Reodica v CA 292 SCRA 87

Facts:Isabelita Reodica was allegedly recklessly driving a van and hit

Bonsolcausing him physical injuries and damage to property amounting to
P 8,542.00. Three days after the accident a complaint was filed before the
fiscals office against the petitioner. She was charged of "Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with Slight Physical Injury."After
pleading not guilty trial ensued. RTC of Makati rendered the decision
convicting petitioner of "quasi offense of reckless imprudence, resulting in
damage to property with slight physical injuries" with arresto mayor of
6months imprisonment and a fine of P 13,542.00. Petitioner made an appeal
before the CA which reaffirmed the lower courts decision. In its motion
for reconsideration, petitioner now assails that the court erred in giving its
penalty on complex damage to property and slight physical injuries both being
light offenses over which the RTC has no
jurisdiction and it cant impose penalty in excess to what the law
authorizes.reversal of decision is still possible on ground of prescription or lack
of jurisdiction.
Issues: Whether or not the penalty imposed is correct. Whether or not reckless
imprudence resulting to damage to property and reckless imprudence resulting
to slight physical injuries are light felonies. Whether or not there is a complex
crime applying Article 48 of the RPC. Whether or not the duplicity of the
information may be questioned for thefirst time on appeal. Whether or not the
RTC of Makati has jurisdiction over the case. Whether the quasi offenses
already prescribed.
Held:1. On penalty imposed The proper penalty for reckless imprudence
resulting to slight physical injury is public censure (being the penalty next
lower in degree to arresto menor see the exception in the sixth paragraph of
Article 365 applies).The proper penalty for reckless imprudence resulting to
damage to property amounting to 8,542.00 would be arresto mayor in
minimum and medium periods.
2. Classification of each felony involved Reckless imprudence resulting to slight
physical injuries is a light felony. Public censure is classified under article 25 of
RPC as a light penalty and it belongs on the graduated scale in Article 71 of the
RPC as a penalty next lower to arresto menor. Reckless imprudence resulting to

damage to property is punishable by a correctional penalty of arresto mayor

and thus belongs to less grave felony and not as a light felony as claimed by
petitioner.
3. Rule on complex crime Art. 48 on penalty for complex crime provides that
when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when
an offense is necessary a means for committing the other, the penalty for the
most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum
period. Both offenses cannot constitute a complex crime because reckless
imprudence resulting to slight physical injuries is not either a grave or
less grave felony. Therefore each felony should be filed as a separate complaint
subject to distinct penalties.
4. Right to assail duplicity of information Rule 120, section 3 of the Rules of
Court provides that when two or more offenses are charged in a single
complaint and the accused fails to object against it before the trial, the court
may convict the accuse to as many offenses as charged and impose a penalty
for each of them. Complainant failed to make the objection before the trial
therefore the right to object has been waived.
5. Jurisdiction Jurisdiction of the court is determined by the duration of the
penalty and the fine imposed as prescribed by law to the offense charged.
Reckless imprudence resulting to slight physical injuries and reckless
imprudence resulting to damage to property is within the jurisdiction of the
MTC. The case was dismissed due to lack of jurisdiction of the RTC of Makati
and the decision of the CA was set aside. Court Ruling on Zaldivia v Reyes and
Reodica v CA on Prescription:1. Zaldivia v Reyes involves a violation of an
ordinance while in Reodica vCA the violation was against the RPC.
2. Filing of a complaint in the fiscals office involving a felony under the RPC is
sufficient to interrupt the running of prescription. But filing a complaint under
the fiscals office involving offenses punished by a special law (i.e. ordinance)
does not interrupt the running of prescription. Act3326 is the governing law on
prescriptions of crimes punishable by a special law which states that
prescription is only interrupted upon judicial proceeding.
Zaldivia v Reyes
G.R. No. 102342, July 3, 1992, 211 SCRA 277
Facts: A complaint was filed before the fiscals office constituting an offense in
violation of a city ordinance. The fiscal did not file the complaint before

the court immediately but instead filed it 3 months later. The defendants
counsel filed a motion to quash on ground that the action to file the complaint
has prescribed. The fiscal contends that the filing of the complaint before his
office already interrupts the prescription period.
Issue: Whether or not the filing of information/complaint before the fiscal office
constituting a violation against a special law/ordinance interrupts prescription.

Held: The mere filing of complaint to the fiscals office does not interrupt
the running of prescription on offenses punishable by a special law. The
complaint should have been filed within a reasonable time before the court. It
is only then that the running of the prescriptive period is interrupted.**Act
3326 is the governing law on prescription of crimes punishable by a special law
which states that prescription is only interrupted upon judicial proceeding.
G.R. No. L-38308

December 26, 1984

MILAGROS DONIO-TEVES and MANUEL MORENO, petitioners,

vs.
HON. CIPRIANO VAMENTA, JR., as Presiding Judge, Branch III, Court of First
Instance, Negros Oriental, PABLO E. CABAHUG, as City Fiscal of Dumaguete, and
JULIAN L. TEVES, respondents.
Geminiano M. Eleccion and Jose A. Arbas for petitioners.
Lenin R. Victoriano for private respondent.

133 SCRA 616 Remedial Law Criminal Procedure De Oficio Prosecution Private
Crimes
In July 1972, Julian Teves submitted a thumbmarked letter-complaint to Pablo Cabahug, the City
Fiscal of Dumaguete. The letter-complaint alleges that he is charging criminally his wife,
Milagros Donio-Teves, and his wifes paramour, Manuel Moreno, with adultery. The fiscal
conducted the initial preliminary investigation. Thereafter, Milagros and Manuel filed a motion
to dismiss on the ground that the fiscal cannot charge them in court of the crime of adultery
because there was no valid complaint filed by Teves as it appeared that the letter-complaint filed
by Teves was not appended with his affidavit. The fiscal denied the motion. Teves however filed

a second letter-complaint, this time, he attached his affidavit. The fiscal however ordered the
removal of some witnesses for the prosecution. Hence, a third letter-complaint was submitted by
Teves. It was this third letter-complaint which was used by the fiscal as Information in charging
the accused. Eventually, teh case was docketed in court the two accused were set for
arraignment.
Thereafter, Milagros and Manuel filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus to
enjoin the fiscal and Judge Cipriano Vamenta, Jr. from hearing the case. While the petition was
pending, Teves died. The accused then amended their petition to include the argument that since
Teves died, the case should be dismissed considering that adultery, the crime charged against
them, is a private crime which cannot be prosecuted without the offended party.
ISSUE: Whether or not the arguments of the accused are tenable.
HELD: No. It is true that in cases of adultery, the complaint cannot be prosecuted de oficio
without compliance with the jurisdictional requirement for the proper filing of the complaint. But
the complaint contemplated under the rule refers to the complaint filed with the court and not
that filed with the fiscals office. In this case, although the first complaint filed by Teves lacked
an affidavit, that was still alright because it was merely filed with the fiscals office. The rule was
already complied with when Teves filed his second complaint with the attached affidavit.
Further, the second letter-complaint was also sufficient in form and it apprised the accused of the
crime being imputed against them. Further still, the SC noted that the rule which states that
private crimes cannot be prosecuted without a valid complaint from the offended party was
borne out of consideration for the aggrieved party who might prefer to suffer the outrage in
silence rather than go through the scandal of a public trial. In this case, the intention of Teves to
charge the accused criminally is already evident in the first letter-complaint - and according to
the SC, this is the overriding consideration in determining whether or not a proper complaint,
with the intention to criminally charge the accused, has been filed by an offended party.
Anent the issue of the death of Teves, his death is already immaterial. It should be noted that in
private crimes, the participation of the offended party is essential not for the maintenance of the
criminal action but solely for the initiation thereof. Once a private crime is properly initiated, the
law will be applied in full force beyond the control of, and in spite of the complainant, his death
notwithstanding. Further, death of the offended party is not a ground for extinguishment of
criminal liability whether total or partial.
Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

REGINO SY CATIIS,
Petitioner,

G.R. NO. 153979

Present:

- versus -

PANGANIBAN, C.J.,
(Chairperson)
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR., and
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.

COURT OF APPEALS (17th

Division), REYNALDO A.
PATACSIL, ENRICO D. LOPEZ,
LUZVIMINDA A. PORTUGUEZ
and THE BUREAU OF JAIL
MANAGEMENT AND PENOLOGY,
NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION,
MAKATI CITY JAIL, THROUGH
ITS OFFICER-IN-CHARGE WARDEN,
CHIEF INSP. ISAGANI M. GAMINO, Promulgated:
Respondents.
February 6, 2006
x --------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Regino Sy Catiis

(petitioner) seeking to nullify the Decision 1[1] dated June 14, 2002 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) which sustained the Order dated December 18, 2001 of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 96, Quezon City,2[2] allowing private respondents to post bail

1[1] Penned by Justice Roberto A. Barrios, concurred in by Justices Bienvenido

L.Reyes and Edgardo F. Sundiam.

and the Order dated December 21, 2001 of the Executive Judge of the same
court3[3] approving the surety bond posted by respondents and their release.
Petitioner filed a letter-complaint dated May 28, 2001 against private
respondents Reynaldo A. Patacsil, Enrico D. Lopez, Luzviminda A. Portuguez and
a certain Margielyn Tafalla before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon
City, for violation of Art. 315, No. 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code in relation to
Presidential Decree No. 1689 (syndicated estafa) and other related offenses. The
complaint was docketed as I.S. No. 01-10686. Private respondents, except for
Tafalla, filed their joint counter-affidavits denying the charges against them.
On October 10, 2001, Assistant City Prosecutor Alessandro D. Jurado issued
a Resolution4[4] finding the existence of a probable cause for syndicated Estafa
against private respondents and Tafalla with no bail recommended. The Resolution
was approved by City Prosecutor Claro A. Arellano.
An Information was filed on the same day by Prosecutor Jurado against
private respondents and Tafalla before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City and
raffled off to Branch 96, which reads:
The undersigned accuses REYNALDO A. PATACSIL, ENRICO D. LOPEZ,
LUZVIMINDA A. PORTUGUEZ and MARGIELYN TAFALLA, of the crime of Estafa under
Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revise Penal Code in relation to P.D. 1689, committed as
follows:
2[2] Penned by Judge Lucas P.Bersamin (now Associate Justice of the Court of
Appeals); Docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-01-105430.
3[3] Per Judge Monina A. Zenarosa.
4[4] Rollo, pp. 89-94.

That on or about the 3rd week of January 2000 or subsequent thereto in

Quezon City and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring and confederating together and all of them mutually helping
and aiding one another in a syndicated manner consisting of five (5) or more
persons through corporations registered with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) and/or unregistered foreign entities with intention of carrying
out the unlawful or illegal act, transaction, enterprise or scheme, with intent to
gain and by means of fraud and deceit, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously defraud REGINO SY CATIIS and several other persons in the
following manner, to wit: by falsely or fraudulently pretending or representing, in
a transaction or series of transactions, which they made with the Complainant and
the public in general to the effect that they were in a legitimate business of foreign
exchange trading successively or simultaneously operating under the following
name and style of Asia Profits Philippines, Incorporation, Winggold Management
Philippines Incorporated, Belkin Management Consultancy, Inc. and/or Belkin
Profits Limited or other unregistered foreign entities induced and succeeded in
inducing complainant and several other persons to give and deliver and in fact,
the latter and said persons gave and delivered to said accused the amount of at
least US$ 123,461.14 or its equivalent in Philippine Pesos on the strength of said
manifestations and representations, the accused knowing fully well that the
above-named corporations registered with the SEC and/or those unregistered
foreign entities are not licensed nor authorized to engage in foreign exchange
trading corporations and that such manifestations and representations to transact
in foreign exchange were false and fraudulent that resulted to the damage and
prejudice of the complainant and other persons and that the defraudation pertains
to funds solicited from the public in general by such corporations/associations.5[5]

On November 7, 2001, Judge Lucas P. Bersamin issued an Order finding probable

cause against all the accused and approved the recommendation of the City
Prosecutor that the charge be non-bailable. The corresponding warrants of arrest
were issued.6[6]
A return7[7] on the warrant of arrest was made by PO3 Joselito M. Coronel,
PNP Criminal Investigation and Detection Group, Camp Crame, Quezon City, with

5[5] Id., at p. 87.

6[6] Id., at p. 98.
7[7] Id., at p. 100.

the information that except for Margielyn Tafalla, who remained at large, all other
accused were already detained at the Makati City Jail.
On November 12, 2001, a notice of hearing was issued by Judge Bersamin
setting the case for arraignment on November 20, 2001. Private respondents on the
same day filed an urgent motion to fix bail.
On November 20, 2001, private respondents, when arraigned, entered pleas
of not guilty. The Prosecution was required to file their comment/opposition on
private respondents motion to fix bail which they did through the Private
Prosecutor with the conformity of Assistant City Prosecutor Arthur O.
Malabaguio.8[8]
On December 18, 2001, Judge Bersamin issued an Order reconsidering his
earlier Order of November 7, 2001 by declaring that the offense charged is
bailable. In finding that the accused are entitled to bail, Judge Bersamin made the
following disquisitions:
xxx
In order to impose the penalty of life imprisonment to death under Sec. 1,
P.D. No. 1689, the estafa or swindling must be committed by a syndicate. The
law plainly states that a syndicate consists of five or more persons formed with
the intention of carrying out the unlawful or illegal act, transaction, enterprise, or
scheme, and the defraudation results in the misappropriation of money or of funds
solicited by corporations/associations from the general public.
Herein, only four persons are actually charged. Consequently, the estafa
charged has no relation to the crime punished with life imprisonment to death
under Sec. 1, Presidential Decree No. 1689.
The allegation of the information that the accused conspired with each
other in a syndicated manner consisting of five (5) or more persons through
8[8] Id., at pp. 110-118.

corporations registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)

and/or unregistered foreign entities with intention of carrying out the unlawful or
illegal act, transaction, enterprise or scheme cannot change the juridical nature of
the offense charged. If the Government has chosen to indict only four
persons, without more, the obvious reason is that only the persons actually
charged were involved in the commission of the offense. As such, there was no
syndicate.
In all likelihood, the allegation of in a syndicated manner consisting of
five (5) or more persons is made herein solely for having bail denied. Whether
that is true or not is beside the point, but the Court cannot now lend itself to such
a likelihood which, according to the foregoing disquisition, lacks legal basis. For
that matter, the Court must recant its approval of the recommendation to deny
bail.
The Prosecution represents that the Supreme Court has affirmed in People
vs. Romero a conviction under Presidential Decree No.1689 even if the accused
charged is only less than five (5) accused.
Such representation is grossly misleading. Far to the contrary, in
People v. Romero, where two accused were actually charged but only one was
ultimately penalized due to the death of the other accused during the pendency of
the case, the Supreme Court did not impose the higher penalty of life
imprisonment to death because the Prosecution failed to clearly establish that the
corporation was a syndicate, as defined under the law, holding, instead, that,
since the crime was not committed by a syndicate, the proper penalty is that
provided in the second paragraph of Sec.1, P.D. No. 1689, to wit:
When not committed by a syndicate as above defined, the
penalty imposable shall be reclusion temporal to reclusion
perpetua if the amount of the fraud exceeds 100,000.00 pesos.
Yet, one should ask: Where, as here, the amount alleged in the
information clearly exceeds 100,000.00 pesos such that the second paragraph of
Sec. 1, P.D. No. 1689, is applicable, is the offense still bailable considering that
the range of the imposable penalty is from reclusion temporal to reclusion
perpetua?
The answer is in the affirmative.
Under Rule 110, 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Information
should aver, among others, the qualifying and aggravating circumstances of the
offense in ordinary and concise language and not necessarily in the language
used in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of common
understanding to know what offense is being charged as well as its qualifying and
aggravating circumstance and for the court to pronounce judgment.

A perusal of the information discloses that no aggravating circumstance

has been alleged in the information. The omission consequently precludes the
State from proving any aggravating circumstance which will raise the penalty to
its maximum period of reclusion perpetua. The Court itself is also prohibited
from imposing reclusion perpetua, since the requirement of complete allegations
of the particulars in the indictment is based on the right of the accused to be
fully informed of the nature of the charges against him so that he may adequately
prepare for his defense pursuant to the due process clause of the Constitution.
As stated in People v. Romero, supra, the penalty under the second
paragraph of Sec.1, P.D. No. 1689, when there is neither mitigating or
aggravating circumstance attendant, is the medium period of reclusion
temporal, that is from sixteen (16) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years.
Hence, the offense charged is unquestionably bailable.9[9]

On December 26, 2001, petitioner filed with the CA a petition for certiorari
with prayer for temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction10[10] assailing the Order of Judge Bersamin allowing private
respondents to post bail.
On the same day, then Associate Justice Romeo J. Callejo Sr., 11[11] Justice
on Duty Per Office Memorandum of Presiding Justice, issued a Resolution 12[12]
granting petitioners prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order, thus,
private respondents and all those acting for and in their behalf were temporarily
restrained from enforcing and implementing the Order of Judge Bersamin and from
further proceeding in Criminal Case No. 01-105430.
9[9] Id., at pp. 54-57
10[10] Docketed as CA G.R. SP No. 68287.
11[11] Now a Member of this Court.
12[12] Rollo, p. 166.

However, unknown to petitioner, private respondents had already filed or

posted their surety bonds on December 21, 2001 with the Office of Executive
Judge Monina A. Zenarosa13[13] who approved the same on the same day and
ordered the immediate release of private respondents unless held for other lawful
cause.14[14] Petitioner filed a supplemental petition with the CA on January 14,
2002 assailing the jurisdiction of Judge Zenarosa in issuing the Order dated
December 21, 2001.
On June 14, 2002, the CA issued its assailed decision denying due course to
the petition and dismissed the same after it found no grave abuse of discretion
committed by Judge Bersamin and Judge Zenarosa in issuing the assailed orders.
Hence, the instant petition filed by petitioner raising the following issues, to
wit:
A

Whether or not the issuance of the questioned Decision promulgated June

14, 2002 by the 17th Division of the Court of Appeals sustaining the validity of the
1st assailed Order dated December 18, 2001 of Hon. Presiding Judge Lucas P.
Bersamin of Branch 96 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City ruling that
there should be at least five (5) persons that must be charged under Section 1,
Presidential Decree No. 1689 is not in accordance with law or with applicable
decisions of this Honorable Supreme Court.
B
Whether or not the questioned Decision sanctioning the grant of bail in the
1st assailed Order dated December 18, 2001 of Hon. Presiding Judge Lucas P.
13[13] Now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals.

14[14] Rollo, p. 58.

Bersamin of Branch 96 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City violated

Section 7, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and actually
departed from the accepted and usual course in the determination of bailability of
criminal offenses.
C
Whether or not the questioned Decision sustaining the order of release in
the 2 assailed Order dated December 21 of Hon. Executive Judge Monina A.
Zenarosa of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City violated Section 17, Rule
114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure15[15]
nd

Anent the first issue, petitioner contends that under Section 1 of P.D. No.
1689, the term any person must be understood and read in its singular meaning
so that even only one person can be indicted for committing estafa or other forms
of swindling in relation to P.D. No. 1689 citing the case of People v. Romero; that
Judge Bersamin erred when he already computed the possible penalty in case of
private respondents conviction; that the capital nature of an offense for the
purpose of bailability is determined by the penalty prescribed by law, not by
penalty which may actually be imposed since the latter requires a consideration of
the evidence on trial; that since no evidence had yet been presented by both
prosecution and defense, Judge Bersamin has again shown bias by already
computing the imposable penalty just to stretch the application of the law and
questionably grant bail in favor of private respondents.
We are not persuaded.
The CA found that the assailed order of Judge Bersamin cannot be
characterized as one issued with grave abuse of discretion for he correctly
15[15] Id., at. p. 19.

determined that the Information did not charge a syndicated Estafa; that with only
four charged in the information, it could not be considered as committed by a
syndicate which must consist of five or more persons and he cannot be faulted for
that.
Section 1 of P.D. No. 1689, increasing the penalty for certain forms of
swindling or estafa, provides:
SECTION 1. Any person or persons who shall commit estafa or other
forms of swindling as defined in Articles 315 and 316 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended, shall be punished by life imprisonment to death if the swindling
(estafa) is committed by a syndicate consisting of five or more persons formed
with the intention of carrying out the unlawful or illegal act, transaction,
enterprise or scheme, and the defraudation results in the misappropriation of
moneys contributed by stockholders, or members of rural banks cooperatives,
"samahang nayon(s)," or farmers associations, or of funds solicited by
corporations/associations from the general public.
When not committed by a syndicate as above defined, the penalty imposable shall
be reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua if the amount of the fraud exceeds
100,000 pesos.
Clearly, P.D. No. 1689 penalizes offenders with life imprisonment to death regardless of the
amount involved, provided that a syndicate committed the crime. A syndicate is defined in the
same law as consisting of five or more persons formed with the intention of carrying out the
unlawful or illegal act, transaction, enterprise or scheme. Under the second paragraph, it is
provided that if the offenders are not members of a syndicate, they shall nevertheless be held
liable for the acts prohibited by the law but they shall be penalized by reclusion temporal to
reclusion perpetua if the amount of the fraud is more than P100,000.00.

Petitioners interpretation that the term any person in the first paragraph of
section 1 could mean that even one person can be indicted for syndicated estafa is
contrary to the provision of the law. It bears stressing that the law must be
considered as a whole, just as it is necessary to consider a sentence in its entirety in

order to grasp its true meaning.16[16] It is a dangerous practice to base

construction upon only a part of a section since one portion may be qualified by the
other portion.17[17] In fact, there is no need for any construction or interpretation
of P. D. No. 1689 since the law is clear and free from any doubt or ambiguity.
Section 1 of P.D. No. 1689 has defined what constitutes a syndicate and such
definition is controlling. Where a requirement is made in explicit and
unambiguous terms, no discretion is left to the judiciary. It must see to it that its
mandate is obeyed.18[18]
In this case, the Information specifically charged only four persons without
specifying any other person who had participated in the commission of the crime
charged, thus, based on the definition of syndicate under the law, the crime charged
was not committed by a syndicate. We find no reversible error committed by the
CA when it upheld the ruling of Judge Bersamin that with only four persons
actually charged, the estafa charged has no relation to the crime punished with life
imprisonment to death under section 1 of P. D. No. 1689.
The wordings in the information that the accused conspired with each other
in a syndicated manner consisting of five (5) or more persons through
corporations registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
and/or unregistered foreign entities with intention of carrying out the unlawful or
illegal act, transaction, enterprise or scheme is not sufficient compliance with the
requirements of the law on what constitute a syndicate. It bears stressing that the
16[16] Judge Noli C. Diaz, Statutory Construction, 2001 edition, p. 35.
17[17] Id.
18[18] Luzon Surety Co., Inc. v. De Garcia, 140 Phil. 509, 514 (1969).

first paragraph of the accusatory portion of the Information charges only four
persons. To repeat, P.D. No. 1689 has provided for the definition of a syndicate
and it is controlling. As correctly found by the trial court, if the government has
chosen to indict only four persons, without more, the obvious reason is that only
the persons actually charged were involved in the commission of the offense, thus,
there was no syndicate.

Petitioners reliance in People v. Romero to support his argument is

misleading.

First, the issue of whether only one person can be indicted for

syndicated estafa was not an issue in the Romero case. Secondly, the Court did not
impose the penalty of life imprisonment to death on the accused since the
prosecution failed to clearly establish that the corporation was a syndicate as
defined under the law. There is no other way of establishing a syndicate under
P.D. No. 1689 than by the adherence to the definition provided by law.
Since the crime charged was not committed by a syndicate as defined under
the law, the penalty of life imprisonment to death cannot be imposed on private
respondents. Judge Bersamin is correct when he ruled that

private respondents

could only be punished with reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua in case of

conviction since the amount of the fraud exceeds P100,000.00. The next question
is, whether Judge Bersamin is correct in finding that the crime charged is bailable
despite that the imposable penalty ranges from reclusion temporal to reclusion
perpetua?
The Court answers in the affirmative.

Sections 8 and 9 of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,

which took effect on December 1, 2000, provide:

Sec. 8. Designation of the offense. The complaint or information shall state

the designation of the offense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions
constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances.
If there is no designation of the offense, reference shall be made to the section or
subsection of the statute punishing it.
Sec. 9. Cause of the accusations. The acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be
stated in ordinary and concise language and not necessarily in the language used
in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding
to know what offense is being charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating
circumstances and for the court to pronounce judgment.

Clearly, it is now a requirement that the aggravating as well as the

qualifying circumstances be expressly and specifically alleged in the complaint or
information. Otherwise, they cannot be considered by the trial court in their
judgment, even, if they are subsequently proved during trial.19[19] A reading of
the Information shows that there was no allegation of any aggravating
circumstance, thus Judge Bersamin is correct when he found that the lesser penalty,
i.e., reclusion temporal, is imposable in case of conviction.
Section 13, Article III of the Constitution provides that all persons, except
those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of
guilt is strong, shall before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties or be
released on recognizance as may be provided by law. In pursuance thereof, Section
4 of Rule 114, as amended, now provides that all persons in custody shall, before
conviction by a regional trial court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, be admitted to bail as a matter of right. Since the
imposable penalty on private respondents, in case of conviction, is reclusion
19[19] People v. Casitas, Jr., 445 Phil. 407, 427 (2003); People v. Bragat, 416 Phil.
829, 844 (2001).

temporal, they are entitled to bail as a matter of right. Notably, Judge Bersamin
issued his Order finding the crime charge bailable and fixed the amount of
P150,000.00 each for the provisional liberty of private respondents only after
petitioner had submitted their comment/opposition to petitioners motion to fix
bail.

Petitioner claims that the Order of Judge Bersamin allowing private

respondents to post bail already prejudged the case; that he summarily decided the
eventual and imminent dismissal of the criminal case without even the reception of
evidence; that such prejudgment came from a ruling on a mere issue of bail.
Such argument is baseless. The Order was issued on the basis that the
allegations in the Information do not establish that the crime charged was
committed by a syndicate as defined under the law where the penalty of life
imprisonment to death could be imposed.

Nowhere in the Order did Judge

Bersamin state that the act complained of is not punishable at all.

Petitioner next contends that private respondents filing of bail with
Executive Judge Monina Zenarosa, other than Branch 96 where the case is
pending, is questionable and not in accordance with Section 17, Rule 11420[20] of
the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure; that the records show that when private
respondents filed their bail with Judge Zenarosa, Branch 96 was open and available
as private respondents through their representative were able to pay for the
20[20] SECTION 17. Bail, where filed. (a) Bail in the amount fixed may be filed with the
court where the case is pending, or, in the absence or unavailability of the judge thereof,
with another branch of the same court within the province or city. If the accused is arrested
in a province, city or municipality other than where the case is pending, bail may be filed
also with any regional trial court of said place, or, if no judge thereof is available, with any
metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial judge or municipal circuit trial judge therein.

issuance of the certifications on the Information and the Order dated December 18,
2001; that petitioners counsel and the Assistant City Prosecutor Arthur
Malabaguio had personally received their respective copies of the Order dated
December 18, 2001 inside the staff room of Branch 96 and they even attested that
Judge Bersamin was physically present on December 21, 2002, the day private
respondents filed their bail bond with Judge Zenarosa; that despite these
circumstances, Judge Zenarosa still exercised jurisdiction over the bail filed by
private respondents and issued the Order dated December 21, 2001 approving the
surety bonds and ordering the release of private respondents; that the CAs
justification that Judge Zenarosa accepted the bail bond due to the fact that Judge
Bersamin was momentarily out of his office or premises at the time of posting of
the bond was not borne by the records.
We are not persuaded.
Section 17, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides
that bail in the amount fixed may be filed with the court where the case is pending,
or, in the absence or unavailability of the judge thereof, with another branch of the
same court within the province or city. While Branch 96 is open and available on
the day private respondents posted their bail with Judge Zenarosa, it does not
necessarily follow that Judge Bersamin was available at that precise moment.
Although it is alleged in the supplemental petition prepared by petitioners counsel,
Atty. Rodeo Nuez, with the conformity of Prosecutor Malabaguio filed before the
CA that both of them saw Judge Bersamin discharging his function on that day, it is
not under oath. Moreover, it is not specifically stated in the supplemental petition
that at the exact time Judge Zenarosa approved the bail, Judge Bersamin was

available. Thus, petitioner failed to rebut the presumption that official duty had
been regularly performed21[21] by Judge Zenarosa under the rules.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED.

The

assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 14, 2002 is AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
Chairperson
(No part)
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO

ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.

Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
21[21] Rules of Court, Rule 131, Section 3(m).

Associate Justice

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified

that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice

LACSON

VS.

EXECUTIVE

SECRETARY

Facts:
Eleven persons believed to be members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang, an organized crime
syndicate involved in bank robberies, were slain by elements of the Anti-Bank Robbery
andIntelligence Task Group (ABRITG). Among those included in the ABRITG were
petitioners

and

petitioner-intervenors.

Acting on a media expose of SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes, a member of the Criminal
Investigation Command, that what actually transpired was a summary execution and not a
shoot-out between the Kuratong Baleleng gang members and the ABRITG, Ombudsman
Aniano Desiertoformed a panel of investigators to investigate the said incident. Said panel
found the incident as a legitimate police operation. However, a review board modified the
panels finding and recommended the indictment for multiple murder against twenty-six
respondents including herein petitioner, charged as principal, and herein petitionerintervenors, charged as accessories. After a reinvestigation, the Ombudsman filed amended
informations before the Sandiganbayan, where petitioner was charged only as an
accessory.
The accused filed separate motions questioning the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan,
asserting that under the amended informations, the cases fall within the jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Court pursuant to Section 2 of R.A. 7975. They contend that the said law
limited the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to cases where one or ore of the principal
accused are government officals with Salary Grade 27 or higher, or PNP officials with rank

of Chief Superintendent or higher. Thus, they did not qualify under said requisites. However,
pending resolution of their motions, R.A. 8249 was approved amending the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan by deleting the word principal from the phrase principal accused in
Section

of

R.A.

7975.

Petitioner questions the constitutionality of Section 4 of R.A. 8249, including Section 7 which
provides that the said law shall apply to all cases pending in any court over which trial has
not

begun

as

of

the

approval

hereof.

Issues:
(1) Whether or not Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 violate the petitioners right to due process
and the equal protection clause of the Constitution as the provisions seemed to have been
introduced for the Sandiganbayan to continue to acquire jurisdiction over the Kuratong
Baleleng

case.

(2) Whether or not said statute may be considered as an ex-post facto statute.
(3) Whether or not the multiple murder of the alleged members of the Kuratong Baleleng
was committed in relation to the office of the accused PNP officers which is essential to the
determination whether the case falls within the Sandiganbayans or Regional Trial Courts
jurisdiction.
RULING:
Petitioner and intervenors posture that Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 violate their right to
equal protection of the law is too shallow to deserve merit. No concrete evidence and
convincing argument were presented to warrant such a declaration. Every classification
made by the law is presumed reasonable and the party who challenges the law
must present proof of arbitrariness. The classification is reasonable and not arbitrary when
the following concur: (1) it must rest on substantial distinction; (2) it must be germane to the
purpose of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing conditions only, and (4) must apply
equally to all members of the same class; all of which are present in this case.
Paragraph a of Section 4 provides that it shall apply to all cases involving certain public
officials and under the transitory provision in Section 7, to all cases pending in any court.
Contrary to petitioner and intervenors argument, the law is not particularly directed only to

the Kuratong Baleleng cases. The transitory provision does not only cover cases which are
in

the

Sandiganbayan

but

also

in

any

court.

There is nothing ex post facto in R.A. 8249. Ex post facto law, generally, provides retroactive
effect of penal laws. R.A. 8249 is not apenal law. It is a substantive law on jurisdiction which
is not penal in character. Penal laws are those acts of the Legislature which prohibit certain
acts and establish penalties for their violations or those that define crimes and provide for
their punishment. R.A. 7975, as regards the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction, its mode of
appeal and other procedural matters, has been declared by the Court as not a penal law,
but clearly a procedural statute, one which prescribes rules of procedure by which courts
applying laws of all kinds can properly administer justice. Not being a penal law, the
retroactive

application

of

R.A.

8249

cannot

be

challenged

as

unconstitutional.

In People vs. Montejo, it was held that an offense is said to have been committed in relation
to the office if it is intimately connected with the office of the offender and perpetrated while
he was in the performance of his official functions. Such intimate relation must be alleged in
the information which is essential in determining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
However, upon examination of the amended information, there was no specific allegation of
facts that the shooting of the victim by the said principal accused was intimately related to
the discharge of their official duties as police officers. Likewise, the amended information
does not indicate that the said accused arrested and investigated the victim and then killed
the latter while in their custody. The stringent requirement that the charge set forth with such
particularity as will reasonably indicate the exact offense which the accused is alleged to
have

committed

in

relation

to

his

office

was

not

established.

Consequently, for failure to show in the amended informations that the charge of murder
was intimately connected with the discharge of official functions of the accused PNP
officers, the offense charged in the subject criminal cases is plain murder and, therefore,
within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court and not the
Sandiganbayan.

BlogThis!Share to TwitterShare to FacebookShare to Pinterest

Labels: criminal procedure digests

G.R. No. L-31665 August 6, 1975 LEONARDO ALMEDA v. HON. ONOFRE A.

VILLALUZ DIGEST CASTRO, J.:

FACTS:
The petitioner Leonardo Almeda (alias Nardong Paa) was charged, together with five
others, with the crime of qualified theft of a motor vehicle (criminal case 285-Pasay) in
the Circuit Criminal Court of Pasig, Rizal, presided by the respondent Judge Onofre
Villauz. The amount of the bond recommended for the provisional release of Almeda
was P15,000, and this was approved by the respondent judge with a direction that it be
posted entirely in cash.
At the hearing of February 18, 1970, Almeda asked the trial court to allow him to post a
surety bond in lieu of the cash bond required of him. This request was denied, and so
was an oral motion for reconsideration, on the ground that the amended information
imputed habitual delinquency and recidivism on the part of Almeda. Hence, the present
special civil action for certiorari with preliminary injunction.
ISSUE:
Whether the respondent judge has the authority to require a strictly cash bond and
disallow the petitioner's attempt to post a surety bond for his provisional liberty.
HELD:
As defined by section 1 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, bail is "the security required
and given for the release of a person who is in the custody of the law, that he will
appear before any court in which his appearance may be required as stipulated in the
bail bond or recognizance." The purpose of requiring bail is to relieve an accused from
imprisonment until his conviction and yet secure his appearance at the trial.
Coming to the issue at hand, the amount fixed for bail, while reasonable if
considered in terms of surety or property bonds, may be excessive if demanded in the
form of cash. A surety or property bond does not require an actual financial outlay on
the part of the bondsman or the property owner, and in the case of the bondsman the
bond may be obtained by the accused upon the payment of a relatively small premium.
Only the reputation or credit standing of the bondsman or the expectancy of the price at
which the property can be sold, is placed in the hands of the court to guarantee the
production of the body of the accused at the various proceedings leading to his
conviction or acquittal. Upon the other hand, the posting of a cash bond would entail a
transfer of assets into the possession of the court, and its procurement could work
untold hardship on the part of the accused as to have the effect of altogether denying
him his constitutional right to bail.

But while we repudiate the particular measure adopted by the respondent judge,
we cannot fault the motive that caused him to demur to the petitioner's offer of a surety
bond. Based on the petitioner's past record, 7 the range of his career in crime weighs
heavily against letting him off easily on a middling amount of bail. The likelihood of his
jumping bail or committing other harm to the citizenry while on provisional liberty is a
consideration that simply cannot be ignored.
Fortunately, the court is not without devices with which to meet the situation.
First, it could increase the amount of the bail bond to an appropriate level. Second, as
part of the power of the court over the person of the accused and for the purpose of
discouraging likely commission of other crimes by a notorious defendant while on
provisional liberty, the latter could be required, as one of the conditions of his bail bond,
to report in person periodically to the court and make an accounting of his movements.
And third, the accused might be warned, though this warning is not essential to the
requirements of due process, that under the 1973 Constitution 8 "Trial may proceed
notwithstanding his absence provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to
appear is unjustified."

PhilippineRabbitvs.People
G.R.No.147703April14,2004
PANGANIBAN,J.:
Facts:NapoleonRomanwasfoundguiltyandconvictedofthecrimeofrecklessimprudence
resultingtotriplehomicide,multiplephysicalinjuriesanddamagetopropertyandwassentenced
tosufferimprisonmentandtopaydamages.Thecourtfurtherruledthatintheeventofthe
insolvencyofaccused,petitionershallbeliableforthecivilliabilitiesoftheaccused.Evidently,
thejudgmentagainstaccusedhadbecomefinalandexecutory.
Admittedly,accusedhadjumpedbailandremainedatlarge.TheCAruledthattheinstitutionof
acriminalcaseimpliedtheinstitutionalsoofthecivilactionarisingfromtheoffense.Thus,once
determinedinthecriminalcaseagainsttheaccusedemployee,theemployerssubsidiarycivil
liability as set forth in Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code becomes conclusive and
enforceable.
Issue:Whetherornotanemployer,whodutifullyparticipatedinthedefenseofitsaccused
employee,mayappealthejudgmentofconvictionindependentlyoftheaccused.
Held:No.Itiswellestablishedinourjurisdictionthattheappellatecourtmay,uponmotionor
motuproprio,dismissanappealduringitspendencyiftheaccusedjumpsbail.Thisruleisbased
ontherationalethatappellantslosetheirstandingincourtwhentheyabscond.
2000RulesofCriminalProcedurehasclarifiedwhatcivilactionsaredeemedinstitutedina
criminalprosecution.Whenacriminalactionisinstituted,thecivilactionfortherecoveryof

civilliabilityarisingfromtheoffensechargedshallbedeemedinstitutedwiththecriminalaction
unlesstheoffendedpartywaivesthecivilaction,reservestherighttoinstituteitseparatelyor
institutesthecivilactionpriortothecriminalaction.
Only the civil liability of the accused arising from the crime charged is deemed impliedly
institutedinacriminalaction;thatis,unlesstheoffendedpartywaivesthecivilaction,reserves
the right to institute it separately, or institutes it prior to the criminal action. Hence, the
subsidiarycivilliabilityoftheemployerunderArticle103oftheRevisedPenalCodemaybe
enforcedbyexecutiononthebasisofthejudgmentofconvictionmetedouttotheemployee.
Whatisdeemedinstitutedineverycriminalprosecutionisthecivilliabilityarisingfromthe
crimeordelictperse,butnotthoseliabilities arisingfromquasidelicts,contractsorquasi
contracts.Infact,evenifacivilactionisfiledseparately,the exdelicto civilliabilityinthe
criminal prosecution remains, and the offended party may subject to the control of the
prosecutorstillinterveneinthecriminalaction,inordertoprotecttheremainingcivilinterest
therein.
The cases dealing with the subsidiary liability of employers uniformly declare that, strictly
speaking,theyarenotpartiestothecriminalcasesinstitutedagainsttheiremployees.Although
insubstanceandineffect,theyhaveaninteresttherein,thisfactshouldbeviewedinthelightof
theirsubsidiaryliability.Whiletheymayassisttheiremployeestotheextentofsupplyingthe
latterslawyers,asinthepresentcase,theformercannotactindependentlyontheirownbehalf,
butcanonlydefendtheaccused.
Asamatteroflaw,thesubsidiaryliabilityofpetitionernowaccrues.UnderArticle103ofthe
RevisedPenalCode,employersaresubsidiarilyliablefortheadjudicatedcivilliabilitiesoftheir
employeesintheeventofthelattersinsolvency.Thus,inthedispositiveportionofitsdecision,
the trial court need not expressly pronounce the subsidiary liability of the employer. Inthe
absenceofanycollusionbetweentheaccusedemployeeandtheoffendedparty,thejudgmentof
convictionshouldbindthepersonwhoissubsidiarilyliable.Ineffectandimplication,thestigma
ofacriminalconvictionsurpassesmerecivilliability.
Toallowemployerstodisputethecivilliabilityfixedinacriminalcasewouldenablethemto
amend,nullifyordefeatafinaljudgmentrenderedbyacompetentcourt.Bythesametoken,to
allowthemtoappealthefinalcriminalconvictionoftheiremployeeswithoutthelattersconsent
wouldalsoresultinimproperlyamending,nullifyingordefeatingthejudgment.Thedecision
convictinganemployeeinacriminalcaseisbindingandconclusiveupontheemployernotonly
withregardtotheformerscivilliability,butalsowithregardtoitsamount.Theliabilityofan
employercannotbeseparatedfromthatoftheemployee.
Thesubsidiaryliabilityofpetitionerisincidentaltoanddependentonthepecuniarycivilliability
oftheaccusedemployee.Sincethecivilliabilityofthelatterhasbecomefinalandenforceable
byreasonofhisflight,thentheformerssubsidiarycivilliabilityhasalsobecomeimmediately
enforceable.Respondentiscorrectinarguingthattheconceptofsubsidiaryliabilityishighly
contingentontheimpositionoftheprimarycivilliability.

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 116463. June 10, 2003]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES thru the DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS and
HIGHWAYS (DPWH), petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. AMANDA VALERACABIGAO in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 73, Malabon,
Metro Manila, and NAVOTAS INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before this Court is a Petition for Review of the Decision22[1] of the Court of Appeals dated 18
July 1994, in CA-G.R. CV No. 33094.23[2] The Court of Appeals affirmed the Order of the
Regional Trial Court of Malabon (Malabon trial court) which denied the motion of petitioner
to consolidate Civil Case No. 1153-MN pending before it with Criminal Cases Nos. 1688916900 filed with the Sandiganbayan. This petition seeks to restrain permanently the Malabon
trial court from further hearing Civil Case No. 1153-MN and to dismiss the case.
The Antecedent Facts
Private respondent Navotas Industrial Corporation (NIC) is a corporation engaged in dredging
operations throughout the Philippines. On 27 November 1985, then Public Works and Highways
Minister Jesus Hipolito requested former President Ferdinand E. Marcos to release P800 million
to finance the immediate implementation of dredging, flood control and related projects in Metro
Manila, Bulacan, Pampanga and Leyte. Of the total funds approved for release, P615 million
went to the National Capital Region of the Ministry24[3] of Public Works and Highways
(DPWH).

22[1] Penned by Associate Justice Serafin V. C. Guingona with Associate Justices

Gloria C. Paras and Minerva G. Reyes concurring.
23[2] Republic of the Philippines thru the DPWH v. Hon. Amanda Valera-Cabigao, in
her capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 73, Malabon, Metro
Manila and Navotas Industrial Corporation.
24[3] Later renamed into a Department.

The DPWH allocated the P615 million to several projects covered by twenty-one contracts. The
DPWH awarded one of the contractors, NIC, P194,454,000.00 worth of dredging work in four
contracts for completion within 350 calendar days.
NIC alleges that the dredging work proceeded pursuant to specific work schedules and plan
approved by DPWH. NIC contends that it accomplished 95.06 percent of the required total
volume of work or P184,847,970.00 worth of services based on an alleged evaluation by DPWH.
However, NIC maintains that DPWH paid only 79.22 percent of the accomplished work, leaving
a balance of P30,799,676.00.
On 20 September 1988, NIC filed a complaint for sum of money with the Malabon trial court
against the Republic of the Philippines, thru the DPWH. The case, docketed as Civil Case No.
1153-MN, was raffled to Branch 73 of the court, presided by Judge Amanda Valera-Cabigao.
In its Answer, petitioner contends that NIC is not entitled to the amount claimed. Soon after the
February 1986 Revolution, DPWH created a fact-finding committee to audit the flood control
projects in the National Capital Region, Bulacan, Pampanga and Leyte. Then DPWH Minister
Rogaciano Mercado, who replaced Minister Jesus Hipolito, ordered the suspension of all projects
funded by special budget released or issued before the snap elections on February 1986, pending
inventory and evaluation of these projects.
Petitioner contends that upon verification and investigation, the DPWH fact-finding committee
discovered that the dredging contracts of NIC with DPWH were null and void. Petitioner claims
that NIC worked on the project five or six months before the award of the dredging contracts to
NIC. The contracts of NIC were awarded without any public bidding. Moreover, DPWH
discovered that NIC, through its corporate officers, connived with some DPWH officials in
falsifying certain public documents to make it appear that NIC had completed a major portion of
the project, when no dredging work was actually performed. The scheme enabled NIC to collect
from DPWH P146,962,072.47 as payment for work allegedly accomplished. Petitioner thus filed
a counterclaim for the return of the P146,962,072.47 plus interest and exemplary damages of
P100 million.
On 14 July 1986, the DPWH fact-finding committee filed with the Office of the Tanodbayan25[4]
a case for estafa thru falsification of public documents and for violation of Republic Act No.
3019 against former Minister Hipolito. Other DPWH officials26[5] involved in awarding the

25[4] Now the Special Prosecutor.

26[5] Aber P. Canlas, former DPWH Deputy Minister; Samuel T. Fadullon, former
DPWH-NCR Regional Director; Rodolfo Palmera, former DPWH-NCR Asst. Regional
Director; Carmelo Manuguid, DPWH-NCR Supervising Engineer; Edilberto Tayao,
DPWH-NCR Chief Civil Engineer; Oscar Cammayo, Project Engineer, Manava Flood
Control and Drainage Project, DPWH-NCR; Enrique Madamba, Jr., DPWH-NCR Chief
Civil Engineer; and Edgardo Manansala, DPWH-NCR.

dredging contracts to NIC, as well as Cipriano Bautista,27[6] president of NIC, were also named
respondents. The charges28[7] were for four counts corresponding to the four contracts that
DPWH entered into with NIC. The case was docketed as TBP Case No. 86-01163.
However, it was only on 17 June 1991 that former Ombudsman Conrado Vasquez approved the
resolution of the Office of the Special Prosecutor finding probable cause for estafa thru
falsification of public documents and for violation of Section 3 (e) and (g)29[8] of RA No. 3019.
Subsequently, the Ombudsman filed the corresponding Informations with the First Division of
the Sandiganbayan against all the respondents in TBP Case No. 86-01163. The cases were
docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 16889-16900.
On 14 April 1993, petitioner filed before the Malabon trial court a Motion to Consolidate Civil
Case No. 1153-MN with Criminal Cases Nos. 16889-16900 in the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner
argued that the civil case for collection and the criminal cases arose from the same incidents and
involve the same facts. Thus, these cases should be consolidated as mandated by Section 4(b) of
Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended.
On 18 June 1993, the Malabon trial court issued a Resolution denying petitioners Motion for
Consolidation. Thereafter, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which the Malabon trial
court denied on 7 November 1993.
On 19 January 1994, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with the
Court of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 33094. In a Decision dated 18 July 1994, the
Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. On 12 September 1994, petitioner filed with the Court
this petition for review.
On 26 September 1994, the Court resolved to issue the temporary restraining order prayed for by
petitioner. Consequently, the Malabon trial court desisted from hearing further Civil Case No.
1153-MN.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In dismissing the petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus filed by petitioner, the Court
of Appeals ruled as follows:

27[6] NIC manifested to the Court that Cipriano Bautista died on 11 May 2000.
28[7] Docketed as TBP Case No. 86-01163.
29[8] Section 3(g) of RA No. 3019 declares unlawful the following act: (g) entering,
on behalf of the Government, into any contract or transaction manifestly and
grossly disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the public officer profited or
will profit thereby.

It is clear that in the same manner that the RTC would have no jurisdiction relative to violations
of Republic Act Nos. 3019, as amended, and 1379, neither could the Sandiganbayan acquire
jurisdiction over collection of sum of money, the latter not involving recovery of civil liability
arising from the offense charged. More specifically, the said Sandiganbayan would have no
power whatsoever to order the defendant in the civil case (the Republic of the Philippines thru
the DPWH) to pay the private respondent the amount of P30,799,676.00 claimed by the latter.
One of the averred purposes then of consolidation (to avoid multiplicity of suits) could not be
realized. A civil action would still have to be instituted by the private respondent to recover the
amount allegedly due.
The Issues
I.
WHETHER THE PETITION WAS FILED ON TIME.
II.
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT ORDERING THE
CONSOLIDATION OF CIVIL CASE NO. 1153-MN WITH CRIMINAL
CASES NOS. 16889-16900 WITH THE SANDIGANBAYAN AS REQUIRED
BY SECTION 4(B) OF P.D. 1606.30[9]
The Ruling of the Court
The petition is devoid of merit.
First Issue: Timeliness of the filing of the petition
We first resolve a minor issue raised by NIC regarding the timeliness of the filing of this petition.
In its Comment, NIC seeks the dismissal of the petition on the ground that it was not served on
time. Petitioner admittedly filed two motions for extension of time, each for fifteen days. The
last day for filing the second motion for extension was on 11 September 1994. NIC, however,
asserts that a copy of the petition was sent by registered mail to its counsel only on 12 September
1994 or a day after the last day for filing.
NIC, believing that this petition was filed out of time, now asks the Court to consider the instant
petition as not having been filed, making the Resolution of the Court of Appeals final and
executory.
We do not agree.

30[9] Rollo, p. 21.

NIC harps on the fact that the petition was sent by registered mail only on 12 September 1994,
when the last day for filing was on 11 September 1994. NIC, however, overlooked one
significant fact. The last day for filing, 11 September 1994, fell on a Sunday.
Based on Section 1,31[10] Rule 22 of the Rules of Court, and as applied in several cases,32[11]
where the last day for doing any act required or permitted by law falls on a Saturday, a Sunday,
or a legal holiday in the place where the court sits, the time shall not run until the next working
day. Thus, petitioner filed on time its petition on 12 September 1994, the next working day,
following the last day for filing which fell on a Sunday.
Second Issue: Consolidation of the Cases
The main issue before us is whether Civil Case No. 1153-MN pending with the Malabon trial
court should be consolidated with Criminal Cases Nos. 16889-16900 filed with the
Sandiganbayan.
Petitioner argues that the civil case for collection of sum of money and the criminal cases for
estafa thru falsification of public documents and for violation of RA No. 3019 arose from the
same transaction and involve similar questions of fact and law. Petitioner claims that all these
cases pertain to only one issue, that is, whether NIC performed dredging work. Petitioner argues
that a determination in the civil case that NIC performed dredging work will entitle NIC to the
balance of the contract price. Similarly, petitioner claims that the criminal cases also involve the
same issue since petitioner charges that the accused connived in falsifying documents and in
fraudulently collecting payments for non-existing dredging work. In sum, petitioner asserts that
since the issues in all these cases are the same, the parties will have to present the same evidence.
Therefore, the consolidation of these cases is in order.
We do not agree.
Consolidation is a matter of discretion with the court. Consolidation becomes a matter of right
only when the cases sought to be consolidated involve similar questions of fact and law, provided
certain requirements are met. The purpose of consolidation is to avoid multiplicity of suits,

31[10] Rule 22, Sec. 1. How to compute time.- In computing any period of time
prescribed or allowed by these Rules, or by order of the court, or by any applicable
statute, the day of the act or event from which the designated period of time begins
to run is to be excluded and the date of performance included. If the last day of
the period, as thus computed, falls on a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday in
the place where the court sits, the time shall not run until the next working day.
32[11] Pilipinas Kao, Inc. v. CA, G.R. No. 105014, 18 December 2001; Labad v.
University of Southeastern Philippines, G.R. No. 139665, 9 August 2001, 362 SCRA
510; Unity Fishing Development Corp. v. CA, G.R. No. 145415, 2 February 2001, 351
SCRA 140.

prevent delay, clear congested dockets, simplify the work of the trial court, and save unnecessary
expense.33[12]
We cannot order the consolidation of the civil case for collection with the criminal cases for two
reasons. First, the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the collection case. Second, the Rules
of Court do not allow the filing of a counterclaim or a third-party complaint in a criminal case.
First, the Sandiganbayan was created as a special court to hear graft cases against government
officials of a particular salary grade for violations of specific laws.34[13] Presidential Decree No.
1606,35[14] as amended by Republic
Act No. 8249,36[15] outlines the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction as follows:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all
cases involving:
A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the
Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following
33[12] People v. Mejia, 341 Phil. 118 (1997).
34[13] PD 1861, Whereas Clause: [I]n keeping with the constitutional mandate
constituting the Sandiganbayan as a special court to try cases involving graft and
corruption, and other offenses committed by public officers and employees in
relation to their office, it is necessary and desirable that certain cases shall be
triable by the appropriate courts, with appellate jurisdiction over these cases to be
vested in the Sandiganbayan.
35[14] Revising Presidential Decree No. 1486 Creating a Special Court to be known
as Sandiganbayan and for other Purposes, 10 December 1978.

36[15] An Act Further Defining the Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, Amending for the Purpose
PD No. 1606, As Amended, Providing Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes. 5 February
1997. At the time the Informations were filed with the Sandiganbayan, the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan was governed by PD No. 1606, as amended by PD No. 1861, which provided as
follows:SEC. 4. Jurisdiction.- The Sandiganbayan shall exercise:
(a) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
(1) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised
Penal Code;

positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of
the commission of the offense:
(1)
Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional
director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade '27' and higher, of the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758),
specifically including:
xxx
B. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the
public officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of this section in relation to their
office.
C. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2,
14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.
In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to Salary Grade '27'
or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military and PNP officers
mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional
trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the
case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,
as amended.
The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments,
resolutions or order of regional trial courts whether in the exercise of their own original
jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction as herein provided.
xxx
In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the
public officers or employees, including those employed in government-owned or controlled
corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said public officers and employees in the proper
courts which shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over them.
Other offenses or felonies committed by public officers and employees in relation to their office,
including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, whether simple or
complexed with other crimes, where the penalty prescribed by law is higher than prision
correcional or imprisonment for six (6) years, or a fine of P6,000.00; PROVIDED, HOWEVER,
that offenses or felonies mentioned in this paragraph where the penalty prescribed by law does
not exceed prision correcional or imprisonment for six (6) years or a fine of P6,000.00 shall be
tried by the proper Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court and
Municipal Circuit Trial Court.

x x x.
The law does not include civil cases for collection of sum of money among the cases falling
under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. If we consolidate the collection case in the
Malabon trial court with the criminal cases, the Sandiganbayan will have no jurisdiction to hear
and decide the collection case. Even if NIC proves it is entitled to payment, the Sandiganbayan
will have no jurisdiction to award any money judgment to NIC. NIC will still have to file a
separate case in the regular court for the collection of its claim. Thus, the avowed purpose of
consolidation which is to avoid multiplicity of suits will not be achieved.
Petitioner invokes Naguiat v. Intermediate Appellate Court37[16] in claiming that a civil action
not arising from the offense charged may be consolidated with the criminal action. Indeed,
Naguiat allowed the consolidation of the criminal case with a civil case arising ex contractu. In
consolidating the two cases, Naguiat relied on Canos v. Peralta38[17] where the Court
consolidated a civil action for the recovery of wage differential with a criminal action for
violation of the Minimum Wage Law. Canos, however, made an important qualification before a
court may order the consolidation of cases. Canos held that:
A court may order several actions pending before it to be tried together where they arise from the
same act, event or transaction, involve the same or like issues, and depend largely or
substantially on the same evidence, provided that the court has jurisdiction over the cases to
be consolidated x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, an essential requisite of consolidation is that the court must have jurisdiction over all the
cases consolidated before it. Since the Sandiganbayan does not have jurisdiction over the
collection case, the same cannot be consolidated with the criminal cases even if these cases
involve similar questions of fact and law. Obviously, consolidation of the collection case with
the criminal cases will be a useless and empty formality since the Sandiganbayan, being devoid
of jurisdiction over the collection case, cannot act on it.
Second, we cannot order the consolidation of the civil action filed by NIC with the criminal
cases in the Sandiganbayan because the civil case amounts to a counterclaim or a third-party
complaint in a criminal case. While NIC, as a corporate entity, is not an accused in the criminal
cases, a consolidation of NICs collection case with the criminal cases will have the same effect
of a counterclaim or a third-party complaint against petitioner and DPWH. In such case, the
rule against counterclaims and third-party complaints in criminal cases may be applied by
analogy.
Section 1, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure expressly requires the accused to
litigate his counterclaim separately from the criminal action.
SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions.37
38

(a) xxx
No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint may be filed by the accused in the
criminal case, but any cause of action which could have been the subject thereof may be
litigated in a separate civil action. (Emphasis supplied)
This paragraph was incorporated in the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure to address the lacuna
mentioned in Cabaero v. Cantos39[18] where the Court noted the absence of clear-cut rules
governing the prosecution of impliedly instituted civil action and the necessary consequences
and implications thereof.40[19] In the same vein, the Court in Cabaero clarified that:
[T]he counterclaim of the accused cannot be tried together with the criminal case because, as
already discussed, it will unnecessarily complicate and confuse the criminal proceedings. Thus,
the trial court should confine itself to the criminal aspect and the possible civil liability of the
accused arising out of the crime. The counterclaim (and cross-claim or third party complaint, if
any) should be set aside or refused cognizance without prejudice to their filing in separate
proceedings at the proper time.
Thus, a counterclaim in a criminal case must be litigated separately to avoid complication and
confusion in the resolution of the criminal cases. This is the rationale behind Section 1 of Rule
111. The same rationale applies to NICs collection case against petitioner and DPWH. Thus,
NICs collection case must be litigated separately before the Malabon trial court to avoid
confusion in resolving the criminal cases with the Sandiganbayan.
Petitioner lodged its own counterclaim to the collection case filed with the Malabon trial court,
praying for the return of the payment DPWH made to NIC arising from the dredging contracts.
However, petitioners counterclaim is deemed abandoned by virtue of Section 4 of PD No. 1606,
as amended.41[20] The last paragraph of Section 4 of PD No. 1606, as amended, provides that:
Any provision of law or Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, the criminal action and
the corresponding civil action for the recovery of civil liability shall at all times be
simultaneously instituted with, and jointly determined in, the same proceeding by the
Sandiganbayan or the appropriate courts, the filing of the criminal action being deemed to
necessarily carry with it the filing of the civil action, and no right to reserve the filing of such
civil action separately from the criminal action shall be recognized: Provided, however, That
where the civil action had heretofore been filed separately but judgment therein has not yet
been rendered, and the criminal case is hereafter filed with the Sandiganbayan or the
appropriate court, said civil action shall be transferred to the Sandiganbayan or the
appropriate court, as the case may be, for consolidation and joint determination with the
39
40
41

criminal action, otherwise the separate civil action shall be deemed abandoned. (Emphasis
supplied)
Petitioners counterclaim in the civil case pending with the Malabon trial court for the return of
the amount DPWH paid NIC is an action to recover civil liability ex delicto. However, this
action to recover civil liability ex delicto is by operation of law included in the criminal cases
filed with the Sandiganbayan. By mandate of RA No. 8249, the counterclaim filed earlier in the
separate civil action with the Malabon trial court shall be deemed abandoned.
The only question left is whether NICs civil case before the Malabon trial court for collection of
sum of money can proceed independently of the criminal cases filed with the Sandiganbayan.
NICs collection case for unpaid services from its dredging contracts with DPWH obviously does
not fall under Articles 32, 33 or 34 (on Human Relations) of the Civil Code. Neither does it fall
under Article 2176 (on quasi-delict) of the Civil Code. Under Section 3 of Rule 111, civil
actions falling under Articles 32, 33, 34 or 2176 may proceed independently and separately from
the criminal case. However, NIC cannot invoke any of these articles.
The only other possibility is for NICs civil action to fall under Article 31 of the Civil Code
which provides:
Art. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission
complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal
proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.
An example of a case falling under Article 31 is a civil action to recover the proceeds of sale of
goods covered by a trust receipt. Such civil action can proceed independently of the criminal
action for violation of the trust receipt law.42[21] In such a case, the validity of the contract, on
which the civil action is based, is not at issue. What is at issue is the violation of an obligation
arising from a valid contract - the trust receipt.
However, when the civil action is based on a purported contract that is assailed as illegal per se,
as when the execution of the contract is alleged to violate the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, Article 31 does not apply. In such a situation, the contract if proven illegal cannot create
any valid obligation that can be the basis of a cause of action in a civil case. Under Article
140943[22] of the Civil Code, a contract whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to law, or a
contract that is expressly prohibited or declared void by law, is void from the very beginning.
No party to such void contract can claim any right under such contract or enforce any of its
provisions.
Under Section 3 (g) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, entering into a contract that is
manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government is declared to be unlawful. If the act
of entering into the contract is assailed as a crime in itself, then the issue of whether the contract
42
43

is illegal must first be resolved before any civil action based on the contract can proceed. Only
the Sandiganbayan has the jurisdiction to decide whether the act of entering into such contract is
a crime, where the salary grade of one of the accused is grade 27 or higher,44[23] as in Criminal
Cases Nos. 16889-16900 filed with the Sandiganbayan.
Article 31 speaks of a civil action based on an obligation not arising from the act x x x
complained of as a felony. This clearly means that the obligation must arise from an act not
constituting a crime. In the instant case, the act purporting to create the obligation is assailed as
a crime in itself. That act, which is prohibited by law, is the entering into dredging contracts that
are manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government.45[24] A contract executed against
the provisions of prohibitory laws is void.46[25] If the dredging contracts are declared illegal, then
no valid obligation can arise from such contracts. Consequently, no civil action based on such
contracts can proceed independently of the criminal action.
In contrast, where the civil action is based on a contract that can remain valid even if its violation
may constitute a crime, the civil action can proceed independently. Thus, in estafa thru violation
of the trust receipt law, the violation of the trust receipt constitutes a crime. However, the trust
receipt itself remains valid, allowing a civil action based on the trust receipt to proceed
independently of the criminal case.
Clearly, NICs civil case before the Malabon trial court does not fall under Article 31 of the Civil
Code. This calls then for the application of the second paragraph of Section 2 of Rule 111 which
states that if the criminal action is filed after the said civil action has already been instituted, the
latter shall be suspended in whatever stage it may be found before judgment on the merits.
Consequently, the civil case for collection pending in the Malabon trial court must be suspended
until after the termination of the criminal cases filed with the Sandiganbayan.
The suspension of the civil case for collection of sum of money will avoid the possibility of
conflicting decisions between the Sandiganbayan and the Malabon trial court on the validity of
NICs dredging contracts. If the Sandiganbayan declares the dredging contracts illegal and void
ab initio, and such declaration becomes final, then NICs civil case for collection of sum of
money will have no legal leg to stand on. However, if the Sandiganbayan finds the dredging
contracts valid, then NICs collection case before the Malabon trial court can then proceed to
trial.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 18 July
1994 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The counterclaim of petitioner in Civil Case No.
1153-MN pending with the Regional Trial Court of Malabon, Branch 73, is deemed abandoned.
The Regional Trial Court of Malabon, Branch 73, is ordered to suspend the trial of Civil Case
44
45
46

No. 1153-MN until the termination of Criminal Cases Nos. 16889-16900 filed with the
Sandiganbayan.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Vitug, Ynares-Santiago, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 147703 Case Digest

G.R. No. 147703, April 14, 2004
Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, INC., petitioner
v People of the Philippines, respondent
Ponente: Panganiban
Facts:
This is a petition for review under rule 45 of the rules of court
assailing resolutions of CA. Petitioner's appeal from the
judgment of the RTC of San Fernando, La Union in Criminal Case
No. 2535 was dismissed.
On July 1994 accused Macadangdang was found guilty and convicted
of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting to triple homicide,
multiple physical injuries and damage to property and was
sentenced to suffer the penalty. The court ruled that rabbit bus
lines shall be liable for the civil liabilities of the accused in
the event of the accused insolvency. Evidently, the judgment
against the accused had become final and executory.
Then the accused jumped bail, worth mentioning that rule 8, rule
124 of the rules of court authorizes the dismissal of appeal when
appellant jumps bail. The counsel for accused hired by rabbit bus
lines filed a notice of appeal which was denied by the trial
court.
The CA ruled that the institution of a criminal case implied the
institution also of the civil action arising from the offense.
Making the subsidiary civil liability of the bus line becomes
conclusive and enforceable.
Issues: (1) Whether or not an employer, who dutifully
participated in the defense of its accused-employee may appeal
the judgment of conviction independently of the accused?

Ruling: Petition has no merit.

Appeal in Criminal Cases: Section 1 of rule 122 of the 2000
revised rules of criminal procedures states "any party may appeal
from a judgment or final order, unless the accused will be placed
in double jeopardy"
Appeal by the accused who jumps bail:
Section 8 of rule 124 provides: "the court appeals may also, upon
motion of the appellee dismiss the appeal if the appellant
escapes from prison or confinement, jumps bail or flees to a
foreign country during pendency of the appeal" The accused cannot
be accroded right to apeal unless they voluntarily submit to the
jurisdiction of the court or are otherwise arrested within 15days
from notice of the judgment against them. They cannot seek relief
from the court, as they are deemed to have waived the appeal.
Finality of a decision in a criminal case:
Section 7 of Rule 120 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure,
which we quote:
"A judgment of conviction may, upon motion of the accused, be
modified or set aside before it becomes final or before appeal is
perfected. Except where the death penalty is imposed, a judgment
becomes final after the lapse of the period for perfecting an
appeal, or when the sentence has been partially or totally
satisfied or served, or when the accused has waived in writing
his right to appeal, or has applied for probation."
In the case before us, the accused-employee has escaped and
refused to surrender to the proper authorities; thus, he is
deemed to have abandoned his appeal. Consequently, the judgment
against him has become final and executory.
Civil Actions are deemed instituted in a criminal prosecution.
but rabbit bus line is not a direct party to the criminal case.
While they may assist their employees, the employer cannot act
independently on their own behalf, but can only defend the
accused.
Waiver of constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy:
an appeal from the sentence of the trial court implies a waiver
and throws the whole case open to a review by the appellate
court.
Effect of absconding on the appeal process: the accused impliedly
withdrew his appeal by jumping bail and he is deemed to have his
right to appeal waived, Thus conviction is now final and
executory.

Subsidiary Liability upon finality of judgment: employers

liability in a finding of guilt against its employee is
subsidiary.
No deprivation of due process: employer became subsidiary liable
only upon proof of the employee's insolvency and the right to
appeal was lost due to the bail of the accused employee not the
court.
Petition denied.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 129282. November 29, 2001]
DMPI EMPLOYEES CREDIT COOPERATIVE, INC., (DMPI-ECCI), petitioner, vs. HON.
ALEJANDRO M. VELEZ, as Presiding Judge of the RTC, Misamis Oriental, Br. 20, and
ERIBERTA VILLEGAS, respondents.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
The Case
In this special civil action for certiorari, petitioner DMPI Employees Credit Cooperative, Inc.
(DMPI-ECCI) seeks the annulment of the orderi[1] of the Regional Trial Court, Misamis
Oriental, Branch 20, granting the motion for reconsideration of respondent Eriberta Villegas, and
thus reversing the previous dismissal of Civil Case No. CV-94-214.
The Facts
On February 18, 1994, the prosecuting attorney filed with the Regional Trial Court, Misamis
Oriental, Branch 37, an information for estafaii[2] against Carmen Mandawe for alleged failure to
account to respondent Eriberta Villegas the amount of P608,532.46. Respondent Villegas
entrusted this amount to Carmen Mandawe, an employee of petitioner DMPI-ECCI, for deposit
with the teller of petitioner.
Subsequently, on March 29, 1994, respondent Eriberta Villegas filed with the Regional Trial
Court, Misamis Oriental, Branch 20, a complaintiii[3] against Carmen Mandawe and petitioner
DMPI-ECCI for a sum of money and damages with preliminary attachment arising out of the
same transaction. In time, petitioner sought the dismissal of the civil case on the following
grounds: (1) that there is a pending criminal case in RTC Branch 37, arising from the same facts,

and (2) that the complaint failed to contain a certification against forum shopping as required by
Supreme Court Circular No. 28-91.iv[4]
On December 12, 1996, the trial court issued an orderv[5] dismissing Civil Case No. CV-94-214.
On January 21, 1997, respondent filed a motion for reconsiderationvi[6] of the order.
On February 21, 1997, the trial court issued an ordervii[7] granting respondents motion for
reconsideration, thereby recalling the dismissal of the case.
Hence, this petition.viii[8]
The Issues
The issues raised are: (1) whether the plaintiffs failure to attach a certification against forum
shopping in the complaint is a ground to dismiss the case;ix[9] and, (2) whether the civil case
could proceed independently of the criminal case for estafa without having reserved the filing of
the civil action.
The Courts Ruling
On the first issue, Circular No. 28-91x[10] of the Supreme Court requires a certificate of nonforum shopping to be attached to petitions filed before the Supreme Court and the Court of
Appeals. This circular was revised on February 8, 1994xi[11] by extending the requirement to all
initiatory pleadings filed in all courts and quasi-judicial agencies other than the Supreme Court
and the Court of Appeals.
Respondent Villegas failure to attach a certificate of non-forum shopping in her complaint did
not violate Circular No. 28-91, because at the time of filing, the requirement applied only to
petitions filed with the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals.xii[12] Likewise, Administrative
Circular No. 04-94 is inapplicable for the reason that the complaint was filed on March 29, 1994,
three days before April 1, 1994, the date of effectivity of the circular.xiii[13]
On the second issue, as a general rule, an offense causes two (2) classes of injuries. The first is
the social injury produced by the criminal act which is sought to be repaired thru the imposition
of the corresponding penalty, and the second is the personal injury caused to the victim of the
crime which injury is sought to be compensated through indemnity which is civil in nature.xiv[14]
Thus, every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable."xv[15] This is the law
governing the recovery of civil liability arising from the commission of an offense. Civil
liability includes restitution, reparation for damage caused, and indemnification of consequential
damages.xvi[16]
The offended party may prove the civil liability of an accused arising from the commission of the
offense in the criminal case since the civil action is either deemed instituted with the criminal
action or is separately instituted.

Rule 111, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which became effective on
December 1, 2000, provides that:
(a) When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising
from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended
party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil
action prior to the criminal action. [Emphasis supplied]
Rule 111, Section 2 further provides that
After the criminal action has been commenced, the separate civil action arising therefrom
cannot be instituted until final judgment has been entered in the criminal action. [Emphasis
supplied]
However, with respect to civil actions for recovery of civil liability under Articles 32, 33, 34 and
2176 of the Civil Code arising from the same act or omission, the rule has been changed.
Under the present rule, only the civil liability arising from the offense charged is deemed
instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves his
right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.xvii[17]
There is no more need for a reservation of the right to file the independent civil actions under
Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The reservation and waiver
referred to refers only to the civil action for the recovery of the civil liability arising from the
offense charged. This does not include recovery of civil liability under Articles 32, 33, 34 and
2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission which may be
prosecuted separately even without a reservation.xviii[18]
Rule 111, Section 3 reads:
Sec. 3. When civil action may proceed independently. In the cases provided in Articles 32, 33,
34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent civil action may be brought by
the offended party. It shall proceed independently of the criminal action and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may the offended party recover damages twice
for the same act or omission charged in the criminal action.
The changes in the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure pertaining to independent civil actions
which became effective on December 1, 2000 are applicable to this case.
Procedural laws may be given retroactive effect to actions pending and undetermined at the time
of their passage. There are no vested rights in the rules of procedure.xix[19]
Thus, Civil Case No. CV-94-214, an independent civil action for damages on account of the
fraud commited against respondent Villegas under Article 33 of the Civil Code, may proceed
independently even if there was no reservation as to its filing.

The Fallo
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition. The Court AFFIRMS the order dated February
21, 1997.xx[20]
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 76590 February 26, 1990
HEIRS OF MARIA DE LA CRUZ Y GUTIERREZ, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and HEIRS OF MARIA DE LA CRUZ Y GUEVARRA,
respondents.

PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the June 17, 1986 decision * of the then
Intermediate Appellate Court in AC-G.R. CV No. 05785 reversing the appealed decision
of the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City, and the November 12, 1986 resolution of the
same court denying the motion for reconsideration.
Herein petitioners are the heirs (children) of the late Maria de la Cruz y Gutierrez,
married to Mateo del Rosario Lansang, while herein private respondents are the heirs of
Maria de la Cruz y Guevarra, married to Calixto Dimalanta, and Fermin de la Cruz. The
controversy involves a 1,980 square meters portion of Lot 1488.
From 1921 until her death in 1951, Maria de la Cruz y Gutierrez resided in the
questioned lot in the concept of an owner. She declared the lot for tax purposes in her
name. Later, she entrusted the administration of the said lot to her niece Maria de la
Cruz y Guevarra. When cadastral proceedings were held in Porac, in Cadastral Case
No. 18, on March 17, 1926, Maria de la Cruz y Gutierrez filed an answer to the

questioned lot. In the said filed answer, over the handwritten name "Maria de la Cruz y
Gutierrez" is a thumbmark presumably affixed by her, Exhibit "2-C"; that in paragraph 7,
a person named therein as Fermin de la Cruz y Gutierrez is stated to have an interest or
participation on the said lot. However, in the space provided in paragraph 8 to be filled
up with the personal circumstances of claimant Maria de la Cruz y Gutierrez, what
appears therein is the name Maria de la Cruz, married to Calixto Dimalanta, instead of
Maria de la Cruz y Gutierrez, Exhibit "2-A"; and in the space provided in paragraph 9,
intended for the personal circumstances of other person or persons who may have an
interest on the said lot, the name Fermin de la Cruz, single, appears, Exhibit "2-B".
Accordingly, the trial court rendered a decision adjudicating Lot No. 1488 in favor of
Maria de la Cruz, 26 years old, married to Calixto Dimalanta and Fermin de la Cruz,
Single. Finally, Original Certificate of Title No. 16684 of the Register of Deeds of
Pampanga was issued in their names.
Petitioners, claiming to have learned of the same only on July 1, 1974, on October 1,
1974 (allegedly barely three months after discovery of the registration, and two years
after the death of Maria de la Cruz y Guevarra who, before she died in 1974, revealed
to petitioners Daniel Lansang and Isidro Lansang that the lot of their mother Maria de la
Cruz y Gutierrez had been included in her title), filed with the then Court of First
Instance of Pampanga, Branch IV, presided over by Hon. Cesar V. Alejandria, a
complaint for reconveyance, docketed therein as Civil Case No. 2148. The same was
amended on June 16, 1975.
The main thrust of the complaint is that the claimant of Lot 1488 in Cadastral Case No.
18 was Maria de la Cruz y Gutierrez and not Maria de la Cruz y Guevarra who by not
using her maternal surname "Guevarra" succeeded in registering Lot 1488 in her name
and that of her brother Fermin de la Cruz. Under the circumstances, it is claimed that
Maria de la Cruz married to Calixto Dimalanta and Fermin de la Cruz hold the property
in trust for the petitioners.
In their answer (Rollo, pp. 62-65), private respondents claimed that the land in questin
is their exclusive property, having inherited the same from their parents and the OCT
No. 16684 was issued in their names. Moreover, they asserted that petitioners have lost
their cause of action by prescription.
During the pre-trial, the parties stipulated the following facts:
1. That Lot No. 1488 is the lot in question as stated in
Paragraph 3 of the Complaint;

2. That on March 17, 1926, Maria de la Cruz y Gutierrez filed

her Answer over the cadastral lot in question;
3. That Maria de la Cruz y Gutierrez affixed her thumbmark
in the Answer dated March 17, 1926;
4. That by virtue of the Answer over Cadastral lot in question
filed by Maria de la Cruz y Gutierrez on March 17, 1926,
OCT No. 16684 was issued covering the lot in question;
5. That the maternal surname of Maria de la Cruz and
Fermin de la Cruz is Guevarra and not Gutierrez; and
6. That Maria de la Cruz y Guevarra and Fermin de la Cruz y
Guevarra did not file their answer over the lot in question. (p.
3, Intermediate Appellate Court Decision; p. 46, Rollo)
The issues stated are as follows:
1. Whether or not the handwritings in the Answer of Maria de
la Cruz y Gutierrez were her handwritings;
2. Whether or not the heirs of Maria de la Cruz y Gutierrez
are paying the land taxes of the lot in question
proportionately to their respective shares;
3. Whether or not Lot 1488, the lot in question, is declared in
the name of Maria de la Cruz y Gutierrez;
4. Whether or not during the lifetime of Maria de la Cruz y
Gutierrez up to the time of her death, she was in actual
possession of the lot in question; and
5. If there was fraud in securing OCT No. 16684 in the name
of Maria de la Cruz, married to Calixto Dimalanta, and
Fermin de la Cruz, single. (pp. 3-4, Intermediate Appellate
Court Decision; pp. 4647, Rollo)
After trial, the trial court, in a decision dated November 17, 1983 (ibid., pp. 34-42), ruled
in favor of the petitioners. The decretal portion of the said decision, reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs;

(a) ordering the above-named defendants to reconvey to the

plaintiffs a portion of 1,980 square meters of Lot No. 1488
covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 16684 of the
Register of Deeds of Pampanga, by executing a deed of
reconveyance and registering the same with the said Office
at their own expense;
(b) ordering the parties to cause the survey and division of
Lot No. 1844 into two equal parts in order that two separate
titles, one for the plaintiffs and the other for the defendants
can be issued by the Register of Deeds of Pampanga in their
favor and one-half of the expenses therefore to be
shouldered by the plaintiffs, and the other half by the
defendant;
(c) ordering that the land to be adjudicated to the plaintiffs
should include the portion where the existing house of the
late Maria de la Cruz y Gutierrez is situated;
(d) ordering the plaintiffs and the defendants to pay the
corresponding estate and inheritance taxes if the parcels of
land inherited by them are subject to the payment of the
same;
(e) ordering the defendants to pay the costs of suit.
On appeal, considering the action as based on an implied trust, the then Intermediate
Appellate Court in its decision promulgated on June 17, 1986 (Ibid., pp. 44-53) reversed
the decision of the trial court. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court is constrained to REVERSE the decision
appealed from. A new one is hereby entered dismissing the complaint.
A Motion for Reconsideration was filed, but the same was denied in a resolution dated
November 12, 1986 (Ibid., p. 66). Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioners raised three (3) reasons warranting review, to wit:
I

RESPONDENT COURT ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT THE ACTION

FOR RECONVEYANCE FILED BY HEREIN PETITIONERS WITH THE
LOWER COURT HAD ALREADY PRESCRIBED;
II
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT PETITIONERS WERE
GUILTY OF LACHES; and
III
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THERE WAS NO
EVIDENCE OF FRAUD COMMITTED BY THE PREDECESSOR-ININTEREST OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS IN SECURING TITLE TO THE
LOT IN QUESTION.
(pp. 13, 20 and 22, Petition for Review pp. 21, 28, and 30 Rollo)
The instant petition is impressed with merit.
The main issue in this case is whether or not petitioners' action for reconveyance has
already prescribed.
The answer is in the negative.
As aptly argued by petitioners, the Court of Appeals erred when it ruled that their action
has already prescribed; obviously on the wrong premise that the action is one based on
implied or constructive trust. As maintained by petitioners, their action is one based on
express trust and not on implied or constructive trust. Petitioners' predecessor-ininterest, Maria de la Cruz y Gutierrez, was an unlettered woman, a fact borne out by her
affixing her thumbmark in her answer in Cadastral Case No. 18, Exhibit "2-C". Because
of her mental weakness, in a prepared document for her, Exhibit "B-3", she consented
and authorized her niece Maria de la Cruz y Guevarra to administer the lot in question.
Such fact is corroborated by the testimony of Daniel Lansay, the son of Maria de la Cruz
y Gutierrez that Maria de la Cruz y Guevarra was the one entrusted with the paying of
land taxes.
Private respondents argue that said Exhibit "B-3" is a portion of the tax declaration
(Exhibit "B") which was prepared by the Office of the Municipal Assessor/Treasurer
where the lot in question is located, and clearly not the written instrument constituting an
express trust required under Article 1443 of the Civil Code. This argument of private
respondents, is untenable. It has been held that under the law on Trusts, it is not
necessary that the document expressly state and provide for the express trust, for it

may even be created orally, no particular words are required for its creation (Article
1444, Civil Code). An express trust is created by the direct and positive acts of the
parties, by some writing or deed or will or by words evidencing an intention to create a
trust (Sotto v. Teves, 86 SCRA 154 [1978]). No particular words are required for the
creation of an express trust, it being sufficient that a trust is clearly intended (Vda. de
Mapa v. Court of Appeals, 154 SCRA 294 [1987]). Hence, petitioner's action, being one
based on express trust, has not yet prescribed. Be it noted that Article 1443 of the Civil
Code which states "No express trusts concerning an immovable or any interest therein
may be proved by parol evidence," refers merely to enforceability, not validity of a
contract between the parties. Otherwise stated, for purposes of validity between the
parties, an express trust concerning an immovable does not have to be in writing. Thus,
Article 1443 may be said to be an extension of the Statute of Frauds. The action to
compel the trustee to convey the property registered in his name for the benefit of the
cestui for trust does not prescribe. If at all, it is only when the trustee repudiates the trust
that the period of prescription may run (Enriquez v. Court of Appeals, 104 SCRA 656
[1981]).
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the June 17, 1986 decision of the Intermediate Appellate
Court is hereby REVERSED and the November 17, 1983 decision of the trial court is
hereby REINSTATED, excpt as to the latter court's finding that this case deals with an
implied trust.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera (Chairperson), Padilla, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
* Special Third Civil Cases Division; penned by Associate Justice Jorge R.
Coquia and concurred in by Associate Justices Floreliana CastroBartolome and Leonor Ines Luciano.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 96080 April 19, 1991

ATTY. MIGUEL P. PADERANGA petitioner,
vs.
HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON, HON. SILVESTRE H. BELLO III, ATTY. HENRICK F.
GINGOYON, HELEN B. CANOY and REBECCA B. TAN, respondent
Concordio C. Diel, Constantino G. Jaraula for petitioner.
Benjamin G. Guimong for private respondents.

REGALADO, J.: p

In this special civil action for mandamus and prohibition with prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction/restraining order, petitioner seeks to enjoin herein public
respondents from including the former as an accused in Criminal Case No. 86-39 for
multiple murder, through a second amended information, and to restrain them from
prosecuting him.
The records disclose that on October 16, 1986, an information for multiple murder was
filed in the Regional Trial Court, Gingoog City, against Felipe Galarion, Manuel Sabit,
Cesar Sabit, Julito Ampo, Eddie Torion, John Doe, Peter Doe and Richard Doe, for the
deaths on May 1, 1984 of Renato Bucag, his wife Melchora Bucag, and their son
Renato Bucag II. Venue was, however, transferred to Cagayan de Oro City per
Administrative Matter No. 87-2-244.
Only Felipe Galarion was tried and found guilty as charged. The rest of the accused
remained at large. Felipe Galarion, however, escaped from detention and has not been
apprehended since then.
In an amended information filed on October 6, 1988, Felizardo Roxas, alias "Ely
Roxas," "Fely Roxas" and "Lolong Roxas," was included as a co-accused. Roxas
retained petitioner Paderanga as his counsel.
As counsel for Roxas, petitioner filed, among others, an Omnibus Motion to dismiss, to
Quash the Warrant of Arrest and to Nullify the Arraignment on October 14, 1988. The
trial court in an order dated January 9, 1989, denied this omnibus motion but directed
the City Prosecutor "to conduct another preliminary investigation or reinvestigation in
order to grant the accused all the opportunity to adduce whatever evidence he has in
support of his defense."

In the course of the preliminary investigation, through a signed affidavit, Felizardo

Roxas implicated herein petitioner in the commission of the crime charged.
The City Prosecutor of Cagayan de Oro City inhibited himself from further conducting
the preliminary investigation against petitioner at the instance of the latter's counsel, per
his resolution dated July 7, 1989. In his first indorsement to the Department of Justice,
dated July 24, 1989, said city prosecutor requested the Department of Justice to
designate a state prosecutor to continue the preliminary investigation against herein
petitioner.
In a resolution dated September 6, 1989, 1 respondent State Prosecutor Henrick F.
Gingoyon, who was designated to continue with the conduct of the preliminary
investigation against petitioner, directed the amendment of the previously amended
information to include and implead herein petitioner as one of the accused therein.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, 2 contending that the preliminary investigation was
not yet completed when said resolution was promulgated, and that he was deprived of
his right to present a corresponding counter-affidavit and additional evidence crucial to
the determination of his alleged "linkage" to the crime charged. The motion was,
however, denied by respondent Gingoyon in his order dated January 29, 1990. 3
From the aforesaid resolution and order, petitioner filed a Petition for Review 4 with the
Department of Justice. Thereafter, he submitted a Supplemental Petition with
Memorandum, 5 and then a Supplemental Memorandum with Additional
Exculpatory/Exonerating Evidence Annexed, 6 attaching thereto an affidavit of Roxas
dated June 20, 1990 and purporting to be a retraction of his affidavit of March 30, 1990
wherein he implicated herein petitioner.
On August 10, 1990, the Department of Justice, through respondent Undersecretary
Silvestre H. Bello III, issued Resolution No. 648 7 dismissing the said petition for review.
His motion for reconsideration having been likewise denied, petitioner then flied the
instant petition for mandamus and prohibition.
Petitioner raises two basic issues, namely: (1) that the preliminary investigation as to
him was not complete; and (2) that there exists no prima facie evidence or probable
cause to justify his inclusion in the second amended information.
Preliminary investigation is generally inquisitorial, and it is often the only means of
discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime, to enable the
fiscal to prepare his complaint or information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits
and has no purpose except that of determining whether a crime has been committed
and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof, and it
does not place the person against whom it is taken in jeopardy. 8
The institution of a criminal action depends upon the sound discretion of the fiscal. He
has the quasi-judicial discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should be
filed in court. 9 Hence, the general rule is that an injunction will not be granted to restrain

a criminal prosecution. 10 The case of Brocka, et al. vs. Enrile, et al. 11 cites several
exceptions to the rule, to wit:
a. To afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused;
b. When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid
oppression or multiplicity of actions;
c. When there is a pre-judicial question which is sub judice;
d. When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority;
e. Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation;
f. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent;
g. Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense;
h. Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution;
i. Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for
vengeance; and
j. When there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a
motion to quash on that ground has been denied.
A careful analysis of the circumstances obtaining in the present case, however, will
readily show that the same does not fall under any of the aforesaid exceptions. Hence,
the petition at bar must be dismissed.
1. Petitioner avers that he was deprived of a full preliminary investigation by reason of
the fact that at the time the resolution of September 6, 1989 was issued, there were still
several incidents pending resolution such as the validity of the testimonies and affidavits
of Felizardo Roxas and Rogelio Hanopol as bases for preliminary investigation, the
polygraph test of Roxas which he failed, and the clarificatory questions which were
supposed to be propounded by petitioner's counsel to Roxas and Hanopol. Petitioner
likwise claims that he was deprived of the opportunity to file his counter-affidavit to the
subpoena of April 25, 1989. These contentions are without merit.
Firstly, it will be noted that petitioner had already filed his counter-affidavit, pursuant to
the subpoena issued to him on April 17, 1989, wherein he controverted the charge
against him and dismissed it as a malicious design of his political opponents and
enemies to link him to the crime. We hold that this is sufficient compliance with the
procedural requirement of the Rules of Court, specifically Section 3(b) of Rule 112
thereof. Besides, petitioner failed to show that the subpoena issued on April 25, 1989

involved a separate complaint charging an offense different and distinct from that
charged in the complaint attached to the first subpoena issued to him earlier.
Secondly, the veracity and credibility of the witnesses and their testimonies are matters
of defense best addressed to the trial court for its appreciation and evaluation.
Thirdly, the right of petitioner to ask clarificatory questions is not absolute. The fiscal has
the discretion to determine whether or not he will propound these questions to the
parties or witnesses concerned. As clearly provided for under Section 3(e), Rule 112 of
the Rules of Court.:
(e) If the investigating officer believes that there are matters to be clarified,
he may set a hearing to propound clarificatory questions to the parties or
their witnesses, during which the parties shall be afforded an opportunity
to be present but without the right to examine or cross-examine. If the
parties so desire, they may submit questions to the to the investigating
officer which the latter may propound to the parties or witnesses
concerned.
Lastly, it has been held that "the proper forum before which absence of preliminary
investigation should be ventilated is the Court of First Instance of a preliminary
investigation does not go to the jurisdiction of the court but merely to the regularity of
the proceedings. It could even be waived. Indeed, it is frequently waived. These are
matters to be inquired into by the trail court not an appellate court." 12
2. Petitioner further submits that there is no prima facie evidence, or probable cause, or
sufficient justification to hold him to a tedious and prolonged public trial, on the basis of
the following grounds: the questioned resolution of respondent Gingoyon is full of
factual misrepresentations or misapprehensions; respondent's reliance on the decision
of the Regional Trial Court against Felipe Galarion suffers from constitutional and
procedural infirmities considering that petitioner was not a party thereto, much less was
he given any opportunity to comment on or rebut the prosecution evidence; reliance on
Rogelio Hanopol's testimony is likewise "contemptible," it being merely hearsay in
addition to the fact that petitioner was never given the opportunity to cross-examine
Hanopol at the time he testified in court; and the affidavit of Roxas dated March 30,
1989, which is the only evidence against petitioner, has been rendered nugatory by his
affidavit of retraction dated June 20, 1990.
A preliminary investigation is defined as an inquiry or proceeding for the purpose of
determining whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well founded belief that a
crime cognizable by the Regional Trial Court has been committed and that the
respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial. 13 The quantum of
evidence now required in preliminary investigation is such evidence sufficient to
"engender a well founded belief as to the fact of the commission of a crime and the
respondent's probable guilt thereof. A preliminary investigation is not the occasion for
the full and exhaustive display of the parties' evidence; it is for the presentation of such

evidence only as may engender a wen grounded belief that an offense has been
committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof. 14 We are in accord with the
state prosecutor's findings in the case at bar that there exists prima facie evidence of
petitioner's involvement in the commission of the crime, it being sufficiently supported by
the evidence presented and the facts obtaining therein.
Likewise devoid of cogency is petitioner's argument that the testimonies of Galarion and
Hanopol are inadmissible as to him since he was not granted the opportunity of crossexamination.
It is a fundamental principle that the accused in a preliminary investigation has no right
to cross-examine the witnesses which the complainant may present. Section 3, Rule
112 of the Rules of Court expressly provides that the respondent shall only have the
right to submit a counter-affidavit, to examine all other evidence submitted by the
complainant and, where the fiscal sets a hearing to propound clarificatory questions to
the parties or their witnesses, to be afforded an opportunity to be present but without the
right to examine or cross-examine. Thus, even if petitioner was not given the
opportunity to cross-examine Galarion and Hanopol at the time they were presented to
testify during the separate trial of the case against Galarion and Roxas, he cannot
assert any legal right to cross-examine them at the preliminary investigation precisely
because such right was never available to him. The admissibility or inadmissibility of
said testimonies should be ventilated before the trial court during the trial proper and not
in the preliminary investigation.
Furthermore, the technical rules on evidence are not binding on the fiscal who has
jurisdiction and control over the conduct of a preliminary investigation. If by its very
nature a preliminary investigation could be waived by the accused, we find no
compelling justification for a strict application of the evidentiary rules. In addition,
considering that under Section 8, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, the record of the
preliminary investigation does not form part of the record of the case in the Regional
Trial Court, then the testimonies of Galarion and Hanopol may not be admitted by the
trial court if not presented in evidence by the prosecuting fiscal. And, even if the
prosecution does present such testimonies, petitioner can always object thereto and the
trial court can rule on the admissibility thereof; or the petitioner can, during the trial,
petition said court to compel the presentation of Galarion and Hanopol for purposes of
cross-examination.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano,
Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Grio- Aquino, Medialdea and Davide, Jr., JJ.,
concur.
Footnotes

1 Annex A, Petition; Rollo, 12.

2 Annex B, Id.; Ibid., 24.
3 Annex C, Id.; Ibid., 36.
4 Annex E, Id.; Ibid., 41.
5 Annex G, Id.; Ibid., 49.
6 Annex H, Id.; Ibid., 61.
7 Annex I, Id.; Ibid., 69.
8 Tandoc et al. vs. Hon. Resultan, etc., et al., 175 SCRA 37 (1989).
9 Crespo vs. Mogul et al., 151 SCRA 462 (1987).
10 Kwong Sing vs. City of Manila, 41 Phil. 103 (1920).
11 G.R. Nos. 69863-65, December 10, 1990.
12 Medina vs. Orozco, Jr., etc., 18 SCRA 1168 (1966); Ilagan et al. vs.
Enrile, et al., 139 SCRA 349 (1985); People vs. Escober, et al., 157 SCRA
541 (1988).
13 Section 1, Rule 112; Rules of Court.
14 Mayuga vs. Maravilla, etc., et al., 18 SCRA 115 (1966).

MARIO FL. CRESPO

vs.
HON. LEODEGARIO L. MOGULG.R. No. L-53373 June 30, 1987
FACTS:

On April 18, 1977 the Provincial Fiscal filed an information for e s t a f a a g a i n s t

M a r i o F l . C r e s p o . W h e n t h e c a s e w a s s e t f o r arraignment the accused filed a
motion to defer arraignment onthe ground that there was a pending petition for review filed
witht h e S e c r e t a r y o f J u s t i c e . I n a n o r d e r , t h e p r e s i d i n g j u d g e , Leodegario L.
Mogul, denied the motion.

A p e t i t i o n f o r c e r t i o r a r i a n d p r o h i b i t i o n w i t h p r a y e r f o r a preliminary writ of
injunction was filed by the accused in the CAwhich was eventually granted while perpetually
restraining the judge from enforcing his threat to compel the arraignment of theaccused in the
case until the Department of Justice shall have finally resolved the petition for review.

The Undersecretary of Justice reversed the resolution of the Officeo f t h e P r o v i n c i a l

F i s c a l a n d d i r e c t e d t h e f i s c a l t o m o v e f o r immediate dismissal of the information
filed against the accused.But the respondent judge denied the motion.
ISSUE:
Whether the trial court acting on a motion to dismiss a criminalcase filed by the Provincial
Fiscal upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice to whom the case was elevated for
review, may refuse to grant themotion and insist on the arraignment and trial on the merits.
RATIO: YES.

It is a cardinal principle that an criminal actions either commencedby complaint or by

information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal.
And it is through the conduct of a preliminary investigation that the fiscal determines the
existenceof a prima facie case that would warrant the prosecution of a case. The Courts
cannot interfere with the fiscal's discretion andcontrol of the criminal prosecution.

Whether the accused had been arraigned or not and whether itwas due to a reinvestigation
by the fiscal or a review by the Secretary of Justice whereby a motion to dismiss was
submittedto the Court,
the Court in the exercise of its discretion maygrant the motion or deny it and require that the trial
on themerits proceed for the proper determination of the case.

The role of the fiscal or prosecutor as we all know is to see that justice is done and not
necessarily to secure the conviction of theperson accused before the Courts. Thus, in spite of his
opinion tot h e c o n t r a r y, i t i s t h e d u t y o f t h e f i s c a l t o p r o c e e d w i t h
t h e presentation of evidence of the prosecution to the Court to enablethe Court to arrive at its
own independent judgment as to whetherthe accused should be convicted or acquitted. The fiscal
shouldnot shirk from the responsibility of appearing for the People of thePhilippines even under
such circumstances much less should heabandon the prosecution of the case leaving it to the
hands of aprivate prosecutor for then the entire proceedings will be null andvoid. The least that
the fiscal should do is to continue to appearfor the prosecution although he may turn over the
presentation of the evidence to the private prosecutor but still under his directionand control.

The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint orinformation is filed in Court
any disposition of the case as itsdismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests
in thesound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains thedirection and
control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in Court he
cannot impose his opinion onthe trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to
dowith the case before it. The determination of the case is within itsexclusive jurisdiction and
competence.

A motion to dismiss thecase filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court who
has the option to grant or deny the same. It does notmatter if this is done before or after the
arraignment of theaccused or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigationo r u p o n
i n s t r u c t i o n s o f t h e S e c r e t a r y o f J u s t i c e w h o reviewed the records of the
investigation
.
Zenaida R. RazonSection 14. Amendment or SubstitutionCriminal Procedure
Larranaga vs CA
G.R. No. 130644March 13, 1998
Facts:Petitioner Larranaga was charged with two counts of kidnapping and serious
illegaldetention before the RTC of Cebu City. He was arrested and was detained withoutthe filing
of the necessary Information and warrant of arrest. The petitioner allegedthat he must be
released and be subject to a preliminary investigation. However p e n d i n g t h e
r e s o l u t i o n o f t h e C o u r t f o r t h e p e t i t i o n f o r c e r t i o r a r i , p r o h i b i t i o n and
mandamus with writs of preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction filedby the petitioner,
RTC judge issued a warrant of arrest directed to the petitioner.
Issue:1.Whether petitioner is entitled to a regular preliminary investigation.
2.Whether petitioner should be released from
d e t e n t i o n p e n d i n g t h e investigation.
Held:1.Yes. Our ruling is not altered by the fact that petitioner has been arraigned onOctober
14, 1997. The rule is that the right to preliminary investigation is waived when the
accused fails to invoke it before or at the time of entering ap l e a a t a r r a i g n m e n t .
P e t i t i o n e r , i n t h i s c a s e , h a s b e e n a c t i v e l y a n d consistently
demanding a regular preliminary investigation even before he w a s c h a r g e d i n
c o u r t . A l s o , p e t i t i o n e r r e f u s e d t o e n t e r a p l e a d u r i n g t h e arraignment
because there was a pending case in this Court regarding his r i g h t t o a v a i l o f a
r e g u l a r p r e l i m i n a r y i n v e s t i g a t i o n . C l e a r l y, t h e a c t s o f p e t i t i o n e r a n d
his counsel are inconsistent with a waiver.
P r e l i m i n a r y investigation is part of procedural due process. It cannot be waived
unlessthe waiver appears to be clear and informed.
2.No. The filing of charges and the issuance of the warrant of arrest against
aperson invalidly detained will cure the defect of that detention or at least d e n y
him the right to be released because of such defect.The
o r i g i n a l warrantless arrest of the petitioner was doubtless illegal. Nevertheless, theR e g i o n a l
Trial Court lawfully acquired jurisdiction over the person of
thepetitioner b y virtue of the warrant of arrest it is sued on Augus t 26,
1 9 9 3 against him and the other accused in connection with the rape-slay cases. Itwas belated, to
be sure, but it was nonetheless legal.

i
ii
iii
iv
v
vi
vii
viii
ix
x
xi
xii
xiii
xiv
xv
xvi
xvii
xviii
xix

xx