HereisapaperIbeganinthesummerof2000,intendingtowritealilediscussionnoteforboAkademi's

philosophyresearchseminar,andnishedinApril2001,whenithadturnedintothisleviathanowingto
mygengprogressivelymoreinterestedinitssubjectmaerasIwrote.Nevertheless,I'msllnot
completelysasedwithit,soanycomments(laudatoryorcondemnatory)wouldbewelcome.
Addion:Aversionofthepaperwaspublished,tled"ErnestGellner'sCricismsofWigensteinand
OrdinaryLanguagePhilosophy,"inGavinKitching&NigelPleasants(eds.),MarxandWigenstein:
Knowledge,MoralityandPolics(London:Routledge,2002).

TheStrangeDeathofOrdinaryLanguagePhilosophy
T.P.USCHANOV,DepartmentofPhilosophy,UniversityofHelsinki
TheConceptofMindisoneofthosebooksthatisoencitedbypeoplewhohaventreaditbut
readaboutit,andthinktheyknowwhatisinit.Theyhavereadthatitepitomizestwowoefully
regressiveschoolsofthoughtthatourishedunaccountablyinmidcenturybutarenowuerly
discredited:OrdinaryLanguagePhilosophyandBehaviourism.Yes,andimbibingalcoholwill
leadyouinexorablytothemadhouseandmasturbaonwillmakeyougoblind.Dontbelieveit.
DanielC.Denne(2000:xiv)
Butordinarylanguageisallright.
LudwigWigenstein(1958:28)
Introducon
WhichbookcricizingcertaindevelopmentsinpostwaranalycphilosophywonfavoursfrombothKarl
PopperandtheSovietUnion,movedI.A.Richardstowriteapoem,inspiredBrishsituaoncomedy,
causedanangrymonthlongcorrespondenceintheTimes,wasthesubjectofconcernededitorialsinboth
thatpaperandtheEconomist,andsllstrikessparkstoday?TheStructureofSciencRevoluons?Naming
andNecessity?PhilosophyandtheMirrorofNature?Noneofthese.ItwasinfactWordsandThingsbythe
CzechanthropologistErnestGellner(19251995),abookthatcausedaheatedworldwidecontroversyonits
rstpublicaonin1959,butispraccallyforgoennowadays.WordsandThingsisavehementaackon
thestyleofphilosophizingknownas"linguiscphilosophy,""Oxfordanalysis"or,mostoen,"ordinary
languagephilosophy"IwillhenceforthcallitOLPforshort.OLPwasidenedmainlywithBrishanalyc
philosophersofthelastmidcenturyandmorespecicallythoseattheUniversityofOxford.Itschief
praconerswereregardedtobesuchphilosophersasLudwigWigenstein(18891951),GilbertRyle
(19001976),J.L.Ausn(19111960),P.F.Strawson(1919),PaulGrice(19131988)andJohnWisdom
(19041993).Fromthelate1940stotheearly1960sOLPwasanintegralpartofthemainstreamofanalyc
philosophy;asStephenMulhall(1994:444)haspointedout,whenaleadingintroductorytextbookofthe
eraspokesimplyof"contemporaryphilosophy,"itwasOLPthatwasbeingreferredto.1Currently,however,
OLPisnotgenerallyviewedasalegimateintellectualoponforphilosophers,analycorotherwise.Infact
itssafetosaythat,withthepossibleexceponofBergsonsandDrieschsvitalism,OLPisthemostdeeply
unfashionableofallthemaincurrentsoftwenethcenturyWesternphilosophy.Ithasfallenvicmtowhat
StanGodlovitchhascalledphilosophysequivalentof"retouchingfamilyphotos,oldKremlinstyle"(2000:
6).ThepresentpaperisarguedfromahistoriographicalposionvoicedcandidlybyMarnKusch"re
wringofhistoryhasabadpressasfaraspolicaleventsareconcerned;thereisnoreasonwhyweshould
tolerateitinourphilosophicalhistory"(1996:95).2ItismyviewthatthewayinwhichOLPhasbeenwrien
outofhistoryinrecentdecadesislargelytheresultofGellnerswidespreadinuence,andwhatIaimatisa
reassessmentofthebackground,natureandscopeofhisimpact.
Ihavethreereasonsforaempngsuchatask.First,therehavebeenveryfewstudiesofwhatmadeonce
livelyintellectualmilieusandclimatesdisappear.3Thehistoryofideasandthesociologyofknowledgehave
hithertoconcentratedalmostexclusivelyonthesuccessandpropagaonofideas,nottheirfailureand

erasure.Thishasledtoforgengofthefactthatvictorswritethehistoriesinintellectualhistoryaswellas
policalhistory,andthereforesourcecricismisoenconspicuouslylackingwhenhistoriansofideastreat
schoolsofthoughtthatfailedtomaintaintheirlegimaon.Withafewexcepons(e.g.Francks1985;
Candlish1989;McCarty1995),thehistoriographyofphilosophyhasnotpaidanysignicantaenontothe
roleofhoslecaricaturesindiscredingphilosophersandtheirideas(exceptperhapsintheatypicalcaseof
AristophanesslampooningofSocrates).Ihopetodemonstratethatshowinganopponentsaccusaonsto
becaricaturescanconstuteasextensiveandagileaformofphilosophicalcricismaslookingfor
straighorwardfactualerrorsorlogicalfallaciesinthem.
Second,IthinkthatWordsandThingsisaverybadbookandthatitsinuencehasbeenalmosttotally
deleterious.IagreecompletelywithAntonyFlewsassessmentthatitisnotonlya"juvenilework"
displaying"fundamentalfrivolousnessandirresponsibility"(1984:77),butalso"theimmediateorulmate
sourceofinnumerableslickandignorantputdownsinthesubsequentliterature"(1986:95).Inmyopinion
GellnerscricismsofOLPareforthemostpartunjused,andevenwhenthisisntthecase,thepoint
wouldhavebeenbeerobeingmadewithouthissmarmysensaonalism.StephenMulhallhas
interesnglysuggestedthat"theneedtorejectortranscend[OLP]faroutweighedthecapacitytoprovide
goodgroundsforsodoing,andsoresultedinaformofcollecveprojeconcoupledwithcollecve
amnesia"(1994:445).EvenifchancesofrevivingOLPonagrandscaleareslim,bycuringpartofthat
amnesiaIhopetotakesometentavestepstocleanthenameofaperiodinwhich,inP.F.Strawsons
words,"thegainsandadvancesinphilosophicalunderstandingmadewereprobablyasgreatasanythat
havebeenmadeinacomparablyshortmeinthehistoryofthesubject"(1998:12).
Third,familiaritywiththeinuenceofWordsandThingsisimportantifonewantstounderstandmany
aspectsofthereceponhistoryofWigenstein,theonephilosopheraackedbyGellnerwhoissll
generallyconsideredoneofthetruegreatsofWesternphilosophy.Evenif,perimpossibile,allthewrings
ofallotherpraconersofOLPshouldturnouttobeworthless,itwouldsllbeinteresngtodemonstrate
howthereceponofWigensteinreectstheinuenceofGellnersaack.Inhindsight,theinuenceofan
instantlyrecognizable(ifoentacit)styleofWigensteinianmisinterpretaon,exploitedbythinkersas
diverseasHerbertMarcuse,KarlPopper,JrgenHabermasandGillesDeleuze,canbeseenlargelytotrace
backtoGellnerspolemic.ItisalsoakeysourceofarhetoricalstyleofarguingagainstWigensteinthat
almosteveryWigensteinianthinkerregularlyndshimselfconfrontedwith.
ThecontentofGellnersbook
OneoftherstthingsthatstrikethereaderofWordsandThingsisGellnersextremerudeness.Hardlya
paragraphgoesbywithoutsomeinvecvebeingused.LikeAlanSokaldidrecentlyintheaermathofhis
hoaxarcle,Gellnerusedessenallypopulistrhetoricalstrategies.Heingeniouslyexploitedthegeneral
publicsfascinaonwithembarrassmentandridiculewhenaackingaphilosophyperceivedasdisastrous.
HisbookexudesthroughitseveryporethesensethatOLPisnotonlyuseless,butevilanddangerous.
Wordslike"evasion,""insinuaon,""camouage"and"dishonesty,"especiallytheformertwo,occuron
praccallyeverypage.Characteriscchapterheadingsinclude"TheCultoftheFox,""TheBaitandthe
Trap,""TheTurnoftheScrew,""ThePrayerWheel,""PhilosophybyFilibuster,""SaladinsFork,""TheIndian
RopeTrick"and"TheNarodniksofNorthOxford".Anotherfeatureofthebookisthemakingofnumerous
negaveexistenalstatements:nopraconersofOLPownuptotheirmistakes,theyneverrefusetouse
suchandsuchaninvalidargument,andsoon.(Asweshallsee,thismakesmanyofGellnersclaims
extremelyeasytofalsifybymeansofcounterexamples.)
AccordingtoGellner,the"fourpillars"onwhichOLPstandsare:
1.Theparadigmcaseargument:languageproves,forexample,thattablesmustexist,sinceweusethe
word"table"oenandwithapparentsuccess.Initsparadigmactualusagesaconceptmustbecorrectly
applied,forwhatelsecoulditmean?(Gellner1959:3037).
2.Thegeneralizedversionofthenaturaliscfallacy:linguiscnormsandrecommendaonscanlegimately
beinferredfromcurrentlyacceptedusage(Gellner1959:3740).

3.Thecontrasttheoryofmeaning:anymeaningfultermmusthavebothapossibleexampleandapossible
counterexample.Theremustbesomethingatermdoesnotcover.Contrastlessconceptsaremeaningless,
becausenothingcouldconceivablycountastheirrefutaon(Gellner1959:4044).
4.Polymorphism:alogicallyhomogeneous"ideallanguage"isimpossible,sinceeverylanguageincludes
conceptssubjecttofamilyresemblanceandotheraspectsoftheirreduciblediversityoflanguage.What
werethoughttobehomonymsareactuallydierentmeaningsofthesameconcept.Anygeneralmodelsof
languagesareimpossible(Gellner1959:4450).
GellnersmostfamousobjecontoOLP,whichheclaimsmustfollowfromthepillars,isthatOLPisdeeply
conservave.Itdeferstothelinguischabitsoftheboorishcommonman;ittendstopreservethesocial
statusquoandbelilethesignicanceofsocialproblems;anditcanonlyexistinaclosedsystemsuchas
thesocialworldoftheUniversityofOxford,"beingofitsessenceanivorytowerpursuit"(Gellner1959:
235).AccordingtoGellner,OLP"isconservaveinthevalueswhichitinfactinsinuatesnotspecically
conservavebutconservaveinageneral,unspecicway.Itconcentratesonshowingthatthereasons
underlyingcricismsofacceptedhabitsareingeneralmistaken"(1959:224225).Furthermore,Gellner
arguesthat"intermsofitsownaccountofitsnatureandpurposes"OLPis"unintelligibletoanyoneofa
praccalorientaon"(1959:246),andthepraconersofitsmethodsareaccordinglyportrayedbyhimas
"smug,unintelligent,upperclass,superciliouslyapolical,unhistoricalandanscienc"(Cohen1960:
180).
ThereceponofGellnersarguments
ThewidespreadinuenceofWordsandThingsisprimarilyafunconofthewayinwhichalargenon
academicpublicwasmadeawareofitshortlyaeritwaspublished.Thebookbecameasuccsdescandale
whenRylewrotetoitspublishers,VictorGollanczLtd,inhiscapacityaseditorofMind:
YourecentlysentmeareviewcopyofWordsandThingsbyErnestGellner.Iamreturningitto
you(separately)sinceIshallnothaveareviewofthebookinMind.Abusivenessmaymakea
booksaleable,butitdisqualiesitfrombeingtreatedasacontribuontoanacademicsubject.
(QuotedinRussell1997:607)
BertrandRussell,whohadwrienalaudatoryintroducontothebook,protestedthisinaleerinthe
Times,Rylereplied,andtheexchangestartedacontroversynallyinvolvingnineteendierent
correspondents,boththemeritsofthebookandtherightnessofRylesdecisionbeingcontestedwithequal
vigour(Mehta1983:114;Re1993:1516;Russell1997:605609).4Thecontroversyculminatedafew
weekslaterinasolicitousTimesleadingarcle(Anonymous1959c)cricalofbothsides,althoughslightly
favourabletoGellner.Aboutamonthlater,theEconomistdevotedasimilarlyworriedandseemingly
imparaleditorialto"TheHatredsofPhilosophers"theaairhadbroughttolight(Anonymous1960).Fora
while,Gellnersassaultseeminglybecame"themostdiscussedworkofEnglishphilosophysinceA.J.Ayers
Language,TruthandLogic"(Cohen1960:178);eveninOxforditself,it"waschictoclaimthatonehad
enormouslyenjoyedthispieceofintellectualslapsck"(Anonymous1973b:8).
AlthoughMinddidnotreviewWordsandThings,manyotherperiodicalsdid.Mostreviewerswereofthe
opinionMindswouldundoubtedlyhavebeen.ThemostnegaveesmatewasprobablyMichael
Dummesview,expressedintheEnglishDominicansjournalBlackfriars,thatthebookdidntevenhave
"thesmellofhonestorseriouslyintenonedwork"(1960:436).CloselybehindwasArnoldIsenbergs
reviewintheJournalofPhilosophy,whichconsideredthebook"resomeandbestleunread,"andGellner
himself"oneofthosephilosopherswhoseemtothinkthattolayarhetoricalstressonadisncon
betweenplayingwithwordsanddealingwithfundamentalissuesistodealwithfundamentalissues"(1961:
110111).IntheSciencAmerican,MortonWhitesubmiedalonglistoflogicalfallaciesinGellners
arguments,speakingof"thebellicosemannersofanangryyoungphilosopher,"whichwereonlyliableto
preventthefairreceponGellnerclaimedhadbeendeniedhisviews(1960:210).InthePhilosophical
ReviewWillisDoney,oneoftheyoungAmericanphilosopherstowhomNormanMalcolmhadintroduced
Wigensteinin1949,wroteonsimilarlines,concentrangonGellnerstreatmentoftheparadigmcase

argument(Doney1962).TheunsignedTimesLiterarySupplementnoce5calledWordsandThings"an
intenselyexasperangbooktoread,"againreferringtotheparadigmcaseargument(Anonymous1959b:
682).InSynthese,thescholasclogicianGabrilNuchelmansaccusedGellnerof"llingupholesina
preconceivedscheme,"andofoeringanonlyallegedlysociologicalanalysisthat"oenremindsonemore
ofamalignantteapartythanofapainstakingsciencstudy"(1961:94,97).TheCambridgeReview
assignedWordsandThingstoGeoreyWarnock,whofoundit"notatallasensiblebook"of"boisterous
pamphleteering"thatwas"anopportunitymisused,"sinceitdidnotaddresstherealweaknessesofOLP,
concentranginsteadonmerelydebunkingthesimpliedslogansofthemovement(1959:129131).6
EvenphilosopherswhothemselvesthoughtthatthehegemonyofOLPneededchallengingwerecricalof
Gellnersabusivenessandunsubstanatedallegaons.IntheNewStatesman,AlasdairMacIntyrestated
thatalthoughWordsandThingswas"asplendidpieceofphilosophicalpolemicwhichnobodyinterestedin
thesubjectoughttoignore,"itis"tooterseandschemactobeconvincing";itwasalsoapitythatGellner
didnotextendhissociologicalanalysistotheulteriormovesofRussellandhisotherallies(1959:597
598).AnthonyQuinton,wringintheBrishJournalforthePhilosophyofScience,sharedthislastregret,
whiledevongmostofhislongreviewtoprovidingtextualcounterexamplestoGellnersspecic
accusaons(Quinton1961).MarshallCohensreviewinCommentarysuspectedGellnerofprofessionalenvy
towardstheholdersofpresgiousOxfordjobs,suggesngthattherewas"enoughtruthinwhathemight
havesaidforhimtohavemadetheeorttosayit"(1960:178).StephanKrnerinthePhilosophical
QuarterlyalsowelcomedacricalatudetoOLP,buthetoofoundGellnersmethodsfaultyand
unwarrantedlysweeping:"WhiledisagreeingwithmuchthatisfundamentaltoWigensteinsphilosophical
posion,Ihavealwaysregardedhimasaphilosopherofgenius.Gellnerhasnotshakenthisvieworgiven
meanyreasonsforchangingit"(1961:379).ThecricalnoceofthephenomenologistJ.N.Findlay,
publishedintheshortlivedIndianJournalofPhilosophy,describedGellnerasatalentedcaricaturist,who
regreably"confrontsnewprejudiceswithageneralappealtoolderones"and"hasonlycontrivedtosnipe
irritanglyatanorderlyprocessionwithvarioustypesofanquemusketry,shoongdowntheusefuland
innocentasmuchasthewicked"(1961:130,138).AndevenA.J.Ayerarecentvicmofanopen
stonewallingaconbyAusnandRyle,whowantedtokeephimoutofanOxfordchairwascensorious.
InhisnoceintheSpectator,hepraisedbothhisnemesesforhavingachievedgenuinelyimportantresults,
referringtoOLPas"anavenueofphilosophicalprogress"which"mayhavebecomeablindalley[b]utthis
isnotanexcuseforimpungfrivolitytothosewhopursueit"(Ayer1959:716).
JustabouttheonlyphilosophicalreviewerswhowereatleastassympathecascricalwereH.B.Acton
(1959);thePopperianJohnWatkins(1960);theOxfordlogicianWilliamKneale(1960);andP.L.Heath
(1962),theScoshcricofOLP.Eventheyinvariablycomplainedaboutthebooksabusivestyleandmade
otherconcessionstoRylesviewpoint.Thefewcompletelylaudatorycommentswereallbynon
philosophers.I.A.RichardswrotetoGellnerexpressinghis"verysubstanalagreement,"enclosing"The
StrayedPoet,"apoemaboutWigensteinwhich,hesaidinanotherleer,waspromptedbyhisreading
WordsandThings(Richards1990:159162).BernardCrick,thepolicalscienstandfuturebiographerof
Orwell,madethemostofRylesrefusalinclaimingthattherehadbeenanenre"frighteneduerof
retreat"awayfromrespondingtoGellnersndings(1960:103).IntheNaon,HansMeyerhoandAlvinN.
MainalsoagreedwithGellnersviewstotallyandpraisedhis"shocktherapy,"whichmakeshim"as
mercilessasheisbrilliant"(1960:184,183).Thismighthavebeentheminorityviewamongthereviewers,
butitquicklybecamethenorm:WordsandThingswasasuccess,andestablishedGellnersname
internaonally.Thankstohim,OLPeven"receivedthecontemporaryequivalentofanociallisngasA
FunnyThing"(Anonymous1973b:8)whenJonathanMillerandAlanBennewrotethesketch"Words
andThings"forthe1961comedyrevueBeyondtheFringe.Init,anOxfordphilosopherclaimsthathecan
"quiteeasily"establishtherelevanceofOLPtoeverydaylife,butisquicklyrenderedalaughingstock
(Benneetal.1963:5152).In1961and1962translaonsofWordsandThingscameoutinItaly,Spainand
theSovietUnion;in1968itappearedasaPenguinpaperback;and1979sawthepublicaonofasecond
edionwithanewintroducon.
BythenGellnersviewswereestablishedalmostasfactsofnature,bothinsideandoutsideacademic
philosophy.ManyphilosophicalschoolsthatopposeeachotherimplacablyPopperians,posivists,
Marxists,poststructuralists,andsoonagreeononething:OLPwaswronganditsdisappearancewasa

goodthingindeed.OLPhasbecometheulmate"goodenemy"inthehistoryoftwenethcentury
philosophy.Overtheyears,philosophershavechargeditwithworshipping"themidmorningincuriosityand
philisnismofthemeansensualman"(Heath1962:177);eming"masochisctwilightofresignaon"
(Cory1969:1115);havingbeen"theBereWoosterseasoninphilosophy"(Grene1995:55);represenng
"dinosaurismofthedeepestdye"(Magee1997:53).CricshavespokenofOLPas"adeviaonfromthe
truepathofphilosophy"(Tomlin1977:232)and"anaberraon"(Mundle1970:7)thatrecommends"giving
upthecallingofphilosophy"(MeyerhoandMain1960:183).Evenanadmirerrecentlycharacterizeditas
"quaintlypass"and"asoidisantmovementthateveninitsheydayaractedavenom"(Lyas1996b:347
348).Forawhile,theanOLPradealmostseemedtobecomeaseparateliteraryformwithitsowngenre
rules(e.g.Cory1969;Rosen1969:127;Tomlin1977;Anderson1992:6570).GeoreyWarnocknotes
wrylythat"beinganordinarylanguagephilosopherseemsalwaystohavebeensomethingofwhichone
wasaccused,ratherthatsomethingwhichoneclaimed"(1998:148).Gellnerhimselfconnuedhisaacks
onWigensteinandOLPformanydecadesaerhisrstonslaught.FiveyearsaerWordsandThings,he
publishedaprcisofthebookasachapterinJ.H.PlumbswidelydisseminatedcolleconCrisisinthe
Humanies(Gellner1964),andinmanyacademicpapersandpopularessaysthroughoutthesixes,
sevenesandeighesherepeatedhisaccusaonsagainstOLP.Astheyearspassed,Gellnersesmateofit
andWigensteinsworkgotlowerandlower.IntheeighesthefalsityofWigensteinsideaswas,tohim,
"probablythesinglemostimportantfactabouttheintellectuallifeofmankind"(1984:263);bytheninees
ithadgrownto"thesinglemostimportantfactaboutthehumancondion"(1996:670),andWigenstein
now"condemnsandignoreseverythingthatisimportantinthehistoryofhumanintellectuallife"(1998:
162),recommending"acollecveinfanleregressionforallmankind"(1992:123).
AfewcommentatorsofWordsandThingshadalreadynotedhowGellnerseemed"likeadisappointedman
whosexedideahassueredablow"(White1960:206);"aharassedman"(Mehta1983:39)whocame
acrossas"slightlyparanoiac"(Quinton1961:344).Butitisonlyinhisrecentlypublishedposthumousbook,
LanguageandSolitude,thatGellnersdislikeofWigensteinandOLPgoesbeyondmeresensaonalismand
takesonthecontoursofacompleteWeltanschauung.ItincludesaseventypagesecononWigenstein
intendedasadenivestatementonthemaerofhisinuence.Inthesixes,Gellnerclaimedthat
DurkheimhadalreadythoughtofeverythingworthpreservinginWigenstein(1964:6366);adecade
later,thethinkerGellnerproposedtoreplaceOLPwithwasCollingwood(Anonymous1973a:338).In
LanguageandSolitude,itisMalinowskiwhoservesasthegoodguyinGellnersManicheanschemein
whichthebadguyisinvariablyWigenstein.Butdotheseaccusaons,orGellnersoriginalonesinWords
andThings,haveanypoint?Shortlybeforehisdeath,Gellnerwrote:"Amandoesnotnecessarilyhavethe
lastwordontheinterpretaonofhisownthought:hisviewsmayimplyorpresupposeideasherepudiates,
andhemaybeblindtoit.Othersmustjudgewhetherthishashappenedtome"(1996:672).Ibelievethatit
happenedtohim,andinthefollowingdiscussionIshalltrytodemonstratethis.
Theparadigmcaseargument
GellnerclaimsinWordsandThingsthattheparadigmcaseargumentis"absolutelyessenaltoLinguisc
Philosophy:itpervadesitanditispresupposedwithoutqualicaon"(1959:3031).Heselectsa
tendenousexample:AntonyFlewsclaimthatifsomeonedeniestherealityoffreewill,theparadigmcase
argumentsupposedlyrefutestheclaimbyinvokingthefactthat"ofonesfreewill"ismeaningfulin
ordinarylanguage(Gellner1959:31;1998:161).Gellnergivestheimpressionthatallparadigmcase
argumentsareofthiskind.NowFlewundeniablyusestheparadigmcaseargumentandthinksthatitsolves
theproblemofdeterminism.Butthishardlyprovesthatitis"absolutelyessenal"toOLP.Forexample,we
havelengthyrecordsofbothWigensteinsandRyleslecturesonthefreedomofthewill,andneitherof
theminvokestheparadigmcaseargument(Wigenstein1989;Ryle1993:111145).I,inturn,disagree
withallofwhatFlewsaysandwithmostofwhatRyleandWigensteinsay.7Gellnersclaimaboutthe
pervasivenessoftheparadigmcaseargumentisthusrefuted;thathe"devotesonlysevenunbuoned
pagesinanextremelyrepeousbooktotheargumenthethinkssocrucial"(Cohen1960:179)doesnot
helphiscaseeither.
Anotherobjeconhedoespresentagainstparadigmcases,whichhasbecomeastockresponsetothem,is
thecaseofwitches:onceuponameacertaintypeofanunaracveoldwomanwouldhavebeena

paradigmcaseofawitch,butnobodybelievesinwitchcraanymore.Theproblemwiththiskindof
objeconisthattheparadigmcaseargumentisparadigmacally(sic)usedinconjunconwithinvoking
conversaonalimplicature.Todenythatwitchesexististocommitoneselftoadebateonwhetherwitches
exist;andtoclaimthatwitchesexististomakethesamecommitment;itis"tomakeoneliabletoquesons
aboutqualicaonsandreasonsthatcallforatleastsomesortofanswer"(Leiber1999:208;cf.Haning
2000:8589).8Andifaphilosopherdeniessomethingextremelyobvious,suchastheexistenceofmiddle
sizeddrygoods,theargumentcanbeusedindirectlybypoinngoutthatthephilosopherusesmany
conceptsotherthan"middlesizeddrygoods"inawaythattacitlypresupposesthedrygoodsexistence
(Hertzberg1976:4246;Grice1989:172;Kitching1994:241244;Haning2000:7778).Thisisnt
analogoustothewitchexample,sincenobodyuseslanguagepresupposingtheexistenceofwitches.
Iftheparadigmcaseargumentisused"toderiveexistenaltruthsfromthefactthatagivenexpressionis,
ormustbe,ostensivelydenedandlearnt"(Hacker1996:239),itisindefensible.Butthisisnotitsonlyuse.
Itsmainpurposeistoremindusofthefactthatifwewantto,say,denytherealityoffreewill,theaudience
weaddressisliabletoraisetheissueofordinaryusage,andthatweshouldbepreparedforthiseventuality,
sinceitisabrutefactthatwordsaretakentohavebothstandardandnonstandarduses(Weitz1953:231
232).Theargumentisbestusedtopointout"classic"logicalfallaciessuchasthenotrueScotsmanfallacy:
forexample,ifthemembersofagroupofpeopleentlethegroupasaninstuontoactinthenameofits
members,amembercannotdisclaimthegroupsundesirableacons,becauseitisconsideredparadigmac
ofhimtobeamember.Orifsomeonewantstogiveacleardenionofwhatwouldperhapsbeerbe
consideredafamilyresemblanceconcept,hecanberemindedofthefactthatproposedcleardenionsof
familyresemblanceconceptsoenexcludeparadigmacinstancesorincludeparadigmacaninstances.9
"Merewords"andtheallegednaturaliscfallacy
Gellnersinjunconagainstinferringlinguiscnormsfromusageisbasedonthesuggesonthatifordinary
languageistobethesubjectmaerofphilosophy,philosophersshouldhaveatraininginsociolinguiscs
andnotpretendthattheirenquiriesintolanguagearepurelyconceptual;otherwisetherewillbeno
knowledge,butonlyahollowpseudosociology(cf.Clammer1976:786788).OutsideofWordsandThings,
thelocusclassicusofthisapproachistherejoinderbyBensonMates(1958)toStanleyCavellsdefenceof
theconceptualnatureofOLP.InthesixestheapproachwasdevelopedandusedbyChomskyanandother
linguists,inwhoseinterestsitwouldhavebeentorefuteOLPsclaimnottotreatempiricalmaers(Herdan
1960;FodorandKatz1963;New1966).10ButthepointofCavellsposion,ashasbeennotedmanymes,
isthateveryonewhospeaksalanguagealreadyhasthelinguiscinsncttosuggestcounterexamplesto
claimsaboutthatlanguage(Henson1965;Richman1966;Friedman1969;BatesandCohen1972;Lyas
1996a:189;Kindi1998;Haning2000:5660).Ausn,RyleandWigenstein"dialeccallyexposedtheir
thoughtstoanintenselycricalandnotalwaysfriendlyphilosophicalaudience,anaudiencequitecapable
ofremindingthemofthingstheymighthaveoverlooked.Thosewhoparcipatedinthatdialeccalprocess
wereperfectlyabletoengageinconrmaonanddisconrmaonofclaimsabouttheuseofwords"(Lyas
1996a:189).Andsoitshouldbeclearthatitisthespeakersownconicnglinguiscinsnctsthatthe
exchangeofcounterexamplesprimarilytriestochartandreconcile(Grice1989:173176).
Andironically,itisabyproductofthemyththatOLPalwaysdeferstoamajorityviewthatitscricswantit
tondoutthemajorityviewempirically.Forexample,AusnscorreconofRylesclaimthat"voluntary"is
usedonlyofaconsthataremorallysuspecthasbeenexhumedagainandagaintoclaimthatproponents
ofOLParenotfamiliarwiththestandardusageoftheirlanguageevenamongthemselves.11"Inproviding
hiscounterexample,"however,"Ausnisnotsurveyingorjusfyinganything.Whenhegiveshis
counterexample,heisassumingthatRylewilltakehispoint.Inspeakingforhimself,Ausntakeshimselfto
bespeakingforRyleatthesameme,becausehiscounterexampleandtheappealhemakestoittakefor
grantedacommondiscoursethatheandRyleshare"(Phillips1999:89).WhenconfrontedwithAusns
claim,Rylesurelydidntreply"Well,thatshowIusethatword,"but"Yes,youreright"(Hacker1996:235).
CounterexampleslikeAusns,farfrombeingfataltothepretensionsofOLP,areinfactcentralinit.Their
useisaparcularlygoodexampleofthebenetsofOLPspiecemealapproach,whichAusnoncecalled
"eldworkinphilosophy"(1956:131).12

AtitsmostsuccessfulOLPalmostalwaysproceedsonacasuiscbasis.Contrariwise,itsopponentsareoen
buildersofgrandtheorecalsystemsafraidoftheirwholeedicecollapsingifanypossibilityofalimittoits
validityistakenintoconsideraon.Onecanofcourserefusetocallaspadeaspade,butthenonecan
reasonablyexpecthavingtocallitsomethingelse,andhavingtojusfythechange(Richman1966:2425;
Slater1986:211;Grice1989:172;Haning2000:2).Everymeitisclaimedthat"ordinarylanguageis
simplynotgoodenoughforphilosophy,"itshouldbeasked:aboutwhichexpressionofordinarylanguageis
itclaimedthatitisinferiortowhatexpressionoftechnicallanguage,andwhy?(Khatchadourian1981:238).
TheclassicexampleisthecontrastbetweenRussells1905"OnDenong"andStrawsons1950"On
Referring":
whereasRussellglancesratherperfunctorilyatwhathetookheretobethemuddledprimive
praccesofordinarylanguageandhurriesontotheconstruconofhisownTheoryof
Descripons,Strawsonndsourowneverydaypraccesofreferringtothingsbothinteresng
andimportant,andindeedsuchthat,ifaccuratelydescribed,theyrevealasunnecessarythe
revisionaryformalizaonwhichRussellaempted.
(Warnock1998:152)
AsregardsWigensteinsconceponofmeaningasuse,Gellnerclaims:"Aselecveuseoftheploymaysll
bepossible.Butthen,ofcourse,theburdenofthediscussionwouldhavetoshitotheprincipleof
selecon.Withinthismovement,nosuchdiscussionsoccurred,andthereisnologicalroomforthem"
(1979:26).13Thisisfalse.Wigensteinneversaid"meaningisuse".Hesaid:"Foralargeclassofcases
thoughnotforallinwhichweemploythewordmeaningitcanbedenedthus:themeaningofaword
isitsuseinthelanguage"(1953:43).AndoneofthemostpopularinterpretaveproblemsinWigenstein
researchhasforalongmebeenthequesonofthescopeofthe"largeclassofcases"(cf.Garver1994:
197204).ButperhapsifthishadbeenpointedouttoGellner,themulplicityofinterpretavestrategies
wouldmerelyhavegivenhimanotherexcusefordamningWigensteinbycomplainingabouthis"wilfully
andpretenouslychaoc"styleofwring(Gellner1974:709).
Another,relatedproblemforOLPistheexistenceofphilosophicalnoons14thatcannotbeexpressedin
English,butareintelligibleincertainotherlanguages,includingChineseandWelsh(Mundle1970:120
133).Rousseauhadapointinasking:"Commentestcequunetudedelusageanglaispuissenousdonner
plusquedesrenseignementssurlalangueanglaiseet,peuttre,lepeupleanglais?"Andtherearealso
indigenouspeopleswhoseworldviewsposesimilarproblemssuchastheNuer,wholackthenoonof
"belief"(Needham1972);theChewong,whodonotdisnguishbetweenthoughtsandfeelings(Howell
1981);ortheDinka(and,accordingtoPauliPylkk,theFinns),whoseeminglydonothaveanykindofself
oregoavailabletointrospecon(Lienhardt1961;Pylkk1998:265280;Pylkk1999).ApparentlyRyle,at
least,rejectedthesuggesonthatsomethingmightmakesenseinonelanguagebutnotinanother
(Mundle1970:126);ifso,hewaswrong.DetailedAusniancharngofdierencesbetweentheconceptual
schemesofvariouscultures,anddebateontheirimplicaonsforepistemologicalandontologicaltheories,
isnotonlypermissible,butquitedesirable.Linguiscphilosopherswhospecicallyemphasizethisatlength
includeR.M.Hare(1960:119)andJ.O.Urmson(Wahletal.1962:39);itwouldalsobeastonishingif
Wigenstein,whosemothertonguewasnotEnglishandwhodidonlyasmallporonofhisphilosophical
wringinEnglish,hadignoredthepointordisagreedwithit.
ThevariaonbetweentheformsofdierentlanguagesformsthebasisforthefamiliaraccusaonthatOLP
discusses"merewords"insteadoftheworldbehindthem.Wigensteinsanswertothisaccusaonisworth
quongextensively:
WhenItalkaboutlanguage(words,sentences,etc.)Imustspeakthelanguageofeveryday.Is
thislanguagesomehowtoocoarseandmaterialforwhatwewanttosay?Thenhowisanother
onetobeconstructed?Andhowstrangethatweshouldbeabletodoanythingatallwith
theonewehave!

IngivingexplanaonsIalreadyhavetouselanguagefullblown(notsomesortofpreparatory,
provisionalone);thisbyitselfshowsthatIcanadduceonlyexteriorfactsaboutlanguage.
Yes,butthenhowcantheseexplanaonssasfyus?Well,yourveryquesonswereframed
inthislanguage;theyhadtobeexpressedinthislanguage,iftherewasanythingtoask!
Andyourscruplesaremisunderstandings.
Yourquesonsrefertowords;soIhavetotalkaboutwords.
(1953:120)
NomaerhowmuchRussell,Gellner,Hinkka,Kripkeandother"ideallanguagephilosophers"protest,the
onlywaytocommunicateabstractthoughtsfromonemindtoanotheristouseanaturallanguage,orelse
tousesomearciallanguageparasiconanaturallanguagebecauseoriginallyformulatedinit.No
Russelliantheoryoftypes,noHinkkatypemodeltheory,noKripkeanpossibleworldsemancscanchange
thatfact,becauseitisafactaboutthehumanconstuon,notafactabouttheconveyancecapaciesof
proposionalsigns.Contra,say,Hinkka,thefundamentalinterpretaonofalanguagecannotbevaried;
whatcanbevariedisinsteadthefundamentalinterpretaonofreality.Ametalanguagecannotbeusedto
getoutsidelanguageanymorethanshowinghowonewalkscanbecalled"metawalking"asopposedto
walking(Friedman1969:414).Andjustastheabsenceofmetawalkingdoesnothingtopreventusfrom
cricizingcertainwaysofwalking,theabsenceofmetalanguagesdoesnothingtopreventusfromcricizing
certainwaysoftalking.ReadingGellner,itwouldbeimpossibletoguessthatWigensteinoncewrote:"Yes,
philosophicalproblemsemergewhenwehandthereinstolanguageinsteadoflife"15orthatoneofhis
closeststudents,M.OC.Drury,publishedabooktledTheDangerofWords.
ThesameignoranceofawarenessofdangersiscommonincricismsofAusn.Inwhatisperhapsthemost
famoussinglepassageinAusnswork,andperhapsevenhisandRylesworkcombined,hewrites:
[O]urcommonstockofwordsembodiesallthedisnconsmenhavefoundworthdrawing,
andtheconnexionstheyhavefoundmarking,inthelifemesofmanygeneraons:thesesurely
arelikelytobemorenumerous,moresound,sincetheyhavestooduptothelongtestofthe
survivaloftheest,andmoresubtle,atleastinordinaryandreasonablypraccalmaers,
thananythatyouorIarelikelytothinkupinourarmchairsofanaernoonthemost
favouredalternavemethod.
(1956:130)
Generaonsofcricshaveseizedonthisasasupposedlyconclusiveproofthatordinarylanguage
philosophersworshipthefaultsofordinarylanguageinthemostuncricalpossibleway.Itsregreablethat
theydidntreadon,sinceacoupleofpageslaterAusnwrites:
Certainlyordinarylanguagehasnoclaimtobethelastword,ifthereissuchathing.It
embodies,indeed,somethingbeerthanthemetaphysicsoftheStoneAge,namely,aswas
said,theinheritedexperienceandacumenofmanygeneraonsofmen.Butthen,thatacumen
hasbeenconcentratedprimarilyuponthepraccalbusinessoflife[andso]thisislikelyenough
nottobethebestwayofarrangingthingsifourinterestsaremoreextensiveorintellectual
thantheordinary.Anditmustbeaddedtoo,thatsupersonanderrorandfantasyofall
kindsdobecomeincorporatedinordinarylanguageandevensomemesstanduptothe
survivaltest(only,whentheydo,whyshouldwenotdetectit?).Certainly,then,ordinary
languageisnotthelastword:inprincipleitcaneverywherebesupplementedandimproved
uponandsuperseded.Onlyremember,itistherstword.
(1956:133)
ThesamethemesurfacesseveralmeselsewhereinAusnswork:

Ordinarylanguagebreaksdowninextraordinarycases.(Insuchcases,thecauseofthe
breakdownissemancal.)Nownodoubtanideallanguagewouldnotbreakdown,whatever
happened.Indoingphysics,forexample,whereourlanguageisghtenedupinorderprecisely
todescribecomplicatedandunusualcasesconcisely,wepreparelinguiscallyfortheworst.In
ordinarylanguagewedonot:wordsfailus.Theremaybeplentythatmighthappenanddoes
happenwhichwouldneednewandbeerlanguagetodescribeitin.Theremaybe
extraordinaryfacts,evenaboutoureverydayexperience,whichplainmenandplainlanguage
overlook.
(1940:3637)
Ifwehavemadesureitsagoldnch,andarealgoldnch,andtheninthefutureitdoes
somethingoutrageous(explodes,quotesMrs.Woolf,orwhatnot),wedontsaywewerewrong
tosaythatitwasagoldnch,wedontknowwhattosay.Wordsliterallyfailus:"Whatwould
youhavesaid?""Whatarewetosaynow?""Whatwouldyousay?"Itseemsaserious
mistaketosupposethatlanguage(ormostlanguage,languageaboutrealthings)is"predicve"
insuchawaythatthefuturecanalwaysproveitwrong.Whatthefuturecanalwaysdo,isto
makeusreviseourideasaboutgoldnchesorrealgoldnchesoranythingelse.
(1946:5657)
Andinadiscussionofcounterfactualsin1937,IsaiahBerlinrecordedthesamereaconinAusn:
[T]heprincipalexamplethatwechosewastheheroofKaasstoryMetamorphosis,a
commercialtravellercalledGregorSamsa,whowakesonemorningtondthathehasbeen
transformedintoamonstrouscockroach,althoughheretainsclearmemoriesofhislifeasan
ordinaryhumanbeing.Arewetospeakofhimasamanwiththebodyofacockroach,ora
cockroachwiththememoriesandconsciousnessofaman?"Neither,"Ausndeclared."Insuch
cases,weshouldnotknowwhattosay.Thisiswhenwesaywordsfailusandmeanthis
literally.Weshouldneednewwords.Theoldonesjustwouldnott.Theyarentmeantto
coverthiskindofcase."
(Berlin1973:11)
Whentheexistenceofthesepassagesispointedout,cricsofOLPtendtoclaimthatthesewords,though
heartwarming,were"evidently"or"surely"meretokengesturesthatAusnnevermeanttobetaken
seriously.Butwhereistheproofforthisclaim?Again,whatissorelylackingisacasebycasetreatment.
AboutwhichexpressionofordinarylanguageisitclaimedwronglybyAusnthatitissuperiortowhat
expressionoftechnicallanguage?Therearenoaemptedanswerstothisquesonintheliterature;thereis
onlyavastmassofunsubstanatedallegaonsthatAusn"evidently"or"surely"believedthatordinary
languageisneverwrongorfaulty.
Therecansimplybenoempiricalquesonofvalidangtheexaminaonofwords,becausewordsare
alreadythemostindispensabletoolofaphilosopher(Ausn1956:129130).Gellnerwrites:"Apart
languagecannotchallengeorsitinjudgementonthewholeworldofwhichitisapart"(1959:83).
Butnophilosopher,nomaerhowimplacablyopposedtothestudyofwords,cancommunicatehisideas
withoutthem;aerall,toGellnersdiscomfort,theverywords"wordsandthings"arewords,notthings
(Hinton1973:382).Tocensureaphilosopherforbeinginterestedin"merewords"asopposed,
presumably,totherealworldiscomparabletoscoldingataxidriverforbeinginterestedin"merecars"
oramicrobiologistforspendingallofhisdaysamong"meregerms"(cf.Sullivan1967:62).R.M.Hare
reducesthecomplaintabout"merewords"adabsurdum:
Thisaccusaonrevealsacuriousmisconceponaboutwhatawordis.Thereis,Isuppose,a
senseoftheword"word"inwhich,ifIweretocutoutofthepageofabookapieceofpaper
carefullychosenastoposion,whatIshouldhavewouldbeaword.Thiscouldbestudied
withoutstudyinganymoreofrealitythanthepieceofinkypaper.Perhaps,even,thereare

certainaspectsoflinguiscstudieswhichdonotinvolveanyconsideraonofmeanings.Ifso,
theyhaveliletodowithphilosophyeven"linguiscphilosophy".Butphilosophersare
concernedwithwordsashavingmeaningsoruses;andtheseatanyratecannotbestudied
withoutseeinghowwordsareused,inconcretesituaons,tosayvariousthings;and,of
course,thisinvolvesacarefulstudyofthesituaons,inordertondoutwhatisbeingsaid.
(1960:118119)
And,asGricehasdamaginglypointedout,somehownobodyeversuggestedtoalinguist,philologistor
lexicographerthattheirendeavourswere"merelylinguisc"or"merelexicography"(1989:178).Ithas
neverbeensasfactorilyexplainedwhyfrequentcomplaintsabouta"cultoflanguage"inconjuconwith
philosophersshouldnotbeequallyapplicabletotheseotheroccupaonsdealingwithlanguage.Tosumup:
OLPisnotmerelyaboutordinarylanguage,butaboutwhateverordinarylanguageisabout(Weitz1953:
230231;cf.Ausn1956:130).16Evenifitscreatorswantedittobe,any"linguisc"philosophycannever
bemerelylinguisc:
NothingismorefundamentallymistakenthantothinkofWigensteinasa"linguisc
philosopher"ora"philosopheroflanguage"(inthenarrowsenseinwhichheispresented,for
example,inErnestGellnersWordsandThingsandinmanyotherpopularisaons).Themost
basicreasonforthisisthatWigensteinstheoryofmeaningis"contextual"inthemost
ramiedsense,takinginwhoaspeaker(orwriter)is,whenandwheretheyarespeaking,to
whomtheyarespeaking,thepurposesforwhichtheyarespeaking.
(Kitching1998:74)
Indeed,theusersofthelanguagegamemodelinanalycphilosophyhasevenbeencricizedforignoring
"possibleinterpretaonsoftheiraconsbasedonthehistoricevoluonofthegame,naonal
characteriscs,aesthecs,psychiatryandsoon"(Macksey1972:12).
Ihavetriedtogivepastphilosophersthebenetofdoubt,butIsllcannothelpbelievingthatmost
philosophersthroughoutthehistoryofphilosophysimplyhavenotunderstoodthefactthat"allphilosophy,
insofarasphilosophyisaconceptualinquiry,mustbeconcernedwithcorrectverbalusage.Thisisbecause
wehaveandcanhavenoaccesstoconceptssavethroughthestudyoftheusageand,hence,theuseof
thosewordsthroughwhichtheseconceptsareexpressed"(Flew1986:79;cf.Haning2000:129149).
Inasmuchasthe"linguiscturn"intwenethcenturyphilosophyremediesthissituaon,philosophyhas,
viait,madegenuineprogress.AndIdontthinkthatadmingthisnecessarilyexhibitsdismissive
haughnesstowardstradionanymorethanadmingthatittook2,500yearsofphysicstocomeupwith
relavitytheory,orthatittook2,500yearsofmathemacstocomeupwithGdelstheorem.
TheportrayalofWigensteinasaconservaverelavist
Throughouthiscareer,GellnerdepictedWigensteinasarelavistwhoclaimedthatallconceptual
schemesareequallyvalid,andwhothereforerepresents"oneofthemostbizarreandextremeformsof
irraonalismofourme"(Gellner1992:121).Todothis,heusedastrictadherencetothedeist
conceponofWigensteinsnoonsof"formoflife"and"languagegames,"accordingtowhichthese
noonscanbeinvokedinjusfyinganypolical,socialorreligiousview.ForGellner,languagegamesare
windowlessmonadsthatghteachotherwithoutevenreallyknowingwhattheyght.Heonceclaimed,
wheninterviewedasananthropologist,thattheWigensteiniannoonofaformoflife"doesntmake
senseinaworldinwhichcommuniesarenotstableandarenotclearlyisolatedfromeachother"(Davis
1991:65).Shortlybeforehisdeath,hesummeduphisposiononformsoflife:
[T]hemostimportanteventsofhumanhistorytheemergenceofabstractdoctrinalreligion,
thepossibilityofReformaonswhichinvokeabstracttruthagainstsocialpracce,the
possibilityofanEnlightenmentwhichdoesthesameinsecularterms,theemergenceofa
transculturalscienceconrmedbyauniquelypowerfultechnologyallthesefactsshowthat
thoughtisnotlimitedbytheformoflifeinwhichitoccurs,butcantranscendit.

(Gellner1996:671)
ButGellnernevereventriestoshowexactlywhereWigensteindisagreed.Heneverstopstoconsiderthe
possibilitythattheWigensteiniannoonof"formoflife"mightincludeelementsopposedtoeachother
thatinteractandcompeteinthemostcomplexways.Inanexceponallyconciliatorymood,heoncewrote:
"AllthatneedstobeaddedtoWigensteinsviewtotheeectthatconceptsarelegimatedbytheirrolein
thelivingsystemofwhichtheyarepart,isthatthisworldcontainsmorethanoneculture,andthatthe
variousculturesfoundinitdierquitealot"(Gellner1968d:457).Henevermanagestoshowwhere
Wigensteintriestodenyorevenplaydownthisfact.NeitheristhereasigninWordsandThingsofa
realizaonthataWigensteinianlanguagegamecanbecricized,rejectedorcondemnedinanyother
Wigensteinianlanguagegame,evenoneplayedwithinthesameformoflife.Thereis,however,abrief
passageintheposthumousLanguageandSolitude,inwhichGellnersuddenlypresentsthisfeatureof
"languagegames"and"formsoflife"ashisownexcingdiscoverythatissupposedtocreateanasty"snag"
forWigensteinsclaimthatallculturesareselfvalidang.Gellnergoesononcemoretocasgate
Wigenstein(andPeterWinch)forignoringthefactthattheworldcontains"anenormousnumberof
unstableand,aboveall,overlappingculturalzones"(1998:171172).
ThisisactuallyaperfectnegaonoftheenreposionsofbothWigensteinandWinch.OneofWinchs
greatestachievementswasactuallytoarguepersuasivelythatitisthefundamentallynonselfvalidang
characterofWigensteinianlanguagegamesthatdemonstratesthesenseofwhatWigensteinreallysaid
aboutvalidaon:thatlanguagegamescertainlyneedarbiters,butwhateverarbitratesbetweenthem,it
isntphilosophy.GellnerdoesntseemtohavetheslightestideathathisinterpretaonofWigensteinasa
transcendentalistrelavistismerelyoneextremeofaspectrumofviewsonthecorrectinterpretaonof
"formoflife"and"languagegame,"attheotherendofwhichisanorganicviewof"thiscomplicatedform
oflife"(Wigenstein1953:174)assomethingcommontoallhumans.TheviewsofWigensteinscholars
constuteawholegamutofreadingsfromthisstrictlynaturalizing,"grammacal"view(e.g.Hunter1968;
Emme1990;Garver1994:237268;Clack1999:8789)viaawideandextremelyheterogeneousmiddle
ground(e.g.Hertzberg1978;Gier1980;Simpson1998;Wallgren1999)totheendthatoers
transcendentalorothernonanthropologicalviews(e.g.Williams1974;Baker1984;vonSavigny1991).
Gellneralwaysconsidersonlythelaerendofthespectrum,andevenitinarathercaricaturedform.
Neitherdoesheconsiderthemoreintriguingreadings,whichregard"formoflife"asamistranslaon
(Thompkins1990)oraempttorelateittosimilarnoonsusedinotherdisciplines.17Ifweaccepttheat
leastparalcorrectnessoftheorganic,"grammacal"interpretaon,itmakesGellnerscriqueofthe
Invesgaonsmissthepointcompletely:
Gellnerseriouslymisreadsthesignicanceofthe"rulefollowing"argumentinthePhilosophical
Invesgaonsinthisrespect.Thepointoftheargumentispreciselytohighlightthe
ineliminabilityofnatureasagainstconvenon.Theapplicaonofaconvenonalruletoa
parcularcaseinonewayratherthananotherisalwaysanormavejudgement.The
judgementdoesnotinturnreectanyfurtherconvenon,anditcorrespondstonofact,
naturalorPlatonic.Itsobjecvityrestsontheepistemologyofnaturalspontaneityand
convergencetheepistemologyappropriatetonormaveratherthanfactualjudgements.
(Skorupski1996:491)
Accordingtothegamutofinterpretaonsthatadmitanorganicelementintothediscussionof"formof
life,"itisthis"naturalspontaneityandconvergence"whatJohnMcDowell(1994)calls"secondnature"
orBildungthatWigensteinappealstoinseekingtogroundhisphilosophicalvisioninhumanpracces.
Philosophysupplies"remarksonthenaturalhistoryofhumanbeings"(Wigenstein1953:415);onaset
offeaturesthatisfoundineverycultureandeveryhumanformoflife,andisnot"limitedbytheformoflife
inwhichitoccurs,"asGellnerwouldhaveusbelieve.ItiswhatWigensteincalls"thecommonbehaviour
ofmankind,"thewaysofbehavingsharedbyalloftheworldsmyriadcivilizaons,whichaccordingtohim
are"thesystemofreferencebymeansofwhichweinterpretanunknownlanguage"(1953:206).Certainly
itisconngentlytrueofmanylanguagegamesthattheyarenotuniversallyplayed,butasNewtonGarver
states,"noneofWigensteinskeylanguagegamesorexamplesdependsonoreveninvolvesanysignicant

culturalvariaon,andthethrustofhisPhilosophicalInvesgaonshastodowithwhatischaracteriscof
humansingeneral"(1994:249).
WhatismostastonishingisGellnersportrayalofWinchasaleadingrepresentaveofthetranscendental
interpretaon.ItisnamelyWigensteinsremark"LanguageIwanttosayisarenement,inthe
beginningwasthedeed"18(Wigenstein1980:31;cf.Wigenstein1969:402)thatWinchalludestoin
thetleofoneofhisbestknownpapers,arguingstronglyforthegrammacalinterpretaonof"formof
life"andpoinngoutcorrectlythat"thereisnoapplicaonforthetruefalsepolarityatthelevelofthe
deed"(1981:53).AndimmediatelyaerthenotoriouspassageinTheIdeaofaSocialScienceinwhich
Winchcallsbothscienceandreligion"nonlogical,"heemphasizesthatthiswayofpungmaersis
misleadingiftakenbyitself,becauseitignores"theoverlappingcharacterofdierentmodesofsociallife"
(1990:100101).19ThereisveryliledoubtthatWinchwouldagreeevenwithoneofthemostaggressive
defendersofthenaturaliscinterpretaon,GavinKitching:humanlanguageis"bothapracceanda
pracceamong,andwithin,otherpracces";andthatconsequently"meaninginlanguageisnotjusta
maeroflanguage"(1994:114).AsMarshallSahlinshaspointedout,inaatlyhyperrealisttheorecal
praccesuchasGellners,
inorderforculturalschematatofunconinpracce,inorderforpeopletosuccessfullyuse
theirunderstandingsoftheworld,theworldwillhavetoconsistentlyandobjecvely
correspondtotheideasbywhichtheyknowit.Ifnot,theirmindsturnintoLockeanblank
sheetsofpaper,andthebiologicalcapacityforrealismtakesover.Indeed,autopianLockean
worldofempiricaltruthwouldbethepanhumanfate,since,soonerorlater,usuallysooner,
realityprovesadisappointmenttoallpeoplescategories.Thereasonthistheorecal
pracceisunworkableisthateverysituaontowhichapeoplereferagivencategoryis
empiricallyunique,disnctfromeveryothertowhichthesamenoonmaybeapplied.One
neverstepsintothesamerivertwicewhichneverstoppedanyonefromcallingitbythe
samename.ToparaphraseJohnBarth,realityisaniceplacetovisit(philosophically),butno
oneeverlivedthere.Unlessexperienceswereselecvelyperceived,classiedandvaluedby
sociallycommunicablecriteria,therewouldbeneithersocietynorintelligibility,letalonesanity.
(1995:204205)
Itisexactlythis"biologicalcapacityforrealism"thatWigensteinreferstowhenusingthenoonofa
"formoflife".Thenoonisalmostbiologicalone.Wigensteindoesoenspeakoftheorganicrootsof
juscaon,butthishardlymeansthathepeddled"acultofGemeinscha,intheverycuriousdisguiseofa
theoryoflanguageandphilosophy"(Gellner1988:286).Actuallyhealwaysspeaksoftheorganicas
somethingnatural,assomethingopposedtotheethnological,notasGellnerwouldhaveusbelieveas
equallingtheethnological:
TheimageoflanguagewhichWigensteinpresentstousconformsmuchbeertolifethan
anythingfoundinthewringsofhispredecessors.Theysawinlanguageasublimemysteryed
inmatelytothought,thepresenceofwhichinmendisnguishedthemfromanimals;
Wigensteinmaintainedthat,onthecontrary,theuseoflanguagewasntbasicallyanything
butacomplicatedformofbehaviourthatshouldbeexaminedlikeotherformsofbehaviour,
successfulornot,adaptedornot."Commanding,quesoning,recounng,chang,"hewrote
inonepassage(1953:25),"areasmuchapartofournaturalhistoryaswalking,eang,
drinking,playing";herelatesustooursituaonintheworldasbeingsthathaveneedsand
goalsatoncegeneralandspecic.
(Walsh1983:377)20
GellnerrepeatedlyclaimsthatWigensteinandWincharerelavistsforwhom,forexample,theworld
viewofSirJamesFrazerisjustasgoodastheworldviewofthesavageswhoseritualshestudied.Thisjust
isnttrue.AccordingtoWigensteinandWinch,theworldviewofFrazerismuchinferiortotheworldview
ofthesavages,sinceFrazerconnuouslymistakesthesavagessymbolicstatementsforempiricalones

(SharrockandAnderson1985:399);similarly,theworldviewofearlytwenethcenturyEuropeansin
generalwasforWigensteinmuchinferiortotheworldviewof,say,earlynineteenthcenturyEuropeans.
ButGellnerhasaquickgetawayfromtheseawkwardcounterexampleshisatrefusaltobelievethat
anyone"reallyhasanydoubtsaboutthecogniveinferiorityofthepresciencoutlook"(1968a:401;my
emphasis).Damnedanddoubledamned:ifWigensteinandWinchareinterpretedasrelavist,theyare
deluded,andiftheyareinterpretedasnonrelavist,theyarelying.
Besidesthedeistconcepon,GellnersviewofWigensteinisequallyhauntedbythepicture,popularin
theiesandsixes,oftwoWigensteins,an"early"onewhosubscribedtoaFregean,solipsiscallyand
myscallyngedversionofRussellslogicalatomism,anda"late"onewhorepudiatedeverybitoftheearly
oneinfavourofarelavisc"usetheoryofmeaning".Duringthepastthreedecadesorsothispicturehas
beenchallengedmoreandmorebyoneinwhichthereisonlyoneWigenstein,whoiscricalofFreges
andRussellslogicistprogrammefromthestart,andwhoselater"turn"awayfromtheTractatusisasmuch
ormoreamaerofmethodorstylethanofsubstanveoutlook.CoraDiamondandJamesConanthave
arguedpersuasivelythatWigensteinsconceponofmeaningwasanatomiscfromthestart,andthat
theendoftheTractatusinstructsWigensteinsaudiencetoreadthebookasaparodicreducoad
absurdumofsolipsismandlogicalatomism,notasapanegyrictothem.21Diamond,Conantandother
similarlyorientedWigensteinscholarshave,inthemindsofanincreasingnumberofphilosophers,buried
thewholetwoWigensteinpicture,oratleasteecvelycorneredit.Gellner,however,consistentlyeats
upeverywordofiteveninhislastbook,whereheinvitesustolookattheTractatusasa"squealof
pessimiscwoe"(1998:59)anda"poemtosolitude"(1998:46)wrienbya"markedlyauscindividual"
whohadproblemswithhomosexualityandmasturbaon(1998:63),andwhoeventuallyrecoiledfromhis
troublesintoanoppositeviewthatconsistsofrelavisccommunitarianism.Gellnersclaimthat"therecan
hardlybeanydoubtbutthatsomethingdramacdidhappen"(1998:94)betweenWigensteinstwo
periodsofphilosophicalcreavity,becausethelaterWigensteinsupposedlynegatedtheearlyone
completelyanduerly,suggestsmereignoranceofmostofwhathasbeenwrienonWigensteinsmental
developmentduringthepasttwentyorthirtyyearsincludingmuchoftheoutputofAllanJanikand
StephenToulmin,againstwhomGellnerdirectshisclaim.IfDiamondandConantsinterpretaonofthe
Tractatusasanironicselfrefutaonisevenparallycorrect,thecloudofblackbilethatisLanguageand
Solitudebeginstodissolveatonce;andnotonlythebook,butthefunconalistexplanatorymodelof
ulteriormovesthatGellnerbuilthiswholecareeron.Nophilosopherorsocialscienstwhobelievesthat
GellnersstoryisthetruthaboutWigensteinhasyetcommentedinanywayontheirviews.
Gellnerblusters:"Idonotapologisefortravestyingtherichnessof[Wigensteins]thought,forthereisno
travesty"(1974:709).Butthereis.HeneverquotesorreferstoRemarksontheFoundaonsof
Mathemacs(whichbothWigensteinandhisliteraryexecutorsintendedasacompanionvolumetothe
Invesgaons);22hedoesntaempttoexplainWigensteinsgloomyreferenceintheInvesgaonsto
"thedarknessofthisme,"orhisangryclaimtoNormanMalcolmthatphilosophyhasnovalue"ifitdoes
notimproveyourthinkingabouttheimportantquesonsofeverydaylife,"orhisvoluntarydescriponof
hisownlecturesas"propagandaforonestyleofthinkingasopposedtoanother"(Wigenstein1966:28);
heignoresthemassofbiographicaldatacontradicnghisselecveuseofit,beingoneofthemany
"thinkerswhotakeaninterestinWigensteinspolicalorientaon[who]areintherstinstance
concernedwiththequesonofthepolicalsignicanceofhisphilosophicalviewsandappealto
biographicaldataonlyinthehopeofcorroborangtheirpreferredanswertoit"(Crary2000:142).Neither
doesGellneraempttoaddressthevastamountofWigensteinmaterialsthathadappearedsincetherst
edionofWordsandThings;whenhereferstoWigensteinswork,itispraccallyalwaystheTractatusor
theInvesgaons.23
ThisbringsusnallytoGellnersmostpopularaccusaon,thatofprevennglinguiscchange.Heclaimsin
WordsandThings:"Philosophydoesnotspring,asWigensteinthought,fromourbeingblindedby
grammar,butfromtheneedtoreorderourconcepts"(1959:55).AtleastfromtheBlueBookonwards,and
repeatedlyinsuchworksasZeel,RemarksonthePhilosophyofPsychology,etc.,Wigensteinuses"being
blindedbygrammar"and"needingtoreorderonesconcepts"praccallyinterchangeably;todayitis
praccallyatrivialitytosaythatWigensteinsconceponofphilosophyisbasedontheneedtoreorder

concepts.24Gellnerclaimsthatordinarylanguageenshrines"theimpossibilityofjuscaon,andthe
fallaciousnessofcricismfromgeneralpremises"(1959:225).ButactuallyOLPcanneitherpreventnor
promotejuscaon.Itis,infact,completelyneutral,becausethevocabulariesofexecungajuscaon
andcontesngitarebothequallyimportantpartsoflanguage:
Thelanguagegamesofcricism,quesoning,doubngandprobingusetheconceptsorwords
oftheEnglishlanguagetoexamine,cricizeandargueforchangingprevailingvalues,
instuonsandpaerns.ItissimplywrongforGellnertoarguethatordinarylanguage
analysisstresses"theimpossibilityofjuscaon,"becausethelanguageofjuscaonisa
partofordinarylanguage.
(Wertheimer1976:411)
ThesamepointismadeinslightlydierenttermsbyHannaPitkin:
Thesameordinarylanguagethatallowstheexpressionofvariouscommonsensebeliefsalso
allowstheirnegaon,theirquesoning,theirdoubng.Whatisbindingisnotordinarybeliefs,
buttheordinarylanguageinwhichtheyareexpressed;anditisnotbindingbecausethe
commonmanisnormaveforthetheorist,butbecausetheordinarylanguageisalsothe
theoristsown.
(1972:19)
Toclaimthatgivingremindersoftheselfjusfyingnatureofallpracceswas,forWigenstein,"theonly
validorpossiblemethodinphilosophy"(Gellner1998:167),issimplybizarre.ForWigenstein,praccally
nothingjusesitself.Gellnerscentralnoonofvitallinguiscchangebeingpreventedby"apre
establishedlanguagegame"(e.g.1959:44)hasnobasisinreality,sincelanguagegamesaretypicallynot
preestablished;theyarisefrominsncvebehaviourthatneitherinvokesnorsuppressescommunal
agreement,sincesuchagreementcomesintothepictureonlyaerthelanguagegamehasarisen(Malcolm
1982;Rhees1997;Phillips1997).Tosuggestotherwisesimplyamountstoamildformoftheconspiracy
theoryofhistory."Languagedidnotemergefromsomekindofraocinaon"(Wigenstein1969:475),so
itcannotingoodfaithbecalledaselfvalidangformofraocinaon:nobodydecidedtotakeitinuse
(Pitkin1972:132)."Thelanguagegameissotosaysomethingunpredictable.Imean:itisnotbasedon
grounds.Itisnotreasonable(orunreasonable).Itistherelikeourlife"(Wigenstein1969:559).
Wigensteinsimplydoesnotdeclareanythinginviolable;hemerelypointsoutthatthereisnoguarantee
thatcricismoflanguagegamesisfoundcompellingbyonesaudience,andthatthefactthatitoenisnt
foundcompellinghascertaintoooenignoredimplicaonsforphilosophicalcricismofcultures.25
PerhapsthemostincisivecriqueeverofGellnertype,relavizing"inviolabilityinterpretaons"of
WigensteinsworkcomesfromarecentpaperbyAliceCrary:
Wigensteinhopestoexposeasconfusedtheideathatmeaningsmightsomehowbe"xed"
(whetherindependentlyofuseorotherwise).Thereis,hewantsustograsp,nosuchthingasa
metaphysicalvantagepointwhich,ifwemanagedtooccupyit,woulddisclosetousthat
meaningswere"xed"inonewayoranotherandwouldthereforeenableustobypassthe
(somemesenormouslydicult)taskoftryingtoseewhetherornotanewemploymentofa
givenexpressionpreservesimportantconneconswithotheremployments.Hisaimistogetus
torelinquishtheideaofsuchavantagepointand,atthesameme,torelinquishtheideathat
whatweimagineistobeseenfromsuchavantagepointhassomebearingonourabilityto
submitpraccestocricism.Heshouldnotberead,asproponentsofinviolability
interpretaonsreadhim,asclaimingthatthereareparcularfeaturesofourlivesorofthe
livesofotherswhichcannotbesubmiedtocricism.Rather,heshouldbereadasmaking
roomforcasesinwhich,althoughwetakeourselvestobecricallyassessingsomefeatureof
ourlivesorofthelivesofothers,wehavenonoonwhat(ifanything)willcountasthe
fulllmentofwordsweareuering.

(2000:138139)
Infactthewholeproblemacofwhetheraformoflifecancricizeanotherisquixoc,forthesimple
reasonLarsHertzbergpointedoutmanyyearsagothattheextenttowhichourargumentsseem
compellingtoourselveshasnothingtodowiththeextenttowhichtheycancompelpersonswhocurrently
dontacceptthem.ItisoenallegedthatWigensteinsnoonsoflanguagegamesandformsoflifemake
itimpossibletojusfyourcricizingracists,Stalinists,Nazisandsoon,becausethesegroupscaninvoke
theirstatusasvalidformsoflifeandthestatusoftheirhatefullanguageasavalidlanguagegame(e.g.
Schlagel1974;Goodman1982:141142;Nieli1987:241242).Butthisisapseudoproblem:
Thequesonwesetourselveswas:howcanwechoosebetweenourownphilosophyandthat
oftheNazis?Butitoughttobeseenthatthisisapseudoquesonwehavealreadychosen,
orsotosayandinfactitisthepresenceofourconviconandnotitslackthatmakesuspose
thisqueson!Webeginbybelievingandthengoontoseekfoundaonsforourbelief.Butthis
isphilosophicalselfdecepon;weforgetthatnofoundaonscouldappeartousmore
convincingthantheverythingthefoundaonsofwhichtheyaresupposedtobe.(Toperceive
this:trytoimagineanargumentthatwouldconvinceyouoftheacceptabilityofNazism!We
canonlyseekfoundaonsforourbeliefwhenitispossibletobelievetheopposite.)
(1971:509)26
Finally,thereremainstheawkwardquesonofintellectualswhoprofesstounderstandandappreciate
WigensteinwhileghngeverythingGellnerclaimsherepresents.IfWigensteinequalsrampantself
legimangrelavism,itsextremelyhardtoexplainwhysuchoutspokenfoesofselflegimangrelavism
asPierreBourdieu,JacquesBouveresse,EsaItkonen,HilaryPutnamandBarrySmithpresentthemselvesas
admirersofWigensteinandconstantlycoopthimasanallyintheirstruggleagainstpostmodernist
defeasm.ItsalsohardtoexplainwhymanyMarxistsandotherpolicalradicalssuchasFerruccioRossi
Landi,K.T.Fann,DavidRubinsteinandGavinKitchinghaveasimilarlyposiveatudetoWigenstein.27As
farasGellnerisconcerned,theseanrelavist,anquiestWigensteiniansmightneverhavewrien.Of
courseitisapossibilitythattheyaredeludedormendaciousonagrandscale;butanimmeasurablymore
economicalexplanaonisthatGellnerprofoundlymisunderstandsWigensteinsstanceonrelavism.Yet
anotherexampleofGellnersnotrueScotsmanargumentsishisexplainingawayofsocialscienstswho
admireWigenstein.InWordsandThingsandinmanyofhisessaysfromthesixesGellnercondemned
OLPforbeingapseudosociologyunsuitablefor"real"empiricalsocialsciensts,whoweresupposedtobe
aboveallthat;intheearlysevenes,asmanytrainedandcompetentsocialscienstslikeHannaPitkinand
RodneyNeedham28startedtouseOLPtofrucfytheirresearches,Gellnerrushedtocondemnthemfor
somehowceasingtobe"real".Alreadyin1968,Gellnerhadaackedtheuseofsociologicalresearchby
philosophersinanarcleintheTimesLiterarySupplement,andagainitwasfollowedbyaheated
correspondence,thismeinvolvingsuchfamiliarnamesasAlasdairMacIntyre,PeterWinch,W.G.
RuncimanandD.Z.Phillips.29
Thesupposedsocialconservasm
ThenoveltyofGellnersbook,andundoubtedlyabigreasonforitspopularity,wastheaemptintheninth
chaptertoexplaintheconservasmofOLPnotonlyphilosophically,butsociologically,withreferencetothe
selfpreservingsocialcondionsofOxfordintheies.Buteventakenasabiographicalasseron,Gellners
claimthattheprevalentsocialatudeamongOLPspraconerswasacomplacent,selfserving
blimpishnessissimplynottrue.Admiedlytheirsocialbackgroundwasextremelynarrow(Re1993:16),
buttheiractualsocialandpolicalopinionswereextremelydiverse;theywerehardlytheirresponsible
"playboy/pedantcoalion"Gellner(1979:23)termsthem.IntheintellectualatmosphereofOLPtherewere
philosophersknownforbeingpolicalleists(StuartHampshire),centrists(Strawson)andrighsts(Flew);
avidanclericalists(Flew,Ryle)andpraccingChrisans(Dumme,G.E.M.Anscombe);moralrelavists
(Hare,P.H.NowellSmith)andmoralrealists(Anscombe,RenfordBambrough)."Themostobviouscommon
characteriscofOxfordphilosophers,is,indeed,theirpropensityforarguingwithoneanother,"asR.M.
Hare(1960:120)putitattheheightofthecontroversy.ButforGellner,thedisagreementswerealla

subterfugeintendedtoconcealthefactofthelackofthem;astheEconomistnoted,inWordsandThings
thehaplessOxfordphilosophersare"notallowedthatrighttodierwhichevenmembersofPlatos
Academypossessed"(Anonymous1959a:618).ItiseasytoagreewithMarshallCohensverdictconcerning
Gellnersnoonthatconceptualconservasmnecessarilyimpliespolicalconservasm:"Ibelievethis
argumenttorestonnothingmoreelevatedthanapun"(1960:180).
Andwhatsmoreimportant,notallofthechiefpraconersofOLPlikedeachotherverymuchaspersons.
Toconcentrateonjustthethreemainrepresentaves,Wigensteinssuspectatudetomostofhis
followersinOxfordandCambridgeiswelldocumentedanddeep.ItshardtoarguewithH.O.Mounces
asseronthat"aguremorealientoOxfordinthe1950sthanWigensteinwouldbedicultevento
imagine"(2000:112)orwithvonWrightsesmatethat"noteventhosewhoprofessedtofollowhimwere
reallyengagedinthesamespiritualendeavourashe"(Flowers1999:4.207).Wigensteinhadbeenfriendly
withRylesince1929,andinthethirestheyusedtogoonwalkingholidaystogether(Monk1990:275),but
WigensteinbrokewithRylein1947aerRylehadpublishedafavourablereviewofPoppersOpenSociety
andItsEnemiesabooknevernoted,ofcourse,foritsdeepunderstandingofWigenstein(Hacker1996:
313).30AusnspokeofWigensteinas"Wiers"andmadeitclearthathepreferredMoore(Hacker1996:
172);heusedto"readapageortwoofWigensteinaloudtoshowhowincomprehensibleandobscure
theAustrianphilosopherwas,andhoweasilyhecouldbeparodiedanddismissed"(Mehta1983:62).Even
therelaonshipofRyletoWigensteinisnotasstraighorwardasonecouldthink.Thereisevidencethat
despitehisadmiraonforWigensteinsphilosophy,RyleregardedWigensteinasaposeurandhis
mannerismsasaected(Deutscher1982:254;cf.Ryle1970:1112).Rylealsoseemstohavedislikedand
avoidedAusn,payingnoaenontomuchofhisphilosophyunlhisdeath(Ryle1970:1415;Magee
1997:382383;White1999:211).
Ashasbeenpointedout,Gellnersmethodofreferringandquongironicallyenoughseemstobe
nothingotherthanWigensteinscelebratednoonoffamilyresemblancesrunwild,sothatitmakeshis
accusaonstowardsOLPcompletelyunfalsiable:31
Mostoenhewillciteaparcularwriter,showthatheholdsagivendoctrineandthen
concludethateveryoneofthatphilosopherssupposedalliesalsoholdsthedoctrine.If
linguiscphilosopheraandlinguiscphilosopherbsharedoctrineXwhichcdoesnothold,and
ifbandcsharedoctrineYwhichisnotacceptedbya,itisgrotesquetoaackthewholefamily
oflinguiscphilosophersforholding,say,X.Moreover,heseemstosaythatthosewhodo
notexplicitlysubscribetoXortoYare"unconsciously"evasiveordishonest.Onecanimagine
howmaddeningthismustbetothosephilosopherswhoarefoundguiltybyassociaon.
(White1960:205206;cf.Nuchelmans1961:92)
ThebasictechniqueusedbyGellnerseveralhundredsofmeswastoscourthewringsofordinary
languagephilosophersforpassagesthatcould,takenoutofcontext,beinterpretedsothattheydenied
trivialiesandthenclaimthatsinceordinarylanguagephilosophersdeniedtrivialies,theywere
madmenorcharlatans.AsWigensteinianinterpretaonboomedinthesixesandsevenes,Gellnerseta
thieftocatchathief,takingeveryinterpretaonofeveryWigensteinexegeteseriouslyaslongasthe
interpretaonshappenedtosupporthisownposion.EvenSaulKripkesbookonWigensteinasa
meaningskepc,whichfamouslydeniesthatitseekstoexpoundWigensteinsownviews(Kripke1982:5),
wasforGellnerexactlythesameasWigensteinhimself(Gellner1984).GellnertermedAusn
"unsurpassedatmakingpeoplebelievethattheirbluhadbeencalledwheninfacttheywerentblung"
(1969:776);butIdthinkitsafetosaythatAusncomesquitefarbehindGellnerhimself.Aerall,the
signicantinnovaonofusingaphilosophersinnocentmienwhenconfrontedwithunfoundedaccusaons
toprovehowcalloushereallyisoriginateswithWordsandThings.
Gellnerclaimsthatthereis"noevidencethatWigensteinwaseverconsciouslyinterestedinsocialand
policalquesons"(1998:74),exceptascondemningthemfromaconservavepointofview;"thehorizon
ofhisintellectuallifeincludedsolileotherthanhisownwrestlingswiththeviewsoftheTractatus"(1959:
101).SomewhatstrangelyitsbecomeacentralpartoftheWigensteinmyththatpolicssimplydidnt

interesthim.Butoneofthemostconsistentaspectsofthemanypersonalmemoirsofhimisactuallyhis
impeccableknowledgeofcurrentevents.He"kepthimselfinformedaboutcurrentevents"(Flowers1999:
2.219220);"had,atallmes,ashrewdideaofwhatwasgoingonabouthiminthewiderworld"(Flowers
1999:2.244);and"seemedtoknowwhatwasgoingonintheworld"(Flowers1999:4.136).Hisrecently
publishedcorrespondencewithhissistersandhisclosefriendLudwigHnseltesfyoftheinteresthetook
inAustrianpolicsevenwhenlivinginBritainforextendedperiods.32AccordingtoG.H.vonWright,he
regularlyreadtheNewStatesman,whichalreadyinhislifemewasamongtheleadingpolicalweekliesin
Britain.In1945,heeventooktheventuresomestepoftellinghisstudentswhichwaytheyshouldvotein
theBrishgeneralelecon:thesupposedly"archconservave"Wigensteinprofessedhisdislikeof
ChurchillandsaidthathedbevongLabour(Monk1990:480).
Partofa1931remarkselectedbyWigensteinforZeelreads:"Thephilosopherisnotacizenofany
communityofideas.Thatiswhatmakeshimintoaphilosopher"(1967:455).Thisisthecoreof
Wigensteinsatudetowardsthemixingofphilosophyandpolics.Itisalsoillustratedbyananecdote
RushRheesrecordsaboutthemehetoldWigensteinofhisintenontojointheRevoluonary
CommunistParty;Wigensteinsaidthatinhisviewphilosopherscannottreattheideasofanyoneideology
dierentlyfromothers,andthataphilosophershouldratherbecontenttosupporthisfavouredpartys
objecvesfromwithout(Flowers1999:3.280281).Wigensteinwasneithertheextremeleistmanyof
hispolicalstatementsimply,northeextremeconservavehisoutlookonlifeimplies.Rather,he
representedanarchetypeofmodernistintellectualthatisquitecommon,butregreablylacksagenerally
agreedname.33Imeansomeonewhoissociallyquiteradicalandwhosepolicalconviconsonthe
everydaylevelaretypicallysomewaytotheleofa"Westernliberalintellectual"inaRortyansense,but
whoseMenschenbildisneverthelessthatofaRomancconservave,oenwithananarchiststreak.34
VaryinginstancesofthisoutlookcanbefoundinsuchdiversethinkersasJosOrtegayGasset,RushRhees,
LeszekKolakowski,G.H.vonWright,HeinrichBll,GuyDebord,JohnLennonand,Ishouldperhapsadd,
myself.
TherehavebeenfrequentaccusaonsthatOLPnotonlyisconservaveandimpotent,itopenlycelebrates
itsconservasmandimpotence.ThereferenceisusuallytoWigensteinsnotoriousremark:"Philosophy
leaveseverythingasitis"(1953:124).ItsundeniablethatWigensteinmakesthisremark.Butthehistory
ofitsinterpretaonisntveryencouraging.Theremarkhasbeenmisreadaseither(1)"Philosophersleave
everythingasitis,"or(2)"Philosophymustleaveeverythingasitis".Bothreadingsareequallymisguided.
Reading(1)hasWigensteinclaiming,bizarrely,thatphilosophersasagroupareexceponallyunableto
engageinaemptstochangetheirsociety,whilereading(2)hashimthinkingthattheyarent,butitwould
neverthelessbebeeriftheywere.ButasStanleyCavell(1962:79)pointedoutalmostfortyyearsago,
Wigensteinspointismerelythathehasaskedforcounterexamplestohisviewthatwhenphilosophersdo
changethings,theresnothingabouttheirbeingphilosophersthatspeciallyenablesthemtodothisand
thatsuchcounterexampleshavenotbeenforthcoming.35Nothingpreventsphilosophersfromvoicingtheir
policalopinionsopenly,standingforelecveocewithanexplicitagenda,orghngsocialevilslikeracial
discriminaon,povertyandwar.Butthereisntanythingabouttheirbeingphilosophersthatspecically
enablesthemtodothiseither.36Theexistenceofpolicalphilosophydoesnotmakeapolicalstatementa
philosophicaloneanymorethantheexistenceofphilosophyofchemistrymakesachemicalstatementa
philosophicalone.D.Z.Phillips,probablythesinglemostdourdefenderofWigensteinsconceponof
philosophyasleavingeverythingasitis,hasputthispointforcefully:
Iamtryingtolegislateagainstandprohibitsomethingphilosophershavealwaysdone.Imust
know,forexample,thatpolicalphilosophershavecricizedformsofgovernmentinthelight
ofpolicalidealstheyespouse.Imustknowthatmoralphilosophershavecricizedcertain
kindsofmoralmovaoninthelightofmoralidealstheyespouse.Imustknowthatsome
philosophersofreligioncondemnbeliefinGod,advocatecertainatudestheythinkshouldbe
takentowardotherreligions,andsoon.Allthisgoeson;howcanIdenyit?TheansweristhatI
donot.WhatIdenyistheclaimbythephilosophersconcernedthatthevaluejudgmentsthey
make(forthatiswhattheyare)arethemselvesunderwrienbyphilosophy.Thesubjectcannot
getthemtowheretheythinktheyaregoing.

(1999:160)
Inanothercontext,Phillipsmakesanextremelyimportantrelatedpoint:nobodycanbecomeanauthority
onanythingmerelybydecidingtobecomeone(1986:9397).Ifphilosophy"leaveseverythingasitis,"it
alsoleaveseveryindividualandmovementseekingtoimprovesocietyasitis(Wertheimer1976:410411).
"OnedoesnotbecomeCanutebyfailingtoassisttheincomingde,"asAnthonyQuinton(1961:341)noted
inhisreviewofWordsandThings.Ifphilosophycannotdosomething,itisuselesstopretendthatitcando
it;itis"nomoresensibletocomplainthatphilosophyisnolongercapableofsolvingpraccalproblems
thanitistocomplainthatthestudyofthestarsnolongerenablesonetopredictthecourseofworld
events"(Grice1989:180;cf.Slater1986:207).TheEconomisteditorialontheGellneraairdiagnosed
Gellnersaccusaonsabouttheabdicaonofwisdom,andhisclaimthatOLPregardsthepursuitofworld
viewsasthecardinalsinofphilosophers(Gellner1959:99),asasimpleignoraoelenchi:
Sowhyaremodernphilosophershatediftheyare?Forthelayoutsider,thecluemightbe
foundinthis:thathardlyanyofthem,despitetheirotherdiversity,wouldclaimthat,as
philosophers,theycantelluswhattodo.Whenotherdireconpostsarefallingdown,
philosophersareassumedtobethepeoplewhooughttobegivingusdireconsaboutlife.But
iftheycannot,theycannot:andtherearephilosophicalargumentsforthebeliefthatthey
cannot.Iftheseargumentsarevalid,thenthesuggesonthattheyoughttogivedireconsall
thesameisaninvitaontodisingenuousness.
(Anonymous1960:16)
Another,relatedcaricaturetobeshotdownisthenoonthatWigensteinwantedto"endphilosophy,"
andthatprofessionalphilosopherswhoconsiderthemselveshisfollowersarethereforedisingenuousinnot
leavingphilosophyforsomethingelse.Ifphilosophyasaseparateacademicsubjectceasedtoexist,
philosophicalquesonswouldnaturallyconnuetheirexistenceinsuchdisciplinesaslaw,mathemacs,
sociology,psychologyandhistory.HannaPitkinhassuggestedthatwhatWigensteinandOLPcall
"philosophicalproblems"shouldbecalled"conceptualproblems,"whichwould"stressthattheyarenot
connedtophilosophypropernortoprofessionalphilosophers.Theyoccuralmostasreadilyinpolical
theory,insocialscienctheory,orindeedinanyformofabstract,general,conceptualthought"(1972:6).
Indeedtheydo,andchangingtheirnamewouldnotremovetheirphilosophicalnature.Aslongaspeople
thinkabstractthoughts,philosophyinWigensteinstherapeucsenseremainsnecessary.Andeventhe
cessaonofabstractthoughtswouldperhapsdoliletoendphilosophicalacvity,sincegrammacal
entanglementsarenot"thesolesourceoftheproblemsofphilosophy":
Othersuchsourcesare,accordingtoWigenstein,thelureofthesciencmodelof
explanaon,illegimatelytransposedtophilosophy;thecravingforgeneralityindomains
wherespecicityisallthatislegimate;themesmerizingpowerandphilosophicallydeforming
inuenceofnewdiscoveries,theoriesandinvenonsinscienceandmathemacs,suchasthe
predicatecalculus,settheory,calculangmachines,Freudianpsychoanalysisandbehaviourism;
andthepursuitofjuscaonbeyondthepointwherejuscaonmakessense.
(Hacker1996:233)
PitkinsuggestspercipientlythatfollowingWigensteinsownwayofspeakingasregardsthenoonof
philosophy"islikelytoprejudiceoureventualexaminaonofthetopic,becausesomuchofwhathesays
soundslikeanunwarrantedcricismofphilosophy"(1972:6).G.H.vonWrightseemstobecorrectwhen
hesaysthattoWigenstein,philosophywasnota"historicalconstant,"nomaerwhatimpressionsomeof
hiswringsmightgiveacasualreader:
IdonotthinkthatWigensteinwouldhaveclaimedthathisconceponofphilosophywasvalid
forallthehistoricalphenomenawhichweheapunderthelabelphilosophy.Hiswayof
seeingphilosophywasnotanaempttotelluswhatphilosophy,onceandforall,is,but
expressedwhatforhim,inthesengofhismes,ithadtobe.

(Flowers1999:4.213)
Thisisconrmedbyadiaryentryfrom1946,inwhichWigensteinwonders:
Arewedealingwithmistakesanddiculesthatareasoldaslanguage?Arethey,sotospeak,
illnessesthatareedtoalanguagesuse,oraretheyofamorespecialnature,peculiartoour
civilizaon?
Oragain:isthepreoccupaonwithlanguage,whichpermeatesourwholephilosophy,anage
oldmoveofallphilosophizing//ofallphilosophy//,anageoldstruggle?Or,again,isthisit:
doesphilosophizingalwayswaverbetweenmetaphysicsandcriqueoflanguage?37
Soitisnottrue,accordingtoWigenstein,thattherecannotbe"substanve"philosophicalquesons;its
justthatitsextremelyunclearwhattheseareandwhatmakesthemsosubstanve.Ifitsselfevidentthat
therearesubstanvephilosophicalquesons,thenthesequesonsshouldsimplybedrawntotheaenon
ofphilosopherswhothinkotherwise.Butthefactthatwhenrequestedtodothis,backersoftheclaimthat
substanvequesonsexisthaveusuallylosttheirtemperinstead,suggeststhattheirexistenceispossibly,
andtheirselfevidencecertainly,chimerical.RandallHavas,comparingthetypicalpraconerofOLPto
Nietzscheinthisrespect,notesthat"neitherphilosopherschargeofempnessrestsonanappealtothe
everydayeithertoeverydaylifeortoeverydayusageasastandardofmeaningfulness;thechargeis
rooted,rather,inasensethatthemeaningofwhatwesaydependsonourwillingnesstotakeresponsibility
formeaningwhatwesay"(1996:135).Thechargerestsonthesupposionthat"someonewhohasthe
righttoincuranobligaontolethimselfbeunderstoodwillnottrytotransferthatresponsibilitytoanyone
oranythingelse"(Havas1996:143).DummesumsupthiswholeatudenicelyinhisreviewofWordsand
Things:
WhatisindeedcommontoalmostallthephilosophersGellneraacksistheviewthat
philosophicalproblemsmostlyarisefrommisunderstandingsofcertainconcepts,andaretobe
resolvedbygivingacorrectaccountofthoseconcepts.Gellnercomplainsthatthisexcludesthe
possibilityofaphilosophersenuncianganysubstanvetruths.IthinkthatmostOxford
philosopherswouldnotbedogmaconthispoint(therebyelicingGellnersaccusaonsof
evasiveness).Theywouldnotrejectthepossibilitythatphilosophycouldarriveatsubstanve
truths:theywouldmerelysaythattheydonotseehowthisistobedone,andaddthat,while
muchpastphilosophymakesclearsense,understoodaselucidaonofconcepts,theyhavenot
foundasingleconvincingexampleofaphilosophicaldemonstraonofasubstanvetruth.
(1960:434435)
AccusaonsthatthepraconersofOLPdidnotoutlinetheirownmetaphilosophicalvisionarealso
unfounded.Manyofthemagonizedoverthequesonfordecades,asisshownbythisquotaonfromone
ofRyleslastpapers:
[L]ongbeforetheTractatushadbeenwidelyheardof,someanxietywasalreadybeingfelt,
bothinsideandoutsidetheuniversies,lestphilosophy,beingnolongerevenindirectly
ancillarytotheology,mightbeceasingtobeancillaryeventotheGoodLife.So,ifitwasever
againtobemorethananoddlyeecvepreparaonfortheCivilServiceExaminaon,shouldit
notexplicitlyundertaketoelevateEverymantowelltosomething?Apartfrominducingabit
ofselfesteeminitslaygospellers,thismissionaryundertakingdidlileharm.Perhapsiteven
didalilegoodbyacclimazingusacademicphilosopherstotheideathatweneednot,aer
all,strainourselvestobeorseemtobeeitherpsychologistsorscienstsoftheunconvincing
sortRussellsponsored,sincewehadinthebackgroundthishighervocaonasouralibi.Some
ofuswelcomedthis(anyhowobligatory)exemponwithoutveryearnestlypleadingthis
embarrassingexcuseforit.Butwhatthenweretheauthencfunconsofthephilosopher,if
theywereneitherthoseofasortofscienst,evenasortofsciencpsychologist,noryet
thoseofasortofsalvaonist?Thisautoinquesthasbeenournaggingworrysinceaboutthe
middle1930s.

(1976:387)
AsAntonyFlew(1986:95)haspointedout,Gellnersbookneveronceaddressesthemethodological
passagesinAusns"APleaforExcuses,"thesinglemostexplicitmanifestoofOLP;abrilliantaemptto
answerRyles"naggingworry,"38whichbrieyaerAusnsdeathcouldalreadybecalled"themost
reprintedessayofthelastdecade"(Tennessen1965:231),andwhichatthemeGellnerwroteconstuted
fullyoneseventhofhispublishedoutput.39
ItsimplyseemsthatOLPdisappearedfromthephilosophicalscenebeforeevenaweakconsensuswas
reachedwithinitonthenatureofphilosophy.Butthereisanothercricismregardingtheallegedlackofa
metaphilosophythatcutsevendeeper.ItisnamelyimpossibletodivineaccuratelyfromWordsandThings
justwhatkindofphilosophyitsauthorwouldlikecontemporaryphilosopherstodo.Somehaveassumed
thatGellnerisprimarilyalogicalposivist(White1960),aCartesianphilosopherofmind(Findlay1961:
132)oraproponentofakindofLockeansciensm(Quinton1961:340),whileothershavetakenhimtobe
afriendofspeculavemetaphysicsandWordsandThingsapolemicinfavourofit(e.g.Tomlin1977).40
PerhapsitismostaccuratetosaythatheissomethinglikePopper,hislongmecolleagueattheLSE:
someonewhodetestsbothposivismandspeculavemetaphysicswithequalfervourwhilepeddlingakind
ofidiosyncrac,dogmacraonalism.Inanycase,asmanyreviewersnoted,Gellnerswholebookdoesnt
giveasingleconcreteanddiscussableexampleofanurgentlyneededlinguiscorsocialchangewhichOLP
hassupposedlytriedtoblock.He"believesthatphilosophyissomethingweightyandseriousbutwould
appeartohavenoideaofaproblemtobesolvedorofanymethodwherebyitistobesolved"(Isenberg
1961:111).
ThesociologicalexplanaonofOLPssuccess
GellnerwantstoreducethepossibilityofOLPstronglytothesociologicalenvironmentofOxfordinthe
ies.Heclaimsthat"anyindividualholdingsomeof[the]ideas[ofOLP]ndshimselfinasituaonwhere
alargepartofhisintellectualenvironment(orratherthewholeoftheintellectualenvironmentthathe
takesseriously)consistsofpeoplewho,collecvely,adduptosomethingliketheinterlockingscheme
depicted"inhisbook(1959:162).InaninterviewwithVedMehta,Gellnerstatedthatthefollowingwas
"theessenceofWordsandThings"andhis"wholesociologicalanalysis.Fullstop":
Philosophersinthepastwereproudofchangingtheworldandprovidingaguideforpolical
life.Abouttheturnofthecentury,Oxfordwasanurseryforrunninganempire;nowitisa
nurseryforleavingtheworldexactlyasitis.Thelinguiscphilosophershavetheirjobcutout
forthemtoraonalizethelossofEnglishpower.Thisisthesociologicalbackgroundwhichis
absolutelycrucialtotheunderstandingoflinguiscphilosophers.
(Mehta1983:3738)
Here,foronce,Gellnerpresentsanempiricalhypothesisthatcanbefalsied.Andinfactmyownexistence
sucestofalsifyit.Iamalinguiscphilosopherwhoiscertainlynotoutto"raonalizethelossofEnglish
power".IamnotOxonian,BrishorevenAngloSaxon;IwasnotbornunloveradecadeaerGellner
madehisaackonOLP;andIhavebeeneducatedinatradionthatdespiteappearancesbuilds
howeverlooselyuponthepostposivist,naturalistparadigmofCarnap,QuineandDavidson,using
teachingmethodsthatbearnoresemblancetotheOxfordtutorialsystem.IhavenothadOLPshoveddown
mythroatbyauthoritarianteacherswhoregardeditasholywrit;rather,withtheexceponofWigenstein,
Ihavebeencompelledacvelytoseekitoutallbymyself.Furthermore,myphilosophicalinterestsareby
nomeansconnedtoOLP.MyappreciaonofOLPhasinnosensediminishedmyinterestinthehistoryof
philosophyormyadmiraonofSpinoza,Lichtenberg,Kierkegaard,Nietzsche,Husserl,Benjamin,Camus,
andalargenumberofothernonanalycphilosophers.IdonotclaimthatOLPisallthereistogood
philosophy;Isimplyclaimthattotheextentnotfull,buthardlynegligibleeitherthatphilosophical
problemsareconceptualorlinguiscones,OLPisthebestwaytotreatthem.Gellnersclaiminthesecond
edionofWordsandThingsthat"onceseennotasthevisionbeauful,butmerelyasonevisionamongst

others,itlosesnotmerelycompulsiveness,butalsoanyplausibility"(1979:3637;cf.Magee1997:91)was
simplywrong.
PerhapsthemostnotoriouspassageinWordsandThingsisthegureonpage160,whichproposesto
presentOLPsbasictenetsintheformofacomplexdiagramwhichdisplaysaselfcontainednetworkof
mutuallyreinforcingdoctrines,suggesngthatthereaderusethediagramtoinventparlourgamesbased
onthisnetworkoftenetsaccordingtohistaste.ButasB.H.Slaterhaspointedout,weneedonlytoputa
negaonsigninfrontofGellnerspersonalvaluejudgementsaboutthehumansignicanceofthediagrams
content,anda"philosophytforprofessionalgentlemenwillthenhaveallthejuscaonitcouldwant"
(1986:215).ItwouldbepointlesstodenythatOxfordphilosophyoftheies"couldnotrecognizeitself
apartfromitssocialstyle"(Re1993:16).41Butthepointisthatwecanrecognizeitapartfromthatstyle.
AndthisshowsthattotheextenttowhichOLPwasconformistandexplicableintermsofsociology,itwas
soextrinsically,notintrinsically.ContraGellner,therearenoCollingwoodian"absolutepresupposions"
whichsomeonemustsubscribetoinordertouseOLPfruiullyinhisownphilosophicalwork.Inhisreview
ofWordsandThings,WilliamKnealepointedoutthatGellnerssupposedlyexhausvesociologicaldivision
betweenthe"lowchurch"ofprovincialuniversiesandthe"highchurch"ofOxford(Gellner1959:252
253)wasntenough,sinceitneglectedtheexistenceof"nonconformistsandevenindels"(Kneale1960:
197198).Itiscertainlytruethatalreadyintheies,manyofthemostbrilliantcontribuonstoOLPcame
fromphilosophersquiteremoved,bothgeographicallyandbywayofmentality,fromtheOxford
atmosphere:O.K.Bouwsma,StanleyCavell,NormanMalcolm,RushRheesandsoon.Thesewriterswere
healthilycricaloftheexcessesofOLP,butfortunatelynotcricalenoughmerelytodismissitoutofhand.
This,incidentally,isalsowhycomplaintsabouttheshallownessofRyleorAusnascomparedto
Wigensteinarelessdamagingthanonemightthink.Nothingpreventsusfromusingthemas
subcontractorsforourownbrandofpostWigensteinianphilosophytakingfromthemtheonlythe
insightsweappreciatewithoutadopngtherestoftheiroutlook.Iwouldsimplyadvisecontemporary
philosopherstothinktwice,withtheprincipleofcharity,aboutthebitstobediscarded,beforeactually
throwingthemaway.WithanthologieslikeTheNewNietzsche,TheNewSpinozaandTheNewWigenstein
alreadyinprint,perhapswhatwouldreallybeneededisTheNewRyle,TheNewAusn,etc.,whichwould
programmacallyaempttorescuethemostmalignedaspectsoftheirphilosophiesforanewgeneraon.
Similarly,itshouldbepossibletoshowthatwhentheperplexiesofpastphilosophersareshowntobe
maersoflanguage,theyarenotshowntobe"merely"maersoflanguageinanypejoravesenseatall.
Andinfactsomesuchaemptshavealreadybeenmade.42
MakingGellnertastehisownmedicine
ItisinteresngthatnolessasociologistofknowledgethanMarnKuschhasrecentlyindicatedhis
sympathywithGellnersthesisthatOLPwasbadsociologyindisguise,itsinsightscalling"forsociological
enquiry,ifindeedtheydonotimplythatsociologyshouldreplacephilosophy"(Gellner1959:230).
AccordingtoKusch(1999:675),thefamoussuggesoninWinchsTheIdeaofaSocialSciencethatsocial
theorywaslargely"misbegoenepistemology"(1990:43)shouldbeturnedaround:epistemologistsshould
bepreparedtolearnthatmuchofwhattheyhaverecentlyclaimedasexcingnewinnovaonshasbeen
knowninsocialtheoryforalongme.ThisnoonrelatestoKuschssuggesonthatanalycphilosophyhas
hadverydierentrelaonstopsychologyandsociology.Philosophershavebeenconsciousofthestatusof
psychologyasacompetor,whilethesimilarstatusofsociologyhasbeenignoredandphilosophyhasbeen
impoverishedbyignoringasourceofhealthycompeonascopiousaspsychology(Kusch1999:671679;
cf.Kusch1996:85).ButitissignicantthatKuschdoesnotcountWigensteinamongthoseignorantofthe
sociologyofknowledge;indeed,hecricizesthecricsofWinchstheory,suchasGellner,forignoringthe
factthatWigenstein"didwhatanygoodsociologistwoulddo"in"deny[ing]thatsocietycanbereducedto
somethingallegedlymorefundamental,"which"isofcoursetheprofessionalcommitmentofthe
sociologist"(1999:675676).
Nowthisisaparcularlyinteresng,andseeminglytrue,viewofthesociologistsrole.Ifitistrue,then
Gellner,forallhisprideinnotbeingamerephilosopher,wasntasociologistaerall.Hisfunconalistsocial
theoryisbasedonthesupposion"anthropologysincurablefunconalism"(Sahlins1999:22)that
societycanalwaysbereducedtosomethingallegedlymorefundamental:theideological,economicor

religiousneedsofitsmembers.Whenaddressingnonsociologists,Gellneroenpresentshisconceponof
sociologyastheparadigm,whileitisactuallyaconceponsharedtodaybyextremelyfewsocialsciensts.
(ItisevenpossiblethatGellnerpresentedhisviewastheonlycorrectonebecausehetrustedtheignorance
ofphilosophersregardingtheheterogeneityofcurrentsocialtheory.)ItisGellnerssociologyratherthanhis
philosophythatmakeshimstandapart.AsTalalAsadhasshownwithaclosereadingofGellners
anthropologicaltexts,Gellnerclaimstodojuscetohisinformantsownconceponsoftheirconceptual
schemesandexplanatorymodels,butinfactheinvariablyforcesthemintohisownatheiscenlightenment
worldviewunlatypicalinformantis"nolongeraMuslimBerbertribesman,butsomethingcomingto
resembleProfessorGellner"(Asad1986:162).ForGellner,thesuperiorconceptualpowerofWestern
languagesisalwayssomethingaculturaltranslatorshouldshamelesslyexploit,neversomethingheshould
bracket(Asad1986:156163;cf.Slater1986:210).Butwhenthe"ethnographicrespectthathaslongbeen
acondionofthepossibilityofascholarlyanthropology"isbrandedunnecessaryinthisway,only"anan
anthropology"canresult(Sahlins1995:9).Asadshrewdlynotesthat"thearibuonofimplicitmeaningsto
analienpracceregardlessofwhethertheyareacknowledgedbyitsagents,"whichcharacterizesboth
Gellnersanthropologyandhisphilosophy,isinfact"acharacteriscformoftheologicalexercise,withan
ancienthistory"(1986:161).
ItisherethatGellners"enlightenmentfundamentalism,"ashehimselfdescribedhisstancetowards
legimaonofbelief,comesintoplay.LikeSirJamesFrazerbeforehim,Gellneristhekindofanthropologist
who"wantstounderstandanalienoutlookbutcannotacknowledgethattherecanbeanyoutlookother
than[his]own"(SharrockandAnderson1985:399).Henotesthat"intheworldasweknowit,culturesare
extremelyunequalincognivepower.Somepossessconceptsandmethodswhichenablethemtoaain
somedegreeofunderstandingoftheirenvironmentandsomepossesssuchanunderstandingonlytoa
minimaldegree"(Gellner1968a:401).Butthisleadshimtomakingtheunrelatedandmuchmore
controversialclaimthatthe"cogniveandtechnicalsuperiorityofoneformoflifeissomanifest,andso
loadedwithimplicaonsforthesasfaconofhumanwantsorneedsthatitsimplycannotbe
quesoned"(Gellner1968a:405;cf.Gellner1998:189).AsJohnSkorupski(1996)hasshownindetail,this
makestherabidlyandeistGellnerintoadeisthimself.Gellnerisadeistbecausehe,likeFrazer,cannot
imagineanylegimatelifeotherthanthatofthescienscenlightenmentfreethinkerhisownlife,in
fact.Evenworse,hisdeismisactuallyaformofhistoricism,sinceitbelieves,nolessthanPlatoorHegel
did,ininexorablelawsofsocietalprogressthat"simplycannotbequesoned"(Winch1970:258259;
Brandon1982:240).43Gellnerseemstothinkthatsincehecannotquesonhisownwayoflivingingood
faith,nobodyshouldbeallowedtoaempttoquesonit,becauseaccordingtohim,the"eecvenessof
sciencindustrialcivilizaonanditsdiusionarethecentralfactsofourme"(1968a:405).Infact,it
simplyseemsthathe"wouldestablishgunsandbuerasthearbitersofphilosophicalquesons"(Brandon
1982:240).
But,aseven(especially?)hardenedPopperiansadmittoday,"sharednormsofinquiry,takentogetherwith
anyamountofdata,determinenosingleopmaltheoryoftheworld"(Skorupski1996:487),andsothe
invocaonofselfevidenceispreachingtotheconverted.AsSkorupskiputsit,thereis"anintellectual
dandyismorspiritualmachismo"inGellners"rejeconofhermeneuccomfortblankets"(1996:492).The
rejeconbackresbadly,becausescienstsalwaysactinaculture,anditisculturethatdeterminesthe
versiontouseofeventheopmaltheoryoftheworld.Evenifsciencedeterminesdenotaon,usesll
determinesconnotaonbydenion.Gellnerhastoadmitthatnomaerhowsuccessfulthenatural
scienceshavebeeninsolvingtheirownproblemsandgatheringthemassesgoodwillforsecularisc
enlightenmentvalues,"neitherourvaluesnorourlifestylenorourunderstandingofoursocial
environmentcanbefullylinked,orlinkedatall,tothebestandmostrespectedtypeofunderstandingof
ournaturalenvironment"(1998:191).SoboundareGellnersintellectualaimstoanimposedidealof
epistemologicalabsolusmthatheamazinglytriestoturnthefragmentaonofpostmoderncultureintoan
advantage:becausescienceisjustonemorestyleofapproachingreality,thosewhouseitastheirsolestyle
donotneedtoexplainanything,sinceexplanaonisasciencnoon,andscienceisjustonemorestyle.
Thebelovednoonofculturetranscendingtruthis,intheend,anotherpragmacallyvalidatedmythwitha
mundanefunconalistexplanaon(Gellner1998:191).Whatinthesixeshadbeena"temporary
compromise"of"interimvalidity"(Gellner1969:775),i.e.theordinaryviewoftheworld,turnsoutbythe
nineestobesoresilientthatitis"aproblem"thatwejust"havetolivewith,"because"[n]oonereally

knowswhetheritmayinmeberemedied"(Gellner1998:191).Theresthebitwhereyousayitandthe
bitwhereyoutakeitback,asAusnwaswonttosay.
AnothercricofGellnersunexpecteddeismnotesthathispricewouldbetoohighevenifhewere
correct:
So,inordertondasasfactoryidentyweapparentlymustsacriceordinaryintellectual
standards.Thereasonweneedtodothisissimplybecauseitisacorollaryofthetheoryof
formsoflifethatGellneremploysinhismethod.Furthermore,thestandardsforthesuccessful
analysisoftheseviewsareneverspelledoutorexplained:howdoweknowitisright?
(Weersten1996:519)
IfGellnerissosureoftheimpendingvictoryofhisundeniablysuperiorformoflife,itsalsopuzzlingwhyhe
spendssomuchmeemphasizingthevastnumberofcompengculturesassupposedlysomethingthat
createstroubleforWigenstein;or,indeed,whyhepieswhatheseesastheearlyWigensteinsinability
toescapethe"compulsive"alienangforceofHabsburgculturewhilemockingthelateWigensteinfor
imaginingthataculturecanbeacompulsiveforce(Lukes1998:xvixvii).But,asthelateWigensteinwrote
inagloomydiaryentryreecngonhisaltercaonwithPopper,noteveryonewhoderideshischainsis
free.44
Somemetaphilosophicallessons
AttheendofhisbookontheGermanpsychologismdebate,MarnKuschformulatessixmetaphilosophical
hypothesesconcerningphilosophicalcontroversies:
1.Philosophicalcontroversiesaremorefuzzythancontroversiesinthenaturalsciences.
Oenthemembersofthecampsthatdisagreedcanbeidenedonlywithhindsight.
Philosopherswarsarewarsofallagainstall,andevenpeopleonthesamesidecanoen
befoundaccusingeachotherofprovidinginsucientargumentsagainstthecommon
opponent;
2.Philosophicalcontroversiesareoencasesofboundarywork.Theyareoentriggered
whenpartsorthewholeofthephilosophicalcommunityfeelendangeredbythesuccess
andappealofoneorseveralandisciplines.Philosophersthenstarttosearchforhidden
tendenciesineachothersworkthatsupposedlyprovideaninsucientdefenceagainst
usurpaon;
3.Thefocalpointofphilosophicalcontroversiesistypicallyaverysmallnumberoftexts.
Tobecomesuchafocalpoint,atextmustbeboldinitsaccusaons,preferablyshort,and
highlyrhetorical.Thesharperthetone,andthemorestraighorwardlythetextprovides
itsreaderswithacatchphrasetowhichitcansubsequentlybereduced,thebeer;
4.Inphilosophicalcontroversies,chargesofrelavism,irraonalism,totalscepcismand
thelikeoccupyamuchmorecentralrolethaninothersciences.Philosophical
controversiesarefollowedbyawideraudienceofscholarsinothereldsandbythe
publicatlarge,andphilosophershavenoqualmsaboutstrengtheningtheirposionin
theeyesoftheselargeraudiencesbylinkingtheiropponentsviewstounreasonand
moraldefect;
5.Philosophicalcontroversiesareabandonedratherthanresolved.Theydonotend
becauseonesidewinsindisputably,butbecauseoneorbothsidesloseinterest,or
becausegeneralculturaltrends,policaleventsordeathweakenorexnguishoneside
inthecontroversy;

6.The"canon"ofclassictextsinphilosophyisdeterminedbythevictoriousparesin
controversies,andisthusshapedbyconngenthistoricalfactors.Ifhistoryhadtakena
slightlydierentturn,thecanonwouldperhapslookverydierent.
(AdaptedfromKusch1995:276278)
ItisevidentthatthesehypothesestthecaseofWordsandThingsjustaswellastheverydierentchainof
eventsKuschstudied.Hypotheses35arealmosttriviallytrue.Hypothesis6ismostlytrue:TheConceptof
MindandPhilosophicalInvesgaonsaresllrequiredreadinginthephilosophyofmind,buttheyare
beingcaricaturedmoreandmoreasrepresentavesofaprescienc"anrealism"thathasmerely
historicalinterest.45Wigensteinsconsiderableinuenceonourcultureisincreasinglymanifestedoutside
analycphilosophy,ineldslikeliterature,visualart,aesthecs,semiocs,theology,andconnental
philosophy.Andmostoftodaysundergraduateswhoaregiven,say,Descartessargumentfromillusion,
Russells"OnDenong"orQuines"TwoDogmas"toreadaspartoftheirstudiescertainlyhavelileorno
ideaoftheOLPstylecriques(AusnsSenseandSensibilia,Strawsons"OnReferring"andGriceand
Strawsons"InDefenceofaDogma")theybrieyhadtodealwithhalfacenturyago.46Therearenobook
lengthhistoriesofphilosophythatdealadequatelywithOLPanditscontemporaneousinuence.47
Hypotheses12aremorevaguelyapplicablehere,sincerepresentavesofOLPtypicallydidnotfeel
threatenedbytheiropponents;thechargesofusurpaonandcollaboraonwerealmostenrelyonthe
otherside,buttheretheywerenotinconsiderable.
AerstudyingtherhetoricalstrategiesofGellnerssociologicaltextsfromtheviewpointIhaveusedin
lookingathisphilosophy,andraisingthequesonofwhyhistakenoprisonersatuderemainsaracve
tosomanypeople,TalalAsadwrites:
Isitperhapsbecausetheyareinmidatedbyastyle?Weknow,ofcourse,thatanthropologists,
likeotheracademics,learnnotmerelytouseascholarlylanguage,buttofearit,toadmireit,to
becapvatedbyit.Yetthisdoesnotquiteanswerthequesonbecauseitdoesnottelluswhy
suchascholarlystyleshouldcapturesomanyintelligentpeople.Inowputforwardthis
tentavesoluon.Whatwehavehereisastyleeasytoteach,tolearn,andtoreproduce(in
examinaonanswers,assessmentessays,anddissertaons).Itisastylethatfacilitatesthe
textualizaonofothercultures,thatencouragestheconstruconofdiagrammacanswersto
complexculturalquesons,andthatiswellsuitedtoarrangingforeignculturalconceptsin
clearlymarkedheapsof"sense"or"nonsense".Apartfrombeingeasytoteachandtoimitate,
thisstylepromisesvisibleresultsthatcanreadilybegraded.Suchastylemustsurelybeata
premiuminanestablisheduniversitydisciplinethataspirestostandardsofsciencobjecvity.
Isthepopularityofthisstyle,then,notareeconofthekindofpedagogicinstuonwe
inhabit?
(1986:164)
Kuschshypotheses24areinfactcuriouslyintertwinedinthecaseofWordsandThings.ItwasGellners
urgentstylethatconvincedhislayaudiencethatunlesssomethingwasdone,theenreWestern
philosophicalheritagewouldfallmoralvicmtoahollowandisciplineburessedbycynicalmeservers.
Hegavetheimpressionofbeingamanofthepeoplewhoselesslyfurthersthecommongoodbydoingthe
dirtywork.Ithadtobedonenomaerhowmuchitpainedhimtohavetowritesucharudebookenraging
reviewersandaackingphilosophershedidntholdresponsiblepersonally.48And,mostimportantly,his
styleprovidedbothtolaymenandtophilosophershosletoOLPasourceofenormousmoral
indignaonatverylilecost.GellnerplayedbrilliantlyonthemounngfearsofnonacademicsthatBrish
philosophywasntdoingitsassignedpartinthebuildingofacheerfullytechnocracsocietywithauence
forallwhilesimultaneouslykindlinghopesthatsaidauentsocietycouldrevivethephilosophers
ancient,Socracroleasitsbadconscience.(InpostwarBritainmuchofthissocialrolewasofcourselled
byRussell,andthisisundoubtedlyonecauseofhisenthusiasmforGellner.)49

Whatsworse,unlikeRussellortheexistenalists(andtheirBrishcounterparts,theAngryYoungMen),50
OLPwasntinterestedinpublicity.EvenifquitemanyofitsBrishrepresentavessupportedtheCND,
womensliberaon,orothersocialstruggles(suchasthecampaignsforlawreformonhomosexualityand
capitalpunishment),theydidntliketoaunttheirprogressiveviews.51Theseviewswerentconsidereda
partofwhatGellnercalls"theprofessionalroleofthepaidthinker"(1979:15).Ifonewantstomakea
sociologicalcomparisonofOLPtosomething,agoodwaywouldbetojuxtaposetheOLPmindsetwiththe
ZeitgeistprevalentinBritainduringtheLabourgovernmentof194551,theeraofthe"NewLook"
(Deutscher1982:255;Flew1986:78;Re1993:9;cf.Cory1969:11161117).52Withtheexceponof
Wigenstein,53praconersofOLPtinverywellwiththequiet,cheerfulcondenceoftheera,
symbolizedbythe1951FesvalofBritain.Whattheydidntseethemselvesasngwasconverselyapan
Europeanmodelofaphilosopherofcrisis(Kierkegaard,Marx,Nietzsche,Heidegger,Sartre),whichwas
indeedoenanobjectoftheirridicule(Critchley1997:357358).Equallysedulouslytheyrefusedtobe
philosophersofcrisisinthereconstruconistsenseofHusserlortheViennaCircle;theysimply"hadno
inclinaontodrawalinebetweenthesavedandthedamned,"asGeoreyWarnock(1979:xiv)wroteof
Ryle.
Inthiscontextshouldbenotedthat1959wasnotonlytheyearofWordsandThings;italsosawthe
deliveryofC.P.Snows"TheTwoCultures,"whichfamouslyaacked"literaryintellectuals"fortheirdisdain
oftechnology,creangacontroversythatwas"inextricablyentangledwithelusivebuthighlycharged
maersofinstuonalstatusandsocialclass"inthesamewaytheGellneraairwas(Collini1993:xvi).54
Gellnersclaimthat"professionalphilosophersarealienatedfromnaturalandsocialscience(andhence
fromtheexcingareasofintellectualadvance),andarenotdeeplyororiginallyinvolvedinsubstanve
moral,policalandsocialissues"(1959:153)couldhavebeenwrienbySnow.Wheninterviewedin1960,
GellnerdrewacomparisonbetweenSnowandhimself,andregreedthatSnowslecturedidnotappear
beforehenishedhisbook(Mehta1983:3638;cf.Coulson1961:122).Itseemsreasonabletosuppose
that,inaveryimportantsense,thefateofOLPslegimaonwassealedbythefactthatitwasntequipped
todealwiththepostwartechnocracturninBrish(and,moregenerally,Western)society;aturn
reectedinpolicalrhetoricbytheleapfromHaroldMacmillans1957"mostofourpeoplehaveneverhad
itsogood"toHaroldWilsons1964"whiteheatofthetechnologicalrevoluon"(cf.Re1995:25).Butthe
resultofSnowsandWilsonsinuenceonacademicphilosophyinBritain,suchasthefoundaonofnew
universies,wasnotthePopperian"enlightenmentfundamentalism"Gellnerwouldhavelikedtoreplace
OLPwith,butanewwaveoftechnicalizaoninanalycphilosophy,andareturntothemetaphilosophical
idealsoftheposivismthatwasequallyabhorrenttoGellnerandOLP.Polically,too,thedeclineofOLP
hardlymeantarenaissanceofthePopperianliberalismGellnerwouldhavelikedtoreplaceitwith,butthe
riseof"rightwingIvyLeagueAmericanphilosophy"(Sylvan1985:203).Itwasadevelopment
foreshadoweduncannilybyacommentatorontheGellneraair,whosuggestedthatdeniedtheagreement
onfundamentalsthatcharacterizedtheimmediatepostwaryears,
menmayverywellfailtoacquireatrulyphilosophicalknowledgeinthetradionalsenseand
becomemereannotators,unabletoriseaboveaseriesofquibblingfootnotestothemoraland
policalmuddlesoftheirme.Housednolongerinintegratedacademiccommunies,butin"a
sortofbazaar,orpantechnicon,inwhichwaresofallkindsareheapedtogetherforsaleinstalls
independentofeachother"(theprophecyisNewmans),theycannotperhapsbeblamedwhen
theyfailtopossessandthereforetotransmitthat"enlargementofmind,"thatintegrity,which
isthehallmarkofaliberaleducaon;butundersuchcircumstancescanweexpecteither
philosophyorliterarycricismtobetaughtorregardedotherwisethanasmerelyatechnique?
(Coulson1961:127;cf.Anonymous1973b:1011)
Conclusion
PersonallyIthinkthatthemostimportantvalidcricismofOLPisthatitsviewofethicsandmoral
philosophyconcentratedtoomuchonanalyzingcertainwordsremovedfromthehumancontextinwhich
allmoralreeconanddecisionmakingtakesplace.55ThecoollymetaethicalworkofHare,NowellSmith

andCharlesStevensondidnotfulllallversionsofthehumanneedformoraladvice;tomanyitwas
understandably"disconcerngtondgrandthemesofethicsapparentlydegenerangintocriteriaforthe
gradingofapples,orevenforassessingsewageeuent"(Dearden1982:61).56Anditistruethat"unless
thetrainedphilosopherandhemostofalloccasionallyissuesoutofhisnarrowterritoryandreects
uponthenatureofmeaningandexistence,hewillleavetheeldopentothecharlatanandthecrank"
(Tomlin1960:78).Butevenhere,thefactthatsomerepresentavesofOLPhadconfusednoonsofthe
natureofmoralandexistenalquesonsdoesntmeanthatwecannotusethetechniquesofOLPtoclarify
conceptualconfusionsinethics:asmuchisapparentfromthewringsofsuchphilosophersasJohn
Wisdom,IlhamDilman,RenfordBambroughandRushRhees.
AnotherreasonwhyOLPdidntcatchonamongthelaypublicwastheeccentricpersonaliesofitschief
proponents.Ausnsalmostbotanicallyminuteclassicaonsoftheconceptualshadesoflinguiscusage
providedanuseful"counterpoise"toWigensteinshighseriousness(Cavell1965:217219),butlackedhis
humanvoice;theyareimmenselyenjoyableandevencharitablewhenthereaderisintherightmood,but
areimmersedina"Falstaanfat"thatreects"akindofexcess,akindofgleefulmalice,thatmakesour
chuckleturnawry"(Leiber1997:24).MaxDeutscherhasspoken,notwithoutjuscaon,ofAusns"wiy
cavaliernihilism"and"desiretoexistasadrycrackle"(1982:254).57Itcanalsobearguedthattheshort
shriRylegivestocategorymistakeslikeCartesianismmissestheir"insidiousaracons"and"rootsinour
individualandculturalselfunderstanding"(Mulhall1994:448).58Wigensteinwouldhardlyhaveagreed
withwhatRylereportedlysaidofhischairinmetaphysicsthatitwaslikeachairintropicaldiseasesin
thatitsholderfoughthisobjectofstudyinsteadofpromongit.59EvidentlyWigensteinconsidered
Oxfordphilosophersinsensivetowardstheworkofthemetaphysicianstheycricized,evenwhenthe
cricismwasjused(e.g.Bouwsma1986:6768).TheOxfordpraconersofOLPoensueredfrom
"Occamizingzeal,"asRyleoncecharacterizedhisownearlyphilosophy(Ryle1971b:vii).AsIrisMurdoch
hasmemorablysaid:"TheworldofTheConceptofMindistheworldinwhichpeopleplaycricket,cook
cakes,makesimpledecisions,remembertheirchildhoodandgotothecircus;nottheworldinwhichthey
commitsins,fallinlove,sayprayersorjointheCommunistParty"(1953:35).ItwasarunningjokeatOxford
thatRylefounditsoeasytoquesonthenoonofaninnerlifebecausehehimselfwasbereofit
(Warnock1979:xiii).ButevenifRyleand,toanextent,Ausnpossessedaratheratpictureofthe
universe,60itisfalsetosupposethattheonlyreasonOLPthrivedwastheexistenceofphilosopherswhodid
notcometophilosophythroughdeepexistenalperplexiesor"loveofwisdom"(e.g.Cory1969;Magee
1997).Icertainlydid,andfromthebiographiesofmanyotherrepresentavesofOLPitisclearthattheytoo
didalthoughmanyothersprobablydidnt.61
AnotherfeaturetroublingaboutOLPisitsignoranceofconnentalphilosophy,parcularlytheHusserlian
phenomenologicaltradion(Weinzweig1977).Recentaemptstotracetheculturalrootsofthenoonof
"connentalphilosophy"(Critchley1997:348,350;Glendinning1999:811,1619)havedrawnaenon
totheroleofOLPincreangafamiliarstereotypicalrepresentaonoftheanalycconnentaldivide.
AccountsofaemptedbridgebuildingbetweenOLPandtheconnentaltradion,suchasthefamous
conferenceonanalycphilosophyatRoyaumont,France,in1958,showthedeepnatureoftheriandthe
ridiculouslydonnishopprobriummanyOxfordphilosopherswereliabletoapplytocontemporary
connentalthought.62IstvnMszroscomplainedinthemidsixesthatthepredominanceofOLPin
Brishphilosophyhadledtoasituaoninwhich"Aristotleasasystemazerisneglected,thatgreat
philosopherslikeDiderotarecompletelyignored,thatHegelonlyappearsasakindofevilspirit,thatthere
islileinclinaontodealwithoreventorecognizeproblemsraisedbyMarx,andthatexistenalismis
hardlytakennoceof"(1966:313).Thecomplaintislargelyjused,especiallyregardingphenomenology:
seriousbridgebuildingbetweenitandanalycphilosophybeganonlyinthesevenes.EvenifAusns
"linguiscphenomenology"hadliletodowiththeconnentalvariety,theHusserloftheCrisisphasewas
veryclosetoRylesmetaphilosophicalvisioninimportantrespects,andRylewouldhavebenetedfromthe
developmentsinphenomenologyaerhelosthisyouthfulinterestinHusserl(Ryle1970:9;1971a:x;1993:
106107;Small1981).63ThesamegoesforWigenstein,whoaerallconsideredhimselfakindof
phenomenologist,andwhoseworkhasinterestedphenomenologistsfordecades;hisonlyrecordedremark

onHusserlshowsthathetoowasonlyfamiliarwiththeearlyHusserlofLogischeUntersuchungen,notthe
laterone.64
Buttheseshortcomingscanmostlybexed,andtheyshouldbexedbeforeOLPhopefullymakesareturn
tothephilosophicalscene.Thereweremany"aemptsatquickxesthatinretrospectseemshallow"
(Burge1992:13),andthespectreof"adisguisedseconalinterestbiddingforuniversalvalidity"(Dearden
1982:62)wasneverfarfromOLPevenatitsbest.Butulmatelythequesonis:whatphilosophicalstyledo
thesefeaturesdierenateOLPfrom?IknowperfectlywellwhatOLPsoldoutto,butIdontunderstand
whatitsoldoutfrom.Whereistheauthencphilosophicaltradion,totallyfreeofimperfeconand
providingonlydeepandeverlasngwisdom?Idaresaythatifitexists,partofitisfoundinOLPitself,for
thesimplereasonthatmanypeoplehavefoundinitsoluonsnotonlytoconceptualconfusions,butto
existenalperplexies.IthasbeensaidindefenceofOLPthat"philosophicalperplexies,whichmanifest
themselvesinlanguage,goverydeepintohumannature.Wedissolveadeeplyrootedperplexity,andbyso
doingilluminatetheworld.Thisisaverygreatthingtohavedone"(McEachran1964:77;cf.Doney1962:
257).Itis,andGellnersblusteringandblunderingwonttakeawaythatgreatness.65
30
Notes
1InthefollowingIconcentratemainlyonWigenstein,RyleandAusn,thethreephilosopherswhohave
enteredmostvisiblyintoametonymicrelaonshipwithOLP.SomeWigensteinians,e.g.GordonBaker,
haveprotestedthatlumpingWigensteintogetherwiththeotherleadingpraconersofOLPiserroneous
owingtothemuchmoredeeplytherapeucnatureofWigensteinsphilosophy.Idonotintendto
minimizethedierencesbetweenWigensteinandthem,butmyaimistolookatOLPfromtheviewpoint
ofthesociologyofknowledge;andsociologicallyWigensteinbelongstoOLP,whetheronelikesitornot.
AsPhilipDwyerhassaid,"sinceitisunlikelythattherewouldbeanythingcalledordinarylanguage
philosophywereitnotforWigensteinslaterwrings,itsabitlatetoexcludehimfromthetradion"
(1999:312).Besides,theOLPerashouldatleastbeinteresngastheonlymesofarinthehistoryof
analycphilosophywhenthemajorityofacvephilosophersweremoreinfavourofWigenstein
howeverhazilytheyperceivedhimthantheywereagainsthim.ThisisoneofthemainreasonswhyI
arguethatthemarriageofOxfordphilosophytoWigensteinwasnottheunmigateddisasteraswhichit
hasoenbeenportrayedduringthepastfewdecades.Amarriageofconvenienceitmayhavebeen,butas
suchitwasoenahappyone.
2AstrikingsignofthesilentdisappearanceofOLPisthefactthatupto1984,themastheadofthejournal
PhilosophicalInvesgaonsstated:"Thejournalseekstoexpress,extendorcricisewaysofphilosophising
inuencedbyLudwigWigenstein,J.L.AusnandGilbertRyle."Intherstissueof1985thisstatement
disappearedwithoutdiscussionandhasnotreappearedsince.Thiswasprobablyduemerelytothelackof
submissionsaboutAusnandRyle.
3InthehistoryofphilosophytheonemajorstudyworthmenoningistheonebyMarnKusch(1995)
abouttheGermanpsychologismdebate.Interesngexamplesofsimilarresearchinthehistoryofother
humansciencesincludeaseriesofpapersbyNeilMcLaughlin(1998a;1998b;1999)onthefallofErich
FrommsNeoFreudianism,andthedissertaonofPerT(1991)ontheeclipsingofWernerSombartby
MaxWeberintheriseofcapitalismdebate.
4ThecorrespondentsapartfromRussell,RyleandGellnerhimselfwereeightinfavourofRussell
(includingthepolicalscienstArnoldS.KaufmanandtheeconomistJoanRobinson);seveninfavourof
Ryle(includingJohnWisdom,BrianMcGuinnessandAlanDonagan);andonecricalofboth.
5ActuallywrienbyJ.F.Thomson,aCambridgebasedlogicianandBerkeleyscholar.
6WarnockalsonotedthatGellnermadeeenabusivereferencestohimself,butthathe"didnotfeel
vicmizedonthataccount,sincehismanyreferencestomanyotherpeoplearejustasabusive"(1959:129).

7Forwhatitsworth,myownposiononhumanfreedomisbasicallySpinozisc.
8ArguablythebestdevelopmentofthisviewoftruthintheorecaltermsisHuwPricessocalled
explanatorytheoryoftruth(Price1988:117218).
9ArecentexampleofthisisprovidedbytheproblemswithMichaelDummesandP.M.S.Hackers
proposeddenionsof"analycphilosophy,"whichendupexcludingRussellandQuinerespecvely.
10ItisunclearwhetherthisclaimcanbeaributedtoAusn.Hadhenotdiedyoung,thestreamofOLP
inuencedbyhimwouldperhapshavedefectedfromphilosophyintolinguiscsorthethennascent
disciplineofsemiocs.ItisreportedthatAusn"mastered,andused,aversionoftheinternaonal
PhonecAlphabetandwasamemberofthePhilologicalSociety,thenthechiefforumforBrishlinguists
andphilologists"(Leiber1999:196).Healsoreportedlyendorsed"theoccurrenceanalysisoflocuonsin
diconaries,"aswellastheuseoftaperecordersinconversaonanalysis,asakeymethodinphilosophy
(Tennessen1965:234),andaerhisdeaththelikesofPaulGrice,JohnSearleandZenoVendlerdeveloped
thenoonofspeechactsinanempiricaldirecon.Asimilarprojectwasthe"empiricalsemancs"
developedfromAusnsideasinNorwaybyArneNss,andlaterusedinBritainbyGeoreyLeech(e.g.
Tennessen1961;Rossvr1989;cf.Leech1969;Lyas1996a:186188).Inanycase,evenifhehadnotgone
thewayofSearleorofsemiocs,theaccusaonthatAusnwasignorantoflinguiscsiscompletely
ludicrous;muchofhis"linguiscphilosophy"wasinfact(contraAurouxandKouloughli1991)philosophyof
scienceofthescienceoflinguiscs.
11WhichisanextremelyoddcommentinviewofthefrequentaccusaonsbyGellner,Russellandothers
thatpraconersofOLParemerelytoolazyorincompetenttoexaminetheempiricalworldinsteadofjust
language.TheRyleAusnexchangeconvincinglyshowsthecharngofconceptualshadesinordinary
languagetobesohardthatevenRyle,anacknowledgedleaderintheeld,cangowronginit(Haning
2000:4).
12ThisisparcularlyclearinC.W.K.MundlesbookACriqueofLinguiscPhilosophy,inwhich
counterexamplesareusedconstantlytocricizeOLPsclaims.MundlecanhardlycharacterizeOLPas"an
aberraon"(1970:7),whenheisusingitsmethodsalltheme,andusingthemwell(Abelson1976).And,
indeed,inthesecondedionofhisbook,whileretainingtheoldtle,headmitscontritelythatin"tackling
almostanyphilosophicalproblem,somelinguiscanalysisisindispensable"andthat"somephilosophical
problemsaremainlyorwhollysolublebysuchmethods"(1979:256).Mundlesbook,nevertheless,remains
everythingGellnersbookshouldhavebeen:anonmocking,welldocumentedcriqueofspecicposions
takenbynamedphilosophers,presentedinthelanguagegameofanalycphilosophyratherthanpolemic.
PersonallyIndseveralofMundlesspeciccricismsunanswerable.
13InhisbriefdiscussionofStrawsonspaper,Gellner(1959:178179)comesperhapsclosesttoexecunga
criqueofasingleeasilyidenableargumentinasingleeasilyidenabletext.But,asDumme(1960:
434)easilyshows,Gellnercompletelymisunderstandsboththenatureandthephilosophicalpointof
StrawsonsobjecontoRussellstheory.
14Wheremostanalycphilosopherstodaywoulduse"idea"or"concept,"Iuse"noon,"believinginthe
argumentpresentedbyGuyRobinson(1998:280)thatthisstrategyisliabletobrackettheconsiderable
historicalbaggageaccompanyingtheformertwonoons.
15TS213,105("Ja,wennwirderSprachedieZgelberlassenundnichtdemLeben,dannentstehendie
philosophischenProbleme").
16Andifaphilosophersbeingprofessionallyinterestedinordinarylanguageautomacallymakeshima
memberofa"cultofcommonsense"(cf.Gellner1959:32)that"deiedactuallanguage"(Gellner1959:
55),shouldntwebrandphilosopherslikeRussellandGellner,whosostronglyandemovelyemphasize
thattheobjectofphilosophyisrather"thenatureofreality"or"theuniverse,"highpriestsofapantheist
cult?(ShouldMindperhapshavebeenretledReality?)

17OneexampleisthesuggesonthatSprachspielshouldbeviewedaslanguageplayratherthan
"languagegame,"relangWigensteintothefamoustheoryofJohanHuizinga(18721945)ontheplayful
elementinculture(Thompkins1990:192194;Savickey1999:155156).Anotheristherelangof"formof
life"totheFrenchculturalgeographerPaulVidaldelaBlache(18451918)andhisnoonof"genredevie"
(Curry1989:281283).InmyopinionthebestsinglereadingofWigensteinasananrelavistis
providedbyHilaryPutnaminhisGiordLecture"WigensteinonReferenceandRelavism"(1992:158
179).RegreablyIdonothavethespacetoexpoundPutnamssubtleandcomplexargumentsfullyinthis
paper.
18Ashasbeennoted,thehardlyconservaveMarxalsoquotesthislinefromGoethesFaustwithapproval
inCapital(Kitching1988:235).
19IntherstedionofTheIdeaofaSocialScience,Winchadmiedlyusedmanyformulaonsthathave
ledtohisphilosophybeingreadasrelavist,butheretractedmostoftheseformulaonsexplicitlyinthe
prefacetothesecondedion(Winch1990:ixxviii).
20Mytranslaon.HellhathnofurylikearomancallyorientedreaderoftheTractatuswhohasthought
oftheearlyWigensteinasanenchanngmystagogue,butgoneontoreadthelateroneandrealized
subconsciouslythattheprojectofthethaumaturgicTractatusisfundamentallythesameasthatofthe
quodianInvesgaons.(FortwoparcularlysadexamplesseeNieli1987andMagee1997.)
21OnthisinterpretaonoftheTractatussee,e.g.,Diamond1991;CraryandRead2000;Conant2001.
NormanMalcolmsmemorythatWigenstein"oncetoldmethathereallythoughtthatintheTractatushe
hadprovidedaperfectedaccountofaviewthatistheonlyalternavetotheviewpointofhislaterwork"is
milkedbyGellner(1979:26;1992:119;1998:7178)allhecan,todemonstratethat"theladderissll
there,onlyithappenstobeheavilycamouaged"(1959:66).ButcontraGellner(andMalcolm),itisinfact
favourabletoDiamondandConant.Wigensteinactuallyspokeofan"account"asinastatementor
exposionofreasons,causesormoves(MerriamWebstersCollegiateDiconary),namelyadiagnosisof
thecausesthatledtheFregeanRussellianlogicaltradionintoabarrenatomism.Itisoddtoclaimthata
bookonecricizesforcontaining"gravemistakes,"asWigenstein(1953:viii)cricizedtheTractatus,can
be"aperfectedaccount"ofitscontentinthesenseofaperfectedpresentaon.Theoneplausible
explanaonisthatthe"gravemistakes"consistedinWigensteinsfailuretomakeitexplicitthathewas
saricallypresenngawilfullynonsensicaltext,areadingwhichIdefendelsewhere(Uschanov2000).
22Andwhichwashardlyreceivedasconservavebyphilosophersofmathemacs,mostofwhom
complainedthatWigensteinwantedtochangealmosteverythingimaginableabouttheselfimageoftheir
discipline(cf.Diamond1991:34).
23Consider,forinstance,apassagefromWigensteins1939lecturesonthefoundaonsofmathemacsin
whichheexplicitlyparodiesthenoonofconceptualanalysisasapanacea:"Thinkofdisputesabout
transubstanaon.ItisnottruethatifsomeonehadsaidtoLutherandZwinglithatthemeaningofthe
wordwineisthemethodofitsvericaon,theywouldhavesaid,Oh,nowIseeandstoppedarguing.On
thecontrarytheymighthavekilledyouandperhapsrightly"(1976:110).
24Ryletooacceptedthedescriponofhisworkas"arrangingthegeographyofconcepts"(Magee1971:
133).
25ThereadingofWigensteinasclaimingthatculturesarehermecallysealedandinviolablehasledto
fascinangmentalsomersaultslikethisone:"Atwhatpointdowedecidewhenamerecolleconof
linguiscconvenonsbecomesaformoflife?Thequesonisimportant,foroncethepromoonoccurs
thatmodeofdiscoursejoinstheranksoftheuncricizable"(Clammer1976:781).Thishasitexactly
backwards.Whatisuncricizableisuncricizableconngently,andthemerefactthatWigensteincalls
somethingaformoflifeoralanguagegameneitherimpliesnorprecludesitscricizability,thepresenceor
lackofwhichonlyshowsinthesuccessorfailureofaemptstocricize.Wigensteinonlydrawsaenon
tothelikelyfailureofsomeaemptedcricisms,andthepossiblerelaonofthistovariaoninworld

picturesbut"whetherwewilltrytogoonornotisalwaysulmatelyuptous"(Hertzberg1976:60).It
wouldbemagicalthinkingtosupposethatcallingsomethingaformoflifewouldmakeituncricizable!
26Mytranslaon.ForeshadowingPutnamstreatmentofWigensteinsOnCertaintyin"Wigensteinon
ReferenceandRelavism,"Hertzbergalsonotesthat"someonemightsuggestthatthenoonofamajority
decisionshouldbereplacedbyanoonofnegoaon.Apersonwhoinsistsonapplyinganexpressionin
conictwithamajorityofspeakerscouldslldefendhisclaimtomeanthesamethingbyhiswordsasthey
dobyshowinghimselfpreparedtonegoatetheissueingoodfaith.Heshouldbewillingtoassumethe
burdenofshowinghowthemajoritycouldcometohavebeenmistakeninthecaseathand.Butthereare
casesinwhichweshouldnotbepreparedeventonegoate"(1990:30).
27Granted,therearenoPopperianWigensteinians,butthisisduesolelytoPoppersignoranceof
Wigensteinsthought.AllthereferencestoWigensteininhisworkseeminglyeither(1)invoketheVienna
CirclesreadingoftheTractatus(evenmanydecadesaerWigensteinsrepudiaonofitbecamecommon
knowledge);or(2)repeatthemantra,probablystampedinhisheadbyhisunfortunate1946confrontaon
withWigenstein,that"Wigensteindeniedtheexistenceofphilosophicalproblems"(cf.Wigenstein
1967:456).ItisunclearwhetherPoppereverevenreadtheInvesgaons,letaloneWigensteinsother
postTractatusworks(seethedebateamonghim,StrawsonandWarnockinMagee1971:165186).
However,anumberofPopperiansnotablyJosephAgassihave,whilepayinglipservicetoPopperslow
esmateofWigenstein,unwinglydisplayedaconsiderableWigensteinianstreak.Gellnertooexhibits
hisPopperiansympathiesinreadingtheTractatusthroughtheViennaCirclesspectacleswheneverit
happenstosuithispurposes.Takingthecakemustbeatrulyastonishingpassageinwhichthebookis
rephrasedasanaempttodiscussthehumancondioninNeurathianprotocolsentences(Gellner1998:
108109).
28Pitkin1972;Needham1972;Needham1975.Inmyopinion,Pitkinsbookisoneoftheverybest
examplesofOLPsgenuineapplicabilitytoproblemsorsetsofproblemsarisingcompletelyoutsideanalyc
philosophyinthiscaseproblemsinradicalpolicalphilosophy.(FormoreexamplesoftheuseofOLPto
supportradicalpolics,seeGallie1956;Symanski1976;Wertheimer1976:414420andConnolly1993.
AndforarecentaempttouseOLPasakeyweaponinaneoMarxistorneoFoucaulanculturalcrique
ofadepthandbreadthusuallyencounteredonlyintheconnentaltradion,seeRobinson1998.)
29Gellner1968b;1968c;1968d;1968e;MacIntyreandWinch1968;Runciman1968;Phillips1968.Inview
ofGellnersscholarlyconduct,itisnoteworthyhowhedevotestwoseparateleerstoahairsplingly
scholascargumentthattheuseofethnographicallyunfaithfulterminologyinanunpublisheddraofa
philosophicalpapercondemnsthepublishedversionofthatpaper,whilehisownworksrepeatedlyuse
terminologyheknowstobeunfaithfultotheextentthathisposthumouseditorhastowarnhisreaders
aboutit(cf.Gellner1998:xi).Gellneralsobrilliantlyanduniquelycombinedatuquoqueargumentwitha
guiltbyassociaonargumentbyclaimingthatsinceanunnamedWigensteinianphilosopheronce
misquotedhim,itisfairforhimtomisquoteanyoneheassociateswithWigensteinianviews.
30CompareWigensteinsremarks,aboutsixweeksbeforehisdeath,onareviewoftwoOLPstylebooks:
"TheotherdayIsawintheNewStatesmanareviewofabookwhichseemstobeacolleconofarclesby
variousLogicalPosivists,Wisdom,Ryle,Waismann,etc.ItparcularlypraisedWaismannforaremark
whichcomesstraightfromme.WheneverIseeanobvioustheIverymuchdislikeit;althoughIreally
oughtbynowtobeenrelyusedtoit.Iwishsomereviewerwoulddebunkthesehumbugs"(leertoRush
Rhees,14March1951).And:"TheotherdayIsawalaudatoryreviewoftwophilosophicalbooksintheNew
Statesman.Onewasbyaman,Toulmin,whocametomyclasseswhileyouwereinCambridge,Ithink;the
otherseemedtocontainarclesbyWisdom,Waismann,Ryle&othercharlatans.Thereviewparcularly
praisedoneremarkofWaismannswhichcamestraightoutofmylectures.Idliketoseeareviewsomeday
whichdebunksthesepeople"(leertoNormanMalcolm,19March1951).
31Indeed,thePopperianJohnWatkinscomplainedinhisreviewofWordsandThingsthatGellner"puts
himselfintheposionofacomplacentpsychoanalystwhoregardshispaentsprotestaonsagainsthis
interpretaonsasfurtherconrmaonofthem"(1960:107).ThisisalsooddintheviewofGellnerslater

interestincricizingpsychoanalysis(e.g.Gellner1985)asisGellnersinsistenceoncallingWigensteina
totaldeistinthefaceofhiswelldocumentedsuspicionofFreudianexplanatoryschemes.
32InLanguageandSolitude,GellnermaintainsthatWigensteinendorsedthepolicallyescapist
movementintorevivinglocalfolklorethatwaspopularintheinterbellumdecadesinthesuccessorstatesof
theAustroHungarianempire.Gellnerconstantlyevokes"theCarpathianvillagegreen,"withitsignorant
folkdancers,asanaccuratemetaphorforWigensteinsculturalideals.Nothingcouldbefurtherfromthe
truth.Inadiaryentryfrom1932,Wigensteinexplicitlydeplores"theadoponofancientnamesfor
denominaons"and"therevivaloffolkdancesandcostumes"as"akindofstupidicaon"(eineArtder
Vertroelung)thatbetraysthedegeneraonofAustrianculture(1997:68).
33InhisclassicstudyofErnstJnger,HansPeterSchwarz(1962)suggeststheterm"conservave
anarchist".Whilehighlymisleadingwhenconsideredinisolaon,thisneverthelesshassomethingofthe
rightavour.
34ItisnoteworthythatmanyofWigensteinsclosefriendswereMarxists,e.g.PieroSraa,George
Thomson,NicholasBachnandMauriceDobb.ThomsonremarksthatWigenstein"wasopposedto
[Marxism]intheory,butsupportedittoalargeextentinpracce"(Flowers1999:2.220).Tohisfriend
RowlandHuWigensteinsimilarlysaid:"Iamacommunist,atheart"(Monk1990:343).InNovember
1940WigensteinmadehisonlypublicpolicalstatementwhenhesupportedacommunistStudents
ConvenonheldinCambridge.ThiswasproemialtothePeoplesConvenonmovementwhichcalledinthe
preBarbarossamonthsof1941forapeaceoertobepresentedtoGermanyandforcloseAngloSoviet
relaons(Flowers1999:3.142143).Thenagain,inthelatethiresWigensteindismissedChamberlains
policyofGermanappeasementmorethanonce(Flowers1999:2.241242;3.3334;3.48;3.228);his
remarksonEuropeanpolicsintheimmediatepostwareraareequallygloomy(Monk1990:516;Flowers
1999:2.209;3.144).
35TheodoreRedpathnotestantalizingly:"OnedayIaskedhimwhyheneverstatedanypolicalviewsor
discussedpolicsinanyofhislectures.Hisreplywasinteresng.Hesaidhecouldnotdosobutthatone
dayhewouldgivealectureortalkexplainingwhyhecouldnot.HenevergavesuchalectureortalkwhileI
wassllaendinghisclasses"(Flowers1999:3.47).HadWigensteingiventhelecture,hewouldinall
likelihoodhaveelaboratedonthe"communityofideas"remarkIdiscussabove.(Orhemighthavehadin
mindareworkingofhisLectureonEthics.)
36Aphilosophercan,ofcourse,lendhispresgeasanintellectualifanytocausesheconsiders
worthyofsupport.Butthepresgeisthesamewithmanyotherkindsofintellectualswhoarenot
philosophers;andnobodywouldsuggestthatpainters,musicians,physicistsormathemacianscanlend
theirsupporttoprogressivesocialcausesanymoreeecvelybecauseoftheirvocaonaltraining.
37MS132,11September1946.IamgratefultoDenisPaul,anadaptaonofwhosetranslaonIquote,for
bringingthispassagetomyaenon.Similarly,whenM.OC.DrurysuggestedtoWigensteinthathe
shouldtlehisforthcomingbooksimplyPhilosophy,Wigensteinreplied:"Dontbesuchanasshow
couldIuseawordlikethatwhichhasmeantsomuchinthehistoryofhumanthought?Asifmyworkwas
anythingmorethanjustasmallfragmentofphilosophy"(Flowers1999:3.242).
38Ryleevencharacterizedthe"overridingWorry"ofhiscareerasmetaphilosophicalquesons(Ryle1971a:
ixx;1971b:vii),andrepeatedlydescribedTheConceptofMindasprimarilyametaphilosophicalbook
ratherthanabookonthephilosophyofmind(Ryle1970:12;1993:105106).Forarecentaempttoread
TheConceptofMindasaprimarilymetaphilosophicalwork,andabrilliantrefutaonofthemyththatit
representsreduconist"logicalbehaviourism,"seePark1994.
39Thetleoftheversionof"APleaforExcuses"Ausndeliveredin1959atGteborg,"SomethingAbout
OneWayofPossiblyDoingOnePartofPhilosophy,"alsotesesofthedepthofhisinterestin
metaphilosophy.

40AninteresngDoppelgngerofWordsandThingswaspublishedayearbeforeitbyG.R.G.Mure(1893
1979),thelastoftheBrishabsoluteidealists.HisRetreatfromTruth(Mure1958)convictedallanalyc
philosophy,withspecialreferencetoOLP,ofanempiricistdisdainforquesonsofvalueandmetaphysics.
However,itreceivedalmostnoaenon.
41ForsympathecoutsidersaccountsofthesocialtheatreofiesOxford,seeMehta1983:14105and
White1999:178220.
42ThebestknownoftheseisprobablyHacking1975,unnecessarilyviatedbyaonesidedcommitmentto
Foucaultsarcheologyofknowledgeandhisinsistencethatowingtothechangingfortunesofthe"knowing
subject,"languagesmaeringandtheawarenessofitsmaeringaretwofundamentallydierentthings.
43GavinKitchinghasintriguinglysuggested(personalcommunicaon,11January2001)thatGellnerisbest
seenasakindofMarxistwithoutMarxism"assomeonewhohatedMarxismpolicallywhileswallowing
itmoreorlesswholeasaphilosophyofhistory".IhopetodevelopthisreadingofGellnersintellectual
proleinafuturepaper.
44MS133,27October1946.
45Themosttangibleexampleofthisisarecentintroductorytextbookonthephilosophyofmind,which
disposesofRylesandWigensteinscontribuonsinasingleparagraph.Thisclaimsthatsincetheir
"anrealism"isgenerallyacceptedashavingbeenrefuteddecisively,thereaderdoesnthavetopayany
aenontoit(BoerillandCarruthers1999:208).Itismyviewthatifthereisacogentchallengetothe
realistparadigminthephilosophyofmind,itisfoundinOLP,insuchpiecesasRylesdemolionofthe
Chomskyanviewofinnateideas(Ryle1974)orvariousaemptstodemonstratetheincoherenceofverbal
descriponsofeliminavenaturalism(Coulter1993;Serani1993;Hunter1995;Haning2000:244261).
46ItistruethatAusnsnoonofspeechactssllsurvivesintheworkofSearle,Vendlerandtheir
followers(cf.footnote10above),butsincethesixesithasbeengengfurtherandfurtherremovedfrom
themetaphilosophicalvaluesthatmovatedthebestofOLP,andcorrespondinglyclosertocontemporary
scienscvalues.IfullysharethereservaonsonecommentatoronSearlerecentlyexpressedabouthis
establishedstatusas"thesoleintellectuallegateeofandauthorizedspokesmanforJ.L.Ausn"
(Rajagopalan2000:351).
47TheclosestthingtosuchabookiscurrentlyP.M.S.HackersWigensteinsPlaceinTwenethCentury
AnalycPhilosophy.HackersbookisintendedasaprogrammacvindicaonofOLP,butironicallyhe
replicatesallofwhattendedtobeworstaboutitanadherencetotheobsoletetwoWigensteinpicture;
ahaughtyandunforgivingatudetowardsmostnonanalycphilosophy;andanignoranceoftheextentto
whichWigensteinhasbeensignicantpreciselyasabridgebuilderbetweenanalycphilosophyandother
partsofculture(cf.Fogelin1998;McManus1998;Sluga1998;Stern1999).Analtogethersuperbhistorical
discussionconcentrangontheOLPerainOxfordandCambridgecanbefoundinFurberg1998(which
badlyneedstranslangintoEnglish);thiscanbesupplementedwiththetheorecaldefenceofOLPin
Haning2000.
48Asomewhatdemurefootnotetotherstaccusaonofsystemacevasivenessnearthebeginningof
WordsandThingsstates:"Ishouldlike,however,toexpressmyrespectforthosephilosopherswho
neverthelessdisplayadmirableforthrightnessindebate,suchasProfessorsRyleandUrmson,orMessrs.R.
HareandA.MacIntyre"(Gellner1959:21;cf.Gellner1971:889;1974:709;1979:36).
49OnthetensionsbetweenRussellssocialposionandtheroleinwhichhesawhimself,seeCrawshay
Williams1970:7881andGrice1989:378.
50Ontheexistenalistspublicitystrategies,seeArppe1996;onthemediaconfeconoftheAngryYoung
Men,ledbyColinWilsonandJohnOsborne,seeRe1993:35.Atleasttwocontemporaneousreviewsof
WordsandThings(Cohen1960;White1960)calledGellneran"AngryYoungPhilosopher,"oneofthem
suggesngthatthebooksmainpurposemightbetoturnphilosophy"intoasocialstrugglebetweenthe

EstablishmentandtheAngryYoungMan"(Cohen1960:180).Overadecadelater,dissasfaconwithOLP
wasoneofthemainreasonsfortheformaonoftheRadicalPhilosophyGroupandthejournalRadical
Philosophy,whichfrequentlydiscussedtheconservasmofOLPinitsearlyissues(e.g.Re1973;Sayers
1974;Re1974;Harrison1974;Fann1974;Burke1975;diNorcia1975;Benton1976).
51Rylesaidduringalecturecoursein1964:"ThisremindsmeofarecentvisittoNewZealand.Having
arrivedattheairportIwasapproachedbyareporterwhoaskedmewhatcontemporaryphilosophersthink
oftheatombomb.MuchtohisdisappointmentIrepliedthattheatombombraiseslessphilosophical
problemsthanthebowandarrowdidcenturiesago"(1993:119120).Wigensteintoowasnotvery
worriedaboutthebomb,andnotoriouslyeventoyedwiththeideaofwelcomingit(1980:4849).
52OnthiseraofBrishsocialhistorymoregenerally,seee.g.Hopkins1963andMorgan1984.
53"Inthiscountrythereisnomoreobviousreaconforpeoplelikemethanmisanthropy,"Wigenstein
wroteinthespringof1947,callingBritaina"countryinwhichpolicsalternatesbetweenanevilpurpose
andnopurpose"(Monk1990:516).
54ForagoodaccountofthecontroversystartedbySnowslecture,andofthesocialcontextwhichgreatly
facilitatedbothhisandGellnersimpact,seeCollini1993.
55Theinadequacyoflanguageanylanguageinthetreatmentofgenuinemoralquesonswasclearly
akeythemeinWigensteinsviewofethics(Wigenstein1965;cf.Rhees1965).Whenaskedabout
intellectualjuscaonofmoralnormsinconversaon,Wigensteinsaid:"Thisisaterriblebusinessjust
terrible!Youcanatbeststammerwhenyoutalkofit"(Toulmin1950:209).AndhisremarktoG.H.von
Wright,whohadwonderedattheslightWigensteinianinuenceonStevensonsclassicEthicsand
Language,wasthatallStevensonhadlearnedfromaendinghislectureswastosay"andlanguage"(von
Wright1978:204205).
56TheallusionsaretoUrmson1950andWisdom1937,respecvely.
57TherearemanyanecdotesaboutthefearsomealoofnessofAusn(e.g.Mehta1983:60;Cavell1994:
5960).OnhisverbalpyrotechnicsorwhatGellner(1969:776)calls"theterribleplayfulgirlsschoolwit
acoydonsoldwomanishhumour"moregenerally,seeRicks1992.
58"Allthemagichasvanished"wasWigensteinstellingcommentonTheConceptofMind(Hacker1996:
169).
59AlthoughRylealsohadtheviewthathewas,inasense,alessmedicalphilosopherthanWigenstein:
"jemploieunlangage,disons,moinscliniquequeceluideWigenstein,etjesuismoinsportquelui
praquerlachirurgie"(Wahletal.1962:29).
60AmeritoftheoenatexamplesusedinOLPwas,ofcourse,thatstudyinganonmomentous
phenomenonhelpsonetoavoidthedistoronsthatcomefrompreconcepons(Marnich1998:144145).
Forthisreason,unexcingexamples(suchasAusnsspillingofinkandshoongofdonkeys)wereoen
desirableandevennecessary;asThomasWallgrensays,itis"philosophicalblackmail"toinsist"thatthe
answerswereachbeofacertainkind,thattheymust,forinstance,haveanairofenormousdepthorbe
enormouslycomplexorextraordinary"(2000:5.2).Anyone"whopretendedtothinkthattherewasa
correlaonbetweenthegravityoftheexampleandtheimportanceofthecorreconthatithelpedto
administerwouldbepretendingtobestupid"(Hinton1973:384).Anditisoddtocondemnaphilosophyon
thegroundsthatonendsitboringasifasingleindividualspersonalaesthectastesshouldbeallowed
todictatewhatphilosophyis,andasifatasksbeingboringequalleditsbeingdispensable(Wertheimer
1976:409).ThereissomethinginDennesdescriponofRylesphilosophyas"wonderfully,importantly
shallow"(2000:xviii)perhapshewas"supercialoutofprofundity,"asNietzschedescribedtheGreeksin
hisprefacetothesecondedionofTheGayScience.

61Foroneharrowinglybeaufulexampleofsuchabiography,seeBambrough1986.MostcricsofOLP
seemtosupposethatnobodyhaseverundertakenadefenceofacademicanalycphilosophythataends
totheexistenalargumentspurporngtoproveitsworthlessness.Unlthefactthatsuchdefences(e.g.
Grith1982;Thomas1989;Dilman1992;Adamowski1993)existinanunansweredstateiseven
acknowledged,theresponsibilityforthegapbetweenacademicphilosophyandLebensphilosophiecan
hardlybesaidtorestsolelyontheshouldersoftheformer(cf.Khatchadourian1981:233).
62Theproceedingsofthisconference,whichfeaturedAyerandQuineaswellasRyle,StrawsonandAusn,
oermanytangibleexamplesofthisri.WhenMerleauPontyaskedRyle"Notreprogrammenestilpasle
mme?,"Rylereplied:"Jesprequenon"(Wahletal.1962:7).AndtheHusserlscholarH.L.vanBredawas
fundamentallycorrecttosayinexasperaon:"Cestlavritpureetsimple,jecrois,dedirequilya
beaucoupdeconnentauxquinontaucunintrtrelpourvotrephilosophie.Etjosedirequecestla
mmechosechezvousenverslesconnentaux"(Wahletal.1962:344).
63InthetwenesRylestudiedCroceandHusserlextensivelyanddiligently,andevenvisitedthelaer(cf.
thenotesonphenomenologicalbooksownedbyhim,aswellasareassessmentoftheextentofhisinterest
inphenomenology,inKramerandWilcock1999:131136).Asisknown,Rylepublishedanotaltogether
censoriousreviewofHeideggersSeinundZeitin1929,andinviewoftheFrankfurtSchoolslaternegave
atudetoOLPitisfascinangtonotethathealsofunconedasadvisortoTheodorAdornosaborve
doctoraldissertaononHusserlin19341937(KramerandWilcock1999).Rylewasalwayskeentooppose
thereduconofabstractthoughttovarious"isms,"anddevotedasuperbearlypaper,"TakingSidesin
Philosophy,"tocricismofsectarianphilosophy(Ryle1937;cf.Ryle1970:6;1971a:ix).Evenintheyearof
hisdeathheconnuedtodenouncethe"sectarianandelectoraldesignaons"ofa"byeleconvoice"(Ryle
1976:385).ButunfortunatelyforHusserl,theword"phenomenology"didnotendin"ism".
64Coupledwithalackofinterestinconnentalthoughtwasalackofdeepinterestinthehistoryof
philosophy.Rylewas,ofcourse,anotinconsiderablePlatoscholar,whileAusnbothwroteonAristotleand
iniatedtheAristotleseriesofOxfordUniversityPress.ButRyleslackofinterestinDescartesandHusserl,
primeobjectsofhiscricism,isallthemorepuzzlingwhencomparedtohisinterestinPlato(Curley1986).
HesuggestedhimselfthatthelackofinterestinhistoryamonghisgeneraonofOxfordphilosopherswas
largelyarecoilreaconagainsttheundueaenontohistorypaidbytheabsoluteidealists(Magee1971:
140141).Perhapsitwasalsoareaconagainsttheneedtotrainasclassicistsbeforegoingonto
philosophicalstudies.
65ThanksareduetoJouniAvelin,JamesConant,TapaniKilpelinen,AnthonyPalmerandMichael
SmithurstforvariouslargeandsmallexchangesonwhetherOLPissllworthwringon;AnArnkil,Olli
KulmalaandEliaLennesformanywonderfuldiscussionsofWigenstein,OLPandMarshallSahlins;Lars
Hertzbergandtheparcipantsofhisresearchseminar(especiallyGranTorrkullaandOlliLagerspetz)for
commentsonanearlyversionofthispaper;GavinKitching,MarnKusch,JusnLeiber,NeilMcLaughlin,
JonathanRe,DuncanRichterandJ.L.Speranzaforcommentsonaslightlylaterversion;BoRamLee,
GnterTrendler,KirbyUrnerandThomasWallgrenforacng,invariousways,assparringpartnersformy
viewthatphilosophytrulyleaveseverythingasitis;SamiJrvinenforconversaonsaboutRyleand
supplyingafewofmysources;ChessKrawczykforsupplyingmoresources;andDeborahMcVeaforsome
invaluablebibliographicinformaon.
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