Filoteo, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan | 263 SCRA 222 | GR No. 79543 | Oct.

16, 1996
KEYWORDS: Petitioners uncounselled waiver of his right to counsel is admissible as evidence.
FACTS:
Petitioner Jose Filoteo, Jr. (Filoteo), a police investigator of the Western Police District in Metro Manila, was a
suspected mastermind of the armed hijacking of a postal delivery van. Along with 10 other co-accused, he was
charged of wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, stopping the Postal Delivery Truck of the Bureau of Postal while it
was travelling along the MacArthur Highway at the point of their guns, and then taking, robbing and carrying away
with them a Postal Delivery Truck, SSS Medicare and Pension Checks and Vouchers, Treasury Warrants, among
others, in the total amount of P253,728.29.At 11pm of May 29, 1982, Filoteos co-accused, Mateo, escorted by a
group of military men, went to petitioners house. The group refused to give any reason for their visit but arrested
him and asked him about his Mercedes Benz and the identities of his companions in an alleged hijacking incident.
The Benz was alleged to be the car that the hijackers used to block the delivery trucks way. Petitioner admitted to
having knowledge of the exact location of the car but denied participation in the crime.
Nobody apprised him of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to be assisted by counsel.After the police
identied petitioner Filoteos Benz, petitioner Filoteo claims that at the SOG headquarters in Camp Crame, he was
repeatedly coaxed to admit participation in the hijacking. As he vehemently denied the accusation against him,
someone blindfolded him from behind, led him outside and loaded him in a car. He was taken to an unidentied
place and made to lie at on his back. An object was tied to his small nger to electrocute him. While a wet
handkerchief was stuffed in his mouth, someone mounted his chest and applied the water cure (tinutubig) through
his nose. Because these ordeals were simultaneously carried out, petitioner felt unbearable pain. He sought
permission to get in touch with his father-in-law (who was an attorney) but his request was denied. They urged him
to cooperate otherwise something terrible would happen to him.On May 30, 1982, Filoteo was therefore constrained
to sign a prepared statement (that was shown and read to him by the police) because of his excruciating experience.
He however admitted having read the document before afixing his signature thereto and initialing the corrections
therein. The waiver under Article 125 of the RPC and the certication he executed were allegedly also obtained by
duress. Thereafter, Petitioner Filoteo led a complaint for grave coercion and maltreatment against Lt. Rosendo
Ferrer and several John Does. Eventually, the Sandiganbayan found the accused and his co-principals guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating the Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974. Petitioners motion for
reconsideration was denied by the Sandiganbayan.
ISSUE:
W/N the extrajudicial confession, executed by the accused without the presence of his lawyer, is admissible in
evidence against him.
HELD:
YES. Extrajudicial confessions made without the benet of counsel while the 1973 Constitution was in force and
effect are admissible since the Constitution, unlike penal laws, are prospective in nature.The petitioner contends that
the Court erred in admitting his extrajudicial confession despite the uncontradicted testimony and documentary
proof that he was made to sign the same through torture, maltreatment, physical compulsion, threats and
intimidation and without the presence and assistance of counsel. He also claims that in executing the extrajudicial
confession, he was denied the right to counsel in the same way that his waiver of the said right was likewise without
the benet of counsel.
Art. IV, Sec. 20 of the 1973 Constitution provides:
No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any person under investigation for the commission of
an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel and to be informed of such rights. No force, violence,
threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him. Any confession
obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence.
1. What is Penal Law?

Art. III, Sec. 12 of the 1987 Constitution provide the relevant rights as follows:
(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right
to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot
afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and
in the presence of counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used
against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited. x x
x
By parity of reasoning, the specic provision of the 1987 Constitution requiring that a waiver by an accused of his
right to counsel during custodial investigation must be made with the assistance of counsel may not be
applied retroactively or in cases where the extrajudicial confession was made prior to the effectivity of said
Constitution.
Accordingly, waivers of the right to counsel during custodial investigation without the benet of counsel during the
effectivity of the 1973 Constitution should, by such argumentation, be admissible. Although a number of cases held
that extrajudicial confessions made while the 1973 Constitution was in force and effect, should have been made with
the assistance of counsel, the denitive ruling was enunciated only on April 26, 1983 when this Court, through
Morales, Jr., vs. Enrile, issued the guidelines to be observed by law enforcers during custodial investigation. The
court specically ruled that the right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with
the assistance of counsel. Thereafter, in People vs. Luvendino, the Court vigorously taught:
x x x. The doctrine that an uncounseled waiver of the right to counsel is not to be given legal effect was initially a
judge-made one and was rst announced on 26 April 1983 in Morales vs. Enrile and reiterated on 20 March
1985 in People vs. Galit. x x x. While the Morales-Galit doctrine eventually became part of Section 12(1) of the
1987 Constitution, that doctrine affords no comfort to appellant Luvendino for the requirements and restrictions
outlined in Morales and Galit have no retroactive effect and do not reach waivers made prior to 26 April 1983
the date of promulgation of Morales.
Pursuant to the above doctrine, petitioner may not claim the benets of the Morales and Galit rulings because he
executed his extrajudicial confession and his waiver to the right to counsel on May 30, 1982, or before April 26,
1983. The prospective application of judge-made laws was underscored in Co vs. Court of Appeals where the Court
ruled that in accordance with Article 8 of the Civil Code which provides that judicial decisions applying or
interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines, and Article 4 of the
same Code which states that laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided, the principle of
prospectivity of statutes, original or amendatory, shall apply to judicial decisions, which, although in themselves
are not laws, are nevertheless evidence of what the law means.Petitioners contention that Article III, Section 12 of
the 1987 Constitution should be given retroactive effect for being favorable to him as an accused, cannot be
sustained . While Article 22 of the RPCprovides that penal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they
favor the person guilty of a felony who is not a habitual criminal, what is being construed here is a constitutional
provision specically contained in the Bill of Rights which is obviously not a penal statute. A bill of rights is a
declaration and enumeration of the individual rights and privileges which the Constitution is designed to protect
against violations by the government, or by individuals or groups of individual. It is a charter of liberties for the
individual and a limitation upon the power of the state.
Penal laws, on the other hand, strictly and properly are those imposing punishment for an offense committed
against the state which the executive of the state has the power to pardon. In other words, a penal law denotes
punishment imposed and enforced by the state for a crime or offense against its law.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

Rev. Ely Velez Pamatong Vs. Commission on Elections

G.R. No. 161872, April 13, 2004
FACTS:
Petitioner Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for President.
Respondent COMELEC declared petitioner and 35 others as nuisance candidates who could not wage a
nationwide campaign and/or are not nominated by a political party or are not supported by a registered
political party with a national constituency.
Pamatong filed a Petition For Writ of Certiorari with the Supreme Court claiming that the COMELEC
violated his right to "equal access to opportunities for public service" under Section 26, Article II of the
1987 Constitution, by limiting the number of qualified candidates only to those who can afford to wage a
nationwide campaign and/or are nominated by political parties.
The COMELEC supposedly erred in disqualifying him since he is the most qualified among all the
presidential candidates, i.e., he possesses all the constitutional and legal qualifications for the office of the
president, heis capable of waging a national campaign since he has numerous national organizations under
his leadership, he also hasthe capacity to wage an international campaign since he has practiced law in
other countries, and he has a platform of government.
ISSUE:
Is there a constitutional right to run for or hold public office?
HELD:
No. What is recognized in Section 26, Article II of the Constitution is merely a privilege subject to
limitations imposed by law. It neither bestows such a right nor elevates the privilege to the level of an
enforceable right. There is nothing in the plain language of the provision which suggests such a thrust or
justifies an interpretation of the sort.
The "equal access" provision is a subsumed part of Article II of the Constitution, entitled "Declaration of
Principles and State Policies." The provisions under the Article are generally considered not self-executing,
and there is no plausible reason for according a different treatment to the "equal access" provision.
Like the rest of the policies enumerated in Article II, the provision does not contain any judicially
enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline for legislative or executive action. The
disregard of the provision does not give rise to any cause of action before the courts.
Obviously, the provision is not intended to compel the State to enact positive measures that would
accommodate as many people as possible into public office. It is difficult to interpret the clause as operative
in the absence of legislation since its effective means and reach are not properly defined.
The privilege of equal access to opportunities to public office may be subjected to limitations. Some valid
limitations specifically on the privilege to seek elective office are found in the provisions of the Omnibus
Election Code on "Nuisance Candidates.
As long as the limitations apply to everybody equally without discrimination, however, the equal access
clause is not violated. Equality is not sacrificed as long as the burdens engendered by the limitations are
meant tobe borne by any one who is minded to file a certificate of candidacy. In the case at bar, there is no
showing that any person is exempt from the limitations or the burdens which they create.
The rationale behind the prohibition against nuisance candidates and the disqualification of candidates who
have not evinced a bona fide intention to run for office is easy to divine. The State has a compelling interest
to ensure that itselectoral exercises are rational, objective, and orderly.
Towards this end, the State takes into account the practical considerations in conducting elections.
Inevitably, the greater the number of candidates, the greater the opportunities for logistical confusion, not to
mention the increased allocation of time and resources in preparation for the election.
The organization of an election with bona fide candidates standing is onerous enough. To add into the mix
candidates with no serious intentions or capabilities to run a viable campaign would actually impair the
electoral process. This is not to mention the candidacies which are palpably ridiculous so as to constitute a
one-note joke. The poll body would bebogged by irrelevant minutiae covering every step of the electoral
process, most probably posed at the instance of these nuisance candidates. It would be a senseless sacrifice

on the part of the State.The question of whether a candidate is a nuisance candidate or not is both legal and
factual. The basis of the factualdetermination is not before this Court. Thus, the remand of this case for the
reception of further evidence is in order.The SC remanded to the COMELEC for the reception of further
evidence, to determine the question on whetherpetitioner Elly Velez Lao Pamatong is a nuisance candidate
as contemplated in Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code.

ELICIDAD ANZALDO, petitioner,

vs.
JACOBO C. CLAVE as Chairman of the Civil Service Commission and as Presidential Executive Assistant;
JOSE A. R. MELO, as Commissioner of the Civil Service Commission, and EULALIA L.
VENZON, respondents.
This is a controversy over the position of Science Research Supervisor II, whose occupant heads the Medical
Research Department in the Biological Research Center of the National Institute of Science and Technology (NIST).
Doctor Felicidad Estores-Anzaldo 55, seeks to annul the decision of Presidential Executive Assistant Jacobo C.
Clave dated March 20, 1980, revoking her appointment dated January 5, 1978 as Science Research Supervisor
II and directing the appointment to that position of Doctor Eulalia L. Venzon, 48.

The contested position became vacant in 1974 when its incumbent, Doctor Quintin Kintanar, became
Director of the Biological Research Center.
Doctor Kintanar recommended that Doctor Venzon be appointed to that position. Doctor Anzaldo protested
against that recommendation. The NIST Reorganization Committee found her protest to be valid and
meritorious (p. 34, Rollo). Because of that impasse, the position was not filled up.
At the time the vacancy occurred, or on June 30, 1974, both Doctors Anzaldo and Venzon were holding
similar positions in the Medical Research Department: that of Scientist Research Associate IV with an
annual compensation of P12,013 per annum. Both were next-in-rank to the vacant position.
Later, Doctor Pedro G. Afable, Vice-Chairman, became the Officer-in-Charge of the NIST. Effective
January 5, 1978, he appointed Doctor Anzaldo to the contested position with compensation at P18,384 per
annum. The appointment was approved by the Civil Service Commission.
Doctor Afable, explained that the appointment was made after a thorough study and screening of the
qualifications of Doctors Anzaldo and Venzon
Doctor Venzon in a letter dated January 23, 1978, addressed to Jacobo C. Clave, appealed to the Office of
the President of the Philippines. The appeal was forwarded to the NIST. The appeal-protest was later sent to
the Civil Service Commission.
Chairman Clave of the Civil Service Commission and Commissioner Jose A. R. Melo recommended that
Doctor Venzon be appointed to the contested position, a recommendation which is in conflict with the 1978
appointment of Doctor Anzaldo which was duly attested and approved by the Civil Service Commission.
The resolution was made pursuant to section 19(6) of the Civil Service Decree of the Philippines,
Presidential Decree No. 807 (which took effect on October 6, 1975) and which provides that before
deciding a contested appointment, the Office of the President shall consult the Civil Service Commission.
After the denial of her motion for the reconsideration of that resolution, or on January 5, 1980, Doctor
Anzaldo appealed to the Office of the President of the Philippines. As stated earlier, Presidential Executive
Assistant Clave (who was concurrently Chairman of the Civil Service Commission) in his decision of
March 20, 1980 revoked Doctor Anzaldos appointment and ruled that, as recommended by the Civil
Service Commission (meaning Chairman Clave himself and Commissioner Melo), Doctor Venzon should
be appointed to the contested position but that Doctor Anzaldos appointment to the said position should be
considered valid and effective during the pendency of Doctor Venzons protest (p. 36, Rollo).
In a resolution dated August 14, 1980, Presidential Executive Assistant Clave denied Doctor Anzaldos
motion for reconsideration. On August 25, 1980, she filed in this Court the instant special civil action of
certiorari.
What is manifestly anomalous and questionable about that decision of Presidential Executive Assistant Clave is that
it is an implementation of Resolution No. 1178 dated August 23, 1979 signed by Jacobo C. Clave, as Chairman of
the Civil Service Commission and concurred in by Commissioner Jose A. Melo.

In that resolution, Commissioner Clave and Melo, acting for the Civil Service Commission, recommended that
Doctor Venzon be appointed Science Research Supervisor II in place of Doctor Anzaldo.
When Presidential Executive Assistant Clave said in his decision that he was inclined to concur in the
recommendation of the Civil Service Commission, what he meant was that he was concurring with Chairman
Claves recommendation: he was concurring with himself (p. 35, Rollo).
It is evident that Doctor Anzaldo was denied due process of law when Presidential Executive Assistant Clave
concurred with the recommendation of Chairman Clave of the Civil Service Commission. The case is analogous to
Zambales Chromite Mining Co. vs. Court of Appeals, L-49711, November 7, 1979, 94 SCRA 261, where it was held
that the decision of Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources Benjamin M. Gozon, affirming his own decision
in a mining case as Director of Mines was void because it was rendered with grave abuse of discretion and was a
mockery of administrative justice.
Due process of law means fundamental fairness. It is not fair to Doctor Anzaldo that Presidential Executive Assistant
Clave should decide whether his own recommendation as Chairman of the Civil Service Commission, as to who
between Doctor Anzaldo and Doctor Venzon should be appointed Science Research Supervisor II, should be adopted
by the President of the Philippines.
Common sense and propriety dictate that the commissioner in the Civil Service Commission, who should be
consulted by the Office of the President, should be a person different from the person in the Office of the President
who would decide the appeal of the protestant in a contested appointment.
In this case, the person who acted for the Office of the President is the same person in the Civil Service
Commission who was consulted by the Office of the President: Jacobo C. Clave. The Civil Service Decree could not
have contemplated that absurd situation for, as held in the Zambales Chromite case, that would not be fair to the
appellant.
We hold that respondent Clave committed a grave abuse of discretion in deciding the appeal in favor of Doctor
Venzon. The appointing authority, Doctor Afable, acted in accordance with law and properly exercised his discretion
in appointing Doctor Anzaldo to the contested position.
Doctor Anzaldo finished the pharmacy course in 1950 in the College of Pharmacy, University of the Philippines. She
obtained from the Centro Escolar University the degree of Master of Science in Pharmacy in 1962 and in 1965 the
degree of Doctor of Pharmacy.
Aside from her civil service eligibility as a pharmacist, she is a registered medical technologist and supervisor
(unassembled).
She started working in the NIST in 1954 and has served in that agency for about twenty-eight (28) years now. As
already stated, in January, 1978, she was appointed to the contested Position of Science Research Supervisor II. Her
present salary as Science Research Supervisor II, now known as Senior Science Research Specialist, is P 30,624 per
annum after she was given a merit increase by Doctor Kintanar, effective July 1, 1981 (p. 259, Rollo).
On the other hand, Doctor Venzon finished the medical course in the University of Santo Tomas in 1957. She started
working in the NIST in 1960. She has been working in that agency for more than twenty-one (21) years. Doctor
Anzaldo is senior to her in point of service.
Considering that Doctor Anzaldo has competently and satisfactorily discharged the duties of the contested position
for more than four (4) years now and that she is qualified for that position, her appointment should be upheld.
Doctor Venzons protest should be dismissed.
WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent Clave dated March 20, 1980 is set aside, and petitioner Anzaldos
promotional appointment to the contested position is declared valid. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

BOARD OF MEDICINE,
-versusYASUYUKI OTA,
Respondent.

Yasuyuki Ota (respondent) is a Japanese national, married to a Filipina, who has continuously resided in
thePhilippines for more than 10 years.
He graduated from Bicol Christian College of Medicine with a degree of Doctor of Medicine.[5] After
successfully completing a one-year post graduate internship training at the
Jose Reyes Memorial Medical Center, he filed an application to take the medical board examinations in
order to obtain a medical license.
He was required by the Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) to submit an affidavit of undertaking,
stating among others that should he successfully pass the same, he would not practice medicine until he
submits proof that reciprocity exists between Japan and the Philippines in admitting foreigners into the
practice of medicine.[6]
Respondent submitted a duly notarized English translation of the Medical Practitioners Law of Japan duly
authenticated by the Consul General of the Philippine Embassy to Japan, Jesus I. Yabes;[7] thus, he was
allowed to take the Medical Board Examinations in August 1992, which he subsequently passed.[8]
In spite of all these, the Board of Medicine (Board) of the PRC, in a letter dated March 8, 1993, denied
respondent's request for a license to practice medicine in the Philippines on the ground that the Board
believes that no genuine reciprocity can be found in the law of Japan as there is no Filipino or foreigner
who can possibly practice there.[9]
Respondent then filed a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus against the Board before the RTC of Manila
on June 24, 1993, which petition was amended on February 14, 1994 to implead the PRC through its
Chairman.[10]
In his petition before the RTC, respondent alleged that the Board and the PRC, in refusing to issue in his
favor a Certificate of Registration and/or license to practice medicine, had acted arbitrarily, in clear
contravention of the provision of Section 20 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 2382 (The Medical Act of 1959),
depriving him of his legitimate right to practice his profession in the Philippines to his great damage and
prejudice.[11]
On October 19, 2003, the RTC rendered its Decision finding that respondent had adequately proved that the
medical laws of Japan allow foreigners like Filipinos to be granted license and be admitted into the practice
of medicine under the principle of reciprocity; and that the Board had a ministerial duty of issuing the
Certificate of Registration and license to respondent, as it was shown that he had substantially complied
with the requirements under the law.[12]The RTC then ordered the Board to issue in favor of respondent the
corresponding Certificate of Registration and/or license to practice medicine in the Philippines.[13]
The Board and the PRC (petitioners) appealed the case to the CA, stating that while respondent submitted
documents showing that foreigners are allowed to practice medicine in Japan, it was not shown that the
conditions for the practice of medicine there are practical and attainable by a foreign applicant, hence,
reciprocity was not established; also, the power of the PRC and the Board to regulate and control the
practice of medicine is discretionary and not ministerial, hence, not compellable by a writ of mandamus.[14]
The CA denied the appeal and affirmed the ruling of the RTC.[15]

WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN FINDING THAT

RESPONDENT HAD ESTABLISHED THE EXISTENCE OF RECIPROCITY IN THE PRACTICE OF
MEDICINE BETWEEN THEPHILIPPINES AND JAPAN.[16]

Petitioners claim that: respondent has not established by competent and conclusive evidence that
reciprocity in the practice of medicine exists between the Philippines and Japan. While documents state that
foreigners are allowed to practice medicine in Japan, they do not similarly show that the conditions for the
practice of medicine in said country are practical and attainable by a foreign applicant.
There is no reciprocity in this case, as the requirements to practice medicine in Japan are practically
impossible for a Filipino to comply with.
There are also ambiguities in the Medical Practitioners Law of Japan, which were not clarified by
respondent. Consul General Yabes also stated that there had not been a single Filipino who was issued a
license to practice medicine by the Japanese Government. The publication showing that there were
foreigners practicing medicine inJapan, which respondent presented before the Court, also did not
specifically show that Filipinos were among those listed as practicing said profession. [17]
Furthermore, under Professional Regulation Commission v. De Guzman,[18]the power of the PRC and the
Board to regulate and control the practice of medicine includes the power to regulate admission to the ranks
of those authorized to practice medicine, which power is discretionary and not ministerial, hence, not
compellable by a writ of mandamus.[19]
Petitioners pray that the CA Decision be reversed and set aside.
The Court denies the petition for lack of merit.

R.A. No. 2382, which provides who may be candidates for the medical board examinations, merely requires a
foreign citizen to submit competent and conclusive documentary evidence, confirmed by the Department of Foreign
Affairs (DFA), showing that his countrys existing laws permit citizens of the Philippines to practice medicine under
the same rules and regulations governing citizens thereof.

Section (j) of P.D. No. 223 also defines the extent of PRC's power to grant licenses, i.e., it may, upon
recommendation of the board, approve the registration and authorize the issuance of a certificate of registration with
or without examination to a foreigner who is registered under the laws of his country, provided the following
conditions are met: (1) that the requirement for the registration or licensing in said foreign state or country are
substantially the same as those required and contemplated by the laws of the Philippines; (2) that the laws of such
foreign state or country allow the citizens of the Philippines to practice the profession on the same basis and grant
the same privileges as the subject or citizens of such foreign state or country; and (3) that the applicant shall submit
competent and conclusive documentary evidence, confirmed by the DFA, showing that his country's existing laws
permit citizens of the Philippines to practice the profession under the rules and regulations governing citizens
thereof.
The said provision further states that the PRC is authorized to prescribe additional requirements or grant certain
privileges to foreigners seeking registration in the Philippines if the same privileges are granted to or some
additional requirements are required of citizens of the Philippines in acquiring the same certificates in his country.
Nowhere in said statutes is it stated that the foreign applicant must show that the conditions for the practice of
medicine in said country are practical and attainable by Filipinos. Neither is it stated that it must first be proven that
a Filipino has been granted license and allowed to practice his profession in said country before a foreign applicant
may be given license to practice in the Philippines. Indeed, the phrase used in both R.A. No. 2382 and P.D. No. 223
is that:
[T]he applicant shall submit] competent and conclusive documentary evidence, confirmed by the Department of
Foreign Affairs, showing that his country's existing laws permit citizens of the Philippines to practice the profession
[of medicine] under the [same] rules and regulations governing citizens thereof. x x x (Emphasis supplied)
It is enough that the laws in the foreign country permit a Filipino to get license and practice therein. Requiring
respondent to prove first that a Filipino has already been granted license and is actually practicing therein unduly
expands the requirements provided for under R.A. No. 2382 and P.D. No. 223.

While it is true that respondent failed to give details as to the conditions stated in the Medical Practitioners Law of
Japan -- i.e., the provisions of the School Educations Laws, the criteria of the Minister of Health and Welfare of
Japan in determining whether the academic and technical capability of foreign medical graduates are the same as or
better than that of graduates of medical schools in Japan, and who can actually qualify to take the preparatory test
for the National Medical Examination respondent, however, presented proof that foreigners are actually practicing in
Japan and that Filipinos are not precluded from getting a license to practice there.
Respondent presented before the trial court a Japanese Government publication, Physician-DentistPharmaceutist Survey, showing that there are a number of foreign physicians practicing medicine in Japan.[32] He
also presented a letter dated January 28, 1992 from Consul General Yabes,[33]
From said letter, one can see that the Japanese Government allows foreigners to practice medicine therein provided
that the local requirements are complied with, and that it is not the impossibility or the prohibition against Filipinos
that would account for the absence of Filipino physicians holding licenses and practicing medicine in Japan, but the
difficulty of passing the board examination in the Japanese language. Granting that there is still no Filipino who has
been given license to practice medicine in Japan, it does not mean that no Filipino will ever be able to be given one.
Petitioners next argue that as held in De Guzman, its power to issue licenses is discretionary, hence, not compellable
by mandamus.
The Court finds that the factual circumstances of De Guzman are different from those of the case at bar; hence, the
principle applied therein should be viewed differently in this case. In De Guzman, there were doubts about the
integrity and validity of the test results of the examinees from a particular school which garnered unusually high
scores in the two most difficult subjects. Said doubts called for serious inquiry concerning the applicants satisfactory
compliance with the Board requirements.[34] And as there was no definite showing that the requirements and
conditions to be granted license to practice medicine had been satisfactorily met, the Court held that the writ
ofmandamus may not be granted to secure said privilege without thwarting the legislative will. [35]
Indeed, to be granted the privilege to practice medicine, the applicant must show that he possesses all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications. It must also appear that he has fully complied with all the conditions
and requirements imposed by the law and the licensing authority.[36]
In De Guzman itself, the Court explained that:
A careful reading of Section 20[37] of the Medical Act of 1959 discloses that the law uses the word shall with respect
to the issuance of certificates of registration. Thus, the petitioners [PRC] shall sign and issue certificates of
registration to those who have satisfactorily complied with the requirements of the Board. In statutory construction
the term shall is a word of command. It is given imperative meaning. Thus, when an examinee satisfies the
requirements for the grant of his physician's license, the Board is obliged to administer to him his oath and register
him as a physician, pursuant to Section 20 and par. (1) of Section 22 of the Medical Act of 1959.[38]
In this case, there is no doubt as to the competence and qualifications of respondent. He finished his medical degree
from Bicol Christian College of Medicine. He completed a one-year post graduate internship training at
theJose Reyes Memorial Medical Center, a government hospital. Then he passed the Medical Board Examinations
which was given on August 8, 1992 with a general average of 81.83, with scores higher than 80 in 9 of the 12
subjects.
In fine, the only matter being questioned by petitioners is the alleged failure of respondent to prove that there is
reciprocity between the laws of Japan and the Philippines in admitting foreigners into the practice of
medicine.Respondent has satisfactorily complied with the said requirement and the CA has not committed any
reversible error in rendering its Decision dated November 16, 2004 and Resolution dated October 19, 2003.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

People v. Domantay J. Mendoza (1999)

On the afternoon of Oct 17, 1996, at around 4, the body of six-year old Jennifer Domantay was found
sprawled amidst a bamboo grove in Guilig, Malasiqui, Pangasinan. The childs body bore several stab wounds.
And Jennifer had been missing since lunch time that day
Preliminary medical examination conducted by the rural health physician of Malasiqui, showed that
Jennifer died of multiple organ failure secondary to 38 stab wounds at the back. No lacerations or signs of
inflammation of the outer and inner labia and the vaginal walls of the victims genitalia were found, although
the vaginal canal easily admitted the little finger with minimal resistance. Noting possible commission of acts
of lasciviousness, the investigating physician recommended an autopsy by a medico-legal expert of the NBI
Meanwhile, the investigation by the Malasiqui police pointed to accused-appellant Bernardino Domantay, a
cousin of the victims grandfather, as the lone suspect in the gruesome crime
At around 6:30pm of that day, said police officers picked up appellant Domantay at the public market and
took him to the police station where he, upon questioning, confessed to killing Jennifer Domantay
He likewise disclosed that he had hidden the weapon used, a bayonet, in the tricycle belonging to Elsa and
Jorge Casingal (his aunt and uncle) which the police recovered the next day, the same being properly receipted
to evidence thereafter
Initially, on the strength of the rural physicians findings, the police charged herein appellant with murder.
Later, after the body of Jennifer was examined by an NBI medico-legal expert, and finding evidence of rape,
the same charge was amended to become rape with homicide. Thereafter, an information for the same charge
was formally filed against herein appellant
On trial, the prosecution presented its witness who all to circumstantial evidence leading to the moral
conclusion that appellant Domantay was guilty of the crime charged one witness testified that Domantay
had too much to drink that afternoon and that he had a bayonet tucked on his waistband then; another witness
testified that she was playing in the same area with the victim when she saw herein appellant move close
towards the victim near the bamboo grove where her body was later found, etc.
The policemen who interrogated Domantay also testified for the prosecution where they attested that herein
appellant had confessed to the crime before them during custodial investigation
The policemen further averred that before they commenced his questioning, appellant was apprised of his
constitutional right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel, in English, which was
later translated into Pangasinense. And that this notwithstanding, the appellant proceeded with his confession
It was admitted by the police, though, that at no time during the course of his questioning was accusedappellant assisted by counsel. Neither was accused-appellants confession reduced in writing
Another witness for the prosecution, a radio reporter named Celso Manuel claims to have also heard herein
appellant confess to the crime charged against him

 He accordingly obtained said confession by way of a tape-recorded interview while he was assigned to
report on the case
On trial, this radio reporter testified that he asked the permission of the chief of police to secure an
interview with the appellant. When this was granted, he testified that he properly introduced himself to the
appellant and offered to have their interview tape-recorded. According to him, appellant acceded and thereon
started his confession of culpability in the rape and slay of Jennifer
The defense contested the admissibility of both the polices and the reporters testimony pertaining to
appellants extra-judicial confession since they were all done without presence of a competent counsel as
provided in the Bill of Rights
The trial court, however, admitted these testimonies into evidence, and notwithstanding appellants defense
of denial and alibi, it found him guilty of the crime charged and sentenced him with the supreme penalty of
death hence this automatic appeal
ISSUE: WoN the trial court erred in appreciating the appellants extra-judicial confessions even though they
were made without assistance of counsel, in violation of his constitutional right
HELD: NO. However, the trial court erred in finding him guilty of the crime of rape with homicide. The
judgment of the trial court is SET ASIDE and another one is rendered FINDING accused-appellant guilty of
homicide
RATIO:
Appellant contends that his extra-judicial confession with the police and the reporter are inadmissible as
evidence as it violates Sec 12, Art III of the Constitution; such that without these vital pieces of evidence, the
remaining circumstantial proof would be inadequate to sustain his guild beyond reasonable doubt this is
UNTENABLE
It has been held that the rule espoused in Sec 12, Art III applies to the stage of custodial investigation, that
is, when the investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but starts to focus on a
particular person as a suspect. This has been subsequently expanded by RA 7438 to situations in which an
individual has not been formally arrested but has merely been invited for questioning
Further, a series of decisions of this Court has consistently held that for an extra-judicial confession to be
admissible, it must satisfy the following requirements: (1) it must be voluntary; (2) it must be made with the
assistance of competent and independent counsel; (3) it must be express; and (4) it must be in writing
In the case at bar, when appellant Domantay was brought to the police station, he was already a suspect, in
fact the only one, in the brutal slaying of Jennifer Domantay he was, therefore, already under custodial
investigation and the rights guaranteed in Art. III, 12(1) of the Constitution applied to him
As revealed in the records, when he made his confession before the police, he orally waived his right to
the assistance of counsel. HOWEVER, this waiver was neither put in writing nor made in the presence of

counsel. For this reason, the waiver is invalid and his confession is inadmissible. Perforce, the bayonet
confiscated through such uncounselled confession is also inadmissible by being the fruit of a poisonous tree
As to appellants confession to the radio reporter, the same ruling cannot be applied. Hence, said
confession with the reporter is admissible as evidence
In view of People v. Andan, confession to the crime during interviews with the media was held to be
admissible, despite the fact that the accused gave his answers without the assistance of counsel and that
confessions to the newsmen are not covered by Sec 12(1) & (3) of Art III of the Constitution
Also, appellant Domantay, having the exclusive prerogative to refuse the interview, agreed to it and he
answered questions freely and spontaneously. Indeed, there is no showing that the radio reporter was acting for
the police or that the interview was conducted under circumstances where it is apparent that accused-appellant
confessed to the killing out of fear
The conviction of appellant, aside from his admitted confession, is also bolstered by the corpus delicti and
other corroborating circumstantial evidence which dovetails materials points in his extra-judicial confession
From the forgoing, it is well established that the accused is guilty of killing Jennifer Domantay. However,
on the strength of the prosecutions evidence, appellant is only guilty of homicide but not rape as there was
insufficient evidence to maintain that appellant Domantay raped Jennifer