Accounting Organizationsand Society, Vol. 13, No. 5, pp. 447-464, 1988.

0361-3682/88 $3.00+.00
Pergamon Press plc

Printed in Great Britain

CULTURE AND CONTROL:

A FIELD STUDY*

J A C O B G. BIRNBERG* and CORAL SNODGRASSt

University o f Pittsburgh; tSouthern Illinois UniversiPy-gTarbondale, U,S./L

Abstract

This paper reports the results of an exploratory study comparing the perceptions of management control
systems (MCS) which are held by U.S. and Japanese workers. It is argued that because of the shared values
and norms present in the Japanese culture and the valuation of cooperation by that culture, the bureaucratic procedures will be fewer in Japanese firms. However, it is hypothesized that the Japanese workers
will be as aware of the presence of the controls as their U.S.counterparts. Thus, the less bureaucratic MCS's
will be perceived to be as explicit by Japanese workers as the more bureaucratic MCS is by U.S.workers.
Subject to all the caveats for exploratory research, the findings are encouraging to those who argue that culture affects control.

Since t h e r e c e n t w r i t i n g s o f O u c h i ( 1977, 1979,

1 9 8 1 ) c a m e t o p r o m i n e n c e , significance has
b e e n a t t a c h e d t o t h e r o l e o f c u l t u r e in b o t h t h e
d e s i g n an d o p e r a t i o n o f c o n t r o l systems. T h e
a r g u m e n t m a d e by O u c h i is that c u l t u r e u n d e r
certain circumstances can provide a synergistic
e l e m e n t to t h e c o n t r o l s y s t e m a n d facilitate it's
o p e r a t i o n . This is t h e n o t i o n o f t h e "clan"
( O u c h i , 1979). Taking t h e U n i t e d States a n d
J a p a n as t w o c o u n t r i e s w h e r e t h e r e m a y b e significant d i f f e r e n c e s in t h e l i k e l i h o o d o f clan beh a v i o r o n t h e job, a field s t u d y w a s u n d e r t a k e n in
an a t t e m p t to a s c e r t a i n t h e s i g n i f i c a n c e o f
s o c i e t a l c u l t u r e in t h e w o r k e r s ' and m a n a g e r s '
perceptions o f t h e n a t u r e o f t h e c o n t r o l system.
T h e p a p e r is d i v i d e d i n t o five sections. T h e
first briefly discusses t h e n a t u r e o f t h e t e r m s
" c u l t u r e " an d " c o n t r o l " a n d defines t h e m for this
research project. The second section outlines
t h e m a n n e r in w h i c h O u c h i ' s v i e w o f t h e clan relates to t h e c u r r e n t l i t e r a t u r e o n c o n t r o l and
h o w it has b e e n m a d e o p e r a t i o n a l in this study.
T h e t h i rd s e c t i o n p r e s e n t s t h e h y p o t h e s e s and

t h e f o u r t h d e s c r i b e s t h e m e t h o d s u s e d to c o l l e c t
t h e data an d test t h e h y p o t h e s e s . T h e fifth an d
final s e c t i o n p r e s e n t s an d discusses t h e results.

L I T E I ~ T U I ~ REVIEW

Definition o f a management control system 1

A m a n a g e m e n t c o n t r o l s y s t e m ( M C S ) is a
m e c h a n i s m d e s i g n e d t o limit t h e d e c i s i o n s p a c e
o f individuals w i t h i n an o r g a n i z a t i o n so as to
affect t h e i r b e h a v i o r . Its p u r p o s e is to c o o r d i n a t e
t h e d e c i s i o n s w h i c h t h e y m a k e so as to i n c r e a s e
the probability of achieving the organization's
goals. A c o n t r o l s y s t e m p e r f o r m s its f u n c t i o n b y
c o n t r o l l i n g t h e f l o w o f i n f o r m a t i o n , establishing
c r i t e r i a for e v a l u a t i o n and d e s i g n i n g a p p r o p r i a t e
r e w a r d s and p u n i s h m e n t s . T h e f o u r s u b s y s t e m s
w i t h i n t h e MCS w h i c h are d e s i g n e d to a c h i e v e
t h e s e goals are t h e p l a n n i n g subsystem, t h e
m o n i t o r i n g subsystem, t h e e v a l u a t i o n subsyst e m an d t h e r e w a r d subsystem.
C e n t r a l to this d e f i n i t i o n o f t h e MCS is t h e no-

*The authors are indebted to Professors John Grant, Anthony Hopwood, Michael Shields and S. Mark Young for many invaluable suggestions during the protracted period over which this paper has evolved.
As one reader of this paper pointed out, the definition of control used in this paper may, itself, possess cultural biases. This
raises an issue with which we will not grapple: is it the concept of control that differs between the cultures or only its manifestations?
447

448

J A C O B G. BIRNBERG a n d C O R A L SNODGRASS

t i o n that t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n ' s goals a r e a c h i e v e d b y

c o o r d i n a t i n g t h e w o r k o f i n d i v i d u a l s and units
t h r o u g h o u t t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n as t h e y c a r r y o u t
t h e i r a p p o i n t e d tasks. This d e f i n i t i o n o f t h e MCS
is a v e r y b r o a d one. It is c o n c e r n e d n o t o n l y w i t h
c o n t r o l i n t h e s e n s e o f an i n f o r m a t i o n
m e c h a n i s m that i n d i c a t e s if s t a n d a r d s are met,
b u t also w i t h c o n t r o l as a b e h a v i o r m o d i f i c a t i o n
m e c h a n i s m . In t h e l a t t e r s e n s e t h e MCS is des i g n e d to e n c o u r a g e t h o s e b e h a v i o r s w h i c h will
i n c r e a s e t h e p r o b a b i l i t y that t h e s t a n d a r d s will
be met and discourage those behaviors which
will n o t d o so. Thus, t h e MCS c o v e r s a b r o a d
r a n g e o f an o r g a n i z a t i o n ' s activities a n d it facilitates t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n ' s a c h i e v i n g o f its goals
t h r o u g h t h e effective f u n c t i o n i n g o f t h e f o u r subsystems.

Explicit-implicit dichotomy
An e x p l i c i t MCS is d e f i n e d as a c o n t r o l s y s t e m
w h e r e t h e b u r e a u c r a t i c rules a n d s t a n d a r d s a r e
f o r m a l i z e d a n d c l e a r l y o b s e r v a b l e to all t h e conc e r n e d parties. T h e m o r e e x p l i c i t t h e system,
t h e m o r e available t h e rules are. In contrast, an
i m p l i c i t c o n t r o l s y s t e m is d e f i n e d as an MCS
w h e r e t h e b u r e a u c r a t i c rules a n d s t a n d a r d s are
n o t c l e a r l y set o u t a n d r e a d i l y k n o w a b l e b y b o t h
parties. In an i m p l i c i t MCS t h e rules a n d standards m u s t b e i n f e r r e d f r o m o n e o r m o r e o f t h e
n u m e r o u s stimuli to w h i c h t h e c o n t r o l l e e (i.e.
s u b o r d i n a t e ) m u s t attend. In this c o n t e x t

e x p l i c i t m a y b e c o n s i d e r e d to b e s y n o n y m o u s
w i t h formal a n d i m p l i c i t w i t h informal.

Culture
C u l t u r e is d e f i n e d as a filter for p e r c e i v i n g t h e
e n v i r o n m e n t . In that sense, c u l t u r e is a c o n c e p tual s y s t e m w h i c h , w h e n c o m b i n e d w i t h p e r s o n ality, sets t h e a c t i o n a n d d e c i s i o n p r e m i s e s for individuals w i t h i n a g i v e n c u l t u r e group. In this
way, c u l t u r e c a n b e v i e w e d as o n e o f t h e f o r c e s
g u i d i n g h u m a n d e c i s i o n making. It d o e s this b y
s e t t i n g t h e p r e c o n d i t i o n s for h u m a n b e h a v i o r .
H o w e v e r , b e c a u s e analyses o f MCS's usually take
c u l t u r e as a given, it m a y r e m a i n in t h e backg r o u n d w h e n t h e b e h a v i o r is discussed. See Fig.
1.
C u l t u r e as it is b e i n g d i s c u s s e d a b o v e a n d as it
is u s e d in this m o d e l , refers to n a t i o n a l o r
s o c i e t a l culture. It is b r o a d e r in s c o p e t h a n t h e
notion of organizational culture which may be
p e c u l i a r to t h e organization. T h e l a t t e r has b e e n
p o p u l a r i z e d b y w r i t e r s s u c h as P e t e r s & W a t e r man (1982). The notion of societal culture,
w h i c h is t h e focus o f this study, is t h e set o f
n o r m s a n d values w h i c h t h e m a n a g e r s a n d w o r k ers bring to the job, r a t h e r than t h e n o r m s a n d
values w h i c h m a n a g e m e n t a n d / o r t h e w o r k e r s
develop in t h e i r w o r k e n v i r o n m e n t . B u r a w o y
( 1 9 7 8 ) gives an e x a m p l e o f this w h e n h e discusses t h e ability o f b l a c k s a n d w h i t e s to w o r k together on the job (organizational culture), but

I Degree of
cooperation in
culture

J Organiza~,ionat ~.~ Degree

coordinating
of formetity
activities
in system

J MCS

Extent of
sharedvatues
in culture
Fig. 1. Influence of culture on MCS design.

CULTUREAND CONTROL

449

their inability to maintain the same relationship mulated by the cultural group's members. Ceroutside the w o r k e n v i r o n m e n t (societal cul- tain classes of stimuli may be sought o u t while
ture). In the latter case, the values of the work- others are ignored because of the cultural filter.
For b e t t e r or for worse, the characteristics of the
ers' b r o a d e r culture g r o u p prevail.
The difference b e t w e e n organizational and culture predisposes o n e to seek out certain classocietal culture is i m p o r t a n t for this study be- ses of stimuli and to ignore others. The s e c o n d
cause the research issue is w h e t h e r elements of effect argues that o n c e a stimulus has b e e n perthe societal culture affect the design of the firm's ceived, its relevance and credibility to the culMCS. Does the set of culture variables that are tural group m e m b e r also will be affected by the
p r e s e n t in the society affect the design of the cultural filter. For example, the o c c u r r e n c e of
certain courtesies may be ignored by m e m b e r s
MCS?
A culture consists of a variety of elements. of o n e culture, b u t in a different culture their
These include values, beliefs and patterns of be- p r e s e n c e or absence may be a datum to w h i c h a
havior. Thus w h e n MCSs are discussed in a cross great deal of significance is attached. Similar
cultural context, it adds another d i m e n s i o n to examples can be found in decision-making on
the analysis. M e m b e r s of different culture e c o n o m i c issues. For example, see Cole (1979).
groups may react differently to the same c o n t r o l
m e c h a n i s m or r e q u i r e different c o n t r o l Japanese culture
Anthropologists such as Smith ( 1983, c h a p t e r
mechanisms to achieve the same behavior. Thus,
there is no reason to believe that a single MCS is 2) discuss the forces in the Japanese culture that
stress the i m p o r t a n c e of the group and the relaa p p r o p r i a t e for all c u l t u r e groups.
Individuals belonging to the same culture tive u n i m p o r t a n c e of self. Significantly, Smith
g r o u p are similar on certain critical dimensions. does not suggest that the focus on the group
However, this does not d e n y the fact that within evolves because of a lack of c o n c e r n with self.
a culture group there may be differences regard- Rather, in the Japanese c o n t e x t a sense of the imingparticular norms, values, etc., w h i c h are not p o r t a n c e of h a r m o n y in relationships and ideas is
used to define that group. Similarly, cultural and paramount. H a r m o n y in this c o n t e x t consists of
national b o u n d a r i e s n e e d not be v i e w e d as iden- not making a distinction. If a distinction betical. At some level, differences can be found t w e e n g o o d and bad can be made, then the dew i t h i n culture groups previously labeled sired h a r m o n y is missing and s o m e t h i n g has
"homogeneous," or a given cultural group may b e e n lost (Smith, 1983, p. 41). Aiding in the
span national borders. Thus the idea of maintenance of the h a r m o n y in the Japanese soch o m o g e n e i t y is a relative one. See Snodgrass iety is the idea of reciprocity. This is the notion
(1984). In this study, the situation w h e r e a that obligations exist b e t w e e n parties taking part
national b o u n d a r y consists of o n e cultural group in social interactions. Each party is e x p e c t e d to
will be referred to as h o m o g e n o u s and the lack discharge his or h e r obligation in a m a n n e r reof such h o m o g e n e i t y within a political unit as flecting c o n c e r n for the other. The n e e d to maintain h a r m o n y and avoid distinctions is the obliheterogenous.
The role of culture as a filter is r e p r e s e n t e d in gation of each individual as he or she interacts
Fig. 1. The MCS and stimuli from the environ- with others.
The ideals of h a r m o n y and r e c i p r o c i t y are rem e n t are i n t e r p r e t e d by the individual and
utilized in d e c i d i n g on a c o u r s e of action. Cul- flected in Japanese society in a variety o f ways.
ture has two i m p o r t a n t effects on the MCS pro- The society reflects a notion of collective rescess. It can affect the c h o i c e of stimuli to w h i c h ponsibility and the legal system emphasizes conthe individual attends, or it can affect any value ciliation over litigation. Within the society there
is a strong sense of ( h u m a n ) o r d e r and hierarj u d g m e n t s about the stimuli.
The first effect is i m p o r t a n t because it says chy. This leads to a strong sense of place, and
that culture affects the database w h i c h is accu- one's role is heavily d e p e n d e n t u p o n one's place

450

JACOB G. BIRNBERGand CORALSNODGRASS

in an organizational, familial o r social n e t w o r k ,

r a t h e r than o n o n e ' s p e r s o n a l attributes and
characteristics.
In t h e J a p a n e s e w o r k p l a c e t h e s e f o r c e s are
manifest in a v a r i e t y o f ways. O n e is c o n s u l t a t i o n
a m o n g g r o u p an d t e a m m e m b e r s u n d e r c e r t a i n
c i r c u m s t a n c e s , s u c h as b r a i n s t o r m i n g and quality circles. This is in d i r e c t c o n t r a s t to t h e a l m o s t
family-like sense o f h i e r a r c h y p r e s e n t at o t h e r
times. ( F o r an i n t e r e s t i n g d i s c u s s i o n o f this
t h r o u g h t h e eyes o f an A m e r i c a n e m p l o y e e o f a
J a p a n e s e firm see Irish, 1986.) Thus, h a r m o n y is
m a i n t a i n e d t h r o u g h t h e give and take o f discussion and i n f o r m a t i o n e x c h a n g e . A t e a m plan o r
s o l u t i o n is d e v e l o p e d . T h e p o t e n t i a l p r o b l e m o f
over concern with the importance of one's own
v i e w is c o u n t e r b a l a n c e d by a s t r o n g s e n s e o f
hierarchy. S u p erio r s address s u b o r d i n a t e s u s i n g
t h e titles that p a r e n t s w o u l d use in a family cont e x t (Irish, 1986).
Thus t h e o r i e n t a t i o n w h i c h a J a p a n e s e
e m p l o y e e brings to t h e jo b is n o t o n e o f subjugating self totally to t h e group. Rather it m a y
b e c h a r a c t e r i z e d b e t t e r as r e f l e c t i n g a n e e d to
d e v e l o p o n e s e l f t h r o u g h t h e p r o g r e s s o f th e
group. As R e i s c h a u e r ( 1977, p. 1 5 2 ) n o t e d :
The cooperative, relativistic Japanese is not thought of as
the bland product of a social conditioning that has worn
off all individualistic comers, but rather as the product of
firm inner-self-control that has made him master of his...
anti-social instincts... Social conformity., is no sign o f
weakness but rather the p r o u g tempered product o f
inner strength." (Emphasis added.)
T h e J a p a n e s e w o r k e r c o m e s to t h e j o b prep a r e d to c o n s i d e r t h e i m p l i c a t i o n s o f his a c ti o n s
for t h e w e l f a r e o f o t h e r m e m b e r s o f t h e organization. Similarly, t h e J a p a n e s e m a n a g e r c o m e s to

his p o s i t i o n already h a v i n g l e a r n e d t h e n e e d for

g r o u p consensus. Finally, t h e s o c i e t y stresses t h e
r o l e o f s u b t l e a c t i o n s an d activities and t h e
n u a n c e s o f language as a m e a n s o f c o n v e y i n g
meaning.

THE MODEL
T h e c o n c e p t s o f c u l t u r e and c o n t r o l c o m e tog e t h e r in t h e activities w i t h i n t h e organization.
W h e n t h e d e c i s i o n - m a k e r s b r i n g different culturally-based p r e d i s p o s i t i o n s to t h e job, t h e
s a m e stimulus m a y cau se t w o d e c i s i o n - m a k e r s
to b e h a v e differently. C o n v e r s e l y , t w o different
stimuli m a y b e r e q u i r e d to a c h i e v e t h e s a m e beh a v i o r f r o m each. Thus t h e c u l t u r e m u s t b e
v i e w e d as o n e o f t h e factors affecting t h e f o r m
that MCSs s u b s y s t e m s take as t h e y a t t e m p t to
affect t h e c o n t r o U e e ' s b eh av i o r . O u c h i ( 1 9 7 9 ) in
d e s c r i b i n g t h e r o l e o f t h e clan in his " t h e o r y Z"
m o d e l o f c o n t r o l in o r g a n i z a t i o n s highlights t w o
critical e l e m e n t s o f t h e clan. First, t h e clan is a
g r o u p o f p e r s o n s w i t h s h a r e d values. 2 In t h e
t e r m s o f t h e p r e v i o u s discussion, t h e y are
homogeneous on those dimensions with which
O u c h i is c o n c e r n e d in his paper. Second, O u c h i
f o c u s e d o n t h o s e clans w h o s e n o r m s o r values
are c o o p e r a t i v e in t h e i r nature. 3 It s h o u l d b e
readily a p p a r e n t that g r o u p s ex i st w h i c h m e e t
O u c h i ' s d e f i n i t i o n o f a clan b u t h o l d an a m o r a l
view of proper behavior toward both outsiders
an d clan m e m b e r s . Such a c u l t u r e w o u l d result
in b e h a v i o r an d c o n t r o l sy st em s that are t h e
antithesis o f t h o s e d i s c u s s e d by O u c h i and by
Becker & Green (1962).
Drawing on these two important dimensions
o f O u c h i ' s m o d e l , c u l t u r e and t h e p r e s e n c e o f a

2 Much earlier than Ouchi, Becker & Green (1962) stressed the role of group cohesiveness as a two edged sword. The cohesive work group could develop shared values which work against the organization's welfare and favor their own. For
examples, see Roy (1952) and Burawoy (1979).
-~The notion that a work group would function with a regard for the effects of the actions of one individual on others, specifically, members of the work group, is not the traditional economic analysis. However, Marschak & Radner (1972) did
attempt to examine such a situation in their discussion of the theory of teams. Their teams exhibit cooperative behavior
because of similarity of purpose, information, etc. Thus the idea is similar to the discussion here. However, there are some
significant differences.

CULTUREAND CONTROL
n o r m o f c o o p e r a t i o n , it w o u l d appear that organizations c o u l d exist i n o n e of four states. O n e
o f t h e s e states possesses b o t h a c o m m o n c u l t u r e
a n d values c o o p e r a t i o n , t h e r e b y m e e t i n g
O u c h i ' s d e f i n i t i o n of a clan. T h e o t h e r t h r e e
w o u l d b e deficient relative to O u c h i ' s d e f i n i t i o n
for t h e y w o u l d n o t possess o n e or b o t h o f the
critical p r o p e r t i e s f o u n d i n O u c h i ' s d e s c r i p t i o n
o f a clan. Figure 2 s h o w s the four c o n d i t i o n s i n a
simplified form. T h e t w o d i m e n s i o n s , c u l t u r e
a n d c o o p e r a t i o n , clearly are m o r e akin to cont i n u a t h a n b e i n g d i c h o t o m o u s . H o w e v e r , as will
b e c o m e m o r e a p p a r e n t later, for the p u r p o s e s o f

(a)
High

451

this s t u d y the a s s u m p t i o n
d i c h o t o m o u s is acceptable.

that

are

Cooperation
Before c o n t i n u i n g w i t h a d i s c u s s i o n o f the
model, it is i m p o r t a n t to define c o o p e r a t i o n as it
is b e i n g u s e d i n this c o n t e x t . C o o p e r a t i o n refers
to the g r o u p o r c u l t u r a l n o r m that causes t h e individual to b e c o n c e r n e d a b o u t the effects his or
h e r a c t i o n s have o n the welfare of others. F r o m
t h e p e r s p e c t i v e of e c o n o m i c analysis a n d utility
theory, c o o p e r a t i o n c o u l d b e d e s c r i b e d as the
p r e s e n c e of positive utility to i n d i v i d u a l A from

Vatue p l a c e d on
cooperation

Low

Homogeneous

CuLture

Heterogeneous

VaLue placed on
cooperation

(b)
High

Low

I.

Coordination

I.
2.

Coordination
Avoid shirking

I.
2.

Coordinate
Motivate

41.
2.
3.

Coordinate
Motivate
Avoid shirking

Homogeneous

CuLture

Heterogeneous

they

Fig.2. a. The culture-cooperationgrid.b. Roleof the MCSunderdifferingculture--cooperationmixes.

452

JACOB G. BIRNBERGand CORALSNODGRASS

a desirable c o n s e q u e n c e a c c r u i n g to i n d i v i d u a l
B as the result of-his or h e r (i.e. A ' s ) actions. In
such a f o r m u l a t i o n it c o u l d b e argued that the
utility t o A of an act is d e p e n d e n t n o t o n l y o n the
intrinsic a n d extrinsic satisfactions a c c r u i n g to A
from the act, b u t also o n s o m e o t h e r class of satisfaction a c c r u i n g to A that reflects the a c c r u i n g
( o r p r e s u m e d a c c r u i n g ) of satisfaction to
a n o t h e r party, B, from that act. 4
An individual w i t h a d e p e n d e n t utility function w o u l d b e e x p e c t e d to b e h a v e differently to
a p e r s o n w h o s e utility f u n c t i o n is of the m o r e
c o n v e n t i o n a l , i n d e p e n d e n t form, for it does n o t
i n c l u d e any such a r g u m e n t . This is because,
h o l d i n g the individual c o n s t a n t so as to avoid
p r o b l e m s of i n t e r p e r s o n a l c o m p a r i s o n s of utility, each alternative will have a different utility
value w i t h a n d w i t h o u t the o t h e r party's utility
considered. Thus, the p e r s o n is c h o o s i n g from a
different set of utility values. Unless the utility to
others is so small as to b e s w a m p e d b y the o t h e r
values, o r the utilities of the o t h e r parties b e h a v e
exactly as the individual's does, o r the o t h e r
party's utility adds a c o n s t a n t a m o u n t to the person's utility, the relative r a n k i n g of the various
alternatives s h o u l d b e altered.

Degree o f f o r m a l i t y in the MCS across cells

Based o n the a b o v e discussion, c o m p a r e the
a r g u m e n t for cell 1 w i t h the a r g u m e n t usually
offered to s u p p o r t the design of MCS's in cells 2,
3 a n d 4. In those cells, c o n t r o l systems f o u n d e r
o n the failure of individuals to i n c l u d e the b e n e fits to others a n d / o r the o r g a n i z a t i o n i n their
c h o i c e of actions, w h e n t h e r e is n o e c o n o m i c inc e n t i v e for t h e m to do so. A variety o f alternative
t e c h n i q u e s s u c h as participation, b u r e a u c r a t i c
rules a n d firm-wide i n c e n t i v e s c h e m e s have
b e e n suggested to facilitate goal c o n g r u e n c e .
T h e i r o b j e c t i v e is to e n h a n c e the organization's

p e r f o r m a n c e b y r e m o v i n g the i m p e d i m e n t of
conflicting individual goals ( B i r n b e r g & Sadhu,
1986). In contrast, in an e n v i r o n m e n t such as
the o n e w e have labeled "cooperative", explicit
a n d p r e c i s e p e r f o r m a n c e i n d i c a t o r s for the purpose of g u i d i n g a n d affecting a c t i o n s are n o t as
necessary. T h e individual already has in m i n d
the "bigger picture."
Thus, the first r e a s o n for e x p e c t i n g to find
fewer formal c o n t r o l s in place in a cell 1 situation than in cells 2, 3 a n d 4 is that the p r e s e n c e
o f the d e p e n d e n t utility f u n c t i o n s m i n i m i z e s
p r o b l e m s s t e m m i n g from the lack of goal cong r u e n c e . T h e p r o b l e m is shifted from controlling activities to c o m m u n i c a t i n g the data to the
p r o p e r p e r s o n s so that they c a n make the best
decision.
T h e r e is a s e c o n d r e a s o n w h y cell 1 in Fig. 2
( t h e h o m o g e n e o u s , values c o o p e r a t i o n c e l l )
s h o u l d have less n e e d for an explicit a n d m o r e
formal c o n t r o l system. T h e p r e s e n c e of a
h o m o g e n e o u s c u l t u r e s h o u l d m e a n that the
w o r k e r s possess a c o m m o n set o f values. I f these

values are consistent with the organization's

goals, t h e r e s h o u l d b e a g r e a t e r d e g r e e of goal
c o n g r u e n c e a n d the n e e d for formal c o n t r o l s is
f u r t h e r r e d u c e d . This is b e c a u s e the controls, in
part, w e r e i n t e n d e d to c o m m u n i c a t e a n d r e w a r d
c e r t a i n m o d e s a n d standards of behavior. In a
cell 1 society this is a c c o m p l i s h e d t h r o u g h comm o n n o r m s and values w h i c h are'already k n o w n .
C o n t r o l systems u s i n g p a r t i c i p a t i o n usually exist
explicitly for the p u r p o s e of achieving goal cong r u e n c e ( B e c k e r & Green, 1962). It w o u l d appear that w h a t m a n a g e r s are striving to achieve
t h r o u g h p a r t i c i p a t i o n is a cell l-like state.
Any formal test of the role of the MCS across
c u l t u r e s c o u l d b e d o n e best b y c o m p a r i n g situations w h e r e cells 1 a n d 4 are a s s u m e d to exist.
O u c h i ( 1981 ) a n d o t h e r s have offered Japan as

4 At the TIMS/ORSAmeeting in November 1985, where this paper was presented, the authors became aware of a paper on
joint decision-making in a familywhich proposed a similar view of a utility function. This paper, Steckel & Gupta (1985),
called this utility function a dependent utility function.
While it is tempting to suggest that A's utility is a function of B's utility in utiles, this is not necessary and could lead to questions of interpersonal comparisons of utility. This, in turn, raises unnecessary questions over whether our utility measure is
a cardinal measure or not. Since this is unimportant to the discussion at hand, it will be omitted. However, see Steckei & Gupta
(1985).

CULTUREAND CONTROL
an e x a m p l e o f w h a t c o u l d b e c a l l e d a c e l l 1 society. Thus, J a p a n e s e firms w o u l d a p p e a r to r e p r e s e n t e x c e l l e n t e x a m p l e s o f o u r cell 1 situation.
In c o n t r a s t , firms in t h e U.S. o p e r a t e in a t o t a l l y
different c u l t u r e . T h e y d r a w t h e i r w o r k e r s a n d
managers from a diverse cultural pool. One of
t h e s t r e n g t h s o f t h e U.S., w e a r e told, is t h e diversity o f o u r c u l t u r a l heritages. T h e n o t i o n o f a
m e l t i n g pot, e v e n w h e n c o n s i d e r e d in its m o s t
e x t r e m e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , stresses t h e o n g o i n g
change. It d o e s n o t d e s c r i b e a c o m p l e t e d p r o cess. Thus, o r g a n i z a t i o n s o p e r a t i n g in t h e U.S.
e m p l o y a w o r k f o r c e that p o s s e s s e s a d i v e r s e cultural b a c k g r o u n d , i.e. cells 3 a n d 4. In general,
m o s t o b s e r v e r s w o u l d a r g u e that t h e m e m b e r s
o f this s a m e w o r k f o r c e are m o r e likely to v i e w
t h e i r a c t i o n s f r o m t h e p e r s p e c t i v e o f h o w it
affects t h e m o r a small p e e r g r o u p r a t h e r t h a n
t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n as a w h o l e . F o r e x a m p l e s , s e e
Roy ( 1 9 5 2 ) o r B u r a w o y ( 1 9 7 9 ) . ~ As a w h o l e it is
r e a s o n a b l e to a s s u m e that U.S. firms lie p r i m a r i l y
in cell 4 o f Fig. 2.

HYPOTHESES
Given the earlier assertion based on the work
o f o t h e r s that t h e c o m m o n c u l t u r e f o u n d in
J a p a n o u g h t to y i e l d a c o m m o n set o f values, t h e
e x i s t e n c e o f t h a t c o m m o n set o f v a l u e s is t h e first
h y p o t h e s i s tested. T h e a r g u m e n t o f f e r e d e a r l i e r
w a s that t h e c o m m o n c u l t u r e o u g h t to l e a d t o
s h a r e d v a l u e s b y w o r k e r s a n d m a n a g e r s in t h o s e
a r e a s g e r m a n e to o r g a n i z a t i o n a l c o n t r o l . This is a
t w o stage p r o c e s s . First, t h e s i m i l a r i t y o f values
b e t w e e n w o r k e r s a n d m a n a g e r s in e a c h c o u n t r y
must be ascertained. Then the patterns of shared
o r c o n f l i c t i n g v a l u e s w h i c h a r e r e v e a l e d in t h e
data can be examined.
T h e c u l t u r a l v a l u e s u s e d in this s t u d y a r e ass u m e d to e v o l v e a r o u n d t h e five c e n t r a l questions r a i s e d b y S t r o d b e c k & K l u c h h o l n ( 1 9 6 1 ) .
T h e s e are:
( 1 ) W h a t is t h e i n n a t e c h a r a c t e r o f h u m a n s ?

453

( 2 ) W h a t is t h e r e l a t i o n o f h u m a n s to nature?
( 3 ) W h a t is t h e t e m p o r a l focus o f h u m a n life?
( 4 ) W h a t is t h e m o d a l i t y o f h u m a n activity?
( 5 ) W h a t is t h e r e l a t i o n o f o n e h u m a n to
another?
Earlier, a c o n t r o l s y s t e m w a s d e f i n e d as consisting o f f o u r s u b s y s t e m s . T h e s e a r e t h e planning subsystem, the monitoring subsystem, the
evaluation subsystem and the reward subsystem.
T h e focus o f this s t u d y is o n t h e effect o f c u l t u r e
o n t h e e v a l u a t i o n facet o f t h e MCS. Thus, o n l y
t h e final t h r e e s u b s y s t e m s are o f interest. In t h e
subsequent hypotheses the planning subsystem
will b e o m i t t e d f r o m c o n s i d e r a t i o n .
G i v e n t h e e a r l i e r discussion, it is e x p e c t e d
that t h e J a p a n e s e w o r k e r s a n d m a n a g e r s w o u l d
n o t o n l y s h a r e c o m m o n c u l t u r a l values, b u t also
h a v e s h a r e d values r e l a t i n g to t h o s e t h r e e subs y s t e m s o f t h e MCS. B e c a u s e J a p a n is v i e w e d as
an e x a m p l e o f a n a t i o n w h e r e a h o m o g e n e o u s
c u l t u r e exists, t h e h y p o t h e s e s s t a t e that n o significant d i f f e r e n c e s a r e e x p e c t e d to b e f o u n d bet w e e n J a p a n e s e w o r k e r s a n d managers.
Since t h e r e is n o basis o n w h i c h to assess
whether the workers and managers have the
" p r o p e r " a m o u n t o f t h e s h a r e d values, this h y p o thesis m u s t b e a c o m p a r a t i v e one. H ( l a ) t h e r e f o r e c o n s i s t s o f 15 e x p e r i m e n t a l s u b h y p o t h e s e s
o f t h e form:
H l g l . Japanese workers and managers share the same
values on the innate characteristic in their orientation to
the monitoring system.

Each o f t h e s u b h y p o t h e s e s will b e o f t h e a b o v e
form. Each o f t h e five c u l t u r a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s
( t h e first p h r a s e in i t a l i c s ) w i l l b e m a t c h e d w i t h
each of the control subsystems (the second
p h r a s e in italics).
HIb. 1. U.S.workers and managers do not share the same
values on the innate characteristic in their orientation to
the monitoring system.

A s e c o n d set o f 15 h y p o t h e s e s will b e t e s t e d

There are the exceptions. Those are the firms which have succeeded in developing an organizational culture that fosters
cooperation. These appear to be the firms discussed by writers such as Ouchi ( 1981 ) and Peters & Waterman (1982). However, the creation of the organizational culture is part of the MCS and is hardly permanent.

454

JACOB G. BIRNBERGand CORALSNODGRASS

( H l b ) for t h e U.S. w o r k e r s a n d managers. However, in t h e c a s e o f w o r k e r s a n d m a n a g e r s in t h e

U.S., it is e x p e c t e d that t h e null h y p o t h e s e s will
b e r e j e c t e d in m o s t cases.
T h e s e c o n d h y p o t h e s i s is r e l a t e d to t h e definit i o n o f a c o n t r o l system. It stresses t h e MCSs int e n d e d p u r p o s e o f facilitating t h e a c h i e v e m e n t
o f o r g a n i z a t i o n a l goals a n d t h e r o l e o f c u l t u r e in
c r e a t i n g goal c o n g r u e n c e . It w o u l d f o l l o w f r o m
t h e e a r l i e r d i s c u s s i o n that an o r g a n i z a t i o n
o p e r a t i n g in an e n v i r o n m e n t w h e r e its w o r k e r s
a n d m a n a g e r s e n t e r t h e firm w i t h a c l e a r u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e s e goals a n d t h e c u l t u r a l e t h i c to
c o o p e r a t e o u g h t to h a v e less n e e d for a formal
c o n t r o l system. As a result, t h e u s e o f e x p l i c i t
rules ( a d m i n i s t r a t i v e c o n t r o l s ) a n d i n c e n t i v e
s c h e m e s s h o u l d b e less necessary. M o r e o v e r ,
m a n y e l e m e n t s o f t h e goal set m a y n o t n e e d to b e
f o r m a l l y a r t i c u l a t e d at all. T h e i n d i v i d u a l c o m e s
to t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n p r e c o n d i t i o n e d a l o n g ( a t
least s o m e o f ) t h e p r o p e r lines o f thought. If this
is true, it s h o u l d affect t h e d e s i g n o f t h e c o n t r o l
system. Specifically, it s h o u l d r e d u c e t h e n e e d
for c o m p l e x s y s t e m s o f b u r e a u c r a t i c rules. This
w o u l d p e r m i t a r e d u c t i o n in t h e s c o p e o f t h e formal c o n t r o l system. T h u s t h e J a p a n e s e firms
s h o u l d e x h i b i t less e x p l i c i t n e s s in t h e i r c o n t r o l
s y s t e m s t h a n U.S. firms do. I n s t e a d J a p a n e s e
firms s h o u l d rely o n i m p l i c i t forms o f c o n t r o l .
Thus:

H2tz The formal MCS in Japanese firms will rely on im-

to t h e J a p a n e s e w o r k e r s a n d m a n a g e r s t h e cultural rules are w e l l k n o w n . T h u s t h e rules a r e

p e r c e i v e d to b e e x p l i c i t - - t h o u g h o u t s i d e t h e
formal c o n t r o l system. It is w h e n t h e c u l t u r e fails
to p r o v i d e a d e q u a t e i m p l i c i t c o n t r o l s that mana g e m e n t m u s t institute e x p l i c i t c o n t r o l s ( s e e
Fig. 2). T h u s t h e degree o f f o r m a l i t y p r e s e n t in a
s y s t e m is n o t t h e s a m e as t h e degree o f perceived
explicitness. It is t h e f o r m a l i t y o f t h e MCS w h i c h
is i n v e s t i g a t e d in h y p o t h e s i s 2, w h i l e it is t h e p e r c e i v e d a s p e c t o f e x p l i c i t n e s s w h i c h is r e l e v a n t
for h y p o t h e s i s 3.
To m a k e this a r g u m e n t testable, t h e w o r k e r s '
and managers' perceptions of the explicitness of
t h e v a r i o u s a s p e c t s o f t h e c o n t r o l s y s t e m will b e
e x a m i n e d . T h e l i t e r a t u r e ( s e e Hage & Aiken,
1967; Hall, 1 9 6 2 ) has d e s c r i b e d four p e r t i n e n t
d i m e n s i o n s for e a c h o f t h e t h r e e s u b s y s t e m s
l i s t e d earlier. ( S e e h y p o t h e s i s 1 . ) T h e s e are:
( 1 ) Role d e f i n i t i o n
(2) Information dissemination
(3) Performance recording
( 4 ) Rule o b s e r v a t i o n .
Thus 12 s u b h y p o t h e s e s c a n b e g e n e r a t e d
u n d e r h y p o t h e s i s 3. Since t h e r e are n o a b s o l u t e
m e a s u r e s o f e x p l i c i t n e s s , t h e h y p o t h e s e s a r e form u l a t e d in a c o m p a r a t i v e fashion. T h e y a r e o f
t h e g e n e r a l form:

H3. There is (is not) a significant difference between U.S.

and Japanese workers' perceptions of the amount of role
definition in the monitoring system.

plicit control techniques.

H2b. The formal MCS in United States firms will rely on

explicit control techniques.
H o w e v e r , if t h e e a r l i e r c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n o f
c o n t r o l s as d e v i c e s i n t e n d e d to c o m m u n i c a t e to
t h e w o r k e r s w h a t is e x p e c t e d o f t h e m is c o r r e c t ,
it d o e s n o t logically f o l l o w that t h e J a p a n e s e
w o r k e r s willperceive t h e i r c o n t r o l s y s t e m s to b e
m o r e i m p l i c i t in n a t u r e a n d U.S. w o r k e r s p e r ceive t h e i r c o n t r o l s y s t e m s t o b e m o r e explicit.
P r o p o n e n t s o f c u l t u r e as a significant factor in
t h e c o n t r o l s y s t e m m i g h t e v e n a r g u e that in
s o m e i n s t a n c e s J a p a n e s e w o r k e r s w o u l d perc e i v e t h e i r c o n t r o l s y s t e m to b e more explicit.
T h e r a t i o n a l e for this p o s i t i o n is two-fold. First,

Each o f t h e four c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s ( t h e first italic

p h r a s e in H 3 ) w i l l b e a s s o c i a t e d w i t h e a c h o f t h e
s u b s y s t e m s ( t h e s e c o n d italic p h r a s e in H3).
W h e t h e r a significant d i f f e r e n c e is o r is n o t exp e c t e d will v a r y f r o m s u b h y p o t h e s i s to subhypothesis. The reasons are discussed below.
In t h e case o f r o l e d e f i n i t i o n it is e x p e c t e d that
t h e U.S. w o r k e r s will find t h e s y s t e m m o r e
explicit. T h e c o n t r a s t b e t w e e n t h e J a p a n e s e cult u r e a n d t h e U.S. culture, p e r h a p s , is g r e a t e s t in
this area. Thus for t h e r o l e d e f i n i t i o n s u b h y p o t h eses in h y p o t h e s i s 3, t h e a r g u m e n t is that t h e U.S.
w o r k e r s will find t h e i r s y s t e m s m o r e e x p l i c i t
t h a n t h e J a p a n e s e w o r k e r s p e r c e i v e t h e i r s to be.
See Smith ( 1 9 8 4 ) for a g e n e r a l d i s c u s s i o n a n d

CULTUREAND CONTROL
K o n o ( 1984, pp. 8 - 9 ) for a n e c d o t a l e v i d e n c e o f
this.
Conversely, the Japanese culture places a
great deal of emphasis on formal communication
( S m i t h , 1983). T h u s it w o u l d a p p e a r r e a s o n a b l e
t o e x p e c t t h a t this w o u l d affect t h e e l e m e n t s o f
t h e MCS to w h i c h t h e y a r e sensitive. T h e r e f o r e
in h y p o t h e s i s 3 all t h e s u b h y p o t h e s e s for inform a t i o n d i s s e m i n a t i o n a r g u e that t h e J a p a n e s e
w o r k e r s will p e r c e i v e as m o r e e x p l i c i t t h e dissemination of information than their United
States c o u n t e r p a r t s .
In t h e c a s e o f t h e p e r f o r m a n c e r e c o r d i n g
d i m e n s i o n , it c a n b e a r g u e d that t h e r e s u l t s will
b e m i x e d . G i v e n that t h e U.S. firms h a v e m o r e
e x p l i c i t s y s t e m s a n d that o n e o f t h e i m p o r t a n t
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f an e x p l i c i t s y s t e m is t h e n e e d
to m o n i t o r p e r f o r m a n c e , t h e U.S. w o r k e r s
s h o u l d p e r c e i v e that t h e m o n i t o r i n g s u b s y s t e m
is m o r e explicit. H o w e v e r , a u t h o r s d i s c u s s i n g
t h e J a p a n e s e c u l t u r e in t h e w o r k p l a c e stress t h e
ongoing nature of the evaluation process and the
stress laid o n t h e n e e d to i m p r o v e o n e ' s self a n d
c o r r e c t o n e ' s e r r o r s (Irish, 1986). T h u s t h e environment within the workplace stresses correct i o n a n d i m p r o v e m e n t o v e r c o m p l i m e n t s in an
a l m o s t t h e o r y X-like m a n n e r . As t h e r e s u l t o f this
environment, Japanese workers should be more
s e n s i t i v e to t h e e v a l u a t i o n s u b s y s t e m o f t h e p e r f o r m a n c e r e c o r d i n g d i m e n s i o n a n d p e r c e i v e it
as m o r e explicit. Finally, in t h e c a s e o f t h e rew a r d s u b s y s t e m , m u c h has b e e n m a d e o f t h e
Japanese use of seniority to reward workers.
R e w a r d s y s t e m s o f this t y p e a r e q u i t e explicit.
In t h e case o f t h e r u l e m o n i t o r i n g d i m e n s i o n it
is n o t a p p a r e n t w h a t differences, if any, m a y b e
found. T h u s t h e r e a r e n o f o r m a l h y p o t h e s e s for
this d i m e n s i o n .
In s u m m a r y , then, t h e s u b h y p o t h e s e s for
h y p o t h e s i s 3 are:
1t3.1. The U.S.workers will perceive that the role definition dimension of the MCS is more explicit for all subsystems than the Japanese workers.
H3.2. The Japanese workers will perceive that the communication dimension of the MCS is more explicitfor all
subsystems than the U.S.workers.
H3.3.1. The U.S. workers will perceive the performance
recording dimension of the monitoring subsystem to be

455

more explicit than the Japanese workers.

tt3. 3.2. The Japanese workers will perceive the performance recording dimension of the evaluation and reward
subsystems to be more explicit than U.S.workers.
METHOD
Q u e s t i o n n a i r e design
T h e q u e s t i o n n a i r e w a s d e s i g n e d t o g a t h e r inf o r m a t i o n o n t h e v a r i o u s facets o f c u l t u r e a n d
c o n t r o l d i s c u s s e d earlier. It w e n t t h r o u g h a
series o f p r e t e s t s t o a s s u r e b o t h its a p p r o p r i a t e ness for t h e issues o f i n t e r e s t a n d its u n d e r s t a n d ability. P a r t i c u l a r c o n c e r n w a s s h o w n for t h e
problems of communicating the instrument to
t h e J a p a n e s e r e s p o n d e n t s . T h e i n s t r u m e n t first
w a s w r i t t e n in English a n d t h e n t r a n s l a t e d i n t o
J a p a n e s e b y a t r a n s l a t o r familiar w i t h b o t h t h e
l a n g u a g e a n d t h e r e s e a r c h area. A b a c k translat i o n i n t o English f r o m J a p a n e s e w a s p e r f o r m e d
by a Japanese manager before the instrument
w a s used. C o m p a r i s o n o f t h e original English
v e r s i o n a n d t h e b a c k t r a n s l a t i o n r e v e a l e d n o significant differences. A c o p y o f t h e English vers i o n o f t h e i n s t r u m e n t is i n c l u d e d as A p p e n d i x A.
F o r a m o r e d e t a i l e d d i s c u s s i o n s e e Snodgrass
(1984).
Sample firms
Data to t e s t t h e h y p o t h e s e s w e r e g a t h e r e d
f r o m a total o f 22 large m a n u f a c t u r i n g a n d cons t r u c t i o n firms in t h e U.S. a n d Japan. A c o n v e n i e n c e s a m p l e o f 11 firms w a s s e l e c t e d f r o m e a c h
c o u n t r y . Initially, t h e 11 J a p a n e s e firms w e r e
s e l e c t e d w i t h t h e h e l p o f v a r i o u s c o n t a c t s in
Japan. T h e firms w h i c h u l t i m a t e l y p a r t i c i p a t e d
c o n s t i t u t e d a c r o s s s e c t i o n o f J a p a n e s e industry.
S u b s e q u e n t l y , a s a m p l e o f 11 firms w a s s e l e c t e d
in t h e U.S. Firms c o n t a c t e d w e r e m a t c h e d w i t h
t h e J a p a n e s e o n i n d u s t r y a n d size. B e c a u s e o f
l i m i t a t i o n s o n a c c e s s in t h e U.S., t h e m a t c h i n g o f
t h e s a m p l e s o n l y c a n b e said to b e a p p r o x i m a t e .
H o w e v e r , t h e r e is n o a p p a r e n t r e a s o n t o b e l i e v e
that t h e y are u n r e p r e s e n t a t i v e . T h e m a t c h i n g is
less o f a p r o b l e m t h a n it m i g h t h a v e b e e n
because the worker and manager responses
were compared between populations rather
t h a n o n a firm p a i r basis.

456

JACOB G. BIRNBERGand CORALSNODGRASS

Sample workers and managers

A sample of 1051 r e s p o n d e n t s was p r o v i d e d

by the firms. Figure 3 shows the b r e a k d o w n by
manager/worker and by country.
Data collection -- MCS

A researcher visited each of the firms p r i o r to

the distribution of the questionnaires. This visit
not only facilitated the distribution of the instruments, but also p r o v i d e d the o p p o r t u n i t y to ascertain the nature of the firm's c o n t r o l system. In
addition to general information, detailed information was gathered c o n c e r n i n g the existence
and scope of a set of MCS characteristics w h i c h
w o u l d assist in the assessment of the explicit/implicit nature of the MCS. These w e r e the existence and scope of: ( a ) job descriptions, ( b )
evaluation criteria and ( c ) organization chart
and information flows.
The results of these interviews w e r e used to
formulate an overall assessment of the e x t e n t to
which :each of the 22 firms a p p e a r e d to rely on
implicit and explicit m e t h o d s for control. These
data w e r e used to test hypothesis 2.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Table 1 shows the results of the 30 t-tests performed intra-country. As can be seen from the
table, the Japanese workers and managers exhi-

bited shared values in 12 of the 15 instances

using a 1% level as a test of significance. In contrast, the data on the U.S. w o r k e r s and managers
indicated that they possessed shared values
seven of the fifteen times. While there is no basis
for asserting that this means that there is or is not
a c o m m o n a l i t y of culture in Japan, the U.S., or
both, the patterns are perhaps m o r e interesting
than the relative percentages indicating no differences (75% for Japan and 47% for the U.S.).
The use of the traditional approach of a 1% or
5% level may be too advantageous to the research hypothesis. Given that our interest is in
n o t rejecting the null hypothesis, a s e c o n d app r o a c h to the analysis of the data in Table 1 may
be m o r e appropriate. Such an approach w o u l d
examine the n u m b e r of situations w h e r e the
probability that the two groups a r e from the
same p o p u l a t i o n is a p p r o x i m a t e l y 0.5 or greater.
Such a view shifts the greater p o r t i o n of the burd e n to the research hypothesis. This is as it
should be. Using this rule, there are eight cells
w h e r e the Japanese w o r k e r s - m a n a g e r s are similar and only three in the case of the U.S. w o r k e r s managers.
In the case of w o r k e r s and managers in the
U.S., they hold different cultural values on four of
the five cultural dimensions for the evaluation
system subsystem. This is consistent with the
p r e p o n d e r a n c e of the managerial literature in
the U.S. which focuses on the p r o b l e m of
Country

Japan

U.S.

Managers

n=278

n=251

Workers

n = 272

n=250

n = 550

n= 501

Total

Fig.3. Sizeofrespondentgroups.

457

CULTURE AND CONTROL

TABLE 1. Probability that the workers and managers within a culture group share values
Cultural
characteristics

Monitoring
subsystem

Evaluation
subsystem

Reward
subsystem

Composite of
three systems

1. Man's innate
character

JM/W*
= 0.85* JM/W
= 0.47
USM/W~-= 0.00 USM/W = 0.00

JM/W = 0.00
USMAV = 0.00

JM/W = 0.00
USM/W = 0.00

2. Man--nature
relationship

JM/W
USM/W

= 0.83 JM/W
= 0.02
= 0.869 USMAV = 0.00

JM/W
= 0.68
USM/W = 0.16

JM/W
= 0.15
USM/W = 0.04

3. Temporalfocus JMAV
oflife
USM/W

= 0.55
= 0.26

JM/W
= 0.16
USM/W = 0.78

JM/W = 0.00
USM/W = 0.52

JM/W
= 0.02
USM/W = 0.20

4. Modalityof
activity

JM/W
USM/W

= 0.02 JM/W
= 0.24
= 0.890 USM/W = 0.00

JM/W = 0.00
USM/W = 0.01

JM/W = 0.01
USM/W = 0.00

5. Man-man
relationship

JM/W
USM/W

= 0.06
= 0.01

JM/W
= 0.90
USM/W = 0.00

JM/W
= 0.74
USM/W = 0.26

JM/W
= 0.247
USM/W = 0.01

JMAV
USM/W

= 0.93
= 0.01

JMAV
= 0.13
USM/W = 0.00

JM/W = 0.01
USM/W = 0,384

Composite of
five characters

* JM/W = Japanese managers compared to Japanese workers.

t USM/W = U.S. managers compared to U.S. workers.
* Values are the probability that the managers and workers are from the same population on a given characteristic x subsystem test.
p ~< 0.01.
evaluating

performance.

See Birnberg

e t al.

(1983).
I n c o n t r a s t , all o f t h e c o n f l i c t s b e t w e e n
Japanese workers and managers occurred over
the reward function. This raises several interesti n g i s s u e s . First, t h e r e h a s b e e n c o n c e r n t h a t t h e
younger Japanese workers are more restless and
less accepting of the traditional values than the
older workers were. See Snodgrass & Grant
( 1 9 8 5 ) . I f t h i s is t r u e , t h e r e a r e t w o r e a s o n s w h y
t h e r e w a r d s y s t e m is t h e m o s t o b v i o u s p l a c e i n
t h e M C S a g a i n s t w h i c h t o r e b e l . First, it m a y b e
t h e l e a s t i n g r a i n e d o f t h e v a l u e s i n t h e c u l t u r e related to the control system. Kono (1984) argued
that the older workers are more accepting of the
traditional seniority-based reward system than
t h e y o u n g e r w o r k e r s are. S e c o n d , r e g a r d l e s s o f
its m e r i t , t h e m a n a g e r s p r o b a b l y h a v e t h e m o s t
to gain from the seniority system.
It would be of interest to study in greater detail e x a c t l y w h e r e t h e d i s p a r i t y i n v a l u e s lies.
S u c h a s t u d y m i g h t y i e l d i n s i g h t s i n t o its c a u s e s .
For example, the younger workers may be resp o n d i n g t o J a p a n ' s n e w l y a c q u i r e d s t a t u s as a
major economic power and may be interested in

obtaining "their share" of this newly obtained

wealth. In contrast, older managers may have
lower expectations based on a very different set
of earlier experiences.
Table 1 indicates that the areas of the greatest
agreement between Japanese workers and managers involve man and man's relationship to elements of his environment. These aspects of the
culture may be particularly important in a control system given our earlier discussion of the
b a s i s f o r o u r c l a s s i f y i n g t h e J a p a n e s e c u l t u r e as
cooperative.
The second hypothesis argued that the cont r o l s y s t e m s i n t h e U.S. f i r m s w o u l d b e e x p l i c i t
and those in the Japanese firms would be imp l i c i t . As n o t e d e a r l i e r , t h e d a t a t o t e s t t h i s h y p o thesis were based upon one of the researchers
visiting each of the 22 companies and investigating the nature of their control system. The final
columns in Tables 2 and 3 indicate the researcher's overall assessment.
In addition to an overall assessment, data were
collected regarding three important characterist i c s o f a f o r m a l i z e d c o n t r o l s y s t e m . T h e t a b l e s ind i c a t e t h e p r e s e n c e o r a b s e n c e of: ( a ) j o b d e -

JACOB G. BIRNBERGand CORALSNODGRASS

458

TABLE2. Summaryof company MCS:Japan

Company
J- 1
J-2
J-3
J-4
J-5
J-6
J-7
J -8
J-9
J- 10
J- 11

Job
descriptions

Evaluation
criteria

Organizational
chart/hierarchy

Intentions

x
X
x
x
x
x
X
x
x
X
x

Explicit
Implicit
Implicit
Implicit
Explicit
Implicit
Implicit
Implicit
Implicit
Implicit
Implicit

TABLE3. Summaryof company MCS:U.S.

Company
u.s.- 1
U.S.-2
U.S.-3
U.S.-4
U.S.-5
U.S.-6
U.S.-7
U.S.-8
U.S.-9
U.S.-10
U.S.-11

Job
descriptions

Evaluation
criteria

Organizational
chart/hierarchy

x
x

x
x
X
X
X
X
X

x
x

scriptions, ( b ) e v a l u a t i o n criteria, ( c ) an organizational chart or hierarchy. Data w e r e also coll e c t e d o n the e x i s t e n c e of t r a i n i n g programs.
This p r o v i d e d a c o n t r a s t a n d c h e c k to b e sure
that those firms w h i c h did n o t possess significant
e l e m e n t s of a formal system w e r e n o t d e v o i d of
a n y formal system.
As c a n b e s e e n from Tables 2 a n d 3, the form
of the formal c o n t r o l systems appears to b e as
predicted. All b u t t w o of the Japanese firms w e r e
evaluated as having implicit c o n t r o l systems. Researchers i n t e r e s t e d i n p l a n n i n g a n d c o n t r o l in
Japanese firms s h o u l d find the p a t t e r n interesting. T h e r e is a u n i f o r m o m i s s i o n of j o b descriptions a n d e v a l u a t i o n criteria. T h e s e are t w o factors w h i c h w o u l d appear to b e i m p o r t a n t for the
formal e v a l u a t i o n of w o r k e r ' s p e r f o r m a n c e .
Table 3 s h o w s the o p p o s i t e pattern. Seven of

X
X

X
X
X

Intentions
Explicit
Explicit
Explicit
Explicit
Explicit
Explicit
Explicit
Implicit
Implicit
Implicit
Implicit

the e l e v e n U.S. firms w e r e j u d g e d to have formal

c o n t r o l systems w h i c h w e r e l a b e l e d explicit. All
s e v e n of the explicit firms possessed elaborate
e v a l u a t i o n criteria. This is in c o n t r a s t to the
Japanese firms w h e r e this was the m o s t striking
omission.
T h u s it w o u l d appear from the qualitative data
that the e x p e c t a t i o n that the Japanese firms
w o u l d have informal c o n t r o l systems a n d the
U.S. firms w o u l d have formal c o n t r o l systems has
b e e n met. Moreover, the area w h e r e o n e w o u l d
e x p e c t the c o o p e r a t i v e c u l t u r e to r e d u c e the
n e e d for formality, formal e v a l u a t i o n criteria,
(see Ouchi, 1 9 8 1 ) was a b s e n t from n i n e of the
e l e v e n Japanese firms. I n contrast, this was true
for o n l y t h r e e of the e l e v e n U.S. firms.
Table 4 r e p o r t s the results of the c o m p a r i s o n
b e t w e e n the t w o w o r k e r groups o n their per-

459

CULTURE AND CONTROL

TABLE 4. Perceived measures of explicitness in MCS by workers
System
characteristics

Monitoring
subsystem

Evaluation
subsystem

Reward
subsystem

Composite

Role
definition

J*
= 2.6
U.S.t = 2.0"

J
--- 3.3
U.S. --- 3.0

J
= 3.0
U.S. = 2.5"

J
= 8.75
U.S. = 7.49"

Information
dissemination

J
U.S.

= 2.56
= 2.48

J
- 2.60,
U.S. --- 2.80

J
= 1.87"
U.S. = 2.74

J
= 7.01"
U.S. = 7.93

Performance
recording

J
U.S.

= 3.09
= 2.7"

J
--- 1.66"
U.S. = 2.52

J
= 2.58"
U.S. = 3.14

J
= 7.10"
U.S. = 8.35

Rule
observation

J
U.S.

= 2.79
= 2.83

J
= 3.25
U.S. --- 2.92"

J
= 2.22"
U.S. = 2.56

J
= 8.24
U.S. = 8.28

Composite

J
u.s.

= 10.93
= 10.01"

J
= 10.76
O.S. = 11.13

J
= 9.41"
U.S. = 10.91

1 = most explicit score, 5 = most implicit score.

*J = Japanese.
t u.s. = united States.
, p ~< 0.05; p ~< 0.01; '~p -< 0.001.
Where the difference between the mean scores in a cell is significant, the more explicit is shown inside a
box.

ceptions of the degree of formality present in the

control system. 6 This was used to form hypo-

control system. In the case of two of the three

c o n t r o l s u b s y s t e m s , t h e J a p a n e s e w o r k e r s re-

t h e s i s 3. I n t h e e a r l i e r s e c t i o n it w a s a r g u e d t h a t

p o r t e d t h a t t h e y p e r c e i v e d m o r e e x p l i c i t information disseminatiort C o r r o b o r a t i n g t h e s e
results, the composite ratings (the simple sum of

the perceived

d e g r e e o f e x p l i c i t n e s s s h o u l d not,
b e g r e a t e r i n all c a s e s f o r U.S. w o r k e r s t h a n
Japanese workers. This was because the culture
c o u l d s e n s i t i z e t h e w o r k e r s i n c e r t a i n areas.
T h u s it w a s a r g u e d t h a t t w o o f t h e s e t s o f h y p o t h e s e s w e r e d i r e c t i o n a l . O n role definition U.S.
workers were expected to be more explicit (a

all t h r e e s y s t e m s ' s c o r e s ) w e r e
both cases.
In

the

case

of

significant in

performance

recording,

Japanese workers. Con-

J a p a n e s e w o r k e r s f o u n d t h e p e r f o r m a n c e recording aspect of the control system to be more

explicit based on the composite score and in

versely, because of the strong sensitivity to the

n u a n c e s o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n in t h e J a p a n e s e cul-

two of the three subsystems. This was despite

the lack of extensive formal evaluation criteria in

t n r e , it w a s h y p o t h e s i z e d t h a t t h e J a p a n e s e w o r k e r s w o u l d p e r c e i v e t h e i r c o n t r o l s y s t e m s as
b e i n g m o r e explicit (indicated b y a l o w e r s c o r e )

n i n e o f t h e e l e v e n J a p a n e s e firms. In contrast,
a n d as t h e r e s u l t s i n T a b l e s 2 a n d 3 w o u l d

lower score) than the

on information dissemination.
The results reported in Table 4 generally are
s u p p o r t i v e o f t h e s e t w o s e t s o f h y p o t h e s e s . I n all
t h r e e c a s e s t h e U.S. w o r k e r s r e p o r t e d t h a t t h e y
p e r c e i v e d a m o r e e x p l i c i t role definition i n t h e

s u g g e s t , t h e U.S. w o r k e r s f o u n d t h e m o n i t o r i n g
subsystem more explicit.
In t h e c a s e o f t h e o t h e r d i m e n s i o n , rule o b s e r v a t i o n , it w a s a r g u e d t h a t t h e r e w a s n o b a s i s f o r
p r e d i c t i n g w h a t o r if a n y s i g n i f i c a n t d i f f e r e n c e s
w o u l d b e found. In this c a s e t h e results, at best,

6 In the discussion of the perceived implicit-explicit nature of the control system we were unable to sort out the responses
from firms whose control systems were atypical of their countries. This would be explicit in Japan and implicit in the U.S.This
may lead to the U.S. results being less explicit and the converse for the Japanese. However, the effects were probably minimal.
It also prevented comparing the perceptions of workers in the U.S. and Japan whose firms' MCSs were implicit.

460

JACOB G. BIRNBERGand CORALSNODGRASS

are characterizable as interesting. While the difference in the c o m p o s i t e scores for rule observation is n o w h e r e near significant, this is attributed
to the two significant, but opposite, findings. The
Japanese w o r k e r s found the rule observation
m o r e explicit vis-d.vis the r e w a r d subsystem
and the U.S. workers found the evaluation subsystem m o r e explicit. Thus, in this case the parts
may be of m o r e interest than the whole. These
are the same areas w h e r e the conflict in w o r k e r manager values existed in Table 1. The Japanese
workers in Table 1 differed significantly from
managers on the r e w a r d dimension. Similarly,
half (four out of eight) of the differences between U.S. workers and managers w e r e in the
area of the evaluation subsystem.
Examining the data from the p e r s p e c t i v e of
each subsystem, a similar pattern emerges. In the
monitoring subsystem, the U.S. workers perceived the system to be m o r e explicit. The explanation for these findings may lie in the higher
d e g r e e of unionization and union p o w e r in the
U.S. This may set limits on b o t h what management can measure and what it is e c o n o m i c a l l y
practical to measure for evaluating and rewarding workers. On the o t h e r hand the m o n i t o r i n g
subsystem still may be useful to management.
Table 4 indicates that the Japanese w o r k e r s
p e r c e i v e d the r e w a r d subsystem to be m o r e
explicit in all four cases! This may be related to
the lack of shared values found earlier and rep o r t e d in Table 1. Again, one might c o n j e c t u r e
that the strong ratings of Japanese w o r k e r s relative to U.S. w o r k e r s vis-a-vis the r e w a r d subsystem could mean that they fully understand and
are very aware of the seniority based r e w a r d system (Table 4) and they do not like it (Table 1 ).
The latter dimension being their point of departure from the managers' values and a source of
friction b e t w e e n the two groups.
A s e c o n d approach to w h e t h e r the control
systems are p e r c e i v e d to be explicit or implicit
w o u l d be to look at all the scores that are 2.0 or
less ( e x p l i c i t ) and 3.0 or m o r e (implicit). The
reason for doing this is to w e e d out the ambiguous results near 2.5, the midpoint of the five
point range. Using this approach, we can either
examine the responses by c o u n t r y or c o m p a r e

them. In Table 4 there are four out of the twelve

cells w h e r e the Japanese w o r k e r s r e s p o n d e d on
average 3.0 or greater. In only one case (information dissemination/reward subsystem) did
their responses average less than 2.0. For the U.S.
w o r k e r s an even less illuminating pattern was
present. In two cases the average response was
3.0 or greater and in o n e case it fell to 2.0. It is
not obvious what these results indicate. It may
be true that most w o r k e r s p e r c e i v e that on average the systems are not located near either extreme.

SUMMARY
The study was intended to be e x p l o r a t o r y in
nature and to c o n d u c t field research on the implications of different cultural settings for the
p e r c e p t i o n of a firm's MCS. Using a c o n v e n i e n c e
sample of Japanese and U.S. firms, it w o u l d appear that the culture affects the nature of the formal c o n t r o l system. However, it w o u l d appear
that the workers' p e r c e p t i o n s of the c o n t r o l systems across the two countries are m u c h less at
variance with one another than might have b e e n
anticipated by looking solely at the formal MCSs.
The overall findings are consistent with the
view that the p r e s e n c e of a culture which is
h o m o g e n e o u s and possesses the critical dimension of c o o p e r a t i o n w o u l d lead to less emphasis
being placed on the "enforcing" of management's wishes. In turn, greater emphasis and resources can be spent on c o m m u n i c a t i n g across
organizational levels and directing information
to the p r o p e r individual or w o r k group. The
Japanese firms are able to do this because in the
U.S. a significant p r o p o r t i o n of the resources and
effort e m b o d i e d in the accounting information
(and c o n t r o l ) system is d i r e c t e d t o w a r d achieving behavioral c o n g r u e n c e through bureaucratic rules and incentive systems. These aspects of
the control system should not be necessary in a
h o m o g e n e o u s culture with positive w o r k attitudes.
A s e c o n d issue which is raised by the findings,
but is outside the scope of this project, is the extent to which Japanese firms are able to spend

CULTUREAND CONTROL
less o n c o n t r o l a n d c o n t r o l r e l a t e d activities
t h a n t h e i r c o u n t e r p a r t s in t h e U.S. do. It w o u l d
a p p e a r that J a p a n e s e firms n e e d to p r o v i d e inform a t i o n t o a i d in d e c i s i o n s , w h i l e U.S. firms m u s t
p r o v i d e t h e s a m e i n f o r m a t i o n as w e l l as t h e
i n f o r m a t i o n n e e d e d to s u p p o r t t h e c o n t r o l
e l e m e n t s o f t h e system. This s h o u l d r e s u l t in a
significant c o s t saving t o J a p a n e s e firms. Such a
saving m a y b e large e n o u g h to d e f r a y all, o r at
least a significant p o r t i o n of, t h e c o s t o f " l i f e t i m e
employment" offered Japanese workers.
A t h i r d issue r a i s e d b y o u r findings is w h e t h e r
t h e h o m o g e n e i t y o f values b e t w e e n w o r k e r s a n d
m a n a g e r s in J a p a n e s e firms will persist. T h e data,
at t h e v e r y least, h i n t at stress o v e r t h e r e w a r d
f u n c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e t w o groups. J a p a n e s e
w o r k e r s a n d m a n a g e r s s h o w t h e least a g r e e m e n t
in this area. T h e d a t a d o n o t p r o v i d e a n y basis for
c o n c l u d i n g w h e t h e r o r n o t this is a r e c e n t
p h e n o m e n o n . H o w e v e r , if it is a r e c e n t in origin,
it w o u l d b e w o r t h w h i l e t o o b s e r v e h o w this
stress affects o t h e r a s p e c t s o f t h e system. W e
c a n n o t d i s c o u n t t h e p o s s i b i l i t y that this always
has b e e n a s o u r c e o f f r i c t i o n a n d m a y h a v e n o imp a c t o n t h e f o r m o f t h e c o n t r o l r e l a t i o n s h i p in
J a p a n e s e firms.
Finally, t h e s t u d y raises a m e t h o d o l o g i c a l
issue vis.dt-vis t h e v a r i o u s l a b o r a t o r y s t u d i e s o f
J a p a n e s e m a n a g e m e n t b e i n g c o n d u c t e d using
U.S. c o l l e g e s t u d e n t s . F o r e x a m p l e , s e e Y o u n g e t

461

aL ( 1 9 8 7 ) . T h e s e s t u d i e s a t t e m p t t o e x a m i n e o r

e x p l a i n t h e b e h a v i o r o f J a p a n e s e w o r k e r s in a
l a b o r a t o r y s e t t i n g using U.S. s t u d e n t s as surrogates. H o w e v e r , u n l e s s t h e y a r e a b l e to s i m u l a t e
t h e r e l e v a n t c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f t h e J a p a n e s e cult u r e in t h e i r subjects, t h e i r findings o n l y m a y b e
o f i n t e r e s t for t h e insight t h e y offer o n h o w U.S.
workers may respond to particular incentive and
production schemes.
W h i l e t h e d i s c u s s i o n u p to this p o i n t has
stressed the differences between the situations
in t h e U.S. a n d Japan, an i n t e r e s t i n g s t u d y m i g h t
b e o n e w h i c h c o m p a r e d t h e values a n d a t t i t u d e s
f o u n d in a p a i r e d s a m p l e o f firms f r o m t h e t w o
c o u n t r i e s all o f w h i c h u s e an i m p l i c i t c o n t r o l system. H o w t h e firms v i e w c o n t r o l , h o w t h e y implement their systems and the role particular
values p l a y in t h e c o n t r o l p r o c e s s w o u l d b e int e r e s t i n g q u e s t i o n s to investigate. D o t h e firms
a p p r o a c h c o n t r o l in t h e s a m e m a n n e r ? If so, cult u r e m a y b e a trivial f a c t o r in t h e p r o c e s s . If t h e y
d o not, t h e n c u l t u r e m a y d e t e r m i n e h o w t h e
firms a t t e m p t to a c h i e v e t h e s a m e goal.
In e s s e n c e , t h e results o f this s t u d y m a y b e
s u m m a r i z e d b e s t b y p o i n t i n g o u t that w h i l e t h e y
raise m a n y issues w o r t h c o n s i d e r i n g , t h e s t u d y
w a s e x p l o r a t o r y and, t h e r e f o r e , t e n t a t i v e in
nature. G i v e n t h e difficulties o f c r o s s - c u l t u r a l research, t h e n e x t studies, also, s h o u l d m o v e tentatively a n d putatively.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Becker, S. W. & Green, D., Budgeting and Employee Behavior, Journal of Business (October 1962)
pp. 392-402.
Birnberg, J. & Sadhu, K., Contributions of Psychological and Cognitive Research to Managerial Accounting,
in Hopwood, A. and Bromwich, M. ( eds )Research in ManagementAccounting (London: Pitman, 1986).
Birnberg, J., Turopolec, L. & Young, S. M., The Organizational Context of Accounting, Accounting organizations and SocieCy (1983) pp. 111-129.
Burawoy, M., Manufacturing Consent (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1978).
Cole, R., Wori~ Mobility, and Participation.. A Comparative Study of American and Japanese Industry
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979).
Hagc, J. & Aiken, M., Relationship of Centralization to Other Structural Properties, Administrative Science
Quarterly (1967) pp. 72-92.
Hall, R., Intraorganizational Structural Variation: Application of the Bureaucratic Model, Administrative
Science Quarterly (1962) pp. 295-308.
Irish, J. S., A Yankee Learns to Bow, New York Times Magazine Section (June 1986)pp. 38-39, 122, 124,
126.
Kono, T., Strategy and Structure ofJapanese Enterlra'ses (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1984).

462

JACOB G. BIRNBERG and CORAL SNODGRASS

Marschak, J. & Radner, R., Economic Theory o f Teams (Cowles Foundation Monograph No. 22, New Haven,
Yale, 1972 ) .
Ouchi, W. G., The Relationship b e t w e e n Organizational Structure and Organizational Control,Administrative Science Quarterly (1977) pp. 9 5 - 1 1 3 .
Ouchi, W. G., A Conceptual Framework for the Design of Organizational Control Mechanisms, Management Science (1979) pp. 8 3 3 - 8 4 8 .
Ouchi, W. G., Theory Z (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1981 ).
Peters, J. & Waterman, R., In Search o f Excellence ( New York: Harper-Row, 1982 ).
Reischauer, E. O., TheJapanese (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977).
Ridgeway, V. F., Dysfunctional C o n s e q u e n c e s of Performance Measurements, Administrative Science
Quarterly (September 1956) pp. 240-247.
Roy, D., Quota Restrictions and Goldbricking in a Machine Ship,American J o u r n a l ofSociologop ( 1952) pp.
427--442.
Smith, R. J.,Japanese Society: Tradition, Self and Social Order (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1983).
Snodgrass, C., Cultural Influences on Strategic Control Systems Requirements, unpublished PhD Dissertation, University of Pittsburgh (1984).
Steckel, J. & Gupta, S., Incorporating Interdependencies in Utilities in the Nash Solution for Cooperative
Bargaining, paper presented at the TIMS/ORSAJoint National Meetings ( N o v e m b e r 1985).
Strodtheck, F. & Kluckhohn, C., Variations in Value Orientations (Chicago: Row, Peterson, 1961 ).
Young, S. H., Shields, M. D. & Wolf, G., Manufacturing Controls and Performance: An Experiment, Working
Paper, School of Business and Public Administration, University of Arizona ( 1987 ).

A P P E N D I X A. I N T E R N A T I O N A L

RESEARCH ON CULTURE AND ORGANIZATIONS

Below you will find 27 items designed to look at two areas. The first 12 items will measure the degree to
w h i c h procedures are written down and observed inyour company. Please respond to these items from the
perspective of your company. The second 15 items are designed to m e a s u r e your opinions about h o w
organizations should be designed. Please respond to t h e m from your o w n perspective.
There are also six demographic items w h i c h will help us in the analysis of the data.
Your help and cooperation in this international research are greatly appreciated.
Coral R. Snodgrass
Graduate School o f Business
University o f Pittsburgh

Instructions
In the sections below, you will see a series of statements. Please indicate your agreement or disagreement
by placing a checkmark in the parentheses according to the following:
Strongly agree
Agree

Undecided/don't know
Disagree
Strongly disagree

I
I
I

I
i

I//

I
I
I

I
I

|
I

I
I
I

I
I
~'/ i

I
I
I

I
I

t
I I// I
I
i
i ~// I

Please be sure to answer all items with one of the given responses.
PART 1
2
A

SA
1.
2.
3.

Managers' salaries are based on length of service and position

in the firm.
Rewards in this c o m p a n y are directly linked to meeting the
budget.
This c o m p a n y keeps written records of budget variances.

3
U/DK

4
D

5
SD

CULTURE AND CONTROL

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

Managers only have responsibility for their part of the budget.

Managers are held responsible for all budget variances.
Managers w h o do not meet their budgets would be in trouble.
Written evaluations of managers' job performances are kept.
Changes in the budget can be made only after approval from
higher management.
Reports on budget variances are done frequently.
Managers know clearly the impact of variances ( both positive
and negative ) on their evaluations.
The budgeting process in this company is a standardized
process.
Rewards in this company are based on our written evaluations.

463

I
I

I
!
I

PART II

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

Workers' pay is based on length of service and position in

the company.
A worker w h o fails to do his job would be in trouble.
This company keeps written records of all the jobs performed
by an individual.
Workers cannot be held responsible for something that happens
outside of their job descriptions.
Workers are evaluated on the basis of h o w well they follow
the rules.
A worker w h o breaks the rules would be in trouble.
Written evaluations are done for every worker.
This company has written descriptions of the positions in
the company.
Going through proper channels is constantly stressed.
Workers know clearly h o w to do a good job.
Workers are to follow strict operating procedures at all times.
Rewards in this company are based on written records of
job performance.

PART III
1.
Age: (
)
2.
Sex: a. male b. female
3.
Length of time with the company: years
4.
Education:
a. 8th grade
b. High school
c. College
d. Other
5.
Area of major job content:
a. Production
b. Sales, marketing, and advertising
c. Finance and accounting
d. Personnel and training
e. Purchasing
f. Research and development
g. General administration
h. Other (please specify):
6.
Level in the organization:
a. Non-management

months

SA

U/DK

SD

I
I
I

I
I
I
I
I

464

JACOB G. BIRNBERG and CORAL SNODGRASS

b. Foreman
c. Section chief
d. Middle m a n a g e m e n t
e. Upper m a n a g e m e n t
f. Other
Briefly describe your job responsibilities, if possible:

A P P E N D I X B. C L A S S I F I C A T I O N O F C O M P A N I E S
1. L i n e o f b u s i n e s s

Line of business
Basic metals
Heavy/light manufacturing
Manufacturing/construction

Japan

U.S.

1
9
1

2
8
1

Japan
(millionsof Yen)

U.S.
(billionsof U.S. $)

7
4

1
9
1

Japan

U.S.

6
4
1

4
3
4

2. S i z e - - s a l e s

Sales ( 1 9 8 3 )
LT 1MY/1B $
1--100OMY/1-10B $
GTIOOOMY/I OB $
3. S i z e - - e m p l o y e e s

N u m b e r of employees
LT 20,000
20,000-50,000
GT 50,000