Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
(1) (Co v. HRET, G.R. Nos. 92191-92, 92202-03, July 30, 1991)
(16) (In re: Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, G.R. No. 83882, January 24, 1989)
(18) (Frivaldo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 87193, June 23, 1989)
(21) (Republic v. De La Rosa, G.R. No. 104654, 105715, 105735, June 06, 1994)
(26) (Labo, Jr. v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 86564, August 01, 1989)
(33) (Aznar v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 83820, May 25, 1990)
(36) (Mercado v. Manzano, G.R. No. 135083, May 26, 1999)
(44) (Re: Vicente D. Ching, B.M. No. 914 (Resolution), October 01, 1999)
(49) (Bengson III v. HRET, G.R. No. 142840, May 07, 2001)
(52) (Moy Ya Lim Yao v. Commissioner of Immigration, G.R. No. L-21289, October 04, 1971)
(91) (Tecson v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 161434, 161634, 161824, March 03, 2004)
(103) (Republic v. Lim, G.R. No. 153883, January 13, 2004)
(105) (Altarejos v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 163256, November 10, 2004)
(110) (Reyes v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 207264, June 25, 2013)
(116) (Republic v. Li Ching Chung, G.R. No. 197450, March 20, 2013)
vs.
OF
JR.,
habitual
residence.
This
domicile,
once
established is considered to continue and will not
be deemed lost until a new one is established
(Article 50, NCC; Article 40, Civil Code of Spain;
Zuellig vs. Republic, 83 Phil. 768 [1949]). Ong Te
became a permanent resident of Laoang, Samar
around 1895. Correspondingly, a certificate of
residence was then issued to him by virtue of his
being a resident of Laoang, Samar. The domicile
that Ong Te established in 1895 continued until
April 11, 1899; it even went beyond the turn of
the 19th century. It is also in this place where Ong
Te set up his business and acquired his real
property. Ong Te falls within the meaning of subparagraph 4 of Article 17 of the Civil Code of
Spain. Although Ong Te made brief visits to China,
he, nevertheless, always returned to the
Philippines. The fact that he died in China, during
one of his visits in said country, was of no
moment. This will not change the fact that he
already had his domicile fixed in the Philippines
and pursuant to the Civil Code of Spain, he had
become a Spanish subject. If Ong Te became a
Spanish subject by virtue of having established
his domicile in a town under the Monarchy of
Spain, necessarily, Ong Te was also an inhabitant
of the Philippines for an inhabitant has been
defined as one who has actual fixed residence in
a place; one who has a domicile in a place
(Bouvier's Law Dictionary, Vol. II). A priori, there
can be no other logical conclusion but to educe
that Ong Te qualified as a Filipino citizen under
the provisions of Section 4 of the Philippine Bill of
1902.
12. ID.; ID.; "RESIDENCE"; MEANING THEREOF
UNDER THE CONSTITUTION. Under the
Constitution, the term "residence" has been
understood as synonymous with domicile not only
under the previous Constitutions but also under
the 1987 Constitution. The term "domicile"
denotes a fixed permanent residence to which
when absent for business or pleasure, one
intends to return (Ong Huan Tin vs. Republic, 19
SCRA 966 [1967]). The absence of a person from
said permanent residence, no matter how long,
notwithstanding, it continues to be the domicile
of that person. In other words, domicile is
characterized by animus revertendi (Ujano vs.
Republic, 17 SCRA 147 [1966]).
13. ID.; ID.; ID.; ESTABLISHMENT THEREOF;
OWNERSHIP OF A HOUSE NOT NECESSARY. The
petitioners' allegation that since the private
respondent owns no property in Laoang, Samar,
he cannot, therefore, be a resident of said place
is misplaced. The properties owned by the Ong
family are in the name of the private
respondent's parents. Upon the demise of his
parents, necessarily, the private respondent,
pursuant to the laws of succession, became the
co-owner thereof (as a co-heir), notwithstanding
the fact that these were still in the names of his
parents. Even assuming that the private
respondent does not own any property in Samar,
the Supreme Court in the case of De los Reyes vs.
Solidum (61 Phil. 893 [1935]) held that it is not
required that a person should have a house in
order to establish his residence and domicile. It is
As
constitutional
creations
invested
with
necessary power, the Electoral Tribunals,
although not powers in the tripartite scheme of
the government, are, in the exercise of their
functions independent organs independent of
Congress and the Supreme Court. The power
granted to HRET by the Constitution is intended
to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had
remained originally in the legislature. (Angara v.
Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139 [1936])
In passing upon petitions, the Court with its
traditional and careful regard for the balance of
powers, must permit this exclusive privilege of
the Tribunals to remain where the Sovereign
authority has place it. (See Veloso v. Boards of
Canvassers of Leyte and Samar, 39 Phil. 886
[1919])
It has been argued that under Article VI, Section
17 of the present Constitution, the situation may
exist as it exists today where there is an
unhealthy one-sided political composition of the
two Electoral Tribunals. There is nothing in the
Constitution, however, that makes the HRET
because of its composition any less independent
from the Court or its constitutional functions any
less exclusive. The degree of judicial intervention
should not be made to depend on how many
legislative members of the HRET belong to this
party or that party. The test remains the same
manifest grave abuse of discretion.
9|CONSTI2_Article IV_CITIZENSHIP
"Mr. Trenas:
The Committee on Citizenship, Bill of Rights,
Political Rights and Obligations and Human Rights
has more or less decided to extend the
interpretation of who is a natural-born Citizen as
provided in section 4 of the 1973 Constitution by
adding that persons who have elected Philippine
Citizenship under the 1935 Constitution shall be
natural-born? Am I right Mr. Presiding Officer?
Fr. Bernas:
yes."
xxx xxx xxx
"Mr. Nolledo:
And I remember very well that in the Reverend
Father Bernas' well written book, he said that the
decision was designed merely to accommodate
former delegate Ernesto Ang and that the
definition on natural-born has no retroactive
effect. Now it seems that the Reverend Father
Bernas is going against this intention by
supporting the amendment?
Fr. Bernas:
As the Commissioner can see, there has been an
evolution in my thinking. (Records of the
Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 189)
xxx xxx xxx
"Mr. Rodrigo:
But this provision becomes very important
because his election of Philippine citizenship
makes him not only a Filipino citizen but a
natural-born Filipino citizen entitling him to run
for Congress . . .
Fr. Bernas:
Correct. We are quite aware of that and for that
reason we will leave it to the body to approve
that provision of section 4.
Mr. Rodrigo:
I think there is a good basis for the provision
because it strikes me as unfair that the Filipino
citizen who was born a day before January 17,
1973 cannot be a Filipino citizen or a natural born
citizen."
(Records
of
the
Constitutional
Commission, Vol. 1, p. 231)
xxx xxx xxx
"Mr. Rodrigo:
The purpose of that provision is to remedy an
inequitable situation. Between 1935 and 1973
when we were under the 1935 Constitution, those
born of Filipino fathers but alien mothers were
natural-born Filipinos. However, those born of
Filipino mothers but alien fathers would have to
11 | C O N S T I 2 _ A r t i c l e I V _ C I T I Z E N S H I P
may
have
obtained
residence
"Mr. Nolledo:
With respect to Section 5, I remember that in the
1971 Constitutional Convention, there was an
attempt to require residence in the place not less
than one year immediately preceding the day of
the elections. So my question is: What is the
Committee's concept of residence of a candidate
for the legislature? Is it actual residence or is it
the concept of domicile or constructive
residence?
Mr. Davide:
Madame President, insofar as the regular
members of the National Assembly are
concerned, the proposed section merely provides,
among others, 'and a resident thereof, that is, in
the district, for a period of not less than one year
preceding the day of the election'. This was in
effect lifted from the 1973 Constitution, the
interpretation given to it was domicile." (Records
of the 1987 Constitutional Convention, Vol. II, July
22, 1986, p. 87)
claim to continued
meritorious.
Philippine
citizenship
is
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco,
Bidin, Sarmiento, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and
Regalado, JJ., concur.
Narvasa, J., in the result.
(Frivaldo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 87193, June
23, 1989)
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 87193. June 23, 1989.]
JUAN GALLANOSA FRIVALDO, petitioner, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE LEAGUE OF
MUNICIPALITIES, SORSOGON CHAPTER, HEREIN
REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT, SALVADOR NEE
ESTUYE, respondents.
J .L. Misa & Associates for petitioner.
Lladoc, Huab & Associates for private respondent.
DECISION
CRUZ, J p:
Petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed
governor-elect of the province of Sorsogon on
January 22, 1988, and assumed office in due
time. On October 27, 1988, the league of
Municipalities, Sorsogon Chapter (hereafter,
League), represented by its President, Salvador
Estuye, who was also suing in his personal
capacity, filed with the Commission on Elections a
petition for the annulment of Frivaldo's election
and proclamation on the ground that he was not
a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in the
United States on January 20,1983. In his answer
dated May 22, 1988, Frivaldo admitted that he
was naturalized in the United States as alleged
but pleaded the special and affirmative defenses
that he had sought American citizenship only to
protect himself against President Marcos. His
naturalization, he said, was "merely forced upon
himself as a means of survival against the
unrelenting persecution by the Martial Law
Dictator's agents abroad." He added that he had
returned to the Philippines after the EDSA
18 | C O N S T I 2 _ A r t i c l e I V _ C I T I Z E N S H I P
We
explained
that
"qualifications for public office are continuing
requirements and must be possessed not only at
the time of appointment or election or
assumption of office but during the officer's entire
22 | C O N S T I 2 _ A r t i c l e I V _ C I T I Z E N S H I P
23 | C O N S T I 2 _ A r t i c l e I V _ C I T I Z E N S H I P
Allegiance and/or
Allegiance.
made
the
Affirmation
of
34 | C O N S T I 2 _ A r t i c l e I V _ C I T I Z E N S H I P
Medialdea,
not
been
effectively
rebutted
by
Lee.
Furthermore, it is basic that such findings of the
Commission are conclusive upon this Court,
absent any showing of capriciousness or
arbitrariness or abuse. Until the filing of his
certificate of candidacy on March 21, 1998,
private respondent had dual citizenship. The acts
attributed to him can be considered simply as the
assertion of his American nationality before the
termination of his American citizenship. What this
Court said in Aznar vs. COMELEC applies mutatis
mutandis to private respondent in the case at
bar: . . . Considering the fact that admittedly
Osmea was both a Filipino and an American, the
mere fact that he has a Certificate stating he is
an American does not mean that he is not still a
Filipino. . . [T]he Certification that he is an
American does not mean that he is not still a
Filipino, possessed as he is, of both nationalities
or citizenships. Indeed, there is no express
renunciation here of Philippine citizenship; truth
to tell, there is even no implied renunciation of
said citizenship. When We consider that the
renunciation needed to lose Philippine citizenship
must be "express," it stands to reason that there
can be no such loss of Philippine citizenship when
there is no renunciation, either "express" or
"implied." To recapitulate, by declaring in his
certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino
citizen; that he is not a permanent resident or
immigrant of another country; that he will defend
and support the Constitution of the Philippines
and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and
that he does so without mental reservation,
private respondent has, as far as the laws of this
country are concerned, effectively repudiated his
American citizenship and anything which he may
have said before as a dual citizen. On the other
hand, private respondent's oath of allegiance to
the Philippines, when considered with the fact
that he has spent his youth and adulthood,
received his education, practiced his profession
as an artist, and taken part in past elections in
this country, leaves no doubt of his election of
Philippine citizenship. acCITS
DECISION
MENDOZA, J p:
Petitioner Ernesto S. Mercado and private
respondent Eduardo B. Manzano were candidates
for vice mayor of the City of Makati in the May 11,
1998 elections. The other one was Gabriel V.
Daza III. The results of the election were as
follows:
Eduardo B. Manzano 103,853
Ernesto S. Mercado 100,894
Gabriel V. Daza III 54,275 1
The proclamation of private respondent was
suspended in view of a pending petition for
disqualification filed by a certain Ernesto Mamaril
who alleged that private respondent was not a
citizen of the Philippines but of the United States.
38 | C O N S T I 2 _ A r t i c l e I V _ C I T I Z E N S H I P
42 | C O N S T I 2 _ A r t i c l e I V _ C I T I Z E N S H I P
the
will
the
the
who are
DECISION
BARREDO, J p:
Appeal from the following decision of the Court of
First Instance of Manila in its Civil Case No. 49705
entitled Moy Ya Lim Yao, etc., et al. vs. The
Commissioner of Immigration which, brief as it is,
sufficiently depicts the factual setting of and the
fundamental issues involved in this case thus:
"In the instant case, petitioners seek the issuance
of a writ of injunction against the Commissioner
of Immigration, 'restraining the latter and/or his
authorized representative from ordering plaintiff
VI
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO
GRANT PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS' MOTION FOR
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION EMBODIED IN THEIR
COMPLAINT, IN AN ORDER DATED MARCH 19,
1962. (PAGES 36-41, RECORD ON APPEAL).
We need not discuss these assigned errors
separately. In effect, the above decision upheld
the two main grounds of objection of the Solicitor
General to the petition in the court below, viz:
"That petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung, having been
admitted as a temporary alien visitor on the
strength
of
a
deliberate
and
voluntary
representation that she will enter and stay only
56 | C O N S T I 2 _ A r t i c l e I V _ C I T I Z E N S H I P
"The
pertinent
part
of
section
15
of
Commonwealth Act No. 473, upon which
petitioners rely, reads:
'Any woman who is now or may hereafter be
married to a citizen of the Philippines, and who
might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be
deemed a citizen of the Philippines.'
"Pursuant thereto, marriage to a male Filipino
does not vest Philippine citizenship to his foreign
wife, unless she 'herself may be lawfully
naturalized.' As correctly held in an opinion of the
Secretary of Justice (O.p. No. 52, series of 1950),
* this limitation of section 15 excludes, from the
benefits of naturalization by marriage, those
disqualified from being naturalized as citizens of
the Philippines under section 4 of said
Commonwealth Act No. 473, namely:
'(a) Persons opposed to organized government or
affiliated with any association or group of persons
who uphold and teach doctrines opposing all
organized governments;
'(b) Persons defending or teaching the necessity
or propriety of violence, personal assault, or
assassination for the success and predominance
of their ideas;
'(c) Polygamists or believers in the practice of
polygamy;
'(d) Persons convicted of crimes involving moral
turpitude;
'(e) Persons suffering from mental alienation or
incurable contagious diseases;
'(f) Persons who, during the period of their
residence in the Philippines, have not mingled
socially with the Filipinos, or who have not
evinced a sincere desire to learn and embrace the
customs, traditions, and ideals of the Filipinos;
'(g) Citizens or subjects of nations with whom
the . . . Philippines are at war, during the period
of such war;
'(h) Citizens or subjects of a foreign country other
than the United States, whose laws does not
grant Filipinos the right to become naturalized
citizens or subjects thereof.'
"In the case at bar, there is neither proof nor
allegation in the pleadings that Ly Giok Ha does
not fall under any of the classes disqualified by
law. Moreover, as the parties who claim that,
despite her failure to depart from the Philippines
within the period specified in the bond in
question, there has been no breach thereof,
petitioners have the burden of proving her
alleged change of political status, from alien to
citizen. Strictly speaking, petitioners have not
made out, therefore a case against the
respondents-appellants.
"Considering, however, that neither in the
administrative proceedings, nor in the lower
58 | C O N S T I 2 _ A r t i c l e I V _ C I T I Z E N S H I P
60 | C O N S T I 2 _ A r t i c l e I V _ C I T I Z E N S H I P
62 | C O N S T I 2 _ A r t i c l e I V _ C I T I Z E N S H I P
reenacted
these
provisions
immigration
authorities
in
the
following
September, and in October a warrant for her
deportation was issued. Pending hearings as to
the validity of that order, she was paroled in the
custody of her counsel. The ground alleged for
her deportation was that she was afflicted with a
dangerous and contagious disease at the time of
her entry. One of the reasons assigned to defeat
deportation was that the woman had married a
citizen of the United States pending the
proceedings for her deportation. Judge Dodge
declared himself unable to believe that a
marriage under such circumstances 'is capable of
having the effect claimed, in view of the facts
shown.' He held that it was no part of the
intended policy of 1994 to annul or override the
immigration laws, so as to authorize the
admission into the country of the wife of a
naturalized alien not otherwise entitled to enter,
and that an alien woman, who is of a class of
persons excluded by law from admission to the
United States does not come within the provisions
of that section. The court relied wholly upon the
dicta contained in the Rustigian Case. No other
authorities were cited.
"In 1914, District Judge Neterer, in Ex parte
Grayson, 215 Fed. 449, construed 1994 and
held that where, pending proceedings to deport
an alien native of France as an alien prostitute,
she was married to a citizen of the United States,
she thereby became a citizen, and was not
subject to deportation until her citizenship was
revoked by due process of law. It was his opinion
that if, as was contended, her marriage was
conceived in fraud, and was entered into for the
purpose of evading the immigration laws and
preventing her deportation, such fact should be
established in a court of competent jurisdiction in
an action commenced for the purpose. The case
was appealed and the appeal was dismissed. 134
C. C. A. 666, 219 Fed. 1022.
"It is interesting also to observe the construction
placed upon the language of the statute by the
Department of Justice. In 1874, Attorney General
Williams, 14 Ops. Atty. Gen. 402, passing upon
the Act of February 10, 1855, held that residence
within the United States for the period required
by the naturalization laws was not necessary in
order to constitute an alien woman a citizen, she
having married a citizen of the United States
abroad, although she never resided in the United
States, she and her husband having continued to
reside abroad after the marriage.
"In 1909, a similar construction was given to the
Immigration Act of May 5, 1907, in an opinion
rendered by Attorney General Wickersham. It
appeared an unmarried woman, twenty-eight
years of age and a native of Belgium, arrived in
New York and went at once to a town in
Nebraska, where she continued to reside. About
fifteen months after her arrival she was taken
before a United States commissioner by way of
instituting proceedings under the Immigration Act
(34 Stat. at L. 898, chap. 1134, Comp. Stat.
4242, 3 Fed. Stat. Anno. 2d ed. p. 637) for her
deportation, on the ground that she had entered
but
before
the
APPENDIX
The following review of all naturalization statutes
of the United States from 1790 to 1970 ravel: (1)
that
aside
from
race,
various
other
disqualifications have also been provided for in
the said statutes from time to time, although it
was only in 1906 that the familiar and usual
grounds of disqualification, like not being
anarchists, polygamists, etc. were incorporated
therein, and (2) that qualifications of applicants
for naturalization also varied from time to time.
83 | C O N S T I 2 _ A r t i c l e I V _ C I T I Z E N S H I P
A DISQUALIFICATIONS
1. In the first naturalization statute of March 26,
1790, only a "free white person" could be
naturalized, provided he was not "proscribed" by
any state, unless it be with the consent of such
state. (Chap. V. 1 Stat. 103)
2. In the Act of January 29, 1795, to the same
provisions was added the disqualification of those
"legally convicted of having joined the army of
Great Britain, during the late war." (Chap. XX, 1
Stat. 414).
3. In the Act of June 18, 1798, Section 1 thereto
provided:
"SECTION 1. Be it enacted by the Senate and
House of Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled, That no alien
shall be admitted to become a citizen of the
United States, or of any state, unless in the
manner prescribed by the act, entitled 'An Act to
establish an uniform rule of naturalization; and to
repeal the act heretofore passed on that subject,
'he shall have declared his intention to become a
citizen of the United States, five years, at least,
before his admission, and shall, at the time of his
application to be admitted, declare and prove, to
the satisfaction of the court having jurisdiction in
the case, that he has resided within the United
States fourteen years, at least, and within the
state or territory where, or for which such court is
at the time held five years, at least, besides
conforming
to
the
other
declarations,
renunciations and proofs, by the said act
required, any thing therein to the contrary hereof
notwithstanding: Provided, that any alien, who
was residing within the limelights, and under the
jurisdiction of the United States, before the
twenty-ninth day of January, one thousand seven
hundred and ninety-five, may, within one year
after the passing of this actand any alien who
shall have made the declaration of his intention
to become a citizen of the United States, in
conformity to the provisions of the act, entitled
'An act to establish an uniform rule of
naturalization, and to repeal the act heretofore
passed on that subject,' may, within four years
after having made the declaration aforesaid, be
admitted to become a citizen, in the manner
prescribed by the said act, upon his making proof
that he has resided five years, at least, within the
limits, and under the jurisdiction of the United
88 | C O N S T I 2 _ A r t i c l e I V _ C I T I Z E N S H I P
1906
contained
the
following
contests
on
the
elections,
returns
and
qualifications of the President or Vice-President.
The constitutional lapse prompted Congress, on
21 June 1957, to enact Republic Act No. 1793, "An
Act Constituting an Independent Presidential
Electoral Tribunal to Try, Hear and Decide Protests
Contesting the Election of the President-Elect and
the Vice-President-Elect of the Philippines and
Providing for the Manner of Hearing the Same."
Republic Act 1793 designated the Chief Justice
and the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court
to be the members of the tribunal. Although the
subsequent adoption of the parliamentary form of
government under the 1973 Constitution might
have implicitly affected Republic Act No. 1793,
the statutory set-up, nonetheless, would now be
deemed revived under the present Section 4,
paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution.
Thus
"The civil rights and political status of the native
inhabitants of the territories hereby ceded to the
United States shall be determined by the
Congress." 22
Upon the ratification of the treaty, and pending
legislation by the United States Congress on the
subject, the native inhabitants of the Philippines
ceased to be Spanish subjects. Although they did
not become American citizens, they, however,
also ceased to be "aliens" under American laws
and were thus issued passports describing them
to be citizens of the Philippines entitled to the
protection of the United States. LibLex
The term "citizens of the Philippine Islands"
appeared for the first time in the Philippine Bill of
1902, also commonly referred to as the Philippine
Organic Act of 1902, the first comprehensive
legislation of the Congress of the United States
on the Philippines
". . . that all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands
continuing to reside therein, who were Spanish
subjects on the 11th day of April, 1891, and then
resided in said Islands, and their children born
subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to
be citizens of the Philippine Islands and as such
entitled to the protection of the United States,
except such as shall have elected to preserve
their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in
accordance with the provisions of the treaty of
peace between the United States and Spain,
signed at Paris, December tenth eighteen
hundred and ninety eight." 23
Under the organic act, a "citizen of the
Philippines" was one who was an inhabitant of the
Philippines, and a Spanish subject on the 11th
day of April 1899. The term "inhabitant" was
taken to include 1) a native-born inhabitant, 2) an
inhabitant who was a native of Peninsular Spain,
and 3) an inhabitant who obtained Spanish
papers on or before 11 April 1899. 24
Controversy arose on to the status of children
born in the Philippines from 11 April 1899 to 01
July 1902, during which period no citizenship law
was extant in the Philippines. Weight was given to
the view, articulated in jurisprudential writing at
the time, that the common law principle of jus
soli, otherwise also known as the principle of
territoriality, operative in the United States and
England, governed those born in the Philippine
95 | C O N S T I 2 _ A r t i c l e I V _ C I T I Z E N S H I P
The
1950
Civil
Code
categorized
the
acknowledgment or recognition of illegitimate
children into voluntary, legal or compulsory.
Voluntary recognition was required to be
expressedly made in a record of birth, a will, a
statement before a court of record or in any
authentic writing. Legal acknowledgment took
place in favor of full blood brothers and sisters of
an illegitimate child who was recognized or
judicially declared as natural. Compulsory
acknowledgment could be demanded generally in
cases when the child had in his favor any
evidence to prove filiation. Unlike an action to
claim legitimacy which would last during the
lifetime of the child, and might pass exceptionally
to the heirs of the child, an action to claim
acknowledgment, however, could only be brought
during the lifetime of the presumed parent.
Amicus Curiae Ruben F. Balane defined, during
the oral argument, "authentic writing," so as to
be an authentic writing for purposes of voluntary
recognition, simply as being a genuine or
indubitable writing of the father. The term would
include
a
public
instrument
(one
duly
acknowledged before a notary public or other
competent official) or a private writing admitted
by the father to be his.
The Family Code has further liberalized the rules;
Article 172, Article 173, and Article 175 provide:
"Art. 172.The filiation of legitimate children is
established by any of the following:
"(1)The record of birth appearing in the civil
register or a final judgment; or
"(2)An admission of legitimate filiation in a public
document or a private handwritten instrument
and signed by the parent concerned.
"In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the
legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
"(1)The open and continuous possession of the
status of a legitimate child; or
"(2)Any other means allowed by the Rules of
Court and special laws.
"Art. 173.The action to claim legitimacy may be
brought by the child during his or her lifetime and
shall be transmitted to the heirs should the child
die during minority or in a state of insanity. In
these cases, the heirs shall have a period of five
years within which to institute the action.
98 | C O N S T I 2 _ A r t i c l e I V _ C I T I Z E N S H I P
99 | C O N S T I 2 _ A r t i c l e I V _ C I T I Z E N S H I P
"Parentage
will
still
be
resolved
using
conventional methods unless we adopt the
modern and scientific ways available. Fortunately,
we have now the facility and expertise in using
DNA test for identification and parentage testing.
The University of the Philippines Natural Science
Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA Analysis
Laboratory has now the capability to conduct
DNA typing using short tandem repeat (STR)
analysis. The analysis is based on the fact that
the DNA of a child/person has two (2) copies, one
copy from the mother and the other from the
father. The DNA from the mother, the alleged
father and the child are analyzed to establish
parentage. Of course, being a novel scientific
technique, the use of DNA test as evidence is still
open to challenge. Eventually, as the appropriate
case comes, courts should not hesitate to rule on
the admissibility of DNA evidence. For it was said,
that courts should apply the results of science
when completely obtained in aid of situations
presented, since to reject said result is to deny
progress."
Petitioner's
Argument
For
Jurisprudential
Conclusiveness
Petitioner would have it that even if Allan F. Poe
were a Filipino citizen, he could not have
transmitted his citizenship to respondent FPJ, the
latter being an illegitimate child. According to
petitioner, prior to his marriage to Bessie Kelly,
Allan F. Poe, on July 5, 1936, contracted marriage
with a certain Paulita Gomez, making his
subsequent marriage to Bessie Kelly bigamous
and respondent FPJ an illegitimate child. The
veracity of the supposed certificate of marriage
between Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez could be
most doubtful at best. But the documentary
evidence introduced by no less than respondent
100 | C O N S T I 2 _ A r t i c l e I V _ C I T I Z E N S H I P
101 | C O N S T I 2 _ A r t i c l e I V _ C I T I Z E N S H I P
J.,
concurs,
please
see
SO ORDERED.
102 | C O N S T I 2 _ A r t i c l e I V _ C I T I Z E N S H I P
AZCUNA, J p:
105 | C O N S T I 2 _ A r t i c l e I V _ C I T I Z E N S H I P
Philippine
citizenship
is
an
indispensable
requirement for holding an elective public office,
and the purpose of the citizenship qualification is
none other than to ensure that no alien, i.e., no
person owing allegiance to another nation, shall
Representative
Marinduque.
for
the
lone
district
of
33)Whether
or
not
Respondent
Comelec
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it declared
that Petitioner is not a Filipino citizen and did not
meet the residency requirement for the position
of Member of the House of Representatives.
113 | C O N S T I 2 _ A r t i c l e I V _ C I T I Z E N S H I P
119 | C O N S T I 2 _ A r t i c l e I V _ C I T I Z E N S H I P