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enabling the marginalized, it would further weaken them and aggravate their
marginalization. The Court stressed that the very reason for the establishment of
the party-list system is the fundamental social justice principle that those who
have less in life should have more in law. It was for them that the party-list system
was enacted to give them not only genuine hope, but genuine power; to give
them the opportunity to be elected and to represent the specific concerns of their
constituencies; and simply to give them a direct voice in Congress and in the
larger affairs of the State. The State cannot now disappoint and frustrate them by
disabling and desecrating this social justice vehicle. The Court also laid down
some guidelines to assist the Comelec in its work of conducting summary
evidentiary hearings on the qualifications of the party-list participants.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; CERTIORARI; VALIDITY OF COMELEC
OMNIBUS RESOLUTION 3785 IN CASE AT BAR MAY BE BROUGHT BEFORE THIS
COURT IN A VERIFIED PETITION THEREFOR UNDER RULE 65 OF RULES OF COURT.
Petitioners attack the validity of Comelec Omnibus Resolution 3785 for having
been issued with grave abuse of discretion, insofar as it allowed respondents to
participate in the party-list elections of 2001. Indeed, under both the Constitution
and the Rules of Court, such challenge may be brought before this Court in a
verified petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; WHEN AVAILABLE. These cases present an exception to the rule
that certiorari shall lie only in the absence of any other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy. It has been held that certiorari is available, notwithstanding the
presence of other remedies, "where the issue raised is one purely of law, where
public interest is involved, and in case of urgency." Indeed, the instant case is
indubitably imbued with public interest and with extreme urgency, for it
potentially involves the composition of 20 percent of the House of
Representatives.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; WHEN PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS MAY BE GLOSSED OVER TO
PREVENT A MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE. Procedural requirements "may be
glossed over to prevent a miscarriage of justice, when the issue involves the
principle of social justice . . . when the decision sought to be set aside is a nullity,
or when the need for relief is extremely urgent and certiorari is the only adequate
and speedy remedy available."
parties." More to the point, the law defines "political party" as "an organized group
of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies for the
general conduct of government and which, as the most immediate means of
securing their adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders
and members as candidates for public office."
9. ID.; ID.; RA 7941; PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION, CONSTRUED.
"Proportional representation" in Sec. 2 of RA 7941 does not refer to the number of
people in a particular district, because the party-list election is national in scope.
Neither does it allude to numerical strength in a distressed or oppressed group.
Rather, it refers to the representation of the "marginalized and underrepresented"
as exemplified by the enumeration in Section 5 of RA 7941; namely, "labor,
peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly,
handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals."
10. ID.; ID.; ID.; LACK OF WELL-DEFINED CONSTITUENCY, EXPLAINED. "Lack of
well-defined constituenc[y]" refers to the absence of a traditionally identifiable
electoral group, like voters of a congressional district or territorial unit of
government. Rather, it points again to those with disparate interests identified
with the "marginalized or underrepresented."
17. ID.; ID.; ID.; MAJOR POLITICAL PARTIES MUST SHOW THAT THEY REPRESENT
INTERESTS OF THE MARGINALIZED AND UNDERREPRESENTED. Second, while
even major political parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and the
Constitution to participate in the party-list system, they must comply with the
declared statutory policy of enabling "Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized
and underrepresented sectors . . . to be elected to the House of Representatives."
In other words, while they are not disqualified merely on the ground that they are
political parties, they must show, however, that they represent the interests of the
marginalized and underrepresented. DAHaTc
18. ID.; ID.; ID.; RELIGIOUS SECTOR MAY NOT BE REPRESENTED IN PARTY-LIST
SYSTEM. In view of the objections directed against the registration of Ang
Buhay Hayaang Yumabong, which is allegedly a religious group, the Court notes
the express constitutional provision that the religious sector may not be
represented in the party-list system.
19. ID.; COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; RELIGIOUS DENOMINATIONS AND SECTS
SHALL NOT BE REGISTERED AS POLITICAL PARTIES. Furthermore, the
Constitutionprovides that "religious denominations and sects shall not be
registered." The prohibition was explained by a member of the Constitutional
Commission in this wise: "[T]he prohibition is on any religious organization
registering as a political party. I do not see any prohibition here against a priest
running as a candidate. That is not prohibited here; it is the registration of a
religious sect as a political party."
20. ID.; PARTY-LIST SYSTEM ACT (RA 7941); A PARTY OR ORGANIZATION MUST NOT
BE DISQUALIFIED UNDER SECTION 6 THEREOF. Fourth, a party or an
organization must not be disqualified under Section 6 of RA 7941, which
enumerates the grounds for disqualification as follows: "(1) It is a religious sect or
denomination, organization or association organized for religious purposes; (2) It
advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal; (3) It is a foreign party or
organization; (4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign
political party, foundation, organization, whether directly or through any of its
officers or members or indirectly through third parties for partisan election
purposes; (5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating
to elections; (6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition; (7) It has ceased
to exist for at least one (1) year; or (8) It fails to participate in the last two (2)
preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes
cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the
constituency in which it has registered."
21. ID.; ID.; ID.; PARTY OR ORGANIZATION MUST NOT BE AN ADJUNCT OF, OR A
PROJECT ORGANIZED OR AN ENTITY FUNDED OR ASSISTED BY THE GOVERNMENT.
Fifth, the party or organization must not be an adjunct of, or a project organized
or an entity funded or assisted by the government. By the very nature of the
party-list system, the party or organization must be a group of citizens, organized
by citizens and operated by citizens. It must be independent of the government.
The participation of the government or its officials in the affairs of a party-list
candidate is not only illegal and unfair to other parties, but also deleterious to the
objective of the law: to enable citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors and organizations to be elected to the House of
Representatives.
22. ID.;
ID.;
ID.;
NOMINEES
MUST
REPRESENT
MARGINALIZED
AND
UNDERREPRESENTED SECTORS. Not only the candidate party or organization
must represent marginalized and underrepresented sectors; so also must its
nominees. To repeat, under Section 2 of RA 7941, the nominees must be Filipino
citizens "who belong to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations
and parties." Surely, the interests of the youth cannot be fully represented by a
retiree; neither can those of the urban poor or the working class, by an
industrialist. To allow otherwise is to betray the State policy to give genuine
representation to the marginalized and underrepresented.
23. ID.; ID.; ID.; NOMINEE MUST BE ABLE TO CONTRIBUTE TO FORMULATION AND
ENACTMENT OF APPROPRIATE LEGISLATION THAT WILL BENEFIT THE NATION AS A
WHOLE. As previously discussed, while lacking a well-defined political
constituency, the nominee must likewise be able to contribute to the formulation
and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole.
Senator Jose Lina explained during the bicameral committee proceedings that
"the nominee of a party, national or regional, is not going to represent a particular
district . . . ."
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J p:
The party-list system is a social justice tool designed not only to give more law to
the great masses of our people who have less in life, but also to enable them to
become veritable lawmakers themselves, empowered to participate directly in the
enactment of laws designed to benefit them. It intends to make the marginalized
The Comelec gave due course or approved the Manifestations (or accreditations)
of 154 parties and organizations, but denied those of several others in its assailed
March 26, 2001 Omnibus Resolution No. 3785, which we quote:
"We carefully deliberated the foregoing matters, having in mind that
this system of proportional representation scheme will encourage
multi-partisan [sic] and enhance the inability of small, new or sectoral
parties or organization to directly participate in this electoral window.
"It will be noted that as defined, the 'party-list system' is a
'mechanism of proportional representation' in the election of
representatives to the House of Representatives from national,
regional, and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof
registered with the Commission on Elections.
"However, in the course of our review of the matters at bar, we must
recognize the fact that there is a need to keep the number of sectoral
parties, organizations and coalitions, down to a manageable level,
keeping only those who substantially comply with the rules and
regulations and more importantly the sufficiency of the
Manifestations or evidence on the Motions for Reconsiderations or
Oppositions." 3
On April 10, 2001, Akbayan Citizens Action Party filed before the Comelec a
Petition praying that "the names of [some of herein respondents] be deleted from
the 'Certified List of Political Parties/Sectoral Parties/Organizations/Coalitions
Participating in the Party List System for the May 14, 2001 Elections' and that said
certified list be accordingly amended." It also asked, as an alternative, that the
votes cast for the said respondents not be counted or canvassed, and that the
latter's nominees not be proclaimed. 4 On April 11, 2001, Bayan Muna and Bayan
Muna-Youth also filed a Petition for Cancellation of Registration and Nomination
against some of herein respondents. 5
On April 18, 2001, the Comelec required the respondents in the two
disqualification cases to file Comments within three days from notice. It also set
the date for hearing on April 26, 2001, 6 but subsequently reset it to May 3,
2001. 7 During the hearing, however, Commissioner Ralph C. Lantion merely
directed the parties to submit their respective memoranda. 8
Meanwhile, dissatisfied with the pace of the Comelec, Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW
Labor Party filed a Petition 9 before this Court on April 16, 2001. This Petition,
docketed as G.R. No. 147589, assailed Comelec Omnibus Resolution No. 3785. In
its Resolution dated April 17, 2001, 10 the Court directed respondents to
comment on the Petition within a non-extendible period of five days from
notice. 11
On April 17, 2001, Petitioner Bayan Muna also filed before this Court a
Petition, 12 docketed as G.R. No. 147613, also challenging Comelec Omnibus
Resolution No. 3785. In its Resolution dated May 9, 2001, 13 the Court ordered
the consolidation of the two Petitions before it; directed respondents named in the
second Petition to file their respective Comments on or before noon of May 15,
2001; and called the parties to an Oral Argument on May 17, 2001. It added that
the Comelec may proceed with the counting and canvassing of votes cast for the
party-list elections, but barred the proclamation of any winner therein, until
further orders of the Court.
Thereafter, Comments 14 on the second Petition were received by the Court and,
on May 17, 2001, the Oral Argument was conducted as scheduled. In an Order
given in open court, the parties were directed to submit their respective
Memoranda simultaneously within a non-extendible period of five days. 15
Issues:
During the hearing on May 17, 2001, the Court directed the parties to address the
following issues:
"1. Whether or not recourse under Rule 65 is proper under the
premises. More specifically, is there no other plain, speedy or
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law?
"2. Whether or not political parties may participate in the party-list
elections.
"3. Whether or not the party-list system is exclusive to 'marginalized
and underrepresented' sectors and organizations.
"4. Whether or not the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion
in promulgating Omnibus Resolution No. 3785." 16
The Court's Ruling
The Petitions are partly meritorious. These cases should be remanded to the
Comelec which will determine, after summary evidentiary hearings, whether the
154 parties and organizations enumerated in the assailed Omnibus Resolution
satisfy the requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941, as specified in this
Decision. ASCTac
First Issue:
regional party in Mindanao." 32 This was also clear from the following exchange
between Comms. Jaime Tadeo and Blas Ople: 33
"MR. TADEO.
Naniniwala ba kayo na ang party list ay pwedeng paghati-hatian ng
UNIDO, PDP-Laban, PNP, Liberal at Nacionalista?
MR. OPLE.
Maaari yan sapagkat bukas ang party list system sa lahat ng mga
partido."
Indeed, Commissioner Monsod stated that the purpose of the party-list provision
was to open up the system, in order to give a chance to parties that consistently
place third or fourth in congressional district elections to win a seat in
Congress. 34 He explained: "The purpose of this is to open the system. In the past
elections, we found out that there were certain groups or parties that, if we count
their votes nationwide, have about 1,000,000 or 1,500,000 votes. But they were
always third or fourth place in each of the districts. So, they have no voice in the
Assembly. But this way, they would have five or six representatives in the
Assembly even if they would not win individually in legislative districts. So, that is
essentially the mechanics, the purpose and objectives of the party-list system."
For its part, Section 2 of RA 7941 also provides for "a party-list system of
registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions
thereof, . . . ."Section 3 expressly states that a "party" is "either a political party or
a sectoral party or a coalition of parties." More to the point, the law defines
"political party" as "an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or
platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of government and
which, as the most immediate means of securing their adoption, regularly
nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members as candidates for
public office."
Furthermore, Section 11 of RA 7941 leaves no doubt as to the participation of
political parties in the party-list system. We quote the pertinent provision below:
"xxx xxx xxx
"For purposes of the May 1998 elections, the first five (5) major
political parties on the basis of party representation in the House of
Representatives at the start of the Tenth Congress of the Philippines
shall not be entitled to participate in the party-list system.
"xxx xxx xxx"
Indubitably, therefore, political parties even the major ones may participate
in the party-list elections.
Third Issue:
Marginalized and Underrepresented
That political parties may participate in the party-list elections does not mean,
however, that any political party or any organization or group for that matter
may do so. The requisite character of these parties or organizations must be
consistent with the purpose of the party-list system, as laid down in
the Constitution and RA 7941. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, provides as
follows:
"(1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more
than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law,
who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the
provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with
the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a
uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by
law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered
national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum
of the total number of representatives including those under the party
list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of
this Constitution,one-half of the seats allocated to party-list
representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or
election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be
provided by law, except the religious sector." (Italics supplied.)
Notwithstanding the sparse language of the provision, a distinguished member of
the Constitutional Commission declared that the purpose of the party-list
provision was to give "genuine power to our people" in Congress. Hence, when
the provision was discussed, he exultantly announced: "On this first day of August
1986, we shall, hopefully, usher in a new chapter to our national history, by giving
genuine power to our people in the legislature." 35
The foregoing provision on the party-list system is not self-executory. It is, in fact,
interspersed with phrases like "in accordance with law" or "as may be provided by
law"; it was thus up to Congress to sculpt in granite the lofty objective of the
Constitution. Hence, RA 7941 was enacted. It laid out the statutory policy in this
wise:
"SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. The State shall promote proportional
representation in the election of representatives to the House of
Representatives through a party-list system of registered national,
regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof,
which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack
well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the
formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit
the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of
Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall develop and
guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to attain the
broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests
in the House of Representatives by enhancing their chances to
compete for and win seats in the legislature, and shall provide the
simplest scheme possible."
The Marginalized and Underrepresented
to Become Lawmakers Themselves
The foregoing provision mandates a state policy of promoting proportional
representation by means of the Filipino-style party-list system, which will "enable"
the election to the House of Representatives of Filipino citizens,
1. who belong to marginalized and
organizations and parties; and
underrepresented
sectors,
In the end, the role of the Comelec is to see to it that only those Filipinos who are
"marginalized and underrepresented" become members of Congress under the
party-list system, Filipino-style.
The intent of the Constitution is clear: to give genuine power to the people, not
only by giving more law to those who have less in life, but more so by enabling
them to become veritable lawmakers themselves. Consistent with this intent, the
policy of the implementing law, we repeat, is likewise clear: "to enable Filipino
citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations
and parties, . . . , to become members of the House of Representatives." Where
the language of the law is clear, it must be applied according to its express
terms. 37
The marginalized and underrepresented sectors to be represented under the
party-list system are enumerated in Section 5 of RA 7941, which states:
"SEC. 5. Registration. Any organized group of persons may register
as a party, organization or coalition for purposes of the party-list
system by filing with the COMELEC not later than ninety (90) days
before the election a petition verified by its president or secretary
stating its desire to participate in the party-list system as a national,
regional or sectoral party or organization or a coalition of such parties
or organizations, attaching thereto its constitution,by-laws, platform
or program of government, list of officers, coalition agreement and
other
relevant
information
as
the
COMELEC
may
require: Provided, that the sector shall include labor, peasant,
fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly,
handicapped, women,
professionals."
workers,
and
list system is only for the "outsiders" who cannot get elected through regular
elections otherwise; it is not for the non-marginalized or overrepresented who
already fill the ranks of Congress.
Verily, allowing the non-marginalized and overrepresented to vie for the remaining
seats under the party-list system would not only dilute, but also prejudice the
chance of the marginalized and underrepresented, contrary to the intention of the
law to enhance it. The party-list system is a tool for the benefit of the
underprivileged; the law could not have given the same tool to others, to the
prejudice of the intended beneficiaries. HDAaIc
This Court, therefore, cannot allow the party-list system to be sullied and
prostituted by those who are neither marginalized nor underrepresented. It cannot
let that flicker of hope be snuffed out. The clear state policy must permeate every
discussion of the qualification of political parties and other organizations under
the party-list system.
Refutation of the
Separate Opinions
The Separate Opinions of our distinguished colleagues, Justices Jose C. Vitug and
Vicente V. Mendoza, are anchored mainly on the supposed intent of the framers
of the Constitution as culled from their deliberations.
The fundamental principle in constitutional construction, however, is that the
primary source from which to ascertain constitutional intent or purpose is the
language of the provision itself. The presumption is that the words in which the
constitutional provisions are couched express the objective sought to be
attained. 46 In other words,verba legis still prevails. Only when the meaning of
the words used is unclear and equivocal should resort be made to extraneous aids
of construction and interpretation, such as the proceedings of the Constitutional
Commission or Convention, in order to shed light on and ascertain the true intent
or purpose of the provision being construed. 47
Indeed, as cited in the Separate Opinion of Justice Mendoza, this Court stated
in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary 48 that "the debates and
proceedings of the constitutional convention [may be consulted] in order to arrive
at the reason and purpose of the resulting Constitution . . . only when other
guides fail as said proceedings are powerless to vary the terms of the
Constitution when the meaning is clear. Debates in the constitutional convention
'are of value as showing the views of the individual members, and as indicating
the reason for their votes, but they give us no light as to the views of the large
majority who did not talk, much less of the mass or our fellow citizens whose
votes at the polls gave that instrument the force of fundamental law. We think it
safer to construe the constitution from what appears upon its face.' The proper
interpretation therefore depends more on how it was understood by the people
adopting it than in the framers' understanding thereof."
all judicial and quasi-judicial instrumentalities is to apply the law as they find it,
not to reinvent or second-guess it. 50
In its Memorandum, Petitioner Bayan Muna passionately pleads for the outright
disqualification of the major political parties Respondents Lakas-NUCD, LDP,
NPC, LP and PMP on the ground that under Comelec Resolution No. 4073, they
have been accredited as the five (six, including PDP-Laban) major political parties
in the May 14, 2001 elections. It argues that because of this, they have the
"advantage of getting official Comelec Election Returns, Certificates of Canvass,
preferred poll watchers . . . ." We note, however, that this accreditation does not
refer to the party-list election, but, inter alia, to the election of district
representatives for the purpose of determining which parties would be entitled to
watchers under Section 26 of Republic Act No. 7166.
What is needed under the present circumstances, however, is a factual
determination of whether respondents herein and, for that matter, all the 154
previously approved groups, have the necessary qualifications to participate in
the party-list elections, pursuant to the Constitution and the law.
Bayan Muna also urges us to immediately rule out Respondent Mamamayan Ayaw
sa Droga (MAD), because "it is a government entity using government resources
and privileges." This Court, however, is not a trier of facts. 51 It is not equipped to
receive evidence and determine the truth of such factual allegations.
Basic rudiments of due process require that respondents should first be given an
opportunity to show that they qualify under the guidelines promulgated in this
Decision, before they can be deprived of their right to participate in and be
elected under the party-list system.
Guidelines for Screening
Party-List Participants
The Court, therefore, deems it proper to remand the case to the Comelec for the
latter to determine, after summary evidentiary hearings, whether the 154 parties
and organizations allowed to participate in the party-list elections comply with the
requirements of the law. In this light, the Court finds it appropriate to lay down the
following guidelines, culled from the law and the Constitution, to assist the
Comelec in its work.
First, the political party, sector, organization or coalition must represent the
marginalized and underrepresented groups identified in Section 5 of RA 7941. In
other words, it must show through its constitution,articles of incorporation, by
laws, history, platform of government and track record that it represents and
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails
to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under
the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the
constituency in which it has registered." 59
Note should be taken of paragraph 5, which disqualifies a party or group for
violation of or failure to comply with election laws and regulations. These laws
include Section 2 of RA 7941, which states that the party-list system seeks to
"enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties . . . to become members of the House of
Representatives." A party or an organization, therefore, that does not comply with
this policy must be disqualified.
Fifth, the party or organization must not be an adjunct of, or a project organized
or an entity funded or assisted by, the government. By the very nature of the
party-list system, the party or organization must be a group of citizens, organized
by citizens and operated by citizens. It must be independent of the government.
The participation of the government or its officials in the affairs of a party-list
candidate is not only illegal 60 and unfair to other parties, but also deleterious to
the objective of the law: to enable citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors and organizations to be elected to the House of
Representatives.
Sixth, the party must not only comply with the requirements of the law; its
nominees must likewise do so. Section 9 of RA 7941 reads as follows:
SEC. 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No person shall be
nominated as party-list representative unless he is a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the
Philippines for a period of not less than one (1) year immediately
preceding the day of the election, able to read and write, a bona
fidemember of the party or organization which he seeks to represent
for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is
at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twentyfive (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the
election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of
thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to continue in office until
the expiration of his term."
In effect, the Comelec would have us believe that the party-list provisions of
the Constitution and RA 7941 are nothing more than a play on dubious words, a
mockery of noble intentions, and an empty offering on the altar of people
empowerment. Surely, this could not have been the intention of the framers of
the Constitution and the makers of RA 7941.
WHEREFORE, this case is REMANDED to the Comelec, which is hereby DIRECTED
to immediately conduct summary evidentiary hearings on the qualifications of the
party-list participants in the light of the guidelines enunciated in this Decision.
Considering the extreme urgency of determining the winners in the last party-list
elections, the Comelec is directed to begin its hearings for the parties and
organizations that appear to have garnered such number of votes as to qualify for
seats in the House of Representatives. The Comelec is further DIRECTED to submit
to this Court its compliance report within 30 days from notice hereof.
The Resolution of this Court dated May 9, 2001, directing the Comelec "to refrain
from proclaiming any winner" during the last party-list election, shall remain in
force until after the Comelec itself will have complied and reported its compliance
with the foregoing disposition.
This Decision is immediately executory upon the Commission on Elections' receipt
thereof. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 147589,
147613, [June 26, 2001], 412 PHIL 308-374)
DECISION
CARPIO, J p:
The Case
Petitioner in G.R. No. 179271 Barangay Association for National Advancement
and Transparency (BANAT) in a petition for certiorari and mandamus, 1 assails
the Resolution 2 promulgated on 3 August 2007 by the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) in NBC No. 07-041 (PL). The COMELEC's resolution in NBC No. 07-041
(PL) approved the recommendation of Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head of the
National Board of Canvassers (NBC) Legal Group, to deny the petition of BANAT for
being moot. BANAT filed before the COMELEC En Banc, acting as NBC, a Petition
to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List Representatives Provided by the
Constitution.
The following are intervenors in G.R. No. 179271: Arts Business and Science
Professionals (ABS), Aangat Tayo (AT), and Coalition of Associations of Senior
Citizens in the Philippines, Inc. (Senior Citizens).
Petitioners in G.R. No. 179295 Bayan Muna, Abono, and Advocacy for Teacher
Empowerment Through Action, Cooperation and Harmony Towards Educational
Reforms (A Teacher) in a petition for certiorari with mandamus and
prohibition, 3 assails NBC Resolution No. 07-60 4 promulgated on 9 July 2007.
NBC No. 07-60 made a partial proclamation of parties, organizations and
coalitions that obtained at least two percent of the total votes cast under the
Party-List System. The COMELEC announced that, upon completion of the canvass
of the party-list results, it would determine the total number of seats of each
winning party, organization, or coalition in accordance with Veterans Federation
Party v. COMELEC 5 (Veterans).
Estrella DL Santos, in her capacity as President and First Nominee of
the Veterans Freedom Party, filed a motion to intervene in both G.R.
Nos. 179271 and 179295.
The Facts
The 14 May 2007 elections included the elections for the party-list
representatives. The COMELEC counted 15,950,900 votes cast for 93 parties
under the Party-List System. 6
On 27 June 2002, BANAT filed a Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List
Representatives Provided by the Constitution, docketed as NBC No. 07-041 (PL)
before the NBC. BANAT filed its petition because "[t]he Chairman and the
Members of the [COMELEC] have recently been quoted in the national papers that
the [COMELEC] is duty bound to and shall implement the Veterans ruling, that is,
would apply the Panganiban formula in allocating party-list seats". 7 There were
no intervenors in BANAT's petition before the NBC. BANAT filed a memorandum on
19 July 2007. aTEACS
On 9 July 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the NBC, promulgated NBC Resolution No.
07-60. NBC Resolution No. 07-60 proclaimed thirteen (13) parties as winners in
the party-list elections, namely: Buhay Hayaan Yumabong (BUHAY), Bayan Muna,
Citizens' Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC), Gabriela's Women Party (Gabriela),
Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives (APEC), A Teacher, Akbayan!
Citizen's Action Party (AKBAYAN), Alagad, Luzon Farmers Party (BUTIL),
Cooperative-Natco Network Party (COOP-NATCCO), Anak Pawis, Alliance of Rural
Concerns (ARC), and Abono. We quote NBC Resolution No. 07-60 in its entirety
below:
WHEREAS, the Commission on Elections sitting en banc as National
Board of Canvassers, thru its Sub-Committee for Party-List, as of 03
July 2007, had officially canvassed, in open and public proceedings, a
total of fifteen million two hundred eighty three thousand six
hundred fifty-nine (15,283,659) votes under the Party-List System
of Representation, in connection with the National and Local Elections
conducted last 14 May 2007;
WHEREAS, the study conducted by the Legal and Tabulation Groups of
the
National
Board
of
Canvassers
reveals
that
the
projected/maximum total party-list votes cannot go any higher
than sixteen million seven hundred twenty three thousand
one hundred twenty-one (16,723,121) votes given the following
statistical
data:
Projected/Maximum Party-List Votes for May 2007 Elections
i.
ii.
iii.
15,283,659
1,337,032
102,430
16,723,121
RANK
PARTY/ORGANIZATION/
COALITION
VOTES
RECEIVED
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
BUHAY
BAYAN MUNA
CIBAC
GABRIELA
APEC
A TEACHER
AKBAYAN
ALAGAD
BUTIL
COOP-NATCO
BATAS
ANAK PAWIS
ARC
ABONO
1,163,218
972,730
760,260
610,451
538,971
476,036
470,872
423,076
405,052
390,029
386,361
376,036
338,194
337,046
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
BUHAY
BAYAN MUNA
CIBAC
GABRIELA
APEC
A TEACHER
AKBAYAN
ALAGAD
BUTIL
COOP-NATCCO
ANAKPAWIS
ARC
ABONO
No. 07-250, in order not to render the proceedings therein moot and
academic.
Finally, all proclamation of the nominees of concerned parties,
organizations and coalitions with pending disputes shall likewise be
held in abeyance until final resolution of their respective cases.
Let the Clerk of the Commission implement this Resolution, furnishing
a copy thereof to the Speaker of the House of Representatives of the
Philippines.
SO ORDERED. 8 (Emphasis in the original)
Pursuant to NBC Resolution No. 07-60, the COMELEC, acting as NBC, promulgated
NBC Resolution No. 07-72, which declared the additional seats allocated to the
appropriate parties. We quote from the COMELEC's interpretation of
the Veterans formula as found in NBC Resolution No. 07-72:
WHEREAS, on July 9, 2007, the Commission on Elections sitting en
banc as the National Board of Canvassers proclaimed thirteen (13)
qualified parties, organization[s] and coalitions based on the
presumptive two percent (2%) threshold of 334,462 votes from the
projected maximum total number of party-list votes of 16,723,121,
and were thus given one (1) guaranteed party-list seat each;
WHEREAS, per Report of the Tabulation Group and Supervisory
Committee of the National Board of Canvassers, the projected
maximum total party-list votes, as of July 11, 2007, based on the
votes actually canvassed, votes canvassed but not included in Report
No. 29, votes received but uncanvassed, and maximum votes
expected for Pantar, Lanao del Norte, is 16,261,369; and that the
projected maximum total votes for the thirteen (13) qualified parties,
organizations and coalition[s] are as follows:
1
2
3
4
5
6
Party-List
BUHAY
BAYAN MUNA
CIBAC
GABRIELA
APEC
A TEACHER
1,178,747
977,476
755,964
621,718
622,489
492,369
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
AKBAYAN
ALAGAD
BUTIL
COOP-NATCO
ANAKPAWIS
ARC
ABONO
462,674
423,190
409,298
412,920
370,165
375,846
340,151
WHEREAS,
based
on
the
above
Report, Buhay
Hayaan
Yumabong (Buhay) obtained the highest number of votes among the
thirteen (13) qualified parties, organizations and coalitions, making it
the "first party" in accordance with Veterans Federation Party versus
COMELEC, reiterated in Citizen's Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC)
versus COMELEC; acITSD
Additional seats
1,178,747
16,261,369
0.07248 or 7.2%
No. of votes of
concerned party
No. of votes of
first party
No. of additional
seats allocated to
first party
Party List
Percentage
Additional Seat
BAYAN MUNA
CIBAC
GABRIELA
APEC
A TEACHER
AKBAYAN
ALAGAD
BUTIL
COOP-NATCO
ANAKPAWIS
ARC
ABONO
1.65
1.28
1.05
1.05
0.83
0.78
0.71
0.69
0.69
0.62
0.63
0.57
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Party List
Additional Seats
BUHAY
BAYAN MUNA
CIBAC
GABRIELA
APEC
2
1
1
1
1
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
1.7
1.8
1.9
1.10
1.11
1.12
1.13
1.14
1.15
Party-List
No. of Seat(s)
Buhay
Bayan Muna
CIBAC
Gabriela
APEC
A Teacher
Akbayan
Alagad
Butil
Coop-Natco [sic]
Anak Pawis
ARC
Abono
AGAP
AMIN
3
2
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
Issues
BANAT brought the following issues before this Court:
1.Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives
provided
in
Section
5(2),
Article
VI
of the
Constitution mandatory or is it merely a ceiling?
2.Is
provided
in
Section
11(b)
of RA
3.Is the two percent threshold and "qualifier" votes prescribed by the
same Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?
4.How shall the party-list representatives be allocated? 16
Bayan Muna, A Teacher, and Abono, on the other hand, raised the following issues
in their petition:
I.Respondent Commission on Elections, acting as National Board of
Canvassers, committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction when it promulgated NBC
Resolution No. 07-60 to implement the First-Party Rule in the
allocation of seats to qualified party-list organizations as said
rule:
A.Violates
the
constitutional
representation.
principle
of
proportional
.80
x .20
This formula allows for the corresponding increase in the number of seats
available for party-list representatives whenever a legislative district is created
by law. Since the 14th Congress of the Philippines has 220 district
representatives, there are 55 seats available to party-list representatives.
220
.80
x .20
55
After prescribing the ratio of the number of party-list representatives to the total
number of representatives, the Constitution left the manner of allocating
the seats available to party-list representatives to the wisdom of the
legislature.
BANAT used two formulas to obtain the same results: one is based on the
proportional percentage of the votes received by each party as against the
total nationwide party-list votes, and the other is "by making the votes of a
party-list with a median percentage of votes as the divisor in computing the
allocation of seats".25 Thirty-four (34) party-list seats will be awarded under
BANAT's second interpretation.
In G.R. No. 179295, Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher criticize both the
COMELEC's original 2-4-6 formula and the Veterans formula for systematically
preventing all the party-list seats from being filled up. They claim that both
formulas do not factor in the total number of seats allotted for the entire Party-List
System. Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher reject the three-seat cap, but accept
the 2% threshold. After determining the qualified parties, a second percentage is
generated by dividing the votes of a qualified party by the total votes of all
qualified parties only. The number of seats allocated to a qualified party is
computed by multiplying the total party-list seats available with the second
percentage. There will be a first round of seat allocation, limited to using the
whole integers as the equivalent of the number of seats allocated to the
concerned party-list. After all the qualified parties are given their seats, a second
round of seat allocation is conducted. The fractions, or remainders, from the
whole integers are ranked from highest to lowest and the remaining seats on the
basis of this ranking are allocated until all the seats are filled up. 26
We examine what R.A. No. 7941 prescribes to allocate seats for party-list
representatives.
Section 11 (a) of R.A. No. 7941 prescribes the ranking of the participating parties
from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during
the elections.
Table 1. Ranking of the participating parties from the highest to the
lowest based on the number of votes garnered during the
elections. 27
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
Party
Votes
Garnered
BUHAY
BAYAN MUNA
CIBAC
GABRIELA
APEC
A TEACHER
AKBAYAN
ALAGAD
COOP-NATCCO
BUTIL
BATAS
ARC
ANAKPAWIS
ABONO
AMIN
AGAP
AN WARAY
YACAP
FPJPM
UNI-MAD
ABS
KAKUSA
KABATAAN
ABA-AKO
ALIF
SENIOR CITIZENS
AT
VFP
ANAD
BANAT
ANG KASANGGA
BANTAY
ABAKADA
1-UTAK
TUCP
COCOFED
1,169,234
979,039
755,686
621,171
619,657
490,379
466,112
423,149
409,883
409,160
385,810
374,288
370,261
339,990
338,185
328,724
321,503
310,889
300,923
245,382
235,086
228,999
228,637
218,818
217,822
213,058
197,872
196,266
188,521
177,028
170,531
169,801
166,747
164,980
162,647
155,920
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
AGHAM
ANAK
ABANSE! PINAY
PM
AVE
SUARA
ASSALAM
DIWA
ANC
SANLAKAS
ABC
KALAHI
APOI
BP
AHONBAYAN
BIGKIS
PMAP
AKAPIN
PBA
GRECON
BTM
A SMILE
NELFFI
AKSA
BAGO
BANDILA
AHON
ASAHAN MO
AGBIAG!
SPI
BAHANDI
ADD
AMANG SCIAaT
ABAY PARAK
BABAE KA
SB
ASAP
PEP
ABA ILONGGO
146,032
141,817
130,356
119,054
110,769
110,732
110,440
107,021
99,636
97,375
90,058
88,868
79,386
78,541
78,424
77,327
75,200
74,686
71,544
62,220
60,993
58,717
57,872
57,012
55,846
54,751
54,522
51,722
50,837
50,478
46,612
45,624
43,062
42,282
36,512
34,835
34,098
33,938
33,903
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
VENDORS
ADD-TRIBAL
ALMANA
AANGAT KA PILIPINO
AAPS
HAPI
AAWAS
SM
AG
AGING PINOY
APO
BIYAYANG BUKID
ATS
UMDJ
BUKLOD FILIPINA
LYPAD
AA-KASOSYO
KASAPI
TOTAL
33,691
32,896
32,255
29,130
26,271
25,781
22,946
20,744
16,916
16,729
16,421
16,241
14,161
9,445
8,915
8,471
8,406
6,221
15,950,900
=========
The first clause of Section 11 (b) of R.A. No. 7941 states that "parties,
organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes
cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each". This clause
guarantees a seat to the two-percenters. In Table 2 below, we use the first 20
party-list candidates for illustration purposes. The percentage of votes garnered
by each party is arrived at by dividing the number of votes garnered by each
party by 15,950,900, the total number of votes cast for all party-list candidates.
Rank
Party
Votes
Votes
Guarantee
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
BUHAY
BAYAN MUNA
CIBAC
GABRIELA
APEC
A TEACHER
AKBAYAN
ALAGAD
COOP-NATCCO
BUTIL
BATAS 29
ARC
ANAKPAWIS
ABONO
AMIN
AGAP IDTHcA
AN WARAY
Garnered
Garnered over
Total Votes
for Party-List,
in %
Seat
1,169,234
979,039
755,686
621,171
619,657
490,379
466,112
423,149
409,883
409,160
385,810
374,288
370,261
339,990
338,185
328,724
321,503
7.33%
6.14%
4.74%
3.89%
3.88%
3.07%
2.92%
2.65%
2.57%
2.57%
2.42%
2.35%
2.32%
2.13%
2.12%
2.06%
2.02%
310,889
300,923
245,382
1.95%
1.89%
1.54%
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
17
===
0
0
0
Total
18
19
20
YACAP
FPJPM
UNI-MAD
From Table 2 above, we see that only 17 party-list candidates received at least 2%
from the total number of votes cast for party-list candidates. The 17 qualified
party-list candidates, or the two-percenters, are the party-list candidates that are
"entitled to one seat each", or the guaranteed seat. In this first round of seat
allocation, we distributed 17 guaranteed seats.
The second clause of Section 11 (b) of R.A. No. 7941 provides that "those
garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional
seats in proportion to their total number of votes". This is where petitioners'
and intervenors' problem with the formula in Veterans lies. Veterans interprets the
clause "in proportion to their total number of votes" to be in proportion to the
votes of the first party. This interpretation is contrary to the express language
of R.A. No. 7941.IATHaS
We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued
operation of the two percent threshold for the distribution of the additional seats
as found in the second clause of Section 11 (b) of R.A. No.
7941 is unconstitutional. This Court finds that the two percent threshold makes
it mathematically impossible to achieve the maximum number of available party
list seats when the number of available party list seats exceeds 50. The continued
operation of the two percent threshold in the distribution of the additional seats
frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling that 20% of the members of
the House of Representatives shall consist of party-list representatives.
To illustrate: There are 55 available party-list seats. Suppose there are 50 million
votes cast for the 100 participants in the party list elections. A party that has two
percent of the votes cast, or one million votes, gets a guaranteed seat. Let us
further assume that the first 50 parties all get one million votes. Only 50 parties
get a seat despite the availability of 55 seats. Because of the operation of the two
percent threshold, this situation will repeat itself even if we increase the available
party-list seats to 60 seats and even if we increase the votes cast to 100 million.
Thus, even if the maximum number of parties get two percent of the votes for
every party, it is always impossible for the number of occupied party-list seats to
exceed 50 seats as long as the two percent threshold is present.
We therefore strike down the two percent threshold only in relation to the
distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Section 11 (b)
of R.A. No. 7941. The two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to
the full implementation of Section 5 (2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents
the attainment of "the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group
interests in the House of Representatives". 30
In determining the allocation of seats for party-list representatives under Section
11 of R.A. No. 7941, the following procedure shall be observed:
1.The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the
highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they
garnered during the elections.
Votes
Garnered
Votes
Garnered
over
Guaranteed
Seat
Additional
Seats
(B) plu
(C), in
whole
Total
Votes for
Party List,
in %
Y
MUNA
ELA
her
AN
AD
NATCCO
PAWIS
O
ARAY
AD
SA
AAN
KO
R CITIZENS
T
ASANGGA
AY
1,169,234
979,039
755,686
621,171
619,657
490,379
466,112
423,149
409,883
409,160
385,810
374,288
370,261
339,990
338,185
328,724
321,503
310,889
300,923
245,382
235,086
228,999
228,637
218,818
217,822
213,058
197,872
196,266
188,521
177,028
170,531
169,801
(A)
7.33%
6.14%
4.74%
3.89%
3.88%
3.07%
2.92%
2.65%
2.57%
2.57%
2.42%
2.35%
2.32%
2.13%
2.12%
2.06%
2.02%
1.95%
1.89%
1.54%
1.47%
1.44%
1.43%
1.37%
1.37%
1.34%
1.24%
1.23%
1.18%
1.11%
1.07%
1.06%
integer
(First
Round)
(B)
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
(Second
Round)
(C)
2.79
2.33
1.80
1.48
1.48
1.17
1.11
1.01
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
(D)
3
3
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
ADA
K
FED
166,747
164,980
162,647
155,920
1.05%
1.03%
1.02%
0.98%
0
0
0
0
17
====
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
55
====
Applying the procedure of seat allocation as illustrated in Table 3 above, there are
55 party-list representatives from the 36 winning party-list organizations. All 55
available party-list seats are filled. The additional seats allocated to the parties
with sufficient number of votes for one whole seat, in no case to exceed a total of
three seats for each party, are shown in column (D). IcADSE
parties? Can they run under the party list concept or must they
be under the district legislation side of it only?
MR. VILLACORTA.
In reply to that query, I think these parties that the Commissioner
mentioned can field candidates for the Senate as well as for the
House of Representatives. Likewise, they can also field
sectoral candidates for the 20 percent or 30 percent,
whichever is adopted, of the seats that we are allocating
under the party list system.
MR. MONSOD.
In other words, the Christian Democrats can field district candidates
and can also participate in the party list system?
MR. VILLACORTA.
Why not? When they come to the party list system, they will
be fielding only sectoral candidates.
MR. MONSOD.
May I be clarified on that? Can UNIDO participate in the party list
system?
MR. VILLACORTA.
Yes, why not? For as long as they field candidates who come
from the different marginalized sectors that we shall
designate in this Constitution.
MR. MONSOD.
Suppose Senator Taada wants to run under BAYAN group and says
that he represents the farmers, would he qualify?
MR. VILLACORTA.
No, Senator Taada would not qualify.
MR. MONSOD.
But UNIDO can field candidates under the party list system and say
Juan dela Cruz is a farmer. Who would pass on whether he is a
farmer or not?
MR. TADEO.
for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is
at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twentyfive (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the
election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of
thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to continue until the
expiration of his term.
Under Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941, it is not necessary that the party-list
organization's nominee "wallow in poverty, destitution and infirmity" 34 as
there is no financial status required in the law. It is enough that the nominee of
the sectoral party/organization/coalition belongs to the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, 35that is, if the nominee represents the fisherfolk,
he or she must be a fisherfolk, or if the nominee represents the senior citizens,
he or she must be a senior citizen.
Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 mandates the filling-up of the entire
20% allocation of party-list representatives found in the Constitution. The
Constitution, in paragraph 1, Section 5 of Article VI, left the determination of the
number of the members of the House of Representatives to Congress: "The House
of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty
members, unless otherwise fixed by law, . . . ." The 20% allocation of party-list
representatives is merely a ceiling; party-list representatives cannot be more than
20% of the members of the House of Representatives. However, we cannot allow
the continued existence of a provision in the law which will systematically prevent
the constitutionally allocated 20% party-list representatives from being filled. The
three-seat cap, as a limitation to the number of seats that a qualified party-list
organization may occupy, remains a valid statutory device that prevents any
party from dominating the party-list elections. Seats for party-list representatives
shall thus be allocated in accordance with the procedure used in Table 3 above.
However, by a vote of 8-7, the Court decided to continue the ruling
in Veterans disallowing major political parties from participating in the party-list
elections, directly or indirectly. Those who voted to continue disallowing major
political parties from the party-list elections joined Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno in
his separate opinion. On the formula to allocate party-list seats, the Court is
unanimous in concurring with this ponencia.
WHEREFORE, we PARTIALLY GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the Resolution of
the COMELEC dated 3 August 2007 in NBC No. 07-041 (PL) as well as the
Resolution dated 9 July 2007 in NBC No. 07-60. We declare unconstitutional the
ON
THE
PHILIPPINES,
(GUARDJAN), petitioner, vs. COMMISSION
ELECTIONS, respondent.
INC.
ON
AUTONOMY
PARTY
ON
ELECTIONS
EN
DECISION
CARPIO, J p:
The Cases
These cases constitute 54 Petitions for Certiorari and Petitions for Certiorari and
Prohibition 1 filed by 52 party-list groups and organizations assailing the
Resolutions issued by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) disqualifying them
from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections, either by denial of their
petitions for registration under the party-list system, or cancellation of their
registration and accreditation as party-list organizations.
Local Athletics
Entrepreneurs
and Hobbyists, -
Inc. (ALA-EH)
Resolution dated 27 November
2012 10
4
Advocating
Autonomy Party
(1AAAP)
Kalusugan
(AKIN), Inc.
Resolution dated 29 November
2012 12
6
(AAB)
Failure to represent a
marginalized
sector of society, despite the
formation of a sectoral wing for
the
12-165
(PLM)
-
Organizations,
Associations of
the Philippines, Inc. (ALONA)
underrepresented.
B.Via the COMELEC En Banc's review on motion for reconsideration
of the COMELEC Division's resolutions denying registration of
groups and organizations
Resolution dated 7 November
2012 15
9
Mamamahayag
(ALAM)
-
List
(KALIKASAN)
Guard, Utility
Helper, Aider,
Rider, Driver/
Domestic
Helper,
Janitor, Agent
and Nanny of
the
Philippines, Inc.
(GUARDJAN)
Resolution dated 5 December
2012 18
12
Political Party
12-177 (AKB)
(PLM)
-
and underrepresented.
Resolution dated 11 October
2012 25
2 20376612-161 Atong Paglaum,
(PLM) Inc. (Atong
Paglaum)
Righteousness
Advocacy on
Leadership
(ARAL)
5 20431812-220 United
(PLM) Movement
Against Drugs
Foundation
(UNIMAD)
-
Guardians
Brotherhood,
Inc. (1 BROPGBI)
7 20412212-223 1 Guardians
(PLM)
Nationalist
Cancelled registration
Failure to define the sector it
seeks to
represent; and
The nominees do not belong to
a
marginalized and
underrepresented
sector.
Cancelled registration
The party is a military
fraternity;
Philippines, Inc.
(1GANAP/
GUARDIANS)
and
The nominees do not appear to
belong to the sector of
community
volunteer workers.
8 20426312-257 Blessed
(PLM)
Federation of
Farmers and
Fishermen
International,
Inc. (A
BLESSED
Party-List)
Cancelled registration
Three of the seven and
nominees do
not belong to the sector of
farmers
and fishermen, the sector
sought
to be represented; and
None of the nominees are
registered
voters of Region XI, the region
sought to be represented.
Alliance for
Rural Energy,
Inc. (1-CARE)
-
Cancelled registration
The sector of rural energy
consumers
is not marginalized and
underrepresented;
The party's track record is
related
to electric cooperatives and
not rural
energy consumers; and
The nominees do not belong to
the
sector of rural energy
consumers.
10 20392212-201 Association of
(PLM) Philippine
Electric
Cooperatives
(APEC)
-
Inc. (ARARO)
-
party
represents differ;
The nominees do not belong to
the
sectors that the party seeks to
represent;
Failure to show that three of
the
nominees are bona fide party
members; and
Lack of a Board resolution to
participate in the party-list
elections.
Magsasaka ng
Pilipinas
Movement
(AGRI)
14 20393612-248 Aksyon
(PLM)
MagsasakaPartido Tinig ng
Masa (AKMA-
Cancelled registration
The party ceased to exist for
more
than a year immediately after
the
May 2010 elections;
The nominees do not belong to
the
sector of peasants and farmers
that
the party seeks to represent;
Only four nominees were
submitted
to the COMELEC; and
Failure to show meaningful
activities
for its constituency.
Cancelled registration
Failure to show that majority of
its
members are marginalized and
underrepresented;
PTM)
-
15 20412612-263 Kaagapay ng
(PLM) Nagkakaisang
Agilang
Pilipinong
Magsasaka
(KAP)
-
16 20436412-180 Adhikain at
(PLM) Kilusan ng
Ordinaryong
Tao Para sa
Lupa, Pabahay,
Hanapbuhay at
Kaunlaran
(AKO-BAHAY)
the Philippines,
Inc. (BANTAY)
18 20440812-217 Pilipino
(PLM)
Nationwide
Party (PASANG
MASDA)
20 20395812-015 Kapatiran ng
Cancelled registration
Failure to show that majority
of
its members are marginalized
and underrepresented; and
Failure to prove that two of its
nominees actually belong to
the
marginalized and
underrepresented.
Cancelled registration
Change of sector (from urban
poor
youth to urban poor)
necessitates
a new application;
Failure to show track record for
the marginalized and
underrepresented;
Failure to prove that majority
of its
members and officers are from
the
urban poor sector; and
The nominees are not
members of the
urban poor sector.
Cancelled registration
The party represents drivers
and
operators, who may have
conflicting
interests; and
Nominees are either operators
or
former operators.
Cancelled registration
(PLM)
mga Nakulong
na Walang Sala,
Inc. (KAKUSA)
-
to be
marginalized and
underrepresented.
Resolution dated 7 November
2012 33
22 20409412-185 Alliance for
(PLM) Nationalism and
Democracy
(ANAD)
Daughters of
Mother Earth
(GREENFORCE)
-
Cancelled registration
(PLM)
Advocates in
Mining
Advancement
for National
Progress
(AAMA)
Movement for
Active Reform
and
Transparency
(SMART)
Cancelled registration
The nominees are disqualified
from
representing the sectors that
the party represents;
2012 40
31 20412512-292 Agapay ng
(PLM) Indigenous
Peoples Rights
Alliance, Inc.
(A-IPRA)
-
Federation, Inc.
(COCOFED)
-
Party-List
Cancelled registration
Failure to establish a track
record of
(ABANG
LINGKOD)
-
Dreamers, Inc.
(ABROAD)
-
35 20437412-228 Binhi-Partido ng
(PLM) mga Magsasaka
Para sa mga
Magsasaka
(BINHI)
-
Sangkatauhan
(1st KABAGIS)
Transport
Koalisyon (1UTAK)
-
Cancelled accreditation
The party represents drivers
and
operators, who may have
conflicting
interests; and
The party's nominees do not
belong
to any marginalized and
underrepresented sector.
Senior Citizens -
12-191 in the
(PLM)
Cancelled registration
The party violated election
laws
because its nominees had a
termsharing agreement.
Philippines, Inc.
(SENIOR
CITIZENS)
These 39 petitioners (AKB, Atong Paglaum, ARAL, ARC, UNIMAD, 1BRO-PGBI,
1GANAP/GUARDIANS, A BLESSED Party-List, 1-CARE, APEC, AT, ARARO, AGRI,
AKMA-PTM, KAP, AKO-BAHAY, BANTAY, PACYAW, PASANG MASDA, KAKUSA, AG,
ANAD, GREENFORCE, FIRM 24-K, ALIM, AAMA, SMART, ABP, BAYANI, AANI, A-IPRA,
COCOFED, ABANG LINGKOD, ABROAD, BINHI, BUTIL, 1st KABAGIS, 1-UTAK, SENIOR
CITIZENS) were able to secure a mandatory injunction from this Court, directing
the COMELEC to include the names of these 39 petitioners in the printing of the
official ballot for the 13 May 2013 party-list elections. CSAaDE
Petitioners prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction. This Court issued Status Quo Ante Orders in all
petitions. This Decision governs only the 54 consolidated petitions that
were granted Status Quo Ante Orders, namely:
G.R. No.
SPP No.
Resolution dated 13
November 2012
203818-19
12-154 (PLM)
12-177 (PLM)
203981
12-187 (PLM)
204002
12-188 (PLM)
203922
12-201 (PLM)
203960
12-260 (PLM)
203936
12-248 (PLM)
203958
12-015 (PLM)
203976
12-288 (PLM)
Group
Resolution dated 20
November 2012
204094
12-185 (PLM)
204125
12-292 (PLM)
204100
12-196 (PLM)
Resolution dated 27
November 2012
204141
12-229 (PLM)
204240
12-279 (PLM)
204216
12-202 (PLM)
204158
12-158 (PLM)
12-223 (PLM)
203766
12-161 (PLM)
204318
12-220 (PLM)
204263
12-257 (PLM)
204174
12-232 (PLM)
204126
12-263 (PLM)
204364
12-180 (PLM)
1 Guardians Nationalist
Philippines, Inc.
(1GANAP/GUARDIANS)
Atong Paglaum, Inc. (Atong
Paglaum)
United Movement Against
Drugs
Foundation (UNIMAD)
Blessed Federation of Farmers
and
Fishermen International, Inc.
(A BLESSED Party-List)
Aangat Tayo Party-List Party
(AT)
Kaagapay ng Nagkakaisang
Agilang
Pilipinong Magsasaka (KAP)
Adhikain at Kilusan ng
204139
12-127 (PL)
204220
12-238 (PLM)
204236
12-254 (PLM)
204238
12-173 (PLM)
204239
12-060 (PLM)
204321
12-252 (PLM)
204323
12-210 (PLM)
204341
12-269 (PLM)
204358
12-204 (PLM)
204359
12-272 (PLM)
204356
12-136 (PLM)
Resolution dated 11 December
2012
204402
12-061 (PL)
204394
12-145 (PL)
Ordinaryong Tao
Para sa Lupa, Pabahay,
Hanapbuhay at
Kaunlaran (AKO-BAHAY)
Alab ng Mamamahayag (ALAM)
Abang Lingkod Party-List
(ABANG
LINGKOD)
Firm 24-K Association, Inc.
(FIRM 24-K)
Alliance of Bicolnon Party (ABP)
Green Force for the
Environment Sons
and Daughters of Mother Earth
(GREENFORCE)
Ang Agrikultura Natin Isulong
(AANI)
Bayani Party List (BAYANI)
Action League of Indigenous
Masses
(ALIM)
Alliance of Advocates in Mining
Advancement for National
Progress
(AAMA)
Social Movement for Active
Reform
and Transparency (SMART)
Butil Farmers Party (BUTIL)
Kalikasan Party-List
(KALIKASAN)
Association of Guard, Utility
Helper,
Aider, Rider, Driver/Domestic
Helper,
Janitor, Agent and Nanny of the
Philippines, Inc. (GUARDJAN)
204408
12-217 (PLM)
204428
204490
204379
204367
204426
12-256
12-073
12-099
12-104
12-011
204455
12-041 (PLM)
204374
12-228 (PLM)
204370
12-011 (PP)
204435
12-057 (PLM)
204486
12-194 (PLM)
204410
12-198 (PLM)
204421,
12-157 (PLM)
204425
12-191 (PLM)
204436
12-009 (PP),
12-165 (PLM)
204485
12-175 (PL)
(PLM)
(PLM)
(PLM)
(PL)
(PLM)
204484
11-002
Partido ng Bayan ng Bida (PBB)
Resolution dated 11 December
2012
Pasang Masda Nationwide
204153
12-277 (PLM)
Party
(PASANG MASDA)
The Issues
We rule upon two issues: first, whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioners
from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections, either by denial of their
new petitions for registration under the party-list system, or by cancellation of
their existing registration and accreditation as party-list organizations;
and second, whether the criteria for participating in the party-list system laid
down in Ang Bagong Bayani andBarangay Association for National Advancement
and Transparency v. Commission on Elections 49 (BANAT) should be applied by
the COMELEC in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections.
The Court's Ruling
We hold that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in following
prevailing decisions of this Court in disqualifying petitioners from participating in
the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections. However, since the Court adopts in
this Decision new parameters in the qualification of national, regional, and
sectoral parties under the party-list system, thereby abandoning the rulings in the
decisions applied by the COMELEC in disqualifying petitioners, we remand to the
COMELEC all the present petitions for the COMELEC to determine who are
qualified to register under the party-list system, and to participate in the coming
13 May 2013 party-list elections, under the new parameters prescribed in this
Decision.
The Party-List System
The 1987 Constitution provides the basis for the party-list system of
representation. Simply put, the party-list system is intended to democratize
political power by giving political parties that cannot win in legislative district
elections a chance to win seats in the House of Representatives. 50 The voter
elects two representatives in the House of Representatives: one for his or her
legislative district, and another for his or her party-list group or organization of
choice. The 1987 Constitution provides: cCTESa
Section 5, Article VI
Yes, why not? For as long as they field candidates who come
from the different marginalized sectors that we shall
designate in this Constitution.
MR. MONSOD.
Suppose Senator Taada wants to run under BAYAN group and says
that he represents the farmers, would he qualify? EaSCAH
MR. VILLACORTA.
No, Senator Taada would not qualify.
MR. MONSOD.
But UNIDO can field candidates under the party list system and say
Juan dela Cruz is a farmer. Who would pass on whether he is a
farmer or not?
MR. TADEO.
Kay Commissioner Monsod, gusto ko lamang linawin ito. Political
parties, particularly minority political parties, are not
prohibited to participate in the party list election if they
can prove that they are also organized along sectoral
lines.
MR. MONSOD.
What the Commissioner is saying is that all political parties can
participate because it is precisely the contention of political
parties that they represent the broad base of citizens and that
all sectors are represented in them. Would the Commissioner
agree?
MR. TADEO.
Ang punto lamang namin, pag pinayagan mo ang UNIDO na isang
political party, it will dominate the party list at mawawalang
saysay din yung sector. Lalamunin mismo ng political parties
ang party list system. Gusto ko lamang bigyan ng diin ang
"reserve." Hindi ito reserve seat sa marginalized sectors. Kung
titingnan natin itong 198 seats, reserved din ito sa political
parties.
MR. MONSOD.
Hindi po reserved iyon kasi anybody can run there. But my question
to Commissioner Villacorta and probably also to Commissioner
Tadeo is that under this system, would UNIDO be banned from
running under the party list system? CDHaET
MR. VILLACORTA.
No, as I said, UNIDO may field sectoral candidates. On that
condition alone, UNIDO may be allowed to register for
the party list system.
MR. MONSOD.
May I inquire from Commissioner Tadeo if he shares that
answer?
MR. TADEO.
The same.
MR. VILLACORTA.
Puwede po ang UNIDO, pero sa sectoral lines. IcESaA
MR. MONSOD:
Sino po ang magsasabi kung iyong kandidato ng UNIDO ay hindi
talagang labor leader or isang laborer? Halimbawa, abogado ito.
MR. TADEO:
Iyong mechanics.
MR. MONSOD:
Hindi po mechanics iyon because we are trying to solve an inherent
problem of sectoral representation. My question is: Suppose
UNIDO fields a labor leader, would he qualify?
MR. TADEO:
The COMELEC may look into the truth of whether or not a
political party is really organized along a specific
sectoral line. If such is verified or confirmed, the political
party may submit a list of individuals who are actually
members of such sectors. The lists are to be published to
give individuals or organizations belonging to such
sector the chance to present evidence contradicting
claims of membership in the said sector or to question
that, after this period, there will be no seats reserved for any class or type of party
that qualifies under the three groups constituting the party-list system.
Hence, the clear intent, express wording, and party-list structure
ordained in Section 5 (1) and (2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
cannot be disputed: the party-list system is not for sectoral parties only,
but also for non-sectoral parties.
Republic Act No. 7941 or the Party-List System Act, which is the law that
implements the party-list system prescribed in the Constitution, provides:
Section 3. Definition of Terms. (a) The party-list system is a
mechanism of proportional representation in the election of
representatives to the House of Representatives from national,
regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof
registered with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). Component
parties or organizations of a coalition may participate independently
provided the coalition of which they form part does not participate in
the party-list system.
(b) A party means either a political party or a sectoral party or
a coalition of parties.
(c) A political party refers to an organized group of citizens
advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies for
the general conduct of government and which, as the most
immediate means of securing their adoption, regularly
nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members
as candidates for public office.
It is a national party when its constituency is spread over the
geographical territory of at least a majority of the regions. It is a
regional party when its constituency is spread over the geographical
territory of at least a majority of the cities and provinces comprising
the region.
(d) A sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens
belonging to any of the sectors enumerated in Section 5
hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to the special
interest and concerns of their sector.
(e) A sectoral organization refers to a group of citizens or a coalition
of groups of citizens who share similar physical attributes or
characteristics, employment, interests or concerns. DCIEac
None of the 8 grounds to refuse or cancel registration refers to nonrepresentation of the "marginalized and underrepresented."
The phrase "marginalized and underrepresented" appears only once in R.A.
No. 7941, in Section 2 on Declaration of Policy. 57 Section 2 seeks "to promote
proportional representation in the election of representatives to the House of
Representatives through the party-list system," which will enable Filipinos
belonging
to
the
"marginalized
and
underrepresented
sectors,
organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political
constituencies," to become members of the House of Representatives. While the
policy declaration in Section 2 of R.A. No. 7941 broadly refers to "marginalized
and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties," the specific
implementing provisions of R.A. No. 7941 do not define or require that the sectors,
organizations or parties must be "marginalized and underrepresented." On the
contrary, to even interpret that all the sectors mentioned in Section 5 are
"marginalized and underrepresented" would lead to absurdities.
How then should we harmonize the broad policy declaration in Section 2 of R.A.
No. 7941 with its specific implementing provisions, bearing in mind the applicable
provisions of the 1987 Constitution on the matter?
The phrase "marginalized and underrepresented" should refer only to the
sectors in Section 5 that are, by their nature, economically "marginalized
and underrepresented." These sectors are: labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban
poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas workers,
and other similar sectors. For these sectors, a majority of the members of
the
sectoral
party
must
belong
to
the
"marginalized
and
underrepresented." The nominees of the sectoral party either must
belong to the sector, or must have a track record of advocacy for the
sector represented. Belonging to the "marginalized and underrepresented"
sector does not mean one must "wallow in poverty, destitution or infirmity." It is
sufficient that one, or his or her sector, is below the middle class. More
specifically, the economically "marginalized and underrepresented" are those who
fall in the low income group as classified by the National Statistical Coordination
Board. 58 TAaCED
The recognition that national and regional parties, as well as sectoral parties of
professionals, the elderly, women and the youth, need not be "marginalized and
underrepresented" will allow small ideology-based and cause-oriented parties who
lack "well-defined political constituencies" a chance to win seats in the House of
Representatives. On the other hand, limiting to the "marginalized and
underrepresented" the sectoral parties for labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and
other sectors that by their nature are economically at the margins of society, will
give the "marginalized and underrepresented" an opportunity to likewise win
seats in the House of Representatives.
This interpretation will harmonize the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 and will
give rise to a multi-party system where those "marginalized and
underrepresented,"both in economic and ideological status, will have the
opportunity to send their own members to the House of Representatives. This
interpretation will also make the party-list system honest and transparent,
eliminating the need for relatively well-off party-list representatives to
masquerade as "wallowing in poverty, destitution and infirmity," even as they
attend sessions in Congress riding in SUVs.
The major political parties are those that field candidates in the legislative district
elections. Major political parties cannot participate in the party-list elections since
they neither lack "well-defined political constituencies" nor represent
"marginalized and underrepresented" sectors. Thus, the national or regional
parties under the party-list system are necessarily those that do not
belong to major political parties. This automatically reserves the national and
regional parties under the party-list system to those who "lack well-defined
political constituencies," giving them the opportunity to have members in the
House of Representatives.
To recall, Ang Bagong Bayani expressly declared, in its second guideline for the
accreditation of parties under the party-list system, that "while even major
political parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and the Constitution to
participate in the party-list system, they must comply with the declared statutory
policy of enabling 'Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors . . . to be elected to the House of Representatives.'"
However, the requirement in Ang Bagong Bayani, in its second guideline, that "the
political party . . . must represent the marginalized and underrepresented,"
automatically disqualified major political parties from participating in the party-list
system. This inherent
inconsistency in Ang Bagong Bayani has been
compounded by the COMELEC's refusal to register sectoral wings officially
organized by major political parties. BANAT merely formalized the prevailing
practice when it expressly prohibited major political parties from participating
in the party-list system, even through their sectoral wings. STECDc
Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941 expressly prohibited the "first five (5) major
political parties on the basis of party representation in the House of
Representatives at the start of the Tenth Congress" from participating in the May
1988 party-list elections. 59 Thus, major political parties can participate
in subsequent party-list elections since the prohibition is expressly
limited only to the 1988 party-list elections. However, major political parties
should participate in party-list elections only through their sectoral wings. The
participation of major political parties through their sectoral wings, a majority of
whose members are "marginalized and underrepresented" or lacking in "welldefined political constituencies," will facilitate the entry of the "marginalized and
underrepresented" and those who "lack well-defined political constituencies" as
members of the House of Representatives.
The 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 allow major political parties to
participate in party-list elections so as to encourage them to work assiduously in
extending their constituencies to the "marginalized and underrepresented" and to
those who "lack well-defined political constituencies." The participation of major
political parties in party-list elections must be geared towards the entry, as
members of the House of Representatives, of the "marginalized and
underrepresented" and those who "lack well-defined political constituencies,"
giving them a voice in law-making. Thus, to participate in party-list elections, a
major political party that fields candidates in the legislative district elections must
organize a sectoral wing, like a labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, professional,
women or youth wing, that can register under the party-list system.
Such sectoral wing of a major political party must have its own constitution, bylaws, platform or program of government, officers and members, a majority of
whom must belong to the sector represented. The sectoral wing is in itself an
independent sectoral party, and is linked to a major political party through a
coalition. This linkage is allowed by Section 3 of R.A. No. 7941, which provides
that "component parties or organizations of a coalition may participate
independently (in party-list elections) provided the coalition of which they form
part does not participate in the party-list system."
Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941 prescribes the qualifications of party-list nominees. This
provision prescribes a special qualification only for the nominee from the youth
sector.
Section 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No person shall be
nominated as party-list representative unless he is a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the
Philippines for a period of not less than one (1) year immediately
preceding the day of the election, able to read and write, a bona
fidemember of the party or organization which he seeks to represent
for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is
at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the
election. aSTAcH
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twentyfive (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the
election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of
thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to continue in office until
the expiration of his term.
A party-list nominee must be a bona fide member of the party or organization
which he or she seeks to represent. In the case of sectoral parties, to be
a bona fide party-list nominee one must either belong to the sector
represented, or have a track record of advocacy for such sector.
In disqualifying petitioners, the COMELEC used the criteria prescribed in Ang
Bagong Bayani and BANAT. Ang Bagong Bayani laid down the guidelines for
qualifying those who desire to participate in the party-list system:
First, the political party, sector, organization or coalition must
represent the marginalized and underrepresented groups
identified in Section 5 of RA 7941. . . .
Second, while even major political parties are expressly allowed by RA
7941 and the Constitution to participate in the party-list system, they
must comply with the declared statutory policy of enabling "Filipino
citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors . . .
to be elected to the House of Representatives." . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Third, . . . the religious sector may not be represented in the party-list
system. . . . . cSCADE
xxx xxx xxx
Fourth, a party or an organization must not be disqualified under
Section 6 of RA 7941, which enumerates the grounds for
disqualification as follows:
"(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or
association, organized for religious purposes;
discretion, we declare that it would not be in accord with the 1987 Constitution
and R.A. No. 7941 to apply the criteria in Ang Bagong Bayani and BANAT in
determining who are qualified to participate in the coming 13 May 2013 partylist elections. For this purpose, we suspend our rule 62 that a party may appeal
to this Court from decisions or orders of the COMELEC only if the COMELEC
committed grave abuse of discretion.
Thus, we remand all the present petitions to the COMELEC. In determining who
may participate in the coming 13 May 2013 and subsequent party-list elections,
the COMELEC shall adhere to the following parameters:
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1)
national parties or organizations, (2) regional parties or
organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or
organizations do not need to organize along sectoral lines and
do
not
need
to
represent
any
"marginalized
and
underrepresented" sector.
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they
register under the party-list system and do not field candidates
in legislative district elections. A political party, whether major
or not, that fields candidates in legislative district elections can
participate in party-list elections only through its sectoral wing
that can separately register under the party-list system. The
sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral party, and is
linked to a political party through a coalition. cdtai
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be "marginalized and
underrepresented" or lacking in "well-defined political
constituencies." It is enough that their principal advocacy
pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector. The
sectors that are "marginalized and underrepresented" include
labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers.
The sectors that lack "well-defined political constituencies"
include professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth.
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that
represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" must belong
to the "marginalized and underrepresented" sector they
WHEREFORE, all the present 54 petitions are GRANTED. The 13 petitions, which
have been granted Status Quo Ante Orders but without mandatory injunction to
include the names of petitioners in the printing of ballots, are remanded to the
Commission on Elections only for determination whether petitioners are qualified
to register under the party-list system under the parameters prescribed in this
Decision but they shall not participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections. The
41 petitions, which have been granted mandatory injunctions to include the
names of petitioners in the printing of ballots, are remanded to the Commission
on Elections for determination whether petitioners are qualified to register under
the party-list system and to participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections
under the parameters prescribed in this Decision. The Commission on Elections
may conduct summary evidentiary hearings for this purpose. This Decision is
immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
Bersamin, Del Castillo, Villarama, Jr. and Perez, JJ., concur.
Sereno, C.J., I dissent; Ang Bagong Bayani should be upheld, not reversed. See
concurring and dissenting opinion.
Velasco, Jr., J., took no part due to relative's participation in party list election.
Leonardo-de Castro, J., I concur and also with the additional grounds cited in
Justice Brion's concurring opinion for revisiting the Ang Bagong Bayani ruling and
his erudite analysis of the aim of the party-list system under the Constitution and
law and its implications on political parties, party-list registrants and nominees.
Brion, J., see: separate opinion.
Peralta, J., I join separate opinion of J. Brion.
Abad, J., I join J. A.D. Brion in his separate opinion.
Mendoza, J., I concur to remand but these was a grave abuse of discretion but
only with respect to the disqualification of nominees separate from the party
organization.
Reyes, J., with separate concurring and dissenting opinion.
Perlas-Bernabe, J., is on leave.
Leonen, J., see separate concurring and dissenting opinion.
ANTONIO
FLORES
and
DECISION
ABAD, J p:
These two cases are about the authority of the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (HRET) to pass upon the eligibilities of the nominees of the party-list
groups that won seats in the lower house of Congress.
The Facts and the Case
In G.R. 189466, petitioner Daryl Grace J. Abayon is the first nominee of
the Aangat Tayo party-list organization that won a seat in the House of
Representatives during the 2007 elections.
Respondents Perfecto C. Lucaban, Jr., Ronyl S. Dela Cruz, and Agustin C. Doroga,
all registered voters, filed a petition for quo warranto with respondent HRET
againstAangat Tayo and its nominee, petitioner Abayon, in HRET Case 07-041.
They claimed that Aangat Tayo was not eligible for a party-list seat in the House of
Representatives, since it did not represent the marginalized and underrepresented
sectors.
Respondent Lucaban and the others with him further pointed out that petitioner
Abayon herself was not qualified to sit in the House as a party-list nominee since
she did not belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors, she being
the wife of an incumbent congressional district representative. She moreover lost
her bid as party-list representative of the party-list organization called An
Waray in the immediately preceding elections of May 10, 2004.
Petitioner Abayon countered that the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) had
already confirmed the status of Aangat Tayo as a national multi-sectoral party-list
organization representing the workers, women, youth, urban poor, and elderly and
that she belonged to the women sector. Abayon also claimed that although she
was the second nominee of An Waray party-list organization during the 2004
elections, she could not be regarded as having lost a bid for an elective
office. cIaCTS
Finally, petitioner Abayon pointed out that respondent HRET had no jurisdiction
over the petition for quo warranto since respondent Lucaban and the others with
footx 4 hence, the recourse to this Court through this petition for special civil
action of certiorari and prohibition.
Since the two cases raise a common issue, the Court has caused their
consolidation.
The Issue Presented
The common issue presented in these two cases is:
Whether or not respondent HRET has jurisdiction over the question of
qualifications of petitioners Abayon and Palparan as nominees of Aangat
Tayo and Bantay party-list organizations, respectively, who took the seats at the
House of Representatives that such organizations won in the 2007
elections. ATcEDS
The Court's Ruling
Petitioners Abayon and Palparan have a common theory: Republic Act (R.A.) 7941,
the Party-List System Act, vests in the COMELEC the authority to determine which
parties or organizations have the qualifications to seek party-list seats in the
House of Representatives during the elections. Indeed, the HRET dismissed the
petitions forquo warranto filed with it insofar as they sought the disqualifications
of Aangat Tayo and Bantay. Since petitioners Abayon and Palparan were not
elected into office but were chosen by their respective organizations under their
internal rules, the HRET has no jurisdiction to inquire into and adjudicate their
qualifications as nominees.
If at all, says petitioner Abayon, such authority belongs to the COMELEC which
already upheld her qualification as nominee of Aangat Tayo for the women sector.
For Palparan, Bantay's personality is so inseparable and intertwined with his own
person as its nominee so that the HRET cannot dismiss the quo warranto action
againstBantay without dismissing the action against him.
But, although it is the party-list organization that is voted for in the elections, it is
not the organization that sits as and becomes a member of the House of
Representatives. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, footx 5 identifies who
the "members" of that House are:
Sec. 5. (1).The House of Representatives shall be composed
of not more than two hundred and fifty members; unless
otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative
districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the
Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of
Petitioners Abayon and Palparan of course point out that the authority to
determine the qualifications of a party-list nominee belongs to the party or
organization that nominated him. This is true, initially. The right to examine the
fitness of aspiring nominees and, eventually, to choose five from among them
after all belongs to the party or organization that nominates them. footx 8 But
where an allegation is made that the party or organization had chosen and
allowed a disqualified nominee to become its party-list representative in the lower
House and enjoy the secured tenure that goes with the position, the resolution of
the dispute is taken out of its hand.
Parenthetically, although the Party-List System Act does not so state, the
COMELEC seems to believe, when it resolved the challenge to petitioner Abayon,
that it has the power to do so as an incident of its authority to approve the
registration of party-list organizations. But the Court need not resolve this
question since it is not raised here and has not been argued by the parties.
What is inevitable is that Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution footx 9 provides
that the HRET shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to, among other
things, the qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives. Since,
as pointed out above, party-list nominees are "elected members" of the House
of Representatives no less than the district representatives are, the HRET has
jurisdiction to hear and pass upon their qualifications. By analogy with the cases
of district representatives, once the party or organization of the party-list nominee
has been proclaimed and the nominee has taken his oath and assumed office as
member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC's jurisdiction over election
contests relating to his qualifications ends and the HRET's own jurisdiction begins.
footx 10
The Court holds that respondent HRET did not gravely abuse its discretion when it
dismissed
the petitions
for quo
warranto against Aangat Tayo party-list
and Bantayparty-list but upheld its jurisdiction over the question of the
qualifications of petitioners Abayon and Palparan.
WHEREFORE,
the
Court DISMISSES the
consolidated
petitions
and AFFIRMS the Order dated July 16, 2009 and Resolution 09-183 dated
September 17, 2009 in HRET Case 07-041 of the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal as well as its Order dated July 23, 2009 and Resolution 09-178
dated September 10, 2009 in HRET Case 07-040.
SO ORDERED. CTHaSD
145.Jimenez v cabangbang
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-15905
August 3, 1966
Liwag and Vivo and S. Artiaga, Jr. for plaintiffs and appellants.
Jose S. Zafra and Associates and V. M. Fortich Zerda for defendant and appellee.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
This is an ordinary civil action, originally instituted in the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, for the recovery, by plaintiffs Nicanor T. Jimenez, Carlos J. Albert and Jose L.
Lukban, of several sums of money, by way of damages for the publication of an
allegedly libelous letter of defendant Bartolome Cabangbang. Upon being
summoned, the latter moved to dismiss the complaint upon the ground that the
letter in question is not libelous, and that, even if were, said letter is a privileged
communication. This motion having been granted by the lower court, plaintiffs
interposed the present appeal from the corresponding order of dismissal.
The issues before us are: (1) whether the publication in question is a privileged
communication; and, if not, (2) whether it is libelous or not.
The first issue stems from the fact that, at the time of said publication, defendant
was a member of the House of Representatives and Chairman of its Committee on
National Defense, and that pursuant to the Constitution:
The Senators and Members of the House of Representatives shall in all cases
except treason, felony, and breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest
during their attendance at the sessions of the Congress, and in going to and
returning from the same; and for any speech or debate therein, they shall
not be questioned in any other place. (Article VI, Section 15.)
The determination of the first issue depends on whether or not the
aforementioned publication falls within the purview of the phrase "speech or
debate therein" that is to say, in Congress used in this provision.
Said expression refers to utterances made by Congressmen in the performance of
their official functions, such as speeches delivered, statements made, or votes
cast in the halls of Congress, while the same is in session, as well as bills
introduced in Congress, whether the same is in session or not, and other acts
performed by Congressmen, either in Congress or outside the premises housing
its offices, in the official discharge of their duties as members of Congress and of
Congressional Committees duly authorized to perform its functions as such, at the
time of the performance of the acts in question. 1
The publication involved in this case does not belong to this category. According
to the complaint herein, it was an open letter to the President of the Philippines,
dated November 14, 1958, when Congress presumably was not in session, and
Regala. The "Planners" wanted to relieve Lt. Col. Ramon Galvezon, Chief of
CIS (PC) but failed. Hence, Galvezon is considered a missing link in the
intelligence network. It is, of course, possible that the offices mentioned
above are unwitting tools of the plan of which they may have absolutely no
knowledge. (Emphasis ours.)
Among the means said to be used to carry out the plan the letter lists, under the
heading "other operational technique the following:
(a) Continuous speaking engagements all over the Philippines for Secretary
Vargas to talk on "Communism" and Apologetics on civilian supremacy over
the military;
(b) Articles in magazines, news releases, and hundreds of letters "typed in
two (2) typewriters only" to Editors of magazines and newspapers,
extolling Secretary Vargas as the "hero of democracy in 1951, 1953, 1955
and 1957 elections";
(c) Radio announcements extolling Vargas and criticizing the administration;
(d) Virtual assumption by Vargas of the functions of the Chief of Staff and an
attempt to pack key positions in several branches of the Armed Forces with
men belonging to his clique;
(e) Insidious propaganda and rumors spread in such a way as to give the
impression that they reflect the feeling of the people or the opposition
parties, to undermine the administration.
Plan No. II is said to be a "coup d'etat", in connection with which the "planners"
had gone no further than the planning stage, although the plan "seems to be held
in abeyance and subject to future developments".
Plan No. III is characterized as a modification of Plan No. I, by trying to assuage
the President and the public with a loyalty parade, in connection with which Gen.
Arellano delivered a speech challenging the authority and integrity of Congress, in
an effort to rally the officers and men of the AFP behind him, and gain popular and
civilian support.
The letter in question recommended.: (1) that Secretary Vargas be asked to
resign; (2) that the Armed Forces be divorced absolutely from politics; (3) that the
Secretary of National Defense be a civilian, not a professional military man; (4)
that no Congressman be appointed to said office; (5) that Gen. Arellano be asked
to resign or retire; (6) that the present chiefs of the various intelligence agencies
in the Armed Forces including the chiefs of the NICA, NBI, and other intelligence
agencies mentioned elsewhere in the letter, be reassigned, considering that "they
were handpicked by Secretary Vargas and Gen. Arellano", and that, "most
probably, they belong to the Vargas-Arellano clique"; (7) that all military personnel
now serving civilian offices be returned to the AFP, except those holding positions
by provision of law; (8) that the Regular Division of the AFP stationed in Laur,
Nueva Ecija, be dispersed by batallion strength to the various stand-by or training
divisions throughout the country; and (9) that Vargas and Arellano should
disqualify themselves from holding or undertaking an investigation of the planned
coup d'etat".
We are satisfied that the letter in question is not sufficient to support plaintiffs'
action for damages. Although the letter says that plaintiffs are under the control
of the unnamed persons therein alluded to as "planners", and that, having been
handpicked by Secretary Vargas and Gen. Arellano, plaintiffs "probably belong to
the Vargas-Arellano clique", it should be noted that defendant, likewise, added
that "it is of course possible" that plaintiffs "are unwitting tools of the plan
of which they may have absolutely no knowledge". In other words, the very
document upon which plaintiffs' action is based explicitly indicates that they
might be absolutely unaware of the alleged operational plans, and that they may
be merely unwitting tools of the planners. We do not think that this statement is
derogatory to the plaintiffs, to the point of entitling them to recover damages,
considering that they are officers of our Armed Forces, that as such they are by
law, under the control of the Secretary of National Defense and the Chief of Staff,
and that the letter in question seems to suggest that the group therein described
as "planners" include these two (2) high ranking officers.
It is true that the complaint alleges that the open letter in question was written by
the defendant, knowing that it is false and with the intent to impeach plaintiffs'
reputation, to expose them to public hatred, contempt, dishonor and ridicule, and
to alienate them from their associates, but these allegations are mere conclusions
which are inconsistent with the contents of said letter and can not prevail over the
same, it being the very basis of the complaint. Then too, when plaintiffs allege in
their complaint that said communication is false, they could not have possibly
meant that they were aware of the alleged plan to stage a coup d'etat or that they
were knowingly tools of the "planners". Again, the aforementioned passage in the
defendant's letter clearly implies that plaintiffs were not among the "planners" of
said coup d'etat, for, otherwise, they could not be "tools", much less, unwittingly
on their part, of said "planners".
Wherefore, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed. It is so ordered.
Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez
and Castro, JJ., concur.
DECISION
BENGZON, J p:
On July 14, 1960, Congressman Sergio Osmea, Jr., submitted to this
Court a verified petition for "declaratory relief, certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction" against Congressman Salipada K. Pendatun and
fourteen other congressmen in their capacity as members of the Special
Committee created by House Resolution No. 59. He asked for annulment of
such Resolution on the ground of infringement of his parliamentary immunity;
he also asked, principally, that said members of the special committee be
enjoined from proceeding in accordance with it, particularly the portion
authorizing them to require him to substantiate his charges against the
President, with the admonition that if he failed to do so, he must show cause
why the House should not punish him.
The petition attached a copy of House Resolution No. 59, the pertinent portions of
which read as follows:
"WHEREAS, on the 23rd day of June, 1960, the Honorable Sergio
Osmea, Jr., Member of the House of Representatives from the
Second District of the province of Cebu, took the floor of this
Chamber on the one hour privilege to deliver a speech, entitled 'A
Message to Garcia;'
WHEREAS, in the course of said speech, the Congressman from the
Second District of Cebu stated the following:
xxx xxx xxx
"The people, Mr. President, have been hearing of ugly reports that
under your unpopular administration the free things they used to get
from the government are now for sale at premium prices. They say
that even pardons are for sale, and that regardless of the gravity or
seriousness of a criminal case, the culprit can always be bailed out
forever from jail as long as he can come across with a handsome
dole. I am afraid, such an anomalous situation would reflect badly on
the kind of justice that your administration is dispensing. . . ."
WHEREAS, the charges of the gentleman from the Second District of
Cebu, if made maliciously or recklessly and without basic in truth and
in fact, would constitute a serious assault upon the dignity and
prestige of the Office of the President, which is the one visible symbol
of the sovereignty of the Filipino people, and would expose said office
to contempt and disrepute; . . .
Resolved by the House of Representatives, that a special committee
of fifteen Members to be appointed by the Speaker be, and the same
hereby is, created to investigate the truth of the charges against the
President of the Philippines made by Honorable Sergio Osmea, Jr., in
his privileges speech of June 23, 1960, and for such purpose it is
authorized to summon Honorable Sergio Osmea, Jr., to appear
before it to substantiate his charges, as well as to
issue subpoena and/or subpoena
duces
tecum to
require
the
attendance of witnesses and/or the production of pertinent papers
before it, and if Honorable Sergio Osmea, Jr., fails to do so to require
him to show cause why he should not be punished by the House. The
special committee shall submit to the House a report of its findings
and recommendations before the adjournment of the present special
session of the Congress of the Philippines."
In support of his request, Congressman Osmea alleged: first, the Resolution
violated his constitutional absolute parliamentary immunity for speeches
delivered in the House; second, his words constituted no actionable conduct; and
third, after his allegedly objectionable speech and words, the House took up other
business, and Rule XVII, sec. 7 of the Rules of the House provides that if other
business has intervened after the Member had uttered obnoxious words in
debate, he shall not be held to answer therefor nor be subject to censure by the
House.
Although some members of the court expressed doubts of petitioner's cause of
action and the Court's jurisdiction, the majority decided to hear the matter
further, and required respondents to answer, without issuing any preliminary
injunction. Evidently aware of such circumstance with its implications, and
pressed for time in view of the imminent adjournment of the legislative session,
the special committee continued to perform its task, and after giving
Congressman Osmea a chance to defend himself, submitted its report on July 18,
1960, finding said congressman guilty of serious disorderly behavior; and acting
on such report, the House approved on the same day before closing its session
House Resolution No. 175, declaring him guilty as recommended, and
suspending him from office for fifteen months.
Thereafter, on July 19, 1960, the respondents (with the exception of Congressmen
De Pio, Abeleda, San Andres Ziga, Fernandez and Baltao) 1 filed their answer,
challenged the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain the petition, defended the
power of Congress to discipline its members with suspension, upheld House
Resolution No. 175 and then invited attention to the fact that Congress having
ended its session on July 18, 1960, the Committee whose members are the sole
respondents had thereby ceased to exist.
There is no question that Congressman Osmea, in a privilege speech delivered
before the House, made the serious imputations of bribery against the President
which are quoted in Resolution No. 59, and that he refused to produce before the
House Committee created for the purpose, evidence to substantiate such
imputations. There is also no question that for having made the imputations and
for failing to produce evidence in support thereof, he was, by resolution of the
House, suspended from office for a period of fifteen months, for serious disorderly
behaviour.
Resolution No. 175 states in part:
"WHEREAS, the Special Committee created under and by virtue of
Resolution No. 59, adopted on July 8, 1960, found Representative
Sergio Osmea, Jr., guilty of serious disorderly behaviour for making
without basis in truth and in fact, scurrilous, malicious, reckless and
irresponsible charges against the President of the Philippines in his
privilege speech of June 23, 1960; and
WHEREAS, the said charges are so vile in character that they
affronted and degraded the dignity of the House of Representatives:
Now, Therefore, be it.
RESOLVED by the House of Representatives, That Representative
Sergio Osmea, Jr., be, as he hereby is, declared guilty of serious
disorderly behaviour; and . . ."
As previously stated, Osmea contended in his petition that: (1) the Constitution
gave him complete parliamentary immunity, and so, for words spoken in the
House, he ought not to be questioned; (2) that his speech constituted no
disorderly behaviour for which he could be punished; and (3) supposing he could
be questioned and disciplined therefor, the House had lost the power to do so
because it had taken up other business before approving House Resolution No. 59.
Now, he takes the additional position (4) that the House has no power, under the
Constitution, to suspend one of its members.
Section 15, Article VI of our Constitution provides that "for any speech or debate"
in Congress, the Senators or Members of the House of Representatives "shall not
be questioned in any other place." This section was taken or is a copy of sec. 6,
clause 1 of Art. 1 of the Constitution of the United States. In that country, the
provision has always been understood to mean that although exempt from
prosecution or civil actions for their words uttered in Congress, the members of
Congress may, nevertheless, be questioned in Congress itself. Observe that "they
shall not be questioned in any other place" than Congress.
Furthermore, the Rules of the House which petitioner himself has invoked (Rule
XVII, sec. 7), recognize the House's power to hold a member responsible "for
words spoken in debate."
Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental
privilege cherished in every legislative assembly of the democratic world. As old
as the English Parliament, its purpose "is to enable and encourage a
representative of the public to discharge his public trust with firmness and
success" for "it is indispensably necessary that he should enjoy the fullest liberty
of speech, and that he should be protected from the resentment of every one,
however powerful, to whom the exercise of that liberty may occasion offense." 2
Such immunity has come to this country from the practices of Parliament as
construed and applied by the Congress of the United States. Its extent and
application remain no longer in doubt in so far as related to the question before
us. It guarantees the legislator complete freedom of expression without fear of
being made responsible in criminal or civil actions before the courts or any other
forum outside of the Congressional Hall. But it does not protect him from
responsibility before the legislative body itself whenever his words and conduct
are considered by the latter disorderly or unbecoming a member thereof. In the
United States Congress, Congressman Fernando Wood of New York was censured
for using the following language on the floor of the House: "A monstrosity, a
measure the most infamous of the many infamous acts of the infamous
Congress." (Hinds' Precedents, Vol. 2, pp. 798-799). Two other congressmen were
censured for employing insulting words during debate. (2 Hinds' Precedents, 799801). In one case, a member of Congress was summoned to testify on a
statement made by him in debate, but invoked his parliamentary privilege. The
Committee rejected his plea. (3 Hinds' Precedents 123-124.)
For unparliamentary conduct, members of Parliament or of Congress have been,
or could be censured, committed to prison 3 , suspended, even expelled by the
votes of their colleagues. The appendix to this decision amply attests to the
consensus of informed opinion regarding the practice and the traditional power of
legislative assemblies to take disciplinary action against its members, including
imprisonment, suspension or expulsion. It mentions one instance of suspension of
a legislator in a foreign country.
And to cite a local illustration, the Philippine Senate, in April 1949, suspended a
senator for one year.
Needless to add, the Rules of Philippine House of Representatives provide that the
parliamentary practices of the Congress of the United States shall apply in a
supplementary manner to its proceedings.
This brings up the third point of petitioner: the House may no longer take action
against me, he argues, because after my speech, and before approving Resolution
No. 59, it had taken up other business. Respondents answer that Resolution No.
59 was unanimously approved by the House, that such approval amounted to a
suspension of the House Rules, which according to standard parliamentary
practice may be done by unanimous consent.
Granted, counters the petitioner, that the House may suspend the operation of its
Rules, it may not, however, affect past acts or renew its right to take action which
had already lapsed.
The situation might thus be compared to laws 4 extending the period of limitation
of actions and making them applicable to actions that had lapsed. The Supreme
Court of the United States has upheld such laws as against the contention that
they impaired vested rights in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment
(Campbell vs. Holt, 115 U. S. 620). The states hold divergent views. At any rate,
courts have declared that "the rules adopted by deliberative bodies are subject to
revocation modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them." 5
And it has been said that "Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and with
their observance, the courts have no concern. They may be waived or disregarded
by the legislative body." Consequently, "mere failure to conform to parliamentary
usage will not invalidate the action (taken by a deliberative body) when the
requisite number of members have agreed to a particular measure." 6
The following is quoted from a reported decision of the Supreme Court of
Tennessee:
"The rule here invoked is one of parliamentary procedure, and it is
uniformly held that it is within the power of all deliberative bodies to
abolish, modify, or waive their own rules of procedure, adopted for
Thus, where the state Senate is given the power to expel a member,
the courts will not review its action or revise even a most arbitrary or
unfair decision." (11 Am. Jur., Const. Law, sec. 200, p. 902.) [Italics
Ours.]
The above statement of American law merely abridged the landmark case of
Clifford vs. French. 7 In 1905, several senators who had been expelled by the
State Senate of California for having taken a bribe, filed mandamus proceedings
to compel reinstatement, alleging the Senate had given them no hearing, nor a
chance to make defense, besides falsity of the charges of bribery. The Supreme
Court of California declined to interfere, explaining in orthodox juristic language:
"Under our form of government, the judicial department has no
power to revise even the most arbitrary and unfair action of the
legislative department, or of either house thereof, taking in
pursuance of the power committed exclusively to that department by
the Constitution. It had been held by high authority that, even in the
absence of an express provision conferring the power, every
legislative body in which is vested the general legislative power of the
state has the implied power to expel a member for any cause which it
may deem sufficient. In Hiss vs. Barlett. 3 Gray 473. 63 Am. Dec. 768,
the supreme court of Mass. says, in substance, that this power is
inherent in every legislative body; that it is necessary to enable the
body 'to perform its high functions, and is necessary to the safety of
the state;' 'That it is a power of self-protection, and that the
legislative body must necessarily be the sole judge of the exigency
which may justify and require its exercise. '. . . There is no provision
authorizing courts to control, direct, supervise, or forbid the exercise
by either house of the power to expel a member. These powers are
functions of the legislative department and therefore, in the exercise
of the power thus committed to it, the senate is supreme. An attempt
by this court to direct or control the legislature, or either house
thereof, in the exercise of the power, would be an attempt to exercise
legislative functions, which it is expressly forbidden to do."
We have underscored in the above quotation these lines which in our opinion
emphasize the principles controlling this litigation. Although referring to expulsion,
they may as well be applied to other disciplinary action. Their gist as applied to
the case at bar: the House has exclusive power; the courts have no jurisdiction to
interfere.
It must be observed, however, that at that time the Legislature had only those
powers which were granted to it by the Jones Law 10 ; whereas now the Congress
has the full legislative powers and prerogatives of a sovereign nation, except as
restricted by the Constitution. In other words, in the Alejandrino case, the Court
reached the conclusion that the Jones Law did not give the Senate the power it
then exercised the power of suspension for one year. Whereas now, as we find,
the Congress has the inherent legislative prerogative of suspension 11 which the
Constitution did not impair. In fact, as already pointed out, the Philippine Senate
suspended a Senator for 12 months in 1949.
"The Legislative power of the Philippine Congress is plenary, subject
only to such limitations as are found in the Republic's Constitution. So
that any power deemed to be legislative by usage or tradition, is
necessarily possessed by the Philippine Congress, unless the
Constitution provides otherwise." (Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil., 192,
212.)
In any event, petitioner's argument as to the deprivation of the district's
representation can not be more weighty in the matter of suspension than in the
case of imprisonment of a legislator; yet deliberative bodies have the power in
proper cases, to commit one of their members to jail. 12
Now come questions of procedure and jurisdiction. The petition intended to
prevent the Special Committee from acting in pursuance of House Resolution No.
59. Because no preliminary injunction had been issued, the Committee performed
its task, reported to the House, and the latter approved the suspension order. The
House has closed its session, and the Committee has ceased to exist as such. It
would seem, therefore, the case should be dismissed for having become moot or
academic. 13 Of course, there is nothing to prevent petitioner from filing new
pleadings to include all members of the House as respondents, ask for
reinstatement and thereby to present a justiciable cause. Most probable outcome
of such reformed suit, however, will be a pronouncement of lack of jurisdiction, as
in Vera vs. Avelino 14 and Alejandrino vs. Quezon.
At any rate, having perceived suitable solutions to the important questions of
political law, the Court thought it proper to express at this time its conclusions on
such issues as were deemed relevant and decisive.
Accordingly, the petition has to be, and is hereby dismissed. So ordered.
Pars, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcin, Barrera, Gutierrez David, Paredes,
and Dizon, JJ., concur.
||| (Osmea, Jr. v. Pendatun, G.R. No. L-17144, [October 28, 1960], 109 PHIL 863888)
or statute covers a subject not authorized by the fundamental law, then the
courts are not only authorized, but are compelled and justified in pronouncing
the same illegal and void, no matter how wise or beneficient such resolution or
statute may seem to be. The legality of a statute or resolution must be tested
by the provisions of the fundamental law of the state.
4. RIGHT OF THE COURTS TO GRANT A REMEDY WHEN IT IS ESTABLISHED
THAT THE CITIZEN PRAYING THEREFOR HAS BEEN DEPRIVED OF ALL HIS
PREROGATIVES, PRIVILEGES, AND EMOLUMENTS UNDER AN ILLEGAL, NULL,
AND VOID STATUTE OR RESOLUTION. When it has been established that a
citizen of the state has been deprived of a right guaranteed to him under the
organic law by an illegal and void resolution, it is the sworn duty of the courts
to take jurisdiction, to make pronouncements upon the legality of such
resolution, and to grant an appropriate remedy. A contrary conclusion would
sanction a tyranny, which has no existence even in monarchies nor in any
government which has a just claim to a stable government, a well regulated
liberty and the protection of the personal rights of individuals. Every
department, every officer of the government, and every individual, are equally
bound by the mandatory provisions of the fundamental law. When a citizen has
been deprived of his life, his liberty, or his property by an illegal statute or
resolution, the official or department so depriving him cannot say to the courts:
"Stop here, for the reason that I (we) have acted as a representative of a
department of the government."
The fear that the respondent in any particular action properly presented
to the courts will not obey the orders of the court, is no reason why the courts
should abstain from making a pronouncement, in accordance with the facts and
the law, upon the rights of citizens of the state who have been illegally
deprived of their prerogatives, privileges, and emoluments. The history of the
Filipino people shows that they love peace, good order, and will, with a spirit of
alacrity, obey the law when they once understand what the law is. The courts
should rest in the confident faith that their orders will be obeyed, and not
disobeyed.
The prayer of the petition should be granted in a modified form.
DECISION
MALCOLM, J p:
them from preventing the petitioner from exercising the rights of his office, and
from carrying the order of suspension into effect. By special appearance, the
Attorney-General, in representation of the respondents, has objected to the
jurisdiction of the court, and later, by demurrer, has pressed the same point.
In order that an obvious angle to the case may not subsequently
embarrass us, we desire first of all to say that looking through the form of the
action to the substance, this is, in effect, a suit instituted by one member of the
Philippine Senate against the Philippine Senate and certain of its official
employees. May the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands by mandamus and
injunction annul the suspension of Senator Alejandrino and compel the
Philippine Senate to reinstate him in his official position? Without, therefore, at
this time discussing any of the other interesting questions which have been
raised and argued, we proceed at once to resolve the issue here suggested.
There are certain basic principles which lie at the foundation of the
Government of the Philippine Islands, which are familiar to students of public
law. It is here only necessary to recall that under our system of government,
each of the three departments is distinct and not directly subject to the control
of another department. The power to control is the power to abrogate and the
power to abrogate is the power to usurp. Each department may, nevertheless,
indirectly restrain the others.
It is peculiarly the duty of the judiciary to say what the law is, to enforce
the Constitution, and to decide whether the proper constitutional sphere of a
department has been transcended. The courts must determine the validity of
legislative enactments as well as the legality of all private and official acts. To
this extent, do the courts restrain the other departments.
With these sound premises in mind, we are not at all surprised to find the
general rule of mandamus to be, that the writ will not lie from one branch of
the government to a coordinate branch, for the very obvious reason that
neither is inferior to the other. Mandamus will not lie against the legislative
body, its members, or its officers, to compel the performance of duties purely
legislative in their character which therefore pertain to their legislative
functions and over which they have exclusive control. The courts cannot dictate
action in this respect without a gross usurpation of power. So it has been held
that where a member has been expelled by the legislative body, the courts
have no power, irrespective of whether the expulsion was right or wrong, to
issue a mandate to compel his reinstatement. (Code of Civil Procedure, secs.
222, 515; 18 R. C. L., 186, 187; Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 190; French
vs. Senate [1905], 146 Cal., 604; Hiss vs. Bartlett [1855], 69 Mass., 468; Ex
parte Echols [1886], 39 Ala., 698; State vs. Bolte [1889], 151 Mo., 362; De
Diego vs. House of Delegates [1904], 5 Porto Rico, 235; Greenwood Cemetery
Land Co. vs. Routt [1892], 17 Colo., 156; State ex rel. Cranner vs. Thorson
[1896], 33 L. R. A., 582; People ex rel. Billings vs. Bissell [1857], 19 Ill., 229;
People ex rel. Bruce vs. Dunne [1913], 258 Ill., 441; People ex rel. La
Chicote vs. Best [1907], 187 N. Y., 1; Abueva vs. Wood [1924], 45 Phil., 612.)
The authorities which support the doctrines above announced are
numerous and instructive. They are found among the decisions of our own
court, of the United States Supreme Court, and of other jurisdictions. If some of
these cases relate to the chief executive rather than to the legislature, it is only
necessary to explain that the same rules which govern the relations of the
courts to the chief executive likewise govern the relations of the courts to the
legislature.
The controlling case in this jurisdiction on the subject is Severino vs.
Governor-General and Provincial Board of Occidental Negros ([1910], 16 Phil.,
366). This was an original application made in this court praying for a writ of
mandamus to the Governor-General to compel him to call a special election as
provided by law. The Attorney-General demurred to the petition on the ground
of lack of jurisdiction, and the court, after an elaborate discussion, reached the
conclusion that "we have no jurisdiction to interfere with the Governor-General
of these Islands, as the head of the executive department, in the performance
of any of his official acts." The demurrer was accordingly sustained and the
complaint dismissed. It is noted that in this decision reliance was placed on the
cases of Mississippi vs. Johnson and Ord ([1867], 4 Wall., 475, and
Sutherland vs. Governor ([1874], 29 Mich., 320), which we will now proceed to
notice.
State of Mississippi vs. Andrew Johnson, President of the United
States, supra, concerned a bill praying the United States Supreme Court to
enjoin and restrain Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, and E. O. C.
Ord, General Commanding in the District of Mississippi and Arkansas from
executing certain Acts of Congress. Mr. Chief Justice Chase delivering the
opinion of the court said the single point which required consideration was this:
Can the President be restrained by injunction from carrying into effect an Act of
Congress alleged to be unconstitutional? He continued:
mandamus is directed, but the nature of the think to be done, by which the
propriety of issuing a mandamus is to be determined." (2 Bailey on Mandamus,
pp. 926-927.) But these were arguments which should have been presented
years ago in this court, and which when recently presented by counsel in his
argument for the petitioner in the case of Perfecto vs. Wood, R. G. No.
20867, 1 met with no favorable response from the court. It is now too late to go
back and revise previous decisions and overturn them; in fact this would be not
only impracticable but impossible since at least two decisions of the United
States Supreme Court seem to us to be controlling.
No court has ever held and we apprehend no court will ever hold that it
possesses the power to direct the Chief Executive or the Legislature or a
branch thereof to take any particular action. If a court should ever be so rash
as to thus trench on the domain of either of the other departments, it will be
the end of popular government as we know it in democracies.
It is intimated rather faintly that, conceding all that is said with reference
to the right of the Supreme Court to issue mandamus directed to the Philippine
Senate, yet we would be justified in having our mandate run not against the
Philippine Senate or against the President of the Philippine Senate and his
fellow Senators but against the secretary, the sergeant-at-arms, and the
disbursing officer of the Senate. But this begs the question. If we have no
authority to control the Philippine Senate, we have no authority to control the
actions of subordinate employees acting under the direction of the Senate. The
secretary, sergeant-at-arms, and disbursing officer of the Senate are mere
agents of the Senate who cannot act independently of the will of that body.
Should the Court do as requested, we might have the spectacle presented of
the court ordering the secretary, the sergeant-at-arms, and the disbursing
officer of the Philippine Senate to do one thing, and the Philippine Senate
ordering them to do another thing. The writ of mandamus should not be
granted unless it clearly appears that the person to who it is directed has the
absolute power to execute it. (Turnbull vs. Giddings [1893], 95 Mich., 314;
Abueva vs. Wood, supra.)
The question of jurisdiction is invariably one of perplexing difficulty. On
the one hand, no consideration of policy or convenience should induce this
court to exercise a power that does not belong to it. On the other hand, no
consideration of policy or convenience should induce this court to surrender a
power which it is its duty to exercise. But certainly mandamus should never
issue from this court where it will not prove to be effectual and beneficial. It
should not be awarded where it will create discord and confusion. It should not
the knowledge that he could achieve only such legislative results, which he could
accomplish within the confines of prison.
What the accused-appellant seeks is not of an emergency nature. Allowing
accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings for
five days or more in a week virtually make him a free man with all the privileges
appurtenant to his position. As such, an aberrant situation not only elevates
accused-appellant's status to that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of
the purposes of the correction system.
The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has
never been an excuse to free a person validly in prison. Accused-appellant is only
one of 250 members of the House of Representatives, not to mention the 24
members of the Senate, charged with the duties of legislation. Congress continues
to function well in the physical absence of one or a few of its members.
The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The necessities imposed by public
welfare may justify exercise of government authority to regulate even if thereby
certain groups may plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded.
The Court found the election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable
classification in criminal enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are
not substantial distinctions, which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted
in their freedom and restrict in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and
confinement are germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all those
belonging to the same class. The Court was constrained to rule against the
accused-appellant's claim that re-election to public office gives priority to any
other right or interest, including the police power of the State.
Instant motion was denied.
SYLLABUS
1. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; PUBLIC OFFICERS; PRIVILEGES ARISING FROM BEING
ELECTED MAY BE ENLARGED OR RESTRICTED BY LAW. True, election is the
expression of the sovereign power of the people. In the exercise of suffrage, a free
people expects to achieve the continuity of government and the perpetuation of
its benefits. However, inspite of its importance, the privileges and rights arising
from having been elected may be enlarged or restricted by law. There is an
unfortunate misimpression in the public mind that election or appointment to high
government office, by itself, frees the official from the common restraints of
general law. Privilege has to be granted by law, not inferred from the duties of a
position. In fact, the higher the rank, the greater is the requirement of obedience
rather than exemption.
2. ID.; ID.; RULING IN AGUINALDO CASE (212 SCRA 768, AT 773) DOES NOT APPLY
IN IMPRISONMENT ARISING FROM ENFORCEMENT OF CRIMINAL LAW;
CONFINEMENT PENDING APPEAL IS NOT REMOVAL. Accused-appellant's reliance
on the ruling in Aguinaldo v. Santos, which states, inter alia, that "The Court
should never remove a public officer for acts done prior to his present term of
office. To do otherwise would be to deprive the people of their right to elect their
officers. When a people have elected a man to office, it must be assumed that
they did this with the knowledge of his life and character, and that they
disregarded or forgave his fault or misconduct, if he had been guilty of any. It is
not for the Court, by reason of such fault or misconduct, to practically overrule the
will of the people," will not extricate him from his predicament. It can be readily
seen in the above-quoted ruling that the Aguinaldo case involves the
administrative removal of a public officer for acts done prior to his present term of
office. It does not apply to imprisonment arising from the enforcement of criminal
law. Moreover, in the same way that preventive suspension is not removal,
confinement pending appeal is not removal. He remains a congressman unless
expelled by Congress or, otherwise, disqualified.
3. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT; PARLIAMENTARY IMMUNITY
FROM ARREST AND DETENTION; GRANTED IN A RESTRICTIVE SENSE AND MAY NOT
BE EXTENDED BY INTENDMENT, IMPLICATION OR EQUITABLE CONSIDERATION.
The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House of
Representatives, the latter customarily addressed as Congressmen, arises from a
provision of the Constitution. The history of the provision shows that the privilege
has always been granted in a restrictive sense. The provision granting an
exemption as a special privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary
meaning of its terms. It may not be extended by intendment, implication or
equitable considerations.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; SCOPE. The 1935 Constitution provided in its Article VI on the
Legislative Department: Sec. 15. The Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives shall in all cases except treason, felony, and breach of the peace
be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the sessions of Congress, and
in going to and returning from the same; . . .. Because of the broad coverage of
felony and breach of the peace, the exemption applied only to civil arrests. A
congressman like the accused-appellant, convicted under Title Eleven of the
Revised Penal Code could not claim parliamentary immunity from arrest. He was
subject to the same general laws governing all persons still to be tried or whose
convictions were pending appeal. The 1973 Constitution broadened the privilege
of immunity as follows: Article VIII, Sec. 9. A Member of the Batasang Pambansa
shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be
privileged from arrest during his attendance at its sessions and in going to and
returning from the same. For offenses punishable by more than six years
imprisonment, there was no immunity from arrest. The restrictive interpretation of
immunity and the intent to confine it within carefully defined parameters is
illustrated by the concluding portion of the provision, to wit: . . . but the Batasang
Pambansa shall surrender the member involved to the custody of the law within
twenty four hours after its adjournment for a recess or for its next session,
otherwise such privilege shall cease upon its failure to do so. The present
Constitution adheres to the same restrictive rule minus the obligation of Congress
to surrender the subject Congressman to the custody of the law. The requirement
that he should be attending sessions or committee meetings has also been
removed. For relatively minor offenses, it is enough that Congress is in
session. cEaCTS
5. ID.; ID.; MEMBERS OF CONGRESS CANNOT COMPEL ABSENT MEMBERS TO
ATTEND SESSION IF REASONS FOR ABSENCE IS A LEGITIMATE ONE. The
accused-appellant argues that a member of Congress' function to attend sessions
is underscored by Section 16 (2), Article VI of the Constitution . . .. However, the
accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the
operation of Section 11, Article VI of the Constitution. The members of Congress
cannot compel absent members to attend sessions if the reason for the absence
is a legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime
punishable by imprisonment of more than six months is not merely authorized by
law, it has constitutional foundations.
6. ID.; ID.; HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES; ALLOWING ACCUSED-APPELLANT TO
ATTEND CONGRESSIONAL SESSIONS AND COMMITTEE MEETINGS WOULD BE A
MOCKERY OF THE PURPOSES OF CORRECTION SYSTEM; EMERGENCY OR
COMPELLING TEMPORARY LEAVES FROM IMPRISONMENT ARE ALLOWED TO ALL
PRISONERS AT DISCRETION OF AUTHORITIES OR UPON COURT ORDERS.
Emergency or compelling temporary leaves from imprisonment are allowed to all
prisoners, at the discretion of the authorities or upon court orders. What the
accused-appellant seeks is not of an emergency nature. Allowing accusedappellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings for five (5)
days or more in a week will virtually make him a free man with all the privileges
appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates accusedappellant's status to that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the
purposes of the correction system. Of particular relevance in this regard are the
following observations of the Court in Martinez v. Morfe: . . .
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; AS A DETAINEE, ACCUSED-APPELLANT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN
ALLOWED TO DISCHARGE HIS DUTY AS MEMBER THEREOF; CASE AT BAR. No
less than accused-appellant himself admits that like any other member of the
House of Representatives "[h]e is provided with a congressional office situated at
Room N-214, North Wing Building, House of Representatives Complex, Batasan
Hills, Quezon City, manned by a full complement of staff paid for by Congress.
Through [an] inter-department coordination, he is also provided with an office at
the Administration Building, New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa City, where he attends
to his constituents." Accused-appellant further admits that while under detention,
he has filed several bills and resolutions. It also appears that he has been
receiving his salaries and other monetary benefits. Succinctly stated, accusedappellant has been discharging his mandate as a member of the House of
Representative consistent with the restraints upon one who is presently under
detention. Being a detainee, accused-appellant should not even have been
allowed by the prison authorities at the National Penitentiary to perform these
acts. When the voters of his district elected the accused-appellant to Congress,
they did so with full awareness of the limitations on his freedom of action. They
did so with the knowledge that he could achieve only such legislative results
which he could accomplish within the confines of prison.
will depriving him of his power of locomotion and it "[is] something more than
mere loss of freedom. It includes the notion of restraint within limits defined by
wall or any exterior barrier." It can be seen from the foregoing that incarceration,
by its nature, changes an individual's status in society. Prison officials have the
difficult and often thankless job of preserving the security in a potentially
explosive setting, as well as of attempting to provide rehabilitation that prepares
inmates for re-entry into the social mainstream. Necessarily, both these demands
require the curtailment and elimination of certain rights.
||| R E S O L U T I O N
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J p:
The accused-appellant, Romeo G. Jalosjos is a full-fledged member of Congress
who is now confined at the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory
rape on two counts and acts of lasciviousness on six counts 1 is pending appeal.
The accused-appellant filed this motion asking that he be allowed to fully
discharge the duties of a Congressman, including attendance at legislative
sessions and committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first
instance of a non-bailable offense. cdtai
4. The electorate of the First District of Zamboanga del Norte wants their voice to
be heard.
5. A precedent-setting U.S. ruling allowed a detained lawmaker to attend sessions
of the U.S. Congress.
6. The House treats accused-appellant as a bona fide member thereof and urges a
co-equal branch of government to respect its mandate.
7. The concept of temporary detention does not necessarily curtail the duty of
accused-appellant to discharge his mandate.
8. Accused-appellant has always complied with the conditions/restrictions when
allowed to leave jail.
The primary argument of the movant is the "mandate of sovereign will." He states
that the sovereign electorate of the First District of Zamboanga del Norte chose
him as their representative in Congress. Having been re-elected by his
constituents, he has the duty to perform the functions of a Congressman. He calls
this a covenant with his constituents made possible by the intervention of the
State. He adds that it cannot be defeated by insuperable procedural restraints
arising from pending criminal cases.
True, election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. In the
exercise of suffrage, a free people expects to achieve the continuity of
government and the perpetuation of its benefits. However, in spite of its
importance, the privileges and rights arising from having been elected may be
enlarged or restricted by law. Our first task is to ascertain the applicable law.
We start with the incontestable proposition that all top officials of Government
executive, legislative, and judicial are subject to the majesty of law. There is an
unfortunate misimpression in the public mind that election or appointment to high
government office, by itself, frees the official from the common restraints of
general law. Privilege has to be granted by law, not inferred from the duties of a
position. In fact, the higher the rank, the greater is the requirement of obedience
rather than exemption. cdll
The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House of
Representatives, the latter customarily addressed as Congressmen, arises from a
provision of the Constitution. The history of the provision shows that the privilege
has always been granted in a restrictive sense. The provision granting an
exemption as a special privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary
meaning of its terms. It may not be extended by intendment, implication or
equitable considerations.
However, the accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be
exempted from the operation of Section 11, Article VI of the Constitution. The
members of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend sessions if the
reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman
charged with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than six months is not
merely authorized by law, it has constitutional foundations.
Accused-appellant's reliance
states, inter alia, that
on
the
ruling
in Aguinaldo
v. Santos, 2 which
The Court should never remove a public officer for acts done prior to
his present term of office. To do otherwise would be to deprive the
people of their right to elect their officers. When a people have
elected a man to office, it must be assumed that they did this with
the knowledge of his life and character, and that they disregarded or
forgave his fault or misconduct, if he had been guilty of any. It is not
for the Court, by reason of such fault or misconduct, to practically
overrule the will of the people.
will not extricate him from his predicament. It can be readily seen in the abovequoted ruling that the Aguinaldo case involves the administrative removal of a
public officer for acts done prior to his present term of office. It does not apply
to imprisonment arising from the enforcement of criminal law. Moreover, in the
same way that preventive suspension is not removal, confinement pending
appeal is not removal. He remains a congressman unless expelled by Congress
or, otherwise, disqualified. cdasia
One rationale behind confinement, whether pending appeal or after final
conviction, is public self-defense. Society must protect itself. It also serves as an
example and warning to others.
A person charged with crime is taken into custody for purposes of the
administration of justice. As stated in United States v. Gustilo, 3 it is the injury to
the public which State action in criminal law seeks to redress. It is not the injury to
the complainant. After conviction in the Regional Trial Court, the accused may be
denied bail and thus subjected to incarceration if there is risk of his absconding. 4
The accused-appellant states that the plea of the electorate which voted him into
office cannot be supplanted by unfounded fears that he might escape eventual
punishment if permitted to perform congressional duties outside his regular place
of confinement.
It will be recalled that when a warrant for accused-appellant's arrest was issued,
he fled and evaded capture despite a call from his colleagues in the House of
Representatives for him to attend the sessions and to surrender voluntarily to the
authorities. Ironically, it is now the same body whose call he initially spurned
which accused-appellant is invoking to justify his present motion. This can not be
countenanced because, to reiterate, aside from its being contrary to well-defined
Constitutional restrains, it would be a mockery of the aims of the State's penal
system.
Accused-appellant argues that on several occasions, the Regional Trial Court of
Makati granted several motions to temporarily leave his cell at the Makati City Jail,
for official or medical reasons, to wit:
a) to attend hearings of the House Committee on Ethics held at the
Batasan Complex, Quezon City, on the issue of whether to
expel/suspend him from the House of Representatives;
b) to undergo dental examination and treatment at the clinic of his
dentist in Makati City;
c) to undergo a thorough medical check-up at the Makati Medical
Center, Makati City;
d) to register as a voter at his hometown in Dapitan City. In this case,
accused-appellant commuted by chartered plane and private
vehicle.
He also calls attention to various instances, after his transfer at the New Bilibid
Prison in Muntinlupa City, when he was likewise allowed/permitted to leave the
prison premises, to wit:
a) to join "living-out" prisoners on "work-volunteer program" for the
purpose of 1) establishing a mahogany seedling bank and 2)
planting mahogany trees, at the NBP reservation. For this
purpose, he was assigned one guard and allowed to use his own
vehicle and driver in going to and from the project area and his
place of confinement.
b) to continue with his dental treatment at the clinic of his dentist in
Makati City.
There is no showing that the above privileges are peculiar to him or to a member
of Congress. Emergency or compelling temporary leaves from imprisonment are
allowed to all prisoners, at the discretion of the authorities or upon court orders.
What the accused-appellant seeks is not of an emergency nature. Allowing
accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings for
five (5) days or more in a week will virtually make him a free man with all the
privileges appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only
elevates accused-appellant's status to that of a special class, it also would be a
mockery of the purposes of the correction system. Of particular relevance in this
regard are the following observations of the Court in Martinez v. Morfe: 5
The above conclusion reached by this Court is bolstered and fortified
by policy considerations. There is, to be sure, a full recognition of the
necessity to have members of Congress, and likewise delegates to
the Constitutional Convention, entitled to the utmost freedom to
enable them to discharge their vital responsibilities, bowing to no
other force except the dictates of their conscience. Necessarily the
utmost latitude in free speech should be accorded them. When it
comes to freedom from arrest, however, it would amount to the
creation of a privileged class, without justification in reason, if
notwithstanding their liability for a criminal offense, they would be
considered immune during their attendance in Congress and in going
to and returning from the same. There is likely to be no dissent from
the proposition that a legislator or a delegate can perform his
functions efficiently and well, without the need for any transgression
of the criminal law. Should such an unfortunate event come to pass,
he is to be treated like any other citizen considering that there is a
strong public interest in seeing to it that crime should not go
unpunished. To the fear that may be expressed that the prosecuting
arm of the government might unjustly go after legislators belonging
to the minority, it suffices to answer that precisely all the safeguards
thrown around an accused by the Constitution, solicitous of the rights
of an individual, would constitute an obstacle to such an attempt at
abuse of power. The presumption of course is that the judiciary would
remain independent. It is trite to say that in each and every
manifestation of judicial endeavor, such a virtue is of the essence.
The accused-appellant avers that his constituents in the First District of
Zamboanga del Norte want their voices to be heard and that since he is treated
removes the accused-appellant as a prisoner from the same class as all persons
validly confined under law?
The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has
never been an excuse to free a person validly in prison. The duties imposed by
the "mandate of the people" are multifarious. The accused-appellant asserts that
the duty to legislate ranks highest in the hierarchy of government. The accusedappellant is only one of 250 members of the House of Representatives, not to
mention the 24 members of the Senate, charged with the duties of legislation.
Congress continues to function well in the physical absence of one or a few of its
members. Depending on the exigency of Government that has to be addressed,
the President or the Supreme Court can also be deemed the highest for that
particular duty. The importance of a function depends on the need for its exercise.
The duty of a mother to nurse her infant is most compelling under the law of
nature. A doctor with unique skills has the duty to save the lives of those with a
particular affliction. An elective governor has to serve provincial constituents. A
police officer must maintain peace and order. Never has the call of a particular
duty lifted a prisoner into a different classification from those others who are
validly restrained by law.
A strict scrutiny of classifications is essential lest wittingly or otherwise, insidious
discriminations are made in favor of or against groups or types of individuals. 8
The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The necessities imposed by public
welfare may justify exercise of government authority to regulate even if thereby
certain groups may plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded. 9
We, therefore, find that election to the position of Congressman is not a
reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties of
the office are not substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners
interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest
and confinement are germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all those
belonging to the same class. 10
Imprisonment is the restraint of a man's personal liberty; coercion exercised upon
a person to prevent the free exercise of his power of locomotion. 11
More explicitly, "imprisonment" in its general sense, is the restraint of one's
liberty. As a punishment, it is restraint by judgment of a court or lawful tribunal,
and is personal to the accused. 12 The term refers to the restraint on the personal
liberty of another; any prevention of his movements from place to place, or of his
free action according to his own pleasure and will. 13 Imprisonment is
the detention of another against his will depriving him of his power of
locomotion 14 and it "[is] something more than mere loss of freedom. It includes
the notion of restraint within limits defined by wall or any exterior barrier." 15
It can be seen from the foregoing that incarceration, by its nature, changes an
individual's status in society. 16 Prison officials have the difficult and often
thankless job of preserving the security in a potentially explosive setting, as well
as of attempting to provide rehabilitation that prepares inmates for re-entry into
the social mainstream. Necessarily, both these demands require the curtailment
and elimination of certain rights. 17
Premises considered, we are constrained to rule against the accused-appellant's
claim that re-election to public office gives priority to any other right or interest,
including the police power of the State. cdtai
WHEREFORE, the instant motion is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Kapunan, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ.,
concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, JJ., concur in the main and
separate opinion.
Gonzaga-Reyes, J., see separate concurring opinion.
149. Trillanes IV v Pimentel
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 179817. June 27, 2008.]
ANTONIO F. TRILLANES IV, petitioner, vs. HON. OSCAR
PIMENTEL, SR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT-BRANCH 148, MAKATI CITY; GEN.
HERMOGENES ESPERON, VICE ADM. ROGELIO I. CALUNSAG,
MGEN. BENJAMIN DOLORFINO, AND LT. COL. LUCIARDO
OBEA,respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO-MORALES, J p:
At the wee hours of July 27, 2003, a group of more than 300 heavily armed
soldiers led by junior officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) stormed
into the Oakwood Premier Apartments in Makati City and publicly demanded the
resignation of the President and key national officials. SICDAa
Later in the day, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued Proclamation No.
427 and General Order No. 4 declaring a state of rebellion and calling out the
Armed Forces to suppress the rebellion. 1 A series of negotiations quelled the
teeming tension and eventually resolved the impasse with the surrender of the
militant soldiers that evening.
In the aftermath of this eventful episode dubbed as the "Oakwood Incident",
petitioner Antonio F. Trillanes IV was charged, along with his comrades, with coup
d'etatdefined under Article 134-A of the Revised Penal Code before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Makati. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 032784, "People v. Capt. Milo D. Maestrecampo, et al."
Close to four years later, petitioner, who has remained in detention, 2 threw his
hat in the political arena and won a seat in the Senate with a six-year term
commencing at noon on June 30, 2007. 3
Before the commencement of his term or on June 22, 2007, petitioner filed with
the RTC, Makati City, Branch 148, an "Omnibus Motion for Leave of Court to be
Allowed to Attend Senate Sessions and Related Requests" 4 (Omnibus Motion).
Among his requests were: ITcCaS
(a) To be allowed to go to the Senate to attend all official functions of
the Senate (whether at the Senate or elsewhere) particularly
when the Senate is in session, and to attend the regular and
plenary sessions of the Senate, committee hearings, committee
meetings, consultations, investigations and hearings in aid of
legislation, caucuses, staff meetings, etc., which are normally
held at the Senate of the Philippines located at the GSIS
Financial Center, Pasay City (usually from Mondays to Thursdays
from 8:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m.);
(b) To be allowed to set up a working area at his place of detention at
the Marine Brig, Marine Barracks Manila, Fort Bonifacio, Taguig
City, with a personal desktop computer and the appropriate
communications equipment (i.e., a telephone line and internet
access) in order that he may be able to work there when there
Hence, the present petition for certiorari to set aside the two Orders of the trial
court, and for prohibition and mandamus to (i) enjoin respondents from banning
the Senate staff, resource persons and guests from meeting with him or
transacting business with him in his capacity as Senator; and (ii) direct
respondents to allow him access to the Senate staff, resource persons and guests
and permit him to attend all sessions and official functions of the Senate.
Petitioner preliminarily prayed for the maintenance of the status quo ante of
having been able hitherto to convene his staff, resource persons and guests 9 at
the Marine Brig. CETDHA
Impleaded as co-respondents of Judge Oscar Pimentel, Sr. are AFP Chief of Staff,
Gen. Hermogenes Esperon (Esperon); Philippine Navy's Flag Officer-in-Command,
Vice Admiral Rogelio Calunsag; Philippine Marines' Commandant, Major Gen.
Benjamin Dolorfino; and Marine Barracks Manila Commanding Officer, Lt. Col.
Luciardo Obea (Obea).
Petitioner later manifested, in his Reply of February 26, 2008, that he has, since
November 30, 2007, been in the custody of the Philippine National Police (PNP)
Custodial Center following the foiled take-over of the Manila Peninsula
Hotel 10 the day before or on November 29, 2007.
Such change in circumstances thus dictates the discontinuation of the action as
against the above-named military officers-respondents. The issues raised in
relation to them had ceased to present a justiciable controversy, so that a
determination thereof would be without practical value and use. Meanwhile,
against those not made parties to the case, petitioner cannot ask for reliefs from
this Court. 11 Petitioner did not, by way of substitution, implead the police officers
currently exercising custodial responsibility over him; and he did not satisfactorily
show that they have adopted or continued the assailed actions of the former
custodians. 12 CTEaDc
Petitioner reiterates the following grounds which mirror those previously raised in
his Motion for Reconsideration filed with the trial court:
I.
THE JURISPRUDENCE CITED BY THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO IS
CLEARLY INAPPLICABLE TO THE INSTANT CASE BECAUSE OF THE
FOLLOWING REASONS:
A.
UNLIKE IN THIS CASE, THE ACCUSED IN THE JALOSJOS CASE WAS
ALREADY CONVICTED AT THE TIME HE FILED HIS MOTION. IN
convicted, albeit his conviction was pending appeal, when he filed a motion
similar to petitioner's Omnibus Motion, whereas he (petitioner) is a mere
detention prisoner. He asserts that he continues to enjoy civil and political rights
since the presumption of innocence is still in his favor.
Further, petitioner illustrates that Jalosjos was charged with crimes involving
moral turpitude, i.e., two counts of statutory rape and six counts of acts of
lasciviousness, whereas he is indicted for coup d'etat which is regarded as a
"political offense".
Furthermore, petitioner justifies in his favor the presence of noble causes in
expressing legitimate grievances against the rampant and institutionalized
practice of graft and corruption in the AFP. CASaEc
In sum, petitioner's first ground posits that there is a world of difference between
his case and that of Jalosjos respecting the type of offense involved, the stage of
filing of the motion, and other circumstances which demonstrate the
inapplicability of Jalosjos. 14
A plain reading of Jalosjos suggests otherwise, however.
The distinctions cited by petitioner were not elemental in the pronouncement
in Jalosjos that election to Congress is not a reasonable classification in criminal
law enforcement as the functions and duties of the office are not substantial
distinctions which lift one from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom
and restricted in liberty of movement. 15
It cannot be gainsaid that a person charged with a crime is taken into custody for
purposes of the administration of justice. No less than the Constitution provides:
All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable
by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before
conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be
impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required. 16 (Underscoring
supplied) ASTDCH
The Rules also state that no person charged with a capital offense, 17 or an
offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted
to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal
action. 18
That the cited provisions apply equally to rape and coup d'etat cases, both being
punishable by reclusion perpetua, 19 is beyond cavil. Within the class of offenses
covered by the stated range of imposable penalties, there is clearly no distinction
as to the political complexion of or moral turpitude involved in the crime charged.
In the present case, it is uncontroverted that petitioner's application for bail and
for release on recognizance was denied. 20 The determination that the evidence
of guilt is strong, whether ascertained in a hearing of an application for bail 21 or
imported from a trial court's judgment of conviction, 22 justifies the detention of
an accused as a valid curtailment of his right to provisional liberty. This
accentuates the proviso that the denial of the right to bail in such cases is
"regardless of the stage of the criminal action." Such justification for confinement
with its underlying rationale of public self-defense 23 applies equally to detention
prisoners like petitioner or convicted prisoners-appellants like Jalosjos. TEDaAc
As the Court observed in Alejano v. Cabuay, 24 it is impractical to draw a line
between convicted prisoners and pre-trial detainees for the purpose of
maintaining jail security; and while pre-trial detainees do not forfeit their
constitutional rights upon confinement, the fact of their detention makes their
rights more limited than those of the public.
The Court was more emphatic in People v. Hon. Maceda: 25
As a matter of law, when a person indicted for an offense is arrested,
he is deemed placed under the custody of the law. He is placed in
actual restraint of liberty in jail so that he may be bound to answer for
the commission of the offense. He must be detained in jail during the
pendency of the case against him, unless he is authorized by the
court to be released on bail or on recognizance. Let it be stressed
that all prisoners whether under preventive detention or serving final
sentence can not practice their profession nor engage in any business
or occupation, or hold office, elective or appointive, while in
detention. This is a necessary consequence of arrest and
detention. 26 (Underscoring supplied) ADaEIH
These inherent limitations, however, must be taken into account only to the
extent that confinement restrains the power of locomotion or actual physical
movement. It bears noting that in Jalosjos, which was decided en banc one month
after Maceda, the Court recognized that the accused could somehow accomplish
legislative results.27
The trial court thus correctly concluded that the presumption of innocence does
not carry with it the full enjoyment of civil and political rights.
Petitioner is similarly situated with Jalosjos with respect to the application of the
presumption of innocence during the period material to the resolution of their
respective motions. The Court in Jalosjos did not mention that the presumption of
innocence no longer operates in favor of the accused pending the review on
appeal of the judgment of conviction. The rule stands that until a promulgation of
final conviction is made, the constitutional mandate of presumption of innocence
prevails. 28
In addition to the inherent restraints, the Court notes that petitioner neither
denied nor disputed his agreeing to a consensus with the prosecution that media
access to him should cease after his proclamation by the Commission on
Elections. 29 aSCHcA
Petitioner goes on to allege that unlike Jalosjos who attempted to evade trial, he is
not a flight risk since he voluntarily surrendered to the proper authorities and such
can be proven by the numerous times he was allowed to travel outside his place
of detention.
Subsequent events reveal the contrary, however. The assailed Orders augured
well when on November 29, 2007 petitioner went past security detail for some
reason and proceeded from the courtroom to a posh hotel to issue certain
statements. The account, dubbed this time as the "Manila Pen
Incident", 30 proves that petitioner's argument bites the dust. The risk that he
would escape ceased to be neither remote nor nil as, in fact, the cause for
foreboding became real.
Moreover, circumstances indicating probability of flight find relevance as a factor
in ascertaining the reasonable amount of bail and in canceling a discretionary
grant of bail. 31 In cases involving non-bailable offenses, what is controlling is the
determination of whether the evidence of guilt is strong. Once it is established
that it is so, bail shall be denied as it is neither a matter of right nor of
discretion. 32 HTIEaS
Petitioner cannot find solace in Montano v. Ocampo 33 to buttress his plea for
leeway because unlike petitioner, the therein petitioner, then Senator Justiniano
Montano, who was charged with multiple murder and multiple frustrated
murder, 34 was able to rebut the strong evidence for the prosecution. Notatu
dignum is this Court's pronouncement therein that "if denial of bail is authorized
in capital cases, it is only on the theory that the proof being strong, the defendant
would flee, if he has the opportunity, rather than face the verdict of the
jury." 35 At the time Montano was indicted, when only capital offenses were nonbailable where evidence of guilt is strong, 36 the Court noted the obvious reason
that "one who faces a probable death sentence has a particularly strong
temptation to flee." 37 Petitioner's petition for bail having earlier been denied, he
cannot rely on Montano to reiterate his requests which are akin to bailing him out.
Second, petitioner posits that, contrary to the trial court's findings, Esperon did
not overrule Obea's recommendation to allow him to attend Senate sessions.
Petitioner cites the Comment 38 of Obea that he interposed no objection to such
request but recommended that he be transported by the Senate Sergeant-at-Arms
with adequate Senate security. And petitioner faults the trial court for deeming
that Esperon, despite professing non-obstruction to the performance of
petitioner's duties, flatly rejected all his requests, when what Esperon only
disallowed was the setting up of a political office inside a military installation
owing to AFP's a political nature. 39 HAaDTE
The effective management of the detention facility has been recognized as a valid
objective that may justify the imposition of conditions and restrictions of pre-trial
detention. 40 The officer with custodial responsibility over a detainee may
undertake such reasonable measures as may be necessary to secure the safety
and prevent the escape of the detainee. 41 Nevertheless, while the comments of
the detention officers provide guidance on security concerns, they are not binding
on the trial court in the same manner that pleadings are not impositions upon a
court.
Third, petitioner posits that his election provides the legal justification to allow
him to serve his mandate, after the people, in their sovereign capacity, elected
him as Senator. He argues that denying his Omnibus Motion is tantamount to
removing him from office, depriving the people of proper representation, denying
the people's will, repudiating the people's choice, and overruling the mandate of
the people.
Petitioner's contention hinges on the doctrine in administrative law that "a public
official can not be removed for administrative misconduct committed during
a priorterm, since his re-election to office operates as a condonation of the
officer's previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him
therefor." 42 aCSDIc
The assertion is unavailing. The case against petitioner is not administrative in
nature. And there is no "prior term" to speak of. In a plethora of cases, 43 the
Court categorically held that the doctrine of condonation does not apply to
Lastly, petitioner pleads for the same liberal treatment accorded certain detention
prisoners who have also been charged with non-bailable offenses, like former
President Joseph Estrada and former Governor Nur Misuari who were allowed to
attend "social functions." Finding no rhyme and reason in the denial of the more
serious request to perform the duties of a Senator, petitioner harps on an alleged
violation of the equal protection clause.
In arguing against maintaining double standards in the treatment of detention
prisoners, petitioner expressly admits that he intentionally did not seek
preferential treatment in the form of being placed under Senate custody or house
arrest, 47 yet he at the same time, gripes about the granting of house arrest to
others.
DECISION
VILLA-REAL, J p:
leave of absence of thirteen days to the justice of the peace of Coron, Palawan
(Exhibit 9).
On May 19, 1938, the Commission on Appointments of the National
Assembly disapproved the aforesaid ad interim appointment of said petitioner,
who was advised thereof by the Secretary of Justice on the 20th of said month
and year.
On August 1, 1938, the President of the Philippines appointed the herein
respondent, Honorable Sixto de la Costa, judge of first instance of the Fourth
Judicial District, with authority to preside over the Fifty Branch of the Court of
First Instance of Manila and the Court of First Instance of Palawan, and his
appointment was approved by the Commission on Appointments of the
National Assembly. By virtue of said appointment, the respondent took the
necessary oath and assumed office. On the same date, August 1, 1938, the
President of the Philippines, pursuant to said appointment of judge of first
instance of the Fourth Judicial District and after confirmation thereof, issued the
corresponding final appointment in favor of the respondent, Honorable Sixto de
la Costa (Exhibit 11).
The respondent, in answer to the petition, admits some of the facts
alleged therein and denies the rest, and alleges, as one of his special defenses,
that the petitioner is estopped from attacking the constitutionality of
Commonwealth Act No. 145, for having accepted his new appointment as judge
of first instance of the Fourth Judicial District, issued by virtue thereof, to
preside over the Courts of First Instance of Manila and Palawan, and for having
taken the necessary oath, entering into the discharge of the functions of his
office and performing judicial as well as administrative acts.
The defense of estoppel being procedural, we shall discuss it first to
determine whether or not the petitioner may proceed to question the
constitutionality of the law by virtue of which the new ad interim appointment
of judge of first instance of the Fourth Judicial District, to preside over the Court
of First Instance of Manila and Palawan, was issued in his favor.
As stated beforehand, while the petitioner Honorable Francisco Zandueta
was presiding over the Fifth Branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
Ninth Judicial District, by virtue of an appointment issued to him on June 2,
1936, and confirmed by the National Assembly on September 8th of the same
year, he received, on November 7, 1936, a new ad interim appointment, issued
in accordance with the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 145, which took
effect on the same date, to discharge the office of judge of first instance,
Fourth Judicial District, with authority of preside over the Fifth Branch of the
Court of First Instance of Manila and the Court of First Instance of Palawan,
upon which he immediately took the corresponding oath and entered into the
discharge of his office. Under his former appointment of June 2, 1936, the
petitioner had authority to preside solely over the Fifth Branch of the Court of
First Instance of Manila but not over the Court of First Instance of Palawan,
while, according to his new appointment of November 7, 1936, he had
authority to preside not only over said Fifth Branch of said Court of First
Instance of Manila but also over the Court of First Instance of Palawan. It should
be noted that the territory over which the petitioner could exercise and did
exercise jurisdiction by virtue of his last appointment is wider than that over
which he could exercise and did exercise jurisdiction by virtue of his last
appointment is wider than that over which he could exercise and did exercise
jurisdiction by virtue of the former. Hence, there is incompatibility between the
two appointments and, consequently, in the discharge of the office conferred
by each of them, resulting in the absorption of the former by the latter. In
accepting this appointment and qualifying for the exercise of the functions of
the office conferred by it, by taking the necessary oath, and in discharging the
same, disposing of both judicial and administrative cases corresponding to the
Courts of First Instance of Manila and of Palawan, the petitioner abandoned his
appointment of June 22, 1936, and ceased in the exercised of the functions of
the office occupied by him by virtue thereof.
The rule of equity, sanctioned by jurisprudence, is that when a public
official voluntarily accepts an appointment to an office newly created or
reorganized by a law, which new office is incompatible with the one formerly
occupied by him , qualifies for the discharge of the functions thereof by
taking the necessary oath, and enters into the performance of his duties by
executing acts inherent in said newly created or reorganized office and
receiving the corresponding salary, he will be considered to have abandoned
the office he was occupying by virtue of his former appointment (46 Corpus
Juris, 947, sec. 55), and he can not question the constitutionality of the law by
virtue of which he was last appointed (11 American Jurisprudence, 166, par.
121; id., 767, par. 123). He is excepted from said rule only when his
nonacceptance of the new appointment may affect public interest or when he
is compelled to accept it by reason of legal exigencies (11 American
Jurisprudence, 770, par. 124).
In the case under consideration, the petitioner was free to accept or not
the ad interim appointment issued by the President of the Commonwealth Act
No. 145. Nothing or nobody compelled him to do so. While the office of judge of
first instance is of public interest, being one of the means employed by the
Government to carry out one of its purposes, which is the administration of
justice, considering the organization of the courts of justice in the Philippines
and the creation of the positions of judges-at-large or substitutes, the
temporary disability of a judge may be immediately remedied without
detriment to the smooth running of the judicial machinery. If the petitioner
believed, as he now seems to believe, that Commonwealth Act No. 145 is
unconstitutional, he should have refused to accept the appointment offered
him or, at least, he should have accepted it with reservation, had he believed
that this duty of obedience to the laws compelled him to do so, and afterwards
resort to the power entrusted with the final determination of the question
whether a law is unconstitutional or not. The petitioner, being aware of his
constitutional and legal rights and obligations, by implied order of the law (art.
2, Civil Code), accepted the office of judge of first instance of the Fourth Judicial
District, with authority to preside over the Fifth Branch of the Court of First
Instance of Manila and the Court of First Instance of Palawan and entered into
the performance of the duties inherent therein, after taking the necessary oath,
thereby acting with full knowledge that if he voluntarily accepted the office to
which he was appointed, he would later be estopped from questioning the
validity of said appointment was issued, is unconstitutional. He likewise knew,
or at least he should know, that his ad interim appointment was subject to the
approval of the Commission on Appointments of the National Assembly and
that if said commission were disapprove the same, it would become ineffective
and he would cease discharging the office.
It appears from all the foregoing that the petitioner having voluntarily
abandoned his appointment of June 2, 1936, and, consequently, the office of
judge of first instance of Manila, Ninth Judicial District, whose Fifth Branch was
being presided over by him by virtue thereof, upon accepting the ad
interim appointment of November 7, 1936, to the office of judge of first
instance of the Fourth Judicial District, with authority to preside over said Fifth
Branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila together with the Court of First
Instance of Palawan, and entering into the discharge of the functions of said
office, he can not now claim to be entitled to repossess the office occupied by
him under his said appointment of June 2, 1936 (22 R. C. L., 560, par. 264), or
question the constitutionality of Commonwealth Act No. 145, by virtue of which
he has been appointed judge of first instance of the Fourth Judicial District, with
authority to preside over the Fifth Branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila
and the Court of First Instance of Palawan, which appointment was disapproved
by the Commission on Appointments of the National Assembly.
Having arrived at the conclusion that the petitioner is estopped by his
own act from proceeding to question the constitutionality of Commonwealth
Act No. 145, by virtue of which he was appointed, by accepting said
appointment and entering into the performance of the duties appertaining to
the office conferred therein, and pursuant to the well settled doctrine
established by both American and Philippine jurisprudence relative to the
consideration of constitutional questions, this court deems it unnecessary to
decide the questions on constitutional law raised in the petition (Cruz vs.
Youngberg, 56 Phil., 234; Walter E. Olsen & Co. vs. Aldanese and Trinidad, 43
Phil., 259; Yangco vs. Board of Public Utility Commissioners, 36 Phil., 116;
Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Municipality of Binagonan, 34 Phil.,
518; Mc Girr vs. Hamilton and Abreu, 30 Phil., 563; 12 Corpus Juris, 699, section
40; id., 780, section 212).
For the foregoing considerations, we are of the opinion and so hold that
when a judge of first instance, presiding over a branch of a Court of First
Instance of a judicial district by virtue of a legal and valid appointment, accepts
another appointment to preside over the same branch of the same Court of
First Instance, in addition of another Court of First Instance to the old one,
enters into the discharge of the functions of his new office and receives the
corresponding salary, he abandons his old office and cannot claim to be
entitled to repossess it or question the constitutionality of the law by virtue of
which his new appointment has been issued; and, said new appointment
having been disapproved by the Commission on Appointments of the National
Assembly, neither can he claim to continue occupying the office conferred upon
him by said new appointment, having ipso jure ceased in the discharge of the
functions thereof.
Wherefore, the petition for quo warranto instituted is denied and the
same is dismissed, with costs to the petitioner. So ordered.
Avancea, C.J., Abad Santos, Imperial and Concepcion, JJ., concur.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J p:
The constitutionality of Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227, 1 otherwise known as the
"Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992," under which respondent Mayor
Richard J. Gordon of Olongapo City was appointed Chairman and Chief Executive
Officer of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SMBA), is challenged in this
original petition with prayer for prohibition, preliminary injunction and temporary
restraining order "to prevent useless and unnecessary expenditures of public
funds by way of salaries and other operational expenses attached to the office . . .
." 2 Paragraph (d) reads
"(d) Chairman/Administrator
The
President
shall
appoint
including
corporations . . . ."
those in
government-owned
or controlled
for the reason that the appointment of respondent Gordon to the subject posts
made by respondent Executive Secretary on 3 April 1992 was within the
prohibited 45-day period prior to the 11 May 1992 Elections.
The principal question is whether the proviso in Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227
which states, "Provided, however, That for the first year of its operations from the
effectivity of this Act, the mayor of the City of Olongapo shall be appointed as the
chairman and chief executive officer of the Subic Authority," violates the
constitutional proscription against appointment or designation of elective officials
to other government posts.
In full, Sec. 7 of Art. IX-B of the Constitution provides:
"No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in
any capacity to any public office or position during his tenure.
"Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his
position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or
employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries."
The section expresses the policy against the concentration of several public
positions in one person, so that a public officer or employee may serve full-time
with dedication and thus be efficient in the delivery of public services. It is an
affirmation that a public office is a full-time job. Hence, a public officer or
employee, like the head of an executive department described in Civil Liberties
Union v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 83896, and Anti-Graft League of the
Philippines, Inc. v. Philip Ella C. Juico, as Secretary of Agrarian Reform, G.R. No.
83815, 6 ". . . . should be allowed to attend to his duties and responsibilities
without the distraction of other governmental duties or employment. He should be
precluded from dissipating his efforts, attention and energy among too many
positions
of
responsibility,
which
may
result
in
haphazardness
and
inefficiency . . . ."
Particularly as regards the first paragraph of Sec. 7, "(t)he basic idea really is to
prevent a situation where a local elective official will work for his appointment in
an executive position in government, and thus neglect his constituents . . . ." 7
In the case before us, the subject proviso directs the President to appoint an
elective official, i.e., the Mayor of Olongapo City, to other government posts (as
Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of SBMA). Since this is precisely
what the constitutional proscription seeks to prevent, it needs no stretching of the
imagination to conclude that the proviso contravenes Sec. 7, first part., Art. IX-B,
of the Constitution. Here, the fact that the expertise of an elective official may be
most beneficial to the higher interest of the body politic is of no moment.
It is argued that Sec. 94 of the Local Government Code (LGC) permits the
appointment of a local elective official to another post if so allowed by law or by
the primary functions of his office. 8 But, the contention is fallacious. Section 94
of the LGC is not determinative of the constitutionality of Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A.
7227, for no legislative act can prevail over the fundamental law of the land.
Moreover, since the constitutionality of Sec. 94 of LGC is not the issue here nor is
government
posts,
except
as
are
particularly
recognized
in
the Constitution itself, e.g., the President as head of the economic and planning
agency;
the
Cabinet; 10 and,
Vice-President,
a
member
who
of
may
be
Congress
appointed
who
may
Member
be
of
the
designated ex
The phrase "shall be appointed" unquestionably shows the intent to make the
SBMA posts appointive and not merely adjunct to the post of Mayor of Olongapo
City. Had it been the legislative intent to make the subject positions ex officio,
Congress would have, at least, avoided the word "appointed" and, instead, "ex
officio" would have been used. 14
Even in the Senate deliberations, the Senators were fully aware that subject
proviso may contravene Sec. 7, first par., Art. IX-B, but they nevertheless passed
the bill and decided to have the controversy resolved by the courts. Indeed, the
Senators would not have been concerned with the effects of Sec. 7, first par., had
they considered the SBMA posts as ex officio. cda
Cognizant of the complication that may arise from the way the subject proviso
was stated, Senator Rene Saguisag remarked that "if the Conference Committee
just said 'the Mayor shall be the Chairman' then that should foreclose the issue. It
is a legislative choice." 15 The Senator took a view that the constitutional
proscription against appointment of elective officials may have been sidestepped
if Congress attached the SBMA posts to the Mayor of Olongapo City instead of
directing the President to appoint him to the post. Without passing upon this view
of Senator Saguisag, it suffices to state that Congress intended the posts to be
appointive, thus nibbling in the bud the argument that they are ex officio.
The analogy with the position of Chairman of the Metro Manila Authority made by
respondents cannot be applied to uphold the constitutionality of the challenged
proviso since it is not put in issue in the present case. In the same vein, the
argument that if no elective official may be appointed or designated to another
post then Sec. 8, Art. IX-B, of the Constitution allowing him to receive double
compensation 16 would be useless, is non sequitur since Sec. 8 does not affect
the constitutionality of the subject proviso. In any case, the Vice-President for
example, an elective official who may be appointed to a cabinet post under Sec.
3, Art. VII, may receive the compensation attached to the cabinet position if
specifically authorized by law.
Petitioners also assail the legislative encroachment on the appointing authority of
the President. Section 13, par. (d), itself vests in the President the power to
appoint the Chairman of the Board and the Chief Executive Officer of SBMA,
although he really has no choice under the law but to appoint the Mayor of
Olongapo City.
As may be defined, an "appointment" is "[t]he designation of a person, by the
person or persons having authority therefor, to discharge the duties of some office
or trust," 17 or "[t]he selection or designation of a person, by the person or
persons having authority therefor, to fill an office or public function and discharge
the duties of the same." 18 In his treatise, Philippine Political Law, 19 Senior
Associate Justice Isagani A. Cruz defines appointment as "the selection, by the
authority vested with the power, of an individual who is to exercise the functions
of a given office."
Considering that appointment calls for a selection, the appointing power
necessarily exercises a discretion. According to Woodbury, J., 20 "the choice of a
person to fill an office constitutes the essence of his appointment," 21 and Mr.
Justice Malcolm adds that an "[a]pointment to office is intrinsically an executive
R.A. 7227, the proviso nevertheless limits the appointing authority to only one
eligible, i.e., the incumbent Mayor of Olongapo City. Since only one can qualify for
the posts in question, the President is precluded from exercising his discretion to
choose whom to appoint. Such supposed power of appointment, sans the
essential element of choice, is no power at all and goes against the very nature
itself of appointment. cdphil
While it may be viewed that the proviso merely sets the qualifications of the
officer during the first year of operations of SBMA, i.e., he must be the Mayor of
Olongapo City, it is manifestly an abuse of congressional authority to prescribe
qualifications where only one, and no other, can qualify. Accordingly, while the
conferment of the appointing power on the President is a perfectly valid legislative
act, the proviso limiting his choice to one is certainly an encroachment on his
prerogative.
Since the ineligibility of an elective official for appointment remains all throughout
his tenure or during his incumbency, he may however resign first from his elective
post to cast off the constitutionally-attached disqualification before he may be
considered fit for appointment. The deliberation in the Constitutional Commission
is enlightening:
"MR. DAVIDE.
On Section 4, page 3, line 8, I propose the substitution of the word
"term" with TENURE.
"MR. FOZ.
his
appointment
thereto
pursuant
to
legislative act
that
contravenes
Conformably with our ruling in Civil Liberties Union, any and all per diems,
allowances and other emoluments which may have been received by respondent
Gordon pursuant to his appointment may be retained by him.
The illegality of his appointment to the SBMA posts being now evident, other
matters affecting the legality of the questioned proviso as well as the
appointment of said respondent made pursuant thereto need no longer be
discussed.
In thus concluding as we do, we can only share the lament of Sen. Sotero Laurel
which he expressed in the floor deliberations of S.B. 1648, precursor of R.A. 7227,
when he articulated
". . . . (much) as we would like to have the present Mayor of Olongapo
City as the Chief Executive of this Authority that we are creating;
(much) as I, myself, would like to because I known the capacity,
integrity, industry and dedication of Mayor Gordon; (much) as we
would
like
to
give him
this
heavy
of this Act, the Mayor of the City of Olongapo shall be appointed as the chairman
and chief executive officer of the Subic Authority," is declared unconstitutional;
consequently, the appointment pursuant thereto of the Mayor of Olongapo City,
respondent Richard J. Gordon, is INVALID, hence NULL and VOID.
However, all per diems, allowances and other emoluments received by
respondent Gordon, if any, as such Chairman and Chief Executive Officer may be
retained by him, and all acts otherwise legitimate done by him in the exercise of
his authority as officer de facto of SBMA are hereby UPHELD.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa C .J ., Cruz, Feliciano, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero,
Nocon, Melo and Quiason, JJ ., concur.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 175352. January 18, 2011.]
DANTE V. LIBAN, REYNALDO M. BERNARDO and SALVADOR M.
VIARI, petitioners, vs. RICHARD J. GORDON, respondent.
RESOLUTION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J p:
This resolves the Motion for Clarification and/or for Reconsideration 1 filed
on August 10, 2009 by respondent Richard J. Gordon (respondent) of
the Decisionpromulgated by this Court on July 15, 2009 (the Decision),
the Motion for Partial Reconsideration 2 filed on August 27, 2009 by movantintervenor Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC), and the
latter's Manifestation and Motion to Admit Attached Position Paper 3 filed
on December 23, 2009. AaHTIE
In the Decision, 4 the Court held that respondent did not forfeit his seat in the
Senate when he accepted the chairmanship of the PNRC Board of Governors, as
"the office of the PNRC Chairman is not a government office or an office in a
government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the prohibition in
Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution." 5 The Decision, however, further
declared void the PNRC Charter "insofar as it creates the PNRC as a private
corporation" and consequently ruled that "the PNRC should incorporate under the
Corporation Code and register with the Securities and Exchange Commission if it
wants to be a private corporation." 6 The dispositive portion of the Decision reads
as follows:
WHEREFORE, we declare that the office of the Chairman of the
Philippine National Red Cross is not a government office or an office in
a government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the
prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. We also
declare that Sections 1, 2, 3, 4(a), 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13 of
the Charter of the Philippine National Red Cross, or Republic Act No.
95, as amended by Presidential Decree Nos. 1264 and 1643, are VOID
because they create the PNRC as a private corporation or grant it
corporate powers. 7
In his Motion for Clarification and/or for Reconsideration, respondent raises
the following grounds: (1) as the issue of constitutionality of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 95 was not raised by the parties, the Court went beyond the case in deciding
such issue; and (2) as the Court decided that Petitioners did not have standing to
file the instant Petition, the pronouncement of the Court on the validity of R.A. No.
95 should be considered obiter. 8
Respondent argues that the validity of R.A. No. 95 was a non-issue; therefore, it
was unnecessary for the Court to decide on that question. Respondent
cites Laurel v. Garcia, 9 wherein the Court said that it "will not pass upon a
constitutional question although properly presented by the record if the case can
be disposed of on some other ground" and goes on to claim that since this Court,
in the Decision, disposed of the petition on some other ground, i.e., lack of
standing of petitioners, there was no need for it to delve into the validity of R.A.
No. 95, and the rest of the judgment should be deemed obiter.
In its Motion for Partial Reconsideration, PNRC prays that the Court sustain
the constitutionality of its Charter on the following grounds:
A.THE ASSAILED DECISION DECLARING
UNCONSTITUTIONAL REPUBLIC ACT NO. 95 AS
After a thorough study of the arguments and points raised by the respondent as
well as those of movant-intervenor in their respective motions, we have
reconsidered our pronouncements in our Decision dated July 15, 2009 with regard
to the nature of the PNRC and the constitutionality of some provisions of the PNRC
Charter, R.A. No. 95, as amended.
As correctly pointed out in respondent's Motion, the issue of constitutionality
of R.A. No. 95 was not raised by the parties, and was not among the issues
defined in the body of the Decision; thus, it was not the very lis mota of the case.
We have reiterated the rule as to when the Court will consider the issue of
constitutionality inAlvarez v. PICOP Resources, Inc., 12 thus:
This Court will not touch the issue of unconstitutionality
unless it is the very lis mota. It is a well-established rule that
a court should not pass upon a constitutional question and
decide a law to be unconstitutional or invalid, unless such
question is raised by the parties and that when it is raised, if the
record also presents some other ground upon which the court may
[rest] its judgment, that course will be adopted and the constitutional
question will be left for consideration until such question will be
unavoidable. 13
Under the rule quoted above, therefore, this Court should not have declared void
certain sections of R.A. No. 95, as amended by Presidential Decree (P.D.) Nos.
1264 and 1643, the PNRC Charter. Instead, the Court should have exercised
judicial restraint on this matter, especially since there was some other ground
upon which the Court could have based its judgment. Furthermore, the PNRC, the
entity most adversely affected by this declaration of unconstitutionality, which
was not even originally a party to this case, was being compelled, as a
consequence of the Decision, to suddenly reorganize and incorporate under the
Corporation Code, after more than sixty (60) years of existence in this
country.
Its existence as a chartered corporation remained unchallenged on ground of
unconstitutionality notwithstanding that R.A. No. 95 was enacted on March 22,
1947 during the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, which provided for a
proscription against the creation of private corporations by special law, to wit:
SEC. 7.The Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for the
formation, organization, or regulation of private corporations, unless
such corporations are owned and controlled by the Government or
any subdivision or instrumentality thereof. (Art. XIV, 1935
Constitution.) SIaHDA
Similar
provisions
are
found
in
Article
XIV,
Section
of
the 1973
Constitution and Article XII, Section 16 of the 1987 Constitution. The latter
reads:
SECTION 16.The Congress shall not, except by general law, provide
for the formation, organization, or regulation of private corporations.
Government-owned or controlled corporations may be created or
established by special charters in the interest of the common good
and subject to the test of economic viability.
Since its enactment, the PNRC Charter was amended several times, particularly
on June 11, 1953, August 16, 1971, December 15, 1977, and October 1, 1979, by
virtue of R.A. No. 855, R.A. No. 6373, P.D. No. 1264, and P.D. No. 1643,
respectively. The passage of several laws relating to the PNRC's corporate
existence notwithstanding the effectivity of the constitutional proscription on the
creation of private corporations by law, is a recognition that the PNRC is not
strictly in the nature of a private corporation contemplated by the aforesaid
constitutional ban.
A closer look at the nature of the PNRC would show that there is none like it not
just in terms of structure, but also in terms of history, public service and official
status accorded to it by the State and the international community. There is merit
in PNRC's contention that its structure is sui generis.
The PNRC succeeded the chapter of the American Red Cross which was in
existence in the Philippines since 1917. It was created by an Act of Congress after
the Republic of the Philippines became an independent nation on July 6, 1946 and
proclaimed on February 14, 1947 its adherence to the Convention of Geneva of
July 29, 1929 for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick of
Armies in the Field (the "Geneva Red Cross Convention"). By that action the
Philippines indicated its desire to participate with the nations of the world in
mitigating the suffering caused by war and to establish in the Philippines a
voluntary organization for that purpose and like other volunteer organizations
established in other countries which have ratified the Geneva Conventions, to
promote the health and welfare of the people in peace and in war. 14
The provisions of R.A. No. 95, as amended by R.A. Nos. 855 and 6373, and further
amended by P.D. Nos. 1264 and 1643, show the historical background and legal
basis of the creation of the PNRC by legislative fiat, as a voluntary organization
impressed with public interest. Pertinently R.A. No. 95, as amended by P.D. 1264,
provides:
WHEREAS, during the meeting in Geneva, Switzerland, on 22 August
1894, the nations of the world unanimously agreed to diminish within
their power the evils inherent in war;
WHEREAS, more than one hundred forty nations of the world have
ratified or adhered to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949 for
the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick of Armed
Forces in the Field and at Sea, The Prisoners of War, and The Civilian
Population in Time of War referred to in this Charter as the Geneva
Conventions;
WHEREAS, the Republic of the Philippines became an
independent nation on July 4, 1946, and proclaimed on
February 14, 1947 its adherence to the Geneva Conventions
of 1929, and by the action, indicated its desire to participate
with the nations of the world in mitigating the suffering
caused by war and to establish in the Philippines a voluntary
organization for that purpose as contemplated by the Geneva
Conventions;
The PNRC works closely with the ICRC and has been involved in humanitarian
activities in the Philippines since 1982. Among others, these activities in the
country include:
1.Giving protection and assistance to civilians displaced or otherwise
affected by armed clashes between the government and armed
opposition groups, primarily in Mindanao;
2.Working to minimize the effects of armed hostilities and violence on
the population;
3.Visiting detainees; and
4.Promoting awareness of international humanitarian law in the public
and private sectors. 16
National Societies such as the PNRC act as auxiliaries to the public authorities of
their own countries in the humanitarian field and provide a range of services
including disaster relief and health and social programmes.
The International Federation of Red Cross (IFRC) and Red Crescent Societies (RCS)
Position Paper, 17 submitted by the PNRC, is instructive with regard to the
elements of the specific nature of the National Societies such as the PNRC, to wit:
National Societies, such as the Philippine National Red Cross and its
sister Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, have certain specificities
deriving from the 1949 Geneva Convention and the Statutes of the
International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement (the Movement).
They are also guided by the seven Fundamental Principles of the Red
Cross and Red Crescent Movement: Humanity, Impartiality,
Neutrality, Independence, Voluntary Service, Unity and
Universality.
A National Society partakes of a sui generis character. It is a
protected component of the Red Cross movement under Articles 24
and 26 of the First Geneva Convention, especially in times of armed
conflict. These provisions require that the staff of a National Society
shall be respected and protected in all circumstances. Such protection
is not ordinarily afforded by an international treaty to ordinary private
entities or even non-governmental organisations (NGOs). This sui
generischaracter is also emphasized by the Fourth Geneva
Convention which holds that an Occupying Power cannot require any
change in the personnel or structure of a National Society. National
societies are therefore organizations that are directly
regulated by international humanitarian law, in contrast to
other ordinary private entities, including NGOs. aSAHCE
xxx xxx xxx
In addition, National Societies are not only officially recognized by
their public authorities as voluntary aid societies, auxiliary to the
public authorities in the humanitarian field, but also benefit from
recognition at the International level. This is considered to be an
under the 1935 Constitution and during the effectivity of the 1973
Constitution and the 1987 Constitution.
The PNRC Charter and its amendatory laws have not been questioned or
challenged on constitutional grounds, not even in this case before the Court now.
In the Decision, the Court, citing Feliciano v. Commission on Audit, 19 explained
that the purpose of the constitutional provision prohibiting Congress from creating
private corporations was to prevent the granting of special privileges to certain
individuals, families, or groups, which were denied to other groups. Based on the
above discussion, it can be seen that the PNRC Charter does not come within the
spirit of this constitutional provision, as it does not grant special privileges to a
particular individual, family, or group, but creates an entity that strives to serve
the common good.
Furthermore, a strict and mechanical interpretation of Article XII, Section 16 of
the 1987 Constitution will hinder the State in adopting measures that will serve
the public good or national interest. It should be noted that a special law, R.A. No.
9520, the Philippine Cooperative Code of 2008, and not the general corporation
code, vests corporate power and capacities upon cooperatives which are private
corporations, in order to implement the State's avowed policy.
In the Decision of July 15, 2009, the Court recognized the public service rendered
by the PNRC as the government's partner in the observance of its international
commitments, to wit:
Court. The structure of the PNRC is sui generis,being neither strictly private nor
public in nature. R.A. No. 95 remains valid and constitutional in its entirety. The
dispositive portion of the Decision should therefore beMODIFIED by deleting the
second sentence, to now read as follows:
WHEREFORE, we declare that the office of the Chairman of the
Philippine National Red Cross is not a government office or an office in
a government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the
prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
SO ORDERED.
Velasco, Jr., Nachura, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Villarama, Jr. and Perez,
JJ., concur.
Corona, C.J., took no part.
Carpio, J., see dissenting opinion.
Carpio Morales, Brion and Mendoza, JJ., join the dissent of J. Carpio.
Abad, J., see my concurring opinion.
Sereno, J., I agree with the dissent of J. Carpio.
Separate Opinions
CARPIO, J., dissenting:
In its Motion for Partial Reconsideration, the PNRC maintains that the decision
declaring unconstitutional certain provisions of RA 95 deprived the PNRC of its
right to due process considering that the PNRC was not a party to the case.
Furthermore, the PNRC states that the constitutionality of RA 95 was never an
issue in the case. Similarly, respondent Gordon posits in his Motion for
Clarification and Reconsideration that the Court should not have passed upon the
constitutionality of RA 95 since such issue was not raised by the parties.
Generally, the Court will not pass upon a constitutional question unless such
question is raised by the parties. 3 However, as explained by the Court in Fabian
v. Hon. Desierto, 4 the rule that a challenge on constitutional grounds must be
raised by a party to the case is not an inflexible rule. In the Fabian case, the issue
of the constitutionality of Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 5 (RA 6770) was not
presented as an issue by the parties. Nevertheless, the Court ruled that Section
27 of RA 6770, which provides for appeals in administrative disciplinary cases
from the Office of the Ombudsman to the Supreme Court, infringes on the
constitutional proscription against laws increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court without its advice and consent.
In this case, the constitutional issue was inevitably thrust upon the Court upon its
finding that the PNRC is a private corporation, whose creation by a special charter
is proscribed by the Constitution. In view of the Court's finding that the PNRC is a
private corporation, it was imperative for the Court to address the issue of the
creation of the PNRC through a special charter. The Constitution prohibits the
creation of a private corporation through a special law. The Court could not
declare the PNRC a private corporation created by the special law RA 95 without
running afoul of Section 16, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. To declare the
PNRC a private corporation necessarily meant declaring RA 95 unconstitutional. To
declare the PNRC, a creation of RA 95, a private corporation without declaring RA
95 unconstitutional would mean that Congress can create a private corporation
through a special law. This the Court could not do. CcaDHT
The fact that the constitutionality of RA 95 has not been questioned for more than
sixty (60) years does not mean that it could no longer be declared
unconstitutional. One is not estopped from assailing the validity of a law just
because such law has been relied upon in the past and all that time has not been
attacked as unconstitutional. 6 Indeed, there is no prescription to declare a law
unconstitutional. Thus, in the case of Moldex Realty, Inc. v. Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board,7 this Court held that constitutional challenge can be made
anytime:
That the question of constitutionality has not been raised
before is not a valid reason for refusing to allow it to be
raised later. A contrary rule would mean that a law, otherwise
unconstitutional, would lapse into constitutionality by the mere failure
of the proper party to promptly file a case to challenge the same.
(Emphasis supplied)
More importantly, the Court granted the PNRC's motion to intervene and
the PNRC then filed its Motion for Partial Reconsideration, in which the
PNRC argued that its charter is valid and constitutional. Thus, the PNRC,
Constitution from which legislative power draws its existence. The limits on
legislative power is explained by the Court in Government v. Springer, 9 thus:
Someone has said that the powers of the legislative department of
the Government, like the boundaries of the ocean, are unlimited. In
constitutional governments, however, as well as governments
acting under delegated authority, the powers of each of the
departments of the same are limited and confined within the
four wall of the constitution or the charter, and each
department can only exercise such powers as are expressly
given and such other powers as are necessarily implied from
the given powers. The constitution is the shore of legislative
authority against which the waves of legislative enactment
may dash, but over which it cannot leap. (Emphasis supplied)
The 1973 Constitution, as amended, was in force when President Marcos
issued PD 1264. Under Section 1, Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution, legislative
power is vested in the National Assembly. By virtue of Amendment No. 6 10 of
the 1973 Constitution, the President was granted legislative power. Thus, under
Amendment No. 6, President Marcos was granted concurrent legislative authority
with the interim Batasang Pambansa. 11 Considering that the legislative power of
the interim Batasang Pambansa and the regular National Assembly is subject to
the limitations imposed by the Constitution, then more so for the emergency
legislative power granted to the President during the period of martial law. In fact,
the Court has declared void several Presidential Decrees or provisions thereof for
being unconstitutional. ATaDHC
In Demetria v. Alba,12 the Court declared void Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of PD
1177 for being unconstitutional since it empowers the President to
indiscriminately transfer funds and unduly extends the privilege granted under
Section 16 (5), Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution. In Export Processing Zone
Authority v. Judge Dulay, 13the Court held that PD 1533 is unconstitutional
because it deprives the courts of their function of determining just compensation
in eminent domain cases and eliminates the courts' discretion to appoint
commissioners pursuant to Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. In subsequent cases,
similar provisions on just compensation found in expropriation laws such as PD 42,
76, 464, 794, 1224, 1259, 1313, and 1517 were also declared void and
unconstitutional for the same reason and for being violative of due
process. 14 In Tuason v. Register of Deeds, Caloocan City, 15 PD 293 was
declared void and unconstitutional since it allows the President to exercise judicial
function and to take property without due process and without compensation.
In Manotok v. National Housing Authority, 16 the Court held that PD 1669 and
1670, which expropriated certain properties, were void and unconstitutional for
violating due process of law.
In this case, PD 1264 contravenes Section 4, Article XIV of the 1973
Constitution which provides that "[t]he National Assembly shall not, except by
general law, provide for the formation, organization, or regulation of private
corporations, unless such corporations are owned or controlled by the government
National Societies are prohibited from being owned or controlled by their host
government or from becoming government instrumentalities as this would
undermine their independence, neutrality, and autonomy.
Indeed, the PNRC, as a member National Society of the International Red Cross
and Red Crescent Movement (Movement) must meet the stringent requirement of
independence, autonomy, and neutrality in order to be recognized as a National
Society by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). The conditions for
recognition of National Societies are enumerated in Article 4 of the Statutes of the
Movement, thus:
Article 4
Conditions for Recognition of National Societies
In order to be recognized in terms of Article 5, paragraph 2
b) 20 as a National Society, the Society shall meet the
following conditions:
1.Be constituted on the territory of an independent State where the
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field is in force.
2.Be the only National Red Cross or Red Crescent Society of the said
State and be directed by a central body which shall alone be
competent to represent it in its dealings with other components of the
Movement. ADcHES
Philippine government can accomplish even without creating the PNRC through a
special charter.
Besides, as auxiliaries in the humanitarian services of their host
governments, the National Societies are subject to the laws of their
respective countries. 24 Thus, the National Societies are bound by the laws of
their host countries and must submit to the Constitution of their respective host
countries.
The Philippine Constitution prohibits Congress from creating private corporations
except by general law. I agree with the PNRC that it is a private organization
performing public functions. Precisely because it is a private organization, the
PNRC charter whether it be RA 95 or PD 1264 is violative of the constitutional
proscription against the creation of private corporations by special law.
Nevertheless, keeping in mind the treaty obligations of the Philippines under the
Geneva Conventions, the assailed Decision only held void those provisions of the
PNRC charter which create PNRC as a private corporation or grant it corporate
powers. The other provisions respecting the government's treaty obligations
remain valid, thus:
The other provisions 25 of the PNRC Charter remain valid
as they can be considered as a recognition by the State that
the unincorporated PNRC is the local National Society of the
International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, and
thus entitled to the benefits, exemptions and privileges set
forth in the PNRC Charter. The other provisions of the PNRC
Due to this requirement, the PNRC must not appear to be an instrument or agency
of the government for, "otherwise, it cannot merit the trust of all and cannot
effectively carry out its mission." 5 It must, in case of invasion or an internal war,
maintain its neutrality and independence to be able to fulfill its humanitarian
tasks. It cannot choose to treat only the wounded on one side.
Moreover, the PNRC cannot be government-owned because it does not receive
appropriations from Congress or possess government assets. It is funded by
voluntary donations from private contributors. The government does not have
control over its affairs. While the President of the Philippines appoints six of the
PNRC Board of Governors, the overwhelming majority of the thirty-member board
is elected by private sector members. The PNRC Chairman is not appointed by or
under the control of the President of the Philippines. He is elected by the
organization's governing board. These all prove that the position of PNRC
Chairman is a private, not a government office. ScaAET
Additionally, the Court held that the Camporedondo ruling relied on by Liban, et
al., was erroneous. The Court's conclusion in that case that the PNRC is a GOCC
is based solely on the fact that it was Congress which created PNRC under a
special law. The case failed to consider, however, that the 1987 Administrative
Code defines a GOCC as "any agency organized as a stock or non-stock
corporation, vested with functions relating to public needs . . ., and owned by
the Government directly or through its instrumentalities . . . ." 6 Since the
government did not own PNRC, it cannot be a GOCC under such definition.
The Court thus concluded that Sen. Gordon did not forfeit his Senate seat.
As stated earlier, the Court partially voided the PNRC Charter on the ground that
Congress has been constitutionally prohibited from creating private corporations
by special law. The Court declared as void those provisions of the PNRC Charter
that related to its creation and those that granted it corporate powers. 7 What
remained of the Charter, said the Court, 8 served "as recognition by the State that
the unincorporated PNRC is the local National Society of the International Red
Cross and Red Crescent Movement." The surviving provisions supposedly
implemented the Philippine Government's treaty obligations under Article 4 (5) of
the Statutes of the Movement which required a National Society to be "duly
recognized by the legal government of its country on the basis of the Geneva
Conventions and of the national legislation." 9
Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura dissented and was joined by four other
members of the Court. 10 First, he argued that Liban, et al., had standing to file
the petition, which he characterized as one for prohibition and not quo warranto.
The petition actually sought an injunction against a continuing violation of the
Constitution and involved a constitutional issue with great impact on public
interest. Thus, the petition deserved the attention of the Court in view of its
seriousness, novelty, and weight as precedent.
According to Justice Nachura, since no private corporation can have a special
charter under the Constitution, it follows that the PNRC is a GOCC. As held
inCamporedondo and Baluyot v. Holganza, 11 the test for determining whether a
corporation is a GOCC is simply whether it was created under its own charter for
the exercise of a public function or by incorporation under the general corporation
law. The definition of a GOCC under the 1987 Administrative Code, on the other
hand, is broad enough to admit of other distinctions as to the kinds of GOCCs.
The more crucial factor to consider, said Justice Nachura, is the definition's
reference to the corporation being vested with functions relating to public needs.
In this regard, the PNRC Charter states that it is created as a "voluntary
organization officially designated to assist the Republic of the Philippines in
discharging the obligations set forth in the Geneva Convention . . . ." 12 These
obligations are undoubtedly public or governmental in character. Hence, the PNRC
is engaged in the performance of the government's public functions.
Justice Nachura added that, at the very least, the PNRC should be regarded as a
government instrumentality under the 1987 Administrative Code. An
instrumentality "refers to any agency of the National Government not integrated
within the department framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by
law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers, administering special funds,
and enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a charter." 13 The PNRC's
organizational attributes, said Justice Nachura, are consistent with this definition.
The dissent then cites the unsettling ripple effect which the main ruling could
create on numerous Court decisions, such as those dealing with the jurisdiction of
the Civil Service Commission (CSC) and the authority of the Commission on Audit
(COA). It also noted the absurdity of partially invalidating the PNRC Charter as this
would have the consequence of imposing obligations and providing an operational
framework for a legally non-existing entity.
Justice Nachura finally warns against the PNRC's ultimate demise if it were
regarded as a private corporation. Because of possible violations of the equal
protection clause and penal statutes, the PNRC may no longer be extended tax
exemptions and official immunity or be given any form of support by the National
Government, local government units, and the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes
Office (PCSO). If the PNRC is consequently obliterated, the Philippines will be
shirking its obligations under the Geneva Conventions. DEcITS
The dissent finally concluded that Sen. Gordon forfeited his Senate seat for
holding two incompatible offices.
Although the main ruling favored Sen. Gordon, he filed a motion for clarification
and reconsideration of the Court's decision. 14 He said that the Court decided the
case beyond what was necessary, considering that the parties never raised the
constitutionality of the PNRC Charter as an issue. He invoked the rule that the
Court will not pass upon a constitutional issue unless it is the very lis mota of the
case or if it can be disposed of on some other ground. Since the Court held that
Liban, et al., had no personality to file the petition, the Court should have simply
refrained from delving into the constitutionality of the PNRC Charter. Sen. Gordon
thus submits that the Court should regard the declaration of unconstitutionality of
the PNRC Charter obiter dictum.
Liban, et al., also filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court's decision,
essentially adopting the thesis of Justice Nachura. 15
Subsequently, the PNRC, which was not a party to the case, sought to intervene
and filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court's decision. 16 It claimed that,
although the Court annulled its very existence, it did not give the PNRC the
chance to defend itself and prove the validity of its creation. The PNRC pointed
out that P.D. 1264 and 1643 completely repealed R.A. 95. Consequently, the PNRC
no longer owed its creation to Congress but to President Marcos pursuant to his
power of executive legislation. The constitutional bar is on Congress.
As for its organizational nature, the PNRC asserts that it is neither a private nor a
government corporation but a sui generis entity, a unique being with no
equivalent in corporate organizations. While the PNRC performs certain public
services, its neutrality and independence would be compromised if it were to be
deemed as a government-owned corporation or instrumentality. Besides, it is in
fact neither owned nor controlled by the government.
The PNRC also stressed that, although it has private characteristics, it was not
created for profit or gain but in compliance with treaty obligations under the
Geneva Conventions. As such, it is an auxiliary of government in the performance
of humanitarian functions under international law.
To support its stand that it is a sui generis entity, the PNRC submitted a position
paper 17 prepared by the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent
Societies (the Federation) explaining the specific nature of National Societies like
the PNRC.
There is a need to examine the Court's decision in this case considering its far
reaching effects. Allowing such decision to stand will create innumerable mischief
that would hamper the PNRC's operations. With a void juridical personality, it
cannot open a bank account, issue tax-exempt receipts for donations, or enter
into contracts for delivery of rescue reliefs like blood, medicine, and food. Its
officers would be exposed to suits in their personal capacities. The validity of its
past transactions would be open to scrutiny and challenge. Neither the country
nor the PNRC needs this.
FIRST. Congress created the PNRC to comply with the country's commitments
under the Geneva Conventions. The treaties envisioned the establishment in each
country of a voluntary organization that would assist in caring for the wounded
and sick of the armed forces during times of armed conflict. Upon proclaiming its
adherence to the Geneva Conventions, the Republic of the Philippines forthwith
created the PNRC for the purpose contemplated by the treaties. Its creation was
not privately motivated, but borne of the Republic's observance of treaty
obligations. The "whereas clause" of P.D. 1643 or the revised PNRC Charter lays
down this basic premise:
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREAS, more than one hundred forty nations of the world
have ratified or adhered to the Geneva Conventions of August
12, 1949 for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick of Armed Forces and at Sea, The Prisoners
The Statutes require, however, that a National Society like the PNRC "(b)e duly
recognized by the legal government of its country on the basis of the Geneva
Conventions and of the national legislation as a voluntary aid
society, auxiliary to the public authorities in the humanitarian
field." 26 This signifies a partnership with government in implementing State
obligations based on international humanitarian law. 27
The status of being an "auxiliary" of government in the humanitarian field is a
precondition to a National Society's existence and recognition as a component of
the Movement. In its position paper, the Federation explained that the status of
auxiliary "means that it is at one and the same time a private institution and a
public service organization because the very nature of its work implies
cooperation with the authorities, a link with the State." In other words, the status
confers upon the PNRC the duty to be the government's humanitarian partner
while, at the same time, remaining independent and free from government
intervention. As a recognized National Society, the PNRC must be autonomous,
even as it assists government in the discharge of its humanitarian
obligations. IcHEaA
Notably, the PNRC Charter is also reflective of the organization's dual nature. It
does not only vest the PNRC with corporate powers, but imposes upon it duties
related to the performance of government functions. Under Section 1 of the
charter, the PNRC is "officially designated to assist the Republic of the Philippines
in discharging the obligations set forth in the Geneva Conventions." As such, it is
obligated "to provide volunteer aid to the sick and wounded of the armed forces in
time of war" and "to perform all duties devolving upon the Corporation as a result
of the adherence of the Republic of the Philippines to the said Convention."
Moreover, the charter clearly established the PNRC as a National Red Cross
Society pursuant to the treaties and Statutes of the Movement. It was authorized
"to act in such matters between similar national societies of other governments
and the governments and people and the Armed Forces of the Republic of the
Philippines." The PNRC was to establish and maintain a system of national and
international relief and to apply the same in meeting natural disasters, all in the
spirit of the Geneva Conventions.
In the pursuit of its humanitarian tasks, the PNRC was thus granted the power of
perpetual succession, the capacity to sue and be sued, and the power to hold real
and personal property. It was authorized to adopt a seal, but was given exclusive
use of the Red Cross emblem and badge in accordance with the treaties. It may
likewise adopt by-laws and regulations and do all acts necessary to carry its
purposes into effect.
The PNRC is financed primarily by contributions obtained through solicitation
campaigns and private donations. And yet, it is required to submit to the President
of the Philippines an annual report of its activities including its financial condition,
receipts and disbursements. It is allotted one annual national lottery draw and is
exempt from taxes, duties, and fees on importations and purchases, as well as on
donations for its disaster relief work and other services.
Congress merely implemented the will of the State to join other nations of the
world in the humanitarian cause.
The special status of the PNRC under international humanitarian law justifies the
special manner of its creation. The State itself committed the PNRC's formation to
the community of nations, and no less than an act of Congress should be deemed
sufficient compliance with such an obligation. To require the PNRC to incorporate
under the general law is to disregard its unique standing under international
conventions. It also ignores the very basic premise for the PNRC's creation.
FOURTH. The main issue in this case is whether or not the office of PNRC
Chairman is a government office or an office in a GOCC for purposes of the
prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the Constitution. The resolution of this
question lies in the determination of whether or not the PNRC is in fact a GOCC. As
explained earlier, the PNRC is not a GOCC, but a sui generis entity that has no
legal equivalent under any of our statutes. Consequently, Senator Gordon did not
forfeit his Senate seat under the constitutional prohibition. ECDAcS
In view of the PNRC's sui generis character, the Court need not even dwell on the
issue of whether or not the PNRC Charter was validly enacted. Congress is
proscribed only from creating private corporations which, as demonstrated, the
PNRC is not. The issue of constitutionality was not raised by any of the original
parties and could have been avoided in the first place. Neither was the PNRC a
party to the case, despite being the entity whose creation was declared void
under the main decision.
Finally, the sui generis character of the PNRC does not necessarily overturn the
rulings of the Court in Camporedondo and Baluyot. The PNRC's exceptional nature
admits of the conclusions reached in those cases that the PNRC is a GOCC for the
purpose of enforcement of labor laws and penal statutes. The PNRC's sui
generischaracter compels us to approach controversies involving the PNRC on a
case-to-case basis, bearing in mind its distinct nature, purposes and special
functions. Rules that govern traditional private or public entities may thus be
adjusted in relation to the PNRC and in accordance with the circumstances of each
case.
ACCORDINGLY, I concur in the decision written for the majority by Justice Teresita
J. Leonardo-De Castro.
||| (Liban v. Gordon, G.R. No. 175352, [January 18, 2011], 654 PHIL 680-738)
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 51122. March 25, 1982.]
EUGENIO J. PUYAT, ERWIN L. CHIONGBIAN, EDGARDO P. REYES,
ANTONIO G. PUYAT, JAIME R. BLANCO, RAFAEL R. RECTO, and
REYNALDO L. LARDIZABAL,petitioners, vs. HON. SIXTO T. J. DE
GUZMAN, JR., as Associate Commissioner of the Securities &
Exchange
VILDZIUS,
Commission,
ENRIQUE
EUSTAQUIO
M.
BELO,
T.
C.
MANUEL
ACERO,
G.
R.G.
ABELLO,
SYNOPSIS
In an election for the eleven Directors of the International Pipe Industries
Corporation (IPI), the Puyat Group won six seats to gain control of the Board and
of the management of the company. The Acero Group which won only five seats,
questioned the said election in a quo warranto proceeding filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) wherein they claimed that the stockholders'
votes were not properly counted. In the said case, Assemblyman Estanislao
Fernandez, then member of the Interim Batasang Pambansa, orally entered his
appearance as counsel for respondent Acero to which the Puyat Group objected
on constitutional grounds, thus discouraging Assemblyman Fernandez from
further appearing therein as counsel. Subsequently, however, Assemblyman
Fernandez acquired P200.00 worth of stock in the subject company representing
ten (10) shares out of 262,843 outstanding shares, on the basis of which he filed
an Urgent Motion for Intervention in the SEC Case alleging legal interest therein.
The respondent Associate Commissioner of the SEC granted leave to intervene on
the basis of Atty. Fernandez ownership of the said ten shares. Hence, this petition.
The Supreme Court, finding that under the facts and circumstances, there had
been an indirect "appearance as counsel before any administrative body" which is
a circumvention of the prohibition under Section 11, Article VIII, of the 1973
Constitution, held that the intervention of Assemblyman Fernandez in the
Securities and Exchange Commission case falls within the ambit of the said
constitutional prohibition.
Petition granted. Questioned order, reversed and set aside.
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; SECTION 11, ARTICLE VIII OF THE 1973 CONSTITUTION;
ASSEMBLYMEN
PROHIBITED
FROM
APPEARING
AS
COUNSEL
BEFORE
ANY
DECISION
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J p:
This suit for Certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction is poised against
the Order of respondent Associate Commissioner of the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) granting Assemblyman Estanislao A. Fernandez leave to
intervene in SEC Case No. 1747.
A question of novel import is in issue. For its resolution, the following dates and
allegations are being given and made:
a) May 14, 1979. An election for the eleven Directors of the International Pipe
Industries Corporation (IPI) a private corporation, was held. Those in charge ruled
that the following were elected as Directors:
Eugenio J. Puyat Eustaquio T.C. Acero
Erwin L. Chiongban R. G. Vildzius
Edgardo P. Reyes Enrique M. Belo
Antonio G. Puyat Servillano Dolina
Jaime R. Blanco Juanito Mercado
Rafael R. Recto
Those named on the left list may be called the Puyat Group; those on the right,
the Acero Group. Thus, the Puyat Group would be in control of the Board and of
the management of IPI.
b) May 25, 1979. The Acero Group instituted at the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) quo warranto proceedings, docketed as Case No. 1747 (the
SEC Case), questioning the election of May 14, 1979. The Acero Group claimed
that the stockholders' votes were not properly counted.
c) May 25-31, 1979. The Puyat Group claims that at conferences of the parties
with respondent SEC Commissioner de Guzman, Justice Estanislao A. Fernandez
then a member of the Interim Batasang Pambansa, orally entered his appearance
as counsel for respondent Acero to which the Puyat Group objected on
Constitutional grounds. Section 11, Article VIII, of the 1973 Constitution, then in
force, provided that no Assemblyman could "appear as counsel before . . . any
administrative body," and SEC was an administrative body. Incidentally, the same
prohibition
was
maintained
by
the
April
7,
1981
plebiscite.
The
cited
Motion for Intervention in the SEC Case as the owner of ten (10) IPI
shares alleging legal interest in the matter in litigation.
e) July 17, 1979. The SEC granted leave to intervene on the basis of Atty.
Fernandez' ownership of the said ten shares. 1 It is this Order allowing
intervention that precipitated the instant petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
with Preliminary Injunction.
f) July 3, 1979. Edgardo P. Reyes instituted a case before the Court of First
Instance of Rizal (Pasig), Branch XXI, against N.V. Verenigde Buinzefabrieken
Excelsior-De Maas and respondent Eustaquio T.C. Acero and others, to annul the
sale of Excelsior's shares in the IPI to respondent Acero (CC No. 33739). In that
case, Assemblyman Fernandez appeared as counsel for defendant Excelsior. In L51928, we ruled that Assemblyman Fernandez could not appear as counsel in a
case originally filed with a Court of First Instance as in such situation the Court
would be one "without appellate jurisdiction."
On September 4, 1979, the Court en banc issued a temporary Restraining Order
enjoining respondent SEC Associate Commissioner from allowing the participation
as an intervenor, of respondent Assemblyman Estanislao Fernandez at the
proceedings in the SEC Case.
The Solicitor General, in his Comment for respondent Commissioner, supports the
stand of the latter in allowing intervention. The Court en banc, on November 6,
1979, resolved to consider the Comment as an Answer to the Petition.
What really has to be resolved is whether or not in intervening in the SEC Case,
Assemblyman Fernandez is, in effect, appearing as counsel, albeit indirectly,
before an administrative body in contravention of the Constitution provision.
Ordinarily, by virtue of the Motion for Intervention, Assemblyman Fernandez
cannot be said to be appearing as counsel. Ostensibly, he is not appearing on
behalf of another, although he is not joining the cause of private respondents. His
appearance could theoretically be for the protection of his ownership of ten (10)
shares of IPI in respect of the matter in litigation and not for the protection of the
petitioners nor respondents who have their respective capable and respected
counsel.
However, certain salient circumstances militate against the intervention of
Assemblyman Fernandez in the SEC Case. He had acquired a mere P200.00 worth
of stock in IPI, representing ten shares out of 262,843 outstanding shares. He
acquired them "after the fact," that is, on May 30, 1979, after the contested
election of Directors on May 14, 1979, after the quo warranto suit had been filed
on May 25, 1979 before SEC and one day before the scheduled hearing of the
case before the SEC on May 31, 1979. And what is more, before he moved to
intervene, he had signified his intention to appear as counsel for respondent
Eustaquio T. C. Acero, 2 but which was objected to by petitioners. Realizing,
perhaps, the validity of the objection, he decided, instead, to "intervene" on the
ground of legal interest in the matter under litigation. And it may be noted that in
the case filed before the Rizal Court of First Instance (L-51928), he appeared as
counsel for defendant Excelsior, co-defendant of respondent Acero therein.
Under those facts and circumstances, we are constrained to find that there has
been an indirect "appearance as counsel before . . . any administrative body and,
in our opinion, that is a circumvention of the Constitutional prohibition. The
"intervention" was an afterthought to enable him to appear actively in the
proceedings in some other capacity. To believe the avowed purpose, that is, to
enable him eventually to vote and to be elected as Director in the event of an
unfavorable outcome of the SEC Case would be pure naivete. He would still
appear as counsel indirectly.
A ruling upholding the "intervention" would make the constitutional provision
ineffective. All an Assemblyman need do, if he wants to influence an
administrative body is to acquire a minimal participation in the "interest" of the
client
and
then
"intervene"
in
the
proceedings.
That
which
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; SEPARATION OF POWERS; SUPREME COURT HAS
NO JURISDICTION OVER SENATE CONTROVERSY FOR SELECTION OF PRESIDING
OFFICER. The subject matter of this quo warranto proceeding to declare
petitioner the rightful President of the Philippines Senate and oust respondent
is not within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, in view of the separation
of powers, the political nature of the controversy (Alejandrino vs. Quezon 46
Phil., 83., 1) and the constitutional grant to the Senate of the power to elect its
own president, which power should not be interfered with nor taken over by the
judiciary. The selection of the presiding officer of the Philippine Senate affects
only the senators themselves who are at liberty at any time to choose their
officers, change or reinstate them.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL LAW; SEPARATION OF
POWERS; WHEN MAY SUPREME COURT ASSUME JURISDICTION OVER SENATE
CONTROVERSY FOR SELECTION OF PRESIDING OFFICER. The Supreme Court
assumed jurisdiction over this quo warranto proceeding, in the light of events
subsequent to the original resolution.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; QUORUM OF PHILIPPINE SENATE. The Court held that
there was a quorum in the session of the Philippine Senate (composed of
twenty-four Senators being in the United States.
RESOLUTION
In G. R. No. L-2821, Avelino vs. Cuenco, the Court by a vote of six justices
against four resolved to deny the petition.
Without prejudice to the promulgation of a more extended opinion, this is
now written briefly to explain the principal grounds for the denial.
The Court believes the following essential facts have been established:
In the session of the Senate of February 18, 1949, Senator Lorenzo M.
Taada requested that his right to speak on the floor on the next session day,
February 21, 1949, to formulate charges against the then Senate President Jose
Avelino be reserved. His request was approved.
On February 21, 1949, hours before the opening of the session Senator
Taada and Senator Prospero Sanidad filed with the Secretary of the Senate a
resolution enumerating charges against the then Senate President and ordering
the investigation thereof.
Although a sufficient number of senators to constitute a quorum were at
the Senate session hall at the appointed time (10:00 A. M.), and the petitioner
was already in his office, said petitioner delayed his appearance at the session
hall until about 11:35 A. M. When he finally ascended the rostrum, he did not
immediately open the session, but instead requested from the Secretary a copy
of the resolution submitted by Senators Taada and Sanidad and in the
presence of the public he read slowly and carefully said resolution, after which
he called and conferred with his colleagues Senators Francisco and Tirona.
At this juncture, some disorderly conduct broke out in the Senate gallery,
as if by pre-arrangement. At about this same time Senator Pablo Angeles
David, one of the petitioner's followers, was recognized by petitioner, and he
moved for adjournment of session, evidently, again, in pursuance of the abovementioned conspiracy to muzzle Senator Taada.
Senator Sanidad registered his opposition to the adjournment of the
session and this opposition was seconded by herein respondent who moved
that the motion of adjournment be submitted to a vote. Another commotion
ensued.
Senator David reiterated his motion for adjournment and herein
respondent also reiterated his opposition to the adjournment and again moved
that the motion of Senator David be submitted to a vote.
Suddenly, the petitioner banged the gavel and abandoning the Chair
hurriedly walked out of the session hall followed by Senators David, Tirona,
Francisco, Torres, Magalona and Clarin, while the rest of the senators remained.
Whereupon Senator Melecio Arranz, Senate President Pro-tempore, urged by
those senators present took the Chair and proceeded with the session.
Senator Cabili stood up, and asked that it be made of record it was so
made that the deliberate abandonment of the Chair by the petitioner, made
it incumbent upon Senate President Pro-tempore Arranz and the remaining
members of the Senate to continue the session in order not to paralyze the
functions of the Senate. Senate President Pro-tempore Arranz then suggested
The Court has examined all principal angles of the controversy and
believes that these are the crucial points:
a. Does the Court have jurisdiction over the subject-matter?
b. If it has, were resolutions Nos. 68 and 67 validly approved?
c. Should the petition be granted?
To the first question, the answer is in the negative, in view of the
separation of powers, the political nature of the controversy (Alejandrino vs.
Quezon, 46 Phil., 83; Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil., 192; Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78
Phil., 1) and the constitutional grant to the Senate of the power to elect its own
president, which power should not be interfered with, nor taken over, by the
judiciary. We refused to take cognizance of the Vera case even if the rights of
the electors of the suspended senators were allegedly affected without any
immediate remedy. A fortiori we should abstain in this case because the
selection of the presiding officer affects only the Senators themselves who are
at liberty at any time to choose their officers, change or reinstate them.
Anyway, if, as the petition must imply to be acceptable, the majority of the
Senators want petitioner to preside, his remedy lies in the Senate Session Hall
not in the Supreme Court.
The Court will not sally into the legitimate domain of the Senate on the
plea that our refusal to intercede might lead into a crisis, even a revolution. No
state of things has been proved that might change the temper of the Filipino
people as a peaceful and law-abiding citizens. And we should not allow
ourselves to be stampeded into a rash action inconsistent with the calm that
should characterize judicial deliberations.
The precedent of Werts vs. Rogers does not apply, because among other
reasons, the situation is not where two sets of senators have constituted
themselves into two senates actually functioning as such, (as in the said Werts
case), there being no question that there is presently one Philippine Senate
only. To their credit be it recorded that petitioner and his partisans have not
erected themselves into another Senate. The petitioner's claim is merely that
respondent has not been duly elected in his place in the same one Philippine
Senate.
It is furthermore believed that the recognition accorded by the Chief
Executive to the respondent makes it adviseable, more than ever, to adopt the
hands-off policy wisely enunciated by this Court in matters of similar nature.
The second question depends upon these sub-questions. (1) Was the
session of the so-called rump Senate a continuation of the session validly
assembled with twenty two Senators in the morning of February 21, 1949?; (2)
Was there a quorum in that session? Mr. Justice Montemayor and Mr. Justice
Reyes deem it useless, for the present to pass on these questions once it is
held, as they do, that the Court has no jurisdiction over the case. What follows
is the opinion of the other four on those subquestions.
Supposing that the Court has jurisdiction, there is unanimity in the view
that the session under Senator Arranz was a continuation of the morning
session and that a minority of ten senators may not, by leaving the Hall,
prevent the other twelve senators from passing a resolution that met with their
unanimous endorsement. The answer might be different had the resolution
been approved only by ten or less.
If the rump session was not a continuation of the morning session, was it
validly constituted? In other words, was there the majority required by the
Constitution for the transaction of the business of the Senate? Justices Paras,
Feria, Pablo and Bengzon say there was, firstly because the minutes say so,
secondly, because at the beginning of such session there were at least fourteen
senators including Senators Pendatun and Lopez, and thirdly because in view of
the absence from the country of Senator Tomas Confesor twelve senators
constitute a majority of the Senate of twenty three senators. When the
Constitution declares that a majority of "each House" shall constitute a
quorum, "the House" does not mean "all" the members. Even a majority of all
the members constitute "the House". (Missouri Pac. vs. Kansas, 63 Law ed. [U.
S.], p. 239). There is a difference between a majority of "all the members of the
House" and a majority of "the House", the latter requiring less number than the
first. Therefore an absolute majority (12) of all the members of the Senate less
one (23), constitutes constitutional majority of the Senate for the purpose of a
quorum. Mr. Justice Pablo believes furthermore that even if the twelve did not
constitute a quorum, they could have ordered the arrest of one, at least, of the
absent members; if one had been so arrested, there would be no doubt
Quorum then, and Senator Cuenco would have been elected just the same
inasmuch as there would be eleven for Cuenco, one against and one abstained.
In fine, all the four justices agree that the Court being confronted with the
practical situation that of the twenty three senators who may participate in the
Senate deliberations in the days immediately after this decision, twelve
senators will support Senator Cuenco and, at most, eleven will side with
Senator Avelino, it would be most injudicious to declare the latter as the rightful
President of the Senate, that office being essentially one that depends
exclusively upon the will of the majority of the senators, the rule of the Senate
about tenure of the President of that body being amendable at any time by that
majority. And at any session hereafter held with thirteen or more senators, in
order to avoid all controversy arising from the divergence of opinion here about
quorum and for the benefit of all concerned, the said twelve senators who
approved the resolutions herein involved could ratify all their acts and thereby
place them beyond the shadow of a doubt.
As already stated, the six justices hereinabove mentioned voted to
dismiss the petition. Without costs.
Separate Opinions
MORAN, C. J., concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I believe that this Court has jurisdiction over the case. 1 The present crisis
in the Senate is one that imperatively calls for the intervention of this Court.
Respondent Cuenco cannot invoke the doctrine of noninterference by the
courts with the Senate because the legal capacity of his group of twelve
senators to act as a senate is being challenged by petitioner on the ground of
lack of quorum (Attorney General ex rel. Werts vs. Rogers et al., 28 Atl. 726; 23
L. R. A., 354). If this group is found sufficient to constitute a quorum under the
Constitution, then its proceedings should be free from interference. But if it is
not possessed of a valid quorum, then its proceedings should be voided.
The issue as to the legal capacity of the Cuenco group to act as a senate
cannot be considered a political question the determination of which devolves
exclusively upon the Senate. That issue involves a constitutional question
which cannot be validly decided either by the Cuenco group or by the Avelino
group separately, for, if the Cuenco group has no quorum, the Avelino group
has decidedly less. And for obvious reasons, the two groups cannot act
together inasmuch as the members of the Avelino group, possibly to avoid
trouble, do not attend the sessions presided by the respondent believing as
they do that the latter was illegally elected. Upon the other hand, the Cuenco
group believing itself as possessing the constitutional quorum and not desiring
to make any semblance of admission to the contrary, does not find it
convenient to compel the attendance of any senator of the Avelino group. Then
the question arises who will decide the conflict between the two groups?
This anomalous situation will continue while the conflict remains unsettled, and
the conflict will remain unsettled while this Court refuses to intervene. In the
meantime, the validity of all the laws, resolutions and other measures which
may be passed by the Cuenco group will be open to doubt because of an
alleged lack of quorum in the body which authored them. This doubt may
extend, in diverse forms, to the House of Representatives and to the other
agencies of the government such as the Auditor General's Office. Thus, a
The situation now in this Court is this there are four members who
believe that there was no quorum in respondent's election as against four other
members who believe that there was such quorum. Two members declined to
render their opinion on the matter because of their refusal to assume
jurisdiction. And, one member is absent from the Philippines. Thus, the
question of whether or not respondent has been legally elected is, to say the
least, doubtful in this Court under the present conditions. This doubt, which
taints the validity of all the laws, resolutions and other measures that the
Cuenco group has passed and may pass in the future, can easily be dispelled
by them by convening a session wherein thirteen senators are present and by
reiterating therein all that has been previously done by them. This is a
suggestion coming from a humble citizen who is watching with a happy heart
the movements of this gallant group of prominent leaders campaigning for a
clean and honest government in this dear country of ours.
PERFECTO, J., dissenting:
In these quo warranto proceedings the question as to who among the
parties is entitled to hold the position of President of the Senate is in issue.
There is no question that up to Monday, February 21, 1949, at the time
the controversial incidents took place, petitioner Jose Avelino was the rightful
occupant of the position. The litigation has arisen because of the opposing
contentions as to petitioner's ouster and as to respondent's election as acting
President of the Senate, on February 21, 1949.
among the audience. The Senators who spoke could not be heard because the
spectators would either shout to drown their voices or would demand that
some other Senators should take the floor and be recognized by petitioner.
Pandemonium reigned and it was impossible for the Senate to proceed with its
deliberations free from undue pressure and without grave danger to its
integrity as a body and to the personal safety of the members thereof. Senator
Pablo Angeles David moved for adjournment until Thursday, February 24, 1949.
There being no objection, petitioner adjourned the session until February 24,
1949. Thereupon petitioner and nine other Senators, namely, Vicente J.
Francisco, Fernando Lopez, Emiliano Tria Tirona, Pablo Angeles David, Salipada
Pendatun, Ramon Torres, Enrique Magalona, Carlos Tan, and Olegario Clarin left
the session hall. Senator Melecio Arranz, President Pro- Tempore of the Senate,
went up the rostrum and, assuming the presidency of the chamber, convened
the remaining twelve Senators into a rump session, in which a resolution was
passed declaring vacant the position of the President of the Senate and
electing respondent as President of the Senate. Thereupon respondent
pretended to assume the office of President of the Senate and continues to
pretend to assume said office.
Petitioner alleges five grounds to claim that respondent is usurping or
illegally exercising the office of the President of the Senate: 1. Petitioner had
adjourned the session of the Senate, the adjournment having been properly
moved and, without objection, favorably acted upon; 2. Petitioner had full
power to adjourn the session even without motion under Chapter II, Section 8,
paragraph (e) of the Rules of the Senate; 3. The ordinary daily session having
been adjourned, no other session could be called in the Senate on the same
day; 4. The President Pro-tempore had no authority to assume the presidency
except in the cases specified in Chapter I, section 4 of the Rules of the Senate,
and none of the conditions therein mentioned obtained at the time in question;
and 5. The twelve Senators that convened in the rump session did not
constitute a quorum to do business under the Constitution and the rules of the
Senate, being less than one-half plus one of the twenty four members of the
Senate.
Respondent's version of the events as follows:
"(a) Since Friday, February 18, 1949, when Senator Lorenzo M. Taada
announced and reserved in open session of the Senate that on Monday,
February 21, 1949, he would make use of his one-hour privilege, it was known
that formal charges would be filed against the then Senate President, petitioner
in this case, on said date. Hours before the opening of the session on Monday,
February 21, 1949, Senators Lorenzo M. Taada and Prospero Sanidad
registered in the Office of the Secretary of the Senate a resolution in which
serious charges were preferred against the herein petitioner. A certified copy of
said resolution, marked as Exhibit "1" is hereto attached and made an integral
part hereof:
"(b) Although a sufficient number of senators to constitute a quorum were
at the Senate session hall at and before 10:00 A. M., scheduled time for the
session to begin, and in spite of the fact that the petitioner was already in his
office, said petitioner deliberately delayed his appearance at the session hall
until about 11:30 A. M.;
"(c) When finally the petitioner ascended the rostrum, he did not
immediately open the session, but instead requested from the Secretary a copy
of the resolution submitted by Senators Taada and Sanidad and in the
presence of the public the petitioner read slowly and carefully said resolution,
after which he called and conferred with his followers, Senators Francisco and
Tirona;
"(d) Shortly before 12:00 noon, due to the insistent requests of Senators
Sanidad and Cuenco that the session be opened, the petitioner finally called
the meeting to order;
"(e) Senator Sanidad, following a practice long established in the Senate,
moved that the roll call be dispensed with as it was evident that with the
presence of all the 22 senators who could discharge their functions, there could
be no question of a quorum, but Senator Tirona opposed said motion, evidently
in pursuance of a premeditated plan and conspiracy of petitioner and his
followers to make use of all sorts of dilatory tactics to prevent Senator Taada
from delivering his privilege speech on the charges filed against petitioner. The
roll call affirmatively showed the presence of the following 22 Senators; Vicente
J. Francisco, Fernando Lopez, Emiliano Tria Tirona, Pablo Angeles David,
Salipada Pendatun, Ramon Torres, Enrique Magalona, Carlos Tan, Olegario
Clarin, Melecio Arranz, M. Jesus Cuenco, Prospero Sanidad, Lorenzo M. Taada,
"(j) Senator David reiterated his motion for adjournment and herein
respondent also reiterated his opposition to the adjournment and again moved
that the motion of Senator David be submitted to a vote;
"(k) Suddenly, the petitioner abandoned the Chair and hurriedly walked
out of the session hall.
"(l) Without the session being adjourned, Senators David, Tirona,
Francisco, Torres, Magalona, and Clarin followed the petitioner out of the
session hall, while the rest of the senators, as afore-named in sub-paragraph
(e) hereof, remained to continue the session abandoned by petitioner,
whereupon Senator Melecio Arranz, as Senate Pro- tempore, took the Chair and
proceeded with the session.
"(m) Senator Cabili took the floor and delivered a speech, whereby he
asked that it be made of record as it was in fact so made that the
deliberate abandonment of the Chair by the petitioner, made it incumbent
upon Senate President Pro-Tempore Arranz and the remaining members of the
Senate to continue the session in order not to impede and paralyze the
functions of the Senate;
President Pro-Tempore Melecio Arranz, and since then, has been discharging
the duties and exercising the rights and prerogatives appertaining to said
office;
"(s) From the allegations of the petition, it clearly appears that the
petitioner had only nine senators in his favor and twelve, decidedly against
him, which fact negates the petitioner's assertion that there was no opposition
to the motion for adjournment submitted by Senator David;
"(t) From the beginning of the session of February 21, 1949, to the alleged
adjournment, it was evidently and manifestly the purpose of the petitioner to
deprive Senator Taada of his right to take the floor and to speak on the
charges filed against said petitioner; that said petitioner resorted to all means
to deprive the Senate of its right and prerogative to deliberate on Senate
Resolution No. 68, Exhibit "I", and that when the petitioner realized that a
majority of the Senators who were present in the said session was ready to
approve said resolution, the petitioner abandoned the session;
"(u) The minutes of the session held on February 21, 1949, a copy of
which is hereto attached and made an integral part hereof as Exhibit "3", show
that the petitioner illegally abandoned the Chair while the Senate was in
session and that the respondent has been duly elected Acting Senate President
in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution."
Respondent alleges further that Senator David's motion for adjournment
was objected to and was not submitted to a vote and, therefore, could not have
been carried; that it is not true that petitioner had the power to adjourn the
session even without motion; that the session presided over, first by petitioner
and then by respondent, was orderly, no Senator having been threatened or
intimidated by anybody, and after petitioner abandoned the session continued
peacefully until its adjournment at 4:40 P.M.; that there was only one session
held on said date; that petitioner's abandonment of the Chair in the face of an
impending ouster therefrom constituted a temporary incapacity entitling the
Senate President Pro-tempore to assume the Chair; that there was quorum as,
with the absence of Senator Tomas Confesor, who was in the U.S. and of
Senator Vicente Sotto, who was seriously ill and confined in the Lourdes
Hospital, the presence of at least twelve senators constitutes a quorum; that,
despite petitioner's claim that he adjourned the session to February 24, 1949,
convinced that he did not count with the majority of the Senators and not
wanting to be investigated by the special investigating committee regarding
the grave charges preferred against him, the petitioner deliberately did not
appear at the session hall on said date.
Three special defenses are advanced by respondent: (a) Lack of
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court; (b) No cause of action as there are only nine
Senators who had recognized petitioner's claim against twelve Senators who
have made patent their loss of confidence in him by voting in favor of his
ouster; and (c) The object of the action is to make the Supreme Court a mere
tool of a minority group of ten Senators to impose petitioner's will over and
above that of the twelve other members of the Senate, to entrench petitioner
in power.
when the two opposing parties claim that each one of them represents the will
of the Senate, and if the controversy should be allowed to remain unsettled, it
would be impossible to determine who is right and who is wrong, and who
really represents the Senate.
The questions raised in the petition, although political in nature, are
justiciable because they involve the enforcement of legal precepts, such as the
provisions of the Constitution and of the rules of the Senate. The power and
authority to decide such questions of law form part of the jurisdiction, not only
expressly conferred on the Supreme Court, but of which, by express prohibition
of the Constitution, it cannot be divested.
"Sec 2. The Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe
and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts, but may not
deprive the supreme court of its original jurisdiction over cases
affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls, nor of its
jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal,
certiorari, or writ of error, as the law or the rules of court may
provide, final; Judgments and decrees of inferior courts in
"(1) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any
treaty, law, ordinance or executive order or regulations is in question.
"(2) All cases
involving
present case, the proper court has the function, the province and the
responsibility to decide them. To shirk that responsibility is to commit a
dereliction of official duty.
Finally, it is alleged that for this Court to entertain the petition, is to
invade and encroach upon the powers, rights and prerogatives solely and
exclusively appertaining to the Legislative Department, of which the Senate is
a branch. The contention is erroneous. The controversy as to the legality of the
adjournment declared by petitioner, of petitioner's ouster, as a result of the
resolution declaring vacant the position of President of the Senate, of
respondent's election as acting President of the Senate, and as to whether or
not the twelve Senators who remained in the session hall could continue
holding session and if they constitute quorum, are all legal questions upon
which courts of justice have jurisdiction and the Supreme Court is the final
arbiter.
From the evidence, it appears that in the session of Friday, February 18,
1949, at the time the resolution of confidence in favor of petitioner, introduced
by Senator Lopez, was being put to vote, Senator Taada voted in the negative,
alleging as ground damaging facts, supported by several checks, highly
detrimental to the personal and official honesty of petitioner. At the same time,
Senator Taada announced his intention of filing in the next session, to be held
on Monday, February 21, 1949, formal charges against petitioner and of
delivering during the so-called privilege hour a speech in support of said
charges.
On said Monday morning, hours before the opening of the ordinary daily
session, Senators Taada and Sanidad registered with the Secretary of the
Senate a resolution for the appointment of a Committee of Three, composed of
Senators Cuenco, Angeles David, and Mabanag, with instructions to proceed
immediately to investigate the serious charges against petitioner embodied in
the document. Said resolution, marked as Exhibit 1 of respondent's answer, is
as follows:
RESOLUTION ORDERING THE INVESTIGATION OF CHARGES FILED
AGAINST THE SENATE PRESIDENT JOSE AVELINO.
WHEREAS, Senate President Jose Avelino, in a caucus of high
government officials of the Philippine Government and leaders of the
Liberal Party held at Malacaan Palace on January 15, 1949, delivered
a speech, wherein he advocated the protection, or, at least,
tolerance, of graft and corruption in the government, and placed the
interest of grafters and corrupt officials as supreme and above the
welfare of the people, a doctrine under which it is impossible for an
honest and clean government to exist;
WHEREAS, this speech of Senate President Jose Avelino was
given
wide
publicity
by
the
press,
especially
the
Chronicle
Quirino
on
the
surplus
property
scandal
and
the
immigration quota racket has lowered the prestige of the Liberal Party
in the eyes of the people, and is a desecration to the memory of the
late President Manuel Roxas. 'It is a crime against the Liberal Party',
Avelino said.
"Defining his attitude regarding rights and privileges of those
who are in power in the government, Avelino maintained that the
Liberal Party men are entitled to more considerations and should be
given allowance to use power and privileges. If they abuse their
power as all humans are prone to do, they will be given a certain
"Avelino
compared
all
political
parties
to
business
even
its
original
capital.
Then
he
mentioned
the
as
governor
of
the
Reconstruction
Finance
General
Manager
of
the
National
Tobacco
Check
No.
49706
of
the
Nederlandsch
Indische
23, 1946 by Chung Liu Ching Long & Co., Ltd., a Chinese concern, in
favor of "Cash", in the amount of P10,000.00, was indorsed by the
Senate President to his wife, Mrs. Enriqueta C. Avelino, who deposited
it in her Savings Account No. 63436 with the Philippine National Bank
on October 26, 1946;
to
explain
the
foregoing
checks,
he
refused
to
be
immediately
proceed
to
investigate
the
charges
mentioned
5 above, with full powers to compel the attendance of witnesses
Magalona, Callos Tan, Olegario Clarin, Melecio Arranz, Mariano Jesus Cuenco,
Prospero Sanidad, Lorenzo Taada, Vicente Madrigal, Geronima Pecson, Camilo
Osias, Carlos Garcia, Ramon Diokno, Jose Vera, Tomas Cabili, Alejo Manag and
Tose Avelino.
Senator Sanidad again moved that the reading of the minutes be
dispensed with, but the motion was again opposed by Senator Tirona whose
opposition was joined by Senator Angeles David, and the reading of the
minutes proceeded.
Senator Taada repeatedly took the floor to claim his right to deliver his
one-hour privilege speech in support of the charges against petitioner,
pursuant to the announcement he made in the session of February 18, 1949;
he did it before and after the roll call and the reading of the minutes. He was
ignored by the Chair and petitioner announced that he would order the arrest
of any Senator who would speak without having been previously recognized by
him. Senator Sanidad requested the Chair to recognize the right of Senator
Taada to speak, and every time he would make the request, Senator Tirona
would oppose him upon the ground that the requests were out of order.
Meanwhile, commotion and disorder took place in the Senate gallery.
Shouts were heard from individuals of the audience, where two fist fights took
place. The detonation of a gun shot was heard from outside. Senator Angeles
David, after being recognized by the Chair, moved for adjournment of the
session. The motion was objected by Senator Cuenco who, at the same time,
moved that the motion be submitted to vote. Petitioner, instead of submitting
to vote the motion to adjourn, banged the gavel and declared the session
adjourned until next Thursday, February 24, 1949, and, thereupon, left the
session hall followed by the nine Senators (Vicente J. Francisco, Fernando
Lopez, Emiliano Tria Tirona, Pablo Angeles David, Salipada Pendatun, Ramon
Torres, Enrique Magalona, Carlos Tan, and Olegario Clarin), supporting him.
Twelve Senators, respondent and his eleven supporters, remained in the
session hall. Senator Arranz, President Pro-tempore of the Senate, ascended
the rostrum, and called those Senators present to order. Senator Mabanag
raised the question of quorum and the President Pro-tempore ordered a roll
call, to which all the twelve Senators remaining in the session hall answered.
The President Pro-tempore declared the presence of quorum and those
present proceeded to continue transacting business. Senator Cabili took the
door and made it of record that the deliberate abandonment of the Chair by
petitioner made it incumbent upon the Senate President Pro-tempore and those
remaining members of the Senate to continue the session in order not to
impede and paralyze the functions of the Senate. Senator Arranz suggested
that respondent be designated to preside over the session and the suggestion
was carried unanimously and respondent took the Chair.
Senator Taada delivered his privileged speech, which took two hours on
the charge against petitioner contained in Resolution No. 68, Exhibit "1", and
moved for the immediate consideration and approval of said resolution, the
complete text of which was read. The motion was seconded by Senator
Sanidad, and the resolution was unanimously approved. Respondent yielded
DECLARING
VACANT
THE
POSITION
OF
THE
which authorizes the presiding officer to decree motu proprio said adjournment,
and the sound parliamentary practice and experience in this country and in the
United States of America, upon which ours is patterned, would not authorize
the existence of such a provision.
Petitioner alleges that he ordered the adjournment because the motion of
Senator Angeles David to said effect was properly made and met with no
objection. If this version of the facts is true, then it was right for petitioner to
declare the adjournment, because the absence of any objection, provided the
motion was properly made and the other Senators after having been properly
apprised of the motion, did not object to it, was an evidence of an implied
consent of all the members. The evidence, however, fails to support
petitioner's claim.
We are inclined to consider respondent's version to be more in
consonance with truth. We are of opinion that the motion to adjourn was
actually objected to. Senator Taada was bent on delivering a speech he had
ready on the charges embodied in a resolution fathered by himself and by
Senator Sanidad, which both filed early in the morning, long before the session
was opened. The formulation of said charges had been announced days before,
since the session of Friday, February 18, 1949, when he showed photostatic
copies of some checks as basis of a part of the charges to be filed. In said
Friday session respondent's group suffered defeat on the approval of the
resolution of confidence fathered by Senator Lopez. And it is understandable
that respondent's group of Senators, believing themselves to constiute the
majority, did not want to waste any time to give a showing of said majority and
must have decided to depose petitioner as soon as possible to wrest from him
the Senate leadership that upon democratic principles rightly belongs to them.
As a showing of eargerness to hurry up the unfolding events that would
give them the control of the Senate, Senator Sanidad moved to dispense with
the roll call and the reading of the minutes, and had been requesting that
Senator Taada be recognized to take the floor. Senator Taada himself made
attempts to deliver his speech.
Evidently, petitioner and his supporters decided to adopt a blocking
strategy to obstruct the processes that would give due course to the
investigation of the serious charges made in resolution No. 68, Exhibit 1, and
would effect petitioner's ouster as President of the Senate.
This strategy is evidenced by the belated appearance of petitioner and
his supporters at the session hall and petitioner's procrastination in opening
the session, by taking all his time in reading first the Taada and Sanidad
resolution, formulating charges against him, and conferring with Senators
Angeles David and Tirona and in not calling to order the members of the
Senate before Senators Cuenco and Sanidad began urging that the session be
opened.
Petitioner's allegation that, even without motion from any member, he
could adjourn the session under the rules of the Senate, is not well taken.
There is nothing in the rules of the Senate giving petitioner such authority. The
provisions quoted in the petition authorizes the Senate President to take
measures to stop disorder, but that power does not include the one to adjourn.
Nowhere and at no time has one-half ever been the majority. Majority
necessarily has to be more than one-half.
We have heard with interest the arguments advanced by respondent's
counsel, premised on the fact that the above constitutional provision does not
use the words "of the members" and the theory of the amicus curi that the
majority mentioned in the Constitution refers only to the majority of the
members who can be reached by coercive processes. There is, however,
nothing in said arguments that can validly change the natural interpretation of
the unmistakable wordings of the Constitution. "Majority of each House" can
mean only majority of the members of each House, and the number of said
members cannot be reduced upon any artificial or imaginary basis not
authorized by the context of the Constitution itself or by the sound processes of
reason.
For all the foregoing, we conclude that:
1. The legal and constitutional issues raised by the petitioner in this case,
notwithstanding their political nature and implications, are justiciable and
within the jurisdiction expressly conferred to the Supreme Court, which cannot
be divested from it by express prohibition of the Constitution. Should there be
analogous controversy between two claimants to the position of the President
of the Philippines, according to the Solicitor General, one of the attorneys for
respondent, the Supreme Court would have jurisdiction to decide the
controversy, because it would raise a constitutional question. Whether there
was a quorum or not in the meeting of twelve Senators in which respondent
was elected acting President of the Senate, is a question that calls for the
interpretation, application and enforcement of an express and specific provision
of the Constitution. Should the two absent Senators come and attend the
session and side with the petitioner's group, it is agreed that the Senate will be
kept at a stand still, because of the deadlock resulting from twelve Senators
voting against twelve other Senators, each group supporting petitioner's and
respondent's opposing claims to the position of President of the Senate.
Admitting that pressure of public opinion may not break the impasse, it has
been suggested from respondent's side that it may invite revolution. Between
the two alternatives, jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and revolution, there is
only one choice possible, and that is the one in consonance with the
Constitution, which is complete enough to offer orderly remedies for any wrong
committed within the framework of democracy it established in this country.
Should this Supreme Court refuse to exercise jurisdiction in this case, such
refusal can only be branded as judicial abdication, and such shirking of official
responsibility cannot expect acquittal in the judgment of history. The gravity of
the issues involved in this case, affecting not only the upper branch of
Congress, but also the presidential succession as provided byRepublic Act No.
181, is a challenge to our sense of duty which we should not fail to meet.
2. The adjournment decreed by petitioner of the Monday session, without
the authority of the Senate, was illegal and, therefore, null and void.
3. The rump session held by twelve Senators, the respondent and his
supporters, after petitioner and his nine supporters had walked out from the
session hall, had no constitutional quorum to transact business.
The members of the Senate were and are free to depose petitioner and to
elect another Senator as President of the Senate, and their freedom to make
such change is subject only to the dictates of their own conscience and to any
verdict that the people, through the electorate, may render at the polls, and to
the judgment of historians and posterity. But in making such changes of
leadership, the Senate and the Senators are bound to follow the orderly
processes set and outlined by the Constitution and by the rules adopted by the
Senate as authorized by the fundamental law. Any step beyond said legal
bounds may create a legal issue which, once submitted to the proper courts of
justice, the latter cannot simply wash their hands and ignore the issue upon the
pretext of lack of jurisdiction, adopting the indifferent attitude of a passerby
who does not care whether the lashing of the wind may cause a live wire to
ignite a neighboring house.
When a Senator or a number of Senators come to the Supreme Court,
complaining that the President of the Senate has adjourned or is adjourning the
daily sessions of the Senate over and above objections voiced from the floor
and without obtaining first the approval or consent of the majority, we cannot
close our eyes to the complaint or bury our heads in the sand in ostrich fashion.
Otherwise, we would be disregarding our sworn duty and, with our abstention
or inaction, we would be printing the stamp of our approval to the existence
and continuation of a unipersonal tyranny imposed upon the upper chamber of
Congress, a tyranny that may obstruct and defeat the functioning and
actuations of the Senate and, consequently, of the whole Congress, thus
depriving the country of the benefits of legislation.
the original text of the Constitution and in the amendment, had been ratified
by the sovereign will of the people.
When we required a majority of a legislative chamber to constitute
a quorum we did it for mighty reasons, such as that democracy is based on the
rule of the majority and, to allow a quorum of less than the majority of the
members, one-half of them for example, as in the present controversy, is to
allow the anomalous and anarchic existence of two independent bodies where
the Constitution provides for only one. If the twelve Senators of respondent's
group constitute quorum to transact official business, what will preclude the
twelve remaining Senators from constituting themselves into a quorum to
transact official business? This is not impossible, should Senator Sotto decide to
attend the session, even if carried in a stretcher, and Senator Confesor returns
from abroad and sides with petitioner's group. Then there will be, in effect, two
Senates and, according to respondent's theory the Supreme Court will have no
jurisdiction to decide the conflict, and no one can decide it except public
opinion or, in its failure, revolution. Such absurd situation and catastrophic
result should be avoided.
Lack of jurisdiction is sometimes a refuge behind which weak courts may
take shelter when afraid to displease the powerful.
Instead of disputing the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in this case,
everybody must congratulate himself because petitioner, instead of resorting
to any high-handed means to enforce his right to continue holding the position
of President of the Senate, has come to us for proper redress by the orderly
processes of judicial settlement. Notwithstanding the fact that three years ago,
he impugned the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and won his case on that
ground the injustice then committed against the suspended Senators Vera,
Diokno and Romero now being more generally recognized petitioner came to
this Court to submit his case to our jurisdiction.
The action taken by petitioner in filing his complaint with this Supreme
Court is premised on this sharing the conviction that said Tribunal is the last
bulwark of the rights and liberties of the people, the final arbiter on all
constitutional conflicts, and the ultimate redoubt of the majesty of the law. That
conviction and faith should not be betrayed, but rather strengthened, and more
imperatively nowadays when the majesty of the law, the basic tenets of the
Constitution, the principles of humanity springing from the golden rule, which is
the law of laws, are being the subject of bold onslaughts from many elements
of society, bent on taking justice in their own hands or on imposing their will
through fraud or violence. The malady is widespread enough to imperatively
and urgently demand a more complete respect and faith in the effectiveness of
our system of administration of justice.
For the Supreme Court to renounce its jurisdiction in this case is to
disappoint the believers in a philosophy and social order based on
constitutional processes and on legal juridical settlement of all conflicts that
may beset a democracy. It has been said in the hearing of this case that for this
Court to refuse cognizance of it may not have other alternative, if the pressure
of public opinion may fail and by experience we know that it had suffered
many failures than revolution. This emphasizes the immeasurable
To bolster the stand against our assumption of jurisdiction in this case the
theory has been advanced that, the President of the Philippines having
recognized respondent as a duly elected acting President of the Senate, that
recognition is final and should bind this Court. The theory sprouts from the
same ideology under which a former king of England tried to order Lord Coke
how the latter should dispose of a pending litigation. Our answer is to
paraphrase the great English judge by saying that nothing should guide us
except what in conscience we believe is becoming of our official functions,
disregarding completely what the President of the Philippines may say or feel
about it.
As a matter of fact, two pretenders may dispute the office. As in the
present case, Congress may split into two groups after a presidential election
and each group may proclaim a different candidate as the duly elected
President of the Philippines. Because of a mistaken ideas to the scope of the
principle of separation of powers, if the case is brought to us for decision, shall
we, as Pontious Pilate, wash our hands and let the people bleed and be
crucified in the Calvary of revolution?
There is absolutely no merit in invoking the unfortunate decision in the
case of Vera vs. Avelino, (77 Phil., 192). No one now would regret more that
such a decision had been rendered than petitioner himself, the very one who
won it upon the pusillanimous judicial theory of lack of jurisdiction. The more
said decision is forgotten, the better, it being one of the blemishes without
which the scutcheon of the post-liberation Supreme Court would be spotless.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 83767. October 27, 1988.]
FIRDAUSI SMAIL ABBAS, HOMOBONO A. ADAZA, ALEJANDRO
D.
ALMENDRAS,
ABUL
KAHYR
D.
ALONTO,
JUAN
PONCE
ROMEO
G.
JALOSJOS,
EVA
R.
ESTRADA-KALAW,
U.
MONTEMAYOR,
BLAS
F.
OPLE,
RAFAEL
P.
PALMARES,
TEVES,
ARTURO
M.
TOLENTINO,
and
FERNANDO
SENATE
R.
ELECTORAL
TRIBUNAL, respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL; PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO ITS
RULES (SEC. 24), NOT FEASIBLE. The proposed amendment to the Tribunal's
Rules (Section 24) requiring the concurrence of five (5) members for the
adoption of resolutions of whatever nature is a proviso that where more than
four (4) members are disqualified, the remaining members shall constitute a
quorum, if not less than three (3) including one (1) Justice, and may adopt
resolutions by majority vote with no abstentions. Obviously tailored to fit the
situation created by the petition for disqualification, this would, in the context of
that situation, leave the resolution of the contest to the only three Members who
would remain, all Justices of this Court, whose disqualification is not sought. We do
not agree with petitioners' thesis that the suggested device is neither unfeasible
nor repugnant to the Constitution. We opine that in fact the most fundamental
objection to such proposal lies in the plain terms and intent of the Constitution
itself which, in its Article VI, Section 17, creates the Senate Electoral Tribunal,
ordains its composition and defines its jurisdiction and powers.
4. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION; CERTIORARI DOES NOT LIE; TRIBUNAL
DID NOT ACT WITH ABUSE OF DISCRETION. The charge that the respondent
Tribunal gravely abused its discretion in its disposition of the incidents referred to
must therefore fail. In the circumstances, it acted well within law and principle in
dismissing the petition for disqualification or inhibition filed by herein petitioners.
FELICIANO, J., Concurring:
REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION; CERTIORARI NOT THE PROPER REMEDY.
Should any three (3) Senator-Members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal voluntarily
inhibit or disqualify themselves from participating in the proceedings in SET Case
No. 002-87, a Tribunal would result that would be balanced between the three (3)
Justice-Members and the three (3) Senator-Members and still constitute more than
a bare quorum. In such a Tribunal, both the considerations of public policy and fair
play raised by petitioners and the constitutional intent above noted concerning
the mixed "judicial" and "legislative" composition of the Electoral Tribunals would
appear to be substantially met and served. This denouement, however, must be
voluntarily reached and not compelled by certiorari.
RESOLUTION
GANCAYCO, J p:
This is a Special Civil Action for certiorari to nullify and set aside the Resolutions of
the Senate Electoral Tribunal dated February 12, 1988 and May 27, 1988, denying,
inhibition. Memoranda on the subject were also filed and oral arguments were
heard by the respondent Tribunal, with the latter afterwards issuing the
Resolutions now complained of. Cdpr
Senator Juan Ponce Enrile in the meantime had voluntarily inhibited himself from
participating in the hearings and deliberations of the respondent Tribunal in both
SET Case No. 002-87 and SET Case No. 001-87, the latter being another contest
filed by Augusto S. Sanchez against him and Senator Santanina T. Rasul as
alternative respondents, citing his personal involvement as a party in the two
cases.
The petitioners, in essence, argue that considerations of public policy and the
norms of fair play and due process imperatively require the mass disqualification
sought and that the doctrine of necessity which they perceive to be the
foundation of the questioned Resolutions does not rule out a solution both
practicable and constitutionally unobjectionable, namely; the amendment of the
respondent Tribunal's Rules of procedure so as to permit the contest being
decided by only three Members of the Tribunal.
The proposed amendment to the Tribunal's Rules (Section 24) requiring the
concurrence of five (5) members for the adoption of resolutions of whatever
nature is a provisothat where more than four (4) members are disqualified, the
remaining members shall constitute a quorum, if not less than three (3) including
one (1) Justice, and may adopt resolutions by majority vote with no abstentions.
Obviously tailored to fit the situation created by the petition for disqualification,
this would, in the context of that situation, leave the resolution of the contest to
the only three Members who would remain, all Justices of this Court, whose
disqualification is not sought.
We do not agree with petitioners' thesis that the suggested device is neither
unfeasible nor repugnant to the Constitution. We opine that in fact the most
fundamental objection to such proposal lies in the plain terms and intent of
the Constitution itself which, in its Article VI, Section 17, creates the Senate
Electoral Tribunal, ordains its composition and defines its jurisdiction and powers.
"Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each
have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective
Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine
Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be
designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be
Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case
may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional
representation
from
the
political
parties
and
the
parties
or
in
the
same
process
of
decision
of
representative
or
Said intent is even more clearly signalled by the fact that the proportion of
Senators to Justices in the prescribed membership of the Senate Electoral Tribunal
is 2 to 1 an unmistakable indication that the "legislative component" cannot be
totally excluded from participation in the resolution of senatorial election contests,
without doing violence to the spirit and intent of the Constitution. prcd
Where, as here, a situation is created which precludes the substitution of any
Senator sitting in the Tribunal by any of his other colleagues in the Senate without
inviting the same objections to the substitute's competence, the proposed mass
disqualification, if sanctioned and ordered, would leave the Tribunal no alternative
but to abandon a duty that no other court or body can perform, but which it
cannot lawfully discharge if shorn of the participation of its entire membership of
Senators.
To our mind, this is the overriding consideration that the Tribunal be not
prevented from discharging a duty which it alone has the power to perform, the
The charge that the respondent Tribunal gravely abused its discretion in its
disposition of the incidents referred to must therefore fail. In the circumstances, it
acted well within law and principle in dismissing the petition for disqualification or
inhibition filed by herein petitioners. The instant petition for certiorari is
DISMISSED for lack of merit. prLL
SO ORDERED.
Fernan C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, GrioAquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr. and Paras, JJ., took no part.
||| (Firdausi Smail Abbas v. Senate Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 83767 (Resolution),
[October 27, 1988], 248 PHIL 879-886)
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 84297. December 8, 1988.]
CARMELO F. LAZATIN, petitioner, vs. THE HOUSE ELECTORAL
TRIBUNAL and LORENZO G. TIMBOL, respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; ELECTION CONTEST; JURISDICTION OF THE COMELEC
AND THE ELECTORAL TRIBUNALS. That Sec. 250 of the Omnibus Election Code,
as far as contests regarding the election, returns and qualifications of Members of
the Batasang Pambansa is concerned, had ceased to be effective under the 1987
Constitution is readily apparent. First, the Batasang Pambansa has already been
abolished and the legislative power is now vested in a bicameral Congress.
Second, the Constitution vests exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relating to
the election, returns and qualifications of the Members of the Senate and the
House of Representatives in the respective Electoral Tribunals [Art. VI, Sec. 17].
The exclusive original jurisdiction of the COMELEC is limited by constitutional fiat
to election contests pertaining to elective regional, provincial and city offices and
its appellate jurisdiction to those involving municipal and barangay offices [Art. IXC, Sec. 2(2)].
2. ID.; ID.; HOUSE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL; POWERS. The power of the HRET, as
the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
the Members of the House of Representatives, to promulgate rules and
regulations relative to matters within its jurisdiction, including the period for filing
election protests before it, is beyond dispute. Its rule-making power necessarily
flows from the general power granted it by the Constitution.
3. ID.; ID.; HISTORICAL BACKGROUND REGARDING THE GRANT OF POWER TO A
BODY TO JUDGE ELECTION PROTESTS. A short review of our constitutional
history reveals that, except under the 1973 Constitution, the power to judge all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the
legislative branch has been exclusively granted either to the legislative body itself
or to an independent, impartial and non-partisan body attached to the legislature.
Except under the 1973 Constitution, the power granted is that of being
the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
the members of the legislative body. The 1935 and 1987 Constitutions, which
separate and distinctly apportion the powers of the three branches of
government, lodge the power to judge contests relating to the election, returns
and qualifications of members of the legislature in an independent, impartial and
non-partisan body attached to the legislature and specially created for that
singular purpose (i.e., the Electoral Commission and the Electoral Tribunals) [see
Suanes v. Chief Accountant of the Senate, 81 Phil. 818]. It was only under
the 1973 Constitution where the delineation between the powers of the Executive
and the Legislature was blurred by constitutional experimentation that the
only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court
interfere with the HRET's judgment.
DECISION
CORTES, J p:
Petitioner and private respondent were among the candidates for Representative
of the first district of Pampanga during the elections of May 11, 1987. During the
canvassing of the votes, private respondent objected to the inclusion of certain
election returns. But since the Municipal Board of Canvassers did not rule on his
objections, he brought his case to the Commission on Elections. On May 19, 1987,
the COMELEC ordered the Provincial Board of Canvassers to suspend the
proclamation of the winning candidate for the first district of Pampanga. However,
on May 26, 1987, the COMELEC ordered the Provincial Board of Canvassers to
proceed with the canvassing of votes and to proclaim the winner. On May 27,
1987, petitioner was proclaimed as Congressman-elect. Private respondent thus
filed in the COMELEC a petition to declare petitioner's proclamation void ab
initio.Later, private respondent also filed a petition to prohibit petitioner from
assuming office. The COMELEC failed to act on the second petition so petitioner
was able to assume office on June 30, 1987. On September 15, 1987, the
COMELEC declared petitioner's proclamation void ab initio. Petitioner challenged
the COMELEC resolution before this Court in a petition entitled "Carmelo F. Lazatin
v. The Commission on Elections, Francisco R. Buan, Jr. and Lorenzo G. Timbol,"
docketed as G.R. No. 80007. In a decision promulgated on January 25, 1988, the
Court set aside the COMELEC's revocation of petitioner's proclamation. On
February 8, 1988, private respondent filed in the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as "HRET") an election protest, docketed
as Case No. 46. LLjur
Petitioner moved to dismiss private respondent's protest on the ground that it had
been filed late, citing Sec. 250 of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881).
However, the HRET ruled that the protest had been filed on time in accordance
with Sec. 9 of the HRET Rules. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was also
denied. Hence, petitioner has come to this Court, challenging the jurisdiction of
the HRET over the protest filed by private respondent.
A. The Main Case
This special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or restraining order seeks the annulment
and setting aside of (1) the resolution of the HRET, dated May 2, 1988, in Case No.
46, holding that the protest filed by private respondent had been filed on time,
and (2) its July 29, 1988 resolution denying the motion for reconsideration.
Without giving due course to the petition, the Court required the respondents to
comment on the petition. The Solicitor General filed a comment in behalf of the
HRET while the private respondent filed his comment with a motion to admit
counter/cross petition and the petitioner filed his consolidated reply. Thereafter,
the Court resolved to give due course to the petition, taking the comments filed
as the answers to the petition, and considered the case submitted for decision.
To support his contention that private respondent's protest had been filed out of
time and, therefore, the HRET did not acquire jurisdiction over it, petitioner relies
on Sec. 250 of the Omnibus Election Code, which provides:
Sec.
250. Election
contests
for
Batasang
Pambansa,
regional,
28, 1987 and the period was suspended and began to run again on January 28,
1988 when private respondent was served with a copy of the decision of the Court
in G.R. No. 80007; that private respondent therefore only had nine (9) days left or
until February 6, 1988 within which to file his protest; but that private respondent
filed his protest with the HRET only on February 8, 1988.
On the other hand, in finding that the protest was filed on time, the HRET relied
on Sec. 9 of its Rules, to wit:
Election contests arising from the 1987 Congressional elections shall
be filed with the Office of the Secretary of the Tribunal or mailed at
the post office as registered matter addressed to the Secretary of the
Tribunal, together with twelve (12) legible copies thereof plus one (1)
copy for each protestee, within fifteen (15) days from the effectivity
of these Rules on November 22, 1987 where the proclamation has
been made prior to the effectivity of these Rules, otherwise, the
same may be filed within fifteen (15) days from the date of the
proclamation. Election contests arising from the 1987 Congressional
elections filed with the Secretary of the House of Representatives and
transmitted by him to the Chairman of the Tribunal shall be deemed
filed with the Tribunal as of the date of effectivity of these Rules,
subject to payment of filing fees as prescribed in Section 15 hereof.
[Emphasis supplied.]
Thus, ruled the HRET:
On the basis of the foregoing Rule, the protest should have been filed
within fifteen (15) days from November 22, 1987, or not later than
December 7, 1987. However, on September 15, 1987, the COMELEC,
acting upon a petition filed by the Protestant (private respondent
herein), promulgated a Resolution declaring the proclamation void ab
initio. This resolution had the effect of nullifying the proclamation,
and such proclamation was not reinstated until Protestant received a
copy of the Supreme Court's decision annulling the COMELEC
Resolution on January 28, 1988. For all intents and purposes,
therefore,
Protestee's
(petitioner
herein)
proclamation
became
effective only on January 28, 1988, and the fifteen-day period for
Protestant to file his protest must be reckoned from that date.
Protestant filed his protest on February 8, 1988, or eleven (11) days
after January 28. The protest, therefore, was filed well within the
reglementary period provided by the Rules of this Tribunal. (Rollo, p.
129.].
The Court is of the view that the protest had been filed on time and, hence, the
HRET acquired jurisdiction over it.
Petitioner's reliance on Sec. 250 of the Omnibus Election Code is misplaced. Sec.
250 is couched in unambiguous terms and needs no interpretation. It applies only
to petitions filed before the COMELEC contesting the election of any Member of
the Batasang Pambansa, or any regional, provincial or city official. Furthermore,
Sec. 250 should be read together with Sec. 249 of the same code which provides
that the COMELEC "shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections,
returns and qualifications of all Members of the Batasang Pambansa, elective
regional, provincial and city officials," reiterating Art. XII-C, Sec. 2(2) of the 1973
Constitution. It must be emphasized that under the1973 Constitution there was no
provision for an Electoral Tribunal, the jurisdiction over election contests involving
Members of the Batasang Pambansa having been vested in the COMELEC. cdrep
That Sec. 250 of the Omnibus Election Code, as far as contests regarding the
election, returns and qualifications of Members of the Batasang Pambansa is
concerned, had ceased to be effective under the 1987 Constitution is readily
apparent. First, the Batasang Pambansa has already been abolished and the
legislative
power
is
now
vested
in
bicameral
Congress.
Second, the
Constitution vests exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of the Members of the Senate and the House of
Representatives in the respective Electoral Tribunals [Art. VI, Sec. 17]. The
exclusive original jurisdiction of the COMELEC is limited by constitutional fiat to
election contests pertaining to elective regional, provincial and city offices and its
appellate jurisdiction to those involving municipal and barangay offices [Art. IX-C,
Sec. 2(2)].
Petitioner makes much of the fact that the provisions of the Omnibus Election
Code on the conduct of the election were generally made applicable to the
congressional elections of May 11, 1987. It must be emphasized, however, that
such does not necessarily imply the application of all the provisions of said code
to each and every aspect of that particular electoral exercise, as petitioner
contends. On the contrary, the Omnibus Election Code was only one of several
laws governing said elections. **
An
examination
of
the Omnibus
Election
Code and
the
executive
orders
specifically applicable to the May 11, 1987 congressional elections reveals that
there is no provision for the period within which to file election protests in the
respective Electoral Tribunals. Thus, the question may well be asked whether the
rules governing the exercise of the Tribunals' constitutional functions may be
prescribed by statute.
The Court is of the considered view that it may not.
The power of the HRET, as the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of the Members of the House of Representatives, to
promulgate rules and regulations relative to matters within its jurisdiction,
including the period for filing election protests before it, is beyond dispute. Its
rule-making power necessarily flows from the general power granted it by the
Constitution. This is the import of the ruling in the landmark case of Angara v.
Electoral Commission [63 Phil. 139 (1936)], where the Court, speaking through
Justice Laurel, declared in no uncertain terms:
. . . [T]he creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex
necesitate rei the power regulative in character to limit the time
within which protests intrusted to its cognizance should be filed. It is
a settled rule of construction that where a general power is conferred
or duly enjoined, every particular power necessary for the exercise of
Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each
have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective
Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine
Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be
designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be
Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case
may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional
representation
from
the
political
parties
and
the
parties
or
Commission [Lachica v. Yap, G.R. No. L-25379, September 25, 1968, 25 SCRA
140]. The same may be said with regard to the jurisdiction of the Electoral
Tribunals under the 1987 Constitution.
The 1935 and 1987 Constitutions, which separate and distinctly apportion the
powers of the three branches of government, lodge the power to judge contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the legislature in
an independent, impartial and non-partisan body attached to the legislature and
specially created for that singular purpose (i.e., the Electoral Commission and the
Electoral Tribunals) [see Suanes v. Chief Accountant of the Senate, supra]. It was
only under the 1973 Constitution where the delineation between the powers of
the Executive and the Legislature was blurred by constitutional experimentation
that the jurisdiction over election contests involving members of the Legislature
was vested in the COMELEC, an agency with general jurisdiction over the conduct
of elections for all elective national and local officials.
That the framers of the 1987 Constitution intended to restore fully to the Electoral
Tribunals exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relating to the election, returns
and qualifications of its Members, consonant with the return to the separation of
powers of the three branches of government under the presidential system, is too
evident to escape attention. The new Constitution has substantially retained the
COMELEC's purely administrative powers, namely, the exclusive authority to
enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an
election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall; to decide, except those
involving the right to vote, all questions affecting elections; to deputize law
enforcement agencies and government instrumentalities for election purposes; to
register political parties and accredit citizens' arms; to file in court petitions for
inclusion and exclusion of voters and prosecute, where appropriate, violations of
election laws [Art. IX(C), Sec. 2(1), (3)-(6)], as well as its rule-making power. In
this sense, and with regard to these areas of election law, the provisions of
the Omnibus Election Code are fully applicable, except where specific legislation
provides otherwise. But the same cannot be said with regard to the jurisdiction of
the COMELEC to hear and decide election contests. This has been trimmed down
under the 1987 Constitution. Whereas the 1973 Constitution vested the COMELEC
with jurisdiction to be the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections,
returns and qualifications of all Members of the Batasang Pambansa and elective
provincial and city officials [Art. XII(C), Sec. 2(2)], the 1987 Constitution, while
lodging in the COMELEC exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to
the elections, returns and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial and city
officials and appellate jurisdiction over contests relating to the election of
municipal and barangay officials [Art. IX(C), Sec. 2(2)], expressly makes the
Electoral Tribunals of the Senate and the House of Representatives the sole judge
of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of their
respective Members [Art. VI, Sec. 17]. LLpr
The inescapable conclusion from the foregoing is that it is well within the power of
the HRET to prescribe the period within which protests may be filed before it. This
except, in any event, upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use
of the power as will constitute a denial of due process of law." Under the 1987
Constitution, the scope of the Court's authority is made explicit. The power
granted to the Court includes the duty "to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government" [Art. VIII, Sec. 1]. Thus,
only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court
interfere with the HRET's judgment. In the instant case, there is no occasion for
the exercise of the Court's corrective power, since no grave abuse of discretion
that would amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the
issuance of the writs prayed for has been clearly shown. llcd
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby DISMISSED. Private respondent's
Counter/Cross Petition is likewise DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Gutierrez,
Jr.,
Paras,
Gancayco,
Padilla,
Bidin,
Grio-Aquino,
Sarmiento, J., took no part; private respondent having been associated with me in
the practice of law.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 86647. February 5, 1990.]
REP.
VIRGILIO
P.
REPRESENTATIVES
TRIBUNAL
AND
HOUSE
ROMEO
OF
L.
SANTOS, respondents.
DECISION
MEDIALDEA, J p:
This is a petition for certiorari with prayer for a temporary restraining order
assailing the resolutions of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(HRET): 1) dated September 19, 1988 granting herein private respondent's Urgent
Motion to Recall and Disregard Withdrawal of Protest, and 2) dated January 26,
1989, denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.
Petitioner Virgilio Robles and private respondent Romeo Santos were candidates
for the position of Congressman of the 1st district of Caloocan City in the last May
11, 1987 congressional elections. Petitioner Robles was proclaimed the winner on
December 23, 1987.
On January 5, 1988, Santos filed an election protest with respondent HRET. He
alleged, among others, that the elections in the 1st District of Caloocan City held
last May 11, 1987 were characterized by the commission of electoral frauds and
irregularities in various forms, on the day of elections, during the counting of
votes and during the canvassing of the election returns. He likewise prayed for the
recounting of the genuine ballots in all the 320 contested precincts (pp. 1620, Rollo).
On January 14, 1988, petitioner filed his Answer (pp. 22-26, Rollo) to the protest.
He alleged as among his affirmative defenses, the lack of residence of protestant
and the late filing of his protest. cdrep
On
August
15,
1988,
respondent
HRET
issued
an
order
setting
the
'Motion
to
Withdraw
Protest,'
has
been
withdrawn
by
February 16, 1989. On February 22, 1989, petitioner filed a Supplemental Petition
(p. 129, Rollo), this time questioning respondent HRET's February 16, 1989
resolution denying petitioner's motion to defer or reset revision until this Court
has finally disposed of the instant petition and declaring that a partial
determination pursuant to Section 18 of the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal Rules was had with private respondent Santos making a recovery of 267
votes (see Annex "C" of Supplemental Petition, p. 138, Rollo).
It is petitioner's main contention in this petition that when private respondent
Santos filed the Motion to Withdraw Protest on Unrevised Precincts and Motion to
Set Case for Hearing dated September 12, 1988, respondent HRET lost its
jurisdiction over the case, hence, when respondent HRET subsequently ordered
the revision of the unrevised protested ballots, notwithstanding the withdrawal of
the protest, it acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.
We do not agree with petitioner.
It is noted that upon Santos' filing of his Motion to Withdraw Protest on Unrevised
Precincts on September 12, 1988, no action thereon was taken by respondent
HRET. Contrary to petitioner's claim that the motion to withdraw was favorably
acted upon, the records show that it was only on September 19, 1988 when
respondent HRET resolved said motion together with two other motions. The
questioned resolution of September 19, 1988 resolved three (3) motions, namely:
a) Protestee's Urgent Motion to Suspend Revision dated September 8, 1988; b)
Protestant's Motion to Withdraw Protest on Unrevised Precincts and Motion to Set
Case for Hearing dated September 12, 1988; and c) Protestant's 'Urgent Motion to
Recall and Disregard Withdrawal of Protest,' dated September 14, 1988. The
resolution resolved the three (3) motions as follows:
"xxx xxx xxx
"WHEREFORE, Protestee's 'Urgent Motion to Suspend Revision' and
Protestant's 'Motion to Withdraw Protest' are NOTED. The 'Urgent
Motion to Recall and Disregard Withdrawal of Protest' is GRANTED.
xxx xxx xxx"
The mere filing of the motion to withdraw protest on the remaining uncontested
precincts, without any action on the part of respondent tribunal, does not by itself
divest the tribunal of its jurisdiction over the case. Jurisdiction, once acquired, is
not lost upon the instance of the parties but continues until the case is terminated
(Jimenez v. Nazareno, G.R. No. L-37933, April 15, 1988, 160 SCRA 1).
We agree with respondent House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal when it
held:
"We cannot agree with Protestee's contention that Protestant's
'Motion to Withdraw Protest on Unrevised Precincts' effectively with
drew the precincts referred to therein from the protest even before
the Tribunal has acted thereon. Certainly, the Tribunal retains the
authority to grant or deny the Motion, and the withdrawal becomes
effective only when the Motion is granted. To hold otherwise would
permit a party to deprive the Tribunal of jurisdiction already acquired.
"We hold therefore that this Tribunal retains the power and the
authority to grant or deny Protestant's Motion to Withdraw, if only to
insure that the Tribunal retains sufficient authority to see to it that the
will of the electorate is ascertained.
"Since Protestant's 'Motion to Withdraw Protest on the Unrevised
Precincts' had not been acted upon by this Tribunal before it was
recalled by the Protestant, it did not have the effect of removing the
precincts covered thereby from the protest. If these precincts were
not withdrawn from the protest, then the granting of Protestant's
'Urgent Motion to Recall and Disregard Withdrawal of Protest' did not
amount to allowing the refiling of protest beyond the reglementary
period."
Where the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter, its orders upon all
questions pertaining to the cause are orders within its jurisdiction, and however
erroneous they may be, they cannot be corrected by certiorari (Santos v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 56614, July 28, 1987, 152 SCRA 378; Paramount Insurance
Corp. v. Luna, G.R. No. 61404, March 16, 1987, 148 SCRA 564). This rule more
appropriately applies to respondent HRET whose independence as a constitutional
body has time and again been upheld by Us in many cases. As explained in the
case
of Lazatin
v.
The
House of
Representatives
Electoral Tribunal
and
jurisdiction,
or
with
grave
abuse
of
discretion
or,
view of the fact that the revision was resumed on February 20, 1989 and was
terminated on March 2, 1989 (Private Respondent's Memorandum, p. 208, Rollo).
This fact was not rebutted by petitioner.
The allegation of petitioner that he was deprived of due process when respondent
tribunal rendered a partial determination pursuant to Section 18 of the HRET rules
and found that Santos made a recovery of 267 votes after the revision of the first
twenty-five per cent of the contested precincts has likewise, no basis. The partial
determination was arrived at only by a simple addition of the votes adjudicated to
each party in the revision of which both parties were properly represented. cdll
It would not be amiss to state at this point that "an election protest is impressed
with public interest in the sense that the public is interested in knowing what
happened in the elections" (Dimaporo v. Estipona, supra.), for this reason, private
interests must yield to what is for the common good.
ACCORDINGLY, finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal in issuing the assailed resolutions, the
instant petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa,
Paras,
Gancayco,
Padilla,
Bidin,
Sarmiento,
Cortes,
Grio-
159.Bondoc v Pineda
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 97710. September 26, 1991.]
Estelito P. Mendoza, Romulo C . Felixmera and Horacio S.J. Apostol for petitioner.
Nicanor S. Bautista for respondent Marciano M. Pineda.
Benedicto R. Palacol for respondent M.M. Palacol.
SYLLABUS
1. POLITICAL LAW; "POLITICAL QUESTION"; DEFINED. The accepted meaning of
"political question" is that "where the matter involved is left to a decision by the
people acting in their sovereign capacity or to the sole determination by either or
both the legislative or executive branch of the government, it is beyond judicial
cognizance. Thus it was that in suits where the party proceeded against was
either the President or Congress, or any of its branches for that matter, the courts
refused to act." (Aquino vs. Ponce Enrile, 59 SCRA 183, 196.)
2. ID.;
CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW;
SECTION
1,
ARTICLE
VIII
OF
THE
1987
Constitution
of
the
Philippines defines
judicial
power
as
both authority and duty of the courts "to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether
or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government."
3. ID.; ID.; HOUSE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL UNDER THE 1987 CONSTITUTION;
DISTINGUISHED FROM THAT UNDER THE 1935 CONSTITUTION. Section 17,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, provides: "Sec. 17. The Senate and the House
of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of their
respective members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members,
three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the
Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or House of
Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of
proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or
organizations registered under the party list system represented therein. The
senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman." Section 17 reechoes
Section 11, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution, except the provision on the
representation of the main political parties in the tribunal which is now based
on proportional representation
from
all
the
political
parties,
instead
of equal representation of three members from each of the first and second
largest political aggrupations in the Legislature.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; INDEPENDENT AND NON-PARTISAN. The use of the word "sole" in
both
Section
17
of
the 1987
Constitution and
Section
11
of
the 1935
and
to
supervise
and
control
them,
without
any
legislative
though not a power in the tripartite scheme of government, it is to all intents and
purposes, when acting within the limits of its authority, an independent organ;
while composed of a majority of members of the legislature it is a body separate
from
and
independent
of
the
legislature.
"The
Electoral
Commission,
contest between Pineda and Bondoc. To sanction such interference by the House
of Representatives in the work of the House Electoral Tribunal would reduce the
tribunal to a mere tool for the aggrandizement of the party in power. The
expulsion of Congressman Camasura from the House Electoral Tribunal by the
House of Representatives was not for a lawful and valid cause, but to unjustly
interfere with the tribunal's disposition of the Bondoc case and to deprive Bondoc
of the fruits of the Tribunal's decision in his favor, the action of the House of
Representatives is clearly violative of the constitutional mandate (Sec. 17, Art.
VI, 1987 Constitution).
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; "DISLOYALTY TO PARTY AND "BREACH OF PARTY DISCIPLINE" NOT
VALID GROUND FOR TERMINATION OF MEMBERSHIP THEREIN. As judges, the
members of the House Electoral Tribunal must be non-partisan. They must
discharge
their
functions
with
complete
detachment,
impartiality,
and
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; MEMBERS THEREIN ENJOY SECURITY OF TENURE; REMOVAL MUST
BE FOR A VALID CAUSE. The resolution of the House of Representatives
expelling Congressman Camasura violates his right to security of tenure. Members
of the HRET, as "sole judge" of congressional election contests, are entitled to
security of tenure just as members of the judiciary enjoy security of tenure under
our Constitution (Sec. 2, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution). Therefore, membership in
the House Electoral Tribunal may not be terminated except for a just cause, such
as, the expiration of the member's congressional term of office, his death,
permanent disability, resignation from the political party he represents in the
tribunal, formal affiliation with another political party, or removal for other valid
cause. A member may not be expelled by the House of Representatives for "party
disloyalty" short of proof that he has formally affiliated with another political
group. As the records of this case fail to show that Congressman Camasura has
become a registered member of another political party, his expulsion from the
LDP and from the HRET was not for a valid cause, hence, it violated his right to
security of tenure.
_______
DECISION
GRIO-AQUINO, J p:
This case involves a question of power. May the House of Representatives, at the
request of the dominant political party therein, change that party's representation
not be an obstacle to judicial inquiry, for the improvident exercise or the abuse
thereof may give rise to a justiciable controversy. Since "a constitutional grant of
authority is not usually unrestricted, limitations being provided for as to what may
be done and how it is to be accomplished, necessarily then, it becomes the
responsibility of the courts to ascertain whether the two coordinate branches have
adhered to the mandate of the fundamental law. The question thus posed is
judicial rather than political. The duty remains to assure that the supremacy of the
Constitution is upheld" (Aquino vs. Ponce Enrile, 59 SCRA 183, 196).
That duty is a part of the judicial power vested in the courts by an express grant
under Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines which
defines judicial power as both authority and duty of the courts "to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and
to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government."
The power and duty of the courts to nullify, in appropriate cases, the actions of
the executive and legislative branches of the Government, does not mean that
the courts are superior to the President and the Legislature. It does mean though
that the judiciary may not shirk "the irksome task" of inquiring into the
constitutionality and legality of legislative or executive action when a justiciable
controversy is brought before the courts by someone who has been aggrieved or
prejudiced by such action, as in this case. It is
"a plain exercise of the judicial power, that power vested in courts to
enable them to administer justice according to law. . . . It is simply a
necessary concomitant of the power to hear and dispose of a case or
controversy properly before the court, to the determination of which
must be brought the test and measure of the law." (Vera vs. Avelino,
77 Phil. 192, 203.)
In the local and congressional elections held on May 11, 1987, Marciano M. Pineda
of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) and Dr. Emigdio A. Bondoc of the
Nacionalista Party (NP) were rival candidates for the position of Representative for
the Fourth District of the province of Pampanga. Each received the following votes
in the canvass made by the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Pampanga:
Marciano M. Pineda
Emigdio A. Bondoc
Difference
31,700 votes
28,400 votes
3,300 votes
On May 19,1987, Pineda was proclaimed winner in the election. In due time,
Bondoc filed a protest (HRET Case No. 25) in the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal (HRET for short) which is composed of nine (9) members, three
of whom are Justices of the Supreme Court and the remaining six are members of
the House of Representatives chosen on the basis of proportional representation
from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the
party-list system represented therein (Sec. 17, Art. VI,1987 Constitution) as
follows:
AMEURFINA M. HERRERA
Associate Justice
Chairman
Supreme Court
ISAGANI A. CRUZ
Associate Justice
Supreme Court
Member
FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO
Associate Justice
Supreme Court
Member
HONORATO Y. AQUINO
Congressman
1st Dist., Benguet
LDP
Member
Member
Member
Member
JOSE E. CALINGASAN
Congressman
4th Dist., Batangas
LDP
Member
ANTONIO H. CERILLES
Congressman
2nd Dist., Zamboanga del Sur
(formerly GAD, now NP).
Member
After the revision of the ballots, the presentation of evidence, and submission of
memoranda, Bondoc's protest was submitted for decision in July, 1989.
By October 1990, a decision had been reached in which Bondoc won over Pineda
by a margin of twenty-three (23) votes. At that point, the LDP members in the
Tribunal insisted on a re appreciation and recount of the ballots cast in some
precincts, thereby delaying by at least four (4) months the finalization of the
decision in the case.
The
reexamination
and
re-appreciation
of
the
ballots
resulted
February 28, 1991 yet, the LDP Davao del Sur Chapter at Digos, Davao del Sur, by
Resolution No. 03-91, had already expelled him and Congressman Benjamin
Bautista from the LDP for having allegedly helped to organize the Partido Pilipino
of Eduardo "Danding" Cojuangco, and for allegedly having invited LDP members in
Davao del Sur to join said political party; and that as those acts are "not only
inimical, uncalled for, unethical and immoral, but also a complete betrayal to (sic)
the cause and objectives, and loyalty to LDP," in a meeting on March 12, 1991,
the LDP Executive Committee unanimously confirmed the expulsions. 3
At the same time, Congressman Cojuangco notified Speaker Ramon V. Mitra about
the ouster of the two congressmen from the LDP, and asked the House of
Representatives, through the Speaker, to take note of it "especially in matters
where party membership is a prerequisite." 4
At 9:45 in the morning of March 4, 1991, the Chairman of the Tribunal, Mme.
Justice Ameurfina M. Herrera, received the following letter dated March 13, 1991,
from the Office of the Secretary General of the House of Representatives,
informing the Tribunal that on the basis of the letter from the LDP, the House of
Representatives, during its plenary session on March 13, 1991, decided to
withdraw the nomination and rescind the election of Congressman Camasura, Jr.
to the House of Electoral Tribunal. The letter reads as follows:
"13 March 1991
"Honorable Justice Ameurfina
Melencio-Herrera
Chairman
House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal
Constitution Hills Quezon City
"Dear Honorable Justice Melencio-Herrera:
"I have the honor to notify the House of Electoral Tribunal of the
decision of the House of Representatives during its plenary session on
13 March 1991, to withdraw the nomination and to rescind the
election of the Honorable Juanito G. Camasura, Jr. to the House
Electoral Tribunal on the basis of an LDP communication which is selfexplanatory and copies of which are hereto attached.
"Thank you.
"For the Secretary-General
"(SGD.) Josefina D. Azarcon
"Officer-in-charge
Operations Department"
(p. 10, Rollo.)
Justices Herrera, Cruz, and Feliciano promptly apprised the Chief Justice and
Associate Justices of the Supreme Court in writing, of this "distressing
development" and asked to be relieved from their assignments in the HRET
because
"By the above action (of the House) the promulgation of the decision
of
the
Tribunal
in
the
electoral
protest
entitled "Bondoc
v.
Pineda" (HRET Case No. 25), previously scheduled for 14 March 1991,
is sought to be aborted (See the Consolidated Bank and Trust
Corporation v. Hon. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 73777-78,
promulgated 12 September 1990). Even if there were no legal
impediment to its promulgation, the decision which was reached on a
5 to 4 vote may now be confidently expected to be overturned on a
motion for reconsideration by the party-litigant which would have
been defeated.
"The decision in Bondoc v. Pineda was ready as early as October 1990
with a margin of 23 votes in favor of protestant Bondoc. Because
some members of the Tribunal requested re-appreciation of some
ballots, the finalization of the decision had to be deferred by at least 4
months.
With the re-appreciation completed, the decision, now with a margin
of 107 votes in favor of protestant Bondoc, and concurred in by
Justices Ameurfina A. Melencio-Herrera, Isagani A. Cruz and Florentino
P. Feliciano, and Congressmen Juanito G. Camasura and Antonio H.
Cerilles, is set for promulgation on 14 March 1991, with Congressmen
Honorato Y. Aquino, David A. Ponce de Leon, Simeon E. Garcia, Jr. and
Jose E. Calingasan, dissenting.
"In the alternative, the Senate Electoral Tribunal could perhaps sit as
the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the House of Representatives. Similarly,
the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal could sit as the sole
judge of all such contests involving members of the Senate. In this
way, there should be lesser chances of non-judicial elements playing
a decisive role in the resolution of election contests.
"We
suggest
that
there
should
also
be
provision
in the
scheduled
for
this
afternoon.
This
is
because,
without
Court,
being
of
the
opinion
that
this
development
Tribunal
further
Noted
that
Congressman
Cerilles
also
contemplation
ofthe
Constitution the
members-legislators,
thereof
should
be
considered
co-extensive
with
the
concern
over
the
intrusion
of
non-judicial
factors
in
the
The Solicitor General, as counsel for the Tribunal, argued in a similar vein; that the
inclusion of the HRET as a party respondent is erroneous because the petition
states no cause of action against the Tribunal. The petitioner does not question
any act or order of the HRET in violation of his rights. What he assails is the act of
the House of Representatives of withdrawing the nomination, and rescinding the
election, of Congressman Juanito Camasura as a member of the HRET. 13
Replying to the Solicitor General's Manifestation, the petitioner argued that while
the Tribunal indeed had nothing to do with the assailed decision of the House of
Representatives, it acknowledged that decision by cancelling the promulgation of
its decision in HRET Case No. 25 to his (Bondoc's) prejudice. 14 Hence, although
the Tribunal may not be an indispensable party, it is a necessary party to the suit,
to assure that complete relief is accorded to the petitioner for "in the ultimate, the
Tribunal would have to acknowledge, give recognition, and implement the
Supreme Court's decision as to whether the relief of respondent Congressman
Camasura from the Office of the Electoral Tribunal is valid." 15
In his reply to Congressman Palacol's Comment, the petitioner explained that
Congressman Palacol was impleaded as one of the respondents in this case
because after the House of Representatives had announced the termination of
Congressman Camasura's membership in the HRET, several newspapers of
general circulation reported that the House of Representatives would nominate
and elect Congressman Palacol to take Congressman Camasura's seat in the
Tribunal. 16
"Sec. 11. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall have an
Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating
to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective
Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine
Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be
designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be
Members of the Senate or of the House of Representatives, as the
case may be, who shall be chosen by each House, three upon
nomination of the party having the largest number of votes and three
of the party having the second largest number of votes therein. The
senior Justice in each Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman."
(1935 Constitution of the Philippines.).
Under the above provision, the Justices held the deciding votes, and it was
impossible for any political party to control the voting in the tribunal.
The 1973 Constitution did not provide for an electoral tribunal in the Batasang
Pambansa. LLpr
The use of the word "sole" in both Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution and Section
11 of the 1935 Constitution underscores the exclusive jurisdiction of the House
Electoral Tribunal as judge of contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives (Robles vs. House
of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 86647, February 5, 1990). The
tribunal was created to function as a nonpartisan court although two-thirds of its
members are politicians. It is a non-political body in a sea of politicians. What this
Court had earlier said about the Electoral Commission applies as well to the
electoral tribunals of the Senate and House of Representatives:
"The purpose of the constitutional convention creating the Electoral
Commission was to provide an independent and impartial tribunal for
the determination of contests to legislative office, devoid of partisan
consideration, and to transfer to that tribunal all the powers
previously exercised by the legislature in matters pertaining to
contested elections of its members.
"The power granted to the electoral Commission to judge contests
relating to the election and qualification of members of the National
Assembly is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had
remained in the legislature."
"The Electoral Tribunals of the Senate and the House were created
by the Constitution as special tribunals to be the sole judge of all
contests relating to election returns and qualifications of members of
the legislative houses, and, as such, are independent bodies which
must be permitted to select their own employees, and to supervise
and control them, without any legislative interference." (Suanes vs.
Chief Accountant of the Senate, 81 Phil. 818.)
To be able to exercise exclusive jurisdiction, the House Electoral Tribunal must
be independent. Its jurisdiction to hear and decide congressional election contests
is not to be shared by it with the Legislature nor with the Courts.
the
invariable
rule
is
to
leave
unto
themselves
the
on
Privileges
which
takes
care
of
this
particular
AZCUNA. To
the
extent
that
the
electoral
tribunals
are
independent, but the Gentleman will notice that the wordings say:
`The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an
Electoral Tribunal.' It is still the Senate Electoral Tribunal and the
House Electoral Tribunal. So, technically, it is the tribunal of the House
and tribunal of the Senate although they are independent.
"MR. MAAMBONG. But both of them, as we have agreed on, are
independent from both bodies?
"MR. AZCUNA. That is correct.
"MR. MAAMBONG. This is the bottom line of my question. How can we
say that these bodies are independent when we still have six
politicians sitting in both tribunals?
"MR. AZCUNA. Politicians can be independent, Madam President.
"MR. MAAMBONG. Madam President, when we discussed a portion of
this in the Committee on the Executive, there was a comment by
Chief Justice Concepcion Commissioner Concepcion that there
seems to be some incongruity in these electoral tribunals, considering
that politicians still sit in the tribunals in spite of the fact that in the
ruling in the case of Sanidad vs. Vera, Senate Electoral Tribunal Case
No. 1, they are supposed to act in accordance with law and justice
with complete detachment from all political considerations. That is
why I am asking now for the record how we could achieve such
detachment when there are six politicians sitting there.
"MR. AZCUNA. The same reason that the Gentleman, while chosen on
behalf of the opposition, has, with sterling competence, shown
independence in the proceedings of this Commission. I think we can
also trust that the members of the tribunals will be independent." (pp.
111-112, Journal, Tuesday, July 22, 1986, Emphasis ours.)
Resolution of the House of
Representatives violates
the independence of the HRET.
The independence of the House Electoral Tribunal so zealously guarded by the
framers of our Constitution,would, however, be a myth and its proceedings a farce
if the House of Representatives, or the majority party therein, may shuffle and
manipulate the political (as distinguished from the judicial) component of the
electoral tribunal, to serve the interests of the party in power.
The resolution of the House of Representatives removing Congressman Camasura
from the House Electoral Tribunal for disloyalty to the LDP, because he cast his
vote in favor of the Nacionalista Party's candidate, Bondoc, is a clear impairment
of the constitutional prerogative of the House Electoral Tribunal to be the sole
judge of the election contest between Pineda and Bondoc.
their
functions
with
complete
detachment,
impartiality,
and
Another reason for the nullity of the expulsion resolution of the House of
Representatives is that it violates Congressman Camasura's right to security of
tenure. Members of the HRET, as "sole judge" of congressional election contests,
are entitled to security of tenure just as members of the judiciary enjoy security of
tenure under our Constitution (Sec. 2, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution). Therefore,
membership in the House Electoral Tribunal may not be terminated except for a
just cause, such as, the expiration of the member's congressional term of office,
his death, permanent disability, resignation from the political party he represents
in the tribunal, formal affiliation with another political party, or removal for other
valid cause. A member may not be expelled by the House of Representatives for
"party disloyalty" short of proof that he has formally affiliated with another
political group. As the records of this case fail to show that Congressman
Camasura has become a registered member of another political party, his
expulsion from the LDP and from the HRET was not for a valid cause, hence, it
violated his right to security of tenure. LLjur
There is nothing to the argument of respondent Pineda that members of the
House Electoral Tribunal are not entitled to security of tenure because, as a
matter of fact, two Supreme Court Justices in the Tribunal were changed before
the end of the congressional term, namely: Chief Justice Marcelo B. Fernan who,
upon his elevation to the office of Chief Justice, was replaced by Justice Florentino
P. Feliciano, and the latter, who was temporarily replaced by Justice Emilio A.
Gancayco, when he (J. Feliciano) took a leave of absence to deliver a lecture in
Yale University. It should be stressed, however, that those changes in the judicial
composition to the HRET had no political implications at all unlike the present
attempt to remove Congressman Camasura. No coercion was applied on Chief
Justice Fernan to resign from the tribunal, nor on Justice Feliciano to go on a leave
of absence. They acted on their own free will, for valid reasons, and with no covert
design to derail the disposition of a pending case in the HRET.
The case of Congressman Camasura is different. He was expelled from, and by,
the LDP to punish him for "party disloyalty" after he had revealed to the
Secretary-General of the party how he voted in the Bondoc case. The purpose of
the expulsion of Congressman Camasura was to nullify his vote in the Bondoc
case so that the HRET's decision may not be promulgated, and so that the way
could be cleared for the LDP to nominate a replacement for Congressman
Camasura in the Tribunal. That stratagem of the LDP and the House of
Representatives is clearly aimed to substitute Congressman Camasura's vote and,
in effect, to change the judgment of the HRET in the Bondoc case.
The judicial power of this Court has been invoked by Bondoc for the protection of
his rights against the strong arm of the majority party in the House of
Representatives. The Court cannot be deaf to his plea for relief, nor indifferent to
his charge that the House of Representatives had acted with grave abuse of
discretion in removing Congressman Camasura from the House Electoral Tribunal.
He calls upon the Court, as guardian of the Constitution, to exercise its judicial
power and discharge its duty to protect his rights as the party aggrieved by the
action of the House. The Court must perform its duty under the Constitution "even
when the violator be the highest official of the land or the Government itself"
resolution of electoral cases, the Court, in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction,
and in the interest of justice, hereby declares the said decision DULY
PROMULGATED, effective upon service of copies thereof on the parties, to be done
immediately by the Tribunal. Costs against respondent Marciano A. Pineda.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Paras, Bidin, Medialdea, Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.
Fernan, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Cruz and Feliciano, JJ., took no part.
||| (Bondoc v. Pineda, G.R. No. 97710, [September 26, 1991], 278 PHIL 784-817)
160. Chavez v COMELEC
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 105323. July 3, 1992.]
FRANCISCO
I.
ON
ELECTIONS, respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. POLITICAL LAW; JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT; POWER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW OVER
OTHER BRANCHES OF GOVERNMENT; RULE; CASE AT BAR. The alleged inaction
of respondent Comelec in ordering the deletion of Melchor Chavez's name in the
list of qualified candidates does not call for the exercise of the Court's function of
judicial review. This Court can review the decisions or orders of the Comelec only
in cases of grave abuse of discretion committed by it in the discharge of its quasijudicial powers and not those arising from the exercise of its administrative
functions. Respondent Commission's alleged failure to implement its own
resolution is undoubtedly administrative in nature, hence, beyond judicial
interference (see Filipinas Engineering Co. v. Ferrer, 135 SCRA 25 [1985];
Aratuc v. Commission on Elections, 88 SCRA 251 [1979]; see also Pungutan v.
Abubakar,
43
SCRA
General, respondent
[1972]).
Comelec
can
As
aptly
observed
administratively
by
undo
the
what
Solicitor
it
has
to
the
election,
returns,
and
qualifications
of
their
respective
Members. . . ." (emphasis supplied). The word "sole" underscores the exclusivity
of the Tribunals' jurisdiction over election contests relating to their respective
Members (Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, 199 SCRA 692
appear to have been tampered with, falsified or prepared under duress (sec. 235)
and/or contain discrepancies in the votes credited to any candidate, the difference
of which affects the result of the election (sec. 236), which are the only instances
where a pre-proclamation recount may be resorted to, granted the preservation of
the integrity of the ballot box and its contents, Sanchez' petition must fail. The
complete election returns whose authenticity is not in question, must be prima
facie considered valid for the purpose of canvassing the same and proclamation of
the winning candidates. . . . "7. The ground for recount relied upon by Sanchez is
clearly not among the issues that may be raised in pre-proclamation controversy.
His allegation of invalidation of "Sanchez" votes intended for him bear no relation
to the correctness and authenticity of the election returns canvassed. Neither the
Constitution nor statute has granted the Comelec or the board of canvassers the
power in the canvass of election returns to look beyond the face thereof, once
satisfied of their authenticity (Abes v. Comelec, 21 SCRA 1252, 1256)."
5. ID.; ID.; CORRECTION OF MANIFEST ERROR IN THE CERTIFICATE OF CANVASS
OR ELECTION RETURNS; MAY BE ALLOWED IN ELECTION FOR PRESIDENT, VICE
PRESIDENT, SENATORS AND MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVE. It
is clear from the above-quoted provision of the law that "pre-proclamation cases
(are) not allowed in elections for President, Vice-President, Senator and Member of
the House of Representatives." What is allowed is the correction of "manifest
errors in the certificate of canvass or election returns." To be manifest, the errors
must appear on the face of the certificates of canvass or election returns sought
to be corrected and/or objections thereto must have been made before the board
RESOLUTION
BIDIN, J p:
This case was originally on urgent petition ad cautelam praying, among others, for
the issuance of a temporary restraining order enjoining respondent Commission
on Elections (Comelec) from proclaiming the 24th highest senatorial candidate.
The antecedents facts are as follows:
On May 5, 1992, this Court issued a Resolution in GR No. 104704, entitled
"Francisco Chavez v. Comelec, et al.," disqualifying Melchor Chavez, private
respondent therein, from running for the Office of Senator in the May 11, 1992
elections.
The above-mentioned resolution was received by respondent Comelec on May 6,
1992. On the same day, petitioner filed an urgent motion with the Comelec
praying that it (1) disseminate through the fastest available means this Court's
Resolution dated May 5, 1992 to all regional election directors, provincial election
supervisors, city and municipal election registrars, boards of election inspectors,
the six (6) accredited political parties and the general public; and (2) order said
election officials to delete the name of Melchor Chavez as printed in the certified
list of candidates tally sheets, election returns and "to count all votes cast for the
disqualified Melchor, Chavez in favor of Francisco I. Chavez . . . ."
On May 8, 1992, the Comelec issued Res. No. 92-1322 which resolved to delete
the name of Melchor Chavez from the list of qualified candidates. However, it
failed to order the crediting of all "Chavez" votes in favor of petitioner as well as
the cancellation of Melchor Chavez' name in the list of qualified candidates.
On May 14, 1992, petitioner sent a letter to the Comelec requesting the latter to
devise ways and means in crediting "Chavez" votes in his favor but the
respondent Commission failed to act on said letter/complaint.
On May 23, 1992, petitioner filed an urgent petition before the respondent
Comelec praying the latter to (1) implement its May 12, 1992 resolution with
costs de officio; (2) to re-open the ballot boxes in 13 provinces including the
National Capital Region involving some 80,348 precincts (p. 9 of petition) and to
scan for the "Chavez" votes for purposes of crediting the same in his favor; (3)
make the appropriate entries in the election returns/certificates of canvass; and
(4) to suspend the proclamation of the 24 winning candidates.
Dissatisfied with the failure of respondent Comelec to act on his petition,
petitioner filed, as aforesaid, this urgent petition for prohibition and mandamus,
with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order, enjoining the
Comelec from proclaiming the 24th highest senatorial candidate, without first
implementing respondent Comelec's resolution of May 12, 1992 and acting upon
petitioner's letter/complaint dated May 14, 1992 and urgent petition dated May
22, 1992. LLjur
It is the submission of petitioner that assuming only ten (10) "Chavez" votes were
invalidated per precinct, he would have lost at least 1.7 million votes (considering
that there are more than 170,000 precincts nationwide); the result of which will
affect the 24 ranking senatorial candidates.
Court granted on June 4, 1992, the instant petition would have been dismissed
outright for having become moot and academic. But even then, this Court could
have acted favorably on petitioner's plaint.
The alleged inaction of respondent Comelec in ordering the deletion of Melchor
Chavez's name in the list of qualified candidates does not call for the exercise of
the Court's function of judicial review. This Court can review the decisions or
orders of the Comelec only in cases of grave abuse of discretion committed by it
in the discharge of its quasi-judicial powers and not those arising from the
exercise of its administrative functions. Respondent Commission's alleged failure
to implement its own resolution is undoubtedly administrative in nature, hence,
beyond judicial interference (See Filipinas Engineering Co. v. Ferrer, 135 SCRA 25
[1985]; Aratuc v. Commission on Elections, 88 SCRA 251 (1979); see also
Pungutan v. Abubakar, 43 SCRA 1 [1972]). As aptly observed by the Solicitor
General, respondent
Comelec
can
administratively
undo
what
it
has
A simple reading of the petition would readily show that petitioner has no cause of
action,
the
controversy
presented
being
one
in
the
nature
of
pre-
proclamation. **
While
the
Commission
has
exclusive
jurisdiction
over
pre-proclamation
controversies involving local elective officials (Sec. 242, Omnibus Election Code),
nevertheless, pre-proclamation cases are not allowed in elections for President,
Vice-President, Senator and Member of the House of Representatives. llcd
Sec. 15 of Republic Act 7166 provides:
"Sec. 15. Pre-proclamation Cases Not Allowed in Elections for
President, Vice-President, Senator, and Member of the House of
Representatives. For purposes of the elections for President, VicePresident, Senator and Member of the House of Representatives, no
pre-proclamation cases shall be allowed on matters relating to the
preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of the
election returns or the certificate of canvass, as the case may be.
However, this does not preclude the authority of the appropriate
canvassing body motu propio or upon written complaint of an
interested person to correct manifest errors in the certificate of
canvass or election returns before it. (emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
"Any objection on the election returns before the city or municipal
board of canvassers, or on the municipal certificates of canvass
The argument, however, is beside the point. The law is very clear on the matter
and it is not right for petitioner to ask this Court to abandon settled jurisprudence,
engage in judicial legislation, amend the Constitution and alter the Omnibus
Election Code. The mandatory procedures laid down by the existing law in cases
like the one at bar must be faithfully followed lest we allow anarchy to reign. The
proper recourse is for petitioner to ask not this Court but the Legislature to enact
remedial measures. LexLib
Finally, the instant petition falls squarely with the case of Sanchez v. Commission
on Elections (153 SCRA 67 [1987]) and the disposition arrived therein finds
application in the case at bar, mutatis mutandis:
the board of inspectors are proper subject for election protest and not
for recount or reappreciation of ballots.
"2. The appreciation of the ballots cast in the precincts is not a
'proceeding of the board of canvassers' for purposes of preproclamation proceedings under Section 241, Omnibus Election Code,
but of the boards of election inspectors who are called upon to count
and appreciate the votes in accordance with the rules of appreciation
provided in Section 211, Omnibus Election Code. Otherwise stated,
the appreciation of ballots is not part of the proceedings of the board
of canvassers. The functions of ballots appreciation is performed by
the boards election inspectors at the precinct level. (Emphasis
supplied)
"3. The scope of pre-proclamation controversy is limited to the issues
enumerated under Sec. 243 of the Omnibus Election Code. The
enumeration therein of the issues that may be raised in preproclamation controversy is restrictive and exclusive. In the absence
of any clear showing or proof that the election returns canvassed are
incomplete or contain material defects (sec. 234), appear to have
been tampered with, falsified or prepared under duress (sec. 235)
and/or contain discrepancies in the votes credited to any candidate,
the difference of which affects the result of the election (sec. 236),
which are the only instances where a pre-proclamation recount may
be resorted to, granted the preservation of the integrity of the ballot
box and its contents, Sanchez' petition must fail. The complete
election returns whose authenticity is not in question, must be prima
facie considered valid for the purpose of canvassing the same and
proclamation of the winning candidates.
xxx xxx xxx
"7. The ground for recount relied upon by Sanchez is clearly not
among the issues that may be raised in pre-proclamation controversy.
His allegation of invalidation of "Sanchez" votes intended for him bear
no relation to the correctness and authenticity of the election returns
canvassed. Neither the Constitution nor statute has granted the
Comelec or the board of canvassers the power in the canvass of
election returns to look beyond the face thereof, once satisfied of
their authenticity (Abes v. Comelec, 21 SCRA 1252, 1256)."
In the case at bar, petitioner's allegation that "Chavez" votes were either
invalidated or declared stray has no relation to the correctness or authenticity of
the
election
returns
canvassed.
Otherwise
stated,
petitioner
has
not
Premises considered, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the instant petition for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C .J ., Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Grio-Aquino,
Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon and Bellosillo, JJ ., concur.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 103903. September 11, 1992.]
MELANIO D. SAMPAYAN, DIEGO L. TURLA, JR., and LEONARDO
G.
A.
DAZA,
HON.
CAMILO
MARIA
TUAO,
as
Officer-in-Charge,
Gen.
Services
as
Chief
Representatives,
and
Accountant
the
HON.
of
the
House
COMMISSION
of
ON
AUDIT, respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. POLITICAL LAW; LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT; HOUSE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL;
SHALL BE THE SOLE JUDGE OF ALL CONTESTS RELATING TO THE ELECTION,
RESOLUTION
ROMERO, J p:
On February 18, 1992, petitioners, residents of the second Congressional District
of Northern Samar filed the instant petition for prohibition seeking to disqualify
respondent Raul Daza, then incumbent congressman of the same congressional
district, from continuing to exercise the functions of his office, on the ground that
the latter is a greencard holder and a lawful permanent resident of the United
States since October 16, 1974.
Petitioners allege that Mr. Daza has not, by any act or declaration, renounced his
status as permanent resident, thereby violating Section 68 of Batas Pambansa
Bilang 881 (Omnibus Election Code) and Section 18, Article XI of the 1987
Constitution. LibLex
On February 25, 1992, we required respondents to comment. On March 13, 1992,
respondents, through the Solicitor General, filed a motion for extension of time to
file their comment for a period of thirty days or until April 12, 1992. Reacting to
the said motion, petitioners on March 30, 1992, manifested their opposition to the
30-day extension of time stating that such extension was excessive and prayed
that respondent instead be granted only 10 days to file their comment. On May 5,
1992, the Court noted the manifestation and opposition.
On April 7, 1992, petitioners manifested before us that on April 2, 1992, they filed
a petition before the COMELEC to disqualify respondent Daza from running in the
recent May 11, 1992 elections on the basis of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election
Code (SPC 92-084) and that the instant petition is concerned with the unlawful
assumption of office by respondent Daza from June 30, 1987 until June 30,
1992. 1
On April 10, 1992, respondent Congressman Daza filed his comment denying the
fact that he is a permanent resident of the United States; that although he was
The central issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not respondent Daza
should be disqualified as a member of the House of Representatives for violation
of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code.
Petitioners insist that Congressman Daza should be disqualified from exercising
the functions of his office being a permanent resident alien of the United States at
the time when he filed his certificate of candidacy for the May 11, 1987 Elections.
To buttress their contention, petitioners cite the recent case of Caasi v. Court of
Appeals. 6
In support of their charge that respondent Daza is a greencard holder, petitioners
presented to us a letter from the United States Department of Justice, Immigration
and Naturalization Service (INS) which reads: 7
File No. A20 968 618
Date: Nov. 5, 1991
LOS914732
Geraghty, O'Loughlin and Kenney
Attn: David C. Hutchinson
386 N. Wasbasha Street
St. Paul, Minn. 55102-1308
SUBJECT:
Daza, Raul A.
Your request was received in this office on _________; please note the
paragraph(s) checked below:
xxx xxx xxx
10. [XX] Other remarks:
Service File A20 968 619 relating to Raul Daza reflects: subject
became a Lawful Permanent Resident on Oct. 16, 1974. As far as we
know subject (sic) still has his greencard. No he has not applied for
citizenship.
Sincerely, (sic)
Sgd.
District Director
Form G-343 (Rev. 8-20-82)N
We vote to dismiss the instant prohibition case. First, this case is already moot
and academic for it is evident from the manifestation filed by petitioners dated
April 6, 1992 8 that they seek to unseat respondent from his position as
Congressman for the duration of his term of office commencing June 30, 1987 and
ending June 30, 1992. Secondly, jurisdiction of this case rightfully pertains to the
House Electoral Tribunal. Under Section 17 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, it
is the House Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating
to the election, returns and qualification of its members. Since petitioners
challenge the qualifications of Congressman Daza, the appropriate remedy should