CASE DIGESTS

ARTICLE 6, SECTION 6
ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS VS. COMELEC
Facts:
Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte, stating that she is 7months resident in the said district. Montejo, incumbent Representative and a candidate for the same position, filed a Petition for Cancellation and
Disqualification, alleging that Imelda did not meet the constitutional one-year residency requirement. Imelda thus amended her COC, changing seven
months to since childhood. The provincial election supervisor refused to admit the amended COC for the reason that it was filed out of time. Imelda,
thus, filed her amended COC with Comelec's head office in Manila.
On April 24, 1995, the Comelec Second Division declared Imelda not qualified to run and struck off the amended as well as original COCs. The
Comelec in division found that when Imelda chose to stay in Ilocos and later on in Manila, coupled with her intention to stay there by registering as a
voter there and expressly declaring that she is a resident of that place, she is deemed to have abandoned Tacloban City, where she spent her childhood
and school days, as her place of domicile. The Comelec en banc affirmed this ruling.
During the pendency of the disqualification case, Imelda won in the election. But the Comelec suspended her proclamation. Imelda thus appealed to the
Supreme Court.
Imelda invoked Section 78 of B.P. 881 which provides that a petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy must be decided,
after due notice and hearing, not later than 15 days before the election. Since the Comelec rendered the resolution on on April 24, 1995, fourteen (14)
days before the election, Comelec already lose jurisdiction over her case. She contended that it is the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and not
the Comelec which has jurisdiction over the election of members of the House of Representatives.
Issues:
1.
2.
3.

Was Imelda a resident, for election purposes, of the First District of Leyte for a period of one year at the time of the May 9, 1995 elections.
Does the Comelec lose jurisdiction to hear and decide a pending disqualification case after the elections?
Does the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal assumed exclusive jurisdiction over the question of Imelda's qualifications after the May
8, 1995 elections?
Held:
1. Imelda was a resident of the First District of Leyte for election purposes, and therefore possessed the necessary residence qualifications to run in Leyte
as a candidate for a seat in the House of Representatives for the following reasons:
a. Minor follows the domicile of his parents. As domicile, once acquired is retained until a new one is gained, it follows that in spite of the fact of
petitioner's being born in Manila, Tacloban, Leyte was her domicile of origin by operation of law. This domicile was established when her father brought
his family back to Leyte.
b. Domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate:
1. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile;
2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one; and
3. Acts which correspond with the purpose.
In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the residence of origin should be deemed to continue. Only with evidence showing
concurrence of all three requirements can the presumption of continuity or residence be rebutted, for a change of residence requires an actual and
deliberate abandonment, and one cannot have two legal residences at the same time. Petitioner held various residences for different purposes during the
last four decades. None of these purposes unequivocally point to an intention to abandon her domicile of origin in Tacloban, Leyte.
c. It cannot be correctly argued that petitioner lost her domicile of origin by operation of law as a result of her marriage to the late President Ferdinand E.
Marcos in 1952. A wife does not automatically gain the husbands domicile. What petitioner gained upon marriage was actual residence. She did not lose
her domicile of origin. The term residence may mean one thing in civil law (or under the Civil Code) and quite another thing in political law. What stands
clear is that insofar as the Civil Code is concerned-affecting the rights and obligations of husband and wife the term residence should only be
interpreted to mean "actual residence." The inescapable conclusion derived from this unambiguous civil law delineation therefore, is that when
petitioner married the former President in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home, not a domicilium necessarium.
d. Even assuming for the sake of argument that petitioner gained a new "domicile" after her marriage and only acquired a right to choose a new one after
her husband died, petitioner's acts following her return to the country clearly indicate that she not only impliedly but expressly chose her domicile of

origin (assuming this was lost by operation of law) as her domicile. This "choice" was unequivocally expressed in her letters to the Chairman of the PCGG
when petitioner sought the PCGG's permission to "rehabilitate (our) ancestral house in Tacloban and Farm in Olot, Leyte ... to make them livable for the
Marcos family to have a home in our homeland." Furthermore, petitioner obtained her residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte, while living in her
brother's house, an act which supports the domiciliary intention clearly manifested in her letters to the PCGG Chairman.
2. With the enactment of Sections 6 and 7 of R.A. 6646 in relation to Section 78 of B.P. 881, it is evident that the Comelec does not lose jurisdiction to
hear and decide a pending disqualification case under Section 78 of B.P. 881 even after the elections.
Section 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. - Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the
votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is
voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action,
inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of
such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.
Moreover, it is a settled doctrine that a statute requiring rendition of judgment within a specified time is generally construed to be merely directory, "so
that non-compliance with them does not invalidate the judgment on the theory that if the statute had intended such result it would have clearly indicated
it.
3. HRET's jurisdiction as the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of members of Congress begins only after
a candidate has become a member of the House of Representatives. Imelda, not being a member of the House of Representatives, it is obvious that the
HRET at this point has no jurisdiction over the question. (Romualdez-Marcos vs Comelec, G.R. No. 119976, September 18, 1995)

Aquino v COMELEC (1995)

Aquino vs. Comelec
Agapito A. Aquino, petitioner vs. Commission on Election, Move Makati, Mateo Bedon, and Juanito Icaro, respondents
Sept, 18, 1995
Special Civil Action in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.
Relevant Provisions:
Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at
least twenty-five years of age, able to read and write, and, except the party-list representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shall be
elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election.
Facts:
On 20 March 1995, Agapito A. Aquino, the petitioner, filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative for the new (remember: newly
created) Second Legislative District of Makati City. In his certificate of candidacy, Aquino stated that he was a resident of the aforementioned district
(284 Amapola Cor. Adalla Sts., Palm Village, Makati) for 10 months.
Move Makati, a registered political party, and Mateo Bedon, Chairman of LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP of Barangay Cembo, Makati City, filed a petition to
disqualify Aquino on the ground that the latter lacked the residence qualification as a candidate for congressman which under Section 6, Article VI of the
1987 Constitution, should be for a period not less than one year preceding the (May 8, 1995) day of the election.
Faced with a petition for disqualification, Aquino amended the entry on his residency in his certificate of candidacy to 1 year and 13 days. The
Commission on Elections passed a resolution that dismissed the petition on May 6 and allowed Aquino to run in the election of 8 May. Aquino, with
38,547 votes, won against Augusto Syjuco with 35,910 votes.
Move Makati filed a motion of reconsideration with the Comelec, to which, on May 15, the latter acted with an order suspending the proclamation of
Aquino until the Commission resolved the issue. On 2 June, the Commission on Elections found Aquino ineligible and disqualified for the elective office
for lack of constitutional qualification of residence.
Aquino then filed a Petition of Certiorari assailing the May 15 and June 2 orders.
Issue:
1. Whether residency in the certificate of candidacy actually connotes domicile to warrant the disqualification of Aquino from the position in the
electoral district.
2. WON it is proven that Aquino has established domicile of choice and not just residence (not in the sense of the COC)in the district he was running in.
Held:
1. Yes, The term residence has always been understood as synonymous with domicile not only under the previous constitutions but also under the
1987 Constitution. The Court cited the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission wherein this principle was applied.
Mr. Nolledo:
I remember that in the 1971 Constitutional Convention, there was an attempt to require residence in the place not less than one year immediately
preceding the day of elections.

What is the Committees concept of residence for the legislature? Is it actual residence or is it the concept of domicile or constructive residence?
Mr. Davide:

This is in the district, for a period of not less than one year preceding the day of election. This was in effect lifted from the 1973 constituition, the
interpretation given to it was domicile.
Mrs. Braid:
On section 7, page2, Noledo has raised the same point that resident has been interpreted at times as a matter of intention rather than actual residence.

Mr. De los Reyes

So we have to stick to the original concept that it should be by domicile and not physical and actual residence.
Therefore, the framers intended the word residence to have the same meaning of domicile.
The place where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually
intends to return and remain, i.e., his domicile, is that to which the Constitution refers when it speaks of residence for the purposes of election law.
The purpose is to exclude strangers or newcomers unfamiliar with the conditions and needs of the community from taking advantage of favorable
circumstances existing in that community for electoral gain.
While there is nothing wrong with the purpose of establishing residence in a given area for meeting election law requirements, this defeats the essence of
representation, which is to place through assent of voters those most cognizant and sensitive to the needs of a particular district, if a candidate falls short
of the period of residency mandated by law for him to qualify.
Which brings us to the second issue.
2. No, Aquino has not established domicile of choice in the district he was running in.
The SC agreed with the Comelecs contention that Aquino should prove that he established a domicile of choice and not just residence.
The Constitution requires a person running for a post in the HR one year of residency prior to the elections in the district in which he seeks election to .
Aquinos certificate of candidacy in a previous (May 11, 1992) election indicates that he was a resident and a registered voter of San Jose, Concepcion,
Tarlac for more than 52 years prior to that election. His birth certificate indicated that Conception as his birthplace and his COC also showed him to be a
registered voter of the same district. Thus his domicile of origin (obviously, choice as well) up to the filing of his COC was in Conception, Tarlac.
Aquinos connection to the new Second District of Makati City is an alleged lease agreement of a condominium unit in the area. The intention not to
establish a permanent home in Makati City is evident in his leasing a condominium unit instead of buying one. The short length of time he claims to be a
resident of Makati (and the fact of his stated domicile in Tarlac and his claims of other residences in Metro Manila) indicate that his sole purpose in
transferring his physical residence is not to acquire a new, residence or domicile but only to qualify as a candidate for Representative of the Second
District of Makati City.
Aquinos assertion that he has transferred his domicile from Tarlac to Makati is a bare assertion which is hardly supported by the facts in the case at
bench. To successfully effect a change of domicile, petitioner must prove an actual removal or an actual change of domicile, a bona fide intention of
abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond with the purpose.
Aquino was thus rightfully disqualified by the Commission on Elections due to his lack of one year residence in the district.
Decision
Instant petition dismissed. Order restraining respondent Comelec from proclaiming the candidate garnering the next highest number of votes in the
congressional elections of Second district of Makati City made permanent.
Dicta:
I. Aquinos petition of certiorari contents were:
A. The Comelecs lack of jurisdiction to determine the disqualification issue involving congressional candidates after the May 8, 1995 elections, such
determination reserved with the house of representatives electional tribunal
B. Even if the Comelec has jurisdiction, the jurisdiction ceased in the instant case after the elections and the remedy to the adverse parties lies in another
forum which is the HR Electoral Tribunal consistent with Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
C. The COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it proceeded to promulagate its questioned decision despite its own recognition that a
threshold issue of jurisdiction has to be judiciously reviewed again, assuming arguendo that the Comelec has jurisdiction
D. The Comelecs finding of non-compliance with the residency requirement of one year against the petitioner is contrary to evidence and to applicable
laws and jurisprudence.
E. The Comelec erred in failing to appreciate the legal impossibility of enforcing the one year residency requirement of Congressional candidates in newly
created political districts which were only existing for less than a year at the time of the election and barely four months in the case of petitioners district
in Makati.
F. The Comelec committed serious error amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it ordered the board of canvassers to determine and proclaim the winner
out of the remaining qualified candidates after the erroneous disqualification of the petitioner in disregard of the doctrine that a second place candidate
or a person who was repudiated by the electorate is a loser and cannot be proclaimed as substitute winner.
II. Modern day carpetbaggers cant be allowed to take advantage of the creation of new political districts by suddenly transplanting themselves in such
new districts, prejudicing their genuine residents in the process of taking advantage of existing conditions in these areas.
III. according to COMELEC: The lease agreement was executed mainly to support the one year residence requirement as a qualification for a candidate of
the HR, by establishing a commencement date of his residence. If a oerfectly valid lease agreement cannot, by itself establish a domicile of choice, this
particular lease agreement cannot be better.

CO VS. HRET
Facts:
On May 11, 1987, the congressional election of Northern Samar was held.Among the candidate is herein respondent Jose Ong, Jr. Respondent Ong was
proclaimed the duly elected representative of the second district of Northern Samar. Petitioners questioned the citizenship of respondent Ong since
Ongs father was only a naturalized Filipino citizen and questioned Ongs residence qualificationsince Ong does not own any property in Samar.
ISSUE/s:
1.) Whether the decision of HRET is appealable;
2.) Whether respondent is a citizen of the Philippines; and

3.) WhetherOng is a resident of Samar.

RULING:
1.) Yes. The Constitution explicitly provides that the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) and the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) shall be
the sole judges of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective members. In the case at bar, the Court finds no
improvident use of power, no denial of due process on the part of the HRET which will necessitate the exercise of the power of judicial review by the
Supreme Court.
2.) Yes. On April 28, 1955, Jose OngChuan, respondents father, an immigrant from China was declared a Filipino citizen by the CFI of Samar. At the time
Jose OngChuan took his oath, the private respondent then is a minor of nine years, was finishing his elementary education in the province of Samar.
Hence, there is no ground to deny the Filipino citizenship of respondent Ong. Respondent Ong was also born of a natural-born Filipino mother, thus the
issue of citizenship is immaterial.
3.) Yes. The framers of the Constitution adhered to the earlier definition given to the word residence which regarded it as having the same meaning as
domicile. The domicile of origin of the private respondent, which was the domicile of his parents, is fixed at Laoang, Samar. Contrary to the petitioners'
imputation, Jose Ong, Jr. never abandoned said domicile; it remained fixed therein even up to the present. Hence, the residency of respondent Ong has
sufficiently proved.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED.
FRIVALDO VS. COMELEC
FACTS:
Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor of the province of Sorsogon and assumed office in due time. The League of Municipalities filed with the
COMELEC a petition for the annulment of Frivaldo on the ground that he was not a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in the United States.
Frivaldo admitted the allegations but pleaded the special and affirmative defenses that he was naturalized as American citizen only to protect himself
against President Marcos during the Martial Law era.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Frivaldo is a Filipino citizen.
RULING:
No. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a qualified voter must be, among other qualifications, a citizen of the Philippines, this being
an indispensable requirement for suffrage under Article V, Section 1, of the Constitution.
He claims that he has reacquired Philippine citizenship by virtue of valid repatriation. He claims that by actively participating in the local elections, he
automatically forfeited American citizenship under the laws of the United States of America. The Court stated that that the alleged forfeiture was
between him and the US. If he really wanted to drop his American citizenship, he could do so in accordance with CA No. 63 as amended by CA No. 473
and PD 725. Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation.
Facts:
Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect of the province of Sorsogon on 22 January 1988, and assumed office in due time. On 27 October 1988,
the league of Municipalities, Sorsogon Chapter represented by its President, Salvador Estuye, who was also suing in his personal capacity, filed with the
Comelec a petition for the annulment of Frivaldos election and proclamation on the ground that he was not a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in
the United States on 20 January 1983. Frivaldo admitted that he was naturalized in the United States as alleged but pleaded the special and affirmative
defenses that he had sought American citizenship only to protect himself against President Marcos. His naturalization, he said, was merely forced upon
himself as a means of survival against the unrelenting persecution by the Martial Law Dictators agents abroad. He also argued that the challenge to his
title should be dismissed, being in reality a quo warranto petition that should have been filed within 10 days from his proclamation, in accordance with
Section 253 of the Omhibus Election Code.
Issue:
Whether Juan G. Frivaldo was a citizen of the Philippines at the time of his election on 18 January 1988, as provincial governor of Sorsogon.
Held:
The Commission on Elections has the primary jurisdiction over the question as the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the members of the Congress and elective provincial and city officials. However, the decision on Frivaldos citizenship has already been
made by the COMELEC through its counsel, the Solicitor General, who categorically claims that Frivaldo is a foreigner. The Solicitors stance is assumed
to have bben taken by him after consultation with COMELEC and with its approval. It therefore represents the decision of the COMELEC itself that the
Supreme Court may review. In the certificate of candidacy filed on 19 November 1987, Frivaldo described himself as a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines, omitting mention of any subsequent loss of such status. The evidence shows, however, that he was naturalized as a citizen of the United
States in 1983 per the certification from the United States District Court, Northern District of California, as duly authenticated by Vice Consul Amado P.
Cortez of the Philippine Consulate General in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. There were many other Filipinos in the United States similarly situated as
Frivaldo, and some of them subject to greater risk than he, who did not find it necessary nor do they claim to have been coerced to abandon their
cherished status as Filipinos. Still, if he really wanted to disavow his American citizenship and reacquire Philippine citizenship, Frivaldo should have
done so in accordance with the laws of our country. Under CA No. 63 as amended by CA No. 473 and PD No. 725, Philippine citizenship may be
reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation. He failed to take such categorical acts. Rhe anomaly of a person sitting as
provincial governor in this country while owing exclusive allegiance to another country cannot be permitted. The fact that he was elected by the people of
Sorsogon does not excuse this patent violation of the salutary rule limiting public office and employment only to the citizens of this country. The will of
the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibilityQualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be
possessed not only at the time of appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officers entire tenure. Once any of the required
qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged. Frivaldo is disqualified from serving as governor of Sorsogon.

Dimaporo v. Mitra
202 SCRA 779 / G.R. No. 96859
October 15, 1991
FACTS:
Petitioner Mohamad Ali Dimaporo was elected Representative for the Second Legislative District of Lanao del Sur during the 1987 congressional elections. On 15 January
1990, petitioner filed with the COMELEC a Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Regional Governor of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao in the immediately
following elections. Upon being informed of this development by the COMELEC, respondents Speaker and Secretary of the House of Representatives excluded petitioner's
name from the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives pursuant to Section 67, Article IX of the Omnibus Election Code which states:
Any elective official whether national or local running for any office other than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity except for President and VicePresident shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
Having lost in the autonomous region elections, petitioner, in a letter addressed to respondent Speaker, expressed his intention "to resume performing my duties and
functions as elected Member of Congress. He maintains that he did not thereby lose his seat as congressman because Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is not operative
under the present Constitution, being contrary thereto, and therefore not applicable to the present members of Congress.
In support of his contention, petitioner points out that the term of office of members of the House of Representatives, as well as the grounds by which the incumbency of
said members may be shortened, are provided for in the Constitution. Section 2, Article XVIII thereof provides that "the Senators, Members of the House of
Representatives and the local officials first elected under this Constitution shall serve until noon of June 30, 1992," while Section 7, Article VI states: "The Members of the
House of Representatives shall be elected for a term of three years which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next
following their election. He asserts that under the rule expressio unius est exclusio alterius, Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is repugnant to these constitutional
provisions in that it provides for the shortening of a congressman's term of office on a ground not provided for in the Constitution.
Moreover, he claims that he cannot be said to have forfeited his seat as it is only when a congressman holds another office or employment that forfeiture is decreed. Filing
a certificate of candidacy is not equivalent to holding another office or employment.
ISSUE:
1. IS SECTION 67, ARTICLE IX, OF B.P. BLG. 881 OPERATIVE UNDER THE PRESENT CONSTITUTION?
2. COULD THE RESPONDENT SPEAKER AND/OR THE RESPONDENT SECRETARY, 'BY ADMINISTRATIVE ACT', EXCLUDE THE PETITIONER FROM THE ROLLS OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, THEREBY PREVENTING HIM FROM EXERCISING HIS FUNCTIONS AS CONGRESSMAN, AND DEPRIVING HIM OF HIS RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES AS SUCH?
HELD:
The petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
1. The officials running for office other than the ones they are holding will be considered resigned not because of abuse of facilities of power or the use of office facilities
but primarily because under our Constitution, we have this chapter on accountability of public officers (both in the 1973 and 1987 constitution). Section 1 of Article XI
(1987) on "Accountability of Public Officers" states that:
Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity,
loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.
Under this commentary on accountability of public officers, the elective public officers must serve their principal, the people, not their own personal ambition. Petitioner
failed to discern that rather than cut short the term of office of elective public officials, this statutory provision (Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881) seeks to ensure
that such officials serve out their entire term of office by discouraging them from running for another public office and thereby cutting short their tenure by making it
clear that should they fail in their candidacy, they cannot go back to their former position. This is consonant with the constitutional edict that all public officials must
serve the people with utmost loyalty and not trifle with the mandate which they have received from their constituents.
Under the questioned provision, when an elective official covered thereby files a certificate of candidacy for another office, an overt, concrete act of voluntary
renunciation of the elective office presently being held, he is deemed to have voluntarily cut short his tenure, not his term. Forfeiture (is) automatic and permanently
effective upon the filing of the certificate of candidacy for another office. Only the moment and act of filing are considered. Once the certificate is filed, the seat is
forever forfeited and nothing save a new election or appointment can restore the ousted official. The law does not make the forfeiture dependent upon future
contingencies, unforeseen and unforeseeable.
That the ground cited in Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is not mentioned in the Constitution itself as a mode of shortening the tenure of office of members of
Congress, does not preclude its application to present members of Congress. Section 2 of Article XI provides that "(t)he President, the Vice-President, the Members of the
Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office, on impeachment All other public officers and
employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment. Such constitutional expression clearly recognizes that the four (4) grounds found in
Article VI of the Constitution by which the tenure of a Congressman may be shortened are not exclusive. The expression in the constitution of the circumstances which
shall bring about a vacancy does not preclude the legislature from prescribing other grounds
Additionally, this Court has enunciated the presumption in favor of constitutionality of legislative enactment. To justify the nullification of a law, there must be a clear
and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative implication. A doubt, even if well-founded, does not suffice.
2. As administrative officers, both the Speaker and House Secretary-General perform ministerial functions; It was their duty to remove petitioner's name from the Roll
considering the unequivocal tenor of Section 67, Article IX, B.P. Blg. 881. When the COMELEC communicated to the House of Representatives that petitioner had filed his
certificate of candidacy for regional governor of Muslim Mindanao, respondents had no choice but to abide by the clear and unmistakable legal effect of Section 67, Article
IX of B.P. Blg. 881. These officers cannot refuse to perform their duty on the ground of an alleged invalidity of the statute imposing the duty. The reason for this is
obvious. It might seriously hinder the transaction of public business if these officers were to be permitted in all cases to question the constitutionality of statutes and
ordinances imposing duties upon them and which have not judicially been declared unconstitutional. Officers of the government from the highest to the lowest are
creatures of the law and are bound to obey it.
In conclusion, We reiterate the basic concept that a public office is a public trust. It is created for the interest and benefit of the people. As such, the holder thereof is
subject to such regulations and conditions as the law may impose and he cannot complain of any restrictions which public policy may dictate on his office.

NOTES:
- In theorizing that the provision under consideration cuts short the term of office of a Member of Congress, petitioner seems to confuse "term" with "tenure" of office: The
term of office prescribed by the Constitution may not be extended or shortened by the legislature (22 R.C.L.), but the period during which an officer actually holds the
office (tenure) may be affected by circumstances within or beyond the power of said officer. Tenure may be shorter than the term or it may not exist at all. These
situations will not change the duration of the term of office (see Topacio Nueno vs. Angeles, 76 Phil 12).
- 4 grounds found in Article VI of the Constitution by which the tenure of a Congressman may be shortened:
a) Section 13, Article VI: Forfeiture of his seat by holding any other office or employment in the government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or controlled corporations or subsidiaries;
b) Section 16 (3): Expulsion as a disciplinary action for disorderly behavior;
c) Section 17: Disqualification as determined by resolution of the Electoral Tribunal in an election contest; and,
d) Section 7, par. 2: Voluntary renunciation of office.

Pobre v. Defensor-Santiago
Facts: Sa kanyang privilege speech sa Senado, sinabi ni Senador Miriam Defensor-Santiago ang:
I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am homicidal. I am suicidal. I am humiliated, debased, degraded. And I am not only that, I feel
like throwing up to be living my middle years in a country of this nature. I am nauseated. I spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his
cohorts in the Supreme Court, I am no longer interested in the position [of Chief Justice] if I was to be surrounded by idiots. I would rather be in another
environment but not in the Supreme Court of idiots.
Iniinvoke naman ng aking paboritong senador ang kanyang constitutional rights bilang isang miyembro ng Kongreso (parliamentary immunity). May
mga nakatala (tulad ni Pobre) na ang pahayag na ito ng senadorang may kaunting tililing ay bunga ng hindi pag-a-appoint sa kanya bilang Chief Justice.
Issue: Kung si Miriam Baliw ba ay administratively liable dahil sa pahayag niyang ito, at kung abuso ba ito ng kanyang mga karapatan bilang isang
senador.
Held: Baliw si Miriam at talagang baliw siya; bitter na bitter rin siya nang hindi siya naging Chief Justice. Lol.
Eto seryoso na.
Isinaad ng Korte Suprema na ang Senadora ay indeed, may constitutional rights na makikita sa Article VI, Section 11 of the Constitution, which provides:
A Senator or Member of the House of Representative shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from
arrest while the Congress is in session. No member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in
the Congress or in any committee thereof. Ika ng Korte Suprema, isa ang free speech sa mga pundasyon ng demokrasya.
Ngunit kahit may parliamentary rights siya na naka-mandate sa Konstitusyon, pinagalitan pa rin ng Korte Suprema ang senadora.
The Court wishes to express its deep concern about the language Senator Santiago, a member of the Bar, used in her speech and its effect on the
administration of justice. To the Court, the lady senator has undoubtedly crossed the limits of decency and good professional conduct. It is at once
apparent that her statements in question were intemperate and highly improper in substance.
Ayon na rin sa Korte Suprema, nasa Senado na ang opisyal na hatol kay Miriam Baliw, dahil Rules of the House ang kanyang nilabag.
Huling hirit ng Korte Suprema: It is unfortunate that her peers bent backwards and avoided imposing their own rules on her. i.e., #$%^&*&^%$#$
%^&* dahil sa separation of powers, wala tayong magawa noong ininsulto tayo ng luka-lokang iyon dahil hindi natin siya saklaw.
Nakanino ang huling halakhak?
"I lied." *hysterical laughter*

Jimenez v. Cabangbang
Facts: Cabangbang was a congressman when he wrote an open letter to the president and caused the same to be published in several newspapers of
general circulation. The letter allegedly maligned several officials of the AFP, including Col. Jimenez, associating them in purported operational plans for
a coup detat. Petitioners instituted this present action for recovery of damages for libel against Cabangbang. In his defense, Cabangbang invoked
parliamentary immunity averring the letter is a privileged communication under Art VI, Sec 15 of the Constitution.
Issue: Whether or not the letter in question a privileged communication protected by Art VI, Sec 15 of the Constitution
Held: The court ruled in the negative. Speech or debate therein used in Art VI Sec 15 of the Constitution, refers to utterances made by Congressman in
the performance of their official functions while Congress is in session. Cabangbang made the open letter to the president when Congress was not in
session. And in causing the communication to be so published, Cabangbang was not performing his official duty as a Member of Congress. Hence, the
communication is not absolutely privileged.

FACTS:
Nicanor Jimenez, Carlos Albert and Jose Lukban they are the persons mentioned in the open letter of Cabangbang to the President
Bartolome Cabangbang member of the HOR and wrote the letter to the President
A civil action was originally instituted by the petitioners in the CFI of Rizal for recovery of several sums of money, by way of damages for the publication of an
allegedly libelous letter of defendant Cabangbang. The letter contains information that:

1. There is an insidious plan or a massive political build up

2. There is a planned coup dtat
3. Modified #1, by trying to assuage the President and the public with a loyalty parade, in a effort to rally the officers and men of the AFP behind General Arellano.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the publication in question is a privileged communication.
2. Whether or not it is libelous.
HELD:
1. It was held that the letter is not considered a privilege communication because the publication:
a. was an open letter,
b. the Congress was not in session
c. it was not a discharge of an official function or duty
2. It was held not libelous because the letter clearly implies that the plaintiffs were not the planners but merely tools, much less, unwittingly on their part.
The order appealed is confirmed

Osmena v. Pendatun
FACTS:
Congressman Osmea took the floor on the one-hour privilege to deliver a speech, entitled A Message to Garcia wherein said speech contained serious imputations of bribery against the
President. Being unable to produce evidence thereof, Osmea was then found to be guilty of serious disorderly behaviour by the House of Representatives. Osmea argues that the
Constitution gave him complete parliamentary immunity, and so, for words spoken in the House, he ought not to be questioned.
ISSUE:
Whether said disciplinary action by the House is in violation of Section 15, Article VI of the Constitution.
RULING:
Said disciplinary action is not in violation of the Constitution. Section 15, Article VI of the Constitution provides that for any speech or debate in Congress, the Senators or Members of the
House of Representative shall not be questioned in any other place. Although exempt from prosecution or civil actions for their words uttered in Congress, the members of Congress may,
nevertheless, be questioned in Congress itself. Observe that they shall not be questioned in any other place in Congress.

In June 1960, Congressman Sergio Osmea, Jr. delivered a speech entitled A Message to Garcia. In the said speech, he disparaged then President
Carlos Garcia and his administration. Subsequently, House Resolution No. 59 was passed by the lower house in order to investigate the charges made by
Osmea during his speech and that if his allegations were found to be baseless and malicious, he may be subjected to disciplinary actions by the lower
house.
Osmea then questioned the validity of the said resolution before the Supreme Court. Osmea avers that the resolution violates his parliamentary
immunity for speeches delivered in Congress. Congressman Salipada Pendatun filed an answer where he averred that the Supreme Court has not
jurisdiction over the matter and Congress has the power to discipline its members.
ISSUE: Whether or not Osmeas immunity has been violated?
HELD: No. Section 15, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity upon members of the legislature which is a fundamental
privilege cherished in every parliament in a democratic world. It guarantees the legislator complete freedom of expression without fear of being made
responsible in criminal or civil actions before the courts or any other forum outside the Hall of Congress. However, it does not protect him from
responsibility before the legislative body whenever his words and conduct are considered disorderly or unbecoming of a member therein. Therefore,
Osmeas petition is dismissed.