Castillo vs Cruz (2009)

G.R. No. 182165 | 2009-11-25

Subject: The coverage of the writs of amaparo and habeas data is limited to the protection of
rights to life, liberty and security; Writ of Amparo cannot be granted to protect property rights

Facts:

Amanda Cruz (Amanda) who, along with her husband Francisco G. Cruz (Spouses Cruz), leased a
parcel of land situated at Barrio Guinhawa, Malolos refused to vacate the property, despite
demands by the lessor Provincial Government of Bulacan which intended to utilize it for local
projects.

The Province thus filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against the Spouses Cruz. The MTC
rendered judgment against the Spouses Cruz. The RTC affirmed the decision of the MTC which
became
final
and
executory.

The spouses Cruz refused to vacate the property. They sought in the case for injunction the
issuance of a permanent writ of injunction to prevent the execution of the final and executory
judgment
against
them.

The RTC issued a permanent writ of injunction until the MTC-Bulacan, Bulacan finally resolves the
pending motions of petitioners with the same determines the metes and bounds.

The Province returned the issue for the consideration of the MTC. In a Geodetic Engineers Report
submitted to the MTC on August 31, 2007, the metes and bounds of the property were indicated.

The MTC approved the Report and ruled that the permanent injunction which the RTC issued is
ineffective. The MTC issued a Second Alias Writ of Demolition. Spouses Cruz filed a motion before
the RTC for the issuance of a TRO. The Spouses Cruz entered the property, placed several
container vans and purportedly represented themselves as owners of the property which was for
lease.

Police Superintendent Felixberto Castillo et al., who were deployed by the City Mayor in
compliance with a memorandum instructing him to protect, secure and maintain the possession
of the property, entered the property.

Amanda and her co-respondents refused to turn over the property. Insisting that the RTC Order
of
Permanent
Injunction
enjoined
the
Province
from
repossessing
it.

The Spouses Cruz filed a Respectful Motion-Petition for Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data. They
averred that despite the Permanent Injunction, the police officers unlawfully entered the property
with the use of heavy equipment, tore down the barbed wire fences and tents, and arrested
them
when
they
resisted.

The

RTC

issued

writs

of

amparo

and

habeas

data.

Held:

The coverage of the writs of amaparo and habeas data is limited to the protection of
rights
to
life,
liberty
and
security

1. The coverage of the writs of amaparo and habeas data is limited to the protection of rights
to life, liberty andsecurity. And the writs cover not only actual but also threats of unlawful acts
or
omissions.

2. As the Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable problem of extralegal killings
and enforced disappearances, its coverage, in its present form, is confined to these two
instances or to threats thereof. Extralegal killings are killings committed without due
process
of
law,
i.e.,
without
legal
safeguards
or
judicial
proceedings.

3. On the other hand, enforced disappearances are attended by the following

characteristics: an arrest, detention or abduction of a person by a government official or
organized groups or private individuals acting with the direct or indirect acquiescence of the
government; the refusal of the State to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the person concerned
or a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which places such persons outside the
protection
of
law. (See
Secretary
of
National
Defense
v.
Manalo)

4. To thus be covered by the privilege of the writs, Spouses Cruz must meet the threshold
requirement that their right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with an unlawful
act or omission. Evidently, the present controversy arose out of a property dispute between the
Provincial
Government
and
Spouses
Cruz.

Writ

of

Amparo

cannot

be

granted

to

protect

property

rights

5. What a writ of amparo is not, is a writ to protect concerns that are purely property or
commercial. Neither is it a writ that we shall issue on amorphous and uncertain grounds.
Notably, none of the supporting affidavits compellingly show that the threat to the rights to life,
liberty and security of the petitioners is imminent or continuing. (See Tapuz v. Del Rosario)

6. In this case, Spouses Cruz's petition did not show any actual violation, imminent or continuing
threat to their life, liberty and security. Bare allegations that police officers in unison, conspiracy
and in contempt of court, there and then willfully, forcibly and feloniously with the use of force
and intimidation entered and forcibly, physically manhandled the Spouses Cruz and arrested
them will not suffice to prove entitlement to the remedy of the writ of amparo. No undue

confinement or detention was present. In fact, Spouses Cruz were even able to post bail for the
offenses
a
day
after
their
arrest.

7. Although Spouses Cruzs release from confinement does not necessarily hinder supplication for
the writ of amparo, absent any evidence or even an allegation in the petition that there is undue
and continuing restraint on their liberty, and/or that there exists threat or intimidation that
destroys the efficacy of their right to be secure in their persons, the issuance of the writ cannot
be justified. That Spouses Cruzs are merely seeking the protection of their property rights is
gathered from their Joint Affidavit.

Paje vs Casino (2015)

G.R. No. 207257 | 2015-02-03

Subject: Writ of Kalikasan; Reliefs that may be granted under the Writ of Kalikasan; Validity of an
ECC can be challenged via a Writ of Kalikasan provided certain requirements are met; Noncompliance with approval requirements under IPRA and LGC are not within the coverage of the
remedy of Writ of Kalikasan; Exceptional nature of the present case; Exception to the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies; The Rules on the Writ of Kalikasan allow the parties to
raise questions of fact on appeal, as an exception to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court; Casio Group
was not able to prove that the coal-fired power plant project will cause grave environmental
damage; Hearsay rule applies to both oral and written statements; Learned treatise as exception
to hearsay exclusion; Expert statements are excluded as hearsay evidence for failure of expert to
testify on the statements; Writ of kalikasan may be employed to compel the production of
information within the custody of the government or a private entity; Signature of the project
proponents representative in the Statement of Accountability portion of the ECC is necessary for
the validity of the ECC and is not a mere formality; Under the particular circumstances, the CA
erred when it invalidated the ECC on the ground of lack of signature in the ECCs Statement of
Accountability; Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) requirement for projects which
significantly affects the quality of the environment; The first and second amendments to the ECC
were valid and sufficiently supported by an EPRMP; Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) is
not a document but a process; The ECC is not a license or permit, thus the Certificate of NonOverlap (CNO) under the IPRA Law is not a precondition to the issuance of an ECC and the lack
of its prior issuance did not render the ECC invalid; CNO is required prior to the grant of a lease
by all government agencies; Under the particular circumstances of this case, the belated
compliance with the CNO requirement does not invalidate the the Lease and Development
Agreement (LDA); Prior approval of the concerned sanggunian under Section 27 of the LGC, is
inapplicable to the subject power plant project because it is located within the SSEZ; Failure to
obtain prior approval of the concerned sanggunian, under Section 27 of the LGC, does not
invalidate the ECC and LDA; The issue as to the validity of the third amendment cannot be
adjudicated in this case

Facts:
In February 2006, Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA) and Taiwan Cogeneration
Corporation (TCC) entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) expressing their
intention to build a power plant in Subic Bay which would supply reliable and affordable power to
Subic Bay Industrial Park (SBIP). SBMA and TCC entered into another MOU (July 28, 2006),
whereby TCC undertook to build and operate a coal-fired power plant. TCC identified 20 hectares
of land at Sitio Naglatore, Mt. Redondo, Subic Bay Freeport Zone (SBFZ) as the suitable area for
the project and another site of approximately 10 hectares to be used as an ash pond. TCC
intends to lease the property from SBMA for a term of 50 years with rent fixed at $3.50 per
square
meter,
payable
in
10
equal
5-year
installments.
On April 4, 2007, an SBFZ Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) was issued by SBMA in
favor of Taiwan Cogeneration International Corporation (TCIC), a subsidiary of TCC, for the
construction of the 2x150-MW Circulating Fluidized Bed (CFB) Coal-Fired Thermal Power Plant at
Sitio
Naglatore.
On June 6, 2008, TCC assigned all its rights and interests under the MOU dated July 28, 2006 to
Redondo Peninsula Energy, Inc. (RP Energy), a Philippine corporation. Accordingly, an Addendum
to
the
said
MOU
was
executed
by
SBMA
and
RP
Energy.
RP Energy then contracted GHD Pty, Ltd. (GHD) to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement
(EIS) for the proposed coal-fired power plant and to assist RP Energy in applying for the issuance
of an ECC from the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).
On December 22, 2008, the DENR, through then Secretary Atienza, Jr., issued an ECC for the
proposed
2x150-MW
coal-fired
power
plant.
Thereafter, RP Energy proposed changes in the project design by including additional components
to the coal-fired power plant. (i.e., inclusion of a barge wharf, seawater intake breakwater,
subsea discharge pipeline, raw water collection system, drainage channel improvement, and a
230kV
double-circuit
transmission
line).
On July 8, 2010, upon request of RP Energy and its submission of an Environmental Performance
Report and Management Plan (EPRMP), the DENR Environmental Management Bureau (DENREMB) issued an amended ECC (first amendment) allowing the inclusion of the additional
components.
Meanwhile, RP Energy and SBMA entered into a Lease and Development Agreement (LDA) over a
380,004.456-square meter parcel of land to be used for building and operating the coal-fired
power
plant.
Several months later, RP Energy again requested the DENR-EMB to amend the ECC. Instead of
constructing a 2x150-MW coal-fired power plant, as originally planned, it now sought to
construct
a
1x300-MW
coal-fired
power
plant.

On May 26, 2011, the DENR-EMB granted the request and further amended the ECC (second
amendment).
However, the project faced opposition from local government units who respectively expressed
their strong objection to the coal-fired thermal power plant as an energy source. Specifically, (a)
Resolution No. 131-08 (August 27, 2008) by the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Olongapo City, (b)
Resolution No. 2011-149 (August 1, 2011) by the Sangguniang Panglalawigan of Zambales, and
(c) Resolution No. 12, Series of 2011 (August 11, 2011) by the Liga ng mga Barangay of
Olongapo
City.
Hon. Teodoro A. Casio and other district Representatives (Casio Group) filed before the
Supreme Court (SC) a Petition for Writ of kalikasan against RP Energy, SBMA, and Hon. Ramon
Jesus
P.
Paje,
in
his
capacity
as
Secretary
of
the
DENR.
The

Casio

Group

alleged,

among

others,

that:

(a) the power plant project would cause grave environmental damage and that it would
adversely affect the health of the residents of the municipalities of Subic, Zambales, Morong,
Hermosa,
and
the
City
of
Olongapo;
(b) that the ECC was issued and the LDA entered into without the prior approval of the
concerned sanggunians as required under Sections 26 and 27 of the Local Government Code
(LGC);
(c) that the LDA was entered into without securing a prior certification from the National
Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) as required under Section 59 of RA 8371 or the
Indigenous
Peoples
Rights
Act
of
1997
(IPRA
Law);
(d) that Section 8.3 of DENR Administrative Order No. 2003-30 (DAO 2003-30) which allows
amendments of ECCs is ultra vires because the DENR has no authority to decide on requests for
amendments of previously issued ECCs in the absence of a new Environmental Impact
Statements (EIS). Due to the nullity of Section 8.3 of DAO 2003-30, all amendments to RP
Energys
ECC
are
null
and
void.
The SC resolved to issue a Writ of Kalikasan and referred the case to the Court of Appeals for
hearing
and
reception
of
evidence.
While the case was pending, RP Energy applied for another amendment to its ECC (third
amendment) proposing the construction and operation of a 2x300-MW coal-fired power plant. On
November 15, 2012, the DENR-EMB granted RP Energys application for the third amendment to
its
ECC.
The Court of Appeals (CA) rendered a Decision denying the privilege of the writ of kalikasan and
the application for an environment protection order due to the failure of the Casio Group to
prove that its constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology was violated or threatened.
The CA likewise found no reason to nullify Section 8.3 of DAO No. 2003-30. It said that the
provision was not ultra vires, as the express power of the Secretary of the DENR, the Director

and Regional Directors of the EMB to issue an ECC impliedly includes the incidental power to
amend the same. In any case, the CA ruled that the validity of the said section could not be
collaterally
attacked
in
a
petition
for
a
writ
of
kalikasan
Nonetheless, the CA invalidated the ECC (issued by the DENR on December 2008) for noncompliance with Section 59 of the IPRA Law and for failure of Mr. Aboitiz, Director of RP Energy,
to affix his signature in the Sworn Statement of Full Responsibility, which is an integral part of
the ECC. The CA likewise declared invalid the ECC first amendment and second amendment for
failure of RP Energy to comply with the restrictions set forth in the ECC that any expansion of
the project beyond the project description or any change in the activity x x x shall be subject to a
new Environmental Impact Assessment. No ruling was made on the ECC third amendment as
the
same
was
not
raised
as
an
issue.
The CA also invalidated the LDA entered into by SBMA and RP Energy as it was issued without
the prior consultation and approval of all the sanggunians concerned as required under Sections
26 and 27 of the LGC and for being in violation of the IPRA Law which enjoins all departments
and other governmental agencies from granting any lease without a prior certification that the
area
affected
does
not
overlap
with
any
ancestral
domain.
In

the

present

petition:

(a) the Casio Group argues that it is entitled to a Writ of Kalikasan as it was able to prove that
the operation of the power plant would cause environmental damage and pollution (b)
(b) DENR imputes error on the CA in invalidating the ECC and its amendments, arguing that the
determination of the validity of the ECC as well as its amendments is beyond the scope of a
Petition for a Writ of Kalikasan. Moreover, no permits, licenses, and/or clearances from other
government agencies are required in the processing and approval of the ECC. Thus, noncompliance with Sections 26 and 27 of the LGC as well as Section 59 of the IPRA Law is not a
ground
to
invalidate
the
ECC
and
its
amendments
(c) SBMA puts in issue the legal capacity of the Casio Group to impugn the validity of the LDA91
and its failure to exhaust administrative remedies. SBMA likewise contends that there is no legal
basis to invalidate the LDA as prior consultation under Sections 26 and 27 of the LGC is not
required in this case considering that the area is within the SBFZ. Under RA 7227, it is the SBMA
which has exclusive jurisdiction over projects and leases within the SBFZ and that in case of
conflict between the LGC and RA 7227, it is the latter, a special law, which must prevail.
Moreover, the lack of prior certification from the NCIP is also not a ground to invalidate a
contract.
(d) RP Energy questions the propriety of the reliefs granted by the CA considering that it did not
issue a writ of kalikasan in favor of the Casio Group. The reliefs are limited to those enumerated
in Section 15, Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases and that the phrase
such other reliefs in paragraph (e) should be limited only to those of the same class or general
nature
as
the
four
other
reliefs
enumerated.
Held:

Writ

of

Kalikasan

1. The Rules on the Writ of kalikasan, which is Part III of the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases, was issued by the Court pursuant to its power to promulgate rules for the
protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, in particular, the individuals right to a
balanced
and
healthful
ecology.
2. Section 1 of Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases provides:
Section 1. Nature of the writ. - The writ is a remedy available to a natural or juridical person,
entity authorized by law, peoples organization, non-governmental organization, or any public
interest group accredited by or registered with any government agency, on behalf of persons
whose constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology is violated, or threatened
with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or private
individual or entity, involving environmental damage of such magnitude as toprejudice the
life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces.
3. The writ is categorized as a special civil action and was, thus, conceptualized as
an extraordinary remedy, which aims to provide judicial relief from threatened or actual
violation/s of the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology of a magnitude or
degree of damage that transcends political and territorial boundaries. It is intended to provide a
stronger defense for environmental rights through judicial efforts where institutional
arrangements of enforcement, implementation and legislation have fallen short and seeks to
address
the
potentially
exponential
nature
of
large-scale
ecological
threats.
4. Under Section 1 of Rule 7, the following requisites must be present to avail of this
extraordinary
remedy:
(1) there is an actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right to a balanced and
healthful
ecology;
(2) the actual or threatened violation arises from an unlawful act or omission of a public official
or
employee,
or
private
individual
or
entity;
and
(3) the actual or threatened violation involves or will lead to an environmental damage of such
magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or
provinces.
4. The Rules do not define the exact nature or degree of environmental damage but only that
it must be sufficiently grave, in terms of the territorial scope of such damage, so as to call for the
grant of this extraordinary remedy. The gravity of environmental damage sufficient to grant the
writ
is,
thus,
to
be
decided
on
a case-to-case
basis.
Reliefs

that

may

be

granted

under

the

Writ

of

Kalikasan

5. If the petition is granted, the court may grant the reliefs provided for under Section 15 of Rule

7,

to

wit:

Section 15. Judgment. - Within sixty (60) days from the time the petition is submitted for
decision, the court shall render judgment granting or denying the privilege of the writ of
kalikasan.
6.

The

reliefs

that

may

be

granted

under

the

writ

are

the

following:

(a) Directing respondent to permanently cease and desist from committing acts or neglecting the
performance of a duty in violation of environmental laws resulting in environmental destruction
or
damage;
(b) Directing the respondent public official, government agency, private person or entity
to protect,
preserve,
rehabilitate
or
restore
the
environment;
(c) Directing the respondent public official, government agency, private person or entity
to monitor
strict
compliance with
the
decision
and
orders
of
the
court;
(d) Directing the respondent public official, government agency, or private person or entity to
make periodic
reports on
the
execution
of
the
final
judgment;
and
(e) Such other reliefs which relate to the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology
or to the protection, preservation, rehabilitation or restoration of the environment, except the
award
of
damages
to
individual
petitioners.
7. It must be noted that the above enumerated reliefs are non-exhaustive. The reliefs that
may be granted under the writ are broad, comprehensive and non-exclusive.
Validity of an ECC can be challenged via a Writ of Kalikasan provided certain
requirements
are
met
8. The DENR, SBMA and RP Energy are one in arguing that the reliefs granted by the appellate
court, i.e. invalidating the ECC and its amendments, are improper because it had denied the
Petition for Writ of Kalikasan upon a finding that the Casin Group failed to prove the alleged
environmental
damage,
actual
or
threatened,
contemplated
under
the
Rules.
9. The challenge to the validity of the ECC was raised in the context of a writ of kalikasan case.
The question then is, can the validity of an ECC be challenged via a writ of kalikasan? The court
answers
in
the
affirmative
subject
to
certain
qualifications.
10. The writ of kalikasan is principally predicated on an actual or threatened violation of the
constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology, which involves environmental damage of
a magnitude that transcends political and territorial boundaries. A party, therefore, who invokes
the writ based on alleged defects or irregularities in the issuance of an ECC must not only allege
and prove such defects or irregularities, but must also provide a causal link or, at least, a
reasonable connection between the defects or irregularities in the issuance of an ECC and the
actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology of

the magnitude contemplated under the Rules. Otherwise, the petition should be dismissed
outright and the action re-filed before the proper forum with due regard to the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies. This must be so if we are to preserve the noble and
laudable
purposes
of
the
writ
against
those
who
seek
to
abuse
it.
11. An example of a defect or an irregularity in the issuance of an ECC, which could conceivably
warrant the granting of the extraordinary remedy of the writ of kalikasan, is a case where there
are serious and substantial misrepresentations or fraud in the application for the ECC, which, if
not immediately nullified, would cause actual negative environmental impacts of the magnitude
contemplated under the Rules, because the government agencies and LGUs, with the final
authority to implement the project, may subsequently rely on such substantially defective or
fraudulent
ECC
in
approving
the
implementation
of
the
project.
12. In cases of defects or irregularities in the issuance of an ECC, it is not sufficient to merely
allege such defects or irregularities, but to show a causal link or reasonable connection with the
environmental damage of the magnitude contemplated under the Rules. In the case at bar, no
such causal link or reasonable connection was shown or even attempted relative to the
aforesaid second set of allegations. It is a mere listing of the perceived defects or irregularities in
the issuance of the ECC. This would have been sufficient reason to disallow the resolution of such
issues
in
a
writ
of
kalikasan
case.
13. However, inasmuch as this is the first time that the Court laid down this principle, the Court
has liberally examined the alleged defects or irregularities in the issuance of the ECC and find
that there is only one group of allegations, relative to the ECC, that can be reasonably connected
to an environmental damage of the magnitude contemplated under the Rules. This is with
respect to the allegation that there was no environmental impact assessment relative to the first
and second amendments to the subject ECC. If this were true, then the implementation of the
project can conceivably actually violate or threaten to violate the right to a healthful and
balanced ecology of the inhabitants near the vicinity of the power plant. Thus, the resolution of
such an issue could conceivably be resolved in a writ of kalikasan case provided that the case
does not violate, or is an exception to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies and
primary
jurisdiction.
Non-compliance with approval requirements under IPRA and LGC are not within the
coverage
of
the
remedy
of
writ
of
kalikasan
14. As to the claims that the issuance of the ECC violated the IPRA Law and LGC and that the
LDA, likewise, violated the IPRA Law, we find the same not to be within the coverage of the writ
of kalikasan because, assuming there was non-compliance therewith, no reasonable connection
can be made to an actual or threatened violation of the right to a balanced and healthful ecology
of
the
magnitude
contemplated
under
the
Rules.
15. To elaborate, the alleged lack of approval of the concerned sanggunians over the subject
project would not lead to or is not reasonably connected with environmental damage but, rather,
it is an affront to the local autonomy of LGUs. Similarly, the alleged lack of a certificate
precondition that the project site does not overlap with an ancestral domain would not result in
or is not reasonably connected with environmental damage but, rather, it is an impairment of the

right of Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples (ICCs/IPs) to their ancestral

domains. These alleged violations could be the subject of appropriate remedies before the proper
administrative bodies (like the NCIP) or a separate action to compel compliance before the
courts, as the case may be. However, the writ of kalikasan would not be the appropriate remedy
to
address
and
resolve
such
issues.
Exceptional

nature

of

the

present

case

16. Notwthstanding the above, the Court shall resolve both the issues proper in a writ of
kalikasan case and those which are not, commingled as it were here, because of the exceptional
character of this case. The Court tookjudicial notice of the looming power crisis that our nation
faces. Thus, the resolution of all the issues in this case is of utmost urgency and necessity in
order to finally determine the fate of the project center of this controversy. In any case, we find
the
records
sufficient
to
resolve
all
the
issues
presented
herein.
Exception

to

the

doctrine

of

exhaustion

of

administrative

remedies

17. We also rule that, due to the extreme urgency of the matter at hand, the present case is an
exception to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. As we have often ruled, in
exceptional cases, we can suspend the rules of procedure in order to achieve substantial justice,
and to address urgent and paramount State interests vital to the life of our nation.
The Rules on the Writ of Kalikasan allow the parties to raise questions of fact on
appeal,
as
an
exception
to
Rule
45
of
the
Rules
of
Court
18.

Section

16,

Rule

of

the

Rules

of

Procedure

for

Environmental

Cases,

viz:

Section 16. Appeal. - Within fifteen (15) days from the date of notice of the adverse judgment or
denial of motion for reconsideration, any party may appeal to the Supreme Court under Rule
45 of
the
Rules
of
Court.
The
appeal
may
raise questions
of
fact.
19. It is worth noting that the Rules on the Writ of Kalikasan allow the parties to raise, on appeal,
questions of fact and, thus, constitutes an exception to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court because
of the extraordinary nature of the circumstances surrounding the issuance of a writ of kalikasan.
Casio Group was not able to prove that the coal-fired power plant project will cause
grave
environmental
damage
20. The Casio Group alleged that the power plant project will cause environmental damage in
the form of (i) thermal pollution of coastal waters,(ii) air pollution due to dust and combustion
gases, (iii) water pollution from toxic coal combustion waste, and (iv) acid deposition in aquatic
and
terrestrial
ecosystems.
21. The three witnesses presented by the Casio Group are not experts on the CFB technology or
on environmental matters. What is wanting in their testimonies is their technical knowledge of
the project design/implementation or some other aspects of the project, even those not requiring
expert knowledge, vis--vis the significant negative environmental impacts which the Casio

Group

alleged

will

occur.

22. Clearly, the Casio Group failed to carry the onus of proving the alleged significant negative
environmental impacts of the project. In comparison, RP Energy presented several expert
witnesses
on
the
Circulating
Fluidized
Bed
(CFB)
technology.
23. Moreover, RP Energy controverted in detail the allegations of the Casio Group on the four
areas of environmental damage that will allegedly occur upon the construction and operation of
the
power
plant.
(a) On thermal pollution of coastal waters As to the expected rise in water temperature once
the power plant is operational, the less than one degree centigrade change predicted by the GHD
modeling would have minimal impact. Moreover, mammals have a higher tolerance for
temperature
change
(b) On air pollution due to dust and combustion gases - The high combustion efficiency of CFB
technology leads to the minimal emissions of PAH. CFB does not cause emissions beyond
scientifically
acceptable
levels.
(c) On water pollution from toxic coal combustion waste - RP Energy shall install safety measures
to insure that waste from burning of coal shall be properly handled and stored.
(d) On acid deposition in aquatic and terrestrial ecosystems - The project will release tons of
oxides (NO2 and SO2) which are the precursors to the formation of sulfuric acid and nitric acid.
However, the acid concentration will be diluted as it is mixed with the air in the atmosphere that
it
will
not
cause
acid
rain.
24. The court observed that the type of coal which shall be used in the power plant has
important implications as to the possible significant negative environmental impacts of the
subject project. 25. Thus, RP Energy is obligated to make use of the proper coal type that will
not
cause
significant
negative
environmental
impacts.
Hearsay

rule

applies

to

both

oral

and

written

statements

26. Petitioners cited various scientific studies or articles and websites culled from the internet.
They were not testified to by an expert witness, and are basically hearsay in nature and cannot
be given probative weight. The article purportedly written by Rex Victor O. Cruz was not even
signed by the said author. Lacbain admitted that he did not personally conduct any study on the
environmental or health effects of a coal-fired power plant, but only attended seminars and
conferences pertaining to climate change. Palatino also testified that he was only furnished by
the petitioners copies of the studies mentioned in his Judicial Affidavit and he did not participate
in the execution, formulation or preparation of any of the said documents.
27. Under the rules of evidence, a witness can testify only to those facts which the witness
knows of his or her personal knowledge, that is, which are derived from the witness own
perception. Concomitantly, a witness may not testify on matters which he or she merely learned
from others either because said witness was told or read or heard those matters. Such testimony

is considered hearsay and may not be received as proof of the truth of what the witness has
learned. This is known as the hearsay rule. Hearsay is not limited to oral testimony or
statements; the general rule that excludes hearsay as evidence applies to written, as well as oral
statements.
Learned

treatise

as

exception

to

hearsay

exclusion

28. There are several exceptions to the hearsay rule under the Rules of Court, among which are
learned
treatises
under
Section
46
of
Rule
130,
viz:
SEC. 46. Learned treatises. -A published treatise, periodical or pamphlet on a subject of history,
law, science, or art is admissible as tending to prove the truth of a matter stated therein if
the court takes judicial notice, or a witness expert in the subject testifies, that the writer of the
statement in the treatise, periodical or pamphlet is recognized in his profession or calling as
expert
in
the
subject.
29. The alleged scientific studies mentioned in the Petition cannot be classified as learned
treatises. We cannot take judicial notice of the same, and no witness expert in the subject matter
of this case testified, that the writers of the said scientific studies are recognized in their
profession
or
calling
as
experts
in
the
subject.
Expert statements are excluded as hearsay evidence for failure of expert to testify on
the
statements
30. The Casio Group relies heavily on the Final Report on the social acceptability policy
consultations conducted by SBMA with different stakeholders with respect to the coal plant
project of RP Energy. The Final Report contained an assessment of the potential effects of the
project by three experts: (1) Dr. Rex Cruz, a forest ecology expert, (2) Dr. Visitacion Antonio, a
toxicologist, and (3) Andre Jon Uychiaco, a marine biologist. The Final Report stated that there
was a clear aversion to the concept of a coal-fired power plant from the participants.
31. The alleged statements by these experts cannot be given weight because they are hearsay
evidence. None of these alleged experts testified before the appellate court to confirm the
pertinent
contents
of
the
Final
Report.
32. The Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases liberally provide the courts with means and
methods to obtain sufficient information in order to adequately protect or safeguard the right to
a healthful and balanced ecology. In Section 6 (l) of Rule 3 (Pre-Trial), when there is a failure to
settle, the judge shall, among others, determine the necessity of engaging the services of a
qualified expert as a friend of the court (amicus curiae). While in Section 12 of Rule 7 (Writ of
kalikasan), a party may avail of discovery measures: (1) ocular inspection and (2) production or
inspection
of
documents
or
things.
33. However, based on the statements in the Final Report, the Court found that there is no
sufficiently compelling reason to compel the testimonies of these alleged expert witnesses . The
statements are not sufficiently specific to point to any flaw (or flaws) in the study or
design/implementation of the project which provides a causal link or, at least, a reasonable

connection between the construction and operation of the project vis--vis potential grave
environmental damage. In particular, they do not explain why the Environmental Management
Plan (EMP) contained in the EIS of the project will not adequately address these concerns.
Nonetheless, the court does not foreclose the possibility that their testimonies could later on be
presented, in a proper case, to more directly, specifically and sufficiently assail the environmental
soundness
of
the
project
Writ of kalikasan may be employed to compel the production of information within the
custody
of
the
government
or
a
private
entity
34. The writ of kalikasan was refashioned as a tool to bridge the gap between allegation and
proof by providing a remedy for would-be environmental litigants to compel the production of
information within the custody of the government. The writ would effectively serve as a remedy
for the enforcement of the right to information about the environment. The scope of the factfinding power could be: (1) anything related to the issuance, grant of a government permit
issued or information controlled by the government or private entity and (2) information
contained in documents such as environmental compliance certificate (ECC) and other
government records. In addition, the writ may also be employed to compel the production of
information, subject to constitutional limitations. This function is analogous to a discovery
measure,
and
may
be
availed
of
upon
application
for
the
writ.
Signature of the project proponents representative in the Statement of Accountability
portion of the ECC is necessary for the validity of the ECC and is not a mere formality
35. The CA ruled that the ECC is invalid because Mr. Aboitiz failed to sign the Statement of
Accountability
portion
of
the
ECC.
36. The laws governing the ECC, i.e., Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1151 and PD 1586, do not
specifically state that the lack of signature in the Statement of Accountability has the effect of
invalidating the ECC. The applicable laws here are silent with respect to the effect of the lack
thereof. This is, of course, understandable because the Statement of Accountability is a mere offshoot of the rule-making powers of the DENR relative to the implementation of PD 1151 and PD
1586.
37. In the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) process, the signing of the Statement of
Accountability takes place at the Decision-Making Stage. After a favorable review of its ECC
application, the project proponent, through its authorized representative, is made to sign a
sworn statement of full responsibility on the implementation of its commitments prior to the
official
release
of
the
ECC.
38. The signing of the Statement of Accountability is an integral and significant component of the
EIA process and the ECC itself. The evident intention is to bind the project proponent to the ECC
conditions, which will ensure that the project will not cause significant negative environmental
impacts by the implementation of specified measures which are necessary to comply with
existing environmental regulations or to operate within best environmental practices that are not
currently covered by existing laws. Indeed, the EIA process would be a meaningless exercise if
the project proponent shall not be strictly bound to faithfully comply with the conditions

necessary to adequately protect the right of the people to a healthful and balanced ecology.
39. The signature of the project proponents representative in the Statement of Accountability is
necessary for the validity of the ECC. It is not, as RP Energy would have it, a mere formality and
its
absence
a
mere
formal
defect.
Under the particular circumstances, the CA erred when it invalidated the ECC on the
ground of lack of signature in the ECCs Statement of Accountability
40. Nevertheless, the court found that there are several circumstances present in this case which
militate against the invalidation of the ECC on the ground of lack of signature in the Statement of
Accountability:
(a) Due to the lack of opportunity for the witness to explain the lack of signature, the court found
that the witness testimony does not, by itself, indicate that there was a deliberate or malicious
intent
not
to
sign
the
Statement
of
Accountability.
(b) after the CA issued its decision, RP Energy attached, to its Motion for Partial Reconsideration,
a certified true copy of the ECC which showed that the Statement of Accountability was signed by
Mr.
Aboitiz.
The certified true copy of the Statement of Accountability was signed by Mr. Aboitiz on December
24, 2008 or two days after the ECCs official release on December 22, 2008. The Revised Manual,
however, state that the proponent shall sign the sworn statement of full responsibility on
implementation of its commitments prior to the release of the ECC. Admittedly, there is lack of
strict compliance with the rules although the signature is present. Be that as it may, we find
nothing in the records to indicate that this was done with bad faith or inexcusable negligence.
(c) The subsequent letter-requests for amendments to the ECC, signed by Mr. Aboitiz on behalf
of RP Energy, indicate its implied conformity to the ECC conditions. In practical terms, if future
litigation should occur due to violations of the ECC conditions, RP Energy would be estopped from
denying its consent and commitment to the ECC conditions even if there was no signature in the
Statement
of
Accountability.
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) requirement for projects which significantly
affect
the
quality
of
the
environment
41. PD 1151 set the Philippine Environment Policy. This law recognized the right of the people to
a healthful environment. Pursuant thereto, in every action, project or undertaking, which
significantly affects the quality of the environment, all agencies and instrumentalities of the
national government, including government-owned or -controlled corporations, as well as private
corporations, firms, and entities were required to prepare, file and include a statement
(i.e., Environmental
Impact
Statement
or
EIS) containing:
(a)

the

environmental

impact

of

the

proposed

action,

project

or

undertaking;

(b) any adverse environmental effect which cannot be avoided should the proposal be

implemented;
(c)

alternative

to

the

proposed

action;

(d) a determination that the short-term uses of the resources of the environment are consistent
with the maintenance and enhancement of the long-term productivity of the same; and
(e) whenever a proposal involves the use of depletable or non-renewable resources, a finding
must
be
made
that
such
use
and
commitment
are
warranted
42. To further strengthen and develop the EIS, PD 1586 was promulgated, which established the
Philippine Environmental Impact Statement System (PEISS). The ECC requirement is
mandated under Section 4 thereof, to wit: No person, partnership or corporation shall undertake
or operate any such declared environmentally critical project or area without first securing
an Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC)issued by the President or his duly
authorized representative. The PEISS consists of the Environmental Impact Assessment
(EIA) process, which is mandatory for private or public projects that may significantly affect
the
quality
of
the
environment.
43. PD 1586 was implemented by DAO 2003-30 which, in turn, set up a system or procedure to
determine when a project is required to secure an ECC and when it is not. When an ECC is not
required, the project proponent procures a Certificate of Non-Coverage (CNC). As part of the
EIA process, the project proponent is required to submit certain studies or reports (i.e., EIA
document type) to the DENR-EMB, which will be used in the review process in assessing the
environmental impact of the project and the adequacy of the corresponding environmental
management plan or program to address such environmental impact. This will then be part of
the bases to grant or deny the application for an ECC or CNC, as the case may be.
44. The appropriate EIA document type vis--vis a particular project depends on the potential
significant environmental impact of the project. At the highest level would be an Environmentally
Critical Projects (ECP), such as the subject project. Thus, because the subject project is classified
as an ECP, new and a single project, RP Energy was required by the DENR-EMB to submit an EIS,
the most stringent and comprehensive among the EIA document types, as part of its application
for
an
ECC.
The first and second amendments to the ECC were valid and sufficiently supported by
an
EPRMP
and
PDR
45. The CA ruled that the first and second amendments to the ECC were invalid because the ECC
contained an express restriction that any expansion of the project beyond the project description
shall be the subject of a new EIA. It found that both amendments failed to comply with the
appropriate EIA documentary requirements under DAO 2003-30 and the Revised Manual. In
particular, it found that the Environmental Performance Report and Management Plan
(EPRMP) and Project Description Report (PDR), which RP Energy submitted to the DENR
relative to the application for the first and second amendments, respectively, were not the
proper
EIA
document
type.

(a)

First

amendment

supported

by

EPRMP

46. Under DAO 2003-30 and the Revised Manual, an EPRMP is appropriate for single projects
that are (1) operating/existing with a previous ECC but planning or applying for modification or
expansion, or (2) operating but without an ECC. In the case at bar, the subject project has not
yet been constructed although there have been horizontal clearing operations at the project site.
Thus, on its face, it appears that the EPRMP is not the appropriate EIA document type since the
subject project is neither of the above but is non-operating project with a previous ECC but
planning
for
modification
or
expansion
47. However, what is involved is not an application for an ECC, but amendments thereto. The
rules on amendments to an ECC is principally found in Section 8.3, Article II of DAO 2003-03 as
implemented
under
the
Revised
Manual.
48. The first amendment to the ECC was requested by RP Energy due to its planned change of
project design. The proposed modifications involved a major amendment because it will result in
an increase in capacity or auxiliary component. Consequently, the amendment was considered as
falling under Item#4 of Annex 2-1c of the Decision Chart for Determination of Requirements 49.
For Project Modification and, under the said Chart, the appropriate EIA document type is an
EPRMP. Note that the Chart expressly states that, [m]odification scenario and decision process
are applicable to both non-implemented and operating projects with or without ECCs.
50. That the proposed modifications in the subject project fall under this class or type of
amendment was a determination made by the DENR-EMB and, absent a showing of grave abuse
of discretion, the DENR-EMBs findings are entitled to great respect because it is the
administrative agency with the special competence or expertise to administer or implement the
EIS
System.
51. Executive actions carry presumptive validity so that the burden of proof is on the Casio
Group to show that the procedure adopted by the DENR in granting the amendments to the ECC
were done with grave abuse of discretion. More so here because the administration of the EIA
process involves special technical skill or knowledge which the law has specifically vested in the
DENR.
52. In conclusion, the definitions in DAO 2003-30 and the Revised Manual, stating that the
EPRMP is applicable to (1) operating/existing projects with a previous ECC but planning or
applying for modification or expansion, or (2) operating projects but without an ECC, were not an
exclusive list. Based on the Decision Chart under the Revised Manual, the EPRMP can likewise be
used as an appropriate EIA document type for a single, non-implemented project applying for a
major amendment to its ECC, involving an increase in capacity or auxiliary component, such as
the
subject
project.
53. A holistic reading of DAO 2003-30 and the Revised Manual will show that a legalistic
approach in its interpretation and application is unwarranted. This is primarily because the EIA
process is a system, not a set of rigid rules and definitions. In the EIA process, there is much
room for flexibility in the determination and use of the appropriate EIA document type . To our
mind, what should be controlling is the guiding principle set in DAO 2003-30 in the evaluation of

applications for amendments to ECCs, as stated in Section 8.3 thereof: [r]equirements for
processing ECC amendments shall depend on the nature of the request but shall be focused on
the information necessary to assess the environmental impact of such changes.
(b)

Second

amendment

supported

by

PDR

54. After the favorable grant of the first amendment, RP Energy applied for another amendment
to its ECC, this time in consideration of its plan to change the configuration of the project from 2
x 150 MW to 1 x 300 MW. In practical terms, this meant that the subject project will still produce
300 MW of electricity but will now make use of only one boiler (instead of two) to achieve greater
efficiency in the operations of the plant. The DENR-EMB determined191 this amendment to be
minor,
under
Scenario
1,
Item#6
of
Figure
2-4
of
the
Decision
Chart.
55. The Project Description Report (PDR) is the EIA document type with the least detail, and,
thus, applicable to such minor modifications. The Revised Manual supports the procedure
adopted by the DENR-EMB in requiring RP Energy to submit a PDR in order to assess the
environmental impact of the planned modifications relative to the second amendment.
Environmental

Impact

Assessment

(EIA)

is

not

document

but

process

56. The Court of Appeals proceeded from the erroneous premise that the EIA is a document,
when it repeatedly stated that the amendments to the ECC require a new EIA, and not merely an
EPRMP or PDR. The appellate court relied on the proviso in the ECC, which stated that [a]ny
expansion of the project beyond the project description or any change in the activity or transfer
of
location
shall
be
subject
to
a
new
Environmental
Impact
Assessment.
57.

The EIA

is

not

document

but

process:

Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) process that involves evaluating and predicting the
likely impacts of a project (including cumulative impacts) on the environment during
construction, commissioning, operation and abandonment. It also includes designing appropriate
preventive, mitigating and enhancement measures addressing these consequences to protect the
environment and the community's welfare. The process is undertaken by, among others, the
project proponent and/or EIA Consultant, EMB, a Review Committee, affected communities and
other
stakeholders. (Section
3(h),
Article
I,
DAO
2003-30)
58. When the proviso in the ECC, therefore, states that a new EIA shall be conducted, this simply
means that the project proponent shall be required to submit such study or report, as warranted
by the DENR Rules and circumstances, which will sufficiently aid the DENR in making a new EIA
and, thus, determine whether to grant the proposed amendment (or project modification).
59. The various EIA documents, such as the EPRMP and PDR, are mere tools used by the DENR
to assess the environmental impact of a particular project. These documents are flexibly used by
the DENR, as the circumstances warrant, in order to adequately assess the impacts of a new
project or modifications thereto. Being the administrative agency entrusted with the
determination of which EIA document type applies to a particular application for an amendment
to an ECC, falling as it does within its particular technical expertise, we must accord great

respect to its determination, absent a showing of grave abuse of discretion or patent illegality.
The ECC is not a license or permit, thus the Certificate of Non-Overlap (CNO) under the
IPRA Law is not a precondition to the issuance of an ECC and the lack of its prior
issuance
did
not
render
the
ECC
invalid.
60. The Court of Appeals ruled that the ECC issued in favor of RP Energy on December 22, 2008
is invalid because the CNO covering the subject project was issued only on October 31, 2012 or
almost four years from the time of issuance of the ECC. Thus, the ECC was issued in violation of
Section 59 of the IPRA Law and its implementing rules which require that a Certificate of NonOverlap (CNO) be obtained prior to the issuance of a government agency of a license or permit.
In so ruling, the appellate court implicitly upheld the Casio Groups argument that the ECC is a
form of government license or permit pursuant to Section 4 of PD 1586 .
61. Section 59 of the IPRA Law requires as a precondition, relative to the issuance of any
concession, license, lease or agreement over natural resources, a certification issued by the
National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) that the area subject thereof does not lie
within any ancestral domain. This is in keeping with the State policy to protect the rights of
Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples (ICCs/IPs) to their ancestral domains.
62. The IPRA Law and its implementing rules do not define the terms license and permit so
that resort to their plain or ordinary meaning in relation to the intendment of the law is
appropriate.
63. A license has been defined as a governmental permission to perform a particular act
(such as getting married), conduct a particular business or occupation, operate machinery or
vehicles after proving capacity and ability to do so safely, or use property for a certain purpose
while a permit has been defined as a license or other document given by an authorized public
official or agency (building inspector, department of motor vehicles) to allow a person or business
to
perform
certain
acts.
64. The issuance of the ECC does not, by and of itself, authorize the implementation of the
project. Although it is indispensable before the covered project can be commenced, as per
Section 4 of PD 1586, the issuance of the ECC does not, as of yet, result in the implementation
of the project. Rather, the ECC is intended to, among others, provide guidance or act as
a decision-making tool to other government agencies and LGUs which have the final authority to
grant licenses or permits, such as building permits or licenses to operate, that will ultimately
result in, or authorize the implementation of the project or the conduct of specific activities.
65. The ECC is not the license or permit contemplated under Section 59 of the IPRA Law and its
implementing rules. Hence, there is no necessity to secure the CNO under Section 59 before an
ECC may be issued and the issuance of the subject ECC without first securing the aforesaid
certification
does
not
render
it
invalid.
CNO

is

required

prior

to

the

grant

of

lease

by

all

government

agencies

66. Even if the indigenous community does not actually reside on the proposed lease site, the

government agency would still be required to obtain the CNO precisely to rule out the possibility
that the proposed lease site encroaches upon an ancestral domain. The reason for this is that an
ancestral domain does not only cover the lands actually occupied by an indigenous community,
but all areas where they have a claim of ownership, through time immemorial use, such as
hunting, burial or worship grounds and to which they have traditional access for their subsistence
and
other
traditional
activities.
67. Indeed, a CNO is required prior to the grant of a lease by all government agencies, including
the SBMA. However, implicit in the operation of Section 59, IPRA law is the practical reality that
the concerned government agency must make a preliminary determination on whether or not to
obtain the required certification in the first place. To expound, a government agency, which
wishes to lease part of its property located near Padre Faura Street, Manila City could not, and
should not be reasonably expected to obtain the CNO, as it is obviously inapplicable to its
planned lease. In contrast, a government agency, which intends to lease a property in a valley or
mountainous region, where indigenous communities are known to reside, conduct hunting
activities, perform rituals, or carry out some other activities, should be reasonably expected to
secure the CNO prior to consummating the planned lease with third persons.
68. The proper rule of action, for purposes of application of Section 59, is that all government
offices should undertake proper and reasonable diligence in making a preliminary determination
on whether to secure the CNO, bearing in mind the primordial State interest in protecting the
rights of ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains. They should consider the nature and location of the
areas involved; the historical background of the aforesaid areas relative to the occupation, use or
claim of ownership by ICCs/IPs; the present and actual condition of the aforesaid areas like the
existence of ICCs/IPs within the area itself or within nearby territories; and such other
considerations that would help determine whether a CNO should be first obtained prior to
granting a concession, lease, license or permit, or entering into a production-sharing agreement.
69. If there are circumstances that indicate that a claim of ownership by ICCs/IPs may be
present or a claim of ownership may be asserted in the future, no matter how remote, the
proper and prudent course of action is to obtain the CNO. In case of doubt, the doubt should be
resolved in favor of securing the CNO and, thus, the government agency is under obligation to
secure the aforesaid certification in order to protect the interests and rights of ICCs/IPs to their
ancestral
domains.
Under the particular circumstances of this case , the belated compliance with the CNO
requirement does not invalidate the Lease and Development Agreement (LDA)
70. Similar to the ECC, the the Lease and Development Agreement (LDA) was entered into
between the SBMA and RP Energy on June 8, 2010, or prior to the issuance of the CNO on
October
31,
2012.
71. SBMA should have secured a CNO before entering into the LDA with RP Energy. Considering
that Section 59 is a prohibitory statutory provision, a violation thereof would ordinarily result
in
the
nullification
of
the
contract.
72. However, under the particular circumstances of this case, the subsequent and belated

compliance with the CNO requirement does not invalidate the LDA. The reason is that this is the
first time that the court lays down the foregoing rule of action appropriate to the application of
Section 59 and it would be inequitable to retroactively apply its effects with respect to the LDA
entered into between SBMA and RP Energy. The court also noted that, under the particular
circumstances of this case, there is no showing that SBMA and RP Energy had a deliberate or ill
intent to escape, defeat or circumvent the mandate of Section 59 of the IPRA Law. On the
contrary, they appear to have believed in good faith, albeit erroneously, that a CNO was no
longer needed . When the matter of lack of a CNO relative to the LDA was brought to their
attention, RP Energy, with the endorsement of SBMA, promptly undertook to secure the CNO.
73. We reject SBMAs argument that the belated application for, and submission of the CNO cured
whatever defect the LDA had. We have purposely avoided a ruling to the effect that a CNO
secured subsequent to the concession, lease, license, permit or production-sharing agreement
will cure the defect. Government agencies and third parties, either through deliberate intent or
negligence, may view it as an excuse not to timely and promptly secure the CNO, even when the
circumstances warrant the application for a CNO under the afore-discussed rule of action, to the
damage
and
prejudice
of
ICCs/IPs.
Prior approval of the concerned sanggunian under Section 27 of the LGC, is
inapplicable to the subject power plant project because it is located within the SSEZ
74. The prior approval of the concerned sanggunian requirement is an attribute and
implementation of the local autonomy granted to, and enjoyed by LGUs under the Constitution.
The LGU has the duty to protect its constituents and interests in the implementation of the
project. Hence, the approval of the concerned sanggunian is required by law to ensure that local
communities
partake
in
the
fruits
of
their
own
backyard.
75. For Section 27, in relation to Section 26, to apply, the following requisites must concur: (1)
the planning and implementation of the project or program is vested in a national agency or
government-owned and-controlled corporation, i.e., national programs and/or projects which are
to be implemented in a particular local community; and (2) the project or program may cause
pollution, climatic change, depletion of non-renewable resources, loss of cropland, rangeland, or
forest cover, extinction of animal or plant species, or call for the eviction of a particular group of
people
residing
in
the
locality
where
the
project
will
be
implemented.
76. In the case at bar, the two above-mentioned requisites are evidently present. Hence, Section
27 of the LGC should ordinarily apply. In the present case, no approval was sought from the
concerned sanggunians relative to the subject project. What is more, the affected LGUs have
expressed their strong oppositions to the project through various sanggunian resolutions.
77. However, the subject project is located within the Subic Special Economic Zone (SSEZ) and,
thus, under the territorial jurisdiction of the SBMA pursuant to RA 7227. The law created SBMA
to administer the SSEZ. In the process, the SBMA was given broad administrative powers over
the SSEZ and these necessarily include the power to approve or disapprove the subject project,
which is within its territorial jurisdiction. But, as previously discussed, the LGC grants the
concerned sanggunians the power to approve and disapprove this same project.

78. The court finds that the power to approve or disapprove projects within the SSEZ is one such
power over which the SBMAs authority prevails over the LGUs autonomy. Hence, there
is no need for the SBMA to secure the approval of the concerned sanggunians prior to the
implementation of the subject project. This interpretation is based on the broad grant of powers
to the SBMA over all administrative matters relating to the SSEZ under Section 13 of RA 7227.
79. Equally important, under Section 14, other than those involving defense and security, the
SBMAs decision prevails in case of conflict between the SBMA and the LGUs in all matters
concerning the SSEZ. Clearly, the subject project does not involve defense or security, but rather
business and investment to further the development of the SSEZ. Hence, the decision of the
SBMA would prevail over the apparent objections of the concerned sanggunians of the LGUs.
80. When the concerned sanggunians opted to join the SSEZ, they were, thus, fully aware that
this would lead to some diminution of their local autonomy in order to gain the benefits and
privileges of being a part of the SSEZ. Neverthless, the representation of the concerned LGUs in
the Board of Directors will compensate for the diminution of their local autonomy and allow them
to
be
represented
in
the
decision-making
of
the
SBMA
Failure to obtain prior approval of the concerned sanggunian, under Section 27 of the
LGC,
does
not
invalidate
the
ECC
and
LDA
81. Sections 26 and 27 of the LGC contemplate two requirements: (1) prior consultations and (2)
prior approval of the concerned sanggunian. The Casio Group only questions the alleged lack of
the prior approval of the concerned sanggunians under Section 27 of the LGC and argues that
the approval requirement was necessary prior to (a) the issuance of the ECC and (b) the
consummation of the LDA; the absence of which invalidated the ECC and LDA.
(a)

Issuance

of

ECC

82. The issuance of an ECC does not, by itself, result in the implementation of the project.
Hence, the purpose or goal of Sections 26 and 27 of the LGC, like Section 59 of the IPRA Law,
does not yet obtain and, thus, the ECC may be issued even without prior compliance with
Sections
26
and
27
of
the
LGC.
(b)

Consummation

of

the

LDA

83. The implementation of the project is not subject to the prior approval of the concerned
sanggunians, under Section 27 of the LGC, and the SBMAs decision to approve the project
prevails over the apparent objections of the concerned sanggunians of the LGUs, by virtue of the
clear provisions of RA 7227. Thus, there was no infirmity when the LDA was entered into
between SBMA and RP Energy despite the lack of approval of the concerned sanggunians.
The issue as to the validity of the third amendment cannot be adjudicated in this case.
84. The Casio Group argues that the validity of the third amendment should have been resolved
by the appellate court because it is covered by the broad issues set during the preliminary
conference. On the other hand, RP Energy counters that this issue cannot be resolved because it

was expressly excluded during the preliminary conference. The Court of Appeals upheld the
position
of
RP
Energy.
The
Supreme
Court
sustained
the
CA.
85. The issue of the validity of the third amendment to the ECC was not part of the issues set
during the preliminary conference, as it appears at that time that the application for the third
amendment
was
still
ongoing.
Refutation

of

the

Partial

Dissent

of

Justice

Leonen

A. Justice Leonen contends that environmental cases should not, in general, be litigated via a
representative, citizen or class suit because of the danger of misrepresenting the interests and
thus, barring future action due to res judicata of those not actually present in the prosecution
of the case. However, it is inappropriate to resolve such an important issue in this case, in view
of the requisites for the exercise of our power of judicial review, because the matter was not
raised by the parties so that the issue was not squarely tackled and fully ventilated.
B. Justice Leonen reasons that the amendments to the subject ECC are void because the
applications therefor were unsupported by an EIS, as required by PD 1151 and PD 1586. The
claim is made that an EIS is required by law, even if the amendment to the ECC is minor,
because an EIS is necessary to determine the environmental impact of the proposed
modifications to the original project design. The DENR rules, therefore, which permit the
modification of the original project design without the requisite EIS, are void for violating PD
1151
and
PD
1586.
RP Energy complied with the requirement to submit an EIS in support of its application for an
ECC, which was granted. it is important to note that PD 1586 does not state the procedure to be
followed when there is an application for an amendment to a previously issued ECC. There is
nothing in PD 1586 which expressly requires an EIS for an amendment to an ECC.
Because PD 1586 did not expressly provide the procedure to be followed in case of an application
for an amendment to a previously issued ECC, the DENR exercised its discretion, pursuant to its
delegated authority to implement this law, in issuing DAO 2003-30 and the Revised Manual .
Moreover, the proposition would constitute a collateral attack on the validity of DAO 2003-30 and
the Revised Manual, which is not allowed under the premises. Assuming that a collateral attack
on the validity of DAO 2003-30 and the Revised Manual can be allowed in this case, the rules on
amendments appear to be reasonable, absent a showing of grave abuse of discretion or patent
illegality.
C. Justice Leonen argues that a petition for certiorari, and not a writ of kalikasan, is the proper
remedy
to
question
a
defect
in
an
ECC.
In general, the proper procedure to question a defect in an ECC is to follow the appeal
process provided in DAO 2003-30 and the Revised Manual. After complying with the
proper administrative appeal process, recourse may be made to the courts in accordance with
the doctrine
of
exhaustion
of
administrative
remedies.

However, in exceptional cases, a writ of kalikasan may be availed of to challenge

defects in the ECCprovided that (1) the defects are causally linked or reasonably connected to
an environmental damage of the nature and magnitude contemplated under the Rules on Writ of
kalikasan, and (2) the case does not violate, or falls under an exception to, the doctrine of
exhaustion
of
administrative
remedies
and/or
primary
jurisdiction.
Further, given the extreme urgency of resolving the issue due to the looming power crisis, this
case may be considered as falling under an exception to the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies. Thus, the aforesaid issue may be conceivably resolved in a writ of
kalikasan
case.

Arigo vs. Swift (2014)

G.R. No. 206510 | 2014-09-15

Subject: Citizen suit in Environmental cases (Locus Standi of petitioners); State immunity from
suit (Doctrine of sovereign immunity); Doctrine of non-suability of the State also applies to
complaints filed against officials of the state for acts performed by them in the discharge of their
duties; Immunity of foreign states from the jurisdiction of local courts; State immunity extends
only to acts Jure imperii; Present petition is a suit against the United States, and is barred under
the principle of state immunity; Waiver of State immunity under the VF A pertains only to
criminal jurisdiction; Award of damages not one of the reliefs granted in a Writ of Kalikasan suit;
US expected to comply with international obligations under the UNCLOS, despite being a nonparty to the international agreement; Court defers to the Executive Branch on the matter of
compensation
and
rehabilitation
measures
Facts:
This is a petition for the issuance of a Writ of Kalikasan with prayer for the issuance of a
Temporary Environmental Protection Order (TEPO) in relation to the grounding of the US military
ship
USS
Guardian
over
the
Tubbataha
Reefs.
In 1988, Tubbataha was declared a National Marine Park. In 1993, Tubbataha was inscribed by
the United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) as a World
Heritage Site. Located in the middle of Central Sulu Sea, southeast of Puerto Princesa City,
Tubbataha lies at the heart of the Coral Triangle, the global center of marine biodiversity.
In 2010, Congress passed Republic Act No. 10067, otherwise known as the "Tubbataha Reefs
Natural Park (TRNP) Act of 2009" "to ensure the protection and conservation of the Tubbataha
Reefs. Under the "no-take" policy, entry into the waters of TRNP is strictly regulated and many
human activities are prohibited and penalized or fined, including fishing, gathering, destroying
and disturbing the resources within the TRNP. The law likewise created the Tubbataha Protected
Area Management Board (TPAMB) which shall be the sole policy-making and permit-granting
body
of
the
TRNP.

On January 13, 2013, the USS Guardian, with diplomatic clearance obtained by the US Embassy,
arrived at the port of Subic Bay for the purpose of routine ship replenishment, maintenance,
and crew liberty." Two days later, the USS Guardian departed Subic Bay for its next port of call in
Makassar, Indonesia. On January 17, 2013 at 2:20 a.m. while transiting the Sulu Sea, the ship
ran aground on the northwest side of South Shoal of the Tubbataha Reefs, about 80 miles eastsoutheast
of
Palawan.
The US Ambassador assured Foreign Affairs Secretazy Albert F. del Rosario that the United States
will provide appropriate compensation for damage to the reef caused by the ship.
By March 30, 2013, the US Navy-led salvage team had finished removing the last piece of the
grounded
ship
from
the
coral
reef.
Petitioners on their behalf and in representation of their respective sectors, filed the present
petition for issuance of a Writ of Kalikasan or TEPO against respondents composed of members of
the US Navy, the President Aquino, Defense Secretary, Philippine Coast Guard, etc. Petitioners
claim that the grounding, salvaging and post-salvaging operations of the USS Guardian cause
and continue to cause environmental damage of such magnitude as to affect the provinces of
Palawan, Antique, Aklan, Guimaras, Iloilo, Negros Occidental, Negros Oriental, Zamboanga del
Norte, Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi, which events violate their constitutional rights to a balanced
and healthful ecology. They also seek a directive from the Court for the institution of civil,
administrative and criminal suits for acts committed in violation of environmental laws and
regulations
in
connection
with
the
grounding
incident.

Held:
Citizen

suit

in

Environmental

cases

(Locus

Standi

of

petitioners)

1. Locus standi is "a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question." Specifically, it
is "a party'spersonal and substantial interest in a case where he has sustained or will sustain
direct injury as a result" of the act being challenged, and "calls for more than just a generalized
grievance."
2. However, the rule on standing is a procedural matter which this Court has relaxed for nontraditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers and legislators when the public interest so
requires, such as when the subject matter of the controversy is of transcendental importance, of
overreaching
significance
to
society,
or
of
paramount
public
interest.
3. In the landmark case of Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., we recognized the "public right" of citizens to
"a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our constitutional history, is
solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law." We declared that the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology need not be written in the Constitution for it is assumed, like other civil and
polittcal rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, to exist from the inception of mankind and it is an
issue of transcendental importance with intergenerational implications. Such right carries with it
the
correlative
duty
to
refrain
from
impairing
the
environment.

4. The Court ruled that not only do ordinary citizens have legal standing to sue for the
enforcement of environmental rights, they can do so in representation of their own and future
generations. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based
on the concept of intergenerational responsibilityinsofar as the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology is concerned. Every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm
and harmony of nature for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology.
5. The liberalization of standing first enunciated in Oposa, insofar as it refers to minors and
generations yet unborn, is now enshrined in A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC, otherwise known as the Rules
of Procedure for Environmental Cases (Rules) which allows the filing of a citizen suit in
environmental cases. The provision on citizen suits in the Rules "collapses the traditional rule on
personal and direct interest, on the principle that humans are stewards of nature.
State

immunity

from

suit

(Doctrine

of

sovereign

immunity)

6. The immunity of the State from suit, known also as the doctrine of sovereign immunity or
non-suability of the State, is expressly provided in Section 3, Article XVI of the 1987 Constitution
which
states:
:
The
State
may
not
be
sued
without
its
consent.
7. The rule that a state may not be sued without its consent is one of the generally accepted
principles of international law that we have adopted as part of the law of our land under Article
II, Section 2. Even without such affirmation, we would still be bound by the generally accepted
principles of international law under the doctrine of incorporation. Under this doctrine, as
accepted by the majority of states, such principles are deemed incorporated in the law of every
civilized state as a condition and consequence of its membership in the society of nations. Upon
its admission to such society, the state is automatically obligated to comply with these principles
in
its
relations
with
other
states. (see
U.S.
vs.
Guinto)
8. As applied to the local state, the doctrine of state immunity is based on the justification given
by Justice Holmes that "there can be no legal right against the authority which makes the law on
which the right depends." [Kawanakoa v. Polybank] In the case of the foreign state sought to be
impleaded in the local jurisdiction, the added inhibition is expressed in the maxim par in parem,
non habet imperium. All states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one
another. A contrary disposition would, in the language of a celebrated case, "unduly vex the
peace
of
nations." (see
U.S.
vs.
Guinto)

Doctrine of non-suability of the State also applies to complaints filed against officials
of the state for acts performed by them in the discharge of their duties
9. While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it
is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by
them in the discharge of their duties.The rule is that if the judgment against such officials will
require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same, such as the
appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages awarded against them, the suit must be
regarded as against the state itself although it has not been formally impleaded. [Garcia vs.

Chief of Staff] In such a situation, the state may move to dismiss the complaint on the ground
that
it
has
been
filed
without
its
consent.
Immunity

of

foreign

states

from

the

jurisdiction

of

local

courts

10. The precept that a State cannot be sued in the courts of a foreign state is a long-standing
rule of customary international law then closely identified with the personal immunity of a foreign
sovereign from suit and, with the emergence of democratic states, made to attach not just to the
person of the head of state, or his representative, but also distinctly to the state itself in its
sovereign capacity. If the acts giving rise to a suit arc those of a foreign government done by its
foreign agent, although not necessarily a diplomatic personage, but acting in his official capacity,
the complaint could be barred by the immunity of the foreign sovereign from suit without its
consent. Suing a representative of a state is believed to be, in effect, suing the state itself. The
proscription is not accorded for the benefit of an individual but for the State, in whose service he
is, under the maxim - par in parem, non habet imperium - that all states are soverr ign equals
and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another. The implication, in broad terms, is that if the
judgment against an official would require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy
the award, such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages decreed against
him, the suit must be regarded as being against the state itself, although it has not been formally
impleaded. (see
Minucher
vs.
Court
of
Appeals)
11. In the case of diplomatic immunity, the privilege is not an immunity from the observance of
the law of the territorial sovereign or from ensuing legal liability; it is, rather, an immunity from
the
exercise
of
territorial
jurisdiction.
State

immunity

extends

only

to

acts

Jure

imperii

12. The traditional rule of State immunity which exempts a State from being sued in the courts
of another State without the former's consent or waiver has evolved into a restrictive
doctrine which distinguishes sovereign and governmental acts (Jure imperii) from private,
commercial and proprietary acts (Jure gestionis). Under the restrictive rule of State
immunity, State immunity extends only to acts Jure imperii. The restrictive application of State
immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign
sovereign,
its
commercial
activities
or
economic
affairs.
13. The doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply and may not be invoked where the public
official is being sued in his private and personal capacity as an ordinary citizen. The cloak of
protection afforded the officers and agents of the government is removed the moment they are
sued in their individual capacity. This situation usually arises where the public official acts without
authority or in excess of the powers vested in him. It is a well-settled principle of law that a
public official may be liable in his personal private capacity for whatever damage he may have
caused by his act done with malice and in bad faith, or beyond the scope of his authority or
jurisdiction. The rationale for this ruling is that the doctrine of state immunity cannot be used as
an
instrument
for
perpetrating
an
injustice. (Shauf
vs.
Court
of
Appeals)

Present petition is a suit against the United States, and is barred under the principle of
state
immunity
14. The US respondents in this case were sued in their official capacity as commanding officers
of the US Navywho had control and supervision over the USS Guardian and its crew. The alleged
act or omission resulting in the unfortunate grounding of the USS Guardian on the TRNP was
committed while they were performing official military duties. Considering that the satisfaction of
a judgment against said officials will require remedial actions and appropriation of funds by the
US government, the suit is deemed to be one against the US itself. The principle of State
immunity therefore bars the exercise of jurisdiction by this Court over the persons of
respondents
Swift,
Rice
and
Robling.
Waiver of state immunity under the VF A pertains only to criminal jurisdiction
15. Petitioners argue that there is a waiver of immunity from suit found in the Visiting Forces
Ageement (VFA). Even under the common law tort claims, petitioners asseverate that the US
respondents
are
liable
for
negligence,
trespass
and
nuisance.
16. The waiver of State immunity under the VFA pertains only to criminal jurisdiction and not to
special civil actions such as the present petition for issuance of a writ of Kalikasan. In fact, it can
be inferred from Section 17, Rule 7 of the Rules that a criminal case against a person charged
with
a
violation
of
an
environmental
law
is
to
be
filed
separately.
17. The VFA is an agreement which defines the treatment of United States troops and personnel
visiting the Philippines to promote "common security interests" between the US and the
Philippines in the region. It defines the rights of the United States and the Philippine government
in the matter of criminal jurisdiction, movement of vessel and aircraft, importation and
exportation of equipment, materials and supplies. The invocation of US federal tort laws and
even common law is thus improper considering that it is the VFA which governs disputes
involving US military ships and crew navigating Philippine waters in pursuance of the objectives
of
the
agreement.
18. In any case, it is our considered view that a ruling on the application or non-application of
criminal jurisdiction provisions of the VFA to US personnel who may be found responsible for the
grounding of the USS Guardian, would be premature and beyond the province of a petition for a
writ of Kalikasan. We also find it unnecessary at this point to determine whether such waiver of
State
immunity
is
indeed
absolute.
Award of damages not one of the reliefs granted in a Writ of Kalikasan suit
19. We cannot grant damages which have resulted from the violation of environmental laws.
The Rules allows the recovery of damages, including the collection of administrative fines under
R.A. No. 10067, in a separate civil suitor that deemed instituted with the criminal action charging
the
same
violation
of
an
environmental
Law.
20. Section 15, Rule 7 enumerates the reliefs which may be granted in a petition for issuance of
a Writ of Kalikasan, to wit:

SEC. 15. Judgment.-Within sixty (60) days from the time the petition is submitted for decision,
the court shall render judgment granting or denying the privilege of the writ of kalikasan.
The
reliefs
that
may
be
granted
under
the
writ
are
the
following:
xxx
( e) Such other reliefs which relate to the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology
or to the protection, preservation, rehabilitation or restoration of the environment, except the
award of damages to individual petitioners.

US expected to comply with international obligations under the UNCLOS, despite being
a
non-party
to
the
international
agreement
21. Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio took the position that the conduct of the US in this case,
when its warship entered a restricted area in violation of R.A. No. 10067 and caused damage to
the TRNP reef system, brings the matter within the ambit of Article 31 of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). He explained that while historically, warships enjoy
sovereign immunity from suit as extensions of their flag State, Art. 31 of the UNCLOS creates an
exception to this rule in cases where they fail to comply with the rules and regulations of the
coastal State regarding passage through the latter's internal waters and the territorial sea.
22. The international law of the sea is generally defined as "a body of treaty rules arid
customary norms governing the uses of the sea, the exploitation of its resources, and the
exercise of jurisdiction over maritime regimes. It is a branch of public international law,
regulating the relations of states with respect to the uses of the oceans." The UNCLOS is a
multilateral treaty which was opened for signature on December 10, 1982 at Montego Bay,
Jamaica. It was ratified by the Philippines in 1984 but came into force on November 16, 1994
upon
the
submission
of
the
60th
ratification.
23. The UNCLOS is a product of international negotiation that seeks to balance State
sovereignty (mare clausum)and the principle of freedom of the high seas (mare liberum). The
freedom to use the world's marine waters is one of the oldest customary principles of
international law. The UNCLOS gives to the coastal State sovereign rights in varying degrees over
the different zones of the sea which are: 1) internal waters, 2) territorial sea, 3) contiguous
zone, 4) exclusive economic zone, and 5) the high seas. It also gives coastal States more or less
jurisdiction
over
foreign
vessels
depending
on
where
the
vessel
is
located.
24. Insofar as the internal waters and territorial sea is concerned, the Coastal State exercises
sovereignty, subject to the UNCLOS and other rules of international law. Such sovereignty
extends to the air space over the territorial sea as well as to its bed and subsoil.
25. In the case of warships, they continue to enjoy sovereign immunity subject to the following
exceptions:
Article
30
(Non-compliance by warships with the laws and regulations of the coastal State); Article 31
(Responsibility of the flag State for damage caused by a warship or other government ship

operated for non-commercial purposes); Article 32 (Immunities of warships and other

government
ships operated
for
non-commercial
purposes)
.
26. A foreign warship's unauthorized entry into our internal waters with resulting damage to
marine resources is one situation in which the above exception (removing immunity) may apply.
But what if the offending warship is a non-party to the UNCLOS, as in this case, the US? While
over 80% of nation states are now members of UNCLOS, the US, the world's leading maritime
power,
has
not
ratified
it.
27. According to Justice Carpio, although the US to date has not ratified the UNCLOS, as a
matter of long-standing policy the US considers itself bound by customary international rules on
the
"traditional
uses
of
the
oceans"
as
codified
in
UNCLOS.
28. Non-membership in the UNCLOS does not mean that the US will disregard the rights of the
Philippines as a Coastal State over its internal waters and territorial sea. We thus expect the US
to bear "international responsibility" under Art. 31 in connection with the USS Guardian
grounding
which
adversely
affected
the
Tubbataha
reefs.
29. Although the said treaty upholds the immunity of warships from the jurisdiction of Coastal
States while navigating the latter's territorial sea, the flag States shall be required to leave the
territorial sea immediately if they flout the laws and regulations of the Coastal State, and they
will be liable for damages caused by their warships or any other government vessel operated for
non-commercial
purposes
under
Article
31.
Court defers to the Executive Branch on the matter of compensation and rehabilitation
measures
30. This petition has become moot in the sense that the salvage operation sought to be enjoined
or restrained had already been accomplished when petitioners sought recourse from this
Court. But insofar as the directives to Philippine respondents to protect and rehabilitate the coral
reef structure and marine habitat adversely affected by the grounding incident are concerned,
petitioners are entitled to these reliefs notwithstanding the completion of the removal of the USS
Guardian
from
the
coral
reef.
31. The US and Philippine governments both expressed readiness to negotiate and discuss the
matter of compensation for the damage caused by the USS Guardian. Exploring avenues for
settlement of environmental cases is not proscribed by The Rules. Mediation and settlement are
available for the consideration of the parties, and which dispute resolution methods are
encouraged
by
the
court.
32. The Court defers to the Executive Branch on the matter of compensation and rehabilitation
measures through diplomatic channels. Resolution of these issues impinges on our relations with
another State in the context of common security interests under the VFA. It is settled that "[t]he
conduct of the foreign relations of our government is committed by the Constitution to
the executive and legislative-"the political" --departments of the government, and the propriety
of what may be done in the exercise of this political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or
decision.

Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards of the Protected Seascape Tanon Strait
vs. Energy Secretary Reyes (2015)
G.R. No. 180771 and G.R. No. 181527 | 2015-04-21

Subject: Courts may decide cases otherwise moot and academic; Locus Standi of petitioners
Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards; Former President Arroyo cannot be impleaded as an
unwilling co-petitioner; Service Contracts are allowed under the 1987 Constitution; Agreements
Involving Technical or Financial Assistance are Service Contracts with Safeguards; SC-46 is null
and void for noncompliance with the requirements of the 1987 Constitution; General Law on Oil
Exploration (PD No. 87 not repealed by the enactment of the present 1987 Constitution);
President was not the signatory to SC-46 and the same was not submitted to Congress (alterego doctrine does not apply since the requirements are not mere formalities but constitutionally
placed safeguards); Service Contract No. 46 in violation of NIPAS Act and PD 1586 (noncompliance with EIA and ECC for protected areas); Requirement of a law passed by Congress
specifically
allowing
exploration
in
the
Tanon
Strait,
a
NIPAS
area
Facts:
In G.R. No. 180771, the Resident Marine Mammals ,as petitioners, are the toothed whales,
dolphins, porpoises, and other cetacean species, which inhabit the waters in and around the
Taon Strait, a narrow passage of water situated between the islands of Negros and Cebu. They
are joined by Gloria Estenzo Ramos and Rose-Liza Eisma-Osorio , to be collectively known as
the Stewards who allegedly seek the protection of the aforementioned marine species. Also
impleaded as an unwilling co-petitioner is former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, for her
express declaration and undertaking in the ASEAN Charter to protect the Taon Strait, among
others
In G.R. No. 181527, petitioners are the Central Visayas Fisherfolk Development Center (FIDEC),
a non-stock, non-profit, non-governmental organization, established for the welfare of the
marginal fisherfolk, and other individuals representing the subsistence fisherfolk of the
municipalities
of
Aloguinsan
and
Pinamungajan,
Cebu.
On June 13, 2002, the Government of the Philippines, acting through the Department of Energy
(DOE), entered into a Geophysical Survey and Exploration Contract-102 (GSEC-102) with Japan
Petroleum Exploration Co., Ltd. (JAPEX), a Japanese company. This contract involved geological
and
geophysical
studies
of
the
Taon
Strait.
On December 21, 2004, DOE and JAPEX formally converted GSEC-102 into Service Contract No.
46 (SC -46), which allowed the exploration, development, and exploitation of petroleum
resources in a block covering approximately 2,850 square kilometers offshore the Taon Strait.
From May 9 to 18, 2005, JAPEX conducted seismic surveys in and around the Taon Strait. JAPEX

committed to drill one exploration well during the second sub-phase of the project. Since the well
was to be drilled in the marine waters of Aloguinsan and Pinamungajan, where the Taon Strait
was declared a protected seascape in 1988, JAPEX agreed to comply with the Environmental
Impact Assessment(EIA) requirements pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1586.
Having obtained the required Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) from the
Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR), JAPEX began to drill an exploratory well, with a depth of 3,150 meters, near
Pinamungajan town in the western Cebu Province. The drilling began onNovember 16, 2007 and
lasted
until
February
8,
2008.
Petitioners filed the present Petitions for Certiorari, Mandamus, and Injunction to enjoin
respondents from implementing SC-46 and to have it nullified for willful and gross violation of
the
1987
Constitution
and
certain
international
and
municipal
laws.
Supply Oilfield Services, Inc. (SOS) filed a Motion to Strike its name as a respondent on the
ground that it is not the Philippine agent of JAPEX. SOS claimed that it had acted as a mere
logistics contractor for JAPEX in its oil and gas exploration activities in the Philippines.
JAPEX PH, branch office of JAPEX (Japan) alleged that it had already stopped exploration
activities in the Taon Strait way back in 2008, rendering this case moot.
The various issues raised by the petitioners may be condensed into two primary issues: (1)
Procedural Issue: Locus Standi of the Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards, petitioners in
G.R. No. 180771; and (2) Main Issue: Legality of Service Contract No. 46.

Held:

I. Procedural Issues

Courts

may

decide

cases

otherwise

moot

and

academic

1. This Court makes clear that the moot and academic principle is not a magical formula that
can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case. Courts have decided cases otherwise
moot and academic under the following exceptions:

(a)
There
is
a
grave
violation
of
the
Constitution;
(b) The exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved;
(c) The constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the
bench,
the
bar,
and
the
public;
and
(d) The case is capable of repetition yet evading review

2. In this case, despite the termination of SC-46, this Court deems it necessary to resolve these
consolidated petitions as almost all of the foregoing exceptions are present in this case. Both
petitioners allege that SC-46 is violative of the Constitution, the environmental and livelihood
issues raised undoubtedly affect the publics interest, and the respondents contested actions are
capable
of
repetition.
Locus

Standi

of

petitioners

Resident

Marine

Mammals

and

Stewards

3. The primary reason animal rights advocates and environmentalists seek to give animals and
inanimate objects standing is due to the need to comply with the strict requirements in bringing
a suit to court. The 1997 Rules of Court demand that parties to a suit be either natural or
juridical persons, or entities authorized by law. It further necessitates the action to be brought in
the
name
of
the
real
party-in-interest,
even
if
filed
by
a
representative.
4. In our jurisdiction, locus standi in environmental cases has been given a more liberalized
approach. While developments in Philippine legal theory and jurisprudence have not progressed
as far as [granting] legal standing for inanimate objects, the current trend moves towards
simplification of procedures and facilitating court access in environmental cases. [For instance],
the Court [recently] passed the landmark Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, which
allow for a citizen suit, and permit any Filipino citizen to file an action before our courts for
violations
of
our
environmental
laws.
5. Although this petition was filed in 2007, years before the effectivity of the Rules of Procedure
for Environmental Cases, it has been consistently held that rules of procedure may be
retroactively applied to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage and will
not violate any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected, inasmuch as there is
no
vested
rights
in
rules
of
procedure.
6. In light of the foregoing, the need to give the Resident Marine Mammals legal standing has
been eliminated by our Rules, which allow any Filipino citizen, as a steward of nature, to bring a
suit to enforce our environmental laws. It is worth noting that the Stewards are joined as real
parties in the Petition and not just in representation of the named cetacean species.
The Stewards, Ramos and Eisma-Osorio, having shown in their petition that there may be
possible violations of laws concerning the habitat of the Resident Marine Mammals, are therefore
declared
to
possess
the
legal
standing
to
file
this
petition.
Former

President

Arroyo

cannot

be

impleaded

as

an

unwilling

co-petitioner

7. Section 10, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 10. Unwilling co- plaintiff. - If the consent of any party who should be joined as plaintiff can
not be obtained, he may be made a defendant and the reason therefor shall be stated in the
complaint.

8. When the consent of a party who should be joined as a plaintiff cannot be obtained, he or she
may be made a party defendant to the case. This will put the unwilling party under the
jurisdiction of the Court, which can properly implead him or her through its processes.
The unwilling partys name cannot be simply included in a petition, without his or her knowledge
and consent, as such would be a denial of due process.

9. Moreover, the reason cited by the petitioners Stewards for including former President Arroyo
in their petition, is not sufficient to implead her as an unwilling co-petitioner. Impleading the
former President as an unwilling co-petitioner, for an act she made in the performance of the
functions of her office, is contrary to the public policy against embroiling the President in
suits, to assure the exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or
distraction, considering that being the Chief Executive of the Government is a job that, aside
from requiring all of the office holders time, also demands undivided attention. Therefore,
former President Macapagal-Arroyo cannot be impleaded as one of the petitioners in this suit.
Thus, her name is stricken off the title of this case.

II. Substantive Issues

Service

Contracts

are

allowed

under

the

1987

Constitution

10. This Court has previously settled the issue of whether service contracts are still allowed
under the 1987 Constitution. In La Bugal-Blaan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos, we held that
the deletion of the words service contracts in the 1987 Constitution did not amount to a ban on
them per se. In fact, in that decision, we quoted in length, portions of the deliberations of the
members of the Constitutional Commission (ConCom) to show that in deliberating on paragraph
4, Section 2, Article XII, they were actually referring to service contracts as understood in the
1973 Constitution, albeit with safety measures to eliminate or minimize the abuses prevalent
during
the
martial
law
regime.
Agreements Involving Technical or Financial Assistance are Service Contracts with
Safeguards
11. The phrase agreements involving either technical or financial assistance, referred to in
paragraph 4, Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution are in fact service contracts. But
unlike those of the 1973 variety, the new ones are between foreign corporations acting as
contractors on the one hand; and on the other, the government as principal or owner of the
works. In the new service contracts, the foreign contractors provide capital, technology and
technical know-how, and managerial expertise in the creation and operation of large-scale
mining/extractive enterprises; and the government, through its agencies (DENR, MGB), actively
exercises
control
and
supervision
over
the
entire
operation.
12. Such service contracts may be entered into only with respect to minerals, petroleum and

other mineral oils. The grant thereof is subject to several safeguards, among which are these
requirements:

(i) The service contract shall be crafted in accordance with a general law that will set standard or
uniform terms, conditions and requirements, presumably to attain a certain uniformity in
provisions and avoid the possible insertion of terms disadvantageous to the country.
(ii) The President shall be the signatory for the government because, supposedly before an
agreement is presented to the President for signature, it will have been vetted several times over
at different levels to ensure that it conforms to law and can withstand public scrutiny.
(iii) Within thirty days of the executed agreement, the President shall report it to Congress to
give that branch of government an opportunity to look over the agreement and interpose timely
objections, if any.

SC-46 is null and void for noncompliance with the requirements of the 1987
Constitution
13. While the Court finds that Presidential Decree No. 87 is sufficient to satisfy the requirement
of a general law, the absence of the two other conditions, that the President be a signatory to
SC-46, and that Congress be notified of such contract, renders it null and void.
(a) General Law on Oil Exploration (PD No. 87 not repealed by the enactment of the
present
1987
Constitution)
14. The disposition, exploration, development, exploitation, and utilization of indigenous
petroleum in the Philippines are governed by Presidential Decree No. 87 or the Oil Exploration
and Development Act of 1972. This was enacted by then President Ferdinand Marcos to promote
the discovery and production of indigenous petroleum through the utilization of government
and/or local or foreign private resources to yield the maximum benefit to the Filipino people and
the revenues to the Philippine Government. PD No. 87, although enacted in 1972, before the
adoption of the 1987 Constitution, remains to be a valid law unless otherwise repealed.
15. Likewise, the Court could not simply assume that PD No. 87 had been impliedly repealed.
Implied repeals are not lightly presumed. It is a settled rule that when laws are in conflict with
one another, every effort must be exerted to reconcile them. Moreover, in cases where the
statute seems to be in conflict with the Constitution, but a construction that it is in harmony with
the
Constitution
is
also
possible,
that
construction
should
be
preferred.
16. Consequently, we find no merit in petitioners contention that SC-46 is prohibited on the
ground that there is no general law prescribing the standard or uniform terms, conditions, and
requirements
for
service
contracts
involving
oil
exploration
and
extraction.
17. However, while PD No. 87 may serve as the general law upon which a service contract for

petroleum exploration and extraction may be authorized, the exploitation and utilization of this
energy resource in the present case may be allowed only through a law passed by Congress,
since
the
Taon
Strait
is
a
NIPAS area.
(b) President was not the signatory to SC-46 and the same was not submitted to
Congress (alter-ego doctrine does not apply since the requirements are not mere
formalities
but
constitutionally
placed
safeguards)
18. As SC-46 was executed in 2004, its terms should have conformed not only to the provisions
of Presidential Decree No. 87, but also to those of the 1987 Constitution. It is basic that the law
is deemed written into every contract. Although a contract is the law between the parties,
the provisions of positive law which regulate contracts are deemed written therein and shall limit
and govern the relations between the parties. (see Heirs of San Miguel v. Court of Appeals)
19. Paragraph 4, Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution requires that the President
himself enter into any service contract for the exploration of petroleum. SC -46 appeared to have
been entered into and signed only by the DOE through its then Secretary, Vicente S. Perez, Jr.,
contrary to the said constitutional requirement. Moreover, public respondents have neither shown
nor alleged that Congress was subsequently notified of the execution of such contract.
20. The argument that, based on the alter ego principle, the [Energy Secretary's] acts are also
that
of
then
President
Macapagal-Arroyos,
cannot
apply
in
this
case.
21. The alter ego principle or the doctrine of qualified political agency recognizes the
establishment of a single executive, all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts
of the Executive Department, the heads of the various executive departments are assistants and
agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the
Constitution or law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he act
personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are
performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of such
departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless
disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.
22. While the requirements in executing service contracts in paragraph 4, Section 2 of Article XII
of the 1987 Constitution seem like mere formalities, they, in reality, take on a much bigger role.
As we have explained in La Bugal, they are the safeguards put in place by the framers of the
Constitution to eliminate or minimize the abuses prevalent during the martial law regime. Thus,
they are not just mere formalities, which will only render a contract unenforceable but not void,
if not complied with. They are requirements placed, not just in an ordinary statute, but in the
fundamental
law,
the
non
-observance
of
which
will
nullify
the
contract.
23. Our Constitution requires that the President himself be the signatory of service agreements
with foreign- owned corporations involving the exploration, development, and utilization of our
minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils. This power cannot be taken lightly. In contrast,
under PD No. 87, it is required that the Petroleum Board, now the DOE, obtain the Presidents
approval for the execution of any contract under said statute. Even if we were inclined to relax
the requirement in La Bugal, it must be shown that the government agency or subordinate

official has been authorized by the President to enter into such service contract for the
government. Otherwise, it should be at least shown that the President subsequently approved of
such contract explicitly. None of these circumstances is evident in the case at bar.

Service Contract No. 46 in violation of NIPAS Act and PD 1586 (non- compliance with
EIA
and
ECC
for
protected
areas)
24. True to the constitutional policy that the State shall protect and advance the right of the
people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature
Congress enacted the National Integrated Protected Areas System Act of 1992 (NIPAS Act) to
establish
a
comprehensive
system
of
integrated
protected
areas.
25. Under Section 4 of the NIPAS Act, a protected area refers to portions of land and water, set
aside due to their unique physical and biological significance, managed to enhance biological
diversity and protected against human exploitation. The Taon Strait, pursuant to Proclamation
No. 1234, was set aside and declared a protected area under the category of Protected
Seascape. A management plan was designed to protect and enhance the permanent preservation
of its natural conditions. Consequently, an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) is required
prior to undertaking any activity outside the scope of the management plan. Unless
an Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) under the EIA system is obtained, no activity
inconsistent
with
the
goals
of
the
NIPAS
Act
shall
be
implemented.
26. The Environmental Impact Statement System (EISS) was established in 1978 under
Presidential Decree No. 1586. It prohibits any person, partnership or corporation from
undertaking or operating in any declared environmentally critical project or areas without first
securing an ECC issued by the President or his duly authorized representative. Under
Proclamation No. 2146, the Taon Strait is an environmentally critical area,having been declared
as a protected area in 1998; therefore, any activity outside the scope of its management plan
may only be implemented pursuant to an ECC secured after undergoing an EIA to determine the
effects
of
such
activity
on
its
ecological
system.
27. It is true that the restrictions found under the NIPAS Act are not without exceptions.
However, while an exploration done for the purpose of surveying for energy resources is allowed
under Section 14 of the NIPAS Act, this does not mean that it is exempt from the requirement to
undergo an EIA under Section 12. Stated differently, surveying for energy resources
under Section 14 is not an exemption from complying with the EIA requirement in Section 12
instead, Section 14 provides for additional requisites before any exploration for energy resources
may
be
done
in
protected
areas.
28. The public respondents themselves admitted that JAPEX only started to secure an ECC prior
to the second sub-phase of SC-46, which required the drilling of an oil exploration well. This
means that when the seismic surveys were done in the Taon Strait, no such environmental
impact evaluation was done. Unless seismic surveys are part of the management plan of the
Taon Strait, such surveys were done in violation of Section 12 of the NIPAS Act and Section 4 of
PD
No.
1586.

29. The respondents subsequent compliance with the EISS for the second sub-phase of SC-46
cannot
and
will
not
cure
this
violation.
Requirement of a law passed by Congress specifically allowing exploration in the
Tanon
Strait,
a
NIPAS
area
30. SC-46 was not executed for the mere purpose of gathering information on the possible
energy resources in the Taon Strait as it also provides for the parties rights and obligations
relating to extraction and petroleum production should oil in commercial quantities be found to
exist in the area. While Presidential Decree No. 87 may serve as the general law upon which a
service contract for petroleum exploration and extraction may be authorized, the exploitation and
utilization of this energy resource in the present case may be allowed only through a law passed
by Congress, since the Taon Strait is a NIPAS area.Since there is no such law specifically
allowing oil exploration and/or extraction in the Taon Strait, no energy resource exploitation and
utilization may be done in said protected seascape.