Reprint
Positive Fantasy and Motivation
Gabriele Oettingen
Octtingen, G. (1996). Positive fantasy and motivation. In P. M. Gollwitzer, & J. A. Bargh (Fds.),
The psychology of action: Linking cognition and motivation to behavior (pp. 236-259).
New York: Guilford.cuarren 11 POSitive Fantasy
and Motivation
| Gabriele Oettingen
ent impacts on motivation and action, are postulated: optimistic expec:
tations and spontaneously generated positive fantasies. Whereas “op:
timistic expectations” are beliefs about how likely it is that certain events
will happen or not, “spontaneously generated positive fantasies’ are
daydreams or mental images depicting future events and scenarios. In this
chapter, I describe various studies demonstrating that optimistic expecta-
tions facilitate successful performance and that spontaneously generated post
tive fantasies about the future restrain motivation. I then discuss experimental
studies investigating the conditions under which spontaneous positive fan
tasies about the future strengthen the motivation to act, First however, Icon:
sider the benefits and perils of optimistic thinking in general.
T: different kinds of optimistic thinking about the future, with differ
THE BENEFITS OF OPTIMISTIC THINKING
Empirical research demonstrates that optimistic thinking, even if illusory,
has beneficial effects on motivation, cognition, and affect. For example, op:
timistic thinking is associated with increased persistence in the face of difficul
ties, better problem solving, heightened creativity, less fear of failure, more
effective coping, more prosocial and caring behavior, and higher standards
and aspirations. Optimistic thinking is also beneficial to mental and physi
cal health. It is a buffer against depression, alcoholism, and obesity. Moreover,
it hinders the emergence of acute and chronic disease and moderates its
progress (for reviews, see Bandura, in press; Scheier & Carver, 1992; Peter
son & Bossio, 1991; Taylor & Brown, 1988, 1994; Taylor, 1989).
Different theories stress different concepts of optimistic thinking. Tay
lor and Brown (1988; see also Taylor, 1989) distinguish aggrandizing self
perceptions, illusions of control, and unrealistic optimism about the future
Peterson and Seligman (1984) infer people's optimistic future outlook fromPositive Fontasy ond Motivation 237
their propensity to use stable, global, and internal attributions for explain
ing positive events to a greater extent than for explaining negative events
Scheier and Carver (1985) ask people directly about their beliefs regarding
the quality of their future life, Finally, optimism can be conceptualized as
“self-efficacy” — that is, as the self-reported competence to perform a certain
action in its relevant context, which is a powerful predictor of successful
—“S—*=‘“=EEUCC:=SsC ==tsttstsstsCs.
health) (Bandura, in press; for a trait measure of self-efficacy, see Skinner,
Chapman, & Baltes, 1988). All of these concepts of optimistic thinking are
common in that they are beliefs about one’s self-worth, one’s future outlook,
or one’s range of control
THE PERILS OF OPTIMISTIC THINKING
Under the influence of humanistic psychologists (e.g, Allport, 1955; Jaho
da, 1958; Maslow, 1954; Rogers, 1951). it was widely believed until the be
ginning of the 1980s that people would benefit from accurately accepting
their reality, even if their own personalities had to be looked upon as aver~
age, their environment as boring or overwhelming, and their future as grim
Despite the overwhelming empirical evidence for the beneficial effects of
optimistic thinking that has accumulated since then, the traditional position
stressing the importance of reality acceptance has recently reappeared, and
the research that stresses the beneficial effects of illusory optimism has been
heavily criticized (e.g., Colvin & Block, 1994), But there are further voices
warning against the perils of illusory optimism. For example, Baumeister
(1989) argues that overly positive illusions will lead to unsafe behavior and
dangerous decision making. He adduces findings that “illusions of unique
invulnerability” lead to risky behaviors (Burger & Burns, 1988), and describes
examples from history to illustrate the maladaptive consequences of over
optimistic thinking, Research on the “power corrupts’ phenomenon (Kip
nis, 1972) seems to corroborate Baumeister’s position. In persons with high
status, overconfidence can lead to a variety of misperceptions of reality, such
as devaluing the performance of the less powerful, viewing the less power-
ful as objects of manipulation, and attributing the agency of others’ efforts
to their own influence. These misperceptions of reality are conducive to high
risk behaviors on the part of the powerful (e.g., restricting or overworking
subordinates). To avoid the dangerous consequences of overconfidence,
Baumeister (1989) suggests staying within an “optimal margin of illusion” a
certain quantity of illusory optimism that is adaptive for psychological func
tioning, A moderately positive distortion of the self and the world helps to
ensure the benefits of illusory optimism without inducing individuals to act
too riskily or on false assumptions.
Gollwitzer and Kinney (1989) present another approach to the advan-
tages and disadvantages of positive illusions, They argue that the benefits238 PREPARING TO ACT: MENTAL CONSTRUCTION OF THE GOAL
of illusory optimism depend on the situation or the task at hand. For exam.
ple, when people attempt to implement a goal, illusory control helps main:
tain the determination to pursue the chosen goal (Gollwitzer & Kinney, 1989;
Gollwitzer, 1990). When people try to arrive at well-thought-out decisions,
however, they need to analyze the positive and negative consequences in an
impartial manner; if they choose a path with undue demands, they may suffer
for a long time from the adversities of the wrong decision.
In summary, Baumeister (1989) argues that one should look at the quan-
tity of illusory optimism in predicting whether illusory optimism is adap:
tive or maladaptive. Gollwitzer and Kinney (1989) suggest considering the
situation or the task at hand in order to check whether illusory optimism
is functional or dysfunctional. But there is still another way to approach this
problem. There may be different kinds of optimistic thinking — some associat-
ed with perils, others with benefits. It is this issue that I focus on in the present
chapter.
DIFFERENT KINDS OF OPTIMISTIC THINKING
Researchers commonly conceptualize optimistic thinking according to con-
trol beliefs, self-efficacy beliefs, outcome expectations, or expectations of fu-
ture life in general. Thoughts about the future, however, do not necessarily
have to be beliefs about how likely or unlikely it is that a certain desired
event will occur or not, or that a certain behavior will be carried out or not.
People also spontaneously imagine their successes and failures, visualize them
in their minds’ eyes, and play with their memories and mental images of
anticipated future events. In their daydreams and wishes, they fancy master
ful performances and blissful experiences. But people also picture the fall-
ing through of their desires; dreadful news cutting right across their lives,
and dreary, everyday, routine work. Such mental images, daydreams, or fan
tasies may depict incidents with good or bad endings, and thus may possess
a positive or negative quality. Fantasies more easily escape the grip of real
ity than expectations, because fantasies are not constrained by the cognitive
mechanisms that make people acknowledge factual information (Klinger,
1971, 1990; Singer, 1966). Accordingly, individuals may indulge in spontane-
ous positive fantasies, although critical analyses of past performance or think
ing about objective likelihoods would lead to low expectations of success.
These considerations suggest that expectations and fantasies are wo
different ways of thinking about the future. But do they have different ef
fects on motivation and action? High expectations of success signal that a
given desired task can be attained, and thus should increase motivation (At
Kinson, 1957). In contrast, positive fantasies of success constitute an antici
pation of having reached it or even an anticipatory consumption of the
various positive consequences or experiences, and thus should reduce moti
vation to actually achieve them. In a positive fantasy, a person may “exPositive Fantasy and Motivation 239
perience” the future event ahead of time and may color the future experience
more brightly and joyfully than reality would ever permit. Therefore the need
to act is not felt, and the thorny path leading to implementing the fantasy
may easily be overlooked. Moreover, positive fantasies may prevent a per
son from realizing that effortful action precedes most achievements; accord
ingly, no action plans for how to achieve the imagined fantasies may be
formed. This should further reduce the chances of success, as a lack of men:
tally rehearsed action plans has been linked to decreased performance (Goll
witzer, Heckhausen, & Ratajczak, 1990; Gollwitzer, 1993 and Chapter 13, this
volume; Taylor & Schneider, 1989; Taylor & Pham, Chapter 10, this volume;
see also Friedman, Scholnick, & Cocking, 1987).
In summary, because positive fantasies imply anticipatory consumption
of success, experience of no need to act, and a lack of detailed action plans,
they should produce less successful performances than negative fantasies.
This should be in contrast to positive expectations, which are known to foster
successful performances.
POSITIVE FANTASIES VERSUS POSITIVE EXPECTATIONS
Various studies in different life domains (e.g., health, interpersonal attrac
tion) were conducted to test the hypotheses stated above. In all of these
studies, the subjects’ expectations and fantasies were assessed for positivity
long before (up to 4 years before) we assessed relevant performances (e.g.,
weight loss, recovery from illness, getting involved with someone). Positive
expectations, according to our hypotheses, would predict strong perfor-
mances. Positive fantasies, on the other hand, would predict weak perfor
mances.
Weight Loss
We assessed expectations of success, as well as weight: and food-related fan.
tasies, in 25 obese women who had enrolled in a weight reduction program
at the Hospital of the University of Pennsylvania (Oettingen & Wadden, 1991).
The women weighed an average of 233 pounds. The weight reduction pro
gram, which offered diet prescriptions and weekly behavior therapy, lasted
for a full year. In the second year, the patients received weight maintenance
therapy.
‘At pretreatment, each patient had to indicate the number of pounds
she wished to lose in the program and her expectations of attaining her
weight goal. We used a semiprojective procedure to assess the positivity of
patients’ fantasies. We wanted subjects to generate spontaneous fantasies at
that very moment rather than to recall fantasy retrospectively from long-term
memory, because such recall is likely to be distorted (see Ericsson & Simon,
1980, 1993). Each patient was asked to imagine herself vividly as the main240 PREPARING TO ACT: MENTAL CONSTRUCTION OF THE GOAL
character in four weight- and food-related scenarios. Two stories were
designed to elicit fantasies about the subject's weight loss, whereas the other
wo stories described encounters with tempting foods. Each story had an open
ending, which subjects were asked to complete in writing by describing the
stream of thoughts that occurred to them. For example, one scenario read:
“You have just completed Penn's weight loss program. A friend of yours has
invited you to her annual pool party. You attended this function last year,
30 you will probably see many familiar faces. As you are on your way to the
party, you imagine. ...” Right after describing their mental images, subjects
rated the positivity and negativity of their images, as well as their imagined
body shape. From the correlations between these ratings, we learned that
positive fantasies meant having images about a slim body. Weight loss was
measured three times on a balance beam scale in the clinic: after 3 months,
1 year, and 2 years.
Expectations and fantasies predicted weight loss in opposite directions
After 1 year, patients with high expectations lost about 12 kilograms more
than patients with low expectations, In contrast, subjects with positive fan
tasies lost about 11 kilograms less than subjects with negative fantasies. Af
ter 2 years, the respective differences were 15 and 12 kilograms. These
patterns of results stayed unchanged when subjects’ weight loss aspirations,
as well as their subjective incentives to reach their aspired weight loss, were
covaried. The findings thus supported our assumption that optimistic ex-
pectations and positive fantasies are different types of optimistic thinking,
and that they have differential effects on motivation and action. Apparent
ly, images of getting slim and resisting food temptations hindered weight
loss. Subjects seemed to daydream that weight loss had occurred without their
having to make any effort. For example, in response to the friend's pool party
scenario, one subject with positive fantasies wrote: “I am going swimming,
in front of everyone! First I have a drink because I am too excited and have
to act like I am not self-conscious. Everyone is going to really check me out.
Tll be shining!” Such wishful daydreams did not help subjects to succeed,
either in the short or in the long run. On the contrary, positive expectations
favored weight loss. This is in line with previous studies demonstrating that
people who expect to lose weight are more successful in doing so (Bernier
& Avard, 1986; Chambliss & Murray, 1979; Glynn & Ruderman, 1986; Leon,
Sternberg, & Rosenthal, 1984; Stotland & Zuroff, 1991)
Recovery from Chronic Illness
Another area where optimistic expectations have beneficial effects is recov
cry from illness. For example, Scheier et al. (1989), using the Life Orienta
tion Scale (Scheier & Carver, 1985), observed that optimistic patients
recovered faster after coronary artery bypass surgery and returned to full
time work somewhat earlier than patients with a pessimistic outlook. Effects
of heightened self-efficacy beliefs on physiological functioning have beenPositive Fantasy ond Motivation ro)
shown by Bandura, Cioffi, Taylor, and Brouillard (1988), who suggest that
even the functioning of the immune system may benefit from optimistic ef
ficacy beliefs, Whatever the path from optimism to recovery may be
physiological or behavioral—it seems that optimistic expectations help to
prevent the onset of and the recovery from physical illness (for reviews, sec
Scheier & Carver, 1992; Taylor, 1989). Data predicting comparatively better
health at ages 45 through 60 from an optimistic explanatory style at age 25
further support this claim (Peterson, Seligman, & Vaillant, 1988).
Do positive fantasies retard the recovery from physical illness? In a con
ceptual replication of the weight loss study, we (Oettingen, Losert, Wood,
Nathanson, & Kazak, 1995, Study 1) tested expectations and fantasies in chil
dren suffering from chronic asthma and gastrointestinal disease. We recorded
children’s disease activity at the time of the interview as well as several months
later. We operationalized positive expectations using a measure of explana
tory style (the children’s version of the Attributional Style Questionnair
Seligman et al., 1984), which assessed to what extent patients perceived
hypothetical positive events as more stable, global, and internal than nega
tive events, An optimistic explanatory style conveyed the patients sense that
they would eventually be able to deal with the situation at hand (see Abram
son, Seligman, & Teasdale, 1978; Peterson & Seligman, 1984), and thus indi
cated positive expectations. Positive fantasies concerning patients future lives
were assessed through 12 scenarios, which pertained to the domains of health,
interpersonal relations, and achievement (four scenarios each). A typical
health scenario read: “Imagine you have been invited to sleep over at a friend's
house. But since you have been sick for the past couple of days, your mother
calls the doctor to see if you are well enough to go. She hangs up the phone
and...” After the children had completed the scenarios in writing, they rated
the positivity-negativity of their images. From the doctors’ charts, we took
a standard measure of disease activity, and also recorded prescribed medi
cine as an indicator of how well children were doing in fighting their dis-
ease. As dependent variables, we used the disease activity and prescription
scores several months after the interview, corrected for the respective scores
at the time of the interview. The pattern of results was the same as in the
weight loss study. Over a period of several months, patients with asthma and
gastrointestinal disease who were optimistic in their explanatory style tend:
ed to show comparatively better recovery. In contrast, the more positive the
patients’ fantasies were, the worse their disease activity scores were and the
more medicine they had to take over time
Recovery from Acute Illness
Ina study on physical illness, we (Oettingen, Losert, et al., 1995, Study 1)
assessed explanatory style and fantasies in children suffering from cancer
(ie. leukemia and lymphoma). The physicians in charge rated patients’ prob:
ability of survival at two points in time: at the interview and 4 years later242 PREPARING TO ACT: MENTAL CONSTRUCTION OF THE GOAL
As the dependent variable, we used probability of survival after 4 years (all
patients were still alive), corrected for probability of survival at the time of
the interview. The same measures of explanatory style and fantasies that were
used in the study of chronically ill children were used here. In the children
with cancer, positive fantasies predicted a less favorable recovery rate (p =
‘10), though explanatory style showed a close to zero correlation to recovery
rate. The predictive relation of positive fantasy rested in particular on the
four health-related scenarios. Apparently, patients’ positive fantasies about
their future health did not aid in recovery. Effective recovery from cancer
demanded taking action (e-g., complying with the various medical demands
and coping with painful procedures), and taking action should have been
suppressed by positive fantasies in which future recovery was anticipated
to be achieved effortlessly.
To sum up, the studies described to this point supported the hypothe:
sis that positive thinking in terms of expectations is beneficial, whereas post
tive thinking in terms of fantasies is maladaptive. This pattern of results
emerged regardless of whether high-risk health behavior or chronic illness
was analyzed. However, all of these data pertained to the health domain only
and came from studies with rather small samples. The next question we ad-
dressed was how reliable the predictive effects of positive fantasies are when
it comes to other domains and larger samples.
Romantic Success
‘The next study focused on starting a love relationship. Students who had
crushes on fellow students of the opposite sex, but who were not yet going
out or were not yet involved with them, were tested for their expectations
of getting together with their “crushees,” as well as for their fantasies about
what might happen to them and their crushees in the future. To measure
subjects fantasies, we (Dettingen, Losert, et al. 1995, Study 2) used a proce
‘dure similar to that described for the health studies. For example, one item
read: “You are at a party. While you are talking to HIM, you see a girl whom
you believe HE might like to meet, As she approaches the two of you, you
imagine. ...” After several months, we asked students whether they were suc
cessful in getting involved with their crushees. Students who originally had
positive expectations were more likely to get together with their crushes
than those with more negative expectations. In contrast, students with post
tive fantasies about themselves and their crushees were less likely to get in.
volved with their crushees than their peers who spontaneously generated
less positive fantasies. This pattern of results stayed the same after subjects
perceived incentive to get together with their crushes and subjects’ gender
were covaried.Positive Fantosy ond Motivation 748
Professional Success
Another study (Octtingen, Losert, et al., 1995, Study 3) focused on the topic
of “transition into work life.” We tested students who were completing their
university education and preparing to enter the job market. We assessed sub:
jects’ expectations of finding a job and the tone of their spontaneous fan
tasies related to the future experience of transition into work life. Two years
later, subjects were asked to report on the professional opportunities they
had been offered and to indicate their current professional status. High ex:
pectations of success predicted success, whereas positive fantasies showed
an inverse relation to professional achievement. This was truc even after
subjects’ incentive to get a job was statistically controlled for.
Summary
Optimistic expectations fostered the resistance to high-risk health behavior
and the combating of chronic disease, as well as interpersonal and profes
sional success, whereas positive fantasies were a clear hindrance. The fact
that similar patterns of results emerged in three different life domains (i.e.,
the health, the interpersonal, and the work domains) supports our hypotheses
on the perils of positive fantasy. Moreover, in almost all of our studies, op:
timistic expectations had beneficial effects. This corresponds to previous find.
ings on optimistic thinking.
OTHER CONCEPTS OF FANTASY
In this section, similarities and differences between our work and three other
lines of research involving the concept of fantasy —Thematic Apperception
Test (TAT) fantasies, the stream of thought, and current concerns—are dis.
cussed.
Thematic Apperception Test Fantasies
Our measure of positive fantasy should not be confused with fantasy gener-
ated in response to the TAT, the classic measure of motives (Murray, 1938;
McClelland, Atkinson, Clark, & Lowell, 1953). In the TAT approach, fanta-
sies are perceived as reflections of specific personal needs. Accordingly, sub:
jects’ fantasies in response to a given picture are contentanalyzed to
‘determine to what extent the fantasies contain elements of striving for
achievement, affilitation, intimacy, power, and so forth, and to determine
whether the fantasies reflect hope (i.e., approach) or fear (i.e., avoidance;
see Heckhausen, 1989/1991). Our work is concerned neither with the num
ber of fantasies generated in a given domain (achievement, affiliation, etc.)246 PREPARING TO ACT: MENTAL CONSTRUCTION OF THE GOAL
nor with whether subjects habitually tend to fantasize about approaching
a desired outcome (eg, having a slim body) versus avoiding an undesired
one (e.g, not having an obese body). Rather, we are interested in how posi-
tively or negatively subjects fantasize about a certain upcoming event (e.
their body shape after the weight loss program). As a consequence, the way
we measure subjects’ positive or negative fantasies is markedly different from
the measures used with TAT fantasies. First, we use self-report scales to de:
termine the positivity or negativity of the fantasies. In contrast, the fantasies
in response to the TAT are rated according to a prescribed coding scheme
applied by trained raters who code various indicators for the respective vari-
ables (e.g., “instrumental activity leading to achieving a standard of excel-
lence” as indicative of hope for success in the achievement domain). Second,
in our approach fantasies pertain to the self, whereas in the TAT approach
they pertain to the people depicted. Third, we have obtained sufficiently
high reliability for our fantasy items (Cronbach's alphas of about .70), whereas
reliability has always been a problem in the TAT (for a discussion, see McClel-
land, 1980). Finally, our measure of positive fantasy is different from what
are referred to as “incentives” in expectancy-value theories (Heckhausen,
1989/1991). Incentives determine people's beliefs about the expected value
(desirability) of a certain future outcome. Our measures of spontaneous posi:
fantasies do not assess beliefs and thus show only negligible correlations
to incentive values, Moreover, expectancy-value theories predict a positive
relationship between subjective expected values and success, whereas we have
found negative relationships between positive fantasies and success.
The Stream of Thought
Over a century ago, William James (1890/1950) published his revealing ideas
about the stream of thought. It took another 60 years for the subject to be
examined empirically. Jerome L. Singer, a pioneer in the research on fanta:
sy, and his collaborators showed in experimental and correlational studies
that people’s inner experience is filled with task-irrelevant thoughts, free:
floating images, and fanciful anticipations (see Singer, 1966, 1988, for sum:
maries). Unstructured thoughts and images appear to arise when a person's
full attention is not needed to adjust to the present external environment,
Memories or environmental stimuli can serve as the starting points for such
daydreaming or fantasizing. Therein, past or present experiences are re:
hearsed, changed, and ingeniously combined to emerge as new creations of
the mind, which reshape the past, embellish the present, and fancy the fu:
ture. Such fantasies can feature extravagant actions, overwhelming success:
es, and clever strategies, but also shameful failure and painful rejection. Many
characteristics of people's fantasy lives, as well as the relationships of these
to other personality dimensions, have been identified by self-report instru
ments measuring daydreaming patterns retrospectively—the Imaginal
Processes Inventory (IPI; Singer & Antrobus, 1963, 1972) and the Short Im:Positive Fontosy ond Motivation 2145
aginal Processes Inventory (SIPI; Huba, Aneshensel, & Singer, 198]; Huba,
Singer, Aneshensel, & Antrobus, 1982) (for a review, see Singer & Bonanno,
1990).
Singer and his collaborators, however, do not focus on the positivity
of fantasies. Rather, the SIP] includes a “positive-constructive” daydream.
ing scale, which combines an accepting attitude toward one’s inner ex
periences with problem-solving, joyful, vivid, and future-oriented
daydreaming, The positive-constructive pattern differs from guilty-dysphor
ic daydreaming, which characterizes people who feel threatened by their fear
ful and hostile daydreams. Furthermore, fantasy is not distinguished from
expectations or self-efficacy beliefs. Rather, both self-efficacy beliefs and fan
tasies are perceived as important corroborative influences on behavioral
change (Singer & Pope, 1978). Finally, rather than prompting the kind of
spontaneous fantasies present in our work, the IPI and SIPI ask subjects to
retrospectively rate the frequency of certain kinds of daydreams (such as
achievementoriented, sexual, or bizarre)
Current Concerns
‘The theory of “current concerns,” which has its roots in achievement moti
vation theory (Atkinson, 1957; McClelland et al., 1953), defines such a con-
cern as the state between the act of commitment to a specific goal and the
time of achievement of or disengagement from that goal (Klinger, 1975, 1977).
Studying the differential effects of optimistic expectations versus spontane
ous positive fantasies on behavior is not the objective in Klinger’s work
Rather, high expectations of success foster commitment, which as a gate to
the state of current concern should then influence the content of fantasies.
Other features of current concerns, such as unexpected difficulties in goal
achievement, also influence what kind of information the person will process
and what the stream of thought will be about (Klinger, Barta, & Maxeiner,
1980). Accordingly, subjects responding to the Concern Dimensions Ques:
tionnaire (Klinger et al., 1980) or the Interview Questionnaire (Klinger, 1987)
are asked to report about various characteristics of their current concerns,
such as value of the goal, subjective probability of success, or intended ac:
tion regarding the goal. From these self-report answers, subjects’ cognitive
and physiological reactions as well as the contents of their spontaneous
thoughts are predicted.
THE PERILS OF POSITIVE FANTASY: SUPPORTIVE FINDINGS
Thus far in this chapter, I have reported studies explicitly designed to test
the predicted negative relation between positive fantasy and performance.
But there are various other lines of research that, at least indirectly, add fur-
ther support to this notion. First, in a prospective study of women with a246 «PREPARING TO ACT: MENTAL CONSTRUCTION OF THE GOAL
history of breast carcinoma (Jensen, 1987), comforting daydreaming, as meas
ured by the positive-constructive scale of the SIPI (Huba et al., 1981, 1982),
predicted metastatic spread over a period of more than a year. As mentioned
earlier, high scores on the positive-constructive scale of the SIPI indicate
vivid, enjoyable, problem-solving, and future-oriented daydreaming, Second,
wish-fulfilling fantasy has been linked to poor adjustment in patients cop-
ing with physical illness and painful medical procedures (Felton & Revere
son, 1984), whereas accurate and thus often negative information about the
kind of anticipated procedures and about the sensations that patients will
experience have beneficial effects on the patients’ ability to deal with the
hardships (Johnson, Lauver, & Nail, 1989; Suls & Wan, 1989), Similarly, Peter-
son (1989), summarizing research on how children cope with medical rou-
tine, has reported better adjustment in children who seek precise information
about upcoming surgical or diagnostic procedures. These results imply that
patients who focus on positive images depicting how easy and effortless up:
coming medical procedures will be cope less well than patients who gener-
ate more negative mental images in response to accurate medical
information.
‘The second line of research comes from the literature on cognitive ther:
apy. By means of various procedures, such as covert modeling, hypnosis, or
guided imagery, subjects are led to give up positive fantasies of effortless
recovery. Patients are guided to produce mental images about upcoming
hardships as a means of preparing them for staying away from high-risk sit-
uations and for resisting temptations (for an example, see Brownell, 1989;
for a review, see Marlatt & Gordon, 1985; Marlatt, Baer, & Quigley, 1995)
Related to this type of research are self-efficacy training programs, in which
the overcoming of possible difficulties and pitfalls that hinder successful task
performance (eg., in school, work, or sports) is systematically rehearsed. This
should also reduce positive fantasies about the ease of solving such tasks (on
changes in self-efficacy, see Bandura, in press; on effects of mental practice,
see Corbin, 1972; Feltz & Landers, 1983).
Harmful effects of positive fantasies on performance were reported in
an experiment by Goodhart (1986). Subjects with experimentally induced
positive images about their own competence did worse on an anagram test
than subjects with negative images. However, this was only true when sub
jects were not asked to predict how well they might perform after generat
ing their images— that is, when subjects’ positive images were not overridden
by their expectations, Similar results were obtained by Sherman, Skov, Her
vitz, and Stock (1981, Study 1). With respect to an upcoming anagram task,
subjects first had to explain hypothetical success or failure, and then either
had or did not have to state their expectations of success. Subjects who ex:
plained failure did somewhat better than those who explained success when
they did not have to state their expectations. The reverse was true for sub
jects who had to state their expectations. Sherman and his collaborators in
terpreted the findings as follows: Explaining hypothetical failure leads toPositive Fantasy and Motwvation ro
the consideration of possible failure and consequently to more effort in the
upcoming task than does explaining hypothetical success. When explicit ex
pectancies are set, however, subjects’ performance tends to confirm their
negative expectations generated from explaining undesirable events
Finally, in working with defensive pessimists, Showers (1992) demon
strated that experimentally induced positive images about performance led
to worse performance than negative images did (Study 1). “Defensive pes
simists” are generally successful people who strategically reduce their expec:
tations of success (Norem & Cantor, 1986). In Study 2, Showers observed
that negative imagery produced more reassuring thoughts than positive im-
agery. This “plucking up” of courage after having generated negative images
should have promoted good performances. Though Showers's findings per
tain only to students who have a successful performance history and use a
particular performance strategy, they do demonstrate that positive imagery
can indeed have harmful effects on performance.
WHY IS POSITIVE FANTASY HARMFUL?
Indulging in positive fantasies should increase the salience of positive out
comes, whereas generating negative fantasies should increase the salience
of difficulties and hardships. Subjects with positive fantasies, because they
are working out positive events in their minds’ eyes, should hardly be moti
vated to put effort into obtaining success. In contrast, subjects with negative
fantasies, because they are perceiving the occurrence of hardship in their
minds eyes, may feel challenged to make efforts to overcome these obsta
cles (see Sherman et al., 1981). To follow up on this speculation, we asked
subjects in our study on finding jobs how many applications they had sent
out, Indeed, subjects with positive fantasies reported having sent out fewer
job applications than subjects with negative fantasies. At the same time, the
subjects with positive daydreams reported having refrained from conflict-
ing commitments (e.g., going on a long vacation) and having already pre
pared themselves for changes in their private lives that would result from
success in finding jobs. It appears, then, that subjects generating positive fan
tasies about finding a job took success for granted. They presumptuously
thought of themselves as having already obtained the desired jobs, and con
sequently failed to confront the adverse reality that needs to be tackled if
success is actually to be achieved.
POSITIVE FANTASY AND NEGATIVE REALITY
At this point, we wondered whether positive fantasy can motivate behavior
if it is contrasted with reflections about the negative reality~that is, with
reflections on what demands stand in the way of fantasy fulfillment. When248 «PREPARING TO ACT: MENTAL CONSTRUCTION OF THE GOAL
positive fantasy and the respective negative reality appear in the mind's eye,
positive fantasy should no longer allow indulgence and premature consump:
tion, because it is experienced as something to be achieved in real life. Where
as positive fantasies give action the necessary direction, reflections on reali:
ty point to the necessity to act. Moreover, reflections on reality provide clues
on how to actually implement one’s positive fantasies in real life. Accord:
focusing on both the positive fantasy and the contradictory negative
should increase motivation toward implementing the positive fantasy
If contrasting positive fantasy with negative reality turns positive fan
tasy into something to be implemented in real life, people who ponder the
contrast between fantasy and reality should become tuned to the probabili
ties of success. The subjective probability of success should now guide moti
vation and action. Imagine a young man indulging in positive daydreams
about getting involved with a young woman. Only after generating both posi
tive fantasies and reflections about the actual situation (i.e., being without
her) should he perceive his positive fantasies as something to be achieved.
Accordingly, he should become attuned to the probability of actually get
ting involved with the loved one when it comes to the decision of whether
to pursue her or not
In contrast, expectations should leave motivation and action largely un-
touched when a person prefers to indulge in positive fantasies. Giving free
reign to positive images about the future does not suggest a necessity to act
nor does it convey any hint on how to act. Such positive images are sheer
fantasies left to the inner stream of consciousness and thus are not ex:
perienced as outcomes to be implemented through laborious efforts. Simi
larly, expectations should fail to guide motivation and action when a person
prefers to brood on the shortcomings of the present reality. Dwelling only
on the negative status quo conveys no allusion to where to go, that is, in which
direction the reality should be changed. There is no guiding future vision
that leads a person's efforts to change reality to the better.
These ideas imply that when people are induced to contrast their posi
tive fantasies with reflections on the corresponding negative reality, they
should evince high positive correlations between subjective probabilities of
fantasy fulfillment and their motivation to achieve their fantasies. In con.
trast, with people who either generate only positive fantasies or reflect only
on their negative reality, no substantial correlations should be observed.
Whereas high expectations of success should lead to more motivation when.
one is contrasting fantasy and reality, as compared to when one is dwelling
on fantasy or reality only, low expectations of success should lead to com:
paratively less motivation,
Interpersonal Concern
In our first experiment on this issue (Oettingen, Bohringer, & Losert, 1995,
Study 1), female students were asked to name the interpersonal matter thatPositive Fantasy ond Motivation ug
was presently most important to them (e.g. getting to know somebody) and
to state their expectations about whether it would result in a happy ending
Then they were asked to list positive aspects of the happy ending (e.g., love,
feeling of being needed) and negative aspects of reality that appeared to stand
against the possibility of a happy ending (e.g., being insecure, unattractive).
In the fantasy-reality contrast group, subjects had to select two aspects of
both the happy ending and the negative reality. To achieve a fantasy-reality
contrast, subjects were asked to alternate in their production of spontane:
ous images between positive aspects of wish fulfillment and negative aspects
of reality, beginning with a positive aspect. Thus, both aspects had to be
reflected on intermittently. In contrast, in the fantasy-only group, subjects
were asked to imagine only positive aspects of the happy ending; in the
reality-only group, subjects were asked to reflect only on negative aspects
of the actual situation. Dependent variables were measures of activity feel
ings and immediacy of action. These variables were recorded right after the
experiment and during the following weeks,
In the fantasy-reality contrast group, subjects’ expectations of success
showed a substantial positive correlation with the dependent variables. In
both the fantasy-only and the reality-only groups, these correlations were
much lower. Furthermore, the latter two groups did not differ in their low
correlations. For example, in the fantasy-reality contrast group, subjects with
high expectations of success acted sooner than those with low expectations,
whereas there was almost no difference in the date of starting action between
subjects with high and low expectations in the other two groups. Moreover,
subjects with high expectations of success felt more active and started act
ing earlier in the contrast group as compared to the other two groups,
whereas subjects with low expectations felt less active and started acting later
in the contrast group than in the other two groups.
Finally, these effects were not attributable to differential effects of the
manipulation on subjects’ expectations. We found an almost perfect corre-
lation between subjects expectations measured before and after the experi
ment. In addition, subjects’ expectations measured after the manipulation
did not differ among the three groups
Getting to Know an Attractive Stranger
In the next experiment (Octtingen, Bohringer, & Losert, 1995, Study 2), we
used the same salience paradigm as in the preceding study, which had been
stimulated by the work of Mischel, Ebbesen, and Zeiss (1972) as well as of
Taylor and Fiske (1978). However, instead of asking subjects to name their
own interpersonal concerns, we created the same concern for al] subjects.
The cover story told the female subjects that we were interested in daydreams
about getting to know a stranger. Then subjects were shown a picture of an
attractive young man whom they did not know, supposedly a young research:
er at the Max Planck Institute. Subjects had to indicate their expectations250 PREPARING TO ACT: MENTAL CONSTRUCTION OF THE GOAL
in terms of the probability of successfully getting to know this person, if they
had the opportunity. Then they had to go through the same procedures as
described in the preceding study. This time, however, the aspects of fantasy
fulfillment pertained to how it would be to get to know the person in the
picture (e.g., joyful, interesting), whereas the aspects of the status quo per-
tained to what would stand in the way of getting to know him (eg, being
shy, not having enough time). We also added a fourth group to the design
of this study. Subjects in this group were asked to solve arithmetic tasks creat
ing a heavy cognitive load, because we wanted to test whether the high corre:
ations between expectation and motivation observed in the preceding study
were indeed attributable to contrasting fantasy-reality images rather than
to the sheer listing of the various aspects of fantasy fulfillment and reality.
The dependent variable in the present study was the extent to which sub:
jects cared about getting to know the person on the picture. This was as-
sessed immediately after the manipulation and 1 week later.
The results were like those of the preceding experiment: A higher posi-
tive correlation between expectation and the dependent variable was ob-
tained for subjects in the fantasy-reality contrast group than for the other
groups, which did not differ from each other and which showed correlation
coefficients close to zero (including the arithmetic task control group). Fur-
thermore, subjects with high expectations cared more about getting to know
the young man in the picture and were more eager to meet him than the
respective subjects in the other groups. The opposite was true for subjects
with low expectations.
These differences between groups were more pronounced after | week
than immediately after the experiment. Over time, only subjects with high
expectations of success in the fantasy-reality contrast group kept up their
motivation to get to know the person in the picture. The remaining subjects
cared less about getting to know him and felt less eager to meet him after
1 week had passed.
Combining Work and Family Life
A third experiment used a rationalization paradigm to vary the fantasy-real
ity contrast. Subjects were female doctoral students who did not have chil
dren and who were approaching a critical age for being able to bear children.
The study supposedly was concerned with life planning. Subjects were told
that we (Oettingen, Bohringer, & Losert, 1995, Study 3) were interested in
how individuals of different ages and career paths imagine their futures.
More specifically, they were asked to produce positive daydreams or fanta:
sies about their professional and their private lives several years from now,
to let these mental images pass in front of their minds’ eyes, and then 10
describe them in writing. Thereafter, subjects rated their confidence that
their fantasies and daydreams would come true. Statements then followedPostve Fantasy and Motvtin 251
that supposedly came from interviews with working mothers. The statements
were complaints about the daily hardships of combining work and family
life. Two examples were as follows:*Again Nina had to wait all alone in front
of the nursery school because I did not get out of the office in time,” and
“At work I am always so tired and irritated because at night my little son
wakes up every other hour.
Subjects in the fantasy-reality contrast group were asked to read through
the statements, to let their associations and imaginary thoughts in response
to these statements pass freely in front of their minds’ eyes, and then to write
these images down. Subjects in the fantasy-only group were given the same
instructions as the fantasy-reality contrast group. To direct subjects’ atten
tion away from the mothers’ statements of negative reality, however, we made
subjects trivialize the mothers’ statements. We added at the beginning of the
instructions that in each of the statements, the mother was complaining about
the harsh reality of combining professional life and motherhood just as an
excuse; in fact, the mother wanted to conceal some other problems she had.
Subjects were asked to imagine what each mother’s excuse could be about.
Finally, subjects in the reality-only group were also given the same instruc
tions as the fantasy-reality contrast group. However, to force subjects’ atten.
tion away from their positive fantasies, we asked them to depict their thoughts
pertaining to the fact that the subjects themselves did not have any children
yet. After a couple of weeks, subjects rated their intention to act toward, their
thought involvement in, and their caring for the idea to combine work and
family life for themselves.
For all three dependent variables, the pattern of results resembled those
of the experiments described above: A strong positive correlation with ex
pectation was obtained for the fantasy-reality contrast group, and this was
stronger than that found for the two other groups, which did not differ from
each other. Furthermore, subjects with high expectations wanted to do more
to combine work and family life, their thoughts were more involved in this
idea, and they cared more about the idea than the respective subjects in the
other groups. However, for subjects with low expectations, the difference
between the fantasy-reality contrast group and the other two groups was
significant only for subjects’ imtention to act.
These results pertained only to subjects who fantasized about their fu
ture lives in terms of having both a profession and a child. Subjects in the
fantasy-reality contrast group who fantasized about having a job only (no
child) or about having a child only (no profession) showed, like the other
group, no correlations between expectations and the dependent variables.
Summary
In each of these studies, optimistic versus pessimistic expectations guided
motivation and action more in subjects from the fantasy-reality contrast252. PREPARING TO ACT: MENTAL CONSTRUCTION OF THE GOAL
group than in subjects from the fantasy-only or reality-only group. Further
more, in the fantasy-reality contrast group, subjects with high expectations
were more motivated and subjects with low expectations were by and large
less motivated than the respective subjects in the other experimental groups,
These effects emerged both when a salience procedure was used and when
a rationalization paradigm was employed.
The observed pattern of results was stable over periods of one to sever:
al weeks. Whether subjects followed up on their fantasies until they reached
a happy ending, we do not know. Our dependent variables focused largely
on thought involvement and on activities pertaining to getting things started.
ENGAGEMENT AND DISENGAGEMENT
The observed effects are not attributable to changes in expectations, but to
changes in motivation and action in response to expectations. Optimistic ex:
pectations, then, seem to develop their beneficial effects on motivation and
action when positive fantasy points in the direction of acting and, at the same
time, when reflections on the negative reality show the necessity of acting.
The experimental studies also revealed two moderators of the effects of op-
timistic expectations: Optimistic expectations did not yield their benefits
for motivation when subjects indulged in positive fantasies or dwelled on
the negative reality. Thus, the observed results should temper the criticism
regarding the perils of illusory optimism. Expectations seem to leave moti
vation and action largely untouched when a person's attention is focused
solely on positive fantasies or solely on negative reality. At the same time,
however, the results imply that negative thoughts about reality can be benefi
cial for adjustment. If these reality images are contrasted with positive fu
ture fantasies in the mind's eye, expectations gain relevance for action.
To engage a person in a task, then, one would need to create the fanta
sy-reality contrast plus optimistic expectations; to disengage a person from
a concern or a task, one would need to induce the fantasy-reality contrast
plus pessimistic expectations. When indulging in positive fantasies or dwell
ing on negative reality, our subjects behaved unreasonably by not thinking
and acting according to the subjective probabilities of success. Subjects with
pessimistic expectations were more engaged than their probability judgments
suggested, whereas subjects with optimistic expectations were less engaged
than their probability judgments suggested. In other words, subjects with low
expectations who indulged in positive fantasies, and thus were “pessimistic
and hopeful” at the same time, stayed more engaged than seemed justified
on the basis of their expectations. Interestingly, this was also true for sub
jects with low expectations who dwelled on the negative reality, and who
were thus “pessimistic and worrying” at the same time. Furthermore, sub
jects with high expectations who indulged in positive fantasies, and thus were
“optimistic and hopeful,” stayed less engaged than seemed justified by their
__Positive Fantosy ond Motivation 253
high expectations. They behaved like subjects with high expectations who
dwelled on the negative reality, and thus were “optimistic and worrying.”
THE FANTASY-REALITY CONTRAST IN DAILY LIFE
Our studies are not relevant to the question of how fantasy-reality contrasts,
emerge spontaneously. When people are lost in reveries, reality may have
to be quite harsh in order to induce them to start reflecting on it. Reality
is a nuisance in the sense that it forces people to take sides— that is, either
to engage in or to disengage from reaching their fantasies (depending on
their expectations). Moreover, engaging and disengaging demand mental,
affective, and behavioral efforts. Not surprisingly, then, rationalizations,
which allow people to keep daydreaming, are plentiful (Erdelyi, 1990; Kun:
da, 1990; Taylor, 1983)
‘And what about people who are lost in dwelling on the negative reali
ty? As they only have to start joyfully daydreaming, shouldn't it be easy for
them to create a fantasy-reality contrast? As it turns out, people often have
reasons not to fantasize. It may also be that people cannot spontaneously
produce positive images about a certain task (e.g,, the doctoral students who
did not spontaneously envision having both a professional life and a child),
Clearly, future studies must examine the processes by which people spon:
taneously produce fantasies to be contrasted with the grim reality
Did the successful subjects in our field studies (e.g., the studies of weight
loss and romantic success) spontaneously produce a fantasy-reality contrast,
whereas the unsuccessful subjects were lost in their positive fantasies? We
do not know the exact content of these subjects’ mental images. The results
of our experiments suggest that indulging in positive fantasies indeed leads
to less motivation than can be reasonably inferred from expectations. But
this is true only for subjects who have high expectations. For subjects with
low expectations, indulging in positive fantasies leads to more motivation
than seems reasonable, However, in the long run the latter finding might
be poor comfort for the “hopeful and pessimistic” subjects, because pessimis:
tic expectations reflect past failure (e.g., in our weight loss sample; see also
Bandura 1977; Mischel, 1973). Over the months and years of harsh confron:
tation with negative reality, then, these “hopeful and pessimistic” subjects
may have started to contrast their positive fantasies with the negative reali
ty. Thus, they may have become attuned to their low expectations, thereby
losing much of their initial motivation.
Finally, what happens to the quality of positive fantasies when people
contrast them with reflections about the negative reality? As contrasted posi
tive fantasies become something to be achieved, fanciful images should fade,
and more realizable features of the happy ending should appear in the stream
of thought. Similarly, reflections on the negative reality may change when
people contrast them with the respective positive fantasies. Instead of focus254 PREPARING TO ACT: MENTAL CONSTRUCTION OF THE GOAL
ing on the stable attributes of the status quo, they now may deal with clues
about how to change reality and with preparations for coping with possible
hardships. Thus, reflections about the negative reality contrasted with posi-
tive fantasies may lead up to what Taylor and Pham (Chapter 10, this volume;
see also Taylor & Schneider, 1989) call “process simulations,” and what Nor-
em and Cantor (1986) mark out as the strategy of defensive pessimism. These
are thoughts of future events and actions that help people to avoid antici:
pated threat and promote coping with foreseen hardship. Such thoughts and
images foster the exploration of alternative routes and hidden opportuni-
ties and help control people's actions, all of which should promote the
achievement of behavioral change.
HOW POSITIVE FANTASIES TURN INTO GOALS
One might argue that our experimental research shows nothing but the classic
notion that deviations from standards are motivating (e.g.. Duval & Wick
lund, 1972; Higgins, 1987; Locke & Latham, 1990; Markus & Nurius, 1986;
Wicklund & Gollwitzer, 1982), particularly when people have high expecta.
tions of success (Bandura, 1991; Carver & Scheier, 1981). If this were the
case, however, the arithmetic task condition in the study of getting to know
an attractive stranger should have generated motivating effects in line with
subjects’ expectations, because subjects wrote down the discrepant reality
at the outset of the experiment. This motivating effect should have been fur-
thered in the positive-fantasy-only group by the subsequent making salient
of the standard, The same argument would apply to the negative reality-only
group. If the subjects had already had a set standard or a goal, making the
discrepant reality salient should have led to motivating effects guided by sub-
jects’ expectations.
The contrasting of mental images about wish fulfillment and the status
quo do something to motivation that goes beyond the effects of the sole ex
istence of discrepancies. We know this because the mere availability of the
respective positive and negative aspects failed zo show the motivational ef
fecis of expectations. It may be, then, that when people rehearse the dis
crepant aspects in their minds’ eyes, their positive fantasies are turned into
something that definitely needs to be achieved or relinquished, depending
on subjects’ expectations. In other words, only when expectations are high
these fantasies acquire a binding quality and thus become goals: People feel
that they have to fulfill these fantasies in real life,
CONCLUSION
To come back to the question of whether realism or illusory optimism is
beneficial, it seems that both positions are true. Clearly, optimistic thinking.
bePositive Fantasy ond Motivation 255
has beneficial effects on health and performance when it is operationalized
via expectations. However, a matter-of fact view of the negative reality is cru
cial, too. What seems necessary in order to translate both into motivation
is fantasy ~a positive vision of what the future may hold. Oddly enough, a
positive vision also seems necessary to advance pessimistic expectations and
reflections on the negative reality into disengagement. Maybe we need to
consider not only the question of how much optimistic thinking there is,
or in what situation optimistic thinking occurs, but also the question of how
various kinds of thinking about the future translate optimistic expectations
into motivation and action.
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