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Social Security System (SSS) Employees Association

vs.
Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 85279, July 28, 1989
Facts:
The petitioners went on strike after the SSS failed to act upon the unionsdemands concerning the implementation
of their CBA. SSS filed before the courtaction for damages with prayer for writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners
for staging an illegal strike. The court issued a temporary restrainingorder pending the resolution of the application for
preliminary injunction while petitioners filed a motion to dismiss alleging the courts lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter. Petitioners contend that the court made reversible error in taking cognizance on the subject matter since the
jurisdiction lies on the DOLE or the National Labor Relations Commission as the case involves a labor dispute. The Social
Security System contends on one hand that the petitioners are covered by the Civil Servicelaws, rules and regulation thus
have no right to strike. They are not covered by the NLRC or DOLE therefore the court may enjoin the petitioners from
striking.
Issue:
Whether or not Social Security System employers have the right to strike.
Ruling:
The Constitutional provisions enshrined on Human Rights and Social Justice provides guarantee among workers
with the right to organize and conduct peacefulconcerted activities such as strikes. On one hand, Section 14 of E.O No. 180
provides that the Civil Service law and rules governing concerted activities and strikes in the government service shall be
observed, subject to any legislation that may be enacted by Congress referring to Memorandum Circular No. 6, s. 1987 of
the Civil Service Commission which states that prior to the enactment by Congress of applicable laws concerning strike by
government employees enjoinsunder pain of administrative sanctions, all government officers and employeesfrom staging
strikes, demonstrations, mass leaves, walk-outs and other forms of mass action which will result in temporary stoppage or
disruption of public service. Therefore in the absence of any legislation allowing government employees tostrike they are
prohibited from doing so.

People vs. Sandiganbayan

FACTS
This is a petition for certiorari filed by the Office of the Ombudsman towards the decision 1 of the Sandiganbayan, granting
private respondent Alejandro A. Villapandos Demurrer to Evidence and acquitting him of the crime of unlawful appointment
under Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code.
Mayor Villapando was the duly elected Municipal Mayor of San Vicente, Palawan when the alleged crime was committed.
On July 1998, the accused appointed Orlando Tiape, who lost in May 1998 election, as Municipal Administrator of the said
municipality. However, respondents contend that the appointee possesses all the qualifications stated in Article 244 of the
Revised Penal Code.
On the other hand, petitioner argues that the Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction because its interpretation of Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code does not
complement the provision on the one-year prohibition found in the 1987 Constitution and the Local Government Code.
ISSUE
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division, acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
RULING
The Court ruled that the Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division, in disregarding basic rules of statutory construction, acted with
grave abuse of discretion.The legal maxim ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus. Basic is the rule in statutory
construction that where the law does not distinguish, the courts should not distinguish. There should be no distinction in the
application of a law where none is indicated. The legal disqualification in Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code where any
public officer who shall knowingly nominate or appoint to any public office any person lacking the legal
qualifications therefor, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding 1,000 pesos simply means
disqualification under the law. Clearly, Section 6, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution and Section 94(b) of the Local
Government Code of 1991 prohibits losing candidates within one year after such election to be appointed to any office in the
government or any government-owned or controlled corporations or in any of their subsidiaries. A judgment rendered with
grave abuse of discretion or without due process is void, and thus, cannot be the source of an acquittal.
The petition is granted. The assailed judgment is hereby declared null and void. The Court ordered the record of the case to
be remanded to Sandiganbayan for further proceedings.
FLORES V DRILON
FACTS
Petitioners, taxpayers and employees of U.S facilities at Subic, challenge the constitutionality of Sec. 13 (d) of
the Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992 which directs the President to appoint a professional manager as
administrator of the SBMAprovided that for the 1st year of its operations, the mayor of Olongapo City (Richard Gordon)
shall be appointed as the chairman and the CEO of the Subic Authority.
ISSUES
(1) Whether the proviso violates the constitutional proscription against appointment or designation of elective officials to
other government posts.
(2) Whether or not the SBMA posts are merely ex officio to the position of Mayor of Olongapo City and thus an excepted
circumstance.
(3) Whether or not the Constitutional provision allowing an elective official to receive double compensation (Sec. 8, Art. IXB) would be useless if no electiveofficial may be appointed to another post.
(4) Whether there is legislative encroachment on the appointing authority of the President.
(5) Whether Mayor Gordon may retain any and all per diems, allowances and other emoluments which he may have
received pursuant to his appointment.
HELD
(1) YES, Sec. 7 of Art. IX-B of the Constitution Provides: No elective officialshall be eligible for appointment or designation in
any capacity to any public office or position during his tenure. Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of

his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. The subject proviso
directs the President to appoint an elective official i.e. the Mayor of Olongapo City, to other government post (as Chairman
and CEO of SBMA). This is precisely what the Constitutionprohibits. It seeks to prevent a situation where a local
elective official will work for his appointment in an executive position in government, and thus neglect his constitutents.
(2) NO, Congress did not contemplate making the SBMA posts as automatically attached to the Office of the Mayor without
need of appointment. The phrase shall be appointed unquestionably shows the intent to make the SBMA posts appointive
and
not
merely adjunct to
the
post
of
Mayor
of
Olongapo
City.
(3) NO, Sec. 8 does not affect the constitutionality of the subject proviso. In any case, the Vice-President for example, an
elective official who may be appointed to a cabinet post, may receive the compensation attached to the cabinet position if
specifically authorized by
law.
(4) YES, although Section 13(d) itself vests in the President the power to appoint the Chairman of SBMA, he really has no
choice but to appoint the Mayor of Olongapo City. The power of choice is the heart of the power to
appoint. Appointment involves an exercise of discretion of whom to appoint. Hence, when Congress clothes the President
with the power to appoint an officer, it cannot at the same time limit the choice of the President to only one candidate. Such
enactment effectively eliminates the discretion of the appointing power to choose and constitutes an irregular restriction on
the power of appointment. While it may be viewed that the proviso merely sets the qualifications of the officer during the first
year of operations of SBMA, i.e., he must be the Mayor of Olongapo City, it is manifestly an abuse of congressional
authority to prescribe qualifications where only one, and no other, can qualify. Since the ineligibility of an
elective official for appointment remains all throughout his tenure or during his incumbency, he may however resign first
from his elective post to cast off the constitutionally-attached disqualification before he may be considered fit
for appointment. Consequently, as long as he is an incumbent, an elective official remains ineligible for appointment to
another
public
office.
(5) YES, as incumbent elective official, Gordon is ineligible for appointment to the position of Chairman and CEO of SBMA;
hence, his appointment thereto cannot be sustained. He however remains Mayor of Olongapo City, and his acts as
SBMA official are not necessarily null and void; he may be considered a de facto officer, and in accordance with
jurisprudence, is entitled to such benefits.
Brillantes vs Yorac Case Digest
G.R. No. 93867, December 18, 1990
FACTS:
President Corazon Aquino appointed Comelec Associate Commissioner Haydee Yorac as Acting Chairman of the
Commission on Elections, in place of Chairman Hilario B. Davide, who had been named chairman of the fact-finding
commission to investigate the December 1989 coup d etat attempt. Petitioner Sixto Brillantes, Jr. questioned
the appointment in view of the status of the COMELEC as an independent constitutional body and and the specific
provision of Article IX-C, Section 1(2) of the Constitution that (I)n no case shall any Member (of the Commission on
Elections) be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity. Brillantes further argued that the choice of the
acting chairman should not come from the President for such is an internal matter that should be resolved by the members
themselves and that the intrusion of the president violates the independence of the COMELEC as a constitutional
commission. He cites the practice in this Court, where the senior Associate Justice serves as Acting Chief Justice in the
absence of the Chief Justice. No designation from the President of the Philippines is necessary.
The Solicitor General argues that no such designation is necessary in the case of the Supreme Court because the
temporary succession cited is provided for in Section 12 of the Judiciary Act of 1948. A similar rule is found in Section 5 of
BP 129 for the Court of Appeals. There is no such arrangement, however, in the case of the Commission on Elections. The
designation made by the President of the Philippines should therefore be sustained for reasons of administrative
expediency, to prevent disruption of the functions of the COMELEC.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the designation of an Acting Chairman of COMELEC is unconstitutional
HELD:
Yes. The appointment of Yorac as Acting Chairman of the COMELEC is unconstitutional.
Article IX-A, Section 1, of the Constitution expressly describes all the Constitutional Commissions as independent.
Although essentially executive in nature, they are not under the control of the President of the Philippines in the discharge of
their respective functions. Each of these Commissions conducts its own proceedings under the applicable laws and its own
rules and in the exercise of its own discretion. Its decisions, orders and rulings are subject only to review on Certiorari by
this Court as provided by the Constitution in Article IX-A, Section 7.
The choice of a temporary chairman in the absence of the regular chairman comes under that discretion. That discretion
cannot be exercised for it, even with its consent, by the President of the Philippines.
A designation as Acting Chairman is by its very terms essentially temporary and therefore revocable at will. No cause need
be established to justify its revocation. Assuming its validity, the designation of the respondent as Acting Chairman of the

Commission on Elections may be withdrawn by the President of the Philippines at any time and for whatever reason she
sees fit.
It is true, as the Solicitor General points out, that the respondent cannot be removed at will from her permanent position as
Associate Commissioner. It is no less true, however, that she can be replaced as Acting Chairman, with or without cause,
and thus deprived of the powers and perquisites of that temporary position.
The Constitution provides for many safeguards to the independence of the Commission on Elections, foremost among
which is the security of tenure of its members. That guaranty is not available to the respondent as Acting Chairman of the
Commission on Elections by designation of the President of the Philippines.
The lack of a statutory rule covering the situation at bar is no justification for the President of the Philippines to fill the void
by extending the temporary designation in favor of the respondent. This is still a government of laws and not of men. The
problem allegedly sought to be corrected, if it existed at all, did not call for presidential action. The situation could have been
handled by the members of the Commission on Elections themselves without the participation of the President, however
well-meaning.

Cayetano vs. Monsod


FACTS:
Monsod was nominated by President Aquino as Chairman of the Comelec. The Commission on Appointments confirmed the appointment
despite Cayetano's objection, based on Monsod's alleged lack of the required qualification of 10 year law practice. Cayetano filed this
certiorari and prohibition. The 1987 constitution provides in Section 1, Article IX-C: There shall be a Commission on Elections composed
of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least
thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective position in the immediately
preceding elections.However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged
in the practice of law for at least ten years.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not Monsod has been engaged in the practice of law for 10 years.
2. Whether or not the Commission on Appointments committed grave abuse of discretion in confirming Monsods appointment.
HELD:
1. YES. The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court. It embraces the preparation of pleadings and other
papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients, and other
works where the work done involves the determination of the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions (PLA vs.
Agrava.) The records of the 1986 constitutional commission show that the interpretation of the term practice of law was liberal as to
consider lawyers employed in the Commission of Audit as engaged in the practice of law provided that they use their legal knowledge or
talent in their respective work. The court also cited an article in the January 11, 1989 issue of the Business Star, that lawyers nowadays
have their own specialized fields such as tax lawyers, prosecutors, etc., that because of the demands of their specialization, lawyers
engage in other works or functions to meet them. These days, for example, most corporation lawyers are involved in management policy
formulation. Therefore, Monsod, who passed the bar in 1960, worked with the World Bank Group from 1963-1970, then worked for an
investment bank till 1986, became member of the CONCOM in 1986, and also became a member of the Davide Commission in 1990, can
be considered to have been engaged in the practice of law as lawyer-economist, lawyer-manager, lawyer-entrepreneur, etc.
2. NO. The power of the COA to give consent to the nomination of the Comelec Chairman by the president is mandated by the
constitution. The power of appointment is essentially within the discretion of whom it is so vested subject to the only condition
that the appointee should possess the qualification required by law. From the evidence, there is no occasion for the SC to
exercise its corrective power since there is no such grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CA.