ReportNo.

16777

Tunisia
Impact Evaluation Report
Reducing Flood Hazards and Traffic
Congestion
Sfax Flood Protection Project (Loan2289 -TU)
June20, 1997
OperationsEvaluationDepartment

U0'O

Abbreviations and Acronyms

BIRH
DAT
DHU
ERR
GNP
IER
NGO
OED
ONAS
SFPP

Bureau of Hydraulic Inventory and Research

Directorate of National Land Planning
Direction de l'Hydraulique Urbaine
Economic Rate of Return
Gross National Product
Impact Evaluation Report
Non-Govermmental Organization
Operations Evaluation Department
Office National de l'Assainissement
Sfax Flood Protection Project

Director-General, Operations Evaluation

D
Director, Operations Evaluation Department
Division Chief
Task Manager

Robert Picciotto
:Roger Slade for ]ElizabethMcAllister
:Yves Albouy
:Ronald Parker

TheWorld Bank
Washington,D.C.20433
U.SA.

June 23, 1997

OfRice
of the Director-General
OperationsEvaluation

MEMORANDUrMTO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Impact EvalluationReport on Tunisia
Sfax Flood Protection Project (Loan 2289-TUN)
Attachedis the ImpactEvaluationReport(IER) on the subjectprojectpreparedby the Operations
EvaluationDepartment(OED). The SfaxFloodProtectionProject(Loan2289-TUNapprovedin 1983)
was the first free-standingfloodprotectionproject in Tunisiain whichthe Bankwas involved.Themain
objectiveof the projectwas to minimizethe damagepotentialof futurefloodingin Sfax. Floodprotection
infrastructureconstructedunderthe loan includedprotectiveembankments,a 13-kmlong drainagecanal
fromthe flood zoneto the sea, andthe realignmentof dry riverbeds. A bypass roadwas constructedon
both banksof the canal.
T'hefocusof the inpact evaluationwasto assessthe effectivenessof the canal and bypassroad. A
key impactof the projectis that flood controlinfrastructurecontinuesto channelfloodwaters intoa
carefullydesigneddrainagesystemwhichdoes reduceuncontrolledwater flowsand damageto urban
infrastructureand protectshouseholdsand commercialbusinesses.The bypassroad dramaticallyimproved
accessintoalreadyurbanizingagriculturalareas. This creatednewcommercialand realestate investment
opportunities,and an attendantincreasein land pricesaroundthe belt road. New constructionin the areas
of project influenceatteststo the increasedconfidenceof developers,both publicand private: in 19881994,the numberof houseslocatednearthe canal increased56 percent,and the numberof occupants
morethan doubled,reachingabout 12,000. About400 newbusinessestablishmentscan be foundalongthe
bypass.In spiteof a dramraticincreasein the numberof vehicles,passingthroughthe city stilltakes about
10minutesless whenusingthe bypassthan goingthroughdowntown.Annualtraffic increaseson the
bypass continueto surpass:growthat otherimportantroutes,indicatingthat the road is still fulfillinga
well-identifiedneed.The canalhas improvedenvironmentalsanitationby preventingflood-caused
contaminationon both sidesof the canal, and helpedto drainstagnantbodiesof water,therebyreducing
relatedhealth hazards.
Betweenof 82 and 90 percentof respondentssurveyedsaid that theproject had had a positive
impact.Benefitscouldhavebeengreaterhoweverhad the policyframeworkin whichthe infrastructure
operatesmorefully suppoitedprojectobjectives.For example,the presenceof certainpollutantsin the
canal occurs because70 percentof homesin zonesadjacentto the canalhave not beenconnectedto the
sewernetwork. Also,the tnunicipalityhas not yetmanagedto constructsufficientstorn sewersto fully
drainimportantstreets. Similarly,urban policypernitted sparse settlementin expensivelyprotectedareas,
and urban sprawlintounprotectedareas,to the extentthat a second,longerand moreexpensiveflood
protection/drainage
canal is beginningto be discussed.
Attachment

Contents
PREFACE..........................................................

EVALUATIONSUMMARY..........................................................

1. STUDY OBJECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY ...............................................11

Background........
Focusof the Inpact Evaluation....................................................
Methodology....................................................
Structureof this volume....................................................

11
12
12
13

2. THE PROJECT ALNDITS SETTING..........................................................

15

Sfax....................................................
15
Early Attemptsto ReduceSfax's Vulnerabilityto FrequentFlooding................. 15
DisasterVulnerability:TorrentialRains, OvergrazedSlopesand
H-ighWater Tables....................................................
16
Traffic Patternsand FloodControlBeforethe Project......................... ..............17
ProjectObjectiivesand Design....................................................
18
ProjectPreparationand Implementation
....................................................
19
InfrastructureDetails....................................................
19
3. IMPACT ON FLOOD CONTROL AND THE URBANENVIRONMENT....... 23
Discussionof lLrbanImpacts....................................................
23
ReducedPotentialFloodDamage....................................................
24
Impact on EconomicActivities...........
.........................................
26
What if the Canalhad not beenbuilt? ....................................
................ 26
Attitudesand Perceptionsof the PeopleLivingin the StudyArea ........... ...........
28
Analysisof NegativeImpactsCited...........................
......................... 30
UnforeseenEnvironmentalImpact........................
............................ 30
Opinionof PublicOfficials....................................................
32
Factors of Perl'ormance....................................................
35
The Key Lesson....................................................
34
4. IMPACTS ON URBANLAND VALUES,HOUSING AND RELATED
IMPROVEMENTS..........................................................

35

HouseholdCharacteristics....................................................
Land Prices....................................................

35
37

This reportwas preparedby Mr. RonaldParker (TaskManager)and Ms. Reno Dewina(Research

Assistant). Thefield surveyand localdata collectionwas carriedout underthe directionof Mr. Jean
FrancoisLandeau,the formerTask Manager. Mr. ArthurAngerand Ms. ArmeleVilc6usprovided
administrativesupport.

Changes on the NeighborhoodLevel...........................................

Urban Amenities...........................................
HousingRenovation/Upgrading
.40
Number of BuildingPermitsIssued.41
Other Impacts.41

38
39

5. IMPACTON TRAFFIC AND URBANACTIVITIES.43

Increase in the Number of Vehicleson the Road.44
Traffic on the Bypass.44
Driving Time.44
Has Traffic in the Urban CenterbeenAmeliorated?.
Road Safety.46
Accidents.46
CommercialOpportunitiesCreatedby the BypassRoad.47
Job Creation.50
6. FINDINGS ANDRECOMMENDATIONS..

45

51

ANNEXES
1.

2.
3.
4.

BuildingPermitsIssued in the StudyArea..................................

Methodology.55
Most DangerousIntersectionsin Sfax..................................
Commentsfromthe Borrower.....................

53
57
59

Preface
The Sfax Flood ProtectionProjectwas the first free-standingflood protectionproject in
Tunisiain which the Bank was involved. This ImpactEvaluationReport(IER) assessesthe
mediumand long-termimpactsof the flood protectioninfrastructureconstructedwith the
proceedsof the loan.
The IER was preparedby the OperationsEvaluationDepartment(OED)of the World
Bank. The study was launchedduringthe studyteam's first missionto Sfax in June 1995.
Researchin the field was conductedover a period of aboutfour months betweenJanuaryand
May of 1996. On-siteiinspectionby a multi-disciplinarycore team composedof a housing
economist,a financial/iinstitutional
specialist,a socialscientist,and a field surveyteam was used
to evaluatethe impactsof the projectson the beneficiariesand stakeholders.A buildingcensus
coveredabout 500 comimercialbuildings,and a detailedquestionnairewas administeredin 120
households. Surveyresults were supplementedby data providedby the Municipalityof Sfax,
and centralgovernmentagencies. Official materialreviewedincludedtraffic accidentreports
and buildingpermit applications.On September10, 1996OED organizeda workshopfor key
individualswho had participatedin the implementationof the project. Manyof the attendees
(Tunisianofficialsfrom differentministriesand governmentagenciesas well as selectedlocal
consultants)completeda questionnaire,and their opinionsand evaluativeconclusionsare cited
withinthis volume.
The study teamnparticularlywishesto acknowledgethe participationof officialsfrom
the Tunis District,the Sfax District,the Municipalityof Sfax,the communesinvolved,the
Ministryof Equipment,and the publicagenciesSocieteNationaleImmobilierede Tunisieand
the OfficeNationald'Assainissement.Theassistanceof the relevantfacultiesof SfaxUniversity
duringthe evaluationplanningand executionphasesis gratefullyacknowledged.
BasicLoan/CreditData(actual)

Ln/CrNumber

ProjectName

Ln. 2289

Sfax FloodProtection

US$
Million
22.3

Board
Approval
06/16/83

Completion
01/17/90

Executive Summary
The Project
1.
Severefloodingin 1982causedconsiderabledamageto Sfax,a major Tunisiancity, and
its suburbs.Expertsestimatedthe probabilityof re-occurrenceof a similarflood at 0.66
percent-in layman's termsthe disasterwas a 130year event. A surveyassessedeconomic
lossesat aboutUS$80 mnillion.Seventyliveswere lost, morethan 700 houseswere destroyed
and 8,000 damaged;alongwith streets,roads, bridges,railways,powersupply lines,and
telecommunicationequipment.
2.
The SfaxFlood ProtectionProject (Loan2289-TUNapprovedin 1983)wasthe first
free-standingflood protectionproject in Tunisiain which the Bank was involved. The main
objectiveof the project wasto minimizethe damagepotentialof futurefloodingin Sfax.
Secondaryobjectiveswere: reducingthe risk of life losses;providingthe populationwith a
greater sense of security; reducingeconomiclossesto productionand assets (mainlyreal estate);
and ensuringpermanentand efficientmaintenanceof the flood protectioninfrastructure.The
flood protectionworks, which cost US$40 million,had 4 components:
* to recalibrate9 km of a dry watercourseto handleflood waters;
* to construcl:a protectingembankmenton the left bank of anotherdry riverbed;
* to constructa dike 10 km north of Sfax;
* to constructa 13-kmlong canal about four kilometersaway from the city center. A
bypassroad was a by-productof the canal althoughit had beenplanned since 1961.
3.
The ProjectCompletionReportand Audit of the projectconcludedthat the project
infrastructurehad reducedthe risk of flood, althoughboth documentsnotedthat the systemhad
yet to be fullytested. The Operationsand OEDevaluationsconcurredthat, overall,the project
contributedsignificantlyto the urban developmentof Sfax. The Audit notedthat the need for a
quickresponsehad foreclosedthe opportunityfor meaningfulbeneficiaryparticipationin project
planning. The ImpactEvaluationof the Sfax FloodProtectionProjectconcentratesprimarilyon
those impacts relatedto the flood protectioncanal and the associatedbypasshighway,and it also
assessesmedium-and long-termimpactson stakeholders,as well as the mediumand long-term
impactson the urban developmentof the city itself.
Impacton Flood Control
4.
The project economicrate of return(ERR)was recalculatedat project completionat 23
percent. The cost streamincludesthe investment,operatingand maintenancecosts (free of taxes
and duties)over a 40 year periodfor the facilitiesincludedin the project augmentedby the
investment,operatingand maintenancecosts relatedto three stormwatercollectorswhichwere
includedin the SecondUrban SewerageProject,' but which form an integralpart of the flood
protectionworks. The benefit streamconsistsof the estimateddamagecost whichhas been
avoidedby the project. To calculatethis figure,the 1982and severalpreviousfloods were
analyzedand a relationshipestablishedbetweenthe flood frequencyand the estimateddamage
values(in 1983prices)causedby these floods. The samecomputationwas repeatedwith the
project in place in order to obtainthe curve representingthe residualdamagevalues. The area
'Loan 1675-TUN.

6
between the two curves represents the probable annual averted damages and amnountsto TD 4.02
million in 1983 prices (US$6.4 million).
5.
Significant benefits have already been realized. Recent heavy rainfalls, though not of
catastrophic flood proportions, have been evacuated by the flood protection system with greater
ease than in the past. The two years with the highest total rainfall and most instances of
torrential rains since project completion were 1990 and 1995. Municipal sources estimated
averted damage at TD 2.4 million annually for those years without taking into account the
considerable economic losses avoided in terms of property, personal belongings and foregone
production. People who live near the canal are highly appreciative of the flood protection
offered, although lower income families were slightly more positive. In the study survey, the
canal's contribution to public safety was the most frequently cited project benefit. This aspect
tended to be recognized more frequently in the lower income (81 percent) than in the middle
class areas (73 percent) because the forrner suffered more from flooding in the past than the
latter.
Impacts on Urban Development Patterns
6.
The substantial amount of new construction in damaged areas attests to the increased
confidence of developers, both public and private. The number of people living in the immediate
vicinity of the project infrastructure has been steadily growing. In the period between 19881994 the study found that the number of houses located near the canal increased 56 percent, and
the number of occupants more than doubled, reaching about 12,000.
7.
The canal and (above all) the bypass were important catalysts on urban development
because they provided better entry into already urbanizing agricultural areas which had poor or
no vehicle access. This made them more desirable neighborhoods to live in, and created new
commercial and real estate investment opportunities. Depending upon the neighborhood,
between of 82 and 90 percent of respondents surveyed said that, in their opinion, the project had
had a positive impact. The increase in land prices was expected to be one of the most significant
indicators of the impact of the belt road-canal. This happened, although not in the manner
anticipated. The project infrastructure-while it disrupted neighborhood social interaction
patterns, and changed land boundaries-greatly encouraged the demand for buildable lots,
mostly by middle-income households. This evolution of land use, largely explains subsequent
price rises.
8.
Dike protection permitted agricultural land to be re-zoned for urban development,
increasing the value of the land by up to 400 percent, but land prices inside the canal's protective
barrier are not markedly higher than those outside: land prices near the bypass, and unprotected
by the canal, rose considerably. There are several explanations for the fact that land prices inside
the canal did not rise as anticipated: 1) vast tracts of land outside the canal-protected area were
better protected because of dikes, storm sewers and other drainage infrastructure; 2) throughout
the neighborhoods both inside and outside the canal, the risks of high levels of water are reduced
by the existence of an unimpeded channel to the sea; 3) the land inside the canal was less
adequately served with storm drains; 4) land prices reflect travel times, and demrandfor land
centered on those areas that were high status neighborhoods but still under-valued in terms of
travel time to the city center; and 5) the population is aware that a 130 year flood is an unusual
event, and discount the value of protection because they do not expect to see another in their or
their children's lifetimes.

7
Impacts on Traffic and Other Activities
9.
The belt road, originally designed to be an urban road, carries heavy traffic moving at
limited speed, which is controlled by three-color traffic lights at each major intersection. The
measurement of project impacts on traffic reduction is complicated by the growth in the total
number of vehicles in circulation within Sfax. The number of cars used primarily for circulating
within Sfax increased from 7,000 vehicles in 1971, to 13,000 in 1980, and to 36,000 in 1996.
Since 1990 the belt road has helped to absorb a share of the penetrating traffic which would
formerly have had to pass through the downtown area. Prior to the project, traffic at the
entrances to the downtown area of Sfax had increased at an average annual rate of 5.6 percent.
After the bypass was opened to traffic in 1990, the rate of traffic increase downtown slowed to
3.8 percent annual rate which, if not an outright reduction, suggests that part of the increase in
traffic was rerouted onto the bypass. Three principal downtown streets registered an absolute
decrease in traffic volurne, including one which showed a dramatic 60 percent decrease at times
of peak use.
10.
The overall travel time passing through the city is about 10 minutes shorter using the
bypass than by going through downtown. The annual traffic increase (16 percent) on the bypass
surpasses growth at other important routes. This increase, which shows the extent to which
traffic is being diverted from other major routes, is one of the most important indicators of
project impact. A secondary benefit occurs when flammable cargo or other hazardous materials
are carried by trucks that now take the bypass: pedestrian exposure to chemical vapors from
dangerous materials has been shifted away from the most populous area to less dense areas with
greater natural airflow.
11.
While the bypass allows vehicle traffic to avoid the downtown commercial district, it
now runs through a zone bustling with new commerce. Before the project, there were very few
businesses in these areas. Now that some time has passed after project completion, about 400
new business establishrnents can be found there. This is something of an unintended
consequence. Since it was not the intent to attract commercial development to the area, the
bypass road was designed without service lanes. Factors limiting further economic development
of zone are the lack of adequate parking, traffic-related nuisances, as well as the absence of lanes
in which merging traffic can pick up speed.
12.
Both urban growth and commercial development account for the heavy traffic on the belt
road, and partly explain the steady increase in the accident rate despite the traffic lights and
speed limit signs (50 krn/h). The number of accidents on the bypass increased between 1991 and
1995 at an average rate of 28 percent a year. With its present level of road signing, traffic
control, lighting and enforcement, the bypass is steadily becoming more dangerous for local
users. The accident rate is high: 11 dead, 43 wounded in 35 accidents in 1995-grim statistics
for an urban road. The consulting engineers who conducted the traffic study attribute the current
(which they class as excessively high) accident rate to technical weaknesses in the Sfax bypass
design (most notably: narrow lanes, narrow bridges, difficult crossroads, insufficient signaling,
and no street lighting). Street lighting has been prioritized by the Government, and is scheduled
to be introduced.2

2 Underthe Ninth DevelopmentPlan.

EnvironmentalImpact
13.
Positiveenvironmentalimpacts. The environmentalimpactof the projectwas expected
to be positivebecauseit channeledfloodwaters intoa carefullydesigneddrainage system,which
would reducedamageto urban infrastructure,protect privateand commercialdwellingsand
reduce erosion in the projectarea. Secondarily,the projectwas designedto improve
environmentalsanitationby preventingflood-causedcontamination(due to sewageoverflows
and water-bornegarbage)in the studyarea, and by drainingstagnantbodies of waterthereby
reducingrelatedhealth hazards. Thesewere achievedlargelyas plannedin many,but not in all,
neighborhoods.
14.
Negativeenvironmentalimpacts. In the event, however,the project did have some
negativeenvironmentalimpacts,some of which shouldimprovewith time as more residential
plots connect to the sanitarynetwork. Theseincludedaccumulationof contaminated
groundwaterat the northernoutlet of the belt canal, which results in unpleasantodors and creates
an environmentthat facilitatesmosquitobreeding.
InstitutionalDevelopment
15.
The institutionaldevelopmentwhichtook place as a resultof Governmentparticipation
in the project was modest. Themost noteworthyinstitutionalachievementwas the creationof a
maintenanceunit for flood protectionworks, a first in the Ministryof Equipment. Three similar
units have been establishedin other parts of the country,modeledon the Sfax maintenanceunit.
Factorsof Performance
16.
Size and executionoptimizedin project. Both the canal and highway larlgelyachieved
their objectives. Theproject had the right size and configurationto be implementedwithouttime
and cost overruns. Thestudy foundthat the major contributingfactorsto successful
implementationwere: (i) the local capacityto plan and supervisethe variousworks, (ii) timely
3 and (iii) earlier Bank work with sector staff in stormwater
disastermitigationplanning,
drainage. Stillthe study findsthat impactswere sub-optimal,and suggeststwo reasonsfor it:
inadequacyof supportinginfrastructureand shortcomingsin urban policies.
17.
Inadequacyof supportinginfrastructure.Thecanal has not fully solvedthe problems
posedby torrentialrains becausethere are insufficientroadsidedrains/stormsewers in the city.4
Projectdesign focusedon evacuatingflood watersapproachingthe city from the hinterland,but
paid little or no attentionto the disposalof storm water fallingon the city itself. Roadsidedrains
and storm sewersconstructedunderthe urban projecthave helped,but they are not sufficientto
handlethe water flowingin the streetsat peakperiods. Thus, heavyrainfallsare not beingfully
channeledintothe canal and standingwaterremainson the roads and in residentialareas, causing health/pesthazardsamongotherproblems.5
3A

flood damage reduction master plan had been prepared before the disaster.
Borrower's view is that, "While the project is regarded as having fully solved the problem of tlooding from
wadisclose to the city, it does need to be supplemented by a stormwater drainage system within the city that either
connects to the flood protection canal or empties into the sea. Creation of such a system, which is the responsibility of
the municipalities affected, will be programmed in accordance with the resources they have at their disposal."
5 The Borrower asserts that there are no health or pest hazards associated with the water stagnating in low-lying areas
at this time.
4The

18.
Shortcomingsin urbanpolicy. The policy frameworkin which the project operatesdid
not fully supportprojectobjectives. For example,transportpolicy favoredthe developmentof
private transportover public, with the almost inevitableresultthat traffic concentration
improvementsand travel-timereductionsfrom the use of the bypassgraduallydiminishedas the
numberof vehicles circulatingwithinthe city multiplied. In a similarfashion,urban policy
permittedsparsesettlementin expensivelyprotectedareas,and allowedvast tracts of urban land
to be kept off the marketfor speculativepurposes. As a result,Sfax's urban sprawl has covered
a far largerarea than wouldotherwisebe necessary,and has (probably)createdthe needfor a
second,longerand more expensiveflood protection/drainagecanal in the near future.6
19.
The presenceof pollutantsin the canal is also the result of inadequateurban policies
generally. In Sfax about 60 percent of housesare not connectedto the sanitationnetwork. The
studyfound that insidean area 70 meter-wideon each side of the beltroad,only 29 percentof the
housing is connectedto the ONASsewernetwork.7
20.
On September10, 1996OED organizeda workshopfor key individualswhohad
participatedin the implementationof the project. Manyof the attendees(Tunisianofficialsfrom
differentministriesand governmentagencies)completeda questionnairewhich interalia
identifiedthe lessonslearnedby Governmentthrough participationin project activities.They
suggestedthat Governmentneeds to do somethingaboutthe low costs associatedwith holding
vacant or under-utilizedurban land,and the absenceof incentivesthat motivatethe general
publicto maximizeon public investment. Other measuresproposedby the workshopincluded
urgentmeasuresto overcomeproject deficiencies. They recommendedadditionalinvestments
interalia in the following:
*
*
*
e

*
*

lightingfor walkwaysand streets alongthe bypass;

improvingroadsidedrainage;
improvingthe functioningof the canal;
increasingthe numberand qualityof pedestriansfacilities;
improvingthe functioningof traffic lights;
making mlaintenanceworks on the canal morefrequent;
wideningthe bridges in order to reduceaccidentrisks in the crossroads.

21.
Overcominginfrastructurebottlenecksis a long-termprocess,which requiresa
supportivelegal framework,and which usuallyhas institutionaldevelopmentcomponentsthat
need to be functioningin place beforethe concreteis poured. The Impact Studyconcludesthat it
is difficultin the extremeto solve flood and traffic problemswith physicalinfrastructureonly,
and that similarprojects shouldin futurealso addressthose policy improvementswhich can
enhancethe flood protectionand traffic benefits.

6 The Borrowerseesthe currenturban developmentpatternas follows: "Expansionof the city past the existingflood

protectioncanalis takingplace in accordancewith approveddevelopmentplans. Flood protectionfor these new areas

canbe providedby a secondcanallocatedbeyondthe expansionarea or by other meansrecommendedas a resultof
the study that hasjust beeninitiated."
Connectionsto the sewernetworkin the zonesadjacentto the projectarea will increasesignificantlyoverthe next
fewyears as a resultof the layingof approximately200km of pipesby ONASunderthe FourthUrbanProject.

11

1.

Study Objectives and Methodology

The Impact Evaluation of the Sfax Flood Protection Project in Tunisia concentrates principally
on the project's impacts in the urban area, andfocuses primarily on those impacts related to the
floodprotection canal amdthe associated bypass highway. The key project-related issues
addressed include: did the canal and bypass increase the protection of the city; alleviate
poverty, improve living standards, or make local goods and services more accessible; what have
been their impacts on urban land values and housing markets; what have been the impacts of the
road on the neighborhoods through which it passes, have travel times been reduced, or has
traffic in the urban center been ameliorated? Research and on-site inspection was conducted by
a multi-disciplinary core team, and a localfield survey team was used to evaluate the impacts of
the projects on the benificiaries and stakeholders. The two teams investigated the physical
results as well as changes in service levels, policy improvements, reform in the land tenure and
ownership system, and improvement in housing quality. The main study area was defined as a
band 100 meters wide on both sides of the canal.

1.1
The Impact Evaluationof the Sfax FloodProtectionProject in Tunisiaconcentrates
principallyon the project's impacts in the urban area, and focusesprimarilyon those impacts
relatedto the flood protectioncanal and the associatedbypasshighway. The purposeof this
study is to assess medium-and long-termimpactson the targetedbeneficiariesand other
stakeholders,as well as the mediumand long-termimpactson the urban developmentof the city
itself.
Background
1.2
Severefloodingin 1982causedconsiderabledamageto Sfax,a majorTunisiancity and
its suburbs. On October30 and 31, 1982rains of unusual intensityfell over the areas north and
west of town. A total of 177.3mm of rain was registeredin 13 hours,with a peakhourly rate of
45.2 mm. The flood starteda few hoursafter the onset of the rain and peakedduringthe night of
the 30th,with peak levelscontinuingthroughthe 31st of October. The enormityof floodsis
expressedby their returnperiod(i.e. how manyyears until anotherflood of equalmagnitudeis
likely to come again)--and expertsclassedthe disasteras a 130year event i.e., it had a
probabilityof re-occurrenceof 0.66 percent. A surveycarried out afterthe flood assessed
economiclossesat about TD5Omillion(US$80million). Seventyliveswere lost, morethan 700
houseswere destroyedand 8,000 damaged;along with streets,roads,bridges, railways,power
supplylines,and telecommunicationequipment.
1.3
The SfaxFloocdProtectionProject(Loan 2289-TUNapprovedin 1983)was the first
free-standingflood protectionprojectin Tunisiain whichthe Bank was involved. Sfax is spread
out alonga set of "wheel-spoke"thoroughfaresconvergingto the city center. The project
undertooktwo principaLl
activities: the buildingof a semicircularcanal to catch and divert the
flood watersthat periodicallyplaguethe city and the buildingof a road on both banksof the
canal which enabledthrough-trafficto bypassthe city center (relievingtrafficjams in the
downtownarea and, in general,contributingto the improvementof traffic flow in all parts of the
city). Thetechnical,financialand economicalapproachtaken by this loanwas elaboratedin
closecooperationwith the Governmentthroughthe Directorateof UrbanHydraulics.

12
1.4
The WorldBank's involvementin urban developmentin Tunisiadatesbackto 1973
when the First Urban Developmentproject (Loan937/Credit432-TUN)was apiproved.It was
relatedto urbantransportin Tunis and focusedon the institutionalstrengtheningof the Tunis
District. The SecondUrbanDevelopmentproject(Loan 1705-TUN)approvediin1979
concentratedon providingbetter shelterand improvedurban servicesfor low-income
populations,and aimed at the establishmentof a viable institutionalframeworkto implement
new urban developmentand housingpolicies. The objectivesof the ThirdUrban Development
project (Loan2223-TUN)approvedin 1982were similar in terms of reducing inequitiesin
housingpolicy,and strengtheningthe institutionalframeworkof the involvedagencies.
Focus of the Impact Evaluation
1.5

The studyfocuseson key canal-relatedissues suchas:

*
*
*

did the interventionreduce the risk of lossof life from floods?

did it increasethe protectionof the city?
did it alleviatepoverty,improvelivingstandards,or make local goodsand services
moreaccessible?
* did it haveimpactson urban land valuesand housingmarkets?
* did it ensurethe permanentand efficientmaintenanceof flood protection
infrastructure?
The assessmentof the bypassroad constructedexploresquestionssuch as:
*

what have beenthe impactsof the road on the neighborhoodsthrough which it

passes?
* have travel times beenreduced?
* has traffic in the urban centerbeen ameliorated?
* have real estateprices changedbecauseof improvedroad access?
* has there beena changein the accidentrate?
1.6
The evaluationmakesa distinctionbetweenimpactsat the levels of households,
neighborhoodsand urban development/institutionsin its analysisof the variouseffects of this
project. An analysisof how the sectorand countrycontextinfluencedthe project'sachievements
was also undertaken.
Methodology
1.7
Researchand on-siteinspectionby a multi-disciplinarycore team composedof a housing
economist,a financial/institutionalspecialist,a social scientist,and a field surveyteam were
used to evaluatethe impactsof the projectson the beneficiariesand stakeholders. As part of the
in-depthassessmentof project impacts in Sfax, studiesand commissionedpapers;were also
conductedunder the supervisionof consultants.
Impactevaluationat neighborhoodand the institutionallevels
1.8
To evaluatethe technical,institutional,financialand environmentalimpactsof the
projects,the core team investigatedthe physicalresults as wellas changesin servicelevels,
policy improvements,reformin the landtenure and ownershipsystem, and imprcvementin

13
housingquality. The rnainstudy area was definedas a band 100meterswide on both sides of
the canal. OnMay 16, 1996the studyteam conducteda commercialbuildingcensus. Team
membersvisited 394 storesand premisesnot used for housingand completedwrittencheck
sheets. In additionto the householdsurveydiscussedbelow,the studyteam also surveyed96
businessestablishmenls(at least one person in each businessrespondedto an open-endedsurvey
instrument). The team also conducted11 structured interviewswith governmentofficials: three
interviewswere conductedwith the presidentof a district(and two others with vice-presidentsof
otherdistricts);and 2 small group interviewswere conductedwith senior staff in two NGOs. In
the higherbusinesscircles, the team interviewedthe directorof a Chamberof Commerceand a
directorof the municipalarts and crafts organization.The team conductedthree otherelite
interviewswith technicians/experts:an engineerhighlyfamiliarwith the city, a directorof a
local consultingfirm, and the regionaldirectorof landuse planning. Finallya medicaldoctor
was also interviewedto get an independentperspectiveon project impactson neighborhood
health. Other sources of neighborhooddata were: on-siteexaminationof the physicalresults of
the projects,a reviewof documents(1,113 buildingpermitswithinthe studyarea were also
analyzed)and relevantsecondarydata, key informantinterviews,focusgroupsand informal
communityinterviewswhich took place in a randomfashion. Further detailson study
methodologycan be found in Annex2.
ParticipatoryEvaluation: contributionof Governmentofficials
1.9
On September10, 1996OED organizeda workshopfor key individualswho had
participatedin the impilementation
of the project. Many of the attendees(Tunisianofficials from
differentministriesand governmentagenciesas well as selectedlocal consultants)completeda
questionnairewhich reflectedtheir understandingof project impacts,institutionaldevelopment,
and the lessonslearnedby Governmentthroughparticipationin project activities. Their opinions
and evaluativeconclusionsare broadlyreflectedwithinthis volume,and specificallycited at
severalpoints.
Structure of this Volume
1.10

The followingchaptersin this volumehavebeen groupedaroundfive topics.

*
*
*
*
*

The project and its setting;

Impactson flood controland the urban environment;
Impactson urban land values,housing,and relatedimprovements;
Impactson traffic and urban activities;
Findingsamdrecommendations.

15

2.

The Project and its Setting

Sfax, a major Tunisian port city, suffers frequent damages from flooding. The downtown area
lies at the foot of a gently sloping plain covered with sparse vegetation. When torrential
rainstorms occur, the high water table, extensive urbanization, and lack of vegetation contribute
to intenseflashfloods and heavy erosion. Plans for more systematic protection had been under
consideration since the 1950s, yet only minimal protection measures were in place in 1982
because of a lack offinancing. The main objective of the disaster reliefproject was to minimize
theflood damage potential in Sfax. Secondary objectives were to reduce the risk of life losses;
provide the population with a greater sense of security, and to reduce economic losses to
production and assets. The flood protection canal that was constructed to drain runoff inscribes
an arc about four kilometers in distance from the dense urban center of the city. It is crossed by
19 major bridges and 19 pedestrian walkways. Parallel to the canal and on both sides of it is a
bypass road eight kilometers long. The canal is about 12.3 kilometers in length.
Sfax
2.1
Sfax is Tunisia's major port and second largest city. In the beginning of the 20th century,
the population of Sfax was around 50,000. The growth of the city has been rapid,8 it currently
has a population of about 400,000.9 Sfax is located on the country's east coast about 267 miles
from Tunis, the capital. Greater Sfax consists of the port area, the industrial zones located in the
littoral corridor, north and south of the port, the traditional quarter or medina, followed to the
west by pockets of densely populated slums, and more recent residential developments. Beyond
these lie low-density neighborhoods where there are one-family homes on garden lots of
substantial size (thejneins). Sfax has developed at the expense of these lots which are gradually
being subdivided, thereby increasing urban density. Clusters of commercial activity (the
merkhez), which includlecraftsmen's' shops and markets, have appeared where major roads pass
through the jneins. Indeed, some of the larger merkhez have eventually become townships in
their own right. Greater Sfax includes the surrounding communities of Agareb, El Ain, Sakiet
Ezzit and Sakiet Ed Dair, and covers an area of 13,000 hectares, while the Sfax Govemorate
covers 708,600 hectares. The majority of usable land in the Govemorate is under cultivation,
around half is devoted to the cultivation of olive trees alone.
Early Attempts to ReiduceSfax's Vulnerability to Frequent Flooding
2.2
Sfax lies at the hub of a network of roads that converge to a downtown area. The center
is situated at the foot of a gently sloping plain covered with sparse vegetation. Annual rainfall
ranges from 37 mm to 650 mm, averaging about 200 mm. The high water table, extensive
urbanization, and lack of vegetation contribute to intense flash floods and heavy erosion.
2.3
Sfax suffers frequent damages from flooding and experienced severe floods in 1934,
1942, 1950, 1957, 1969, and 1973. The need for providing adequate flood protection control
measures had long been recognized, yet only minimal protection measures were in place. Plans
for more systematic protection had been under consideration since the 1950s, but were not acted
on for lack of financing.
The populationgrowthrate was 2.2 percent/yearin the period 1984-1994.
In 1982 during project preparation Sfax had a population of 313,000.

16

2A
In the 1950sand 1960s,protectivemeasureswere studiedby variousconsultingfirms
and some flood protectionwas providedthrough diversionof two dry riverbeds(OuedKhalifa
and OuedMaou),and the constructionof dikes which couldprovidedrainagefollowingmajor
storms. In 1977and 1978,a foreignconsultingfirm prepareda sewerageand slorm water
drainagemasterplan proposinga belt canal aroundthe city's perimeter,with a numberof storm
drainagecollectorsplaced in a radial patternoutsidethe canal. The northernsection of this canal
woulddrain storm wateraroundthe city's perimeterdirectlyintothe sea,the southernsection
wouldempty intothe Oued Maou. As financingwas unavailableat that time, the projectwas not
implemented.
2.5
The developmentof the SfaxFlood Protectionproject(SFPP)in Tunisiawas facilitated
by earlierBank work. Bank financinghelpedto establishand developthe entitiesresponsiblefor
watersupplyand sewerage(SONEDEand ONAS)and staff have maintainedan ongoing
dialoguewith the TunisianGovernmenton sectorpoliciesand operatingpractices. In this
mannerthe Bank was able to buildon some indirectexperiencewith flood control (stormwater
drainagehad been a componentof earliersewerageprojects).
Disaster Vulnerability: Torrential Rains, Overgrazed Slopes and High Water Tables

2.6
In the semi-aridregionsurroundingSfax,there is scantvegetationuphill'from the city.
Whatlittle there is tends to be either naturallysparseor overgrazed. The city's natural
environmentaldefenseswere weak to beginwith, and agriculturalland use patterns further
reducethe moistureabsorptioncapacityof the soil and enhancethe violenceof flash flooding.
2.7
Most of the rain falls in the monthsfrom Septemberto December,and floods usually
occur in October,when it rains the hardest. Rainfalldata gatheredover a 100year periodwere
analyzedduring project preparation,and a depth-duration-frequency
correlationwas
established.10

2.8
The typicalflash flood in the Sfaxarea is causedby torrentialrainstorrnsconcentratedon
smallareas. Floodinggenerallystarts withinhours of the onset of the rain, leaving little or no
time to evacuatepopulationor their belongings. Becauseof the unpredictabilityof these storrns
and the fact that they often occurat nightwhile peopleare asleep, it was determinedduring
project preparationthat an advancewarningsystemwouldnot be feasible.
2.9
The sloping plain aboveSfax has permeablesoil which easily allows infiltrationof
surfacewater. However,the watertable is relativelyhigh and thus its abilityto absorbrain water
is limited. In certainlocalities(and dependingupon weatherand season)the water table is
sometimesabovegroundlevel. Swampsand stagnantpools can be found in most
neighborhoods.Projectdesignersconsideredand rejectedthe idea of attemptingitoincreasethe
potentialof Sfax'sloose and poroussoil to reduce stormn
waterrunoff. The soil's storage
capacityfor additionalwatercouldbe temporarilyincreasedby water extraction,but any water
extractedwould be quicklyreplacedby salt water infiltratingfrom the sea, which would
jeopardizethe aquiferupon which the city dependsfor its water supply.

' Annex3 inthe Staff Appraisal Report

17
2.10 The Sfaxplain covers an area of roughly 135 km2 , and the city lies at the low end. The
gradient of the slope fiom the sea to about 15 km from the coast averagesabout 2 percentto 3
percent. Even beyondthis pointthe gradientis not severe. The slopeof the first several
kilometersfrom the coast is less thanthe average. The most urbanizedarea generallycoincides
with the high water table, occupyingthe zone from where it is most difficultto evacuate
stormwater.
Traffic Patterns and Flood Control Before the Project
2.11 The originalciitywas a medinasurroundedby largegardenplots (ineins). Fourteenmain
roads (knownlocallyas radiales),coming from othertowns inlandconvergeas they approach
the downtown/portarea. Beforethe bypassroad, through-traffichad to passthroughthe center.
As cars approachedthe center,the radiales cometogether(like spokesinto a wheelhub) and
incomingtraffic is funneledevermore tightly into fewerstreets and lanes. Mergingtraffic
delaysexacerbatedtraffic problemsand increasedtransittimes (see Figure 2.1).
2.12 Developmentalongthe radial roads has led to the progressivedensificationof the
gardens (jneins),which were subdivided,oftenbetweenfamily members,and built on without
permits and connectionsto trunk services. Relativelysparse settlement(threedwellings/hectare
in a vast 10,000hectarezone) and lack of drainage infrastructureincreasedthe floodingin the
jneins area. Sincethe downtownwas lowerthan the more inlandareas,followingheavyrains
the radialesprovidedchannelsfor suburbanrunoffand compoundedfloodingin the center. The
gardenswere originallyenclosedby hedgerowsof cacti growingover earthenfences(known
locallyas the tabias system)which helpedto hold the soil, reducerunoffand increaseabsorption
of rain water. Overthe last severaldecades,this traditionalcopingmechanismhas been lost.
The urbanizationof the garden lots led to the gradualdestructionof the tabiasand concomitant
diminishedwater absorptionand increasedrunoff velocities.
2.13 Much of the runoff finds its way into two main dry watercoursesnear Sfax: OuedMaou
in the south and Oued Ezzit in the north. Theseoueds and their tributariesare dry for all but a
few days of the year,to the pointthat landownersplant trees and cultivatecrops in their dry
beds. Indeed,the treatmentof the land in and aroundthe oueds was anothermajor contributing
factor that increasedthe effects of flooding. Althoughthe 1975Law (Codedes Eaux)forbids,
interalia, constructionin watercourses,which are declaredpart of the public domain-and this
Law has usuallybeen enforced-there have been some squattersand other isolatedexceptions,
that exacerbatenaturallydangerousconditions. OuedMaou has been leveedwith earthdikes
and its left bank levee containeda "blow-out"sectiondesignedto fall under extremeflowsin
order to maintainthe integrityof the rest of the system. The intensityof the 1982flood was
suchthat the "blowouit"sectionfailed as planned. OuedEzzit is not leveed and its channelis
clutteredin parts with residentialand commercialbuildings,trees and debris. Its lower reaches
are actuallyoccupied by a shop-linedstreet.
2.14 The oueds and their tributarieswere rarely lined, and structuralprotectionmeasuressuch
as bridgeabutments,ripwrapor gabionsare seldomused. Prior to the projectthere were no
adequatelysizedretentionbasins and accompanyingstructuresto reducethe velocityof rushing
waters and capture some of the sedimentand debristhey carry. Therehas been littleattemptto
maintainthe size of the channelsand sedimentdepositedhas only been removedwhere deposits
have createdimmediateproblems,such as on roads or within smallstorm drainage structures.
The resulthas been a reductionof the carryingcapacityof existingchannels.

18

Project Objectivesand Design

2.15 Themain objectiveof the disasterrelief project wasto minimizethe flood damage
potentialin Sfax. Secondaryobjectiveswere: reducingthe risk of life losses;providingthe
populationwith a greater senseof security; reducingeconomiclossesto productionand assets
(mainly real estate);and ensuringpermanentand efficientmaintenanceof the flood protection
infrastructure.The flood protectionworks, which cost US$40 million,had 4 components:
* to recalibrate9 km of a oued (OuedEzzit)north of Sfax;
* to constructa protectingembankmenton the left bank of anotheroued (OuedMaou)
south of Sfax(2);
* to constructanotherdike 10 km north of Sfax (3); and
* to constructa 13-kmlong canal aboutfour kilometersaway fromthe city center (4),
(The bypassroad was a by-productof the canal althoughit had beenplanned since
1961).
2.16 Least cost solution. The level of protection"l was determinedin sucha rnannerthat the
marginalcost of providingthe protectionequalsthe marginalbenefits. Canaldesign took into
considerationseveralalternativesof constructioncosts, types of lining, and ongoingmaintenance
costs. The locationof the belt canal wasparticularlyappropriatesince it was constructedparallel
to a belt road that was already under construction,which providedaccessibilityfor heavy
equipmentduring construction,and subsequentlyfacilitatedmaintenanceof the canal.
2.17

Theproject supportedthe followingphysicalcomponents:

* rehabilitationof the water courseof Oued Ezzit on the northernside of Sfax;
* rehabilitationand extensionof the existingdikes alongOued Maou and Oued
Khalifaon the southernside of Sfax;
D constructionof an eight-kmlong belt canal at about four km from the city center;
3
minor flood protectionworks in neighboringvillages;
* provisionof equipmentto maintainthe flood controlfacilities;and
* staffing,equipping,and operationof a specialFlood ProtectionSectionwithin the
RegionalDirectorateof the Ministryof Equipmentin Sfax to be responsiblefor
maintenanceand repairsof flood protectionworks.

l i.e. size and capacity of the canal, which is a function of the decision to design the facilities for a 100 year
recurrence flood.

19
Project Preparation and Implementation
2.19
The project concept-digging a belt canal as a barrier against flooding together with the
construction of storm water drainage systems- was innovative for Tunisia. The Government
had engaged a consortium of consulting firms to prepare a feasibility study. Using a 100-year
series of hydrological data, the specialists updated the 1978 master plan, which provided a basis
for detailed design and., subsequently, for project appraisal. The study was finished by January
of 1983, before the rains started to fall, and detailed designs were available at loan effectiveness.
2.20
The SFPP was designed to protect Sfax and neighboring communities at an
economically acceptable cost, and low operating costs contributed to benefit sustainability.
While not providing blanket protection against worst-case scenarios that might never arrive
(which would have been prohibitively costly), the facilities were designed to protect against
those events that were statistically likely to occur. However, protection facilities can withstand a
flood of catastrophic proportions (a 100-year event). A related Bank-financed project, the
Second Urban Sewerage Project, constructed three storm water collectors to evacuate flood
waters from the city center.
2.21 Institutionalframework. Since February 1983, the Sfax Regional Director (Ministry of
Equipment) has been responsible for the maintenance and repair of flood protection works in the
Govemorate. A new section, the Direction de l'Hydraulique Urbaine (DHU), was created and
staffed for that purpose. The Bank loan also financed the purchase of equipment for DHU to
ensure the proper maintenance of the canal. Simultaneously with project preparation, Bank staff
involved in the project also collaborated in a study carried out by the Directorate of National
Land Planning, assisted by Stockholm University, evaluating Tunisia's flood-sensitive areas.
This study lead to the establishment of a national flood hazard map and also predicted which
zones would experience increases in land values as a result of flood protection projects. The
Office National de I'Assainissement (ONAS) was responsible for the combined urban stormwater
and sewerage systems. The Directorate of National Land Planning (DAT) of the Ministry of
Equipment coordinatecl the preparation of the countrywide flood hazard map. The Bureau of
Hydraulic Inventory and Research (BIRH), a public enterprise which operates under the Ministry
of Agriculture, was responsible inter alia for studies and research related to rainfall and river
flow. Finally, rainfall data was collected by the Ministry of Agriculture and the Meteorological
Service of the Ministry of Transport and Communications.
Infrastructure Details
2.22 The flood protection canal inscribes an arc around the dense urban center of the city (see
Figure 2.1). It is crossed by 19 major bridges (16 road bridges and 3 railroad bridges) and 19
pedestrian walkways (small bridges for people that will not accommodate vehicles).

20

Figure2.1 Locationof the canal and bypassroad

'1
'~~~~~-

11---10
5~~~~~~~~~~~~0

2.23 Parallelto the canal and on both sides of it, are the one-waylanes of the bypassroad (see
Figure 2.2). This road is knownlocally as the "rocade at kilometer four" becauseit is found at
approximatelythat distance from the medina on the various radiales that lead out of the city
center.

21

lane

lane
10.0 m

10.0 m

Figure

C A N AWML_~rCANAL

2.2 Cross-section

of Canal

and Bypass

Road

2.24
The bypass road is twenty meters wide, (there are two lanes for travel in each direction,
around nine meters wide on each bank, and narrow shoulders too narrow for parking). The
bypass road is 8.0 kilometers long, it was built between 1987 and 1990. The canal about 12.3
kilometers in length.

23

3.

Impact on Flood Control and the Urban Environment

This chapterdescribesthe medium-and long-termimpactsof theflood protectioncanal and the

bypassroadon the city's inhabitants,and its urbandevelopmentpattern. It also tracestheir
effectson traffic and the environment.Recentheavy rainfalls,thoughnot of catastrophicflood
proportions,have beenevacuatedby thefloodprotection system withgreater ease than in the
past. People who live near the canalare highly appreciativeof thefloodprotection. In the study
survey, the canal's contributionto public safety was the mostfrequentlycitedproject benefit,
althoughthis aspecttenadedto be recognizedmorefrequently in the lower-income(81percent)
than in the middleclass areas (73percent) becausetheformer sufferedmorefromflooding in
thepast. Thesubstantialamountof new constructionin damagedareasatteststo the increased
confidenceof developers,bothpublic andprivate. The canaland the bypassprovided better
access to alreadyurbanizingagriculturalareaswhichhadpoor vehicleaccess. Thiscreated
new commercial and real estate investment opportunities including an increase in landprices.

ReducedPotentialFlood Damage
3.1
The main positiveimpactsof the canal on the rapidly growingneighborhoodswithinthe
study area has been to minimizethe flood damagepotentialby:
*
*

reducingdisasterrisks;
ensuringpermanentand efficientmaintenanceof the flood protectioninfrastructure;
and
reducingeconomiclossesto productionand assets (mainlyreal estate).

3.2
Sincethe projectwas built there have been no more floods. How much of this
alleviationcan be attributedto the flood controlinfrastructure,and howmuchto a decreasein
torrentialrains? Additiionally,what is the positiveimpactunder averageand extremerainfall
conditions?

3.3
Accordingto the NationalMeteorologicalinstitute,over the last ten years rainfallsover
10 mm have continuedto occur on averagesix times a year. And when it rains heavily it pours:
averageprecipitationduring theseeventshas actuallybeen 22 mm. The followingFigures(3.2
and 3.3) give rainfalldata over the last decade in Sfax.

24

Figure 3.2 Total Annual Precipitation in Sfax

250
200
150

1ETotal

PrFcipitation(j

irknm)m

100
50

0
n

ID

r-

00

a,

00

00

00

00

00

ON

0%

et
a

0%

Figure 3.3. Instances of Rainfall > 10 mm in Sfax

10-

Fjurb.rofraus

6-

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

3.4
The magnitude of the losses averted can be estimated: the floods of 1969, 1973 and
1982 have been evaluated at 25.5, 11.7 and 47 million Tunisian Dinar (in 1982 prices)
respectively. At current prices, any disaster subsequent to those listed would have cost a
multiple of these figures, without taking into account lives lost. Moreover, between 1969 and
1982 there was no ten-year period without a major flood event. It is now some fifteen years that
flooding has been averted.
3.5
Under normal conditions, there is also a positive impact. Run-off from rains in excess of
20 mm used to leave standing water 20-40 cm in the streets of the downtown area.12 Also
severely affected by standing water were nearby towns of El Habib, El Bahri, Bourguiba, El
Khalije and Mraia. Standing water used to remain in the streets for several days, causing the
following problems:

12
Principally the Avenues des Martyrs,du 5 Aout, de l'Armee,d'Algerie,duCommandant
Bjaoui,ruedeTazarka,
quartierde Moulin-villeand De Pic-ville. Alsopreviouslyinterruptedby floodingwere the principalradialesGremda,
El Ain, MenzelChaker,Agareb,Soukra,M'harza,Mahdia,Habbana,Saltnia,and Sidi Salem.

25

*
*
*
*

Deteriorationof lateral serviceroads. Assuming,based on past experiencewith runoff, that 10kilometers(of segments)of these smallerstreetswould needto be
3
repairedannually:the cost wouldbe 400,000dinars;1
Damageto sectionsof the main roads (radiales): 15kilometersof roadwork
annuallyestimatedat 1,050,000dinars;14
Damageto housing(essentiallyto earthen structuresand dwellingsin low-income
areas),(conservatively)estimatedat 100,000dinars annually;
Interruptionof economicactivities
- commerciial: 120,000 dinars annually

*
*

- delays,enforcedabsences,and water-relatedsickness:240,000dinars annually;

Damageto motorizedvehicles:420,000dinarsannually;
Removalof water-bornesand and mud from streetsand storm sewers: 75,000
dinars.

3.6
Significantbenefitshave alreadybeen realized. The cost savingsbecausedamage from
torrentialrains of less than catastrophicscalehave been avoidedcomesto 2,405,000dinars
annually,based on the aboveofficialestimateswithouttaking into accountthe considerable
economiclossesavoidedin terms of property,personalbelongingsand foregoneproduction.
3.7
At projectcompletionthe recalculatedERR was 23 percent. Thecost stream includes
the investment,operatingand maintenancecosts (freeof taxes and duties)over a 40 year period
for the facilities includedin the projectaugmentedby the investment,operatingand maintenance
costs relatedto three stormwatercollectorswhich were includedin the SecondUrban Sewerage
5 but which form an integral part of the flood protectionworks. The benefit stream
Project,1
consistsof the damage cost which has been avoidedby the project. To calculatethis figure,the
1982and severalpreviousfloodswere analyzedand a relationshipestablishedbetweenthe flood
frequencyand the estimateddamagevalues(in 1983prices)causedby these floods. The samne
computationwas repeatedwith the project in place in orderto obtain the curverepresentingthe
residualdamagevalues. The area betweenthe two curves representsthe probableannualaverted
damagesand amountsto TD 4:02 million(US$ 6.38 million)in 1983prices.16 For years from
1982forward,benefitswere assumedto increaseas a resultof populationand GNP growthin the
project area, estimatedat about3 percentand 2 percentper annumrespectively. This analysis
does not considerunquantifiablebenefits(life, health, environment)so that a return of 23 percent
is a minimumvalue.
7 providesthe
3.8
An importantpsychologicalimpactis that flood protectioninfrastructure1
populationwith a greatersense of security,particularlyamongthe poor. Figure 3.1. showsthe
percentageof informantswho mentioned"end of flooding"as benefitsof the project.

3 Valuationdevelopedwiththe Municipality'sroad maintenancestaff.

4 Valuationdevelopedwiththe Municipality'sroad maintenancestaff.
5
Loan 1675-TUN.
16One of the most importantbenefitsof the projectis that it avoidsconsiderableeconomiclossesin terms of property,

personalbelongingsand foregoneproduction.Thesewerenot taken into accountin the Municipality'sfigurescited in

the previousparagraph.
17The realigmnentof 9 km of Oued Ezzit northof Sfax; the constructionof a protectiveembankmenton Oued Maou;
the constructionof the dike 10km northof Sfax; and the constructionof the 13-kmlongcanal.

26

Figure

3.1. Percentage

of Informants in the Study Area Who Cited "End of Flooding"

Benefit of the Project

as a

90.
8060

_Endofflooding

40
020
-

/l

Low-income Areas

Middle-income Areas

3.9
Recent heavy rainfalls, though not of flood proportions, have been evacuated by this
system with greater ease than in the past. The substantial amount of new construction in
damaged areas attests to the increased confidence of developers, both public and private. Dike
protection permitted agricultural land to be re-zoned for urban development, increasing the value
of the land by up to 400 percent. There are several explanations for the fact that land prices
inside the canal did not rise as anticipated: 1) vast tracts of land outside the canal-protected area
were better protected because of dikes, storm sewers and other drainage infrastructure; 2)
throughout the neighborhoods both inside and outside the canal, the risks of high levels of water
are reduced by the existence of an unimpeded channel to the sea; 3) the land inside the canal
was less adequately served with storm drains; 4) land prices reflect travel times, and demand for
land centered on those areas that were high status neighborhoods but still under-valued in terms
of travel time to the city center; and 5) the population is aware that a 130 year flood is an unusual
event, and discount the value of protection because they do not expect to see another in their o!
their children's lifetimes.
3.10
Institutional development. The institutional development which took place as a result of
Government participation in the project was modest. The most noteworthy institutional
achievement was the creation of a maintenance unit for flood protection works, a first in the
Ministry of Equipment. Three similar units have been established in other parts of the country,
modeled on the Sfax maintenance unit. Government officials have found that these units
function efficiently, as has the Bank-financed special equipment that helps to ensure the proper
maintenance of the canal.
3.11
Roads near the canal. The bypass road was a by-product of the canal although it had
been planned since 1961. New roads constructed off (perpendicular to) the rocadle along the belt
canal are another visible benefit of the project. The bypass road provides for better traffic
circulation in the canal zone (all other main roads in the area are radiales) and acts as a
downtown bypass. The smaller roads enable goods and people to reach most neiighborhood
buildings by vehicle. The bypass has alleviated downtown traffic as well (details in Chapter 4),
the same impact which similar measures have obtained in Tunis, Sousse, and BEeja.Additionally
it incorporated an isolated zone into the mainstream of city life.

27
Discussionof UrbanImpacts
3.12 In terms of its impacton urbandevelopment, the canal and (especially)the bypasswere
importantcatalystsbecausethey providedbetter accessto already urbanizingagriculturalareas
which had poor or no vehicleaccess. This made them moredesirableneighborhoodsto live in,
and creatednew commercialand real estate investmentopportunities. Smallbusinessesflocked
to the zonebecauserents startedout low,and commercialbuildingsthere offeredaccessto the
large numberscustomerswhouse the new bypass. Particularlynoteworthyis the development
of factoriesand warehousesin the new industrialzone,PoudriereII, on one side of the bypass.
The increasein landprices was expectedto be one of the most significantindicatorsof the
impactof the belt road-canal. This happened,althoughnot in the manner anticipated.While
land pricesinsidethe canal's protectivebarrier did not go up substantially,that of land nearby
but outsidethe canalrose considerably(impactson land pricesare discussedmore in detail in
Chapter4). Theproject infrastructure-while it disruptedneighborhoodsocial interaction
patterns,and changedlandboundaries-greatly encouragedthe demandfor buildablelots,
mostlyby middle incornehouseholds. This evolutionof landuse, largelyexplainssubsequent
price rises. In this context,the project helpedcreate an outlet for a long pent-updemandfor
additionalurbanhousing and land. However, much of the land whichwas developedstayed
withinthe family. Sincemanypropertyowners' childrenwere marriedadults,once the area
becamesuitable for commutersto live in, their parentsgave them a piece of landto buildtheir
homes on-a commonpracticein Tunisia.
3.13 As new peoplesettled in the area,they changedits physicalappearanceand demographic
composition:over time a larger percentageof area occupantshavebecome homeowners.Before
settling in the canal area, only 32 percent of the heads of householdssaid that they were
homeowners: now 93 percentof those interviewedownthe homes they live in. The newly
arrivedpeopletend to be youngerand moreeducatedthan those who lived there before,and to
come from higherprofessionalcategoriesthanthe ones who were alreadysettled. Homeowners
havetended to make gradualimprovementsto the physicalstructureof their homes, and to
improvethe living conditionson the inside.
3.14 With the constructionof hundredsof new buildings,populationdensityhas greatly
increasedboth insideand outsidethe protectedarea. However,householdsize has decreased,18
and it is probable(becauseof the lowerage of the headof householdand the decrease in
householdsize) that there has been a decreasein the densityof occupancyper room.
3.15 The rate of connectionto the sanitationnetwork in the study area remains inferiorto the
averagerate for the city of Sfax (which is 40 percent, see discussionin para. 4.12)but this
representsa small improvementfor the zone when comparedto pre-projectfigures. There has
been a marked decreasein squatting(from 31.1 percentto 0.8 percent)-probably not causedby
anythingto do with the project but due ratherto legal and social changesoccurringin the whole
country.
3.16 There was also a changein the type of housingwhich prevailed. Beforethe project,
there were mainly single-familyhomes;after the project,there was an increaseof urban-style
multipleoccupantbuildings(oftenfor differentgenerationsof the samefamily, or some form of
shared ownership),and moretwo-storyhomes. At the street level, it is increasinglycommonto
Is From 5.7 peoplein 1975to 5 people in 1994.

28
builda commercialunit (either for familyuse or to rent out), usuallya worksholp,officeor
storefront;with housingon the floor above. Before 1985,only 25 percentof the building
inventorywastwo- (or more) story buildings;after 1985this number increasedto 51 percent.
This changein housingtype is additionalconfirmationof rising landprices (see Chapter4):
high land costs made it too expensiveto buildvillas.
Impacton Economic Activities
3.17

Development of commercial activities. One example of the impact of the project on the

economyis the developmentof commercialactivities alongthe canal, and where the bypass
road crossesthe radiales. Beforethe projectthere were very few businessesin these areas. Now
that some time has passedafter project completion,about 400 new businessestablishmentscan
be foundthere. This illustrates,on one hand, an importantproject impacton Sfax's urban
development,and on the other,its impacton the local economy.
3.18 To some degree,the impactis sub-optimal,and the numberof new establishments
overstatesthe benefit. The local economyhas been slow,and manyof the new businesseshave
closed. Propertyownerssay that they cannotfind new tenantseasily (seepara 5.17). Some
observersattributethis problemto the regional characterof the bypassand the local characterof
the economicactivitiesthat have been establishedthere to date. Factors limitingfurther
economicdevelopmentof zoneare the lack of adequateparking,traffic-relatednuisances,as
well as the absenceof on-rampsand lanesin which mergingtraffic can pickup speed.
Attitudesand Perceptionsof the PeopleLiving in the StudyArea
3.19 In order to ascertainhowawarepeople in the studyarea were of the project,the study
team asked the familiesinterviewedto givethe date constructionbegan on the canal and bypass
road. An impressivetwo-thirdsin the middleclass areaswere able to identifythe exact year.'9
In the lower-incomeneighborhoods,less than half of the respondentsknew the year.
Interestingly,a large group of those whohad livedthere beforethe project(51.4 percent) placed
the date betweenthe floods and actual start-up(1982-84). The canal may have beentied to the
flood in their minds, and they recollected(incorrectly)that the project had begunvery soon after
the 1982iTagedy.Thus taking the percentageof residentswho knowthe acti;al constructiondate
was a good proxy,but it may underestimatethe actuallevel of awareness.
3.20 Withinthe studyarea, residentswere asked whetherthey thoughtthe SFPPhad a
positiveimpact. An overwhelmingmajoritybelievedthat it had (see Figure3.4).

1961.3 percent of families who had lived there before the project, and 65.9 percent of those who moved there after it
was completed.

29

Figure 3.4. Percentage of Residents in the Study Area Who Thought the Project Had a
PFositive Impact
10090-

70-

50-

4030*

t0

%No

V. Yes

In the aggregate,within the study area by the canal, 86.7 percentof respondentswere able to
identifyone or morepositive impactson their liveswhich had beena direct resultof the canal.
Figure3.5 lists the most frequentlycited advantages.
Figure 3.5. Peircentage of Informants in the Study Area that Cite Different Benefits

90307060-

40I
oLowincome

Areas

30

1,Middle.-inorneAreasl

20.

End of
flooding
I~_

Taffic
more fluid

Easier
access to
home

Closer to
work or
shopping

Other

3.21 To some degreewhat the peoplesaw is a functionof whereand howthey live; to a lesser
degreehow long they have lived in the studyarea also influencedtheir attitudes. The canal
tendedto be cited more frequentlyin the lower income(82 percent)than in the middle income
areas (73 percent)for removingthe threat of flood becausethe formersufferedmore fromthe
floodsthan the latter. On the other hand, those peoplewho statedthat the accessto homes is
easier and businessesare closerwere foundmore in middle-incomeareasthan in the working
class areasbecausethey either drivethemselvesor can more easily affordto take public
transportation.Additionally,the bypassroad surfaceis better in the middleclass areas.
Moreover,the Northernpart of the canal-bypassproject, which goesthrough workingclass
areas, is served less by publictransport,in part becauseit ends at the edge of the urban area. In
the middle class areas,thiebypassis used by the buseswhich providetransit betweenTunis and
Gabes,so urban serviceis supplementedby inter-urban,and bus qualityis better and busespass

30
more frequently. Again, those who cited increasedfluidityof traffic flow towaLrd
downtownand
betweenthe differentparts of the city providedby the bypasswere more likely to come from the
middleclass areasthan from the workingclass areasbecausethe formeruse more privatecars,
and probablygo downtownmore oftenthanthe latter. The abovefigures indicatethat the
contributionsof the canal-bypassto neighborhoodquality of life are knownand appreciatedby
stakeholdersin the city of Sfax.
Analysisof Negative ImpactsCited
3.22 The widespreadacknowledgmentof project benefitsdid not preventthe stakeholders
from attributingnegativeimpactsto the project. It will be recalledthat one in eight (13.3
percent) people living in the study area could not identifya singlepositiveprqject impactand/or
failedto see howthe canal/bypassimprovedtheir life. In addition,almostunanimouslypeople
livingin the study area identifiedsome negativeprojectimpactsthat affectedtheir lives.
Figure 3.6 Public Opinion: Did the Project HaveNegativeImpacts?
100.090.0
80.0
70.060.0 50.0

income
Areas

40.0 -EMiddleincome

30.0 -Areas
20.0

10.0
% Yes

% No

UnforeseenEnvironmentalImpact
3.23 The environmentalimpactof the project was expectedto be positivebecauseit
channeledflood waters into a carefullydesigneddrainagesystem,which wouldreduce damage
to urban infrastructure,protect privateand commercialdwellingsand reduceerosion in the
project area. Secondarily,the projectwas designedto improveenvironmentalsanitationby

31

Fhpr 3.79t0bder-ld
,MO

.. .

..

.....
. . ..... .. .. .....
. . . .. . ....
...
..

41eDrnboktiw

ae boftheProjed

......
.........
............

no-

lwbd

U*

N*%

Nwm awe

Dhtki

Iadepmc

LUs1b.dW,

preventingflood-causedcontamination(due to sewageoverflowsand water-bornegarbage)in

the study area, and drainingstagnantbodiesof waterthereby reducingrelatedhealth hazards.
Thesewere achievedlargely as plannedin many,but not all neighborhoods.
3.24 In the event, however,the projectdid have some negativeenvironmentalimpacts,some
of which shouldimprovewith time. Theseincludedaccumulationof contaminatedgroundwater
at the northernoutlet of the belt canal, which results in unpleasantodorsand creates an
environmentthat facililtatesmosquitobreeding. This contaminationis the legacyof an olive oil
factorythat onceoperatedin an oued,where waste productswere allowedto saturatethe ground.
Althoughmaintenancecrews removerubbishfrom the canal on a regularbasis, they cannotcope
with the odor problem,though eventuallythe olive wastesare expectedto decomposeto a point
wherethey causeno furtherproblem.
3.25 There are other sourcesof the pollutedwaterthat sits in the canal during periodsof low
rainfall. The overflowsfrom nearbydrywellshas led the infiltrationof householdwastewater
into some parts of the canal. This contaminationis supplementedby untreatedindustrialrun-off.
3.26 The presenceof pollutantsin the canal cannotreally be classedas an impactof project
infrastructurebut rather the resultof urban policies in general. In Sfax about60 percentof
housesare not connectedto the sanitationnetwork. The study foundthat insidean area 70
meter-wideon each side of the beltroad,only 29 percent of the housingis connectedto the
ONASsewernetwork. This impliesthat more than 70 percent of householdsuse a septicsystem
that-because the watertable is so high-pollutes groundwater. Drywellsactuallyraise the
level of the watertable, and the watertable is currentlygoing up by an astounding10-15
centimeterseveryyear. This has the addedeffect of increasingthe likelihoodof overflow,
makingdrywellsincreatsinglyless practical.The rising watertable reachesabovethe bottom of
the canal in some (limiited)areas and this leadsto infiltrationintothe canal contributingto the
odor problemthe residentscomplainabout, as well as providingadditionalsourcesof water for

32
incubationpondswhere mosquitoesbreed.20Thewater seepingfrom the aquiferrequired
treatmnent
with insecticideto reducemosquitoinfestations,but it was not possible to determine
what chemicalswere used, or whetherthesepose a risk to the marine life of the coastalzone.
The OfficeNationalde l'Assainissement
(O.N.A.S.)has been workingon ways to overcome
these problems,and it shared its plans for additionalsanitationnetworks(that will be installedin
the area borderingthe canal in order to alleviatethis problem)with the studyteam.
3.27 The SakietEzzit canal (North of Sfax)was built so that water couldflow out evenduring
low tide levels,with the resultthat it gets the high tide flowbackinlandfor about 700metersanothersource of the smelly stagnatingwaterwhich the residentsof the studyarea complained
aboutin the householdsurveys. Complaintsassociatedwith stagnantwater were very common:
either algae, bad odors,mosquitoes,or deadanimals thrownin the canal were cited as negative
impactsfor 75 percentof the inhabitantsin low incomeareas,and by 54.2 percentof the people
of the middle-classareas. Far too many residentsthrow garbageintothe canal (200 m3 are
collectedeach month). Theseproblemsare much less severewhere the canal d;rainsat the high
tide level.Field observationsrevealedthat the most affected by these problemsare (naturally)
the people livingcloserto the sea and those living in the area knownas Sidi MansourHaffara.
3.28 The rocade is a source of noise pollutionfor the inhabitants,especiallydisturbingto
long-timeresidentsin the areasthat were not muchbuilt up beforethe project. Thetraffic noise
(especiallyfrom poorly muffledtrucks) disturbsthe sleepof (bypass)road-sidedwellers. The
canal and bypassbifurcatemanyneighborhoods,and cut the city in two. Thedifficultiesof
crossingfrom one side of the canal to another-because overpassesare too far apart for
pedestrians-rends the socialfabric in may places (seepara 3.30).
Opinion of Public Officials
3.29 At the end of the OED sponsoredworkshopfor governmentofficialswho had
participatedin the implementationof the project, abouthalf the participantsturned in the
questionnairethey had been given: 15out of 17respondentsfelt that the overall impactof the
projecton the developmentof Sfaxhad been positive. They suggestedthat in the future, similar
infrastructureprojects shouldundertakebetter baseline studiesand conductan ernvironmental
21
impactassessmentso that retrospectiveevaluationcan be more easilyconducted.
3.30 Amongthe constraintsthe project had to deal with, they highlightedan urban policythat
permitssparse settlementin expensivelyprotectedareas.As a result, Sfax's urban sprawlhas
covereda far largerarea than would otherwisebe necessary. Vast tracts of urban landhave been
kept off the marketfor speculativepurposes. Governmentofficials believethat the low costs
associatedwith holdingvacant or under-utilizedurban land, and the absenceof incentivesthat
motivatethe generalpublicto maximizeon public investmentin protectionand drainage
infrastructurehas (probably)createdthe need for a second,longerand moreexpensiveflood
protection/drainagecanal in the near future.
3.31 Participantsat the workshopproposedurgentmeasuresto overcomewhat they saw as
project deficiencies. Their proposalsincluded:
20The NGO A.P.N.E.S.(Associationde Protectionde la Natureet de I'Environnement
de Sfax)highlightedthis

problemin its meetingswiththe study team.

IPrior to 1989EnvironmentalAssessmentswere not requiredfor Bank-financedprojects.

33
lightingfor walkwaysand streetsalongthe bypass;
improvingroadsidedrainage;
improvingthe functioningof the canal/finishingthe mouthof the canal through
harnessingworks;
* increasethe numberof bridges,pathwaysand walkwaysfor pedestrians;
* improvethe managementand functioningof traffic lights,especiallyin the major
crossroads;
* find othermreansto reducethe impactof neighborhoodseparationcreatedby the
buildingof lhe canal;
* minimizenegativeenvironmentalimpactsby strengtheningoversight,and making
maintenanceworks on the canal more frequent;
* undertakea campaignof communityawarenessto reducethe dumpingof refuse in
the canal;and
* widen the bridges in order to reduceaccidentrisks in the crossroads.
*
*
*

Factors of Performance
3.32
The study finds that both the canal and highway largely achieved their objectives. In
those areas where impacts were sub-optimal, the study found that the policy framework in which
the infrastructure operates did not fully support project objectives. For example, transport policy
favored the development of private transport over public, with the almost inevitable result that
traffic concentration improvements and travel-time reductions from the use of the bypass
gradually diminished as the number of vehicles circulating within the city multiplied. In a
similar fashion, urban policy permitted sparse settlement in expensively protected areas, and
allowed vast tracts of urban land to be kept off the market for speculative purposes. As a result,
Sfax's urban sprawl has covered a far larger area than would otherwise be necessary, and has
(probably) created the need for a second, longer and more expensive flood protection/drainage
canal in the near future.
3.33
The canal has not fully solved the problems posed by torrential rains because there are
insufficient roadside drains/storm sewers in the city. Project design focused on evacuating flood
waters approaching the city from the hinterland, but paid little or no attention to the disposal of
storm water falling on the city itself. Storm drains constructed under the urban project have
helped, but they are not sufficient to handle the water flowing in the streets at peak periods.
Heavy rainfalls are not being fully channeled into the canal and standing water remains on the
roads and in residential areas, causing health/pest hazards among other problems.
3.34
However, these should be transitory as their resolution is a matter of remedial action.
The real problem arises when it comes to taking the action, because there is confusion over who
is responsible. The city authorities regard the canals, protective works, their maintenance, and
any resulting problems, as the central government's responsibility. The project did in fact entrust
the Ministry of Equipment with the job of maintaining the flood protection works (see para
2.21), but it is hard to see how the Ministry can take responsibility for the city's overall drainage
system.
3.35
The project's sustainability is assured by the force account funding for operation and
maintenance. This approach to cost recovery was chosen because, while the benefits of the
project would be widespread, the beneficiaries could not be easily identified. The Tunisian
Government decided that its policy is that the state should pay for the cost of flood prevention

34
infrastructureout of generalrevenues. First, differentfloods affect differentparts of the city and
it is impossibleto predictwhich residentswill be affectedand the extent to which their property
and possessionmay suffer from future floods. Second,the public infrastructureof the entire
SfaxGovernorateis at risk from floods. Third,the wholeTunisianeconomyis affectedbecause
of the essentialrail, highway,port and telecommunication,facilitiespassthrough Sfax.
3.36 To a large degree,the project was able to reduce the destructiveimpactof torrentialrains
becausethe best approachto the floodingproblemwas chosen. Staff involvedin project
preparationsaid that they did not acceptthe Flood MasterPlan designsuncritically. In fact, they
analyzedseveralalternativesbefore decidingon the courseof action. Thethree basic
possibilitiesthat were examinedare:
*
*
*

A legislativesolutionthat relies exclusivelyon legislativemeasuresto preventthe

populationfrom livingin high-risk areas;
A no-actionsolution: a do-nothingapproachcouldbe chosen, and the individuals
affectedby the disaster,or the Government,assumethe cost of the damageswhen
floodsoccur;
Structuralsolution: The constructionof flood protectionworks to protectthe
endangeredareas.

3.37 The legislativesolutionwas rejectedbecauseit wouldhave dependedon a strict zoning

policy and the relocationof tens of thousandsof people-economically prohibitiveand
politicallyunacceptable. Zoningalone wouldnot solvethe problemas all existing structuresin
the high risk areaswould remainexposed. A comparativecost/benefitanalysisof the "no
action" and the proposed"structural"solutionsdemonstratedthat the latterwas the best
solution.2 2

The Key Lesson

3.38

The Impact Study concludes that it is difficult in the extreme to solve complex urban

flood and traffic problemsonly by constructinginfrastructure.RecentOEDevaluationshave

noted that overcominginfrastructurebottlenecksis a long-termprocess,which requiresa
supportivelegal framework,and whichusuallyhas institutionaldevelopmentcomponentsthat
need to be functioningin place beforethe concreteis poured. Bank supportfor similarprojects
shouldbe contingenton the requisitesoftwareaccompanyingthe flood protectionand traffic
infrastructure.

22The selected flood protection system was the least cost solution at a discount rate of 10 percent. Considering the
topographic and demographic characteristics of Greater Sfax, an intercepting canal between the outside impluvium and
the agglomeration to be protected was determined to be the most logical solution.

35

4.
Impacts on Urban Land Values, Housing and Related
Improvements
The urbanareas made mnoreaccessibleby the bypassroad have broughtfewnew citizensto Sfax.
Generally,subdividedplotshave beenpurchasedor otherwiseobtainedby locals,who have
benefitedfromsubstantialappreciation. Of thepeople currentlyliving on the banksof the canal,
(98percent) are long-ti,meresidentsof Sfax. In the 15year period sinceconstructionbegan,the
numberof houseslocatedalong the bypassroadnear the canal increased,and the numberof
occupantsrosefrom 2,000 to about 12,000. The bypassand the canaldivided the city in two, the
infrastructurehavingan importantobstacleeffect in that it dividesthe city into "inside" and
"outside"the bypassroad zones. Withinthe study area, residentswere asked to identify
changesto theirneighborhoodwhich haveoccurredsince theproject. Respondentsidentfied
new streets,businessesandbuildingsas the most noteworthypost-projectchangesnear their
homes.An averageof about 62percent of allfamilies surveyedhad madea significant
improvementto their homesat somepoint in time. Thestudyfound that home improvementsare
morefrequent in the lower-incomeneighborhoods(66.7percent) than in the areasof middle
class (58.3percent).
Household Characteristics
4.1
The numberof peopleliving in the immediatevicinityof the projectinfrastructurehas
been steadilygrowing. In the periodbetween 1978-1994it is knownthat the numberof houses
locatedalongthe bypassroad nearthe canal increased,and the numberof occupantsrose from
2,000to about 12,000. Most peopleliving in the study area were either born near where they
live'now or are rural immigrantswho settled in the neighborhoodsbeforethe project. Only 14.6
percentof the heads of householdssurveyedin lower-incomeneighborhoodscame to live in the
area after the project. Most better-offinhabitantsare new-comers,manycame from morecentral
neighborhoodsin Sfax. Theycame lookingfor a singlehouse (villa) which was closeenough for
an easy commuteto work downtown,but far enoughaway from the downtownarea to providea
more suburbanlife style for their families. The studyfound that 38.9percent of the better-off
heads of householdscarneto the canal area after the completionof the project and the migration
of better-offfamiliesto the zonelargely explainsthe impactof the project on these areas.
4.2
The buildingcensus conductedby the study comparedthe age of buildingson the bypass
with those on the radialeswithinthe study area. Figure 4.1 belowshowsthe percentageof
buildingsin the studyarea which were built before and afterthe projectwas completed. The
studyfound that becominga homeowneris highlycorrelatedwith makingongoing
improvementsto the housingconditions. This commitmentto pleasingvisual and living
conditionsis a resultof the culturalattitudetoward (investmentsin) housingand its relationship
to status. However,the ongoingbuildingupgradingeverywhereobservablearound the canal,
shouldbe creditedas muchto the pattern of urbanizationtypical of Tunisiaas to the impactof
the project.
4.3
Arrival date. The urban areas mademore accessibleby the bypassroad have brought
few new citizensto Sfax. Generallysubdividedplots have beenpurchasedor otherwiseobtained
by locals. Of the peoplecurrentlylivingon the banksof the canal,(97.5 percent)are long-time
residentsof Sfax: either they were born in Sfax (82.5percent),or they have been settledin the

36
canal area since before the project (15 percent). Those who were not born in Sfax and/or who
settled in the area after the project infrastructure was completed represent just 2.5 percent of all
the heads of households. As for the relationship between longevity in the neighborhood and
socio-economic status, 38.9 percent of the households in the middle class areas moved to their
current location after the beginning of the project, versus only 14.6 percent for those of the
working class areas. About 18 percent of the households in the middle class areas and 8.3
percent of those of the working class areas changed homes after the project; 39.6 percent of the
heads of the households in the working class areas were born in the area where the canal was
built.
Flgure4.1.BuildingsBuiltBeforeandAfterthe Project

7000
g~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
OnBln

40.0

10.0
3o

__Radials

Before
1988

Aft 1988

Furthermore, 64.6percent changed homes but moved from another homes that was already
located within the same area where they now reside, Of the heads of the households, 22.9
percent were not born in Sfax. In contrast to the working class areas, the survey showed in the
middle class areas only 13.9 percent of the heads of the households were born in the area where
the canal was built, and none was born in the building in which they now reside.
4.4
Age. The heads of the households in the middle class areas are younger (73.2 percent are
less than 50 years old) than those of the working class areas (40.5 percent of the heads of the
households in this area are over 60 years old).
4.5
Professional status. In the of middle class areas 22.2 percent of respondlents class
themselves as "bosses" and 47.2 percent as middle level professionals. But in the working class
areas, informants classed themselves as workers or employees (27. 1 percent), and retired or
inactive (20.8 percent). There were very few respondents who classed themselves as
unemployed or inactive who were less than 60 years old (6.3 percent) in the working class areas.
This shows that the population of the study area is well integrated in the Sfaxian economy.
However, in what the city considers to be low-income neighborhoods, 4.2 percent of respondents
class themselves as bosses and/or high level professionals and 22.9 percent as middle-level
professionals. Hence the neighborhoods are somewhat heterogeneous-a fact that can be
explained by the lower cost of real estate in lower income areas (land costs are low enough that
the better-off families can afford to build villas where land is still relatively cheap). While land
in Sfax often changes hands without the fact that it is for sale becoming public knowledge, the
increase of land prices caused by the building of the canal, especially in the middlleclass areas,
led some poor people who inherited land to sell it on the open market.

37

Land Prices
4.6
In Sfax, as in any city, the constructionof a dividedhighwaythroughan urban area has
both positiveand negative impacts. As far as many local propertyownersare concerned,the
increasein the value of propertywithinthe area borderingthe canal is the most importantof the
project's positiveimpacts. By openingup a very largeurban area in the outskirtsof Sfax to
motorizedtransportand a newly importanttransportcorridor,the bypassaddedvalueto the land,
causingan importantincreasein land prices. The increasein value of the landnear the canal
lead to subdivision(splittingup of the largerland holdings)so that familiescould capitalizeon
the sale of some landwhile retainingsome for their ownuse. Onthe other hand, studysurveys
also reveal that an importantnumberof large plots of less-than-fullyutilizedland are being held
off the marketfor speculativepurposes. Additionally,desirableareaswith high landprices
inevitablyexcludecertain segmentsof the populationwhocan not affordto live there.
4.7
Prices of plots next to the expropriatedarea variedbetweenTD1Oand TD25/meter2 in
1980reachinga maximumof TD60 alongthe radial roads. Whenasked to recall landprices in
the studyarea beforethe canal was built, 83 percentof householdsliving in the area estimated
that priceswere below TD30per square meter. Now that the canal has been completed,when
asked to estimatethe currentvalue of land in the neighborhoodonly 26 percentof respondentsin
the studyarea mentionedthis price; but 38 percentput the price per squaremeter in a range from
TD5Oto morethan TD80-this can be comparedto the recollectedprice, 8 percent said that land
was worththat muchbeforethe canal. Thesepricescan be comparedto landcost in other
neighborhoods.
Sf3

4.8
The prices of plots suitablefor buildingin Greater Sfax2 rangefrom DT 10to 250 per
square meter. Thehigherthe price, the closerto downtown. Prices also changeaccordingto
proximityto the radialesor othermajor roads and they increaseaccordingto the land's nearness
of these roads. In an informalsurveymadewith four (real estate) brokersof Sfax on May 1996
these expertsestimatedthat plots locatedin the studyarea alongthe bypasswould rangefrom
TD10-80per squaremeter. However,they notedthat between 1994and 1996,the real estate
market was slow,buyerswere scarce,real estate supply low,and sellerswere generallylimited
only to people in dire need of money(to pay off a debt or to pay for urgent medicalcare). The
market is expectedto pick up in the near future.
4.9
Land pricesare high on both sidesof the centralpart of the canal. Reachinga high of
DT 70 per squaremeter in the centralpart, land pricesgo downto DT 20-30per squaremeter in
the North and Southwingsof the canal, the lower figurein those areas where the bypassis a dirt
road. Thereis no significantprice differentialbetweenpropertyinsideand outsidethe protective
canal, which presumabl,yreflectsthe fact that floodingdangerand rain-relatednuisanceshave
also been reducedin the area outsidecanal but withinreach of relateddrainageinfrastructurelike
storm sewers. The fact that prices are aboutthe sameinsideand outsidethe protectivebarrier
also indicatesthat becauseof improvedstormwaterevacuationto the sea there is a limitto the
potentialheight of floodL
waters. It is also true, however,that higher landprices reflectthe value
addedby the bypass,which improvesaccessto the rest of the city. Finally, speculationand
scarcityalso play a role in land appreciation:many informantsand the consultingengineers
cited the dominationof the land marketby a few individualswithin Sfax as an important
23 1994estimates.

38
contributing factor to higher prices. Indeed, there are large plots which rarely change hands
outside a group of Sfax families. On the other hand, the North and South ends of the canal are
low-lying areas, still subject to standing water, that are less desirable historically and on amenity
grounds because they contain no orchards. These are the areas which have been attracting
immigrant groups from elsewhere in Tunisia and low-income families because land is cheapest
there.
4.10
Obstacle effect. Not all landowners benefited from the project. The bypass and the
canal divided the city in two, the infrastructure having an important obstacle effect in that it
divides the city into "inside" and "outside" the bypass road zones. Although :38bridges (16
road bridges, 3 railroad bridges and 19 pedestrian bridges) were built, not all areas are served
equally well. The more densely populated areas and heavily traveled routes are relatively well
served. However, areas which can still be classed as urban are rather poorly served, with the
result that pedestrians may need to walk a kilometer or more to get to a point directly across the
canal, less than 30 meters from their point of origin. About 3 8 percent of the households in the
working class areas and 49 percent of those of the middle class areas complained about the way
the project infrastructure created a separation between their homes and those of neighbors which
they frequently visited. When asked to suggest improvements in bypass infrastructure, about 40
percent of all respondents suggested that the number of pedestrian bridges be doubled.
Additionally, the road and canal left many owners with unusable fractions of their original plots.
Some buildings were totally or partially destroyed to establish the right of way or, later on,
during the construction process. This fragmentation of real estate and structures in the area led
to the creation of a "checkerboard of triangles:" leftover plots and plots which cannot be built
for other reasons are interspersed with usable land and buildings for the entire trajectory.
Changes on the Neighborhood Level
4.11
Within the study area, residents were asked to identify changes to their neighborhood
which have occurred since the project. Disaggregated by longevity and neighborhood (that is,
distinguishing between families that have lived in the middle class and low-income areas since
before and after the project) respondents identified new streets, businesses and buildings as the
most noteworthy post-project changes near their homes (see Figure 4.2).
Figure 4.2. Typesof ChangesIntroduced in the Neighborhood
70

50-

40-

30

.MddIl4COMICAMR

Nesw
Iut

New
Busians

New
i
Buddigss

Other

39
Urban Amenities
4.12
In urban Sfax, over 80 percent of homes connected to the sanitary sewers, but in the
canal area (Onein) connection rates are still well under the city average. In terms of connection
to the sanitation (sewer) system, only 40 percent of the population (and a smaller percentage of
homes) in the study area are connected. In the working class neighborhoods of the study area
more homes have connections to the sewer system (31.3 percent) than in the middle class areas,
where are only 12.5 percent of the homes connected. More than 50 percent of the households
evacuate wastewater through drywells (puits perdus), the rest use latrines or public facilities.
4.13
Although it is unlikely that the project had any impact on the level of amenities and
sanitary equipment within the study area houses, the study team asked about these aspects in
order to have a better grasp on living conditions within the neighborhoods studied. Results in
Figure 4.3 below have been disaggregated by longevity and neighborhood.
Figure 43. Amenity Level of Houses in the Study Area

100.0

70

.0

6000v

40.01
20.0

sl__

ng

Water

300

tthtb.

(Ye.)

S-

(Wa)

,i~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~MiddIo-mcoonAre.l

T_ITphro.K

(Y-)

(Ye.)

(Ye-)

Project activities did not lead to the introduction of sanitation infrastructure in the areas which
needed sanitation nor did it stop the practice of parcellization (excessive subdivision) common
in Sfax, which actually increases the number of plots without access to sanitation and running
water. The level of certain amenities and the presence of modem household facilities (telephone
and the bathtubs) depends on the buying power of the households and the level of urban services
provided to the area by the city.
4.14
The fact that the connection point to the main lines of the sewer system (collectors and
interceptors) is closer to the lower-income neighborhoods explains why a higher percentage of
homes (31.3 percent) are connected there than in the middle class neighborhoods (12.5 percent).
There are two other explanations for the higher service levels in lower-income neighborhoods:
1) there have been targeted sanitation programs for Sfax's poorer neighborhoods; and 2) the
middle class neighborhoods have a population density low enough to make the use of dry wells

40

almostpracticable. A similar situationprevails with the poor neighborhoodsin terms of running

water, servicelevels are higherbecausethe middle class can afford other acceptable
alternatives. This pattern is repeatedin other aspectsof daily life and is relatedto the model of
growthin the city of Sfax.
HousingRenovation/Upgrading
4.15 An averageof about62 percentof all familiessurveyedhad made a significant
improvementto their homes at some point in time. The study foundthat home improvementsare
more frequentin the lower-incomeneighborhoods(66.7percent)than in the areas of middle
class (58.3 percent). This is due to the still-changingcharacterof the homes locatedin the
lower-incomeneighborhoodsand, in general,to the more functional(better) state of those
located in the middle class area. Figure4.4 showshome improvementrates in both income
neighborhoodssinceproject completion.
Figure 4.4 Infornants Who SignificantlyInmprovedTheir HomneSince the Project

50.0
-

go.0.
40.030.0
20.0.

10.0

i
Aea
LowerinOrnme

Middl4nCrmeArea

4.16 It is logicalthat the changesin the homes are more importantin the lower-income
neighborhoodsthan in the middle class neighborhoods.Moreover,the changesin the middle
class areasare oftenmade by lower-incomehouseholdswhich settledthere and which inherited
land and a structure/sthat they graduallyimprovedas they couldafford.
F

Figure 4.5. Typesofimprovements

Madeto Homes in the StudyArea
j

...........

300

~~~...........
.................

............

........ ...

........... ...... ............. ....................

................

.............................................

....................

25.020.0

15.0.

PRebuldlng
MuI
MSattem
PsM=
BIrbmom
YK&cn
APnkl

Added

FaCdC
_OIge

41
Number of Building Permits Issued
4.17
Building permits granted after 1985 represent 63.3 percent of all the permits granted for
the area under study in the last 15 years. The numbers for building permits show that the project
accelerated the building in the area and the increase for the demand of building permits (see
Annex 1).
Other Impacts
4.18
The reduction in the size of the households which is taking place in the project area is
reflected, to varying degrees, throughout the entire country. Smaller family size is a result of
several factors, but household composition has been heavily influenced by the birth control
policy followed by the national government since 1966. In the thirty years this policy has been
implemented it has significantly reduced fertility and launched Tunisia into a demographic
transition. Thus, in the canal area, the reduction in the size of the households is not an impact of
the project, but is related to the system of social changes noticed in urban areas in Tunisia for the
last thirty years.
4.19
An interesting change in residential architecture was mentioned by some of the
informants surveyed. Traditionally the entry way into the house has been on the street side. This
has been both for convenience and, to a certain degree, for status reasons. Older homes along the
bypass follow this design practice. However, having a door on the bypass facilitates the entry of
dust into living quarters, and it does not help to cloak traffic noise. To overcome these
inconveniences, many families that have built more recently leave a passage into the back of the
house, and the main door no longer opens off the main road. Other informants lamented the
development of urban buildings in areas once reserved for agricultural activities and rural type
homes. A few others commented on the reduction in the amount of space available for children
to play and other outside activities.

43

5.

Impact on Traffic and Urban Activities

The overall travel time passing through the city is about 10 minutes shorter using the bypass
than by going through downtown. The annual traffic increase (16 percent) on the bypass
surpasses growth at other important routes. This increase, which shows the extent to which
traffic is being diverted' intofrom other major routes, is one of the most important indicators of
project impact. In Sfax the transport policy environment did not support project traffic reduction
objectives because itfavored the development ofprivate transport over public. The number of
cars usedprimarilyfor circulating within Sfax increasedfrom 7,000 vehicles in 1971, to 13,000
in 1980, and to 36,000 in 1996. The belt road, originally designed as an urban street, carries
heavy traffic moving at limited speed, which is controlled by traffic lights at major intersections.
On the most heavily traveled segment, it is near saturation. Since 1990 the belt road has helped
to absorb a share of the penetrating traffic which wouldformerly have had to pass through the
downtown area Prior to the project, traffic at the entrances to the downtown area of Sfax had
increased at an average annual rate of 5.6 percent. After the bypass was opened to traffic in
1990, the rate of traffic increase downtown slowed to 3.8 percent annual rate which, if not an
outright reduction, suggests that part of the increase in traffic was rerouted onto the bypass.
Three principal downtown streets registered an absolute decrease in traffic volume, including
one which showed a dramatic 60 percent decrease at times ofpeak use.

5.1
The belt road was originallydesignedas an urban street, althoughit is now used almost
as a freeway(in the sense that cars travel at speedsconsiderablyabovethe postedspeed limit
when traffic permits). ][twas openedas an unpavedroad in 1988,then upgradedto a pavedroad
on most of its lengthby 1990-which can be consideredas the year it was openedto traffic
(since a few less-usedsection are still unpaved). Sinceit was ultimatelyonly possibleto acquire
a band 32 meterswide for the entire project(see cross-sectionin Figure2.2), the road was
limitedto 20 meters includingshoulders,that is, 10metersfor each side). It was foreseenthat
this excessivenarrownesswas goingto be a significantconstrainton the flow of traffic, and the
studyfound that this is indeedthe case.
5.2
The studyteam asked a Tunisianfirm of consultingengineersto analyzetraffic patterns
and road safetyto find out to what extent one of the key objectivesof the bypasshad been
attained,i.e. to shift traffic awayfrom over-congestedurban radiales. Sinceit was not possible
to comparebeforeand after projectconditions(it being impossibleto have figures on traffic
levelson a road not built) the consultantsused sometraffic modelingdata generatedby an earlier
traffic study.24This data, which used 1976conditionsto estimatewhat the use of a bypass
would havebeen at that time, was comparedto the currentstatisticsdealingwith traffic. This
chapteralso reviewscertainaspectsof road safetyincludingthe numberand frequencyof
accidentson the bypass:and the types of placesthey happen. Locationsof accidentsfrom police
accidentreports were plotted on a map to identifythe most dangerousintersections,and
an analysisof the causesof accidentshas beendone. Annex3 illustratesthe intersectionswhere
loss and damagewere highest. Data for the periodafterthe bypassbeganfunctioninghas also
beencomparedto the total data for accidentsin the city of Sfax beforethe project.

24

Comparatorstudy was made by the D.A.T/Groupe8 (1976).

44
Increase in the Number of Vehicles on the Road
5.3
In Sfax the transport policy environment did not support project objectives. Incentives
to reduce the use of private vehicles and/or to promote the use of public transport would have
advanced the objectives of the project and enhanced the utility of the transport infrastructure. In
greater Sfax, transport policy favored the development of private transport over public. Large
urban areas beyond the end of the bypass were only sporadically served by buses. The almost
inevitable result was that traffic concentration improvements and travel-time reductions from the
use of the bypass gradually diminished as the number of vehicles circulating within the city
multiplied. The measurement of project impacts on traffic reduction is complicated by the
growth in the total number of vehicles in circulation within Sfax. The number of cars used
primarily for circulating within Sfax increased from 7,000 vehicles in 1971, to 1J3,000in 1980,
and to 36,000 in 1996. The large increase in the number of cars in circulation-which is
paralleled by the increase in two-wheel vehicles-is a reflection of an increase in disposable
income and concomitant improvement in the standard of living of many households. But it
cannot be denied that another factor which has contributed to the rapid growth of private
motorized transport has been the poor service provided by the public transportation system.
Traffic on the Bypass
5.4
Given the speed limit (50 kilometers per hour) and the relative narrowness of the bridges
(8 to 11Im), larger vehicles traveling on the two lanes (going in each direction) have to stagger
their bridge crossing. Because this impedes flow, the study's traffic engineers estimate that the
bypass will not allow more than 1,200 cars per hour. On the most heavily traveled segment, the
bypass road is near saturation, however: measurements showed a peak-use average of 1,059 cars
per hour. While traffic on the bypass only reaches this rate (on the part that is miost traveled,
Gremda-Menzel Chaker) at high-traffic periods, it has increased at a rate of 16 percent a year on
average since it opened. If past trends continue, saturation at peak hours could be reached in a
year's time.

5.5
The increase of vehicular traffic on the bypass surpasses growth at other important
routes. For example, at the level of the bypass, on the radialesof Gremda, Tunis, and Mehdia,
the traffic at the morning rush hour increased at a rate of 3.8 percent a year between 1976 and
1990 and at a rate of 10.2 percent between 1990 and 1995. This latter increase is reflected on all
the Sfax radials which, in addition to the factors mentioned above, is explained btythe much
higher population density in areas which were recently planted in crops or used for orchards, but
which have been rapidly urbanized, particularly in the period 1990-1995. Thus the 16 percent
traffic increase along the bypass, revealing, as it does, the extent to which traffic is being
diverted into its lanes, is one of the most important indicators of project impact.
Driving Time
5.6
The disproportionate increase in traffic on the bypass is strong evidence that individual
users find that for their purposes there are still time and distance economies to be made through
its use. However, because of infrastructure deficiencies, notably the lack of shoulder width and
the narrowness of bridges, travel time is increasing rapidly at high traffic periods. The average
includingtwo-wheeledvehiclesit wouldbe about40,000. Numberof vehicles(estimatedby) using nationalrate of
7 percentvehiclegrowthannuallysince 1980.
25

45
speedat the morningrushhour is currentlyat 12 km/hourwhereasit was 16 km/hourin 1990.
When it was openedto the public in 1990,the most traveledeight kilometerstook 10 minutes
drivingtime plus an estimated 5-10 minuteswaitingat traffic lightsover the 10main
intersections.Now the drivingtime (whilevehicleis in motion)duringthe morningrushhour
has increased25 to 30 minutes;and the waitingtime has increasedmarginallyas well, because
the bridges are saturatedduring rush hours. Despitethis, the overalltravel time passingthrough
the city is still about 10D
minutesshorterusing the bypassthan by going throughdowntown.
Observationsrevealedthat the bypassis popularwith taxi drivers. Interviewswith taxi drivers
showedthat theybelievethat the bypasshas helpedto relievethe traffic pressurein the
downtownarea, and they appreciatethe fact that they can nowmove from one radial to the other
in a mannerthat wouldhave been very difficultand/orimpossiblewithoutthe bypass.The time
gain is greateron average (24-27minutes,comparedwith 10 minutestraversingthe entire city)
for driversjust switchiingradial roads.
Has Trafficin the UrbanCenter beenAmeliorated?
5.7
Sfax is characterizedby a massivevehicularmigrationfrom the outskirtsto the center at
the start of the workday and an equallylarge returnvehicleflow at the end of the day.
DowntownSfax has more than 90 percent of alljobs but only 10-20percentof residences
(housing)accordingto local officials. Almost 94 percent of trips in privatevehicleswithin Sfax
have homeas the pointof origin or destination.About 34 percentof thesetrips are between
homeand the workplace.
5.8
The numberof cars in traffic in 1976just on the radialesof GreaterSfax (movingin or
out of the downtownaerea)was 7,294vehicles daily,which representeda traffic inflowat the
morningrush hour of.just 1,312private cars. By 1990,officialestimatesput the flow into the
centralcity at 10,000a day, not countingpublic vehicles. Since 1990the belt road has helped to
absorba share of the penetratingtraffic which wouldformerlyhaveto passthrough the
downtownarea. Prior to the project,traffic at the entrancesto the downtownarea of Sfaxhad
increasedat an averageannual rate of 5.6 percent.26 After the bypasswas openedto traffic in
1990,the rate of traffic increasedowntownslowed to 3.8 percentannual rate which, if not an
outrightreduction,suggeststhat part of the increasein traffic was reroutedonto (one of several
new)transverseroutes or bypassesincludingthe one at kilometerfour, which wasthe longest
and most importantto open aroundthat time. While severalother principalstreetssaw large
increasesbetween 1990-1995,three did registeran absolutedecrease,includingMenzelChaker
which showeda dramatic60 percent decreaseat times of peak use.
5.9
The consultingengineersnote that evenwhere averagetraffic volumesare rising, the
bypassimprovedgreatly theflow of the traffic througha decreaseof trafficjams (in the
downtownarea). In summary,the distanceof travel betweenhome,work and shoppinghas been
shortenedfor manyfamilies,not to mentionthe resultantdecreasein travel time and use of fossil
fuels. Moreover,the increasein traffic on the bypassand improvementof connectionsbetween
the urbanhighway(radiales)are direct results of the project. Particularlynoteworthyis the fact
that the bypassallowedheavytrucks (estimatedat 150per day) to avoidthe downtowncrossing.

265.5 percentbetween1976and 1990and 5.7 percentbetween1990and 1995(as measuredalong the eightmain

radialeswhichrun into the center).

46
5.10 A secondary benefit occurs when flammable cargo or other hazardous materials are
carried by trucks that now take the bypass: pedestrian exposure to chemical vapors from
dangerous materials has been shifted away from the most populous area to less dlense areas with
greater natural airflow.
Road Safety
5.11
Along the bypass there has been a steady increase in serious and fatal accidents. The
engineers on the study team attribute this to:
*
*
*
*

lack of public/street lighting. The sides of the road are very dark, which hides
pedestrians, children and people alighting from parked cars from the eyes of drivers;
narrow crossroads lead to tight turns and remove a necessary margin for error;
traffic lights are not adequately maintained, with the result that some accidents are
the result of non-functioning or malfunctioning equipment;
the lack of parking coupled with excessively narrow shoulders have the unintended
effect of (parked/stopped cars) blocking travel lanes which leads to emergency
merges, avoidance maneuvers and accidents; and
there are no exit/entrance ramps or slow lanes for merging traffic.

Accidents
5.12 Unfortunately, the number of accidents on the bypass has been increasing,as fast as the
traffic. Since the asphalting of the bypass in 1990, the following pattern of traffic;accidentrelated injury and damage has unfolded (see Figures 5.1 and 5.2).
Figure

5.1 Number

,30

of Accidents

on the Bypass

l1

Numberofaccidents

10

X.I.

................
<

.....

~~~~ ~

.....

~~~~
1992
~~1991
1993

......;
1994

995s

47

Figure5.2 MortalityandMorbidityon the Bypass

60

40
30

*Number

10

......

ofwoundedi

Numberof dead

.........
1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

Both urban growth and commercial development

account for the heavy traffic on the belt road,
and partly explain the increase in the accident rate despite traffic lights at every intersection and
speed limit signs.27 The above table shows that the number of accidents on the bypass increased
between 1991 and 1995 at an average rate of 28 percent a year. With its present level of road
signing, traffic control, lighting and enforcement, the bypass is becoming steadily more
dangerous for local users. The accident rate is high: 11 dead, 43 wounded in 35 accidents in
1995-grim
statistics for an urban road. The consultants attribute the current (which they class

as excessively high) accident rate to technical weaknesses in the Sfax bypass design (most
notably:

narrow

lanes, narrow

bridges,

difficult

crossroads,

insufficient

traffic signs/signaling,

no street lighting). The 7 meter-wide lanes which are found in some areas are too narrow for
heavy trucks, and makes passing a dangerous operation.
The bridges, which are of a standard
more appropriate to country roads than urban ones (8 meter-wide instead of 15) are bottlenecks.
The absence of public lighting is a source of accidents in part because many bicycles do not have
lights. The map in Annex 3 illustrates the most dangerous intersections on the bypass, based on
official accident data.
Commercial

Opportunities

Created

by the Bypass Road

5.13
When land was expropriated
for the project, the indemnities paid to land owners were
modest. To provide additional compensation,
the land which they retained was granted
exemptions from certain building and zoning restrictions, which increased its commercial
value.

28

27 The Borrowercommentedthat, "Withthe rapid increasein traffic volume,it has becomeclearthat the width of the

beltroad (two lanesin each direction)has rapidlybecomeinadequate.It may be notedthat the absenceof street
lightingalongthe belt road,which is a contributingfactorto the traffic accidentrate, will be rectifiedunderthe Ninth
DevelopmentPlan.
2s Exceptionsto the UrbanP'lanwere grantedin 1986-87in responseto numerouscomplaintsfrom formerowners.
Theseexemptionscomplementedthe low indemnitieson the expropriatedland,butthey also changedthe urbanprofile

48

5.14 On May 16, 1996,a team commissionedby the studyto surveythe studyarea counted
394 business-suitable/commercial
premisesas well as 12 factories. Thesurveyorsonly counted
the premiseslocatedon the bypassor installedon a road which reachedthe bypass,taking into
account only those which were locatedwithin 100meters of the bypassroad, onieach side of the
canal. The activitieswhich were found at that time to be ongoinghave beenclassifiedinto four
categories:
Groce Stor
-Groceries
-Groceries& gas
-Groceries& tobacco
-Groceries& fruit and vegetables
-Otherfoodstuff

Services
-BarberShop
-Mechanics
-Autobody work
-PartyItems
-Other Services

Non-groceryStores
-Furniture
-Buildingmaterials
-Iron works
-Spare parts
-Coal and gas
-Other materials

SmallWorkshops
-Smalliron works
-Carpenter
-Otherworkshops

5.15 Althoughthere were a numberof artisanworkshopsbefore 1988,theytended to be

insideearthen homes,or in temporarystructures:stores and steel-reinforcedconcrete
commercialbuildingsof the type now prevalentwere the exceptionsin the zonebefore 1988.
About 70 percent of the stores and workshopsin the area havebeen constructedsince 1988when
the beltroadwas openedwith a dirt surface(not yet paved). Themonthlyrent for a commercial
unit in the study area rangesbetweenTD40-100. The averagerent for premisesborderingor
visiblefrom the bypassis around TD80.
5.16 The types of activitiesand the intensityof use currentlyfoundalongthe beltroadare
differentthanthose in the bustlingdowntownand alongthe radiales(wherea broaderrangeof
productsand servicescan still be found). An analysisof the establishmentsopen for business
(see Figure 5.3) showedthat serviceswere most common(40 percent), followedby smallrepair
shops (27 percent),non-grocerybusinesses(hardware,spare parts, agriculturalclhemical,etc., 23
percent),and food shops (10 percent).

of the area. A negativeurban impact,unaestheticconstructionsand poor use of urbanspace,is not a negativeimpact

of the project,but ratherof the decisionto grant exemptions.

49

Figure 5.3 Types of Commercial

Enterprises

Found Along the Bypass

140
'
120.||'

gTotalNo.

(Irey

Stocrs
y

N6n

Nony

Services

Smal

WoSishops

Closed

Stoeds

Stores

Amongthe things that the buildingcensusdiscoveredinclude:

o
D

*
*
*
*
*

the small shops for repairingcars and bicycles are concentratedon the beltroad,very
few were on the radiales;
51 percent of the shops have been constructedsince 1990,that is, sincethe beltroad
was paved;
77 percentof the shopsare self-containedconstructionswhilethe rest are extensions
to dwellings;
56 percentof the shopownersare workingalone(no employees);
About28 percentof occupants ownthe premiseswere their businessis located;
71 percentare tenants; and
one percentoccupypremiseswhichthey do not own but for which they pay no rent.

5.17 The high proportionof new servicesand repair shops is a desirablestate of affairs: these
operationscreatemorejobs. Evenmore employmentcouldbe createdif deficiencieswere
overcome. The absenceof parkingin some areas coupledwith the difficultiesfindinga place to
park in others, the delay beforetelephoneconnectionsare granted/installed,the absenceof public
lighting,and traffic-relatednuisanceshave led numerousshopsto close. The field survey
buildingcensus showedthat 32 percent of the shop premiseswere closedor not functioningas
activebusinesseson a daily basis (3 timesthe frequencyobservedon the radial roads).
However,manystorefrontswere built on speculation(with the ownersliving on the floor/s
above). In the earlyyears of the bypass,the extent and nature of the commercialopportunity
which it offeredwas not well understood. Someof the storesthat closedoverestimatedthe
potentialclientele. Others were neveroccupied. There is thereforesomethingof a glut of
commercialspaceon tihecanal-areamarket,which will likely disappearas the local economy
improvesand as businessesbetter suitedto actualmarket conditionsare installed.

50

Job Creation
5.18 The commercialactivitieson the bypassgeneratemorejobs than the ones on the
radiales,both becauseof the nature of the enterprises,and the fact that each estaLblishment
is a
bit more spacious. Thejobs createdby businessesalongthe bypassand the ra,dialesare as
follows:
* on the bypasstherewere 163paidjobs for each 100establishmentsdedicatedto
commercialactivities;
* on the radialesthere were 134jobs for each 100 establishments;
* the averagefor all businessesvisited by the studyteam was 151jobs for each 100
activities.
5.19 Most of the entrepreneurswho run establishmentsin the studyarea are men (94 percent).
They range in age between20 and 77 years old. The womenwho manageactivitiestended to be
in servicebusinesses,most oftenthey were hairdressers,seamstressesor tailors. Almost 90
percent of the shopkeeperswho are on the bypass,settledin their currentpremisesafter the
project was completed. Low rent and excellentaccessto downtownSfaxwere the main
motivationscited by entrepreneurswho did not owntheir own premisesfor their location
decision. Entrepreneurscomplainedmost aboutthe lack of parking,noise causedby cars and
heavytrucks, air-bornedust, and poor security. Theyobservedthat the lack of public lighting
makes it easier for thieves(whowork at night)to break in and rob them. Many of those
interviewedworriedthat if businessdoes not pick up that they will be forcedto close and/or
move elsewhere.

5.20 Even limitingthe area studiedto 100meterson both sides of the canal (and there were
numerousestablishmentsjust outsidethe area counted,it remainsnonethelessincontrovertible
that the canal and the bypasshave exerteda positiveeconomicimpacton Sfax,and contributed
to the growthof small enterpriseand family incomes.

the averagefloorspacein the units surveyedwas 48.4 squaremeters.

51

6.

Findings anidRecommendations

6.1
The ImpactEvaluationconfirmsearlier evaluationfindingsthat-although there were
small glitchesin design-both the canal and highwaylargely achievedtheir objectives. The
most fundamentalimpactof the project is that flood control infrastructurecontinuesto channel
flood waters into a carefullydesigneddrainagesystemwhich, everyrainy season,reduces
damageto urban infrastructure,protectsprivateand commercialdwellingsand significantly
reducesuncontrolledwater flows in the projectarea. Secondly,the canal has improved
environmentalsanitationby preventingflood-causedcontaminationon both sidesof the canal,
and helpedto drain stagnantbodiesof water,therebyreducingrelatedhealth hazards. In termns
of the bypassroad's impacts,it is impressivethat even after the numberof cars in Sfax increased
morethan three-foldsincethe project wasbuilt, the overalltravel time passingthroughthe city
is still about 10 minutesshorter usingthe bypassthan by going throughdowntown. The fact that
annualtraffic increaseson the bypasscontinueto surpass growthat other importantroutes is also
an indicatorthat the roads componentis still fulfillinga well-identifiedneed.
6.2
In lightof the achievementsnotedabove,it is still importantto reflectabout waysthat
potentialbenefitscouldlhave beenfurther maximized. The policy frameworkin which the
infrastructureoperatesdid not fullysupportproject objectives.Transportpolicy favoredthe
developmentof privatetransportover public, with the resultthat traffic concentration
improvementsand travel-timereductionsfrom the use of the bypasshas graduallydiminishedas
the numberof vehiclescirculatingwithinthe city multiplied. Similarly,urban policy permitted
sparsesettlementin expensivelyprotectedareas,with the result that Sfax's urban sprawlhas
covereda far larger areathan wouldotherwisebe necessary,to the extent that a second,longer
and more expensiveflood protection/drainagecanal is beginningto be discussed. It is difficult
in the extremeto arrive at lastingsolutionsfor flood and traffic problemswith physical
infrastructureonly. OEDsuggeststhat similar projectsshouldin future also addressthose policy
improvementswhichcan enhancethe flood protectionand traffic benefits. Anothertool which
may have beenunder-utilizedwas public awareness/education.For example,communicatingthe
dangersof hazardousmaterialsto the broaderpopulationwouldhave createdpressureon
polluters,who are obviouslyknownto their neighbors.
6.3
Another study findingis that the lack of supportinginfrastructurecan significantly
constrainprojectbenefits. The canal has not fully solved the problemsposed by torrentialrains
becausethere are insufFicientroadsidedrains/stormsewers in the city.
6.4
In spiteof the numerouspositiveoutcomesdescribedin this volume,benefitswere also
constrainedbecauseof design shortcomings.Specifically,the evacuationof floodwaters
approachingthe city from the hinterlandwas dealt with properly,but insufficientattentionwas
given to the disposalof storn waterfalling on the city itself; heavyrainfalls are not beingfully
channeledintothe canal,and standingwater remainsa problemin some neighborhoods.Better
baselinestudiesand an environmentalimpactassessment(which,under currentguidelines,
would now be requiredof a Bank-sponsoredproject)so that retrospectiveevaluationcan be more
easilyconducted.
6.5
Again it must be recognizedthat many of the importantfindingscontainedin this
volume comefrom the Governmentofficialsand other involvedand informedstaff who

52
participatedin the OEDsponsoredworkshop. Theywere the ones who suggestedthat
Governmentneeds to do somethingabout the lowcosts associatedwith holdingvacantor underutilizedurban land, and the absenceof incentivesthat motivatethe generalpublicto maximize
on public investment.Other measuresproposedby the workshopincludedurgentmeasuresto
overcomeprojectdeficiencies. It will be recalledthat they recommendedadditionalinvestments
inter alia in the following:

*
*
*
*
*
*
*

lighting for walkwaysand streetsalongthe bypass;

improvingroadsidedrainage;
improvingthe functioningof the canal;
increasingthe numberand quality of pedestriansfacilities;
improvingthe functioningof traffic lights;
making maintenanceworkson the canal more frequent;
wideningthe bridges in order to reduceaccidentrisks in the crossroads.

6.6
Anotherissue noted in this study is that when urgentaction is required,there is
sometimesconfusionover who is responsible,the city or the centralgovemment. Thecity
authoritiesregardthe canals and their maintenanceas the centralgovernment'sresponsibility,but
the flood protectioninfrastructureis a systemthat goes beyondthe project-builtinfrastructure,
and it is hard to see howthe Ministrycan take responsibilityfor the city's overall drainage
system. Certainlymany othercities in the world deal effectivelyon their own with such
systems.
6.7
In conclusion, the projectwas able to reducethe destructiveimpactof torrentialrains
and constructan effectivetraffic congestionreducingbypassbecause,after analyzingmany
alternatives, very good approachesto the problemswas chosen. Nevertheless,overcoming
infrastructurebottlenecksis a long-tern process,which requiresa supportivelegal framework,
and whichusuallyhas institutionaldevelopmentcomponentsthat need to be functioningin place
beforethe concreteis poured. Bank supportfor similarprojectsshouldbe contingenton having
the requisitesoftwareaccompanyingthe flood protectionand traffic infrastructure.Where it is
not alreadyin place, a paralleleffort is needed.

53
Annex 1

BuildingPermitsIssuedIn the StudyArea

On or Before 1985
After 1985
Number
%
Number
%

Total
Number
%

La mer (Nord)- Sidi Mansour

Sidi Mansour- Saitnia
Saltnia - Routede Mahdia
Routede Mahdia- Routede Tunis
Routede Tunis - Teniour
Teniour- Gremda

4
57
86
46
19
38

0.8
11.5
17.3
9.3
3.8
7.6

8
67
98
69
15
76

1.3
10.9
15.9
11.2
2.4
12.3

12
124
184
115
34
114

1.1
11.1
16.5
10.3
3.1
10.2

Gremda - L' Afrane

L'Afrane - El Ain

29
35

5.8
7.0

34
34

5.5
5.5

63
69

5.7
6.2

El Ain - Routede MenzelChaker

Routede MenzelChaker- Rtouted'Agareb
Routed'Agareb- Soukra

43
63
38

8.7
12.7
7.6

41
60
35

6.7
9.7
5.7

84
123
73

7.5
11.1
6.6

Soukra - M'harza

M'harza- Routede Gabes

Routede Gabes - La Mer (Sud)
Total
Source:Municipalitede Sfax

0.6

12

1.9

15

1.3

29
7

5.8
1.4

54
13

8.8
2.1

83
20

7.5
1.8

497

100.0

616

100.0

1,113

100.0

55

Annex2
Methodology
1.
Researchand on-site inspectionby a multi-disciplinarycore team composedof a housing
economist,a financial/institutionalspecialist,a socialscientist,and a field surveyteam were
used to evaluatethe im[pactsof the projectson the beneficiariesand stakeholders. As part of the
in-depthassessmentof project impactsin Sfax,studies and commissionedpapers were also
conductedunder the supervisionof consultants.
Impact evaluation at the household level

2.
To assess direct impactsof the projectson beneficiaries,a field surveywas undertaken
by a local researchteam specializedin surveytechniques. The team surveyed 120households
and asked 49 questionsin each household. The samplewas stratifiedtwo ways: (i) households
living in their homes before 1985were comparedwith the householdswhich were established
later; and (ii) two kind[sof neighborhoodswere represented-low-income and middle class.
Nature of the instrument

3.
Beforethe questionnairewas used, earlyversionsof the instrumentwere pilot tested in
about20 householdsto ensure that respondentsunderstoodthe questions. The surveyinstrument
investigatedthe extent to which the project affected informantsin termsof: (i) their income,
assets,expenditures,and consumption;(ii) their accessto social services;and (iii) their health.
Households'perceptionswith regardto the project 's achievementsand deficiencieswere also
explored. Backgrounddata on the respondents' age,profession,familycomposition,housing
previousaddress,etc., werealso gathered.
4.
Takentogetherthe neighborhoodand family data focusedboth on current and
retrospectiveconditions,and coveredthe followingissues (a) improvementin standardsof
living such as health conditions,water and sanitation(includingthe impactof insectpests as a
resultof new infrastructureuse), and accessto social services(schools,health centers,
communitycenters,markets);(b) housingconditionssuch as plot allocation,land values,
buildingpermits,propertytitles and taxes, mortgages,rentals and buildingmaterial loans;and
(c) income/expendituresand assets. Conditionsbeforeand after-projectwere investigated.

57

Annex 3

Mt,stD.igcw Iitazimto, inSfa

isi.,

b44h

I..
4.

T1eBIa* PoubnwkhtmscMu
a mm.a

59
Annex 4

Comments from the Borrower

(Translationof FrenchOriginal)
REPUBLICOF TUNISIA
MIIiVISTR
Y OF INFRASTRUCTURE
AND HOUSING
Urban WVaterDepartment

Tunis
June 7, 1997

No. 9801D9

Mr. Yves Albouy

Chief, Infrastructure and Energy Division
Operations Evaluation Department
The World Bank
Washington, D.C.
Dear Sir:
_SMbjet:

Rlef

Impact Assessment of Sfax Flood Protection Project

(Loan 2789-TUN)
Your communication of May 12, 1997

'In response to the copy of the impact assessment statement on the abovementioned
project, which you forvarded to us on Mav 12, 1997, we would like to make the following
comrnments:

Page1para. 2
The second of the four flood protection works components listed should read:
' .. ,
to construct a protecting embankment on the left bank of another dry
riverbed.".
Page 3. para, 9
The belt road, designed to be an urban road, carries heavy traffic moving at limited speed,
which is controlled by three-color traffic lights at each intersection. This belt road does not serve
as a freeway.

Page 4. para, 11
The belt road allows vehicle traffic to bypass the downtown area. As a bypass road, it
was designed without side service lanes [?? voies d'evitement] or parking areas; it was not
intended to attract commercial development.

60
Annex4
Page 4. para. 12
Both urban growth and commercial development account for the heavy traffic on the belt
road. and partly explain the increase in the accident rate despite traffic lights at every intersection
and speed limit signs (50 kn/'h). With the rapid increase in traffic volume. it has become clear
that the width of the belt road (two lanes in each direction) has rapidly become inadequate. It
may be noted that the absence of street lighting along the belt road, which is a contributing factor
to the traffic accident rate, will be rectified under the Ninth Development Plan.
Page 5. para. 14
The accumulation of groundwater at the northern outlet of the canaltwill also lessen with
time as more and more residential plots bordering the canal are connected to the sanitation
network.
Page 5. para. 17
While the project is regarded as having fully solved the problem of flooding from the
wadis close to the city, it does need to be supplemented by a stormwater drainage system within
the citv that either connects to the flood protection canal or empties into the sea. Creation of
such a system, which is the responsibility of the municipalities affected, will be programmed in
accordance with the resources they have at their disposal.
It should be noted that no health or pest-related hazards are caused by water stagnating in
low-lying areas.
Page 6. para. 18
Expansion of the city past the existing flood protection canal is taking place in
accordance with approved development plans. Flood protection for these new areas can be
provided by a second canal located beyond the expansion area or by other means recommended
as a result of the study that has just been initiated.

Page6. para,19
Connections to the sewer network in the zones adjacent to the project area will increase
significantly over the next few years as a result of the laying of approximately 200 km of pipes
by ONAS under the Fourth Urban Project.
/s/

M. Kharrat
Director, Urban Water Department

61
Annex 4

REPUBLIQU'ETUNISI'EYNE

i,'

Mrnis8rede ('Equipement

m
1i

Direcnion ne l'Hy(draulique Lrbe,ine

j3tl

j9
1

, !

Tunis, le: 7/06/1997

NO 980/D9
Monsieur
YVES ALBOUY, Chef de Division
Infrastructure et Energie
Departement de I'Evaluation
Retrospective des Op6rations
A Ia Banque Mondiale

B ,J E T Emdedirmnacadu-roi-t pcurila protection contreles

inondations de Sfax(?rtZ

RERNCE

S9-TLU.

: Vorre envoi du 1Z Mai 1997.

Faisant suite a vorre envci du 1: Mvai1997 d'une copie du resume de l'e6ude d'impact relatif au
projet cite en objet, j'ai l'honneur de vous taire part des commentaires suivants:
- Page I S 2

11convient de rectifier le deuxieme type d'intervention cornme suit:

"construire une levee sur la rive cauche d'un autre lit assiche."
- gage 3 9 : La rocade qui est conque comrne une route urbaine, draine ur. srafic intense i
vitesse limitee. La circulation sur la rocade est r6gle par des feux tricolores au niveau de

chaquecarrefourcetterocadene faitpas fonciiond'autoroutc.

PRQe 4 _
: La rocade perrnet de devier le trafic routier par rapport au centre ville, cette
route de deviation qui a ete conque sans voies d'evitement et sans parkings le long des voies
n'avait pas pour objectif le deveioppernent des activites commerciales.
-

Pge 4
12: ILa croissance urbaine ainsi que le developpement des activites comrnerciales
ont engendre un trafic intense 'e long de la rocade, cc qui explique en partie l'accroissemenT du
taux des accidents de circulation malgre une signalisation lumineuse au niveau de tous les
carrefours et des pannaux de limitation de vitesse (50 Km/h). La conrsequence de P'6volution
rapide du ;rafic permet de constater que la largeur de la rocade (2 x 2 voics) est devenue
rapiderent insuff ante. Il ccr.vier.: de signaler que I'absence d'6clairage de la rocade qui est
l'une des raisons qui favorise les accidents de circulation sera satisfaite au cours du 96me plan
de ddveloppement.
-

62

Annex4

audebcuche
Bordducanalscra egalement
d'eauSouterraine
- Pae 4-g 14 Laccumulation
attenu6e avec .e temps par sui.e de 'arnelioration des taux de raccordement des rnverains 1u
reseau d'assainisserrent des eaux usees.
- P!ge ; j I, On considere que ie prcjet a bien resolu le prcbleme des c,res des Oueds qui se
trouvent a proximite de la ville, toutefois ce projet devrait itre complir6 par un drainage des

eaux pluviales des zones urbaines qui sera raccorde au canal de protection de Lavilleou A la
mer selon le cas. L'ex6cution de ce reseau qui est du ressort des collec:ivit6s locales sema
programrme en foncvion des moyens de ces collectivites.

Il est a signaier qu'il n'y a pas eu de problmes sanitaire5et de presence d'animaux nuisible5
causcs par la stagnation d'eau dar.s certains endroits bas.
*Page
6 1S: L'Lextensionde la ville au deli du canal de protection seoairselon les plans
d'amenagemnent approuves , la protection contre les inondations de catte extensionpourra etre
faite par un deuxierne canal qui sera irnplante au dela de l'extension de la viileou par tout autre
moyen que i'6tude qui vient d'tre lancee aura a. definir.

au r-seau d'eaux usees des zones environrnan:esau projet va

- 'Page 6 19 . Le maccordernernt
s'ameliorer sensibiernent au cours des prochaines annees par la r6aiisationd'ernviron200 Km de
dans le cadre du quatrissme projet urbain.
conduites par TL9ONNAS

LE DIRECTEVR DE L'HYDRAtLLIQ1E

U\A
rbaine/g
*~ /

IMAGING

Report No.:
Type:
IER

16777