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AMPATUAN vs.

DE LIMA
DATU ANDAL AMPATUAN JR., Petitioner,
vs.
SEC. LEILA DE LIMA, as Secretary of the Department of Justice,
CSP CLARO ARELLANO, as Chief State Prosecutor, National
Prosecution Service, and PANEL OF PROSECUTORS OF THE
MAGUINDANAO MASSACRE, headed by RSP PETER Respondents.
G.R. No. 197291
April 3, 2013
Facts:
On Nov 2009, 57 innocent civilians were massacred in the
Municipality of Ampatuan, Maguindanao Province. Among the principal
suspects was herein petitioner, then the Mayor of the Municipality of Datu
Unsay, Maguindanao Province. Inquest proceedings were conducted
against him.
Through Department Order No. 948, it constituted a Special Panel
of Prosecutors to conduct the preliminary investigation.
The DOJ resolved to file the corresponding informations for
murder against petitioner, and to issue subpoenae to several persons.
Thereafter, 25 informations for murder were also filed against petitioner in
the RTC
Secretary of Justice, transmitted her letter requesting the transfer
of the venue of the trial of the Maguindanao massacre from Cotabato City
to Metro Manila, either in Quezon City or in Manila, to prevent a
miscarriage of justice.
The records show that petitioner pleaded not guilty to each of the
41 informations for murder when he was arraigned on January 2010,
February 2010,11 and July 2010.
In the joint resolution issued, the Panel of Prosecutors charged
196 individuals with multiple murder in relation to the Maguindanao
massacre. It appears that in issuing the joint resolution, the Panel of

Prosecutors partly relied on the twin affidavits of one Kenny Dalandag


(Dalandag).
Dalandag was then admitted into the Witness Protection Program
of the DOJ. QC RTC issued its amended pre-trial order, wherein
Dalandag was listed as one of the Prosecution witnesses.
Subsequently, petitioner, through counsel, wrote to respondent
Secretary of Justice Leila De Lima and Assistant Chief State Prosecutor
Richard Fadullon to request the inclusion of Dalandag in the informations
for murder considering that Dalandag had already confessed his
participation in the massacre through his two sworn declarations but was
denied.
Petitioner brought a petition for mandamus in the RTC in Manila, seeking
to compel respondents to charge Dalandag as another accused in the
various murder cases undergoing trial in the QC RTC.

Issue:
Whether respondents may be compelled by writ of mandamus to
charge Dalandag as an accused for multiple murder in relation to the
Maguindanao massacre despite his admission to the Witness Protection
Program of the DOJ.
Held:
No. The prosecution of crimes pertains to the Executive
Department of the Government whose principal power and responsibility
are to see to it that our laws are faithfully executed.
The right to prosecute vests the public prosecutors with a wide
range of discretion the discretion of what and whom to charge, the
exercise of which depends on a smorgasbord of factors that are best
appreciated by the public prosecutors.36 The public prosecutors are
solely responsible for the determination of the amount of evidence
sufficient to establish probable cause to justify the filing of appropriate
criminal charges against a respondent.
Mandamus shall issue when any tribunal, corporation, board,
officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act that the
law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station.
It is proper when the act against which it is directed is one addressed to

the discretion of the tribunal or officer. In matters involving the exercise of


judgment and discretion, mandamus may only be resorted to in order to
compel respondent tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person to take
action, but it cannot be used to direct the manner or the particular way
discretion is to be exercise, or to compel the retraction or reversal of an
action already taken in the exercise of judgment or discretion.
As such, respondent Secretary of Justice may be compelled to act
on the letter-request of petitioner, but may not be compelled to act in a
certain way, i.e., to grant or deny such letter-request. Considering that
respondent Secretary of Justice already denied the letter-request,
mandamus was no longer available as petitioner's recourse.

MASAYUKI HASEGAWA v. LEILA F. GIRON


Topic: Who must prosecute; Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention
Facts:
On December 2005, Giron and her officemate, Leonarda Marcos
(Marcos) filed a complaint against their employer Pacific Consultants
International, J.F. Cancio & Associates, Cancio, Tagalo and petitioner for
illegal salary deductions, non-payment of 13th month pay, and nonremittance of SSS contributions. Respondent averred that since the filing
of said complaint, they have been subjected to threats and verbal abuse
by petitioner to pressure them to withdraw the complaint. Respondent had
also filed separate complaints for grave threats, grave coercion, slander
and unjust vexation against petitioner.
On July 7, 2006, respondent and Marcos were followed by
suspicious men inside the mall where they were taken at gunpoint pushed
inside a black pajero. While inside the vehicle, they were blindfolded and
gagged. They were taunted and repeatedly threatened by their abductors
into withdrawing the case against petitioner. Before respondent and
Marcos were released, they were once again threatened by a man who
said: pag tinuloy nyo pa kaso kay Hasegawa, may paglalagyan na kayo,
walang magsusumbong sa pulis, pag nalaman namin na lumapit kayo,
babalikan namin kayo.
On 16 September 2006, respondent filed a Complaint-Affidavit for
Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention against petitioner and several
John Does. In a separate affidavit, Marcos added that while she was in
captivity, her blindfold was loosened and she was able to see petitioner
inside one of the vehicles parked nearby, talking to one of their abductors,
whom she noticed to be wearing bonnets. Respondent had also filed

separate complaints for grave threats, grave coercion, slander and unjust
vexation against petitioner.
The petitioner countered the arguments of the respondent which
include, among others, that respondent and Marcos are extorting money
from him because the instant case was filed right after the negotiations to
settle the civil aspect of the three cases they filed with the Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation (BID), National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) and MeTC.
In a Resolution dated 5 January 2007, Senior State Prosecutor
Emilie Fe M. De Los Santos dismissed the complaint for lack of probable
cause. Respondent filed an appeal from the Resolution of the prosecutor
dismissing her complaint. In her Petition for Review before the DOJ,
respondent claimed that the Investigating Prosecutor gravely erred when
she recommended the dismissal of the case against petitioner despite
overwhelming evidence showing the existence of probable cause. She
thus prayed for the reversal of the Resolution of the Investigating
Prosecutor. Finding no basis to overturn the findings of the Investigating
Prosecutor, then Secretary of Justice Raul M. Gonzales dismissed the
petition on 11 April 2007. Respondent's motion for reconsideration having
been denied by the DOJ, she filed a petition for certiorari before the Court
of Appeals. On 30 June 2008, the Court of Appeals granted the petition,
reversed and set aside the Resolutions of the DOJ and ordered the filing
of an Information for Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention against
petitioner. The Court of Appeals found that the Secretary [of Justice]
arrogated upon himself the functions of the judge by demanding more
than a sampling, but for pieces of evidence that were understandably not
there yet, being suited to a trial proper.The appellate court went on to
state that the prosecutor usurped the duties belonging to the court when
she overstretched her duties and applied the standards, not of ordinary
prudence and cautiousness, nor of mere reasonable belief' and
probability, but of a full-blown trial on the merits, where rules on
admissibility of testimonies and other evidence strictly apply. The motion
for reconsideration was denied, hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of
discretion in overturning the decision of the Secretary of DOJ which
affirmed the findings of the Investigating Prosecutor.
Held:
No.
The decision whether or not to dismiss the criminal complaint
against the accused depends on the sound discretion of the prosecutor.
Courts will not interfere with the conduct of preliminary investigations, or
reinvestigations, or in the determination of what constitutes sufficient
probable cause for the filing of the corresponding information against an

offender. Courts are not empowered to substitute their own judgment for
that of the executive branch. Differently stated, as the matter of whether
to prosecute or not is purely discretionary on his part, courts cannot
compel a public prosecutor to file the corresponding information, upon a
complaint, where he finds the evidence before him insufficient to warrant
the filing of an action in court. In sum, the prosecutor's findings on the
existence of probable cause are not subject to review by the courts,
unless these are patently shown to have been made with grave abuse of
discretion.
Probable cause has been defined as the existence of such facts
and circumstances as would excite the belief in a reasonable mind, acting
on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person
charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted. xxx it is
merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. Thus, a finding of
probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient
evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the
act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged. What is
determined is whether there is sufficient ground to engender a wellfounded belief that a crime has been committed, and that the accused is
probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. It does not require an
inquiry as to whether there is sufficient evidence to secure a conviction.
The elements of kidnapping or serious illegal detention are all
present in the case at bar1.

1 The elements of kidnapping and serious illegal detention under Article


267 of the Revised Penal Code are:
1. the offender is a private individual;
2. he kidnaps or detains another or in any other manner deprives the
latter of his liberty;
3. the act of detention or kidnapping is illegal; and
4. in the commission of the offense, any of the following circumstances
are present: (a) the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than 3 days; or
(b) it is committed by simulating public authority; or (c) any serious
physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained or
threats to kill him are made; or (d) the person kidnapped or detained is a
minor, female, or a public officer.

G.R. No. L-53373 June 30, 1987


MARIO FL. CRESPO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. LEODEGARIO L. MOGUL, Presiding Judge, CIRCUIT
CRIMINAL COURT OF LUCENA CITY, 9th Judicial Dist., THE PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the SOLICITOR GENERAL,
RICARDO BAUTISTA, ET AL., respondents.
Facts:

Assistant Fiscal Proceso K. de Gala with the approval of the


Provincial Fiscal filed an information for estafa against Crespo in
the Circuit Criminal Court

When the case was set for arraignment the accused filed a motion
to defer arraignment on the ground that there was a pending
petition for review filed with the Secretary of Justice of the
resolution of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal for the filing of the
information

The presiding judge (Mogul), denied the motion as well as the


accuseds motion for reconsideration. But the arraignment was
deferred to afford time for petitioner to elevate the matter to the
appellate court.

A petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a preliminary


writ of injunction was filed by the accused in the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals restrained Judge Mogul from proceeding
with the arraignment of the accused until further orders of the
Court. A decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals granting
the writ restraining the judge from going ahead with the
arraignment of the accused in the case until the Department of
Justice shall have finally resolved the petition for review.

The Undersecretary of Justice, in resolving the petition for review


reversed the resolution of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal and
directed the fiscal to move for the dismissal of the information filed
against the accused. A motion to dismiss for insufficiency of
evidence was filed by the Provincial Fiscal with the trial court.

The Judge denied the motion and set the arraignment, stating
that the motions trust being to induce this Court to resolve the
innocence of the accused on evidence not before it but on that
adduced before the Undersecretary of Justice, a matter that not
only disregards the requirements of due process but also erodes
the Courts independence and integrity.

The accused then filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and


mandamus with petition for the issuance of preliminary writ of
prohibition and/or temporary restraining order in the Court of
Appeals. A restraining order was issued by the Court of Appeals
against the threatened act of arraignment of the accused until
further orders from the Court. The Court of Appeals later
dismissed the petition and lifted the restraining order. A motion for
reconsideration of said decision filed by the accused was denied.

Hence this petition for review of said decision was filed by


accused.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court acting on a motion to dismiss a
criminal case filed by the Provincial Fiscal upon instructions of the
Secretary of Justice to whom the case was elevated for review, may
refuse to grant the motion and insist on the arraignment and trial on the
merits.

HELD:
YES.
The Trial Court may refuse to grant the motion and insist on the
arraignment and trial on the merits.
It is a cardinal principle that all criminal actions either
commenced by complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the
direction and control of the fiscal. The institution of a criminal action
depends upon the sound discretion of the fiscal. The reason for placing
the criminal prosecution under the direction and control of the fiscal is to
prevent malicious or unfounded prosecution by private persons.
However, the filing of a complaint or information in Court initiates a
criminal action. The Court then thereby acquires jurisdiction over the
case, which is the authority to hear and determine the case.
Therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information
is filed in Court any disposition of the case as its dismissal or the
conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the
Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the
prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in Court he
cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best and
sole judge on what to do with the case before it. The determination of the
case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to
dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court who
has the option to grant or deny the same. It does not matter if this is done
before or after the arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed
after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who
reviewed the records of the investigation.
(In order therefor to avoid such a situation whereby the opinion of
the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the action of the fiscal may
be disregarded by the trial court, the Secretary of Justice should,
as far as practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition for review
or appeal from the action of the fiscal, when the complaint or
information has already been filed in Court. The matter should be
left entirely for the determination of the Court.)
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit without
pronouncement as to costs.

PEOPLE V. DIU
(G.R. NO. 201449, April 3 2013)
Facts:
Accused-appellants Welvin Diu and Dennis Dayaon were charged
with the crime of Robbery with Homicide before the RTC of Angeles City,
Pampanga. In the alleged information, it was said that on or about

October 3, 2003, the accused together with one Jay-Ar De la Cruz,


robbed victims Perlie and Nely Salvador, and in the same incident, were
able to kill the latter (Nely).
Perlie, the surviving sister who was also the main witness of the
prosecution , clearly identified Diu and Dayaon as the ones who stabbed
and killed her sister while they were on their way home after work. During
the trial, Perlie even recalled the weapon used by the perpetrators as
according to her, a double-bladed knife.
Upon the other hand, defendants denied the accusations that they
killed Nely but both admitted that they were on the crime scene when the
incident happened. According to Diu, he even pushed Perlie to protect her
from De la Cruz, who was the one that stabbed Nely. It was corroborated
with his co-accused Dayaon.
The RTC convicted accused-appellants of the crime charged
which was subsequently affirmed by the CA

Issue:
Whether or not public prosecutors have the discretion to
determine what and whom to charge, based on the nature of the crime
and the evidence presented, regardless of the witness' doubtful
uncertainties. *(Not the real issue of the case. For purposes only of
corelating it with our topic)

Held:
Yes. Public prosecutors have a wide range of discretion of what
and whom to charge.
During the examinations, Perlie even identified the weapon used
by the accused. However, she only based her testimony when the police
showed the weapon to her after the incident. Uncerntainty was then
established as to whether it was indeed the weapon that was used in the
crime.

Nevertheless, Identification of the weapon used is not substantial


in this case since Perlie positively identified accused Diu and Dayaon as
the killers. What is vital in her testimony is not the knowledge of the
weapon used, but that she saw appellant stabbing her sister.The
presentation of the murder weapon is not indispensable to the
prosecution of an accused. The non-identification or non-presentation of
the weapon used is not fatal to the prosecutions cause where the
accused was positively identified.
Furthermore, prosecutors have a wide range of discretion in
determining whether, what, and whom to charge, the exercise of which
depends on many different factors which are best appreciated by
prosecutors. In this case, the City Prosecutor of Angeles City, in a valid
exercise of his discretion, and after evaluation of the evidence turned over
by the police, resolved that there was probable cause to charge accusedappellants and De la Cruz with the crime of Robbery with Homicide, not
merely homicide.

G.R. No. 181658, August 07, 2013


LEE PUE LIONG A.K.A. PAUL LEE, PETITIONER, VS. CHUA PUE
CHIN LEE, RESPONDENT.
Facts:Lee Pue Liong, a.k.a. Paul Lee, President of Centillion Holdings,
Inc. by virtue of a Secretarys Certificate issued by Virginia Lee, for and in
behalf of CHI, filed a petition for issuance of an owners duplicate
certificate of title of TCT No. 232238, covering a property owned by CHI.
Despite opposition by Chua Pue Chin Lee, her sister, who alleged that as
Corporate Treasurer of Chi, she has possession of important documents
of the Corporation, including the duplicate copy of TCT No. 232238, the
RTC of Manila granted the petition and directed the Registrar of Deeds of
Manila to issue a new TCT. Chula filed an Omnibus motion to recall the
order granting the petition, alleging that she has possession of TCT No.
232238; because of this the RTC recalled the order. Chua Lee also filed a
case for perjury against Paul Lee because of the alleged perjurious
statements made in the Petition as well as his testimony in court
regarding the loss of TCT 232238, which she alleged Paul Lee did to
mortgage the property to Planters Bank, even though there is an intracorporate controversy between him and his siblings, including Chua. The
Office of the City Prosecutor then filed an Information for perjury against
Paul Lee before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila. After Atty. Augusto
Macam, private prosecutor under the control of the public prosecutor,
presented the first witness, Atty. Roland Viesca Jr of the Registry of
Deeds, Manila, the accused thru counsel, moved in open court that Atty.
Macam be excluded from participating in the case since perjury is a public
offence, to which Atty. Macam vehemently objected. After allowing the
parties to file their respective written memoranda in support of their
positions, the MeTC denied the Omnibus Motion filed by the accused,
where he principally raised his objection on the appearance of the private
prosecutor on the ground that perjury is a crime against public interest;
since there being no allegation of damage to private interest, hence on
private prosecutor is needed. According to the MeTC, citing that the rules
do not distinguish between public and private crimes when it comes to
participation of private prosecutors; since the private offended party did
not waive her civil action or reserved her right to institute a separate civil
action, then the private prosecutor may participate, under the direction
and control of the public prosecutor. His motion for reconsideration
denied, Paul Lee elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, which also
denied it, citing such right to intervene exists even when no civil liability
attaches to a crime. Hence, Paul Lee went right up to the Supreme Court
to question the propriety of allowing a private prosecutor to intervene in a
case for perjury, a crime against public interest.

The Supreme Court:


Generally, the basis of civil liability arising from crime is the fundamental
postulate of our law that [e]very person criminally liable x x x is also
civilly liable. Underlying this legal principle is the traditional theory that
when a person commits a crime, he offends two entities, namely (1) the
society in which he lives in or the political entity, called the State, whose
law he has violated; and (2) the individual member of that society whose
person, right, honor, chastity or property was actually or directly injured or
damaged by the same punishable act or omission.
Section 1, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as
amended, provides:
SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions.(a) When a criminal
action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising
from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal
action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right
to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal
action.
x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
For the recovery of civil liability in the criminal action, the appearance of a
private prosecutor is allowed under Section 16 of Rule 110:
SEC. 16. Intervention of the offended party in criminal action.Where the
civil action for recovery of civil liability is instituted in the criminal action
pursuant to Rule 111, the offended party may intervene by counsel in the
prosecution of the offense. (Emphasis supplied.)
Section 12, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as
amended, defines an offended party as the person against whom or
against whose property the offense was committed. In Garcia v. Court of
Appeals, this Court rejected petitioners theory that it is only the State
which is the offended party in public offenses like bigamy. We explained
that from the language of Section 12, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court, it is
reasonable to assume that the offended party in the commission of a
crime, public or private, is the party to whom the offender is civilly liable,
and therefore the private individual to whom the offender is civilly liable is
the offended party.
In Ramiscal, Jr. v. Hon. Sandiganbayan, we also held that

Under Section 16, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
the offended party may also be a private individual whose person, right,
house, liberty or property was actually or directly injured by the same
punishable act or omission of the accused, or that corporate entity which
is damaged or injured by the delictual acts complained of. Such party
must be one who has a legal right; a substantial interest in the subject
matter of the action as will entitle him to recourse under the substantive
law, to recourse if the evidence is sufficient or that he has the legal right to
the demand and the accused will be protected by the satisfaction of his
civil liabilities. Such interest must not be a mere expectancy, subordinate
or inconsequential. The interest of the party must be personal; and not
one based on a desire to vindicate the constitutional right of some third
and unrelated party. (Emphasis supplied.)
In this case, the statement of petitioner regarding his custody of TCT No.
232238 covering CHIs property and its loss through inadvertence, if
found to be perjured is, without doubt, injurious to respondents personal
credibility and reputation insofar as her faithful performance of the duties
and responsibilities of a Board Member and Treasurer of CHI. The
potential injury to the corporation itself is likewise undeniable as the courtordered issuance of a new owners duplicate of TCT No. 232238 was only
averted by respondents timely discovery of the case filed by petitioner in
the RTC.
Even assuming that no civil liability was alleged or proved in the perjury
case being tried in the MeTC, this Court declared in the early case of Lim
Tek Goan v. Yatco, cited by both MeTC and CA, that whether public or
private crimes are involved, it is erroneous for the trial court to consider
the intervention of the offended party by counsel as merely a matter of
tolerance. Thus, where the private prosecution has asserted its right to
intervene in the proceedings, that right must be respected. The right
reserved by the Rules to the offended party is that of intervening for the
sole purpose of enforcing the civil liability born of the criminal act and not
of demanding punishment of the accused. Such intervention, moreover, is
always subject to the direction and control of the public prosecutor.

In Chua v. Court of Appeals, as a result of the complaint-affidavit filed by


private respondent who is also the corporations Treasurer, four counts of
falsification of public documents (Minutes of Annual Stockholders
Meeting) was instituted by the City Prosecutor against petitioner and his
wife. After private respondents testimony was heard during the trial,
petitioner moved to exclude her counsels as private prosecutors on the
ground that she failed to allege and prove any civil liability in the case.
The MeTC granted the motion and ordered the exclusion of said private
prosecutors. On certiorari to the RTC, said court reversed the MeTC and
ordered the latter to allow the private prosecutors in the prosecution of the
civil aspect of the criminal case. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari in
the CA which dismissed his petition and affirmed the assailed RTC ruling.
When the case was elevated to this Court, we sustained the CA in
allowing the private prosecutors to actively participate in the trial of the
criminal case. Thus:
Petitioner cites the case of Tan, Jr. v. Gallardo, holding that where from
the nature of the offense or where the law defining and punishing the
offense charged does not provide for an indemnity, the offended party
may not intervene in the prosecution of the offense.
Petitioners contention lacks merit. Generally, the basis of civil liability
arising from crime is the fundamental postulate that every man criminally
liable is also civilly liable. When a person commits a crime he offends two
entities namely (1) the society in which he lives in or the political entity
called the State whose law he has violated; and (2) the individual member
of the society whose person, right, honor, chastity or property has been
actually or directly injured or damaged by the same punishable act or
omission. An act or omission is felonious because it is punishable by law,
it gives rise to civil liability not so much because it is a crime but because
it caused damage to another. Additionally, what gives rise to the civil
liability is really the obligation and the moral duty of everyone to repair or
make whole the damage caused to another by reason of his own act or
omission, whether done intentionally or negligently. The indemnity which
a person is sentenced to pay forms an integral part of the penalty
imposed by law for the commission of the crime. The civil action involves
the civil liability arising from the offense charged which includes
restitution, reparation of the damage caused, and indemnification for
consequential damages.

Under the Rules, where the civil action for recovery of civil liability is
instituted in the criminal action pursuant to Rule 111, the offended party
may intervene by counsel in the prosecution of the offense. Rule 111(a) of
the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that, [w]hen a criminal action is
instituted, the civil action arising from the offense charged shall be
deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party
waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately, or
institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
Private respondent did not waive the civil action, nor did she reserve the
right to institute it separately, nor institute the civil action for damages
arising from the offense charged. Thus, we find that the private
prosecutors can intervene in the trial of the criminal action.
Petitioner avers, however, that respondents testimony in the inferior court
did not establish nor prove any damages personally sustained by her as a
result of petitioners alleged acts of falsification. Petitioner adds that since
no personal damages were proven therein, then the participation of her
counsel as private prosecutors, who were supposed to pursue the civil
aspect of a criminal case, is not necessary and is without basis.
When the civil action is instituted with the criminal action, evidence should
be taken of the damages claimed and the court should determine who are
the persons entitled to such indemnity. The civil liability arising from the
crime may be determined in the criminal proceedings if the offended party
does not waive to have it adjudged or does not reserve the right to
institute a separate civil action against the defendant. Accordingly, if there
is no waiver or reservation of civil liability, evidence should be allowed to
establish the extent of injuries suffered.
In the case before us, there was neither a waiver nor a reservation made;
nor did the offended party institute a separate civil action. It follows that
evidence should be allowed in the criminal proceedings to establish the
civil liability arising from the offense committed, and the private offended
party has the right to intervene through the private prosecutors.
(Emphasis supplied; citations omitted.)
In the light of the foregoing, we hold that the CA did not err in holding that
the MeTC committed no grave abuse of discretion when it denied
petitioners motion to exclude Atty. Macam as private prosecutor in Crim.
Case Nos. 352270-71 CR.

Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Hon. Hontanosas, et. al.


G.R. No. 157163, August 25, 2014

Facts:
(1)Respondent Spouses Borbon, Spouses Xerxes, Erlinda
Facultad , XM Facultad and Development Corporation, as solidary
debtors, executed promissory notes, real estate mortgage on parcels of
land, continuing surety agreement and chattel mortgages on their
Mitsubishi Pajero in favor of BPI, for a loan extended to them..
(2)Respondents obligation amounted to P17, 983,191.49 but they were
only able to pay P13 Million.
(3) As security, petitioner BPI required them to issue postdated
checks to cover the loan under threat of foreclosing on the mortgages.
(3) Respondents immediately filed a case before the RTC to
declare the notes and mortgages void and to obtain a TRO to stay the
threatened foreclosure. In response, BPI claimed that foreclosure was
within its legal right to do.
(4) RTC grants the TRO, thereby staying the foreclosure and the
use of questioned post-dated checks as evidence for the filing of
complaint x x x for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, while the
present case is pending litigation.
(5) CA uphelds RTC decision.

Issue:
Whether or not BPI may continue with the foreclosure and use the
postdated checks as evidence for the filing of a criminal case on the
ground that the preliminary injunction is erroneously issued.
Held:
Yes, BPI may continue with the foreclosure and use the postdated
checks as evidence for the filing of a criminal case on the ground that the
preliminary injunction is erroneously issued.
A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an
action prior to the judgment or final order requiring a party or a court,

agency or a person to refrain from a particular act or acts. It is the strong


arm of equity, an extraordinary peremptory remedy that must be used
with extreme caution, affecting as it does the respective rights of the
parties.
The grounds for the issuance of a preliminary injunction are
provided for under Sec. 3, Rule 58, of the Rules of Court:
(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded,
and the whole or part of such relief consists in restraining
the commission or continuance of the act or acts
complained of, or in requiring the performance of an act or
acts, either for a limited period or perpetually;
(b) That the commission, continuance or non-performance
of the act or acts complained of during the litigation would
probably work injustice to the applicant; or
(c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing,
threatening, or is attempting to do, or is procuring or
suffering to be done, some act or acts probably in violation
of the rights of the applicant respecting the subject of the
action or proceeding, and tending to render the judgment
ineffectual.
To issue, (a) the right to be protected must exist prima facie; (b)
the act sought to be enjoined is violative of that right; and (c) there must
be an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious
damage.
The issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction was improper.
They had admittedly constituted the real estate and chattel mortgages to
secure the performance of their loan obligation to BPI, and, as such, they
were fully aware of the consequences on their rights in the properties
given as collaterals should the loan secured be unpaid. The foreclosure of
the mortgages would be the remedy provided by law for the mortgagee to
exact payment. In fact, they did not dispute BPIs allegations that they had
not fully paid their obligation, and that they filed the case to stave off the
impending foreclosure of the mortgages based on their claim that they
had been compelled to sign pre-printed agreements.
As a general rule, the courts will not issue writs of prohibition or
injunction whether preliminary or final in order to enjoin or restrain any

criminal prosecution. But there are extreme cases in which exceptions to


the general rule have been recognized, including:
(1) when the injunction is necessary to afford adequate protection
to the constitutional rights of the accused;
(2) when it is necessary for the orderly administration of justice or
to avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions;
(3) when there is a prejudicial question that is sub judice;
(4) when the acts of the officer are without or in excess of
authority;
(5) when the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or
regulation;
(6) when double jeopardy is clearly apparent;
(7) when the court has no jurisdiction over the offense;
(8) when it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution;
(9) when the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the
lust for vengeance; and
(10) when there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused
and a motion to quash on that ground has been denied. However,
the respondents did not sufficiently show that their case came
under any of the foregoing exceptions.

Department of Justice v. Alaon, G.R. No. 189596, April 23, 2014


DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE v. TEODULO NANO ALAON
G.R. No. 189596, 23 April 2014
Facts:
Teodulo was charged before the Provincial Prosecutor of
Camarines Norte for alleged Rape on three occasions by AAA, a minor.
After the requisite preliminary investigation where Teodulo was charged
with rape, but filed a motion for reconsideration thereof, the provincial
prosecutor charged Teodulo with acts of lasciviousness instead of rape.
The corresponding Information was filed before the Regional Trial Court
presided by Judge Leo. Unknown to Teodulo, BBB, the mother of AAA
sent a letter to the Secretary of Justice narrating what happened to AAA,
who allegedly suffers from an intellectual disability. Thus, the Secretary of
Justice ordered the Provincial Prosecutor to forward the entire records of
the case and to defer the filing of the Information against Teodulo.
Thus, the assistant provincial prosecutor, on a mistaken belief that
Teodulo filed a petition for review with the DOJ, requested the withdrawal
of the information against Teodulo. While the judge found probable cause
with the Information filed, he took into consideration Prosecutor
Estrellados letter and suspended the proceedings. He also ordered
Estrellado to submit a copy of Teodulos petition for review. When
Prosecutor Estrellado realised his mistake, he filed a Manifestation before
the RTC that Teodulo did not in fact file a Petition for Review but was
merely informed by BBB that they sought the assistance of the DOJ
Secretary by way of the letter.
Alarmed at this development, Teodulo moved to lift the suspension
of proceedings and his arraignment on the charge for acts of
lasciviousness set, invoking his right to speedy trial. The RTC granted the
motion. Prosecutor Estrellado, confused, withdrew his appearance before
the case, in view of the directive by the DOJ. The RTC denied this order,
citing that withdrawal of appearance is not a proper remedy. The
prosecutor then filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings which the RTC
also denied and set the case for pre-trial.
Meantime, at the Department of Justice, the review process ended
in the DOJ reversing the earlier finding of acts of lasciviousness and
directing the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor to file a case for rape
against Teodulo. Teodulo thus filed a petition for certiorari with the Court
of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals ruled that the review of the resolution by the
Secretary of Justice did not go through the appeals process mandated by
the DOJ, thus it should not have been treated as a petition for review. The
review therefore was made with grave abuse of discretion.
The Secretary of Justice elevated the case to the Supreme Court,
invoking its power of review over the orders and resolutions of the
provincial and city prosecutors. Further, Teodulo was charged with notice
of the letter of BBB which they treated as a petition for review.
Issue:
Whether or not the secretary of justice acted with grave abuse of
discretion denying alaon of procedural due process?
Held:
Yes.
The conduct of preliminary investigation is subject to the
requirements of both substantive and procedural due process.
Preliminary investigation is considered as a judicial proceeding wherein
the prosecutor or investigating officer, by the nature of his functions, acts
as a quasi-judicial officer. Even at the stage of petition for review before
the Secretary of Justice, the requirements for substantive and procedural
due process do not abate.
What Alaon eventually learned is that the records of I.S. No. 200210728 were with the Secretary of Justice for his review. Alaon cannot be
charged with notice that the Secretary of Justice had treated the letter of
BBB as a petition for review. Notice in this case, as a function of an
opportunity to be heard, a component of procedural due process, was not
met. Once the Secretary of Justice decided to treat the letter of BBB as
an appeal, he should have required Alaon to comment thereon. Even if
the letter did not comply with the requirements for an appeal under the
2000 National Prosecution Service Rules on Appeal, indeed, precisely for
such reason, the Secretary of Justice was duty-bound, as the one hearing
the case, to afford Alaon, respondent therein, an opportunity to be heard
to satisfy procedural due process. On this score, the DOJ abused its
discretion when it rode roughshod over Alaons rights as it accommodated
private complainant.
With our holding that the Secretary of Justice acted in excess of
jurisdiction when he failed to afford Alaon an opportunity to be heard on
private complainants letter which he deemed as a petition for review, we

affirm the appellate courts issuance of the special writ of certiorari,


annulling the 18 March 2008 Resolution of the DOJ.

People vs. Go, G.R. No. 201644, September 24, 2014


PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner v. JOSE C. GO and AIDA C.
DELA ROSA, respondents
G.R. No. 201644, 24 September 2014
Facts:
On September 28, 2000, seven (7) Informations, instituted by
private complainant Philippine Deposit Isuarnce Corporation (PDIC), were
filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) against various accused
including Go and Dela Rosa (respondents) for charges of Estafa through
Falsification of Commercial Documents for allegedly defrauding Orient
Commercial Banking Corporation of the amount of Php 159,000,000.00.
The trial of the case, however, was successively postponed by the
prosecution, consequently resulted to its inability to finish its presentation
of evidence despite the lapse of almost five (5) years.
On December 11, 2007, filed a Motion to Dismiss for failure to
prosecute and for violation of their right to speedy trial. RTC, then,
dismissed the criminal cases on the ground of violation of the
respondents right to speedy trial. The prosecution, however, moved for
reconsideration dated December 10, 2008, which caused the
reinstatement of the criminal charges against the respondents.
Subsequently, the respondents had the case moved for reconsideration
but was denied by the RTC which prompted them to file a petion for
certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA).
A copy of the petition was served, however, only on the private
complainant PCID and not the People of the Philippines, through the
Office of the Solicitor General, as well as not even impleaded as party to
the case.
In a decision dated September 28, 2011, the CA, without first
ordering the respondents to implead the People, annulled and set aside
the assailed orders of the RTC and dismissed the criminal cases. The
PDIC moved for reconsideration but was denied thus the instant case.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) argued that the People was not
impleaded thereby violating its right to due process of law, therefore
constituting grave abuse of discretion on the part of CA.
Issue:
Whether or not the criminal cases against respondents were
properly dismissed by the CA on certiorari, without the People, as
represented by the OSG having been impleaded.
Held:
No. In Vda. De Manguerra v. Risos, the Court held that as
provided by Section 5, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal

Procedure, all criminal actions are prosecuted under the direction and
control of the public prosecutor. Therefore, it be appropriate for the
respondents, in this instant case, to implead the People of the Philippines
as an indispensable party.
Although the failure to implead an indispensable party is not per se a
ground for dismissal of an action as the said parties may be added at any
stage, it is, however, essential that any indispensable party be impleaded
in the proceedings before the court renders judgment.

Cristina Perez, petitioner vs. Hagonoy Rural Bank, Inc., and Hon.
Court of Appeals, respondents. G.R. No. 126210. March 9, 2000. 327
SCRA 588
Second Division. De Leon, Jr., J.
Facts:
(1) Hagonoy Rural Bank, Inc. (private respondent) owns the
Hagonoy Money Shop which employed Cristina O. Perez (petitioner) as
Officer-In-Charge, Cashier and Teller, Alberto S. Fabian as Bookkeeper,
and Cristina Medina and Milagros Martin as Solicitors/Field Managers.
(2) For the period starling August 3, 1992 up to December 5,
1993, the Laya, Manabat, Salgado and Company, an independent
management, consultancy and accounting firm, conducted an audit of the
financial affairs of the Hagonoy Money Shop.
(3) The auditing firm found anomalies in more or less 28 savings
accounts consisting of withdrawals which were recorded in the subsidiary
ledgers of the money shop but not in the passbooks which were in the
possession of the depositors. Although these withdrawals were supported
by withdrawal slips, the signatures appearing thereon were noticeably
different from the sample signatures written by the bona fide depositors in
their specimen signature cards and/or in the subsidiary ledgers. The audit
also revealed that to cover-up the anomalous withdrawals, fake deposits
were recorded in the money shops subsidiary ledgers whenever the
remaining balance in a particular savings account was depleted below the
amount of legitimate withdrawals made by a depositor.
(4) The discovery of the above-mentioned anomalies prompted
the private respondent to file an affidavit-complaint for estafa against the
aforementioned employees of the money shop and two outsiders, Susan
Jordan and Brigida Mangahas.
(5) On February 18, 1994, Acting Provincial Prosecutor, Jesus Y.
Manarang (prosecutor), issued a resolution finding prima facie evidence
that the petitioner and her co-employees, Alberto Fabian, Cristina Medina
and Milagros Martin had committed the crime of estafa thru falsification of
commercial documents, and recommending the filing of the
corresponding information against them with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan. The charges against Susan Jordan and
Brigida Mangahas were, however, dismissed.
(6) Aggrieved by the said resolution, petitioner filed a petition for
review with the Secretary of Justice praying for the dismissal of the
charges against her. On the other hand, private respondent moved for a
reconsideration of the portion of the same resolution dismissing the
complaint against Susan Jordan.

(7) In a resolution dated April 19, 1994, the prosecutor granted


private respondents motion for reconsideration. Hence, on April 27, 1994,
an information for estafa thru falsification of commercial documents was
filed against herein petitioner, Alberto Fabian, Milagros Martin, Cristina
Medina and Susan Jordan, and docketed as Criminal Case No. 1604-M94 in the RTC.
(8) On September 23, 1994, then Secretary of Justice, Franklin M.
Drilon, issued Resolution No. 696, series of 1994 ordering the prosecutor
to cause the dismissal of the information against petitioner on the ground
of insufficient evidence.
(9) The private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the
order of the Secretary of Justice, which motion, however, was denied with
finality by the latter.
(10) Pursuant to the said directive of the Secretary of Justice, the
prosecutor filed a motion in the RTC praying for the dismissal of the case
against herein petitioner and the admission of an amended information
excluding petitioner as one of the accused in Criminal Case No. 1604-M94.
(11) On January 13, 1995, presiding Judge D. Roy A. Masadao of
the said court granted the said motion.
(12) Private respondent assailed the dismissal of the case against
the petitioner in a motion for reconsideration filed in the RTC. However,
the RTC denied the said motion in an Order dated February 21, 1995
after finding that the private respondent, as private complainant, had no
legal personality to question the dismissal of the criminal charges against
the petitioner.
(13) Alleging that Judge Masadao had issued the said order with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, private
respondent filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with a prayer for
the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary
injunction with the Court of Appeals (CA).
(14) On February 23, 1996, the CA rendered a decision annulling
and setting aside the assailed Order of February 21, 1995 and directing
Judge Masadao to resolve with dispatch the private respondents motion
for reconsideration on the basis of its merit or lack thereof.
Issue:
(1) Whether or not Judge Masadao committed grave abuse of
discretion in granting the prosecutors motion to dismiss the criminal case
against petitioner without an independent assessment of the sufficiency or
insufficiency of the evidence against the latter.

(2) Whether or not the private respondent, as private complainant,


in a criminal case has the legal personality to question the dismissal by
the trial judge of the criminal charges against petitioner upon the motion
filed by the prosecutor.
(3) Whether or not the dismissal of the charges against the
petitioner is warranted by the evidence at hand.
Held:
(1) Yes. Judge Masadao acted with grave abuse of discretion in
granting the prosecutors motion to dismiss the criminal charges against
the petitioner on the basis solely of the recommendation of the Secretary
of Justice. Judge Masadaos reliance on the prosecutors averment that
the Secretary of Justice had recommended the dismissal of the case
against the petitioner was, an abdication of the trial courts duty and
jurisdiction to determine a prima facie case, in blatant violation of the
Supreme Courts (SC) pronouncement in Crespo v. Mogul as reiterated in
the later case of Martinez v. Court of Appeals, to wit:
The trial judge must himself be convinced that there
was indeed no sufficient evidence against the accused,
and this conclusion can be arrived at only after an
assessment of the evidence in the possession of the
prosecution. What was imperatively required was the trial
judges own assessment of such evidence, it not being
sufficient for the valid and proper exercise of judicial
discretion merely to accept the prosecutions word for its
supposed insufficiency.
Judge Masadao categorically declined to pass upon the merits of
the private respondents motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of the
criminal case against the petitioner, and chose to summarily deny the
same on the ground of the private respondents lack of personality to
revive the criminal charges against the petitioner.
(2) Yes. The private respondent, as private complainant, had legal
personality to assail the dismissal of the criminal case against the
petitioner on the ground that the order of dismissal was issued with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In the case
of Dela Rosa v. Court of Appeals, the SC held that:
In a special civil action for certiorari filed under
Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court wherein it is
alleged that the trial court committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction or on other
jurisdictional grounds, the rules state that the petition may
be filed by the person aggrieved. In such case, the
aggrieved parties are the State and the private offended

party or complainant. The complainant has an interest in


the civil aspect of the case so he may file such special civil
action questioning the decision or action of the respondent
court on jurisdictional grounds. In so doing, the
complainant should not bring the action in the name of the
People of the Philippines. The action may be prosecuted in
the name of the said complainant.
Thus, while it is only the Solicitor General that may bring or defend
actions on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, or represent the
People or State in criminal proceedings pending in the SC and the CA,
the private offended party retains the right to bring a special civil action for
certiorari in his own name in criminal proceedings before the courts of
law.
It follows, therefore, that if the private respondent in this case may
file a special civil action for certiorari, then with more reason does it have
legal personality to move for a reconsideration of the order of the trial
court dismissing the criminal charges against the petitioner. In fact, as a
general rule, a special civil action will not lie unless a motion for
reconsideration is first filed before the respondent tribunal, to allow it an
opportunity to correct its assigned errors.
(3) As a general rule, the determination of probable cause is not
lodged with the SC. Its duty in an appropriate case is confined to the
issue of whether the executive or judicial determination, as the case may
be, of probable cause was done without or in excess of jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to want of jurisdiction. This is
consistent with the general rule that criminal prosecutions may not be
restrained or stayed by injunction, preliminary or final.

Cristina Perez, petitioner vs. Hagonoy Rural Bank, Inc., and Hon.
Court of Appeals, respondents. G.R. No. 126210. March 9, 2000. 327
SCRA 588
Second Division. De Leon, Jr., J.
Facts:
(1) Hagonoy Rural Bank, Inc. (private respondent) owns the
Hagonoy Money Shop which employed Cristina O. Perez (petitioner) as
Officer-In-Charge, Cashier and Teller, Alberto S. Fabian as Bookkeeper,
and Cristina Medina and Milagros Martin as Solicitors/Field Managers.
(2) For the period starling August 3, 1992 up to December 5,
1993, the Laya, Manabat, Salgado and Company, an independent
management, consultancy and accounting firm, conducted an audit of the
financial affairs of the Hagonoy Money Shop.
(3) The auditing firm found anomalies in more or less 28 savings
accounts consisting of withdrawals which were recorded in the subsidiary
ledgers of the money shop but not in the passbooks which were in the
possession of the depositors. Although these withdrawals were supported
by withdrawal slips, the signatures appearing thereon were noticeably
different from the sample signatures written by the bona fide depositors in
their specimen signature cards and/or in the subsidiary ledgers. The audit
also revealed that to cover-up the anomalous withdrawals, fake deposits
were recorded in the money shops subsidiary ledgers whenever the
remaining balance in a particular savings account was depleted below the
amount of legitimate withdrawals made by a depositor.
(4) The discovery of the above-mentioned anomalies prompted
the private respondent to file an affidavit-complaint for estafa against the
aforementioned employees of the money shop and two outsiders, Susan
Jordan and Brigida Mangahas.
(5) On February 18, 1994, Acting Provincial Prosecutor, Jesus Y.
Manarang (prosecutor), issued a resolution finding prima facie evidence
that the petitioner and her co-employees, Alberto Fabian, Cristina Medina
and Milagros Martin had committed the crime of estafa thru falsification of
commercial documents, and recommending the filing of the
corresponding information against them with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan. The charges against Susan Jordan and
Brigida Mangahas were, however, dismissed.
(6) Aggrieved by the said resolution, petitioner filed a petition for
review with the Secretary of Justice praying for the dismissal of the
charges against her. On the other hand, private respondent moved for a
reconsideration of the portion of the same resolution dismissing the
complaint against Susan Jordan.

(7) In a resolution dated April 19, 1994, the prosecutor granted


private respondents motion for reconsideration. Hence, on April 27, 1994,
an information for estafa thru falsification of commercial documents was
filed against herein petitioner, Alberto Fabian, Milagros Martin, Cristina
Medina and Susan Jordan, and docketed as Criminal Case No. 1604-M94 in the RTC.
(8) On September 23, 1994, then Secretary of Justice, Franklin M.
Drilon, issued Resolution No. 696, series of 1994 ordering the prosecutor
to cause the dismissal of the information against petitioner on the ground
of insufficient evidence.
(9) The private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the
order of the Secretary of Justice, which motion, however, was denied with
finality by the latter.
(10) Pursuant to the said directive of the Secretary of Justice, the
prosecutor filed a motion in the RTC praying for the dismissal of the case
against herein petitioner and the admission of an amended information
excluding petitioner as one of the accused in Criminal Case No. 1604-M94.
(11) On January 13, 1995, presiding Judge D. Roy A. Masadao of
the said court granted the said motion.
(12) Private respondent assailed the dismissal of the case against
the petitioner in a motion for reconsideration filed in the RTC. However,
the RTC denied the said motion in an Order dated February 21, 1995
after finding that the private respondent, as private complainant, had no
legal personality to question the dismissal of the criminal charges against
the petitioner.
(13) Alleging that Judge Masadao had issued the said order with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, private
respondent filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with a prayer for
the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary
injunction with the Court of Appeals (CA).
(14) On February 23, 1996, the CA rendered a decision annulling
and setting aside the assailed Order of February 21, 1995 and directing
Judge Masadao to resolve with dispatch the private respondents motion
for reconsideration on the basis of its merit or lack thereof.
Issue: (1) Whether or not Judge Masadao committed grave
abuse of discretion in granting the prosecutors motion to dismiss the
criminal case against petitioner without an independent assessment of
the sufficiency or insufficiency of the evidence against the latter.

(2) Whether or not the private respondent, as private complainant,


in a criminal case has the legal personality to question the dismissal by
the trial judge of the criminal charges against petitioner upon the motion
filed by the prosecutor.
(3) Whether or not the dismissal of the charges against the
petitioner is warranted by the evidence at hand.
Ruling: (1) Yes. Judge Masadao acted with grave abuse of
discretion in granting the prosecutors motion to dismiss the criminal
charges against the petitioner on the basis solely of the recommendation
of the Secretary of Justice. Judge Masadaos reliance on the prosecutors
averment that the Secretary of Justice had recommended the dismissal of
the case against the petitioner was, an abdication of the trial courts duty
and jurisdiction to determine a prima facie case, in blatant violation of the
Supreme Courts (SC) pronouncement in Crespo v. Mogul as reiterated in
the later case of Martinez v. Court of Appeals, to wit:
The trial judge must himself be convinced that there
was indeed no sufficient evidence against the accused,
and this conclusion can be arrived at only after an
assessment of the evidence in the possession of the
prosecution. What was imperatively required was the trial
judges own assessment of such evidence, it not being
sufficient for the valid and proper exercise of judicial
discretion merely to accept the prosecutions word for its
supposed insufficiency.
Judge Masadao categorically declined to pass upon the merits of
the private respondents motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of the
criminal case against the petitioner, and chose to summarily deny the
same on the ground of the private respondents lack of personality to
revive the criminal charges against the petitioner.
(2) Yes. The private respondent, as private complainant, had legal
personality to assail the dismissal of the criminal case against the
petitioner on the ground that the order of dismissal was issued with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In the case
of Dela Rosa v. Court of Appeals, the SC held that:
In a special civil action for certiorari filed under
Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court wherein it is
alleged that the trial court committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction or on other
jurisdictional grounds, the rules state that the petition may
be filed by the person aggrieved. In such case, the
aggrieved parties are the State and the private offended
party or complainant. The complainant has an interest in

the civil aspect of the case so he may file such special civil
action questioning the decision or action of the respondent
court on jurisdictional grounds. In so doing, the
complainant should not bring the action in the name of the
People of the Philippines. The action may be prosecuted in
the name of the said complainant.
Thus, while it is only the Solicitor General that may bring or defend
actions on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, or represent the
People or State in criminal proceedings pending in the SC and the CA,
the private offended party retains the right to bring a special civil action for
certiorari in his own name in criminal proceedings before the courts of
law.
It follows, therefore, that if the private respondent in this case may
file a special civil action for certiorari, then with more reason does it have
legal personality to move for a reconsideration of the order of the trial
court dismissing the criminal charges against the petitioner. In fact, as a
general rule, a special civil action will not lie unless a motion for
reconsideration is first filed before the respondent tribunal, to allow it an
opportunity to correct its assigned errors.
(3) As a general rule, the determination of probable cause is not
lodged with the SC. Its duty in an appropriate case is confined to the
issue of whether the executive or judicial determination, as the case may
be, of probable cause was done without or in excess of jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to want of jurisdiction. This is
consistent with the general rule that criminal prosecutions may not be
restrained or stayed by injunction, preliminary or final.

Ejercito vs COMELEC
Facts:
Contested in this petition for certiorari is the May 21, 2014
Resolutio1 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) which affirmed
the September 26, 2013 Resolution2 of the COMELEC First Division
granting the petition for disqualification filed by private respondent Edgar
"Egay" S. San Luis (San Luis) against petitioner Emilio Ramon "E.R." P.
Ejercito (Ejercito).
Three days prior to the May 13, 2013 National and Local
Elections, a petition for disqualification was filed by San Luis before the
Office of the COMELEC Clerk in Manila against Ejercito, who was a fellow
gubernatorial candidate and, at the time, the incumbent Governor of the
Province of Laguna
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION:
1.Ejercito], during the campaign period for 2013 local election, distributed
"Orange Card" with an intent to influence, induce or corrupt the voters in
voting for his favor. This could be used in any public hospital within the
Province of Laguna for their medical needs .
2.The so-called "Orange Card" is considered a material consideration in
convincing the voters to cast their votes for [Ejercitos] favor in clear
violation of the provision of the Omnibus Election Code
Consequently, Ejercito should be disqualified.
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION:
1. A candidate for the position of Provincial Governor of Laguna is
only authorized to incur an election expense amounting to FOUR
MILLION FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTY-SIX THOUSAND FIVE
HUNDRED SIXTY-SIX (P4,576,566.00) PESOS. However, in total
disregard and violation of the afore-quoted provision of law,
[Ejercito] exceeded his expenditures in relation to his campaign for
the 2013 election. For television campaign commercials alone,
[Ejercito] already spent the sum of PhP23,730.784 based on our
partys official monitoring
In view of the foregoing disquisitions, it is evident that [Ejercito]
committed an election offense as provided for under Section 35 of
COMELEC Resolution No. 9615, which provides :

Election Offense. Any violation of R.A. No. 9006 and these Rules shall
constitute an election offense punishable under the first and second
paragraph of Section 264 of the Omnibus Election Code in addition to
administrative liability
Moreover, it is crystal clear that [Ejercito] violated Sec. 68 of the Omnibus
Election Code which provides:
Sec. 68. Disqualifications. Any candidate who, in an action or protest in
which he is a party is declared by final decision by a competent court
guilty of, or found by the Commission of having (a) given money or other
material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public
officials performing electoral functions; (b) committed acts of terrorism to
enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in his election campaign an amount in
excess of that allowed by this Code; (d) solicited, received or made any
contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or (e)
violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86, and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v,
and cc, subparagraph 6, shall be disqualified from continuing asa
candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the office. Any person
who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall
not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless said
person has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a
foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement provided for
in the election laws.
On the other hand, the effect of disqualification is provided under
Sec. 6 of Republic Act No. 6646, which states and I quote:
Effect of Disqualification Case. Any candidate who has been
declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and
the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate
is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and
he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election,
the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the
action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any
intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the
proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of [his] guilt is
strong.
Issue:
Whether or not Ejercito be disqualified.
Held:
Yes. In tracing the legislative history of Sections 100, 101, and 103
of the OEC, it can be said, therefore, that the intent of our lawmakers has
been consistent through the years: to regulate not just the election
expenses
of
the
candidate
but
also
of
his
or
her
contributor/supporter/donor as well as by including in the aggregate limit

of the formers election expenses those incurred by the latter. The phrase
"those incurred or caused to be incurred by the candidate"is sufficiently
adequate to cover those expenses which are contributed or donated in
the candidates behalf. By virtue of the legal requirement that a
contribution or donation should bear the written conformity of the
candidate, a contributor/supporter/donor certainly qualifies as "any person
authorized by such candidate or treasurer." Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos
distinguere debemus.126 (Where the law does not distinguish, neither
should We.) There should be no distinction in the application of a law
where none is indicated.
The inclusion of the amount contributed by a donor to the
candidates allowable limit of election expenses does not trample upon
the free exercise of the voters rights of speech and of expression under
Section 4, Artticle III of the Constitution. As a content-neutral regulation,
the laws concern is not to curtail the message or content of the
advertisement promoting a particular candidate but to ensure equality
between and among aspirants with "deep pockets" and those with less
financial resources. Any restriction on speech or expression is only
incidentaland is no more than necessary to achieve the substantial
governmental interest of promoting equality of opportunity in political
advertising. It bears a clear and reasonable connection with the
constitutional objectives set out in Section 26, Article II, Section 4, Article
IX-C, and Section 1, Art. XIII of the Constitution.
The conduct of preliminary investigation is not required in the
resolution of the electoral aspect of a disqualification case
Assuming, arguendo, that San Luis petition was properly instituted as an
action for disqualification, Ejercito asserts that the conduct of preliminary
investigation to determine whether the acts enumerated under Section 68
of the OEC were indeed committed is a requirement prior to actual
disqualification. He posits that Section 5, Rule 25 of COMELEC
Resolution No. 9523 is silent on the matter of preliminary investigation;
hence, the clear import of this is that the necessity of preliminary
investigation provided for in COMELEC Resolution No. 2050 remains
undisturbed and continues to be in full force and effect.
We are not persuaded.
Section 5, Rule 25 of COMELEC Resolution No. 9523 states:
Section 5. Effect of Petition if Unresolved Before Completion of
Canvass. If a Petition for Disqualification is unresolved by final
judgment on the day of elections, the petitioner may file a motion with the

Division or Commission En Banc where the case is pending, to suspend


the proclamation of the candidate concerned, provided that the evidence
for the grounds to disqualify is strong. For this purpose, at least three (3)
days prior to any election, the Clerk of the Commission shall prepare a list
of pending cases and furnish all Commissioners copies of said the list.
In the event that a candidate with an existing and pending Petition to
disqualify is proclaimed winner, the Commission shall continue to resolve
the said Petition.
It is expected that COMELEC Resolution No. 9523 is silent on the
conduct of preliminary investigation because it merely amended, among
others, Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, which deals with
disqualification of candidates. In disqualification cases, the COMELEC
may designate any of its officials, who are members of the Philippine Bar,
to hear the case and to receive evidence only in cases involving barangay
officials.59 As aforementioned, the present rules of procedure in the
investigation and prosecution of election offenses in the COMELEC,
which requires preliminary investigation, is governed by COMELEC
Resolution No. 9386. Under said Resolution, all lawyers in the COMELEC
who are Election Officers in the National Capital Region ("NCR"),
Provincial Election Supervisors, Regional Election Attorneys, Assistant
Regional Election Directors, Regional Election Directors and lawyers of
the Law Department are authorized to conduct preliminary investigation of
complaints involving election offenses under the election laws which may
be filed directly with them, or which may be indorsed to them by the
COMELEC.
Clearly, the legislative intent is that the COMELEC should
continue the trial and hearing of the disqualification case to its
conclusion, i.e., until judgment is rendered thereon. The word shall
signifies that this requirement of the law is mandatory, operating to
impose a positive duty which must be enforced. The implication is that the
COMELEC is left with no discretion but to proceed with the
disqualification case even after the election. Thus, in providing for the
outright dismissal of the disqualification case which remains unresolved
after the election, Silvestre v. Duavit in effect disallows what RA No. 6646
imperatively requires. This amounts to a quasi-judicial legislation by the
COMELEC which cannot be countenanced and is invalid for having been
issued beyond the scope of its authority. Interpretative rulings of quasijudicial bodies or administrative agencies must always be in perfect
harmony with statutes and should be for the sole purpose of carrying their
general provisions into effect. By such interpretative or administrative

rulings, of course, the scope of the law itself cannot be limited. Indeed, a
quasi-judicial body or an administrative agency for that matter cannot
amend an act of Congress. Hence, in case of a discrepancy between the
basic law and an interpretative or administrative ruling, the basic law
prevails.

Enrile Vs. Manalastas


G.R. No. 166414
Doctrine:
The remedy against the denial of a motion to quash is for the
movant accused to enter a plea, go to trial, and should the decision be
adverse, reiterate on appeal from the final judgment and assign as error
the denial of the motion to quash. The denial, being an interlocutory order,
is not appealable, and may not be the subject of a petition for certiorari
because of the availability of other remedies in the ordinary course of law.
Facts:
The mauling incident involving neighbors gave rise to the issue
subject of this appeal. Claiming themselves to be the victims in that
mauling, Josefina Guinto Morano, Rommel Morano and Perla Beltran
Morano charged the petitioners and one Alfredo Enrile in the MTC with
frustrated homicide (victim being Rommel); with less serious physical
injuries (victim being Josefina); and with less serious physical injuries
(victim being Perla). After the parties submitted their respective affidavits,
the MTC issued its joint resolution whereby it found probable cause
against the petitioners for less serious physical injuries and set their
arraignment.The petitioners moved for the reconsideration of the joint
resolution, arguing that the complainants had not presented proof of their
having been given medical attention lasting 10 days or longer, thereby
rendering their charges of less serious physical injuries dismissible; and
that the two cases for less serious physical injuries, being necessarily
related to the case of frustrated homicide still pending in the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor, should not be governed by the Rules on Summary
Procedure.MTC denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration
because the grounds of the motion had already been discussed and
passed upon in the resolution sought to be reconsidered; and because
the cases were governed by the Rules on Summary Procedure, which
prohibited the motion for reconsideration.Thereafter, the petitioners
presented a manifestation with motion to quash and a motion for the
deferment of the arraignment which was however denied by the MTC on
the grounds that issues raised therein are matters of defense that can be
fully ventilated in a full blown trial on the merits. Upon petition for
certiorari, both the RTC and the CA rejected the motion of the petitioners.

Issue:
1. Whether or not the denial of a motion to quash may be the subject
matter of a petition for certiorari.
2. Whether or not the MTC committed grave abuse of discretion in
the denial of said motion to quash.

Held:
1. No. The remedy against the denial of a motion to quash is for the
movant accused to enter a plea, go to trial, and should the
decision be adverse, reiterate on appeal from the final judgment
and assign as error the denial of the motion to quash. The denial,
being an interlocutory order, is not appealable, and may not be the
subject of a petition for certiorari because of the availability of
other remedies in the ordinary course of law.
2. No. A motion to quash is the mode by which an accused, before
entering his plea, challenges the complaint or information for
insufficiency on its face in point of law, or for defects apparent on
its face. According to Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court,
the complaint or information is sufficient if it states the names of
the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute;
the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense;
the name of the offended party; the approximate date of the
commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was
committed. The fundamental test in determining the sufficiency of
the averments in a complaint or information is, therefore, whether
the facts alleged therein, if hypothetically admitted, constitute the
elements of the offense. In the context of Section 6, Rule 110 of
the Rules of Court, the complaints sufficiently charged the
petitioners with less serious physical injuries. Indeed, the
complaints only needed to aver the ultimate facts constituting the
offense, not the details of why and how the illegal acts allegedly
amounted to undue injury or damage, for such matters, being
evidentiary, were appropriate for a trial on the merits. Hence, the
complaints were not quashable.

FELINA ROSALDES, Petitioner,


vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
G.R. No. 173988
October 8, 2014
FACTS : Felina Rosaldes (petitioner), a public school teacher, was
charged with child abuse or violation of RA No. 7610, by Michael Ryan
Gonzales, a grade one pupil whom she maltreated. On Feb. 3, 1996,
when Michael Ryan was hurriedly entering his classroom, he accidentally
bumped the knee of his teacher, Felina Rosaldes, who was then asleep
on a bamboo sofa. Roused from sleep, petitioner asked Michael Ryan to
apologize to her. When Michael did not obey but instead proceeded to his
seat, petitioner went to Michael and pinched him on his thigh. Then, she
held him up by his armpits and pushed him to the floor. As he fell, Michael
Ryans body hit a desk. As a result, he lost consciousness. Petitioner
proceeded to pick Michael Ryan up by his ears and repeatedly slammed
him down on the floor. Michael Ryan cried.
The petitioner was charged with child abuse in the Regional Trial
Court of Iloilo where she was found guilty. The Court of Appeals affirmed
the RTCs decision with modification of the penalty.
ISSUE : WON the information charging the petitioner with child abuse
insufficient in form and substance, in that the essential elements of the
crime charged were not properly alleged therein
HELD : No. The information set is not in insufficient.
Sec. 6 Rule 110. Sufficiency of complaint or information- A
complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused;
the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts
or
omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the
offended party; the proximate date of the commission of the offense;
and the place where the offense was
committed.
xxxxxxx
The information explicitly averred the offense of child abuse
charged against the petitioner in the context of the statutory definition of
child abuse found in Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. 7610, supra, and
thus complied with the requirements of Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules
of Court. Moreover, the Court should no longer entertain the petitioners
challenge against the sufficiency of the information in form and
substance. Her last chance to pose the challenge was prior to the time
she pleaded to the information through a motion to quash on the ground
that the information did not conform substantially to the prescribed form,
or did not charge an offense. She did not do so, resulting in her waiver of
the challenge.

** RTC and CA did not grant civil liability to the accused. Even without
proof of the actual expenses, or testimony on the victims feelings, the
lower courts still had the authority to define and allow civil liability arising
from the offense and the means to fix their extent. The child abuse surely
inflicted on Michael Ryan physical and emotional trauma as well as moral
injury. It cannot also be denied that his parents necessarily spent for his
treatment. RTC and CA committed a plain error that demands correction
by the Court. Indeed, as the Court pointed out in Bacolod v. People, it was
"imperative that the courts prescribe the proper penalties when convicting
the accused, and determine the civil liability to be imposed on the
accused, unless there has been a reservation of the action to recover
civil liability or a waiver of its recovery.
Sec. 2 Rule 120. Content of the judgment.- If the judgment is of
conviction, it shall state (1) the
legal qualification of the offense
constituted by the acts committed by the accused and the aggravating or
mitigating circumstances which attended its commission; (2) the
participation of
the accused in the offense, whether as principal,
accomplice, or accessory after the fact; (3) the
penalty imposed upon
the accused; and (4) the civil liability or damages caused by his wrongful
act or omission to be recovered from the accused by the offended
party, if there is any, unless the enforcement of the civil liability by a
separate civil action has been reserved or waived.
xxxxx

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. LTSG. DOMINADOR


BAYABOS, et al.
G.R. Nos. 171222 & 174786, 18 February 2015, FIRST DIVISION,

(Sereno, C.J.)

The failure by school authorities to take any action to prevent the


offenses as provided by the law exposes them to criminal liability as
accomplices in the criminal acts. Thus, the institution and its officers
cannot stand idly by in the face of patently criminal acts committed within
their sphere of responsibility. They bear the commensurate duty to ensure
that the crimes covered by the Anti-Hazing Law are not committed.

Facts:
Fernando C. Balidoy, Jr. was admitted as a probationary midshipman at
the Philippine Merchant Marine Academy (PMMA). In order to reach
active status, all new entrants were required to successfully complete the
mandatory Indoctrination and Orientation Period, which was set from 2
May to 1 June 2001. Balidoy died on 3 May 2001. PMMA were criminally
charged before the Sandiganbayan as accomplices to hazing under the
Anti-Hazing Law. Before they were arraigned, the Sandiganbayan
quashed the Information against them on the basis of the dismissal of the
criminal case against the principal accused and, the failure to include in
the Information the material averments required by the Anti-Hazing Law.
Consequently, this petition was filed before this Court questioning the
Sandiganbayans quashal of the Information.

Issue:

May the dismissal of the criminal case of the principal accused be


invoked as a ground to dismiss the criminal case of the accomplices,
some school authorities herein?

Held:
No. That the case against those charged as accomplices is not ipso facto
dismissed in the absence of trial of the purported principals; the dismissal
of the case against the latter; or even the latters acquittal, especially
when the occurrence of the crime has in fact been established.

In the case of school authorities and faculty members who have had no
direct participation in the act, they may nonetheless be charged as
accomplices if it is shown that (1) hazing, as established by the above
elements, occurred; (2) the accused are school authorities or faculty
members; and (3) they consented to or failed to take preventive action
against hazing in spite actual knowledge thereof.

First, the Court rejects the contention of respondents that PMMA should
not be considered an organization. Under the Anti-Hazing Law, the
breadth of the term organization includes but is not limited to groups,
teams, fraternities, sororities, citizen army training corps, educational
institutions, clubs, societies, cooperatives, companies, partnerships,
corporations, the PNP, and the AFP. Attached to the Department of
Transportation and Communications, the PMMA is a government-owned
educational institution established for the primary purpose of producing
efficient and well-trained merchant marine officers. Clearly, it is included
in the term organization within the meaning of the law.

Nevertheless, the Court finds albeit for a different reason that the
Motion to Quash must be granted, as the Information does not include all
the material facts constituting the crime of accomplice to hazing. Failure
to aver this crucial ingredient would prevent the successful prosecution of
the criminal responsibility of the accused, either as principal or as
accomplice, for the crime of hazing.

SU ZHI SHAN @ ALVIN CHING SO vs. People of the Philippines


G.R. No. 169933
Facts:
The case stemmed from the violation of the accused of the
Dangerous Drugs Act, that the accused sold and delivered 495.3 grams
of shabu. Another complaint was filed for having in his possession
15,076.1 grams of shabu in his residence.
A buy-bust operation was conducted and the accused was brought into
custody by the PNP Narcotics Group.
The accused, denying that his name is Alvin Ching So or Su Zhi
Shan, claimed that he was a victim of hulidap. He gave the following
details of the circumstances attendant to his arrest:
After he withdrew P500,000 from Equitable Bank at Blumentritt,
Sta. Cruz, Manila on March 31, 2000, he was intercepted by unidentified
men somewhere along Blumentritt Street. He was immediately
blindfolded, forced into another car, and divested of his clutch bag
containing the P500,000 he had just withdrawn. He was then brought to
Camp Crame after which he was forced by his captors to repair to his
apartment and, over his protest, his room was searched.
However, the RTC found the accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of both drug pushing/selling and of possession.
Thus, he filed with the Supreme Court a Motion for
Reconsideration claiming that the lower courts erred in convicting him
when in fact they convicted the wrong person.
Issue:
Whether or not the lower courts erred in convicting the accused
despite his claim of not being the person described in the information?
Held:

No. Respecting petitioners disclaimer that he is the Su Zhi Shan


alias Alvin Ching So accused in the case, he contends that there is no
scintilla of evidence offered to prove that said accused is the same Su
Jing Yue alias So Alvin Cheng that he is. This contention falls in the face
of this Courts repeated rulings that the erroneous designation in the
Information of the name of the accused does not vitiate it if it is clearly
proven that the person accused and brought to court is the person who
committed the crime.
As People v. Navaja holds, whether there lived another person
with the same name as the accused in the area where the buy-bust
operation was conducted is immaterial, the identity of the therein accused
as the person who sold the marijuana to the poseur-buyers having been
established, as in the present case.
It bears noting that the information charging petitioner was
prepared after he was arrested and while he was in custody. There could,
therefore, be no doubt that the person who was arrested and brought to
court is the same person charged in the information. Even the police
officer identified petitioner in open court as the person who sold the shabu
to him as the poseur-buyer.

People v. Cagadas, Jr., et. al.


G.R. No. 88044
January 23, 1991
Topic: Name of the accused, Rule 110, Section 7
Facts:
The case was elevated to the Supreme Court on appeal as the
penalty of reclusion perpetua was imposed upon the appellants on the
crime of Murder with aggravating circumstances. The deceased, together
with his sister went to the capital Tagum City to withdraw money from the
bank to purchase necessities and to provide salary for his workers. Upon
their way, defendants who are members of a para-military group
organized by the local units of AFP approached and asked them why they
are going to the capital to which the deceased and his sister said the
reason why. In going back from the capital, it was only the deceased who
returned carrying his purchase and the money. But the deceased was not
found the next day. The defendants were prosecuted and found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged based on circumstantial
evidence. However, one of the defendants, Roberto Cultura, alleged that
the Court erred in convicting him because he was different from the
person charged in the Information.
Issue:
Whether or not a different designation of the name of the accused
will vitiate the Information.
Held:

No. Appellants' contention that the trial court erred in convicting


Roberto Cultura for he was not one of those indicted in the information
but "Jose" Cultura (his father's name), has no merit. The erroneous
designation of his name in the information will not vitiate it, as it was
clearly proven that the accused, Roberto Cultura, was part of the group
that arrested, hogtied and killed the victim. Besides, Cultura did not raise
this question of his identity during the arraignment. His acquiescence to
be tried under the name "Jose" at that stage of the case is deemed to be
a waiver on his part to raise the question of his identity as one of the
accused for the first time on appeal (People vs. Maravilla, 165 SCRA 392;
People vs. Torres, 165 SCRA 702).

PEOPLE vs. FELICIANO


(Sec. 8 Designation of Offense)
Facts:
On December 8, 1994, 7 members of the Sigma Rho fraternity while they
were eating lunch at the Beach House Canteen in the UP Diliman, they
were attacked by several masked men carrying baseball bats and lead
pipes. Some of them sustained injuries, which required hospitalization.
One of them, Venturina, died from these injuries. (Hit him on the head and
clubbing him on different parts of his body inflicting him some serious and
mortal injuries which cause his direct and immediate death.)
Information for murder was filed against several members of the Scintilla
Juris Fraternity herein the respondents, with the RTC of Quezon City.
According to the prosecution:
- While the members of Sigma Rho were having lunch in the
canteen, suddenly Venturina shouted Brads, brods! When
they looked around, 10 men charging toward them. They were
carrying baseball bats and lead pipes. Within a few seconds, 5
of them attacked the members of Sigma Rho. During the
attack, they recognized Alvir because his mask fell off.
- The attack lasted for about 30 45 seconds.
- Natalicio, the Vice Grand Archon of Sigma Rho saw about 15
20 men, most of them were wearing masks, running toward
them.
- Mangrobang Jr. was the one who saw Venturina lying on the
ground. Feliciano Jr. was beating Venturina up with a lead pipe
while Narag was aiming to hit Venturina. By then, policemen

were coming so Feliciano and Narag then ran away. The


bystanders brought Venturina to the UP Infirmary.
- Leandro, a member of Sigma Rho received an information that
the members of Scintilla Juris were heading to SM North thus,
Lachica and his group set off for SM North to confront Scintilla
Juris and identify their attackers. When they arrived in SM
North, pillboxes and stones were thrown at them so they had
no choice but to get away from the mall and proceed instead
to UP where their members held a meeting.
- The officers of Sigma Rho advised the victims to filed a
complaints with the NBI.
- Meanwhile, Venturina was transferred to St. Lukes Hospital.
He eventually died on December 10, 1994. An autopsy was
conducted and found out that "several contusions located at
the back of the upper left arm and hematoma on the back of
both hands," "two (2) lacerated wounds at the back of the
head, generalized hematoma on the skull," "several fractures
on the head," and "inter-cranial hemorrhage." The injuries,
according to Dr. Victoria, could have been caused by a hard
blunt object. Dr. Victoria concluded that Venturina died of
traumatic head injuries.
- Some other victims also submitted their affidavits before the
NBI and underwent medico-legal examinations. It was found
out that they also suffered injuries which required medical
attendance for a period of 10 days to 30 days from the date of
infliction
After the prosecution presented its evidence-in-chief, the court granted
the demurrer on the ground that he was not identified by the prosecutions
witnesses and he was not mentioned in any of the documentary evidence
of the prosecution.
According to the Defense:
- A member of the UP Police vaguely heard somebody shouted
Rumble!. Thus they went to the place where the alleged
rumble was happening and saw injured men being helped by
the bystanders.
- Lato, a utility woker of the Beach House Canteen likewise
testifies that the identities of the attackers were
unrecognizable because of their masks but he admitted also
that he did not see the attack.
- Capilo, a utility worker of UP assigned to the main library
allegedly saw the whole incident. He testified that 10 men,
wearing either masks and black bonnets or with shirts covering
their faces, came from a red car parked nearby.
- Also, a member of a sorority testified that she and her friends
were in line to order lunch when the commotion happened.
She saw 15 18 masked men attacked the members of
Sigma Rho. They said that they were unrecognizable because

of the mask but Perez, however, admitted that a member of


Scintilla Juris approached her to make a statement.
- According to Feliciana Feliciano, mother of the accused
Feliciano jr., her son was in Pampanga to visit his sick
grandfather at the time of the incident. She alleged that her
son went to Pampanga before lunch and visited the school
where she teaches to get their house key.
- Alvir, meanwhile, defended that he was not feeling well since
December 5, 1994. He was absent from work and he was not
enrolled in UP at that time since he was working to support
himself.
- Several members of the Scintilla Juris gave their individual
defense stating that they were impossibly present in the said
rumble.
The trial court rendered its decision with the finding that Robert
Michael Alvir, Danilo Feliciano, Jr., Christopher Soliva, Julius
Victor Medalla, and Warren Zingapan were guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of murder and attempted murder and were
sentenced to, among other penalties, the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. The trial court, however, acquitted Reynaldo Ablanida,
Carlo Jolette Fajardo, Gilbert Magpantay, George Morano, and
Raymund Narag. The court ordered the case against Benedict
Guerrero archived until his apprehension.
The penalties meted out was reclusion perpetua, the case was
brought to the SC on automatic appeal. However, due to the
amendment of the Rules on Appeal, the case was remanded to
the Court of Appeals. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC of
Quezon City.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not accused-appellants constitutional rights were
violated when the information against them contained the
aggravating circumstance of the use of masks despite the
prosecution presenting witnesses to prove that the masks fell off
2. Whether or not the RTC and the CA correctly ruled, on the basis of
the evidence, that accused-appellants were sufficiently identified.
HELD:
1. NO
- Information is sufficient when the accused is fully apprised of
the charge against him to enable him to prepare his defense.
- It is enshrined in the Bill of Rights that no person shall be held
answer for a criminal offense without due process of law. This
includes the right of the accused to be presumed innocent until
proven guilty and to be informed of the nature and accusation

against him.
Upon a finding of probable cause, information is filed by
the prosecutor against the accused, in compliance with
the due process of the law. Rule 110, Section 1, paragraph
1 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that - A
complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name
of the accused; the designation of the offense given by
the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense; the name of the offended pary;
the approximate date of the commission of the offense;
and the place where the offense was committed.
Contrary to the arguments of the appellants, the inclusion of
the phrase "wearing masks and/or other forms of disguise" in
the information does not violate their constitutional rights.
It should be remembered that every aggravating circumstance
being alleged must be stated in the information. Failure to
state an aggravating circumstance, even if duly proven at trial,
will not be appreciated as such. It was, therefore, incumbent
on the prosecution to state the aggravating circumstance of
"wearing masks and/or other forms of disguise" in the
information in order for all the evidence, introduced to that
effect, to be admissible by the trial court.

2. YES
- The findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the appellate
court, are entitled to great weight and credence.
- For the trial court has the advantage of observing the
witnesses through the different indicators of truthfulness or
falsehood. However, there is an exception, where such
findings are clearly arbitrary or erroneous as when they are
tainted with bias or hostility or are so lacking in basis as to
suggest that they were reached without the careful study and
perceptiveness that should characterize a judicial decision.
- In this case, a total of eleven (11) witnesses for the
prosecution and forty-two (42) witnesses for the defense were
put on the stand from 1995 to 2001. In an eighty-three (83)page decision, the trial court acquitted six (6) and convicted
five (5) of the accused. On the basis of these numbers alone, it
cannot be said that the trial court acted arbitrarily or that its
decision was "so lacking in basis" that it was arrived at without
a judicious and exhaustive study of all the evidence presented.
Inasmuch, however, as the trial court's findings hold great
persuasive value, there is also nothing that precludes this
court from coming to its own conclusions based on an
independent review of the facts and the evidence on record.
The accused were sufficiently identified by the witnesses for
the prosecution.

The trial court, in weighing all the evidence on hand, found the
testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution to be credible.

MATRIDO vs. PEOPLE

TOPIC: DESIGNATION OF OFFENSE (Sec. 8, Rule 110); Qualified theft


Facts:
Petitioner Sheila Matrido was a credit and collection assistant of private complainant
Empire East Land Holdings, Inc. Matrido was tasked to collect payments from buyers of real
estate properties, issue receipts therefor and remit the payments to private complainant.
Matrido received payment amounting to 22,470.66 from Amante dela Torre but only
remitted 4,470.66 to private complainant.
Private Complainant filed various complaints for estafa against Matrido. The latter paid
162,000 to exculpate herself from liability. However, the case pushed through since the amount
did not sufficiently cover Matridos liability of 400,000.
The City Prosecution Office of Makati dismiss the complaint for estafa for insufficiency of
evidence but found probable cause to indict petitioner for qualified theft.
Matrido asserted that despite her indictment for qualified theft, the prosecution was
trying to prove estafa during trial, thus violating her right to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation against her.
RTC convicted Matrido of qualified theft and ordered her to pay private complainant the
amount of 18,000.
CA affirmed the decision of the TC.
Issue:
WON the conviction of qualified theft is valid despite the fact that the prosecution tried to prove
during trial the crime of estafa.
Held:
Yes. There was no violation of Matridos rights. The recital of facts and circumstances in
the Information sufficiently constitutes the crime of qualified theft.
It is the allegations in the Information that determine the nature of the offense, not the
technical name given by the public prosecutor in the preamble of the Information. The real
question is not did he commit a crime given in the law some technical and specific name, but did
he perform the acts alleged in the body of the information in the manner therein set forth.
As alleged in the Information, Matrido took, with intent to gain and without the use of
force upon things or violence against or intimidation of persons, the money in the amount of

18,000 belonging to the private complainant, without the latters knowledge and consent and
thereby gravely abusing the confidence reposed on her as credit and collection assistant.
If theft is committed with grave abuse of confidence, the crime of theft becomes
qualified.
The taking was done with grave abuse of confidence. Matrido made use of her position
to obtain the amount due to private complainant.
Conversion of personal property in the case of an employee having material possession
of the said property constitutes theft, whereas in the case of an agent to whom both material
and juridical possession have been transferred, misappropriation of the same property
constitutes estafa.
Estafa was not committed since Matrido did not have juridical possession over the
amount. A sum of money received by an employee in behalf of an employer is considered to be
only in the material possession of the employee.

Licyayo v. People

Facts:
Licyayo was charged of Homicide with the RTC when he stabbed Rufino in different
parts of the body. The RTC convicted Licyayo guilty of the crime Homicide there being no
attending aggravating or mitigating circumstances.
The petitioner appealed contending that the information filed is not sufficient as it did not
specifically charged petitioners for the crime of homicide as define in the RPC, hence petitioner
could not be validly for said crime.
Although the information accuses of him of the crime of homicide, it does not
categorically state that he is being charged with homicide under the rpc article 249. He argues
that the specification in the information of the law violated is necessary to enable him to
adequately prepare for his defense, and that to convict him under such detective information
would violate his constitutional right.
Issue:
Whether or not the information filed is sufficient
Held:
Yes. Sec 6 rule 110 of the Revised rules of criminal procedure provides that an
information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given
bu the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the
offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the
offense was committed.
With particular reference to the designation of the offense, section 8, rule 110 of the
revised rules of criminal procedure merely directs that the information must state the
designation of the offense given by the statute, over the acts constituting the offense, and
specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances.
The information in the instant case contains the foregoing required statements. The
information state the petitioners name as the offended party, the date place of the crime, and
designates the crime committed by the petitioner as homicide.
The fact that the information does not specifically mention article 249 of the RPC, it
would not make it defective. Besides it should be stressed that the character of the crime is
determined neither by the caption or preamble of the information nor by the specification of the
provision of the law alleged to have been violated, they being conclusions of the law, but by the
recital of the ultimate facts and circumstances in the information.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILS VS EDWIN MEJIA


Facts:
On March 2, 2003, private complainants (AAAs) womanhood was allegedly violated by a
man cohabiting with her mother (BBB) as common-law-spouse. BBB was already living
separately from AAAs father at the time the crime were committed at BBBs and accusedappellants residence. This dastardly act led to AAAs pregnancy. Out of fear and shame, it took
some time before AAA had the courage to report the incident to her relatives.
Thereafter, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Pangasinan filed, with the RTC of
San Carlos City in Pangasinan, two separate informations for Rape under Article 266-A of the
Revised Penal Code. Trial court found accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crimes of (a) Rape and (b) Acts of Lasciviousness (Criminal Case No. SCC-4080), with the
penalty of Reclusion Perpetua in accordance with RA 9346. Accused-appellant elevated the
case to the Court of Appeals via a notice of appeal under the twin defenses of denial and alibi.
Thus, on 14 July 2008, the Court of Appeals affirmed accused-appellants guilt in the two cases,
but modified the decision of the court a quo by disregarding the qualifying circumstance of
minority and awarding moral damages
Hence, this appeal.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the trial court erred in considering the qualifying circumstance of Minority although
the Information does not allege such circumstance
2. Whether or notthe trial court erred in convicting Accused-Appellant
Held:
1. YES. Although the qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship were appreciated by
the TC, the Court of Appeals correctly disregarded them. These qualifying circumstances
cannot be considered in fixing the penalty because minority, though proved, was not alleged in
the information. As regards relationship, the same was alleged and proved. Pursuant,
however, to Section 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, in order to fall within subparagraph 1 of
said provision, both circumstances of minority and relationship must be alleged in the
information and proved during trial.
As amended, Secs. 8 and 9, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure
now provide that aggravating as well as qualifying circumstances must be alleged in the
information and proven during trial; otherwise they cannot be considered against the accused.

Proof of the age of the victim cannot consist merely of testimony. Neither can a stipulation of the
parties with respect to the victims age be considered sufficient proof of minority. Thus, the same
cannot be used to impose the higher penalty of capital punishment on the accused-appellant.
2. NO. Accused-appellants defense of denial is inherently weak. Jurisprudence has established
that the defense of denial assumes significance only when the prosecutions evidence is such
that it does not prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Mere denial, unsubstantiated by clear and
convincing evidence, is negative, self-serving evidence, which cannot be given greater
evidentiary weight than the testimony of the complaining witness who testified on affirmative
matters. Assessment made by the trial court is even more enhanced when the Court of Appeals
affirms the same, as in this case. With respect to Criminal Case No. SCC-4080 SC concurred
with CA in downgrading the crime from rape to acts of lasciviousness inasmuch as carnal
knowledge was not established.

PEOPLE v. MALIBIRAN
G.R. No. 173471, March 17, 2009

Facts:
Three separate Informations for Rape under Articles 266-A and 266-5 of the RPC were
filed with the RTC against Ernesto Malibiran.
AAA, born on April 30, 1994, was raped seven times by the accused. AAAs mother,
BBB, was the daughter of Ernesto. Therefore, AAA is Ernerstos granddaughter.
RTC found Ernesto guilty of qualified rape on all three accounts. The records of the case
were elevated to the CA for automatic review, which then affirmed the rulings of the RTC.
Issue:
Whether or not the minority and relationship of the victim with the accused were alleged
in the information.
HELD:
Yes. In the instant case, the aggravating circumstances of minority of the victim and her
blood ties to the offender were properly appreciated.
Ernesto's filial ascendancy was properly alleged in the informations and duly established
by the presentation of the birth certificates of BBB and AAA as well as the marriage certificate of
Ernesto. The birth certificate of BBB as well as the marriage contract of Ernesto and his wife
Edna Caballe proved BBB to be Ernesto's daughter. And the birth certificate of AAA proved that
she is the daughter of BBB and, thus, the granddaughter of Ernesto. Ernesto was duly identified
by AAA as her grandfather, the latter not even impugning the relationship during trial. Likewise,
alleged in the information and duly proved during trial by virtue of her birth certificate was AAA's
minority.
The concurrence of the minority of the rape victim and her relationship to the offender is
a special qualifying circumstance which ups the penalty.

People v. Umawid,
G.R. No. 208719, June 09, 2014
Facts:
On November 8, 2011, herein respondent had been found guilty of the crimes of Murder
and Frustrated Murder by the Regional Trial Court of Roxas, Isabela, Branch 23 (RTC). Upon
appeal, respondent alleged the defense of insanity which he was not able to prove by clear and
positive evidence, thus the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC on February 28,
2013.
Issue:
Whether or not respondents conviction must be affirmed.
Held:
Yes. The defense of insanity is in the nature of confession and avoidance
because an accused invoking the same admits to have committed the crime but claims
that he or she is not guilty because of such insanity. As there is a presumption in favor of
sanity, anyone who pleads the said defense bears the burden of proving it with clear and
convincing evidence.
*This is the Criminal Procedure issue, which was not included in the issue of the case,
the Supreme Court merely expressed its observation:
Maureens death is a case of aberratio ictus, given that the fatal blow therefor was only
delivered by mistake as it was actually Vicente who was Umawids intended target. In this
regard, Umawids single deed actually resulted in the: (a) Attempted Murder of Vicente;

and (b) Consummated Murder of Maureen. This may be classified as species of complex
crime defined under Article 48 of the RPC, particularly, a delito compuesto, or a compound
crime where a single act produces two (2) or more grave or less grave felonies. Based on
the foregoing, Umawid should have been punished for committing the complex crime of
Murder and Attempted Murder, pursuant to Article 48 in relation to Article 4(1) of the RPC.
However, considering that the information in Criminal Case No. 23-0471 only charged him
with the Murder of Maureen, Umawid cannot be convicted of a complex crime because to
do so would be violative of his right to due process.
In criminal cases, where the life and liberty of the accused is at stake, due process
requires that the accused be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
An accused cannot be convicted of an offense unless it is clearly charged in the
complaint or information. To convict him of an offense other than that charged in the
complaint or information would be a violation of this constitutional right (Burgos v.
Sandiganbayan).

SILVERINA E. CONSIGNA, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE HON.


SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION), and EMERLINA MOLETA, respondents.
G.R. No. 17575051, April 2, 2014
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Actions; Information; Entrenched in jurisprudence is the
dictum that the real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or
preamble of the information, or from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have
been violated, which are mere conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of the facts in the
complaint or information. Entrenched in jurisprudence is the dictum that the real nature of the
criminal charge is determined not from the caption or preamble of the information, or from the
specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, which are mere conclusions
of law, but by the actual recital of the facts in the complaint or information.
Facts:
Petitioner Silverina Consigna, the Municipal Treasurer of General Luna Surigao del
Norte, together with Jose Herasmio, obtained as a loan from private respondent Hermelina
Moleta (Moleta), the sum of Php 320,000.00, to pay for the salaries of the employees of

municipality and to construct a municipal gymnasium. As payment, petitioner issued three postdated checks signed by Jaime Rusillon (Rusillon), mayor of the Municipality of General Luna.
Moleta demanded payment but to no avail. Thus, Moleta deposited the checks but were
returned by the bank as the account had no funds. Moleta, again, deposited the checks the
following day, but the checks were returned again as the municipalitys account was reportedly
already closed. Hence, Moleta filed with the Sandiganbayan two sets of Information against
petitioner and Rusillon in their capacity as public officials under Sec. 3 par. (e) of R.A. 3019 and
Estafa, Art. 315 of the RPC.
Petitioner contended that the court a quo had no jurisdiction because (1) the crime
charged did not specify the provision of law allegedly violated, and (2) that Sec. 3(e) of R.A.
3019 does not fall within the jurisdiction of the court a quo. Petitioner also contended that there
was no fraud or misrepresentation, while Rusillon maintained that he had no participation in the
acts committed by the petitioner. The court a quo admitted that the Information for violation of
Estafa did not specify the provision allegedly violated, but based on the allegations of deceit and
misrepresentation, it allowed the prosecution to indict the petitioner and Rusillion under Art. 315
(2)(a) of the RPC.
The Sandiganbayan found the petitioner guilty under both charges of violation of Sec.3
(e) of R.A. 3019 and Estafa, but exonerated Rusillon.
Petitioner then filed the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45. Notably,
petitioner formulated its arguments in purview of a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Court.

Issue:
Whether or not the court a quo committed a reversible error for finding petitioner guilty of
Estafa, based on information which does not specifically designate the provision allegedly
violated.

Held:
No. There was no error in judgement. As jurisprudence dictates, as held in People v.
Dimaano, the real nature of the criminal charge is determined from the actual recital of the facts
in the complaint or information. The caption, preamble of the information, and the specification
of the provision of law alleged to have been violated are mere conclusions of law.

G.R. No. L-8267


THE UNITED STATES vs. APOLINARIO CUNANAN
An offense committed outside the jurisdiction of a court cannot be tried there. The
jurisdiction of CFIs (now RTCs) are limited and well-defined. CFIs cannot assume jurisdiction if
it is not alleged in the complaint and the crime is not a continuing offense. The complaint may
be demurred based on such grounds.
Facts:
Apolinario Cunanan was a registered seaman of the Bureau of Navigation, aboard the
steamship Rover. On June 22, 1912 when the said ship was docked in Cebu, Province of Cebu,
Cunanan departed from the ship for more than 10 days. He departed before his terms of
enlistment expired and without the permission of his superiors; committing Desertion in violation
of section 9(c) of Act 1980. An information was filed and soon Cunanan was arrested. Upon
arraignment, Cunanan demurred the complaint based on the following issues: "(1) That the
court had no jurisdiction of the person of the defendant or of the subject of the action; (2)
that the complaint did not show facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action; and (3)
that the complaint was ambiguous, unintelligible, and uncertain
The Judge, from the Court of First Instance of Manila, held that he had no jurisdiction
over the crime. The judge sustained the demurrer and ordered the defendant to be brought to
Cebu Province where the crime allegedly took place and be tried there.

The Attorney-General appealed the case to the Supreme Court, arguing that the crime
committed was a continuing offense, like larceny, and can thus be tried by any court within the
Philippines jurisdiction, wherever the accused may be found. The Attorney-General also relied
upon the principle in military law, that in cases of desertion court-martials are not limited by
territory.
Issue/s:
Does the Court of First Instance of Manila have jurisdiction over the crime of desertion
committed in Cebu?
Is the crime of Desertion under section 9(c) of Act 1980 a continuing offense?
Held:
No, the CFI of Manila does not have jurisdiction over the said crime. Unlike CourtsMartial, the jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance are limited and well-defined by the law. An
offense committed outside a courts jurisdiction cannot be tried there, save for exceptional cases
like continuing offenses. The Supreme Court found that the complaint filed against Cunanan did
not indicate that the crime committed was within the CFI of Manilas jurisdiction. As such, the
CFI of Manila is not vested with jurisdiction to try and decide the case. Hence, the complaint is
demurrable.
Undecided. The court notes that the crime of larceny under the laws existing then clearly
indicated its continuing nature and granted jurisdiction to any court wherever the offender may
be found. However, the crime of desertion under section 9(c) of Act 1980 did not include a
provision to this effect. The Supreme Court did not decide on this matter. What was relevant, the
court noted, was the defects of the allegation in the complaint.
The Supreme Court sustained the CFI of Manila and remanded the case back to the
lower court.

People v. Navarro
63 SCRA 264 G.R. No. L-38453-54 March 25 (1975)
Facts:
A petition for certiorari is filed to annul the joint decision of the court of first instance for it
acquits Jaime Catuday of the charge of light threat and frustrated theft while the crime of light
threat was not tried in the lower court. On March 6, 1968, respondent Catuday was charged in
the Municipal Court of Makati, Rizal, with the crime of light threat allegedly committed against
Henry Dioquino (Criminal Case No. 12846). Almost a year later, or on February 3, 1969, and
while the light threat case was still pending, he was charged in the same court, with a different
offense, frustrated theft, allegedly committed against the Commonwealth Foods, Inc. In two
separate decisions rendered on September 10, 1969, the Municipal Court convicted him of the
two charges. He appealed both decisions to the Court of First Instance.
The theft case was first set for hearing on December 16, 1969. The threat case was
originally set for hearing on December 22, 1969. But due to multiple reschedules the scheduled
threat case hearing was rescheduled for February 11, 1970 along with the theft case. Later on
the court issued a single order in the two cases, where the council de offcio did not appear,
directing arrest of said counsel "and to show cause why she should not be punished for
contempt"; and ordering that "the trial set for today is hereby re-set for March 25, 1970.
Sometime in December 1972, upon retirement of Judge Flores of Branch XI, respondent
District Judge Pedro C. Navarro took over in the two cases. The theft case was then in the

rebuttal stage. On March 20, 1973, rebuttal evidence closed, and upon order of the court, the
parties filed their respective "offer and submission of exhibits", and submitted the theft case for
decision. On July 20, 1973, respondent Judge rendered one decision, acquitting Catuday of
both charges for lack of proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Private prosecutor filed a motion for reconsideration of said decision insofar as Criminal
Case No. 20145 for light threat is concerned but was denied on the ground that there was joint
hearing of the two criminal cases. Another motion for reconsideration was filed but was again
denied. They later filed a petition for certiorari but was dismissed for lack of merit.
Petitioner claims that the threat case was never tried in the lower court so the charge
therein should not have been dismissed on the ground of lack of proof beyond reasonable
doubt. Respondents, on the other hand, claim that there was joint trial of the threat case and the
theft case, and since the prosecution failed to present evidence respecting the alleged threat,
the case was properly dismissed on the stated ground
Issue:
Whether or not a joint trial of both the theft and light threat case is the proper remedy of
the court for such a situation?

Held:
No for the court held that the case at hand did not have the proper elements for the case
to be tried jointly. The order of the lower court only conveyed the intent to have a common date
for the cases to be heard so that the accused may come to court on the same day.
There is the rule that "when two or more defendants are jointly charged with any offense,
they shall be tried, jointly, unless the court in its discretion upon motion of the fiscal or any
defendant orders separate trial." (Sec. 8, Rule 119, Revised Rules of Court). As long as the
condition therein is fulfilled, that is, two or more defendants are jointly charged with any offense,
joint trial is automatic, without need of a court order. The rule is inapplicable here because there
is only one defendant in the two cases.
Then there is the rule that "charges for offenses founded on the same facts, or which
form or are part of a series of offenses of the same or similar character may, in the discretion of
the court, be tried jointly." (Sec. 15, Rule 119, Revised Rules of Court). In contrast, this second
rule clearly requires a court order for a joint trial, since the court has discretion whether or not to
order the same.
The case at hand is for two different complaints wherein the crimes are of different
classes for them to be tried jointly, and the other crime was committed almost a year after the
first one was being tried. Light threat is a crime against personal liberty and security; frustrated
theft is a crime against property. The court cannot say the charges are for offenses founded on

the same facts or form or are part of a series of offenses of the same or similar character.
Consequently, the court had no power to try them jointly.
It is quite clear in the record of this case, especially in the transcript of stenographic
notes and in practically all the pleadings filed by the parties, that there was absolutely no trial or
hearing of Criminal Case No. 20145 for light threat. Thus the acquittal was rendered null and
void ab initio for lack of due process accorded to the state thus abuse of discretion tantamount
to excess or lack of jurisdiction on the part of the court.

People vs. Delfin


G.R. No. 201572; July 9, 2014

Facts:

On the night of 27 September 2000, one Emilio Enriquez (Emilio)a 51-year-old


fisherman from Navotas Citywas killed after being gunned down at a store just across
his home.The Rael Delfin was formally charged with the murder of Emilio before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malabon.
Part of the information reads: That on or about the 27th day of November 2000
On 20 July 2009, the Regional Trial Court rendered a Decision finding Delfin guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of murder. On 29 April 2012, the Court of
Appeals rendered a Decision affirming the conviction of Delfin.
In his appeal to the Supreme Court, Delfin assails the validity of the information under
which he was tried and convicted. He specifically points out to the discrepancy between
the date of the commission of the murder as alleged in the information i.e., "on or about
the 27th day of November 2000" and the one actually established during the trial i.e., 27
September 2000.
Delfin protests that the failure of the information to accurately allege the date of the
commission of the murder violated his right to be properly informed of the charge against
him and consequently impaired his ability to prepare an intelligent defense thereon.

Issue: Whether or not the discrepancy on the date of the commission of the murder would
render the Information against Delfin invalid.
Held:

No. In crimes where the date of commission is not a material element, like murder, it is
not necessary to allege such date with absolute specificity or certainty in the information.
The Rules of Court merely requires, for the sake of properly informing an accused, that
the date of commission be approximated.
Since the date of commission of the offense is not required with exactitude, the
allegation in an information of a date of commission different from the one eventually
established during the trial would not, as a rule, be considered as an error fatal to
prosecution.
In such cases, the erroneous allegation in the information is just deemed supplanted by
the evidence presented during the trial or may even be corrected by a formal
amendment of the information.
The inaccurate allegation in the information is simply the product of a mere clerical error.
This is obvious from the fact that, while all its supporting documents point to the murder
as having been committed on the 27th of September 2000, the informations mistake is
limited only to the month when the crime was committed. Such an error is evidently not
fatal; it is deemed supplanted by the evidence presented by the prosecution.
The Court sustains the information for murder, under which Delfin was tried and
convicted, as valid.

People vs Balino, G.R. No. 194833, 2 July 2014

Facts: Porferio Balino was charged for violation of Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8353 (statutory rape). It was alleged that on or about the
middle part of August 2001 in Dangcagan, Bukidnon, the complainant-victim, AAA, went to the
accuseds house to watch TV; that she was about to leave but since her slipper was missing,
she searched for it and found the same at the back of the house; but when she was about to
leave, accused pulled her and brought her inside the house; he then closed the door in the
kitchen and also closed the door by the sala, and then he brought her to the room and
undressed her; that she was wearing then a blouse with a sleeve; After the accused undressed
her, he then undressed himself, took off his clothing, his pants and his brief and then he put
himself on top of her then kissed her and when she was about to shout for Mama, he covered
her mouth; he kissed her and then he bit her mouth; then her vagina was bleeding because he
inserted his penis she felt "very painful"; and he wipe the same with his clothing; that after the
accused had sexual intercourse with her; He then dressed her and pushed her outside as a
result of which her feet was sprained and her chest hit the ground. He said to me that he is
going to kill me if I am going to reveal that he raped me. She was able to go home and when
she returned home nobody was around; because her mother was working in Quirino; she did
not tell her mother it was after a longtime because she was not yet around. She was 8 years old
at that time; that she is afraid every time she saw the accused.
BBB, the mother of AAA, claimed that she went home and saw her daughter with a
fever; that on September 2 she brought AAA at the Emergency Hospital at Kibawe, Bukidnon;
and on September 4, 2001 she transferred her to provincial hospital at Cagayan de Oro City
because AAAs vagina was swelling and for the reason that the hospital at Kibawe did not have
the things needed for her treatment; she was already losing consciousness, she cannot
anymore talk and her eyes were already not normally functioning; the sex organ of AAA was
examined at the hospital of Cagayan de Oro; she was admitted on September 4 and was
discharged somewhat in October 7, but continued checkup was done on her even after she was
discharged. x x x; she then reported the matter to the police. She learned that her daughter was
raped because the Doctor said that her daughter was molested; she asked her daughter and
she told her that it was Porferio Balino.
Dr. Cristilda Villapane, testified on the medical certificate and the injuries suffered by the victim.
Balino denied the allegations against him.
RTC convicted accused of statutory rape. Accused was sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua, and to pay the victim a fine of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as
moral damages, and P25,000.00 for actual damages.

CA affirmed the RTCs Decision in convicting the accused. The RTC Decision, which had
sentenced accused to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua in lieu of death and awarded
various damages to the victim, was also affirmed by the appellate court.

Issue: Whether or not the date of the commission of rape is an essential element of the crime.
Held: This Court has likewise repeatedly held that the date of the commission of rape is not an
essential element of the crime. It is not necessary to state the precise time when the offense
was committed except when time is a material ingredient of the offense. In statutory rape, time
is not an essential element except to prove that the victim was a minor below twelve years of
age at the time of the commission of the offense. Therefore, given the victims established date
of birth on the basis of the evidence adduced, she was definitely short of 12 years of age when
the crime of rape was committed against her.

LITO CORPUZ
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
G.R. No. 180016; April 29, 2014
ROC Rule 110, Section 11: Date or Time of Commission
CRIMINAL LAW; ESTAFA; TIME OF OCCURRENCE NOT A MATERIAL INGREDIENT: It is true
that the gravamen of the crime of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1, subparagraph (b) of the
RPC is the appropriation or conversion of money or property received to the prejudice of the
owner and that the time of occurrence is not a material ingredient of the crime, hence, the
exclusion of the period and the wrong date of the occurrence of the crime, as reflected in the
Information, do not make the latter fatally defective.
Facts:
Danilo Tangcoy (complainant), who was in the business of lending money to casino
players and selling pieces of jewelry, met the petitioner at the Admiral Royale Casino
sometime in 1990. The petitioner approached the former in May 2, 1991 and offered to
sell the said pieces of jewelry on commission basis. Pieces of jewelries with an
aggregate value of P98,000, as evidenced by a receipt of even date, was turned over to
the petitioner to be sold, with the agreement that the latter shall remit the proceeds of
sale, and/ or if unsold, return the same items, within a period of 60 days. The period
expired without petitioner remitting the proceeds of the sale or returning the pieces of
jewelry. When private complainant was able to meet petitioner, the latter promised the
former that he will pay the value of the said items entrusted to him, but to no avail. Thus,
an information was filed for the crime of estafa.
Petitioner pleaded not guilty, contending that he was made to sign a blank receipt in
1989 when he obtained a loan from Balajadia, person for whom both the complainant
and petitioner were working for as collecting agents, and that the same receipt was then
dated May 2, 1991 and was used as evidence against him for the supposed agreement
to sell the subject pieces of jewelry, which he did not even see.
RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged in the
Information.
The case was elevated to the CA, however, the latter denied the appeal of petitioner and
affirmed the decision of the RTC.
Hence, this current petition, contending, among others, that the information for estafa
was fatally defective in that it did not fix a period within which the subject jewelry should
be returned, if unsold, or the money remitted, if sold and that the date of occurrence of
the crime alleged in the information as of July 5, 1991, was materially different from the
one testified by the complainant, which was May 2, 1991.
Issue:
Whether or not date of occurrence or time is material in estafa with abuse of confidence.

Held:
NO. The CA did not err in finding that the Information was substantially complete and in
reiterating that objections as to the matters of form and substance in the Information
cannot be made for the first time on appeal. It is true that the gravamen of the crime of
estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1, subparagraph (b) of the RPC is the appropriation
or conversion of money or property received to the prejudice of the owner and that the
time of occurrence is not a material ingredient of the crime, hence, the exclusion of the
period and the wrong date of the occurrence of the crime, as reflected in the Information,
do not make the latter fatally defective.
An information is legally viable as long as it distinctly states the statutory designation of
the offense and the acts or omissions constitutive thereof. Section 6, Rule 110 of the
Rules of Court provides that a complaint or information is sufficient if it states the
following:
1) Name of the accused;
2) Designation of the offense by the statute;
3) Acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense;
4) Name of the offended party;
5) Approximate time of the commission of the offense, and
6) Place wherein the offense was committed.
In the case at bar, a reading of the subject Information shows compliance with the
foregoing rule. That the time of the commission of the offense was stated as " on or
about the fifth (5th) day of July, 1991" is not likewise fatal to the prosecution's cause
considering that Section 11 of the same Rule requires a statement of the precise time
only when the same is a material ingredient of the offense.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari dated November 5, 2007 of
petitioner Lito Corpuz is hereby DENIED.
OTHER ISSUES:
REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; EVIDENCE; FORMAL OFFER; FAILURE TO
OBJECT; OBJECTION WAIVED:According to petitioner, the CA erred in affirming the ruling of
the trial court, admitting in evidence a receipt dated May 2, 1991 marked as Exhibit "A" and its
submarkings, although the same was merely a photocopy, thus, violating the best evidence rule.
However, the records show that petitioner never objected to the admissibility of the said
evidence at the time it was identified, marked and testified upon in court by private complainant.
The CA also correctly pointed out that petitioner also failed to raise an objection in his Comment
to the prosecution's formal offer of evidence and even admitted having signed the said receipt.
The established doctrine is that when a party failed to interpose a timely objection to evidence at
the time they were offered in evidence, such objection shall be considered as waived.

CRIMINAL LAW; ESTAFA; TYPE OF DEMAND: No specific type of proof is required to show
that there was demand. Demand need not even be formal; it may be verbal. The specific word
"demand" need not even be used to show that it has indeed been made upon the person
charged, since even a mere query as to the whereabouts of the money [in this case, property],
would be tantamount to a demand.
CRIMINAL LAW; DUTY OF THE COURT TO APPLY LAW: Verily, the primordial duty of the
Court is merely to apply the law in such a way that it shall not usurp legislative powers by
judicial legislation and that in the course of such application or construction, it should not make
or supervise legislation, or under the guise of interpretation, modify, revise, amend, distort,
remodel, or rewrite the law, or give the law a construction which is repugnant to its terms. The
Court should apply the law in a manner that would give effect to their letter and spirit, especially
when the law is clear as to its intent and purpose. Succinctly put, the Court should shy away
from encroaching upon the primary function of a co-equal branch of the Government; otherwise,
this would lead to an inexcusable breach of the doctrine of separation of powers by means of
judicial legislation.

BACASMAS vs. SANDIGANBAYAN


(Sec. 11 Date or time of commission; violation of sec. 3 Corrupt Practices of public officers,
RA 3019)
Facts:

The case at the bar involves three consolidated cases assailing the decision of the
Sandiganbayan with regard to the charges filed against Gaviola, Cesa, Bacasmas and
Jaca who were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Sec. 3 (e) of
Republic Act no. 3019 and for them to suffer perpetual disqualification from holding any
public office and to indemnify jointly and severally the City Government of Cebu the
amount of Php 9, 810, 752.60.
All the petitioners work for the City Government of Cebu Bacasmas as the Cash
Division Chief, Gaviola as the City Administrator, Cesa as the City Treasurer and Jaca as
the City Accountant.
By virtue of their position, they are involved in the process of approving and releasing
cash advances for the City. The procedure is as follows:
- A written request for a cash advance is made by paymaster Gonzales who then
submits it to Cash Division Chief for approval.
- Upon approval, she then affixes her initials to the voucher then forward it to the City
Treasurer for him to also sign which will certify that the cash advance is necessary.
- The voucher then forwarded to the City Accountant for processing and pre-audit and
also to certify that there is adequate available funds; the expenditures are properly
certified and supported by documents; and have been liquidated and accounted. By
then, she prepares an Accountants Advice.
- The Advice is returned with the voucher to Chief Cashier for the preparation of the
check. Afterwards, it the forwarded to the City Administrator for him to approve the
voucher and countersigns the check.
- The voucher, Advice and the check then returned to Cash Division where Gonzales
signs the receipt portion of the voucher and for the Check Register to acknowledge
the check for encashment.
- Gonzales then encashes the check to the bank. She then liquidates it within 5 days
after payment for a Report of Disbursement.
On March 4, 1998, the COA issued an order creating a team to conduct an examination
of cash and accounts of the accountable officers of the Cash Division, City Treasurers
Office of Cebu City.
The examination revealed an accumulated shortage of funds. Also, they found out that
Bacasmas, Gaviola, Cesa and Jaca failed to follow the procedure and that there were
irregularities in the grant, utilization and liquidation of cash advances.
The report also stated that the petitioners, despite the deficiencies, they signed and
countersigned the checks, which amounted to violation of RA 7160, PD 1445 and
circulars issued by the COA.
Thus, a case was filed before Sandiganbayan against the petitioners.
Bacasmas testified on her own defense stating that she could not be held liable because
she was not responsible for examining the cash book. She also pointed out the Jaca is
the one responsible.

Cesa, on his defense, averred that Jaca was the approving authority in granting cash
advances, hence, when he signed the vouchers, he relied on Jacas certification.
Jaca admitted the cash advances were granted even if there were no liquidations so that
salaries could be paid on time.
Gaviola claimed that he affixes his signatures on the basis of the signatures of Cesa and
Jaca and that he was not aware of the anomaly.
SANDIGANBAYANs decision:
Give credence to the COA Narrative Report submitted as evidence.
The petitioners acted with gross inexcusable negligence by disregarding the
instruction for preparing disbursement voucher
Illegal practice.
Found conspiracy showing that they confederated, connived with and mutually
helped one another in causing injury to the government through loss of public
money.
Motion consideration was filed for the sufficiency of the information and
that the criminal and civil liabilities of Jaca was extinguished by her death.
Denied. Information was sufficient. Although the criminal liability of
Jaca was extinguished upon her death but her civil liability remained.

Issues:
1. Whether or not the information was sufficient
2. Whether or not the petitioners are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 3
(e) of Republic Act no. 3019.
Held:
1. YES
- The Information specified when the crime was committed, and it named all of the
accused and their alleged acts or omissions constituting the offense charged are
deemed sufficient.
- The information was challenged because (1) it did not specify a reasonable time
frame within which the offense was committed, in violation of their right to be
informed of the charge against them; (2) not all the accused were named, as
Gonzales was not charged in the information and (3) the information did not specify
an offense, because negligence and conspiracy cannot co-exist in a crime.
- (1) It is not necessary to state the precise date when the offense was
committed, except when it is a material ingredient thereof. In the case, the date
was not a material ingredient of the crime, not having committed on one day
alone, but rather within a period of time ranging from Sept 20, 1995 to March 5,
1998, thus it is impossible to state the exact dates of the commission of the
crime.
- (2) the information charges petitioners with the violation of RA 3019 Sec. 3 (e) which
pertains only to the corrupt practices of public officers. Thus, the information correctly
excluded Gonzales because her alleged acts did not fall under the crime charged in
the information.
- (3) The information is sufficient because it adequately describes the nature and
cause of the accusation against the petitioners. There was no inconsistency in

alleging both the presence of conspiracy and gross inexcusable negligence, because
it was not a simple negligence. Rather, the negligence involved a willful, intentional
and conscious indifference to the consequences of ones actions or omissions.
2. YES
- Petitioners gross negligence amounting to bad faith, the undue injury to the
government, and the unwarranted benefits given to Gonzales, were all proven
beyond reasonable doubt.
- Petitioners committed gross negligence amounting to bad faith when they approved
and disbursed the cash advance in violation of law and rules and regulations. They
must comply with RA no. 7160, PD 1445 and COA circulars on the proper procedure
for the approval and grant of cash advances.
- Petitioners were all aware of their responsibilities before they affixed their signatures
on the cash advance vouchers; yet, they still chose to disregard the requirements
laid down by law and rules and regulations. What is worse is that they continue to
plead their innocence.
- Moreover, the Sandiganbayan found out that the acts not only shown gross
negligence amounting to bad faith but, when taken together, also show that there
was conspiracy in their willful noncompliance with their duties in order to defraud the
government.
3. The indeterminate penalty of 12 years and one month as minimum to 15 years as
maximum is fully justified.
- The penalty for violation of Sec. 3 (e) of RA 3019 is imprisonment for not less than 6
years and 1 month nor more than 15 years, perpetual disqualification from public
office, and confiscation or forfeiture in favor of the Government of any prohibited
interest and unexplained wealth manifestly out of proportion to his salary and other
lawful income.
- Thus, the indeterminate penalty imposed in the present case is within the range fixed
by law.
- It is justified considering the extent of the negligent acts involved in this case in terms
of the number of laws and regulations violated by the petitioners and the number of
positive duties neglected.

G.R. No. 201620


March 6, 2013
RAMONCITA O. SENADOR, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and CYNTHIA JAIME, Respondents.
Facts:
Petitioner Ramoncita O. Senador (Senador) was charged before the RTC with the crime
of Estafa under Article 315, par. 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code. The information reads: the
said accused, having obtained and received from one Cynthia Jaime various kinds of
jewelry valued in the total amount of P705,685.00 for the purpose of selling the same on
consignment basis with express obligation to account for and remit the entire proceeds of the
sale if sold or to return the same if unsold within an agreed period of time and despite repeated
demands therefor, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously fail to remit proceeds
of the sale of said items or to return any of the items that may have been unsold to said Cynthia
Jaime but instead has willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriated, misapplied and
converted the same to his/her own use and benefit to the damage and prejudice of said Cynthia
Jaime in the aforementioned amount of P705,685.00.
Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded "not guilty." During the preliminary investigation,
Senador tendered to Rita a bank check for the amount of PhP 705,685, as settlement of her

obligations. However, the check was later dishonored as it was drawn against a closed account.
Senador refused to testify and refute prosecutions evidence and only relied on the defense that
the facts alleged in the Information and the facts proven and established during the trial differ. In
particular, Senador asserted that the person named as the offended party in the Information is
not the same person who made the demand and filed the complaint. According to Senador, the
private complainant in the Information went by the name "Cynthia Jaime," whereas, during trial,
the private complainant turned out to be "Rita Jaime." He argued that her constitutional right to
be informed of the nature of the accusation against her has been violated, thus, she should be
acquitted.
The Trial Court found her guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa. Senador
questioned the RTC Decision before the CA but the appellate court affirmed RTCs decision.
Issue:
Whether or not an error in the designation in the Information of the offended party
violates the accuseds constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against her, thus, entitling her to an acquittal.
Held:
NO.
The variance between the allegations of the information and the evidence offered by the
prosecution does not of itself entitle the accused to an acquittal, more so if the variance relates
to the designation of the offended party, a mere formal defect, which does not prejudice the
substantial rights of the accused.
Thus, in case of an error in the designation of the offended party in crimes against
property, Rule 110, Sec. 12 of the Rules of Court mandates the correction of the information,
not its dismissal:
SEC. 12. Name of the offended party.The complaint or information must state the
name and surname of the person against whom or against whose property the offense
was committed, or any appellation or nickname by which such person has been or is
known. If there is no better way of identifying him, he must be described under a
fictitious name.
(a) In offenses against property, if the name of the offended party is unknown, the
property must be described with such particularity as to properly identify the offense
charged.
(b) If the true name of the person against whom or against whose property the
offense was committed is thereafter disclosed or ascertained, the court must cause such
true name to be inserted in the complaint or information and the record. x x x (Emphasis
supplied.)
It is clear from the above provision that in offenses against property, the materiality of the
erroneous designation of the offended party would depend on whether or not the subject matter
of the offense was sufficiently described and identified.
Senadors reliance on Uba is misplaced because in Uba, the appellant was charged with
oral defamation, a crime against honor, wherein the identity of the person against whom the
defamatory words were directed is a material element. Thus, an erroneous designation of the
person injured is material. On the contrary, in the instant case, Senador was charged with
estafa, a crime against property that does not absolutely require as indispensable the proper
designation of the name of the offended party. Rather, what is absolutely necessary is the
correct identification of the criminal act charged in the information. The holdings in United
States v. Kepner, Sayson v. People, and Ricarze v. Court of Appeals support the doctrine that if

the subject matter of the offense is specific or one described with such particularity as to
properly identify the offense charged, then an erroneous designation of the offended party is not
material and would not result in the violation of the accuseds constitutional right to be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation against her. Such error would not result in the
acquittal of the accused.
CA Decision AFFIRMED.

HILARIO P. SORIANO and ROSALINDA ILAGAN, petitioners, vs. PEOPLE OF THE


PHILIPPINES, BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS (BSP), and PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT
INSURANCE CORPORATION (PDIC), respondents.
G.R. Nos. 159517-18.June 30, 2009.
Third Division. Nachura, J.
Facts:
1. Hilario P. Soriano (Soriano) and Rosalinda Ilagan (Ilagan) were the President and
General Manager, respectively, of the Rural Bank of San Miguel (Bulacan), Inc. (RBSM).
Allegedly, on June 27, 1997 and August 21, 1997, during their incumbency as president and
manager of the bank, petitioners indirectly obtained loans from RBSM. They falsified the loan
applications and other bank records, and made it appear that Virgilio J. Malang and Rogelio
Maaol obtained loans of P15,000,000.00 each, when in fact they did not.
2. On May 4, 2000, State Prosecutor Josefino A. Subia charged Soriano in the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, with violation of Section 83 of Republic Act No. 337 (R.A.
No. 337) or the General Banking Act, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1795, or Violation
of the Director, Officer, Stockholder or Related Interest (DOSRI) Rules (DOSRI Rules). On the
same date, an information for estafa thru falsification of commercial document was also filed
against Soriano and Ilagan.
3. The informations were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 1719-M-2000 and 1720-M2000, respectively, and were raffled to Branch 14, presided by Judge Petrita Braga Dime.
4. Another information for violation of Section 83 of R.A. No. 337, as amended, was filed
against Soriano, this time, covering the P15,000,000.00 loan obtained in the name of Rogelio
Maaol. Soriano and Ilagan were also indicted for estafa thru falsification of commercial
document for obtaining said loan.
5. The cases were docketed as 1980-M-2000 and 1981-M-2000, respectively, and were
raffled to Branch 77, presided by Judge Aurora Santiago-Lagman.
6. Petitioners moved to quash the informations in Criminal Case Nos. 1719-M-2000 and
1720-M-2000 (pending before Branch 14), and also in Criminal Case Nos. 1980-M-2000 and
1981-M-2000 (pending with Branch 77), on grounds that: (i) more than one (1) offense is
charged; and (ii) the facts charged do not constitute an offense. Specifically, petitioners argued
that the prosecutor charged more than one offense for a single act. Soriano was charged with

violation of DOSRI rules and estafa thru falsification of commercial document for allegedly
securing fictitious loans. They further argued that the facts as alleged in the information do not
constitute an offense.
7. In an Order dated November 15, 2000, RTC Branch 77 denied the motion to quash.
Petitioners motion to quash informations in Criminal Case Nos. 1719-M-2000 and 1720-M-2000
before Branch 14 likewise suffered the same fate, as Judge Braga Dime denied the same in an
Order dated November 27, 2000.
8. Petitioners went up to the Court of Appeals via certiorari, assailing the Orders of
Branch 77 and Branch 14. The petitions were docketed as CA-G.R. SP. Nos. 64648 and 64649.
By decision of August 5, 2003, the CA, which priorly consolidated the petitions, sustained the
denial of petitioners separate motions to quash.
Issue:
1. Whether or not petitioners motion to quash based on duplicity of offenses should be
granted.
2. Whether or not petitioners contention that Soriano should be charged with one
offense only, because all the charges filed against him proceed from and are based on a single
act of obtaining fictitious loans should be sustained.
3. Whether or not the allegations in the informations are sufficient to constitute an
offense.
Ruling:
1. No. Duplicity of offenses in a single information is a ground to quash the Information
under Section 3(e), Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure. The Rules prohibit the
filing of a duplicitous information to avoid confusing the accused in preparing his defense. By
duplicity of charges is meant a single complaint or information that charges more than one
offense. Otherwise stated, there is duplicity (or multiplicity) of charges when a single Information
charges more than one offense.
In this case, however, Soriano was faced not with one information charging more than
one offense, but with more than one information, each charging a different offenseviolation of
DOSRI rules in one, and estafa thru falsification of commercial documents in the others. Ilagan,
on the other hand, was charged with estafa thru falsification of commercial documents in
separate informations. Thus, petitioners erroneously invoke duplicity of charges as a ground to
quash the Informations.
2. A single act or incident might offend against two or more entirely distinct and unrelated
provisions of law thus justifying the prosecution of the accused for more than one offense. The
only limit to this rule is the Constitutional prohibition that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy
of punishment for the same offense.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court held that two (or more) offenses arising from the same
act are not the same if one provision requires proof of an additional fact or element which the
other does not, that two (or more) offenses arising from the same act are not the same if one
provision of law requires proof of an additional fact or element which the other does not.
Phrased elsewise, where two different laws (or articles of the same code) define two crimes,
prior jeopardy as to one of them is no obstacle to a prosecution of the other, although both

offenses arise from the same facts, if each crime involves some important act which is not an
essential element of the other. Consequently, the filing of the multiple charges against
petitioners, although based on the same incident, is consistent with settled doctrine.
As aptly pointed out by the BSP in its memorandum, there are differences between the
two (2) offenses. A DOSRI violation consists in the failure to observe and comply with
procedural, reportorial or ceiling requirements prescribed by law in the grant of a loan to a
director, officer, stockholder and other related interests in the bank, i.e. lack of written approval
of the majority of the directors of the bank and failure to enter such approval into corporate
records and to transmit a copy thereof to the BSP supervising department. The elements of
abuse of confidence, deceit, fraud or false pretenses, and damage, which are essential to the
prosecution for estafa, are not elements of a DOSRI violation. The filing of several charges
against Soriano was, therefore, proper.
3. The fundamental test in considering a motion to quash anchored on Section 3(a),
Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, is whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically
admitted, would establish the essential elements of the offense charged as defined by law. The
trial court may not consider a situation contrary to that set forth in the criminal complaint or
information. Facts that constitute the defense of the petitioners against the charge under the
information must be proved by them during trial. Such facts or circumstances do not constitute
proper grounds for a motion to quash the information on the ground that the material averments
do not constitute the offense.
In the present case, the informations contain material allegations charging Soriano with
violation of DOSRI rules and estafa thru falsification of commercial documents.

Claudio J. Teehankee, Jr.


v. Hon. Job B. Madayag, and People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 103102; March 6, 1992
Special civil action for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus
Facts:

July 19, 1991 Petitioner was charged with frustrated murder


After which, the prosecution rested its case, and petitioner was allowed to file a motion
for leave to file a demurrer to evidence. However, before said motion could be filed, the
victim died
October 31, 1991 Private prosecutor filed an omnibus motion for leave of court, and
subsequently amended the information from frustrated murder to murder
November 13, 1991 The trial court accepted the amended information
November 26, 1991 Petitioner refused to be arraigned on the amended information,
citing the reason of lack of preliminary investigation on the amended information. Thus
the judge ordered the entry of a not guilty plea on behalf of the petitioner.
Petitioners counsel manifested that he would not take part in the proceedings because
of the legal issue the petitioner raised, thus the judge appointed a counsel de oficio to
represent petitioner

Issues:

Whether or not an amended information involving a substantial amendment, without


preliminary investigation, after the prosecution has rested on the original information,
may legally and validly be admitted;
Whether or not a counsel de oficio may legally and validly be appointed to represent an
accused who is represented by counsel of choice who refuses to participate in the

proceedings because of a perceived denial of due process and after a plea for appellate
remedies within a short period is denied by the trial court; and
Whether or not a particular criminal case may legally and validly be rushed and
preferentially scheduled for trial over and at the expense and sacrifice of other,
especially older, criminal cases.

Held:

Yes. Section 14, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:
Sec. 14. Amendment. The information or complaint may be amended, in
substance or form, without leave of court, at any time before the accused pleads;
and thereafter and during the trial as to all matters of form, by leave and at the
discretion of the court, when the same can be done without prejudice to the rights
of the accused.
If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in
charging the proper offense, the court shall dismiss the original complaint or
information upon the filing of a new one charging the proper offense in
accordance with Rule 119, Section 11, provided the accused would not be placed
thereby in double jeopardy and may also require the witnesses to give bail for
their appearance at the trial.

The first paragraph provides for the rules of amendments, while the second provides for
substitution.
In determining, therefore, whether there should be an amendment under the first paragraph of
Section 14, Rule 110, or a substitution of information under the second paragraph thereof, the
rule is that where the second information involves the same offense, or an offense which
necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the first information, and amendment of the
information is sufficient; otherwise, where the new information charges an offense which is
distinct and different from that initially charged, a substitution is in order.
It is evident that frustrated murder is but a stage in the execution of the crime of murder, hence
the former is necessarily included in the latter. Except for the death of the victim, the essential
elements of consummated murder likewise constitute the essential ingredients to convict herein
petitioner for the offense of frustrated murder.

Yes. There is nothing irregular in the appointment by the trial court of a counsel de
oficio for herein petitioner whose counsel of record refused to participate in the
proceedings because of an alleged legal issue.

Yes. For as long as the substantial rights of herein petitioner and other persons charged
in court are not prejudiced, the scheduling of cases should be left to the sound discretion
of the trial court.

DR. JOEL C. MENDEZ, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND COURT OF TAX APPEALS
Facts:
The Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) filed a complaint affidavit with the Department of
Justice against the petitioner. The BIR alleged that the petitioner had been operating as a single
proprietor doing business and/or exercising his profession for taxable years 2001 to 2003. The
BIR alleged that petitioner failed to file his income tax returns for taxable years 2001 to 2003
and, consequently evaded his obligation to pay the correct amount of taxes due the
government.
After a preliminary investigation, State Prosecutor Juan Pedro Navera found probable
cause against petitioner for non-filing of income tax returns for taxable years 2001 and 2002 and
for failure to supply correct and accurate information as to his true income for taxable year 2003,
in violation of the National Internal Revenue Code. Accordingly an Information was filed with the
CTA charging the petitioner with violation of Section 255 of Republic Act No. 8424 (Tax Reform
Act of 1997). The
Information reads:
That on or about the 15th day of April, 2002, at Quezon City, and within the jurisdiction of
[the CTA] the above named accused, a duly registered taxpayer, and sole proprietor of
Weigh Less Center with principal office at No. 31 Roces Avenue, Quezon City, and with
several branches in Quezon City, Makati, San Fernando and Dagupan City, did then and
there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously fail to file his Income Tax Return (ITR) with the
Bureau of Internal Revenue for the taxable year 2001, to the damage and prejudice of
the Government in the estimated amount of P1,089,439.08, exclusive of penalties,
surcharges and interest.
CONTRARY TO LAW.

The accused was arraigned and pleaded not guilty on March 5, 2007. On May 4, 2007,
the prosecution filed a Motion to Amend Information with Leave of Court. The amended
information reads:
That on or about the 15th day of April, 2002, at Quezon City, and within the jurisdiction
of [the CTA] the above named accused, doing business under the name and style
ofWeigh Less Center/Mendez Medical Group, with several branches in Quezon
City,Muntinlupa City, Mandaluyong City and Makati City, did then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously fail to file his income tax return (ITR) with the Bureau of
Internal Revenue for income earned for the taxable year 2001, to the damage and
prejudice of the Government in the estimated amount of P1,089,439.08, exclusive of
penalties, surcharges and interest (underscoring and boldfacing in the original).
The petitioner failed to file his comment to the motion within the required period; thus,
the CTA First Division granted the prosecutions motion. The CTA ruled that the prosecutions
amendment is merely a formal one as it merely states with additional precision something
already contained in the original information. The petitioner failed to show that the defenses
applicable under the original information can no longer be used under the amended information
since both the original and the amended information charges the petitioner with the same
offense (violation of Section 255).
The petitioner claims in his petition that the prosecutions amendment is a substantial
amendment prohibited under Section 14, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
It is substantial in nature because its additional allegations alter the prosecutions theory of the
case so as to cause surprise to him and affect the form of his defense. Thus, he was not
properly informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
Issue:
Whether the prosecutions amendments made after the petitioners arraignment are
substantial in nature and must perforce be denied?
Held:
No.
Section 14, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure governs the matter of
amending the information:
Amendment or substitution. A complaint or information may be amended, in form or in
substance, without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea. After
the plea and during the trial, a formal amendment may only be made with leave of court
and when it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused.
However, any amendment before plea, which downgrades the nature of the offense
charged in or excludes any accused from the complaint or information, can be made
only upon motion by the prosecutor, with notice to the offended party and with leave of
court. The court shall state its reasons in resolving the motion and copies of its order
shall be furnished all parties, especially the offended party.
There is no precise definition of what constitutes a substantial amendment. According to
jurisprudence, substantial matters in the complaint or information consist of the recital of facts

constituting the offense charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of the court. Under Section
14, however, the prosecution is given the right to amend the information, regardless of the
nature of the amendment, so long as the amendment is sought before the accused enters his
plea, subject to the qualification under the second paragraph of Section 14.
Once the accused is arraigned and enters his plea, however, Section 14 prohibits the
prosecution from seeking a substantial amendment, particularly mentioning those that may
prejudice the rights of the accused. One of these rights is the constitutional right of the accused
to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him, a right which is given life
during the arraignment of the accused of the charge of against him. The theory in law is that
since the accused officially begins to prepare his defense against the accusation on the basis of
the recitals in the information read to him during arraignment, then the prosecution must
establish
its
case
on
the
basis
of
the
same
information.
Amendments that do not charge another offense different from that charged in the original
one; or do not alter the prosecution's theory of the case so as to cause surprise to the accused
and affect the form of defense he has or will assume are considered merely as formal
amendments.
As to when the rights of an accused are prejudiced by an amendment made after he had
pleaded to the original information, Montenegro ruled that prejudice exists when a defense
under the original information would no longer be available after the amendment is made, and
when any evidence the accused might have, would be inapplicable to the Information as
amended.
The jurisprudential test on whether a defendant is prejudiced by the amendment of an
information pertains to the availability of the same defense and evidence that the accused
previously had under the original information. This test, however, must be read together with the
characteristic thread of formal amendments, which is to maintain the nature of the crime or the
essence of the offense charged.
In the present case, the amendments sought by the prosecution pertains to (i) the alleged
change in the date in the commission of the crime from 2001 to 2002; (ii) the addition of the
phrase doing business under the name and style of Mendez Medical Group; (iii) the change
and/or addition of the branches of petitioners operation; and (iv) the addition of the phrase for
income earned. Thread remained consistently under the amended information, alleging the
petitioners failure to file his return and consequently to pay the correct amount of taxes.
Accordingly, the petitioner could not have been surprised at all. The Court cannot see how these
amendments would adversely affect any substantial right of the petitioner as accused.
Petition was dismissed.

Leviste v. Alameda
G.R. No. 182677 / August 03, 2010 / J. Carpio-Morales
Facts:
Jose Antonio C. Leviste (petitioner) was charged with homicide for the death of Rafael
de las Alas on January 12, 2007 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City. Branch
150 to which the case was raffled, presided by Judge Elmo Alameda, forthwith issued a
commitment order against petitioner who was placed under police custody while confined at the
Makati Medical Center. After petitioner posted a P40,000 cash bond which the trial court
approved, he was released from detention, and his arraignment was set on January 24, 2007.
The private complainants-heirs of De las Alas filed, with the conformity of the public
prosecutor, an Urgent Omnibus Motion praying, inter alia, for the deferment of the proceedings
to allow the public prosecutor to re-examine the evidence on record or to conduct a
reinvestigation
to
determine
the
proper
offense.
The RTC thereafter issued an Order deferring petitioners arraignment and allowing the
prosecution to conduct a reinvestigation to determine the proper offense, and another order
denying reconsideration of the first order. Leviste assailed these orders via certiorari and
prohibition before the CA.
Meantime, petitioner filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation and Motion before the trial
court to defer acting on the public prosecutor's recommendation on the proper offense until after
the appellate court resolves his application for injunctive reliefs, or alternatively, to grant him
time to comment on the prosecutor's recommendation and thereafter set a hearing for the

judicial determination of probable cause. Petitioner also separately moved for the inhibition of
Judge Alameda with prayer to defer action on the admission of the Amended Information.
The trial court nonetheless issued the other assailed orders, which, first, admitted the
Amended Information for murder and directed the issuance of a warrant of arrest; and second,
set the arraignment on February 13, 2007. Leviste questioned these two orders via a
supplemental petition before the appellate court.
The CA dismissed Levistes petition hence this petition for review was filed before the
SC.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent Judge Alameda erred in granting the reinvestigation and
admitting State Prosecutor Velascos amended information.
Ruling:
No. Since a reinvestigation may entail a modification of the criminal information as what
happened in the present case, the Court's holding is bolstered by the rule on amendment of an
information under Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court:
A complaint or information may be amended, in form or in substance, without
leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea. After the plea and
during the trial, a formal amendment may only be made with leave of court and when it
can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused.
However, any amendment before plea, which downgrades the nature of the offense
charged in or excludes any accused from the complaint or information, can be made
only upon motion by the prosecutor, with notice to the offended party and with leave of
court. The court shall state its reasons in resolving the motion and copies of its order
shall be furnished all parties, especially the offended party.
If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the
proper offense, the court shall dismiss the original complaint or information upon the
filing of a new one charging the proper offense in accordance with section 11, Rule 119,
provided the accused would not be placed in double jeopardy. The court may require
the witnesses to give bail for their appearance at the trial.
In fine, before the accused enters a plea, a formal or substantial amendment of the complaint or
information may be made without leave of court. After the entry of a plea, only a formal
amendment may be made but with leave of court and only if it does not prejudice the rights of
the accused. After arraignment, a substantial amendment is proscribed except if the same is
beneficial to the accused.
It must be clarified though that not all defects in an information are curable by amendment prior
to entry of plea. An information which is void ab initio cannot be amended to obviate a ground
for quashal. An amendment which operates to vest jurisdiction upon the trial court is likewise
impermissible.
Considering the general rule that an information may be amended even in substance and even
without leave of court at any time before entry of plea, does it mean that the conduct of a
reinvestigation at that stage is a mere superfluity?

It is not.
Any remedial measure springing from the reinvestigation - be it a complete disposition or an
intermediate modification of the charge - is eventually addressed to the sound discretion of the
trial court, which must make an independent evaluation or assessment of the merits of the
case. Since the trial court would ultimately make the determination on the proposed course of
action, it is for the prosecution to consider whether a reinvestigation is necessary to adduce and
review the evidence for purposes of buttressing the appropriate motion to be filed in court.
More importantly, reinvestigation is required in cases involving a substantial amendment of the
information. Due process of law demands that no substantial amendment of an information may
be admitted without conducting another or a new preliminary investigation. In Matalam v. The
2nd Division of the Sandiganbayan, the Court ruled that a substantial amendment in an
information entitles an accused to another preliminary investigation, unless the amended
information contains a charge related to or is included in the original Information.
The question to be resolved is whether the amendment of the Information from homicide
to murder is considered a substantial amendment, which would make it not just a right
but a duty of the prosecution to ask for a preliminary investigation.
The Court answers in the affirmative.
A substantial amendment consists of the recital of facts constituting the offense charged
and determinative of the jurisdiction of the court. All other matters are merely of form. The
following have been held to be mere formal amendments: (1) new allegations which relate only
to the range of the penalty that the court might impose in the event of conviction; (2) an
amendment which does not charge another offense different or distinct from that charged in the
original one; (3) additional allegations which do not alter the prosecution's theory of the case so
as to cause surprise to the accused and affect the form of defense he has or will assume; (4) an
amendment which does not adversely affect any substantial right of the accused; and (5) an
amendment that merely adds specifications to eliminate vagueness in the information and not to
introduce new and material facts, and merely states with additional precision something which is
already contained in the original information and which adds nothing essential for conviction for
the crime charged.
The test as to whether a defendant is prejudiced by the amendment is whether a defense
under the information as it originally stood would be available after the amendment is
made, and whether any evidence defendant might have would be equally applicable to
the information in the one form as in the other. An amendment to an information which does
not change the nature of the crime alleged therein does not affect the essence of the offense or
cause surprise or deprive the accused of an opportunity to meet the new averment had each
been held to be one of form and not of substance.
Matalam adds that the mere fact that the two charges are related does not necessarily or
automatically deprive the accused of his right to another preliminary investigation. Notatu
dignum is the fact that both the original Information and the amended Information
in Matalam were similarly charging the accused with violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act.
In one case, it was squarely held that the amendment of the Information from homicide to
murder is "one of substance with very serious consequences." The amendment involved in the

present case consists of additional averments of the circumstances of treachery, evident


premeditation, and cruelty, which qualify the offense charged from homicide to murder. It being
a new and material element of the offense, petitioner should be given the chance to adduce
evidence on the matter. Not being merely clarificatory, the amendment essentially varies the
prosecution's original theory of the case and certainly affects not just the form but the weight of
defense to be mustered by petitioner.
The Court distinguishes the factual milieus in Buhat v. CA and Pacoy v. Cajigal, wherein the
amendment of the caption of the Information from homicide to murder was not considered
substantial because there was no real change in the recital of facts constituting the offense
charged as alleged in the body of the Information, as the allegations of qualifying circumstances
were already clearly embedded in the original Information. Buhat pointed out that the original
Information for homicide already alleged the use of superior strength, while Pacoy states that
the averments in the amended Information for murder are exactly the same as those already
alleged in the original Information for homicide. None of these peculiar circumstances obtains in
the present case.
Considering that another or a new preliminary investigation is required, the fact that what
was conducted in the present case was a reinvestigation does not invalidate the
substantial amendment of the Information. There is no substantial distinction between a
preliminary investigation and a reinvestigation since both are conducted in the same
manner and for the same objective of determining whether there exists sufficient ground
to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is
probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. What is essential is that petitioner was
placed on guard to defend himself from the charge of murder after the claimed circumstances
were made known to him as early as the first motion.
Petitioner did not, however, make much of the opportunity to present countervailing evidence on
the proposed amended charge. Despite notice of hearing, petitioner opted to merely observe
the proceedings and declined to actively participate, even with extreme caution, in the
reinvestigation. Mercado v. Court of Appeals states that the rules do not even require, as a
condition sine qua non to the validity of a preliminary investigation, the presence of the
respondent as long as efforts to reach him were made and an opportunity to controvert the
complainant's evidence was accorded him.

BUHAT v. CA
Facts:
On March 25, 1993, an information for HOMICIDE was filed in the (RTC) against
petitioner Danny Buhat, John Doe and Richard Doe. The information alleged that on October
16, 1992, petitioner Danilo Buhat, armed with a knife, unlawfully attacked and killed one Ramon
George Yu while the said two unknown assailants held his arms, using superior strength,
inflicting mortal wounds which were the direct cause of his death. Even before petitioner could
be arraigned, the prosecution moved for the deferment of the arraignment on the ground that
the private complainant in the case, one Betty Yu, moved for the reconsideration of the
resolution of the City Prosecutor which ordered the filing of the aforementioned information for
homicide. Petitioner however, invoking his right to a speedy trial, opposed the motion. Thus,
petitioner was arraigned on June 9, 1993 and, since petitioner pleaded not guilty, trial ensued.
Drilon, ordered the City Prosecutor of Roxas City to amend the information by upgrading
the offense charged to MURDER and implead therein additional accused Herminia Altavas,
Osmea Altavas and Renato Buhat. The Assistant City Prosecutor filed a motion for leave to
amend information. The amendment as proposed was opposed by the petitioner.

Issue:

Whether or not the upgrading of the crime charged from homicide to the more serious
offense of murder is such a substantial amendment that it is proscribed if made after the
accused had pleaded not guilty to the crime of homicide.
Held:
No. In the case of Dionaldo v. Dacuycuy it was held that:
x x x the provision which is relevant to the problem is Rule 110, Sec. 13 [now
Sec. 14 under the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure] of the Rules of Court which
stipulates:
x x x The information or complaint may be amended, in substance or form,
without leave of court, at any time before the defendants pleads; and thereafter
and during the trial as to all matters of form, by leave and at the discretion of
the court, when the same can be done without prejudice to the rights of the
defendant.

The cited ruling, however, differs from the case at bench because the facts herein
sustain a contrary holding. As pointed out by the Court of Appeals:
x x x the original Information, while only mentioning homicide, alleged:
Danny Buhat, John Doe and Richard Doe as the accused; of Danny Buhat stabbing the
deceased Ramon while his two other companions were holding the arms of Ramon, thus, the
information already alleged superior strength; and inflicting mortal wounds which led to the
death of Ramon.
Superior strength qualifies the offense to murder (Article 248).
In a criminal case, due process requires that, among others, the accusation be in due
form, and that notice thereof and an opportunity to answer the charged be given the
accused;hence, the constitutional and reglementary guarantees as to accuseds right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
In the event, however, that the appellation of the crime charged as determined by the
public prosecutor, does not exactly correspond to the actual crime constituted by the criminal
acts described in the information to have been committed by the accused, what controls is the
description of the said criminal acts and not the technical name of the crime supplied by
the public prosecutor.
Attention should be directed to the facts alleged. The real question is not did he commit
a crime given in the law some technical and specific name, but did he perform the acts alleged
in the body of the information in the matter therein set forth.

In other words, the real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption
or preamble of the information nor from the specification of the provision of the law alleged to
have been violated, but from the actual recital of facts as alleged in the body of the information.
Petitioner in the case at bench maintains that, having already pleaded not guilty to the
crime of homicide, the amendment of the crime charged in the information from homicide to
murder is a substantial amendment prejudicial to his right to be informed of the nature of the
accusation against him. He utterly fails to dispute, however, that the original information did
allege that petitioner stabbed his victim using superior strength. And this particular allegation
qualifies a killing to murder, regardless of how such a killing is technically designated in the
information filed by the public prosecutor.

SSGT. JOSE M. PACOY v. HON. AFABLE E. CAJIGAL,


PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and OLYMPIO L. ESCUETA
GR No. 157472, 28 September 2007; 534 SCRA 338
FACTS: Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 filed by Ssgt. Jose M. Pacoy seeking to annul and
set aside the Orders issued by Presiding Judge Afable E. Cajigal of RTC Camiling, Tarlac.
An Information for Homicide was filed in the RTC against petitioner Pacoy for unlawfully
and feloniously shooting his commanding officer Lt. Frederick Esquita with his armalite rifle
hitting and sustaining multiple gunshot wounds on Lt. Esquitas body which caused the
latters death. Said information also stated the aggravating circumstance of killing Lt. Esquita
in disregard of his rank.
Upon arraignment, Pacoy pleaded not guilty of the crime charged.
After arraignment, Judge Cajigal issued an order directing the trial prosecutor to correct
and amend the Information to Murder in view of the aggravating circumstance of
disregard of rank alleged in the Information.
The prosecutor entered his amendment by crossing out the word Homicide and instead
wrote the word Murder in the caption and in the opening paragraph of the Information.
However, the accusatory portion remained exactly the same as that of the original
Information of Homicide.
On the pre-trial, counsel for Pacoy objected to be re-arraigned on the ground that the
latter would be placed in double jeopardy, considering that his Homicide case had been
terminated without his express consent resulting in the dismissal of the case.

Pacoy filed a Motion to Quash with Motion to Suspend Proceedings Pending the
Resolution of the Instant Motion on the ground of double jeopardy.
Judge Cajigal denied the Motion to Quash due to the following reasons:
a. A claim of former acquittal or conviction does not constitute double jeopardy and
cannot be sustained unless judgment was rendered acquitting or convicting the
defendant in the former prosecution;
b. Petitioner was never acquitted or convicted of Homicide since the Information was
merely corrected/amended before the trial commenced;
c. The Information for Homicide was patently insufficient in substance; and
d. The allegation of aggravating circumstance of disregard of rank which qualified
Homicide to Murder.
Pacoy filed a Motion for Reconsideration reiterating the following:
a. The case against him was dismissed due the lack of his express intent to terminate
the proceedings, which then is a ground to quash information. Thus, to try him
against for the same offense constitutes double jeopardy.
b. The disregard of rank is a generic aggravating circumstance which only serves to
affect the imposition of the penalty period.
c. The correction/amendment made was substantial and under the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure, this cannot be done since the petitioner had already been
arraigned.
Judge Cajigal granted the MR and found out that disregard of rank is merely a generic
mitigating circumstance which should not elevate the classification of the crime of homicide
to murder.
Petitioner Pacoy filed herein petition for certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether or not Hon. Afable E. Cajigal committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering
the trial prosecutor amend the Information after petitioner had pleaded not guilty of the charge of
Information for Homicide.

RULING: Hon. Afable E. Cajigal did not commit grave abuse of discretion on the issue.
Section 14, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides the margin
between amendment and substitution: (Teehankee v. Madayag)
Amendment
May involve either formal or substantial
changes
Can be effected without leave of court if
occurred before plea has been entered
(Form) There is no need for another preliminary
investigation and the retaking of the plea of the
accused
Refers the same offense charged in the original
information or to an offense which necessarily
includes or is necessarily included in the
original charge

Substitution
Necessarily involves a substantial change from
the original charge
There must always be with leave court as the
original information has to be dismissed
Another preliminary investigation is entailed
and the accused has to plead anew to the new
information
Requires or presupposes that the new
information involves a different offense which
does not include or is not necessarily included
in the original charge

(Substance) Amendments to the information


after the pleas has been taken cannot be made
over the objection of the accused, for if the
original information would be withdrawn, the
accused can invoke double jeopardy

The accused cannot claim double jeopardy

In the present case, the change of the offense charged from Homicide to Murder is
merely a formal amendment and not a substantial amendment or a substitution. While
the amended Information was for Murder, a reading of the Information shows that the only
change made was in the caption of the case. There was no change in the recital of facts
constituting the offense charged or in the determination of jurisdiction of the court.
Both amendment and substitution of the Information may be made before or after the
defendant pleads.
Section 14, Rule 110 also provides that in allowing formal amendments in cases in which
the accused has already pleaded, it is necessary that the amendments do not prejudice the
rights of the accused. The test of whether the rights of an accused are prejudiced by
the amendment of complaint or information is whether a defense under the complaint or
information, as it originally stood, would no longer be available after the amendment is
made.
Requisites for the existence of double jeopardy:
a. A first jeopardy attached prior to the second;
The first jeopardy attaches only: (1) after a valid indictment; (2) before a competent
court; (3) after arraignment; (4) when a valid plea has been entered; and (5) when
the accused was acquitted or convicted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his consent.
b. The first jeopardy has been validly terminated; and
c. A second jeopardy is for the same offense as in the first.
Petitioners contention that respondent judge dismissed or terminated his case for homicide
without his express consent, which is tantamount to acquittal, is misplaced. Petition is
DISMISSED, there being no grave abuse of discretion committed by respondent Judge
Afable E. Cajigal.