 1992
The transcript of stenographic notes which was taken down by stenographer Alexander Yberley, was missing. He
was ordered to produce the transcript.
October 30, 1992
Witness Atilano Ramirez was recalled for cross-examination since stenographer Yberley manifested that the record
was burned. Despite due notice, nobody appeared for the [petitioners]. So as of this day, the cross-examination of
Atilano Ramirez was considered waived and the case was finally submitted for decision.
December 11, 1992
Court granted the prayer of Atty. Sedillo and the case [was] set for hearing on March 22, 29 and April 5 1993.
March 22, 1993
Atty. Sedillo did not present evidence but instead moved for a resetting of the hearing to April 12, 1993. He [was]
advised by the Court to be prepared on the next scheduled hearing.
June 4, 1993
Judge [was] on leave. Hearing [was] reset to July 2, 1993.
July 2, 1993
Flaviano Umbac was presented as first [petitioners'] witness. Hearing [was] scheduled [for] August 27, 1993.
August 27, 1993
[Petitioners] moved for a resetting to October 7, 1993.
October 7, 1993
Atty. Bongaciso was presented as second witness for the [petitioners]. His testimony [was] terminated and hearing
[was] reset to December 13, 1993.
December 13, 1993

Judge [was] on leave. Hearing [was] reset to February 14, 1994.

February 14, 1994
Hearing [was] reset at the instance of Atty. Sedillo who want[ed] to recall his witness Atty. Bonganciso. Hearing [was]
reset to March 23, 1994.
March 24, 1994
Hearing [was] postponed to May 6, 1994 to find avenue for settlement.
May 6, 1994
Due to the conflict of schedule by Atty. Sedillo and due to the absence of recalled 2nd [petitioners'] witness
Bongaciso, hearing [was] reset to June 17, 1994.
June 17, 1994
Atty. Sedillo asked for postponement. He [would] attend a Kiwanis Training Conference. Hearing [was] reset to July
4, 1994.
July 4, 1994
Atty. Sedillo was present but Atty. Rosalinda Ybanez [was] available at 10:00 a.m. so the case [was] reset to August
15, 1994.
August 15, 1994
Judge [was] on leave. Hearing [was] reset to October 3, 1994.
October 3, 1994
The hearing [was] reset to November 17, 1994 due to non-availability of [petitioners'] witness Atty. Roque
Bonganciso who [was] on recall.
November 17, 1994
There [was] talk about [a] proposed settlement, hearing [was] held in abeyance.
January 6, 1995
Since no settlement [was] realized a [private respondents'] motion to set [the] case for hearing was filed and the
case was reset to [February] 27, 1995.
February 27, 1995
Earlier, [petitioners'] counsel, Atty. Sedillo filed a motion for postponement as he [would be] appearing in a case in
Manila. Atty. Ybanez manifested that on February 26, 1995 Atty. Sedillo was in Dumaguete and further that this case
ha[d] been delayed by the failure of the [petitioners] to complete the presentation of their evidence. The Court then
ordered the case submitted for decision for the THIRD TIME.
March 16, 1995
The Court issued an order reconsidering the February 27, 1995 order upon motion of Atty. Sedillo and set the case
for the [petitioners] for June 16, 1995 with a STERN WARNING TO THE [PETITIONERS].
June 16, 1995
The hearing set for [this day] was cancelled as the Judge [was] on leave and reset to September 8, 1995.
September 8, 1995

The [petitioners'] counsel did not appear. Hearing [was] reset to November 16, 1995.
November 16, 1995
The [petitioners'] counsel did not appear. Neither did his client. The hearing [was] reset to February 13, 1996.
February 9, 1996
The [petitioners'] counsel filed a motion to withdraw as counsel.
February 12, 1996
The Court issued an order granting the withdrawal of the [petitioners'] counsel. The [petitioners were] directed to
immediately engage the services of a new counsel. This notice was received personally by the wife of [Petitioner]
Mauro Edrial, Jr.
February 13, 1996
The Court issued an order setting the case [for] April 26, 1996. This order was received by the wife of the [Petitioner]
Mauro Edrial, Jr.
April 26, 1996
There was no appearance from the [petitioners]. Hence, the case was submitted for decision for the FOURTH TIME.
July 8, 1996
Atty. Sedillo filed a motion to reopen the case and in effect reentered his appearance.
August 20, 1996
Private respondents thru counsel filed opposition to the motion of the [petitioners].
September 6, 1996
The Hon. Judge issued an order denying the motion to reopen hereby affirming the April 26, 1996 order submitting
the case for decision.
September 11, 1996
[Petitioners] filed a motion for reconsideration.
October 2, 1996
Court denied the motion for reconsideration.
October 23, 1996
Private respondents received a copy of the Petition for Certiorari." 6
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA dismissed petitioners' appeal because, in issuing the questioned Orders, the trial judge committed no grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. In giving petitioners more than ample time to complete their
presentation of evidence and in granting their Motions for Postponement, the judge was accommodating them more
than they actually deserved.
Hence, this Petition.7
Issues

Petitioners submit that the CA erred in affirming the twin Orders of the Dumaguete City RTC, Branch 39. They
contend that a reversal thereof would have allowed them to complete their presentation of evidence. Hence, by
affirming those Orders, the CA allegedly violated their right to due process. 8
This Court's Ruling
The Petition is without merit.
Main Issue
Due Process and Reopening of Trial
Counsel for petitioners alleges that the addresses of his clients on file in his law firm were incorrect; hence, the
notices and other forms of communication he had sent to them were not received. He allegedly discovered this fact
only after he had filed his withdrawal as their counsel. He also argues that the denial of the Motion to Reopen Trial
was "plainly capricious and oppressive" because private respondents were equally guilty of delay and
procrastination. Finally, he maintains that allowing petitioners to present their remaining evidence would be "in the
interest of substantial due process and humane justice."
Respondents disagree, reasoning that the trial court thrice reconsidered its Order to submit the case for decision;
that is, petitioners were given several opportunities to present their evidence, but they squandered them.
Petitioners, they further point out, were intentionally seeking to delay the resolution of the case because they were
in physical possession of the land in dispute.
Counsel's excuses are unsatisfactory and unacceptable. The CA ruled that petitioners were given "more than
enough time" to complete their presentation of evidence. Respondents rested their case as early as September
1992. Petitioners' lawyer, at his own request, was allowed to start presenting evidence only on April 12, 1993. From
that day until April 26, 1996 or for a period of three years, counsel presented only two witnesses. The trial judge was
in fact liberal in granting petitioners' Motions for Postponement. But enough was enough; when they attempted to
delay the trial some more, the trial judge finally and correctly refused to go along.
True, respondents also asked for continuances, but petitioners were ultimately to blame for the inexcusable delay.
The case was submitted for decision three times -- on December 11, 1990, October 30, 1992, and February 27,
1995 - but petitioners and/or their counsel did not appear in court each time. After having failed to take advantage of
opportunities to ventilate their claims below, parties may no longer be accorded the same chances, in the absence
of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court, as in this case. 9
The Court frowns on lawyers' practice of repeatedly seeking extensions of time to file pleadings and thereafter
simply letting the period lapse without submitting any pleading or even any explanation or manifestation of their
failure.10 The same principle applies more forcefully to motions for continuance. Postponement is not a matter of
right, but of sound judicial discretion. Actions thereon will not be disturbed by appellate courts in the absence of a
clear or manifest abuse of discretion, resulting in a denial of substantial justice. 11 We concur with the CA that there is
no such denial in this case.
1wphi1

It is highly suspicious how the counsel for petitioners continued to represent his clients effectively for several years
despite allegedly having lost their correct addresses. It was definitely his duty to know the correct ones. Indeed, it
was too late for him to do so after he had withdrawn as their counsel. According to him, after April 16, 1996, he sent
an office employee to verify the whereabouts of Mauro Edrial Jr. The inquiry yielded the information that Mauro
actually resided in San Jose, Negros Oriental, and that Susan Edrial Valenzuela resided in Gomez St., Dumaguete
City.12 He should have undertaken the search before withdrawing as counsel. Further, notice might not have been
received by petitioners themselves, but that did not excuse counsel's failure to appear during trials.
Counsel for petitioners further avers that he had difficulty in presenting Atty. Roque Bonganciso because of the
latter's prior commitments which conflicted with the scheduled trial dates. The last witness was Mauro Edrial Jr., but
counsel had the wrong address on file. He should just have adjusted the order of presentation of witnesses and
called Edrial Jr. later. Such move could have prevented the postponement. Besides, finding an available date in his
calendar would not have taken Atty. Bonganciso three years.
The Code of Professional Responsibility requires that lawyers, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings,
memoranda or briefs, shall not let the period lapse without submitting the same or offering an explanation for their
failure to do so (Rule 12.03).13 Moreover, they should avoid any action that would unduly delay a case, impede the
execution of a judgment or misuse court processes (Rule 12.04).

For the benefit of the bench and bar, worth repeating is the CA's reminder to petitioners' counsel of his duty to his
client and to the court:
"Being an officer of the court a lawyer is part of the machinery in the administration of justice. Like the court itself, he
is an instrument to advance its ends-the speedy, efficient, impartial, correct and inexpensive adjudication of cases
and the prompt satisfaction of final judgments. A lawyer should not only help attain these objectives but should
likewise avoid any unethical or improper practices that impede, obstruct or prevent their realization, charged as he is
with the primary task of assisting in the speedy and efficient administration of justice." 14
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision and Resolution AFFIRMED. Costs against the
petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.