Colloquium September 2003

Rio de Janeiro

D2-A15

SCADA for the Operation of the Transmission Line SoutheastNortheast (Brazil)

Nestor Galmn
Transba S.A.

Guillermo Lizzano
Tansener S.A.

Rodolfo Pellizzoni
Transba S.A.
rodolfo.pellizzoni@transx.com.ar
(Argentina)

Rudy Roccia
Transener S.A.

Abstract

The SCADA System described enables the automatic and centralised operation of the 500 kV
transmission line, over 1000 Km long, that joins the Serra da Mesa and Sepeau Substations located
in the Northeast of Brazil. At the substation level, the system has a modern architecture based on a
normalized Station Bus, a Station Unit and Bay Units. It is structured with a Control Centre that by
means of a WAN, using the IEC 60870-5-104 protocol, telecontrols the five substations that make up
this electrical system. The communication system is based on an O.P.G.W Fiber Optic cable. The
Control Centre, located in Sapeau, sends information to the Control Centres located in Rio de
Janeiro and Recife owned by ONS, Pituau and Paulo Alfonso III, Bahia owned by CHESF, and
Itumbiara, Minas Gerais owned by Furnas.

1.0 INTRODUCTION
The architecture implemented in the automation of the substations respond, to some extent, to the
new SAS (Substation Automation System) concept of the IEC 61850, Fig. 1, in that it is formed at the
Station Level by an Ethernet bus and not by a proprietary bus. In spite of this, at the Bay and Process
levels the conventional architecture was adopted, that is to say, with parallel connections between the
primary equipment and the secondary equipment. To this regard, the cabling could have been
simplified and the investment reduced, but a normalized process bus, in the context of a normalized
architecture, which would assure the future interoperativeness of the devices is not yet available in the
market.

On the other hand, even though the technology existing in the market is already offering combined
units for control and protection, independent units were chosen for this project. Here, a concept of
conventional architecture took precedence. Since, if combined units or devices for control and
protection (C/P IEDs) had been used, the architecture required would have been a more complex one,

since probably, duplication of the Station Unit and the Bay Units would have been necessary in order
to achieve an adequate availability and security

HMI
Station Level
ComU

SU

Station Bus
(Future IEC 61850 - 8 1)

Bay Level
C/P

CU

PU

IEDs
Process Bus
(Future IEC 61850 - 9- 1 and IEC 61850 - 9 - 2)

Process Level
A

Fig. 1 SAS Architecture

2.0 CONTROL PHILOSOPHY

With respect to the system functions, the control philosophy is based in the classic SCADA
functionality, which relates the state of the electric system at the station with the acquired information
of position of circuit breakers and isolating switches, level of current and voltage in bars and lines, and
transmission of active and reactive energy. The CC, CA supply and the tripping of the circuits are also
supervised, as customary.

The SCADA system has a structure based on one Station Unit and a bay oriented architecture where
the bay corresponds to a line or a transformer. The control, protection and data acquisition linked to a
line or a transformer have been, therefore, installed in Bay Units or IEDs. The functions are divided
among a few, different independent hardware units (IEDs) to optimize the requirements of reliability,
safety and tolerance to failures.

The Bay Units are linked to the Station Unit by means of duplicated point-to-point links, using
F.O./electric media converters and IEC 60870-5-101 data transmission protocol.

The protection relays are linked to the Station Unit through a double electric-F.O. conversion
(electric/F.O.-F.O./electric), using DNP 3.0, IEC 60870-5-103 and proprietary data transmission
protocols.

In general, the IEDs or Bay Units which control and supervise objects such as a transmission line or a
transformer, have been mounted in one or more racks placed in the relay house, and the Station Unit
in the control room of the stations.
The Bay Units, in addition to the data acquisition functions and the control functions, have also the
function of intelocking the isolating switches and of blocking of the circuit breakers, as well as of intertripping.

In some of the conditions of interlocking, the Bay Units, for the equipment correct operation, need to
interchange variables of the different bays. The interchange of this information does not occur directly
between these units, but through the Station Unit.
The control, the data acquisition, the interlocking at bay level, the synchronism verification, the
recording of perturbations or the zero voltage supervision are functions which have been programmed
at the IEDs or Bay Units. While such functions as the automatic restoration has been implemented at
the Substation Unit, since it needs the input information supplied by different IEDs or Bay Units in
order to be executed correctly.

The protection functions are considered, from the functional point of view, as part of the equipment at
bay level, but report to the Station Unit. That is to say that the alarms and tripping information of the
protections are transmitted to the Station Unit.

The system implemented has a series of functions for the remote maintenance of protection devices
and remote registering of perturbations. Communication with these devices is carried out through a
WAN structured on an fiber optic communication system that links the five stations. At local level, the
links of the different devices with the Station Unit are also implemented with F.O. In the station, the
remote access to the protection devices occurs through a terminal server, connected to the LAN.
Among others the systems renders as facility, the remote access to protection devices, allowing for
adjustment and configuration of all the parameters, the reading/reset of instructions, values taken at
failure and values of service of analogic and digital inputs.

The operation at the station is carried out through an HMI used as the operator interface within the
station. It is possible to have access to the Bay Units and to the Station Unit through the HMI interface.
The operation, at local level, can be carried out through this HMI which allows operation on all the
station equipment. From the Bay Units, it is possible to operate on the equipment pertaining to that
bay, and obviously, it is also possible to operate each equipment, at the field, at the base of the
equipment.

3.0 SUBSTATION ARCHITECTURE

The system is based on a client/server architecture, made up of a SCADA server, a SCADA client and
automation components.

In each substation, the SCADA architecture, is based on two hot stand-by Work Stations equipped
with two monitors each, a Development and Engineering Work Station, a Station Unit, Bay Units and
protection equipments, Fig 2. Beside the modern architecture of the SCADA system used at the
Station Level, the criterion adopted was based on not concentrating the control and protection
functions in a single IED. Therefore, and subject to a conventional philosophy on this issue modern
numerical protections have been installed. The protection alarms and tripping data are transmitted to
the Station Unit using the DNP 3.0 and IEC 60870-5-103 protocols over fiber optic links.

SDH - MUX

SDH - MUX

G 703

G 703

Router

Router

Switch
Switch

Station Bus

RS 232

Station Unit

IEC 60870-5-103

TS

DNP 3.0

IEC 60870-5-101

Bay Units
Protection
Units

Protection
Units

Fig. 2 Typical Substation Architecture

The Station Unit, is the higher level automation unit, and it is based on modular multi-processor
technology, in which each single function, for example peripheral signal processing, automation
functions, communication functions or protocol functions, is decoupled from the next and performed by
the appropriate firmware. Up to 19 communication and processing elements can be operated by the
Station Unit, but in each HV/MV substation, the number of elements is function of the configuration of
the substation.

The communication elements carry out data traffic with other components, each

element being able to do so with up to 4 serial interfaces, or one field-bus or LAN interface. The
processing elements perform higher-level processing tasks, for instance the sorting of real time data,
filing of values and events, or automation functions.

One of the four channels of each of the communication processors of the Station Unit, is used to link
with the existing switches (Switch 1 and Switch 2).
The Bay Units have direct process interfacing which enable them to handle the signalling and control
voltages of up 220 VDC, the protected command output with switching capabilities ranging to 660 W,
and the direct current and voltage transformer input.

The Bay Units receive information on the status of the circuit breakers and disconnectors. Likewise,
they are responsible for carrying out commands, interchanging information among themselves through
the Station Unit. The Station Unit does a general polling of the Bay Units every 8 seconds. By means
of the software these units carry out interlockings, blocking logic, intertripping and synchronisation
operations. The Bay Units are modular, processor controlled, parameterizable automation devices for
the combined tasks of integrated field oriented process control and telecontrol. These IEDs are high
performing in terms of environmental conditions such as operating temperature (-25 C to +70 C), and
electromagnetic compatibility (EMC).

The communication between the Bay Units and the Station Unit, which is a master-slave type
relationship, is carried out through a duplicated (4 filaments) Fiber Optic connection, within a star type
configuration, and it uses the IEC 60870-5-101 protocol in an unbalanced mode.

The system configuration is based on a duplicated LAN Ethernet. Likewise, the Station Unit develops
gateway functions, and it allows for the information exchange between the LAN and the WAN through
routers using the IEC 60870-104 protocol, over TCP/IP.

The Development and Engineering Station of each substation allows for the remote configuration of
the Station Unit and the Bay Units, the configuration of the protection devices, and the acquisition of
protections oscilographic registers and the perturbation registers through a proprietary protocol.

4.0 SOFTWARE
The system uses a SCADA object oriented software, which means that it does not take into
consideration data points but technological objects for displays and data models. The Operative
System is Windows NT, and the Data Base is Oracle.

The local control and automation functions are also implemented with object-oriented software. This
software uses graphical function-diagram technology which comprises hundreds of processing
modules, allowing a rapid configuration, testing online and offline, including integrated oscilloscope
functions, and documentation set-point values. It comprises processing modules for logic and
arithmetic operations, higher mathematical functions, non linear characteristic curves, curve
adaptations, step-by-step control, close-loop control functions, and program control functions.

5.0 COMMUNICATIONS
The communication system is SDH (STM-1), based on Fiber Optic cable type O.P.G.W., with PDH
derivations. The total length of the O.P.G.W. cable is 1.127,794 km. The F.O. cable used is made up
of 36 fibers type SMR (Single Mode Reduced), divided in six groups of six fibers each, which comply
with UTU-T G.652. The fibers have been designed to work in 3rd window (1550 nm), and to have an
attenuation that must be less than 0,21 db/km.
Due to the distance between each substation, it was necessary to install regenerative stations among
them (Fig. 3).

63.436 m
133.333 m
127.321 m

209.221 m
133.570 m

SDM

114.800 m

208.998 m

Reg. N 2
131.315 m

BJLII

SAP

Reg. N 1
Reg. N 3

Reg. N 4

IBI

RDE

Fig. 3 Communication System O.P.G.W. Fiber Optic Cable

The WAN topology is based in a party-line channel and a direct channel among the different
substations and the Control Centre.
The communications between the control center system and the automation components in the
substations occurs via Ethernet-TCP/IP (IEC 60870-5-104).
The communication between the Sapeau Control Center and the other Control Centers to which it
must report takes place by means of rented and land satellite channels.
6.0 CONCLUSIONS
The use of an architecture based in a normalized LAN (Ethernet) at the Station Level, and IEDs
(Station Unit and Bay Units), jointly with the transmission protocol IEC 60870-5-104 adopted, will
facilitate, in the future, an easier transition to the new architecture IEC 61850.

Likewise, the adoption of an object oriented software in this system, will undoubtly help to make this
transition to the SAS architecture, as it is being normalized by IEC, easier and more feasible.