PHILCONSA v.

Mathay
RA 4134 was passed in 1964, providing for an increase
in the salaries of members of the Senate and of the
HoR. Petitioner seeks to enjoin respondent Auditor
General from authorizing the disbursement of the new
increased amounts because such act is alleged to be
contrary to the Constitution. The 1935 Constitution
provides: No increase in said compensation shall take
effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the
Members of the Senate and of the HoR approving such,
increase. The senators who approved the law were
elected in 1963, hence their term would expire only in
1969. On the other hand, the terms of the members of
the House who participated in the approval of the
increase ended in 1965.
HELD: The use of the word term in the singular, when
combined with the following phrase all the members
of the Senate and of the House, means terms of office
of all members of the Legislature that enacted the
measure must have expired before the increase in
compensation can become operative. The intendment
of the clause has been to require expiration of the full
term of all members of the Legislature that approved
the higher compensation, whether the Legislature be
unicameral or bicameral, in order to circumvent, as far
as possible, the influence of self-interest in its
adoption. The singular use of term precisely
emphasizes that the Constitution envisaged both
legislative chambers as one single unit, and this
conclusion is reinforced by the expression employed,
until the expiration of the full term of ALL the
members of the Senate and of the House of
Representatives approving such increase.
Ligot v. Mathay
Petitioners term of office ended on December 30,
1969. He qualified for retirement benefits. He argues
that these benefits should be computed on the basis of
the increased salary rates provided in RA 4134.
HELD: Petitioner is entitled only to the salary he was
actually receiving at the time he was serving as
Congressman. If the Court were to allow the
disbursement of the increased amounts, it would be
tantamount to doing indirectly what could not be done
directly. Retirement gratuities are compensatory in
nature, which necessarily requires that the amount
received by the beneficiary is equivalent to his salary
as provided by
Martinez v. Morfe
Petitioners were delegates to the Constitutional
Convention. Martinez was charged with falsification of
a public document while Bautista was charged with
certain election offenses relating to his act of
distributing free food and cigarettes at two public
meetings. Both petitioners were arrested. They invoke
immunity from suit. They also cite Art. 145 of the RPC
which punishes the arrest of members of Congress,
except when they commit offenses punishable by a
penalty of prision mayor or higher.
HELD: Petitioners cannot invoke immunity from suit.
1935
Constitution provides that immunity does not extend to
any prosecution for treason, felony, and breach of the
peace. The RPC provision cannot prevail over the
Constitution because the former took effect in 1932,
and the latter, in 1935.

People v. Jalosjos
While Jalosjos appeal of his conviction for rape was
pending with the Court of Appeals, he filed a Motion to
be Allowed to Discharge Mandate as a Member of the
HoR. He contends that his continued detention in the
National Penitentiary would deprive his constituents of
representation.
HELD: Jalosjos cannot be allowed to attend sessions.
This would practically make him a free man. Rape is
punishable by reclusion perpetua. The evidence of guilt
is strong. NO BAIL. There is no substantial distinction
between a Congressman and a regular citizen to
warrant special treatment. Furthermore, when the
voters of the First District of Zamboanga del Norte cast
their votes in favor of petitioner, they did so with full
knowledge of the limitations confronting petitioner.
They were aware of the charges against him.
Jimenez v. Cabangbang
Cabangbang, then a member of the House of
Representatives, caused the publication of an open
letter to the President in newspapers of general
circulation. He did so while Congress was not in
session. The letter spoke of a coup attempt, and it
mentioned the names of herein petitioners as persons
under the control of the planners of the alleged coup.
Petitioners instituted an action for damages against
Cabangbang.
Is the letter covered by the Speech and Debate
clause of the Constitution? NO.
At the time, Congress was not in session. Cabangbang
did not publish the letter in the exercise of his official
functions. He was not acting as a member of the House
or any of its committees.
Osmea vs. Pendatun
In a privileged speech, Osmea criticized Pres. Garcias
administration as being unpopular and corrupt. The
House resolved to suspend Osmea for 15 months. He
invokes parliamentary immunity.
HELD: The Constitution provides that speech and
debate cannot be questioned in any other place. This
means that it can be questioned in Congress. The Court
will not determine factual issues such as the existence
of disorderly conduct. That is for the House to decide.
The Resolution suspending Osmea was unanimously
approved. Alejandrino finds no application as the
member being suspended in this case is an elective
and not an appointive one.
> privileged speech on June 23, 1960:
The people, Mr. President, have been hearing of ugly
reports that under your unpopular administration the
free things they used to get from the government are
now for sale at premium prices. They say that even
pardons are for sale, and that regardless of the gravity
or seriousness of a criminal case, the culprit can
always be bailed out forever from jail as long as he can
come across with a handsome dole. I am afraid, such
an anomalous situation would reflect badly on the kind
of justice that your administration is dispensing.
>A special committee was made to investigate on such
allegations. Osmea was also to be subpoenaed in
order for him to appear before court and prove his
claims. If he failed to do so, he was required to give
reasons as to why he should not be punished by the
house.>Osmea was found guilty of serious disorderly

behavior in House Resolution No. 175; suspended him

for 15 months.
>This petition was filed for declaratory relief, certiorari,
and prohibition with preliminary injunction.
Is the House Resolution calling him to answer for
his speech in violation of his parliamentary
immunity?NO. Parliamentary immunity guarantees
free speech without fear of civil and criminal liability in
order for a member of congress to discharge of his
duty well. But is does not protect him from
responsibility before the legislative body itself
whenever his words and conduct are considered by the
latter disorderly or unbecoming a member thereof.
Moreover, Rule XVII, Section 7 of the Rules of the
House of Representatives recognizes that a member
can be held responsible for words spoken in
debate.Did his speech constitute disorderly
behavior?It is up to the Congress to decide. Does the
Congress have power to suspend its members?
YES.DISMISSED
Reyes, J.B.L., J. dissenting:
Committee was not subject to certiorari as it was only a factfinding committee
House Rule XVII, on Decorum and Debates, in its section V,
provides as follows: If it is requested that a Member be called
to order for words spoken in debate, the Member making such
request shall indicate the words excepted to, and they shall
be taken down in writing by the Secretary and read aloud to
the House; but the Member who uttered them shall not be
held to answer, nor be subject to the censure of the House
therefor, if further debate or other business has
intervened.The Special committee was made 15 days after
the speech: ex post facto; they already conducted other
business from time of speech and time of supposed censure
While it is clear that the parliamentary immunity
established in Article VI, section 15 of our Constitution does
not bar the members being questioned and disciplined by
Congress itself fro remarks made on the floor, that disciplinary
power does not, as I have noted, include the right to
retroactively amend the rules so as to divest a member of an
immunity already gained.
Labrador, J. dissenting:
The fact that no action was promptly taken to punish
Congressman Osmea immediately after its delivery, except
to have some part of the speech deleted, show that the
members of the House did not consider Osmea's speech a
disorderly conduct.

>>First canon of legal ethics -- "[i]t is the duty of a lawyer to maintain

towards the Courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the
temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of
its supreme importance."

Statement: I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the

mouth. I am homicidal. I am suicidal. I am humiliated,
debased, degraded. And I am not only that, I feel like throwing
up to be living my middle years in a country of this nature. I
am nauseated. I spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio
Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court, I am no
longer interested in the position [of Chief Justice] if I was to be
surrounded by idiots. I would rather be in another
environment but not in the Supreme Court of idiots.

-Pobre expresses that this is TOTAL DISRESPECT and a

DIRECT CONTEMPT OF COURT. He asks for disbarment
proceedings or other disciplinary actions.>April 25,
2007 - Sen. Miriam, did not deny the statementcovered by the constitutional provision on
parliamentary immunity, being part of a speech she
delivered in the discharge of her duty as member of
Congress or its committee. >PURPOSE of the speech:
To bring out in the open controversial anomalies in
governance with a view to future remedial legislation -exposing what she believed "to be an unjust act of the
Judicial Bar Council [JBC],">>The JBC sent out public
invitations for nomination (vacated position of Chief
Justice), but eventually informed applicants that only
incumbent justices of the Supreme Court would qualify
for nomination. Which disqualifies her and others who
applied.
-She says the JBC should have at least given an
advanced advisory about this.
Whether Sen. Miriam can evoke parliamentary
immunity from disbarment or disciplinary
proceedings
-YES. It is a fundamental privilege enshrined in our
Constitution (see Doctrine).
-Courts do not interfere with the legislature or its members in

the manner they perform their functions in the legislative floor

or in committee rooms. HOWEVER, the Court would like to
point out that Sen. Miriam undoubtedly crossed the limits of
decency and good professional conduct. That her statements
were intemperate and highly improper in substance.>She
alluded the Vicenete Sotto case which says:No lawyer who
has taken an oath to maintain the respect due to the courts
should be allowed to erode the peoples faith in the judiciary.
>She clearly violated Canon 8, Rule 8.01 and Canon 11 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, which respectively
provide:
Canon 8, Rule 8.01.A lawyer shall not, in his professional
dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or
otherwise improper.
Canon 11.A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect
due to the courts and to the judicial officers and should insist
on similar conduct by others.>>Though the Speech and

Debate clause is important, equal important is ART VIII,

SEC 5(5) of the Constitution (see Doctrine above) >>The

-ART VIII, SEC 5(5) of the 1987 Constitution:

Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the
admission to the practice of the law, the Integrated Bar, and legal
assistance to the underprivileged. (Emphasis ours.)
The Court, besides being authorized to promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, exercises specific
authority to promulgate rules governing the Integrated Bar with the
end in view that the integration of the Bar will, among other things:
(4) Shield the judiciary, which traditionally cannot defend itself except
within its own forum, from the assaults that politics and self interest
may level at it, and assist it to maintain its integrity, impartiality and
independence;
(11) Enforce rigid ethical standards

lady senator belongs to the legal profession bound by the

exacting injunction of a strict Code.>>The Court is not
hesitant to impose some form of disciplinary sanctions [...]
The factual and legal circumstances of this case, however,
deter the Court from doing so, even without any sign of
remorse from her. -- (HAHAHAHA they scared) >>The Rules
of the Senate itself contains a provision on Unparliamentary
Acts and Language. The lady senator clearly violated the rules
of her own chamber, but was not sanctioned by her peers.

>>The Court stresses that the senators use of

intemperate language to demean and denigrate the
highest court of the land is a clear violation of the duty
of respect lawyers owe to the courts. However, her
implied admission is good enough for the Court.

Ruling: The letter-complaint of Antero J. Pobre against

Senator/Atty. Miriam Defensor-Santiago is, conformably to Art.
VI, Sec. 11, DISMISSED

Rule of Law:
Section 10, Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution provides as follows:
Section 10 A member of the National Assembly [now Batasan
Pambansa shall not hold any other office or employment in the
government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof,
including government owned or controlled corporations, during his
tenure, except that of prime minister or member of the cabinet. ...
Section 13(2), Batas Pambansa Bilang 697
Section 13[2] of which specifically provides that "governors, mayors,
members of the various sangguniang or barangay officials shall, upon
filing a certificate of candidacy, be considered on forced leave of
absence from office
Section 204 2(a), Local Government Code
2] He shall:
a] Assume the office of the governor for the unexpired term of the
latter in the cases provided for in Section 48, paragraph 1 of this Code

Facts: Adaza was elected governor, and Pacana jr was

elected vice governor of Misamis Oriental in the 1980
elections. Both terms to expire in March 3, 1986. In
1984, both Adaza annd Pacana filed their respective
COCfor the 1984 Batasan Pambansa Elections
Governor Adaza won and since then has discharged
the functions of the office July 23 1984 Pacana Jr
took his oath of office as governor of Misamis Oriental
and started to perform the duties of a governorAdaza
filed a petition for prohibition with prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction and/or restraining order claiming
that he is the lawful occupant of the governors service
and he was elected for the term of six years. He argued
that oAs provided by law and wihtin the context of
parliamentary government such as in France , Greta
Britain, New Zealand, local elective official can hold the
position he had been elected in and simultaneously be
an elected member of the Parliament
oPacana Jr has abandoned/resigned his vice governor
position when he filed his COC for the Batas Pambansa
elections
Issued and Holding:
W/N a provincial governor who was elected and
had qualified as a Mambabatas Pambansa can
exercise and discharge the functions of both
offices simultaneouslyNo, Sec 10, Article VIII of the
1973 Consitution prohibits a member of the Batasan
Pambansa from holding any other office orgovernment
position during his tenure
W/N a vice governor who ran for the position of
Mambabatas Pambansa, but lost, can continue
serving as vice governor and subsequently
suceed to the office of governor if te said office
is vacated?Yes because Section 13(2) of BP Blg. 697
only places officials in forced leave of absence. More
importantly under Sec 204(2a) of the Local
Government Code, Pacana Jr being the vice mayor, is
to succeed to the office of the governor upon the
positions vacancy. DENIED

Boy Scout of the Philippines vs. COA, June 7,

2011, Nov 22, 2011
Article XII, Section 16 The Congress shall not, except by general law,
provide for the formation, organization, or regulation of private
corporations. Government-owned or controlled corporations may be
created or established by special charters in the interest of the
common good and subject to the test of economic viability.
Doctrine: Sec 16, Article II the formation, organization or regulation of
private corporations which should be done through a general law
enacted by Congress, provides for an exception: if the corporation is
GOCC, its creation is in the interest of the common good and it meets
the test of economic viability. >The bar the creation of private
corporations by a special law is not be construed as prohibiting the
creation of public corporations or a corporate agency or should not be
measured on the basis of economic viability but on public interest or
purpose.

Facts: BSP seeks that COA be prohibited from

implementing its June 18, 2002 Decision, its February
21, 2007 Resolution- be null and void. COA issued
Resolution No. 99-011, defining the commissions policy
with respect to the audit of the Boy Scouts of the
Philippines and that BSP was created as a public
corporation under Commonwealth Act No. 111, as
amended by PD No. 460 and RA No. 7278.In BSP vs
NLRC, Supreme Court ruled that BSP was a GOCC and
that it is appropriately regarded as a government
instrumentality under the 1987 Administrative Code.
BSP sought reconsideration of the COA resolution in a
letter signed by BSP National President, Jejomar
Binay.In a letter dated November 20, 2000 signed by Dr.
Escarda, the COA informed the BSP that a preliminary survey
of its organizational structure, operations and accounting
system/records shall be conducted on November 21 to 22,
2000 Upon the BSPs request, the audit was deferred

for thirty (30) days. The BSP then filed a Petition for
Review with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and/or
Temporary Restraining Order before the COA. This was
denied by the COA in its questioned Decision, which
held that the BSP is under its audit jurisdiction. The BSP
MR - denied under its questioned Resolution
WoN BSP falls under the COAs audit jurisdiction?
BSP is a public corporation and its funds are subject to the
COAs audit jurisdiction. Commonwealth Act No. 111 BSP
Charter; PD No. 460 amended Commonwealth Act No. 111,
changing BSPs structure; RA No. 7278 further amended
Commonwealth Act No. 111 by strengthening the volunteer
and democratic character of the CSP and reducing
government representation in the governing body.oBSP as a
public corporation under Par. 2, Art. 2 of the Civil CodeCivil
Code Article 44 there are three kinds of juridical persons: 1.
State and its political divisions; 2. Other corporations,
institutions and entities created by/for public interest or

purpose created by law; their personality begins as soon as

they have been constituted according to law; 3. Corporations,
partnerships and associations for private interest or purpose.
In accordance with Civil Code Article 45, BSP is created for a
public purpose or interest so it is subject to the law creating it.
It is to implement the state policy in Article II, Section 13 of
the 1987 Constitution regarding the role of youth in nation
building. oBSPs classification under the administrative
Code of 1987The public character of BSP is recognized by
the fact that along with the Girl Scouts, it is classified as an
attached agency of DECS under EO No. 292 or
Administrative Code of 1987As an attached agency, BSP
enjoys operational autonomy, as long as policy and program
coordination is achieved by having at least 1 representative of
government in its governing board, which is the DECS
secretary.Thus, BSP is not a GOCC but it does not
automatically make it a private corporation.oArt XII,

Sec 16 of the Constitution refers to private

corporations created by government for proprietary or
economic/ business purposes (natural economy and
patrimony)Sec 16, Article II the formation, organization
or regulation of private corporations which should be done
through a general law enacted by Congress, provides for an
exception: if the corporation is GOCC, its creation is in the
interest of the common good and it meets the test of
economic viability.The bar the creation of private
corporations by a special law is not be construed as
prohibiting the creation of public corporations or a corporate
agency or should not be measured on the basis of economic
viability but on public interest or purpose. oBSP is a public

corporation not subject to the test of government

ownership or control and economic viability. Not all
corporations which are not GOCC are ipso facto to be
considered private corporations because another class
exists: public corporations, which are not subject to
tests of ownership and control and economic viability
but to a different criteria relating to their public
purposes or interests or constitutional policies and
objectives and their administrative relation to
government or any of its departments or agencies.
oClassification of corporations under Sec 16, Art XII of
the Constitution on National Patrimony and Patrimony
In BSP vs NLRC BSP under its former charter was
regarded as both a GOCC with original charter and a public
corporation.BSP is still a public corporation because it does
not follow that just because it ceases to be owned/controlled
by the government because of reduction of number of
representative of government in BSP board, does not follow
that it also ceases to be a government instrumentality.

oEconomic Viability and ownership control tests

inapplicable to public corporations It is the intent of the
constitutional framers to distinguish between government
corporations performing government functions and
corporations involved in business or proprietary functions.
This is because there should be minimum government
participation and intervention in the economy therefore,
economic viability does not apply to public corporations
dealing with governmental functions where BSP belongs.
Requisites for declaration of unconstitutionality not
met in this caseo It is not met because the constitutional
issue raised by Justice Carpio in his dissenting opinion is not
the lis mota of the case.COAs jurisdictionoSince the BSP
under its amended chater, continues to be a public
corporation or a government instrumentality, we come to the
inevitable conclusion that it is subject to the exercise by the
COA of its audit jurisdiction in the manner consistent with the
provision of the BSP charter.DISMISSED.

November 22, 2011The court resolved to GRANT the

motions dated Oct 14, 2011 filed by OSG for 2nd and
3rd extensions of a total count of 40 days from October
15, 2011 or until November 14, 2011 within which to
file comment on motion for reconsideration. WARNING
that no further extension will be given by the Court.

Puyat vs. de Guzman, Jr., GR No. L-51122, Mar

25, 1982

Art VIII, Sec. 11 of the 1973 Constitution No Member of the National

Assembly shall appear as counsel before any court inferior to a court
with appellate jurisdiction, before any court in any civil case wherein
the government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof
is the adverse party, or before any administrative body
Respondents: Hon. de Guzman, as Associate CIRr of the SEC, Eustaquio
Acero, R.G. VIldzius, Belo, Manuel Abello, Servillano Dolina, Juanito
Mercado, Estanislao Fernandez

Petition is one for certiorari and Prohibition with

Preliminary Injunction against the Order or Respondent
SEC Associate Commissioner granting Assemblyman
Estanislao Fernandez leave to intervene in SEC Case
No. 1747. May 14, 1979 An election for eleven
Directors of the International Pipe Industries
Corporation (IPI), a private corporation, was held. The
Puyat group had greater control of the company.
May 15, 1979 Assemblyman Fernandez bought 10
shares (out of 262,843 outstanding) in order to qualify
himself for election as Director. However it was only on
May 30, 1979 that he acquired the shares. On May
25, 1979, the Acero group (respondents; including
Fernandez) instituted at the SEC quo warranto
proceedings questioning the results of the elections
and claiming that the votes werent properly counted.
May 25-31, 1979 Puyat group claims that at
conferences with SEC Commissioner de Guzman and
Justice Fernandez, then a member of the Interim
Batasang Pambansa, orally entered his appearance as
counsel for respondents Acero, to which they objected
on constitutional grounds namely in the basis of Sec.
11, Art. VIII of the 1973 Consti July 17, 1979 - The
SEC granted leave to intervene on the basis of Atty.
Fernandezs ownership of ten shares.
1)W/N Assemblyman Fernandez, as a then
stockholder of IPI may intervene in the SEC Case
without violating Sec. 11, Art. VIII of the 1973
Constitution, which disallows members of the
National Assembly from appearing as counsel
before any administrative body. NO.>By virtue of a
Motion for Intervention, Assemblyman Fernandez cannot be
said to be appearing as counsel. Ostensibly, he is not
appearing on behalf of another, although he is joining the
cause of the private respondents. He is there, theoretically, to
protect his ownership of 10 shares. O However, certain
circumstances militate against the intervention of
Assemblyman Fernandez:1. He only owns 10 of 200,000+
shares. 2. He became a stockholder only the day after the
elections thus, he has no involvement. 3. Before he moved to
intervene, he signified his intention to appear as counsel for
respondent Acero, but was objected to by the Puyat
group.oUnder these facts, there has been an indirect

appearance as counsel before an

administrative body and this is a circumvention
of the 1973 Constitutional provision.oA ruling
upholding the intervention would make the
constitutional provision ineffective. All an
Assemblyman need do, if he wants to influence
an administrative body (SEC, in this case) is to
acquire minimal participation in the interest of
the client and intervene as a party of interest
in the proceedings.
Ruling: Granted grant of leave to Fernandez is reversed
ok TRO.
SALN Cases Impeachment of CJ Coronan

Rule of Law:
1987 Constitution Section 16(1) - The Senate shall elect its President
and the House of Representatives its Speaker, by a majority vote of all
its respective Members. Each House shall choose such other officers as
it may deem necessary.
Doctrine: While the Constitution mandates that the President of the
Senate must be elected by a number constituting more than one half
of all the members thereof, it does not provide that the members who
will not vote for him shall ipso facto constitute the minority, who could
thereby elect the minority leader. Verily, no law or regulation states
that the defeated candidate shall automatically become the minority
leader.

Facts:The Senate of the Philippines, with Sen. John

Henry R. Osmena as presiding officer, convened on July
27, 1998 (1st) regular session of the 11th Congress.
Compo: o 10 members -Laban ng Masang Pilipino (LAMP)o7
members - Lakas-National Union of Christian DemocratsUnited Muslim Democrats of the Philippines (Lakas-NUCDUMDP)o1 member - Liberal Party (LP)o1 member - Aksyon
Demokrasyao1 member - Peoples Reform Party (PRP) o1
member - Gabay Bayano2 members - Independento23 - total

number of senators (The last six members are all classified by

petitioners as independent.) election of officers. Senate

President nominated: Sen. Marcelo B. Fernan (respo),

Sen. Francisco S. Tatad by Sen. Miriam Defensor
Santiago. By a vote of 20 to 2, Senator Fernan won.
Tatad manifested that, with agreement of Santiago,
allegedly the only other member of the minority, he
was assuming the position of minority leader. those
who had voted for Senator Fernan - majority, for him,
the losing nominee - minority.
discussion on who should constitute the Senate
minority, Sen. Juan M. Flavier manifested that the
senators belonging to the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP Party -numbering (7) and, thus, a minority -- choose Senator
Guingona as the minority leader. >. The following
session day, the debate on the question continued,
with Senators Santiago and Tatad delivering privilege
speeches. third day: failed to resolve the issue. On
July 30, 1998, the majority leader informed the body
that he was in receipt: letter signed by the seven
Lakas-NUCD-UMDP senators: Guingona as the minority
leader. the Senate President formally recognized
Guingona. Senators Santiago and Tatad filed
petition for quo warranto, alleging in the main that
Senator Guingona had been usurping, unlawfully
holding and exercising the position of Senate minority
leader, a position that, according to them, rightfully
belonged to Senator Tatad.
Does the Court have jurisdiction over the
petition? oYES. In the instant controversy, the petitioners
-- one of whom is Senator Santiago, a well-known
constitutionalist -- try to hew closely to these jurisprudential
parameters. They claim that Section 16 (1), Article VI of the
Constitution, has not been observed in the selection of the
Senate minority leader. They also invoke the Courts expanded
judicial power to determine whether or not there has been
GAD.> Dissenting in part, Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza
submits that the Court has no jurisdiction. > In light of the
aforesaid allegations of petitioners, it is clear that this Court
has jurisdiction over the petition. It is well within the power
and jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether indeed the
Senate or its officials committed a violation of the Constitution
or gravely abused their discretion in the exercise of their
functions and prerogatives.

In recognizing Respondent Guingona as the

Senate minority leader, did the Senate or its
officials, particularly Senate President Fernan,
violate the Constitution or the laws?
NOoPetitioners contend that provision requiring the
election of the Senate President carries with it a judicial
duty to determine the concepts of majority and
minority, as well as who may elect a minority leader.
They argue that majority in the constitutional provision
[Section 16 (1), Article VI - [t]he Senate shall elect its Pres and
the HoR its Speaker, by a majority vote of all its respective
Members] refers to that group of senators who (1) voted for
the winning Senate President and (2) accepted committee
chairmanships. Accordingly, those who voted for the losing
nominee and accepted no such chairmanships comprise the
minority, to whom the right to determine the minority leader
belongs. As a result, petitioners assert, Respondent Guingona
cannot be the legitimate minority leader, since he voted for
Respondent Fernan as Senate President. Furthermore, the
members of the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP cannot choose the
minority leader, because they did not belong to the minority,
having voted for Fernan and accepted committee
chairmanships.o The term majority has been judicially defined
a number of times. When referring to a certain number out of
a total or aggregate, it simply means the number greater than
half or more than half of any total. The plain and
unambiguous words of the subject constitutional clause
simply mean that the Senate President must obtain the votes

of more than one half of all the senators. Not by any

construal does it thereby delineate who

comprise the majority, much less the minority, in
the said body. And there is no showing that the
framers of our Constitution had in mind other than the
usual meanings of these terms. O it does not provide
that the members who will not vote for him shall
ipso facto constitute the minority, who could
thereby elect the minority leader. Verily, no law or
regulation states that the defeated candidate
shall automatically become the minority leader.
Consti dead silent on the manner of selecting the other
officers in both chambers of Congress. All that the
Charter says is that [e]ach House shall choose such
other officers as it may deem necessary. To our mind,
the method of choosing who will be such other officers
is merely a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative
conferred by the aforequoted constitutional provision.
Therefore, such method must be prescribed by
the Senate itself, not by this Court.
oIn this regard, the Constitution vests in each house of
Congress the power to determine the rules of its proceedings.
Pursuant thereto, the Senate formulated and adopted a set of
rules to govern its internal affairs. Pertinent to the instant
case are Rules I and II thereof, which provide:
Rule I ELECTIVE OFFICERS SECTION 1. The Senate shall
elect, in the manner hereinafter provided, a President, a
President Pro Tempore, a Secretary, and a Sergeant-atArms.These officers shall take their oath of office before
entering into the discharge of their duties.
Rule II ELECTION OF OFFICERSSEC. 2. The officers of the
Senate shall be elected by the majority vote of all its
Members. Should there be more than one candidate for the
same office, a nominal vote shall be taken; otherwise, the
elections shall be by viva voce or by resolution.

o Rules of the Senate do not provide for the positions

of majority and minority leaders. Neither is there an
open clause providing specifically for such offices and
prescribing the manner of creating them or of choosing
the holders thereof. At any rate, such offices, by
tradition and long practice, are actually extant. But, in
the absence of constitutional or statutory guidelines or
specific rules, this Court is devoid of any basis upon
which to determine the legality of the acts of the
Senate relative thereto. courts may not intervene
o Needless to state, legislative rules, unlike statutory laws, do
not have the imprints of permanence and obligatoriness
during their effectivity. In fact, they are subject to revocation,
modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting
them. Being merely matters of procedure, their observance
are of no concern to the courts, for said rules may be waived
or disregarded by the legislative body at will, upon the
concurrence of a majority.

oIn view of the foregoing, Congress verily has the

power and prerogative to provide for such officers as it
may deem.
Was Respondent Guingona usurping, unlawfully
holding and exercising the position of Senate
minority leader?
O In order for a quo warranto proceeding to be successful, the
person suing must show that he or she has a clear right to the
contested office or to use or exercise the functions of the
office allegedly usurped or unlawfully held by the respondent.
In this case, petitioners present no sufficient proof of a clear
and indubitable franchise to the office of the Senate minority
leader.
ono norms or standards that may be used in determining who
may lawfully occupy the position. Absent any clear-cut
guideline, in no way can it be said that illegality or irregularity
tainted Respondent Guingonas assumption and exercise of
the powers of the office of Senate minority leader.

Furthermore, no GAD has been shown to characterize any of

his specific acts as minority leader.

Did Respondent Fernan act with GAD in

recognizing Guingona ?
oNO Respondent Fernan did not GAD. By unanimous
resolution of the members of this party that he be the
minority leader, he was recognized as such by the Senate
President. Such formal recognition by Respondent Fernan
came only after at least two Senate sessions and a caucus,
wherein both sides were liberally allowed to articulate their
standpoints.No laws. GAD cannot be imputed to Senate
officials for acts done within their competence and authority.
DISMISS

x x x x x x x x xd) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly,

to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice Article
VI, Section 21 of the 1987
Petition:(a) G.R. No. 136760, for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and
preliminary injunction, assailing the RTC resolution which denied the
Senate Blue Ribbon Committees motion to dismiss the petition for
prohibition, injunction with writ of preliminary injunction filed by private
respondent (b) G.R. No. 138378, for review of the resolution of
respondent Judge declaring petitioner Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr.
guilty of indirect contempt of court.

(G.R. No. 136760) Senator Ople filed Senate Res No. 157
directing Committee on National Defense and Security to
conduct an inquiry, in aid of legislation, into the charges of
Def Secretary Orlando Mercado that a group of active and
retired military officers were organizing a coup detat to
prevent the administration of then President Joseph Estrada
from probing alleged fund irregularities in the Armed Forces of
the Philippines Senator Sotto III also filed Resolution No. 160,
directing senate committee to conduct an inquiry, into the
alleged mismanagement of the funds of the Armed Forces
Retirement and Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS)Both
resolutions referred to Committee on Accountability of Public
Officers and Investigations (Blue Ribbon Committee) and
Committee on National Defense and Security In the public
hearings of the Blue Ribbon Committee, AFP-RSBS bought a
parcel of land, Lot X, from Atty. Nilo J. Flaviano for
P10,500/sqm, but purchase price on deed of sale is
P3,000/sqm Committee served subpoena to respondent Atty,
directing him to appear and testify. Respo refused to appear
and filed petition for prohibition and preliminary injuction with
prayer for TRO with the RTC of GenSan City RTC issued TRO
directing the committee to cease and desist from proceeding
The committee filed for a motion to dismiss on the grounds
of (a) lack of jurisdiction and (b) no cause of action, which the
RTC denied; which is now raised to the SC on certiorari (G.R.
No. 138378) The Philippine Star published an article about this
petition raised to SC on certiorari, and quoted protions of the
petition alledging RTC Judge Majaducon was guilty of gross
ignorance of the rules and procedures when he issued the
TRO. Reacting to this, Judge charged Sen. Aquilino Pimentel,
Jr. with indirect contempt of court and found him guilty
W/N respondent Judge Jose Majaducon committed
grave abuse of discretion when he dismissed
petitioners motion to dismiss the petition for
prohibition and issued the writ of preliminary
injunction
O SC holds courts have no jurisdiction to restrain Congress
from performing its constitutionally vested function to conduct
investigations in aid of legislation, following the principle of
separation of powers. O There is GAD when the respondent
acts in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner
in the exercise of his judgment, as when the assailed order is
bereft of any factual and legal justification. In this case, the
assailed resolution of Judge Majaducon was issued
without legal basis. oWhen the Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee served subpoena on respondent Flaviano to
appear and testify, it did so pursuant to its authority to
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation provided in Article VI,
Section 21 of the Constitution>or any court for that
matter, had no authority to prohibit the Committee
from requiring respondent to appear and testify before
it. O Bengzon ruling does not apply diff factual circumstances.
In Bengzon, no intended legislation was involved and the subject
matter of the inquiry was more within the province of the courts rather
than of the legislature. The investigation in the said case was an
offshoot of the privilege speech of then Senator Enrile, who urged
the Senate to look into a possible violation of the AntiGraft and Corrupt
Practices Act by the relatives of then President Cory Aquino, Mr.
Ricardo Lopa, in connection with the alleged sale of 36 to 39
corporations belonging to Benjamin Romualdez. On the other hand,

Rule 71, Section 3(d) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
Section 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing.
After a charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to
the respondent to comment thereon within such period as may be
fixed by the court and to be heard by himself or counsel, a person
guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for indirect
contempt:

in this case a clear legislative purpose, as stated in

Senate Resolution No. 160, and the appropriate Senate
Committee was directed to look into the reported misuse and
mismanagement of the AFPRSBS funds, with the intention of
enacting legislation to protect the rights and interests of the
officers and members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
GRANTED. The RTC resolutionnis REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
petition for indirect contempt is ordered DISMISSED.

Romero II vs. Estrada, GR No. 174105, April 2,

2009
August 15, 2006: Petitioner, Reghis Romero II received from
the Committee, headed by Jinggoy Estrada, an invitation to an
investigation/inquiry specifically intended to aid the Senate in
the review and possible amendments to the pertinent
provisions of R.A. 8042, the Migrant Workers Act and to craft a
much needed legislation relative to the stated subject matter
and purpose of the Resolutions In his letter-reply, Petitioner
requested to be excused to appear and testify-denied. A
subpoena was issued by Estrada on Romero II directing him to
appear and testify before the Committee on September 4,
2006 and separate subpoenas to other petitioners in different
date. August 30, 2006: Petitioners filed this petition seeking
to bar the Committee from continuing with its inquiry and to
enjoin it from compelling petitioners to appear. However,
failed to secure TRO, thus Romero II appeared at the
scheduled investigation.

legislation. On-going judicial proceedings do not

preclude congressional hearings in aid of legislation.
> pursuant to its authority to conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation. This is clearly provided in Art. VI, Sec. 21 of the
Constitution. And the Court has no authority to prohibit a
Senate committee.

September 6, 2006: Petitioner Romero II filed Urgent

Plea for a TRO. Petitioners in gist claim that: (1)The
subject matter of the investigation is sub judice ( )
owing to the pendency of the Chavez petition; Sub judice
rule restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to judicial
proceedings to avoid prejudging the issue, influencing the court, or
obstructing the administration of justice . (2)Since investigation

has been intended to ascertain ps criminal liability for

plunder,- not in aid of legislation;
(3)The inquiry compelled them to appear and testify in
violation of their rights against self-incrimination;
and(4)Unless the Court immediately issues a TRO,
some or all of petitioners would be in danger of being
arrested, detained, and forced to give testimony
against their will, before the Court could resolve issues
in G.R. No. 164527 (Chavez).
Respondents aver that: a. distinction bet the issues in
Chavez and Senate resolutions subject matter, thus
sub judice does not apply. The alleged dissipation of
OWWA funds and the purpose of the probe was to aid
the Senate to determine the propriety of amending
Republic Act No. 8042 and enacting laws to protect
OWWA fund. b.The proposed resolutions were a proper
subject of legislative inquiry; and petitioners right
against self-incrimination was well-protected and could
be invoked when incriminating questions were
propounded.
Whether or not the subject matter of the
Committees inquiry is sub judice.
Held: No. The subject matter is no longer sub judice. The
case, Chavez, is no longer sub judice or before a court or
judge for consideration because by an en banc Resolution
dated July 1, 2008, the Court denied with finality the motion of
Chavez(, as the petitioner in Chavez,) for reconsideration of
the earlier Decision of the Court (dated August 15, 2007).>>It
will not avail petitioners any to invoke the sub judice effect of
Chavez and resist the assailed congressional invitations and
subpoenas. (1)The sub judice issue has been rendered
moot and academic by the supervening issuance of the en
banc Resolution of July 1, 2008. (2) AND even assuming hypo
that Chavez is still pending final adjudication by the Court,
still, such circumstance would not bar the continuance
of the committee investigation. Legislative Investigation v
Court Proceedings: A legislative investigation, in aid of
legislation, and court proceedings -different purposes. Court
Proceedings: courts conduct hearings or like adjudicative
procedures to settle, through the application of a law, actual
controversies arising between adverse litigants and involving
demandable rights. Legislative investigation: inquiries in aid
of legislation are, inter alia, undertaken as tools to enable the
legislative body to gather information and, thus, legislate
wisely and effectively; and to determine whether there is a
need to improve existing laws or enact new or remedial
legislation, albeit the inquiry need not result in any potential

Arnault vs. Nazareno, GR No. L-3820, July 18, 1950

Senate Resolution # 8 (Feb 27 1950): Resolution Creating a
Special Committee to Investigate the Buenavista and
Tambobong Estate Deal
oThe Buenavista and Tambobong Estates were bought by the Govt,
through the Rural Progress Administration for 5 Million Pesos from
Ernest H. Burt, who got it for much less. Burt was represented
by Jean L. Arnault for his interests in the purchase of both estates.
oPH Government did not have to purchase the Buenavista Estate
because the occupation government had made a tender of payment in
the amount of 3 Million Pesos already in Japanese currency which

should have been sufficient to vest title of ownership because

payments made in Japanese military notes during occupation were
held to be valid. oPH Government did not have to pay anything for the
Tambobong Estate as it was already practically owned by it by virtue of
a deed of sale from the Philippine Trust Company by virtue of the
recission of the contract of Burt.

O A Special Committee was created to determine

whether the said purchase- honest, valid and proper
and price - fair and just,(has Power to conduct public hearings,
issue subpoenas, and may require instrumentalities of the Government
to assist and cooperate Mandated to determine who were
responsible for and who benefited from the transaction) According

to Arnault, 2 checks payable to Burt aggregating P1.5 M were

delivered to him. On the same date, he opened a new account
in the name of Ernest Burt with the Philippine Bank. The
500,000 was transferred to the account of Associated
Agencies but the P440,000 was payable to cash (the amount
in question in this case). Arnault also claimed that he was
acting in a purely functional capacity as rep and he constantly
invoked his constitutional right to self incrimination. During
the Senate Committee Investigation, Senator Sumulong
asked Arnault: Do you remember or the not the name
of the person to whom you gave the P440,000?
>>During the examinations, Arnault testified (which the Court found

oThe question which Arnault refused to answer was

held in contempt by the Senate because it was
pertinent to the matter under inquiry.
oThe name of the person to whom Arnault gave the P440,000
is indisputably pertinent to the very thing sought to be
determined by the Committee.
oIt was not necessary for the legislative body to show that every
question is material to any proposed or possible legislation; what is
required is that it be pertinent to the matter under inquiry. oTo hold

that the Senate may punish the witness for contempt only
during the session in which investigation has begun and not
after its recess would be to recognize the right of the Senate
to perform its function but at the same time deny to it an
essential and appropriate means for its performance. If we
hold that the power to punish for contempt terminates upon
adjournment of session, then Senate would have to
resume investigation at the succeeding sessions and
repeat the proceedings until it is finally completed
which is absurd and vexatious.

as impossible) that a person whose name he does not remember

received the amt in question from his office. Even if the amount was
huge and the transaction had no receipt, and even if he knew the
receiver as early as 1946 when he made deliveries of him prior and
when Burt was still in the Philippines, he maintained that he does not
remember the name of the person sought for. >>However, in the
next hearings, Arnault refused to answer, invoking her right to the
constitutional right against self-incrimination. >>But what was the
real reason for Arnaults refusal to reveal the name of the person? The
Senators argued that the claim of not remembering the name should
not warrant and is therefore conflicting with Arnaults resolve to invoke
his right against self-incrimination. >>In a mimeographed letter to
the President of the Senate before the Committee proceedings, Arnault
stated that he cannot reveal the name to whom the P440,000 was
given because if he is a public official, he might be liable for bribery
and if he is a private individual, slander. The Senators questioned if
Arnault was just trying to make a pretext for not revealing the
information desired by the Senate. Senate Resolution (May 15

1950): Jean Arnault is committed to the custody of the

Sergeant of Arms and imprisoned in the New Bilibid Prison,
Muntinlupa until discharged by further order of the Senate.
Such discharge will only be ordered when he has purged the
contempt by revealing to the Senate the name of the person
whom he gave the P440,000 as well as answer other pertinent
questions in connection therewith.
Does the Congress have power to punish a person not
a member, for contempt? Power of Inquiry is an essential
and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A
legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the
absence of information. Where the legislative body does not
itself possess the requisite information, recourse must be had
to others who do possess it. Mere requests for information are
often unavailing, and information that is volunteered is not
always accurate or complete so some means of compulsion is
essential to obtain what is needed. The fact that the
Constitution expressly gives to Congress the power to
punish its Members for disorderly behavior, does not
by necessary implication exclude the power to punish
for contempt any other person.
The inquiry must be within the jurisdiction of the legislative
body to makemust be material and necessary to the
exercise of its power. Although not every question must be
related to the legislation to be enacted, the sum total of the
information to be gathered as a result of the investigation (not
a fraction elicited from a single question) will be the basis for
the resulting legislative action. If the subject of investigation
before the committee is within the range of legitimate
legislative inquiry and the proposed testimony of the witness
called relates to that subject, obedience to its process may be
enforced by imprisonment. The power of the legislative body to
punish for contempt is not to the end of every session but to the
end of the last session terminating the existence of that body
to enable the legislative body to perform its constitutional
function without impediment or obstruction.

Doctrine: The legislature has the ability to punish contempt but only in
the particular session in which the act was committed as their
personality expires upon the adjournment of their session.

Facts:The case is an application for writ of habeas corpus to

relieve petitioner from restraint of his liberty under the
respondent Petitioner is under arrest for acts of aggression
committed against representative Dimayuga committed
outside the halls of the House in October 1929 The Session
of Congress ended in November 1929 The arrest warrant
against petitioner was only made by Congress in September

1929The CFI refused the petition for writ of habeas corpus

based on the following< oHoR has the authority and
jurisdiction to try and punish any citizen in this country o
House did not lose jurisdiction though the act was committed
in October 1929 and session of the House ended in November
1929 and the order was released on September 1930>
contention: if the HoR has the power to punish contempt
W/N The House of Representatives has the power to
punish contempt? Yes, The House, the entire legislature for that
matter, has the power to punish contempt, but it must be done within
the session which the act was committed.

W/N The CFI erred in not granting the petition for writ
of habeas corpus? Yes, In the US and England the legislature
is allowed to punish contempt but only within the session in
which the act was committed. The personality of the
legislature is extinguished at every adjournment of session,
and thus it can no longer act on the acts committed in the
previous session. In this case it is clear that the warrant was
served to petitioner was served after the end of the session in
which the act was committed. GRANTED
Separate Opinions: Avancena, C.J., Concur and dissent: Agrees that the
legislature has the power to punish contempt but disagree that it can
only be exercised in the particular session in which the act was
committed
VIllamor and Ostrand, JJ., Concur and dissent: Concur with the opinion
that the legislature has the inherent power to punish contempt but
dissent on the application to this case as Act No. 1755 clearly states
that the court has the jurisdiction over the acts of the members of the
legislature outside its halls
Romualdez, J., Concur and dissent: Agree with the majority except
where it denies the House the power to punish only in the particular
session
Johnson, J., Dissent: It is the same legislature that had a member
assaulted by petitioner which released the warrant of arrest hence it is
a valid act of the House to punish petitioner and that the act cannot
expire upon the adjournment of session

Doctrine: Contempt of court is of two kinds, namely: direct

contempt, which is committed in the presence of or so near
the judge as to obstruct him in the administration of justice;
and constructive or indirect contempt, which consists of willful
disobedience of the lawful process or order of the court.
The test for criticizing a judges decision is whether
or not the criticism is bona fide or done in good faith, and
does not spill over the walls of decency and propriety.
The power to punish for contempt of court is
exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive
principle, and only occasionally should a court invoke its
inherent power in order to retain that respect without which
the administration of justice must falter or fail.
Lorenzo Shipping Corp vs. Distribution Management
Association of the Philippines
Doctrine: Contempt of court is of two kinds, namely: direct contempt,
which is committed in the presence of or so near the judge as to
obstruct him in the administration of justice; and constructive or
indirect contempt, which consists of willful disobedience of the lawful
process or order of the court. >The test for criticizing a judges
decision is whether or not the criticism is bona fide or done in good
faith, and does not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. >The
power to punish for contempt of court is exercised on the preservative
and not on the vindictive principle, and only occasionally should a
court invoke its inherent power in order to retain that respect without
which the administration of justice must falter or fail.

>>petition to charge the respondents with indirect contempt

of court for including allegedly contemptuous statements in
their so-called Sea Transport Update concerning the Courts
resolutions dated June 5, 2002 and August 12, 2002 issued in
G.R. No. 152914 entitled Distribution Management Association
of the Philippines, et al. v. Administrator Oscar Sevilla,
Maritime Industry Authority, et al. On June 4, 2001, the
Maritime Industry Authority (MARINA) issued a LetterResolution, advising respondent Distribution Management
Association of the Philippines (DMAP) that a computation of
the required freight rate adjustment by MARINA was no longer
required for freight rates officially considered or declared
deregulated in accordance with MARINA Memorandum
Circular No. 153 (MC 153). On July 2, 2001, in order to
challenge the constitutionality of EO 213, MC 153, and the
Letter-Resolution dated June 4, 2001, DMAP commenced in

the Court of Appeals (CA) a special civil action for certiorari

and prohibition, with prayer for preliminary mandatory
injunction or temporary restraining order (CA-G.R. SP No.
65463). CA dismissed the petition and MR.
CA denied DMAPs motion for reconsideration. DMAP
appealed to the Court (GR 152914). The Court denied the
petition for petitioners failure to: (oTake the appeal within the
reglementary period of fifteen (15) days in accordance with
Section 2, Rule 45 in relation to Section 5(a), Rule 56, in view
of the foregoing denial of petitioners motion for extension of
time to file the petition; o pay the deposit for sheriffs fee and
clerks commission in the total amount of P202.00 in
accordance with Sections 2 and 3, Rule 45 in relation to
Section [c], Rule 56 and paragraph 1 of Revised Circular No. 188 of this Court. August 12, 2002, the Court denied with
finality DMAPs MR.
October 2002, DMAP held a general membership meeting
(GMM) and publicly circulated the Sea Transport Update. the
petitioners brought this special civil action for contempt
against the respondents, insisting that the publication of the
Sea Transport Update constituted indirect contempt of court
for patently, unjustly and baselessly insinuating that the
petitioners were privy to some illegal act, and, worse, that the
publication unfairly debased the Supreme Court by making
scurrilous, malicious, tasteless, and baseless innuendo to
the effect that the Supreme Court had allowed itself to be
influenced by the petitioners as to lead the respondents to
conclude that the Supreme Court ruling issued in one month
only, normal lead time is at least 3 to 6 months. They
averred that the respondents purpose, taken in the context of
the entire publication, was to defy the decision, for it was
based on technicalities, and the Supreme Court was
influenced!
Did the statements contained in the Sea Transport
Update constitute or amount to indirect contempt of
court?NO, The petitioners did not sufficiently show how the
respondents publication of the Sea Transport Update
constituted any of the acts punishable as indirect contempt of
court under Section 3 of Rule 71. :::Petition for indirect
contempt is DISMISSED.
Romero II vs. Estrada, GR No. 174105, April 2, 2009
repeated
Neri vs. Senate, GR No. 180643, Mar 25, 2008 and Sept
04, 2008
March 25, 2008 Decision
Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution: and Section 22,
Article VI of the Constitution: On April 21, 2007, the (DOTC)
entered into a contract with Zhong Xing Telecommunications
Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of equipment and services for
the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project in the amount
of U.S. $ 329,481,290 (approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The
Project was to be financed by the People's Republic of China.
4 Resol were introduced in the Senate directing the proper
senate committees to conduct investigations in connection
with this NBN Project. Respo Committees initiated the
investigation by sending invitations to certain personalities
and cabinet officials involved. Petitioner was among those
invited. On September 26, 2007, petitioner testified before
respondent Committees for eleven (11) hours. He disclosed
that then Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Chairman
Benjamin Abalos offered him P200 Million in exchange for his
approval of the NBN Project. He further narrated that he
informed President Arroyo about the bribery attempt and that
she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However, when
probed further on what they discussed about the NBN
Project, petitioner refused to answer, invoking
"executive privilege". In particular, he refused to answer
the questions on (a) whether or not President Arroyo followed
up the NBN Project, (b) whether or not she directed him to
prioritize it, and (c) whether or not she directed him to
approve. Respondent Committees issued a Subpoena Ad
Testificandum to petitioner, requiring him to appear and
testify on November 20, 2007.

In a letter dated November 15, 2007, Exec Secretary Ermita

requested Committees to dispense with ps testimony on the
ground of exec privilege.
petitioner did not appear, Committees issued:to explain why
not be in contempt. Finding his explanations unsatisfactory,
Respondent Committees issued the Order January 30, 2008
citing him in contempt of respondent Committees and
ordering his arrest and detention at the Office of the Senate
Sergeant-At-Arms until such time that he would appear and
give his testimony. Petitioner stresses that his conversations with
President Arroyo are "candid discussions meant to explore options in
making policy decisions." According to him, these discussions "dwelt
on the impact of the bribery scandal involving high government
officials on the country's diplomatic relations and economic and
military affairs and the possible loss of confidence of foreign investors
and lenders in the Philippines." He also emphasizes that his claim of
executive privilege is upon the order of the President and within the
parameters laid down in Senate v. Ermita and US v. Reynolds. Related
Events: On March 6, 2008, President Arroyo issued Memorandum
Circular No. 151, revoking Executive Order No. 464 and Memorandum
Circular No. 108. She advised executive officials and employees to
follow and abide by the Constitution, existing laws and jurisprudence,
including, among others, the case of Senate v. Ermita when they are
invited to legislative inquiries in aid of legislation.

1.Are the communications elicited by the subject three

(3) questions covered by executive privilege? -YES. The
power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation
extends even to executive officials, except when there is a
valid claim of executive privilege. The revocation of E.O. 464
does not in any way diminish our concept of executive
privilege, because this concept has Constitutional
underpinnings.
-In Re: Sealed Case, the US CA ruled that there are two (2)
kinds of executive privilege:(1)Presidential
communications privilege (Pertains to communications,
documents or other reflect presidential decision-making and
deliberations and that the Pres believes should remain
confidential Applies to decision-making of the pres,
Rooted in SOP and the presidents unique constitutional
role) (2) Deliberative process privilege (Includes
advisory opinions, recom and delib comprising part of a
process by which governmental decisions and policies are
formulated. Applies to decision-making of executive officials
Rooted in common law privilege))
>Unlike the deliberative process privilege, the presidential
communications privilege applies to documents in their
entirety, and covers final and post-decisional materials as well
as pre-deliberative ones. As a consequence, congressional or
judicial negation of the presidential communications privilege
is always subject to greater scrutiny than denial of the
deliberative process privilege. >-Courts ruled early that the
Executive has a right to withhold documents that might reveal
military or state secrets, identity of government informers in
some circumstances, and information related to pending
investigations. An area where the privilege is highly revered is
in foreign relations.
-Elements of presidential communication privilege: Deliberative

process privilege?

(1)The protected communication must relate to a "quintessential and

non-delegable presidential power."
(2)The communication must be authored or "solicited and received" by
a close advisor of the President or the President himself. The judicial
test is that an advisor must be in "operational proximity" with the
President.
(3)The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified
privilege that may be overcome by a showing of adequate need, such
that the information sought "likely contains important evidence" and
by the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate
investigating authority

-Using the above elements, we are convinced that,

indeed, the communications elicited by the three (3)
questions are covered by the presidential
communications privilege. First, the communications relate
to a "quintessential and non-delegable power" of the
President, i.e. the power to enter into an executive agreement
with other countries. This authority of the President to enter
into executive agreements without the concurrence of the

Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine

jurisprudence. Second, the communications are "received"
by a close advisor of the President. Under the "operational
proximity" test, petitioner can be considered a close
advisor, being a member of President Arroyo's cabinet.
And third, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need
that would justify the limitation of the privilege and of the
unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate
investigating authority.
>>>For a claim to be properly invoked, must be formal claim
of privilege, lodged by the dept head which has control over
the matter. A formal and proper claim of executive privilege
requires a "precise and certain reason" for preserving
their confidentiality. The Letter dated November 15, 2007
of Executive Secretary Ermita satisfies the req: states
that "this Office is constrained to invoke the settled doctrine
of executive privilege as refined in Senate v. Ermita, and has
advised Secretary Neri accordingly."
-With regard to the existence of "precise and certain reason,"
we find the grounds relied upon by Executive Secretary Ermita
specific enough so as not "to leave respondent Committees in
the dark on how the requested information could be classified
as privileged." The case of Senate v. Ermita only requires that
an allegation be made "whether the information demanded
involves military or diplomatic secrets, closed-door Cabinet
meetings, etc." The particular ground must only be specified.
The enumeration is not even intended to be comprehensive."
The following statement of grounds satisfies the
requirement:The context in which executive privilege is being
invoked is that the information sought to be disclosed might
impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the
People's Republic of China. Given the confidential nature in which
these information were conveyed to the President, he cannot provide
the Committee any further details of these conversations, without
disclosing the very thing the privilege is designed to protect.

2.Did respondent Committees commit GAD in issuing

the contempt Order?
-YES. Reasons:(1)There being a legitimate claim of executive
privilege, the issuance of the contempt Order (2)Respondent
Committees did not comply with the requirement laid down in Senate
v. Ermita that the invitations should contain the "possible needed
statute which prompted the need for the inquiry," along with "the usual
indication of the subject of inquiry and the questions relative."
Compliance with this requirement is imperative, both under Sections
21 and 22 of Article VI of the Constitution. Unfortunately, despite
petitioner's repeated demands, respondent Committees did not send
him an advance list of questions. (3)Only a minority of the members of
the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee was present during the
deliberation. Section 18 of the Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries
in Aid of Legislation provides that the needed vote is a majority of all
the members of the Committee to punish a witness for contempt.
(4)Respondent Committees likewise violated Section 21 of Article VI of
the Constitution, requiring that the inquiry @ "duly published rules of
procedure." Not having published its Rules of Procedure, the subject
hearings in aid of legislation conducted by the 14th Senate, are
therefore, procedurally infirm. (5)Respondent Committees' issuance of
the contempt Order is arbitrary and precipitate. It must be pointed out
that respondent Committees did not first pass upon the claim of
executive privilege and inform petitioner of their ruling. Instead, they
curtly dismissed his explanation as "unsatisfactory" and simultaneously
issued the Order citing him in contempt and ordering his immediate
arrest and detention. GRANTED.
September 4, 2008 Decision
1. Whether or not there is a recognized presumptive
presidential communications privilege in our legal system
-YES. This is not the first time that the presumption in favor of
presidential comm priv has been mentioned and adopted in our legal
system. The privilege is fundamental to the operation of government
and inextricably rooted in the separation of powers. The right to
information does not extend to matters recognized as privileged
information under the separation, by which the Court meant
Presidential conversations, corresp, and discussions in closed-door
Cabinet meetings.

2.Whether or not there is factual or legal basis to hold that the

communications elicited by the three questions are covered by
executive privilege -YES. -The power to enter into an executive
agreement is a "quintessential and non-delegable presidential power.The "doctrine of operational proximity" was laid down precisely to limit

the scope of the presidential communications privilege but, in any

case, it is not conclusive.
-The Presidents claim of executive privilege is not merely based on a
generalized interest; and in balancing respondent Committees and the
Presidents clashing interests, the Court did not disregard the 1987
Constitutional provisions on government transparency, accountability
and disclosure of information.
3.Whether or not respondent Committees have shown that the
communications elicited by the three questions are critical to
the exercise of their functions
-NO.

4.Whether or not respondent Committees committed GAD in

issuing the contempt
-YES. RULING: Respondent Committees MR dated April 8, 2008 is
DENIED.

Bengzon vs. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, GR No. 89914, Nov

20, 1991

>>30 July 1987: The Republic, represented by the with the

Sandiganbayan a Civil Case entitled "Republic of the
Philippines vs. Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez, et al.", for
reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and
damages. alleges that the defendants, (Kokoy) Romualdez and
Juliette Gomez Romualdez, engaged in devices, schemes and
stratagems to unjustly enrich themselves at the expense of
Plaintiff and the Filipino with the active collaboration of the
lawyers of Bengzon Law Offices, such as Atty. Jose F.S.
Bengzon Jr., et al. On motion of Senator Orlando Mercado,
the matter was referred by the Senate to the Committee on
Accountability of Public Officers (Blue Ribbon Committee).
Thereafter, the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee started its
investigation on the matter. Petitioners and Ricardo Lopa were
subpoenaed by the Committee to appear before it and testify
on "what they know" regarding the "sale of 36 corporations
belonging to Romualdez." 23 May 1989 (hearing): Ricardo
Lopa declined to testify on the ground that his testimony may
"unduly prejudice" the defendants. Petitioner Jose F.S.
Bengzon, Jr. likewise refused to testify invoking his
constitutional right to due process, and averring that the
publicity generated by respondents Committee's inquiry could
adversely affect his rights as well as those of the other
petitioners who are his co-defendants in the Sandiganbayan
Civil Case.
Claiming that the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee is poised to
subpoena them and required their attendance and testimony
in proceedings before the Committee, in excess of its
jurisdiction and legislative purpose, in clear and blatant
disregard of their constitutional rights, and to their grave and
irreparable damages, prejudice and injury, and that there is
no appeal nor any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law, the petitioners filed the present
petition for prohibition with a prayer for temporary restraining
order and/or injunctive relief.
(1)Does the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee's inquiry have
valid legislative purpose, i.e., done in aid of legislation?-NO.
The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation is not absolute. As provided in Section 21, Art. VI of the
1987 Constitution, the investigation must be "in aid of legislation in
accordance with its duly published rules of procedure" and that "the
rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be
respected." It follows then that the rights of persons under the Bill of
Rights must be respected, including the right to due process and the
right not to be compelled to testify against one's self.-The inquiry, to be
within the jurisdiction of the legislative body making it, must be
material or necessary to the exercise of a power in it vested by the
Constitution, such as to legislate or to expel a member (Arnault v.
Nazareno). To ascertain the character or nature of an inquiry, resort
must be had to the speech or resolution under which such an inquiry is
proposed to be made. -A perusal of the speech of Senator Enrile
reveals that he (Senator Enrile) made a statement which was published

in various newspapers in September 1988 accusing Mr. Ricardo "Baby"

Lopa of "having taken over the FMMC Group of Companies." Mr. Lopa
wrote a letter to Senator Enrile categorically denying such.-The Lopa
reply prompted Senator Enrile, during the session of the Senate on 13
September 1988, to avail of the privilege hour. The speech of Senator
Enrile contained no suggestion of contemplated legislation; he merely
called upon the Senate to look into a possible violation of Sec. 5 of RA
No. 3019, otherwise known as "The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act." I other words, the purpose of the inquiry to be conducted by
respondent Blue Ribbon Commitee was to find out whether or not the
relatives of President Aquino, particularly Mr. Ricardo Lopa, had
violated the law in connection with the alleged sale of the 36 or 39
corporations belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez to the Lopa
Group. There appears to be, therefore, no intended legislation
involved.-It appeals, therefore, that the contemplated inquiry by
respondent Committee is not really "in aid of legislation" because it is
not related to a purpose within the jurisdiction of Congress, since the
aim of the investigation is to find out whether or not the relatives of
the President or Mr. Ricardo Lopa had violated Section 5 RA No. 3019,
the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act", a matter that appears more
within the province of the courts rather than of the legislature.
-It cannot be overlooked that when respondent Committee decide to
conduct its investigation of the petitioners, the complaint had already
been filed with the Sandiganbayan. A perusal of that complaint shows
that one of its principal causes of action against herein petitioners, as
defendants therein, is the alleged sale of the 36 (or 39) corporations
belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez. Since the issues in said
complaint had long been joined by the filing of petitioner's respective
answers thereto, the issue sought to be investigated by the respondent
Commitee is one over which jurisdiction had been acquired by the
Sandiganbayan. In short, the issue had been pre-empted by that court.
(2)Does the inquiry violate their right to due process?
-YES. One of the basic rights guaranteed by the Constitution to an
individual is the right against self-incrimination. this right of the
accused is extended to respondents in administrative investigations,
but only if they partake of the nature of a criminal proceeding or
analogous to a criminal proceeding. It is not the character of the suit
involved but the nature of the proceedings that controls. Thus, the
right against self-incrimination may be invoked not only in criminal
proceedings but also in all other types of suit. RULING: The petition is
GRANTED.
DISSENTS
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:
-There are three queries which, if answered in the affirmative, may
give the Court cause to intervene.(1)Is the matter being investigated
one on which no valid legislation could possibly be enacted? It is
presumed that the action of the legislative body was with a legitimate
object if it is capable of being so construed. (McGrain v. Daugherty)
The Court cannot probe into the motives of the members of the
Congress. (Stamler v. Willis)The investigative power of Congress is
not subject to the limitation that hearings must result in legislation or
recommendations for legislation. (US v. Shelton)The Congress has
the right secure information in order to determine whether or not to
legislate on a particular subject matter on which it is within its
constitutional powers to act. (United States v. Deutch) The
materiality of the question must be determined by its direct relation to
the subject of the inquiry and not by its indirect relation to any
proposed or possible legislation. The reason is that the necessity or
lack of necessity for legislative action and form and character of the
action itself are determined by the sum total of the information to be
gathered as a result of the investigation, and not by a fraction to be
gathered as a result of the investigation, and not by a fraction of such
information elicited from a single question. On the basis of this
interpretation of what "in aid of legislation" means, it can readily be
seen that the phrase contributes practically nothing towards protecting
witnesses. Practically any investigation can be in aid of the broad
legislative power of Congress. Applying the above principles to the
present case, it can readily be seen that the Senate is investigating an
area where it may potentially legislate. The ease with which relatives
of the President were allegedly able to amass great wealth under the
past regime is a legitimate area of inquiry. And if we tack on the
alleged attempts o f relatives of a succeeding administration to
duplicate the feat, the need for remedial legislation becomes more
imperative. (2)Is Congress encroaching on terrain which the
Constitution has reserved as the exclusive domain of another branch of
government?The prosecution of offenders by the DOJ or the
Ombudsman and their trial before courts of justice is intended to
punish persons who violate the law. Legislative investigations go
further. The aim is to arrive at policy determinations which may or may
not be enacted into legislation. Referral to prosecutors or courts of
justice is an added bonus. For sure, the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee
knows it cannot sentence any offender, no matter how overwhelming
the proof that it may gatherm to a jail term. But certainly, the
Committee can recommend to Congress how the situation which
enabled get-rich-quick schemes to flourish may be remedied. The fact
that the subject of the investigation may currently be undergoing trial
does not restrict the power of Congress to investigate for its own

purposes. The legislative purpose is distinctly different from the judicial

purpose.
(3)Is Congress violating the basic liberties of an individual?The
Constitution expressly provides that "the rights of persons appearing in
or affected by such inquiries shall be respected. It does not call for the
banning or prohibition of investigations where a violation of a basis
rights is claimed. It only requires that in the course of the proceedings,
the right of persons should be respected. What the majority opinion
mandates is a blanket prohibition against a witness testifying at all,
simply because he is already facing charges before the
Sandiganbayan. To my mind, the Constitution allows him to interpose
objections whenever an incriminating question is posed or when he is
compelled to reveal his court defenses, but not to refuse to take the
witness stand completely. Arnault v. Nazareno, supra, illustrates the
reticence, with which the court views petitions to curtail legislative
investigations even where an invocation of individual liberties is made.
nIn Arnault, the entire country already knew the name of the
presidential relative whom the Senate was trying to link to the
Tambobong-Buenavista estate anomalies. Still, the Court did not
interfere when Arnault refused to answer specific questions directed at
him and he was punished for his refusal. The Court did not restrain the
Senate when Arnault was sent to the national penitentiary for an
indefinite visit until the name which the Senate wanted him to utter
was extracted. Only when the imprisonment became unreasonably
prolonged and the situation in Congress had changed was he released.
nAs pointed out by the respondents, not one question has been
asked requiring an answer that would incriminate the petitioners. The
allegation that their basic rights are violated is not only without basis
but is also premature
CRUZ, J., dissenting:
-It is presumed that the action of the legislative body was with a
legitimate object if it is capable of being so construed. This
presumption is supported by the established facts. The inquiry is
sustainable as an implied of power the legislature and even as
expressly limited by the Constitution.
-The inquiry deals with alleged manipulations of public funds and illicit
acquisitions of properties now being claimed by the PCGG for the
Republic of the Philippines. The purpose of the Committee is to
ascertain if and how such anomalies have been committed. It is settled
that the legislature has a right to investigate the disposition of the
public funds it has appropriated; indeed, "an inquiry into the
expenditure of all public money is an indispensable duty of the
legislature." Moreover, an investigation of a possible violation of a law
may be useful in the drafting of amendatory legislation to correct or
strengthen that law.
-The petitioner's contention that the questioned investigation would
compel them to reveal their defense in the cases now pending against
them in the Sandigangbayan is untenable. Like any ordinary witness,
they can invoke the right against self-incrimination only when and as
the incriminating question is propounded.
-The expanded power of judicial review is available only if there is a
clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion, which cannot be seen in
the case at bar.
Standard Chartered Bank vs. Senate Comm. on Banks, GR No.
167173, Dec 27, 2007 repeated
AKBAYAN vs. Aquino, GR No. 170516, Aug 28, 2007, July 16,
2008
Doctrine: Executive Privilege. The president and high-ranking officials enjoy
privileged communications where such communication is not subject to being
required to be produced in a court of law if the revelation of the communications
would be of a nature which would significantly affect the presidents or the officials
ability to do their jobs properly and effectively.

This is a petition for mandamus and prohibition to obtain from

respondents the full text of the Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership
Agreement (JPEPA) including the Philippine and Japanese offers
submitted during the negotiation process and all pertinent attachments
and annexes thereto.
01/25/2005. Pettioners Congressman Lorenzo R. Taada III and Mario
Joyo filed House Resolution No. 551 calling for an inquiry into the
bilateral trade agreements then being negotiated by the Philippine
government, particularly the JPEPA. Numerous requests from the
Congress (on separate dates, all in 2005) were sent to Usec. Aquino,
Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita, NEDA Director-General Romulo
Neri and Tariff Commission Chairman Edgardo Abon to provide the
House Committee with all documents on the JPEPA including the latest
draft of the proposed agreement, the requests and offers, etc. The
request was not heeded on the ground that proposed Agreement is still
a work in progress. A copy of the Agreement shall be provided once
the negotiations are completed and as soon as a thorough legal review
of the proposed Agreement has been conducted. 08/31/2005. The
House Committee resolved to issue a subpoena for the most recent
draft of the JPEPA, but the same was not pursued because by
Committee Chairman Congressman Teves information, then House
Speaker Jose de Venecia had requested him to hold in abeyance the
issuance of the subpoena until the President gives her consent to the
disclosure of the documents.

The JPEPA, which will be the first bilateral trade agreement to be

entered into by the Philippines with another country in the event the
Senate grants its consent to it, covers a broad range of topics which
respondents enumerate as follows: trade in goods, rules of origin,
customs procedures, paperless trading, trade in services, investment,
intellectual property rights, government procurement, movement of
natural persons, cooperation, competition policy, mutual recognition,
dispute avoidance and settlement, improvement of the business
environment, and general and final provisions.
9/11/2006. The final text of the JPEPA has been made accessible to
the public.
1)Do the petitioners, in their capacity as citizens, taxpayers,
and legislators, have legal standing to file this suit? Yes, the
petitioners may file this suit.
In a petition anchored upon the right of the people to information on
matters of public concern, which is a public right by its very nature,
petitioners need not show that they have any legal or special interest
in the result, it being sufficient to show that they are citizens and,
therefore, part of the general public which possesses the right. As the
present petition is anchored on the right to information and petitioners
are all suing in their capacity as citizens and groups of citizens
including petitioners-members of the House of Representatives who
additionally are suing in their capacity as such, the standing of
petitioners file the present suit is grounded in jurisprudence.

2)Upon the public availability of the final text of JPEPA

to the public, has the relief sought become moot and
academic?The petition has become PARTLY moot and academic.The
text of the JPEPA having been made accessible to the public, the
petition has become moot and academic to the extent that it seeks
the disclosure of the full text thereof. The petition is not entirely
moot, however, because petitioners seek to obtain, not merely the text
of the JPEPA, but also the Philippine and Japanese offers in the course
of negotiations. 3)Does the refusal of the government to disclose the
documents bearing on the JPEPA negotiations violate the petitioners
right to information on matters of public concern, and contravene other
constitutional provisions on transparency, such as that on the policy of
full public disclosure of all transactions involving public interest? No,
because diplomatic negotiations come under the scope of the doctrine
of executive privilege. From the nature of the JPEPA as an international
trade agreement, it is evident that the Philippine and Japanese offers
submitted during the negotiations towards its execution are matters of
public concern.
However, the documents of the proposed JPEPA as well as the text
which is subject to negotiations and legal review by the parties fall
under the exceptions to the right of access to information on matters
of public concern and policy of public disclosure. They come within the
coverage of executive privilege. The negotiations of the
representatives of the Philippines as well as of Japan must be allowed
to explore alternatives in the course of the negotiations.In PMPF v
Manglapus, the Court held that secrecy of negotiations with foreign
countries is not violative of the constitutional provisions of freedom of
speech or of the press nor of the freedom of access to information.
It bears emphasis, however, that such privilege is only presumptive.
The Court provided in Senate v Ermita that recognizing a type of
information as privileged does not mean that it will be considered
privileged in all instances. Only after a consideration of the context in
which the claim is made may it be determined if there is a public
interest that calls for the disclosure of he desired information, strong
enough to overcome its traditionally privileged status.
Conclusion:To recapitulate, petitioners demand to be furnished with a
copy of the full text of the JPEPA has become moot and academic, it
having been made accessible to the public since September 11, 2006.
As for their demand for copies of the Philippine and Japanese offers
submitted during the JPEPA negotiations, the same must be denied,
respondents claim of executive privilege being valid. Diplomatic
negotiations have, since the Court promulgated its Resolution in PMPF
v. Manglapus on September 13, 1988, been recognized as privileged in
this jurisdiction and the reasons proffered by petitioners against the
application of the ruling therein to the present case have not
persuaded the Court. Moreover, petitioners both private citizens and
members of the House of Representatives have failed to present a
"sufficient showing of need" to overcome the claim of privilege in this
case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed.
NOTE:
According to Blacks Law Dictionary, contempt (the topic in the
syllabus in which this case falls under) refers to a willful disregard or
disobedience of a public authority. BUT neither in the August 2007 SC
Resolution and in the July 2008 SC Decision speaks of contempt
haizxst. Please further read on na lang. Included below are some things
na paulit-ulit sinasabi sa case (which I dont still get how they make
this case one about contempt.)
In the realm of treaty-making, the President has the sole authority to
negotiate with other states. Nonetheless, while the President has the
sole authority t negotiate and enter into treaties, the Constitution
provides a limitation to his power by requiring the concurrence of 2/3

of all members of the Senate for the validity of the treaty entered into
by him.
Congress, while possessing vast legislative powers, may not interfere
in the field of treaty negotiations. While Article VII, Section 21 provides
for Senate concurrence, such pertains only to the validity of the treaty
under consideration, not the conduct of negotiations attendant to its
conclusion. Moreover, it is not even Congress as a whole that has been
given the authority to concur as a means of checking the treatymaking power of the President, but only the Senate.
Separate Opinions
Puno, C.J. (dissenting)
- For a claim of diplomatic secrets privilege to succeed, it is incumbent
upon respondents to satisfy the Court that the disclosure of the subject
JPEPA documents after the negotiations have been concluded would
prejudice our national interest, and that they should therefore be
cloaked by the diplomatic secrets privilege. Otherwise, the Court,
which has the duty to determine with finality whether the
circumstances are appropriate for a claim of privilege, will not have
any basis for upholding or rejecting respondents invocation of the
privilege.
- The judicial branch, not the executive branch, is the final arbiter of
whether the privilege should apply, contrary to the governments
assertion that the head of the relevant agency should be allowed to
assert the privilege unilaterally.
- Courts and scholars have identified three purposes of the privilege (1)
to protect candid discussions within an agency; (2) to prevent public
confusion from premature disclosure of agency opinions before the
agency has established a final policy; (3) to protect against confusing
the issues and misleading the public by dissemination of documents
suggesting reasons and rationales for a course of action, when these
were not in fact the ultimate reasons for the agencys action.
- Two requisites are essential for a valid assertion of the privilege: the
material must be (1) pre-decisional, i.e. a document must be generated
before the adoption of an agency policy; (2) deliberative, i.e. It must
reflect the give-and-take of the consultative process
Azcuna, J. (dissenting)
- Executive Secretary Ermita did not really invoke the privilege. All he
said was that, at the time of the request, negotiations were on-going,
so that it was difficult to provide all the papers relative to he proposed
Treaty. He did not say that it was privileged or secret or confidential but
that it was difficult at the time to comply with the request as the
Executive understandably had its hands full in the midst of the
negotiations.

Paredes vs. Sandiganbayan, GR No. 118364, Aug 10, 1995

The admissibility of evidence is a question for the Sandiganbayan to determine in
the event it is used by the prosecution
The mere filing of several cases based on the same incident does not necessarily
constitute forum-shopping. The test is whether the several actions filed involve the
same transactions, essential facts, and circumstances.
To warrant a finding of political harassment so as to justify the grant of
extraordinary writs of certiorari and prohibition, it must be shown that the
complainant possess the power and the influence to control the prosecution of
cases. They must prove that public prosecutor, and not just the public
complainant, is acting in bad faith in prosecuting the case or has lent himself to a
scheme that could have no other purpose than to place the accused in contempt
and disrespute.

Facts:
Petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction, seeking to set aside
the resolution dated December 9, 1992 of the Office of the
Ombudsman, denying petitioners motion for the reinvestigation of
three cases of falsification of public documents which had been filed
against petitioners and to restrain the Second Divison of the
Sandiganbayan from hearing the cases.January 23, 1990, Teofilo
Gelacio filed a complaint against petitioner, Paredes Jr., petitioner
Masueto Honrada and Atty. Generoso Sansaet, counsel of petitioners.
He alleged that Honrada, as MTC clerk of court, in conspiracy with
Paredes and the counsel, certified as true copy of a Notice of
Arraignment dated July 1, 1985 and of the Transcript of Stenographic
Notes on July 9, 1985 showing that an arraignment had been held in
Criminal Case when in fact there hadnt. He also submitted a
Certification issued by Judge Ciriaco Ario of the MCTC saying that said
Criminal Case never reached the arraignment stage before it was
dismissed on motion of the prosecution to support this
claim.Preliminary investigation was conducted. Petitioners filed their
counter-affidavits. Paredes denied the charges. Honrada said an
arraignment has been held was certified by him. This was supported by
Atty. Sansaet who said that he was present during the arraignment and
said that Judge Arioss certification was a product of a faltering
mind.Resolution was submitted to the Deputy Ombudsman but
before it could be acted upon, Atty. Sansaet retracted his statement
and instead said that there really was no arraignment held and that
Honrada made false certifications which were used to support the
dismissal of Criminal Case. On the basis of the evidence of the
parties, Graft Investigation Officer of the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman redommended that petitioners and Atty. Sansaet be
charged with Falsification of Public Documents. Petitioners moved to
quash the informations, which was denied. They then moved for
reinvestigation of the cases. This was granted. The Special Prosecution
Officer, however, recommended the denial of their motion because
their grounds for this latter motion were the same as those of in their
motion to quash, which was denied. He held that no newly-discovered
evidence or denial of due process had been shown, there was no basis
for petitioners request for a reinvestigation.
W/N petitioners constitutional right to due process was
violated at various stages of the preliminary investigation?
Petitioners: Filing of charges against them was not recommended by
the prosecutor who conducted the preliminary investigation, but by
another one who had not part at all in the investigation. > no basis for
the petitioners claim. The first preliminary investigation was done by
Public Prosecutor Albert Alcalan. However, because Atty. Sansaet
retracted his earlier statement, the investigation has to be reopened.
This new investigation was designated to be conducted by Gay Maggie
Balajadia-Violan. Such an arraignment has never been thought to raise
any question of due process. What is important is that the judge who
decides does so on the basis of the evidence in record, it does not
matter that he did not conduct the hearing of that case from the
beginning.Petitioners: GIO II Violan and Prosecutor Querubin do not
have such cold neutratlity of an impartial judge to be trusted to
conduct a fair investigation. Violan gave credence to the Certification
issued by Judge Ario when the fact is that Judge Ario executed an
affidavit explaining that he issed such certification without expectation
that it would be used as evidence in any case and that the use of said
certificate is against his conscience. Violan also considered Atty.
Sansaets Affidavit of Explanations and Rectifications when it is in
violation of the confidentiality of attorney-client communication under
Rule 130, 24 (b) of the Rules of Court. For Querubin, he is biased
because he is the same prosecutor who handled the previous criminal
case. oViolan Violan giving credence to Judge Arios certification is
not proof that he is biased against petitioners. The fact that Judge Ario
did not anticipate that his certificate might be used in evidence, much
less in criminal cases is not a reason to disregard it. Consideration of
the retraction of Atty. Sansaet does not also prove that Violan was
biased against petitioners. There was no proof that the resolution of
Violan was based on Atty. Sansaets retraction. All she said is that Atty.
Sansaets confession has important bearing in the case. Violan even
thought that the retraction was made in violation of attorney-client
privilege and therefore, would be inadmissible in evidence. Violan
could not, therefore, have relied on the affidavit of retraction. The
admissibility of this piece of evidence is a question for the
Sandiganbayan to determine in the event it is used by the prosecution.
oQuerubin simply because he was the one who handled the
prosecution of Criminal case in connection with the documents
allegedly falsified is not a reason for supposing he could not act fairly.

Querubin is a public prosecutor, not a private attorney. He is the

representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy but of a
sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartiality is as compelling as
its obligation to govern at all and whose interest is that justice shall be
done.
W/N prosecutor closed their eyes to the fact that in filing the
cases private respondent Teofilo Gelacio engaged in forumshopping?
The mere filing of several cases based on the same incident does not
necessarily constitute forum-shopping. The test is whether the several
actions filed involve the same transactions, essential facts, and
circumstances.In the case at bar, although several cases were filed by
the same complainant against the same defendant and the subject
matter of the actions of two of the cases was the same incident
(application for free patent of petitioner), the fact is that the serveral
cases involve essentially different facts, circumstances and causes of
action. Although they arose from the same incident it is well settled
that a single act may offend against two or more distinct and related
provisions of law15 or that the same act may give rise to criminal as
well as admin liability. 16As such, they may be prosecuted
simultaneously or one after another, so long as they do not place the
accused in double jeopardy of being punished for the same offense.
But one thing is administrative liability. Quite another thing is the
criminal liability for the same act. Our determination of the
administrative liability for falsification of public documents is in no way
conclusive of his lack of criminal liability. In Tan v. Comelec,18 the
dismissal of an administrative case does not necessarily bar the filing
of a criminal prosecution for the same or similar acts which were the
subject of the administrative complaint. Petitioners assertion that
private respondent Alterado has resorted to forum-shopping is
unacceptable. The investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman
on the criminal case for falsification and violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, on the one hand, and the inquiry into the
administrative charges by the COMELEC, on the other hand, are
entirely independent proceedings. Neither would the results in one
conclude the other.
W/n the cases were filed for political harassment and there is
in fact no prima facie evidence to hold them answerable for
falsification of public documents? We find the foregoing
averments to be unpersuasive. First of all, that the filing of the charges
is politically motivated cannot justify the prohibition of a criminal
prosecution if there is otherwise evidence to support them. What
petitioners raise are questions which go to the weight to be given to
the affidavits by Atty. Nueva and Judge Ario. These are matters for the
trial courts appreciation. A preliminary investigation is not a trial. The
function of the government prosecutor is merely to determine the
existence of a probable cause. To warrant a finding of political
harassment so as to justify the grant of extraordinary writs of certiorari
and prohibition, it must be shown that the complainant possess the
power and the influence to control the prosecution of cases. They must
prove that public prosecutor, and not just the public complainant, is
acting in bad faith in prosecuting the case or has lent himself to a
scheme that could have no other purpose than to place the accused in
contempt and disrespute. DISMISSED.

Aldovino, Jr. vs. COMELEC, GR No. 184836, Dec 23, 2009 Respondent
was elected for 3 consecutive terms as counselor of Lucena city. In
September 2005 or during his 2004-2007 term of office, the
Sandiganbayan preventively suspended him for 90 days in relation
with a criminal case he then faced. In September 2005 or during his
2004-2007 term of office, the Sandiganbayan preventively suspended
him for 90 days in relation with a criminal case he then faced. In the
2007 election, Asilo filed his certificate of candidacy for the same
position. Petitioners sought to deny course to the respondents
certificate of candidacy on the ground that he had been elected and
had already served for three terms. The COMELEC's Second Division
ruled against the petitioners and in Asilo's favour in its Resolution of
November 28, 2007. It reasoned out that the three-term limit rule did
not apply, as Asilo failed to render complete service for the 2004-2007
term because of the suspension the Sandiganbayan had ordered.
W/N Preventive suspension of an elected public official is an
interruption of his term of office for purposes of the 3-term
limit rulePetition is meritorious Interruption of a term"Interruption"
of a term exempting an elective official from the three-term limit rule is
one that involves no less than the involuntary loss of title to office.
On the other hand, temporary inability or disqualification to exercise
the functions of an elective post, even if involuntary, should not be
considered an effective interruption of a term because it does not
involve the loss of title to office or at least an effective break from
holding office; the office holder, while retaining title, is simply barred
from exercising the functions of his office for a reason provided by
law.An interruption occurs when the term is broken because the office
holder lost the right to hold on to his office, and cannot be equated
with the failure to render service.
Preventive suspension: Preventive suspension is imposed under the
Local Government Code "when the evidence of guilt is strong and
given the gravity of the offense, there is a possibility that the
continuance in office of the respondent could influence the witnesses
or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other
evidence." Notably in all cases of preventive suspension, the
suspended official is barred from performing the functions of his office
and does not receive salary in the meanwhile, but does not vacate and
lose title to his office; loss of office is a consequence that only results
upon an eventual finding of guilt or liability. Strict adherence to the
intent of the three-term limit rule demands that preventive suspension
should not be considered an interruption that allows an elective
official's stay in office beyond three terms. A preventive suspension
cannot simply be a term interruption because the suspended official
continues to stay in office although he is barred from exercising the
functions and prerogatives of the office within the suspension
period.To allow a preventively suspended elective official to run for a
fourth and prohibited term is to allow a constitutional violation through
sophistry by equating the temporary inability to discharge the
functions of office with the interruption of term that the constitutional
provision contemplates.> Hence, Comelec committed grave abuse of
discretion when it granted due course to the respondents certificate of
candidacy for a fourth term PETITION GRANTED

Mabanag vs. Lopez

Section 313 of the old Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2210
"Official documents may be proved as follows: . . . (2) the proceedings of the
Philippine Commission, or of any legislative body that may be provided for in the
Philippine Islands, or of Congress, by the journals of those bodies or of either house
thereof, or by published statutes or resolutions, or by copies certified by the clerk
or secretary, or printed by their order; Provided, That in the case of Acts of the
Philippine Commission or the Philippine Legislature, when there is an existence of a
copy signed by the presiding officers and secretaries of said bodies, it shall be
conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the due enactment thereof."
Doctrine: The Supreme Court follows the Enrolled Bill Rule. It ensures the stability
and validity of statutes. If it will not be followed, then the Court would always have
to check the journals/proceedings of Congress to see if the statute conforms to it
and the presumption of validity would go to those journals/proceedings; to rely on
these imperfect, unauthenticated journals would render all of written law
unstable.

Petition for prohibition to prevent the enforcement of a congressional

resolution proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the
Philippines (For the Parity Rights Agreement)The petitioners, 3
senators and 8 representatives, were proclaimed by a majority vote of
the Comelec as having been elected senators and representatives in
the election of April 23, 1946. However, the three senators were
suspended, and the 8 representatives were not allowed to sit in the
lower House. Because of this, they didnt take part in the passage of
the questioned resolution, their membership werent included in the
computation of the necessary vote required in proposing an
amendment to the constitution. Thus they filed this petitioncontending that if they were counted, the votes in favor of the
resolution wouldve fallen short of the required number.Respondents
argue that the Court had no jurisdiction over this case, relying on the
conclusiveness of an enrolled bill/resolution.
W/N The Court has jurisdiction over this caseThe court has no
jurisdiction because the issue is a political question. The court cited
Coleman v Miller, the efficacy of ratification by state legislature of a
proposed amendment to the Federal Constitution is a political question
and hence not justiciable. If the ratification of an amendment is a

political question, a proposal which leads to ratification has to be a

political question as well.
W/N The Enrolled Bill rule is applicableEnrolled Bill rule- a duly
authenticated bill or resolution imports absolute verity and is binding
on the courts. Once a bill passes a legislative body and is signed into
law, the court assumes that all rules of procedure in the enactment
process had been properly followed. SC chooses to follow the rule
since it conforms to the expressed policy for our law making body. Sec
313 of the old Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2210 is
statutory sanction for conclusiveness. In the opinion of the court, the
reasons in support of the rule are decisive. 50 American Jurisprudence
SEC. 150. Reasons for Conclusiveness. It has been declared that the
rule against going behind the enrolled bill is required by the respect
due to a coequal and independent department of the government, and
it would be an inquisition into the conduct of the members of the
legislature, a very delicate power, the frequent exercise of which must
lead to endless confusion in the administration of the law. The rule is
also one of convenience, because courts could not rely on the
published session laws, but would be required to look beyond these to
the journals of the legislature and often to any printed bills and
amendments which might be found after the adjournment of the
legislature. Otherwise, after relying on the prima facie evidence of the
enrolled bills, authenticated as exacted by the Constitution, for years,
it might be ascertained from the journals that an act theretofore
enforced had never become a law. In this respect, it has been declared
that these is quite enough uncertainty as to what the law is without
saying that no one may be certain that an act of the legislature has
become such until the issue has been determined by some court
whose decision might not be regarded as conclusive in an action
between the parties.Professor Wigmore: If the rule would be followed,
the Court must then compare the statute to the journal/proceedings of
the legislature and if there is any discrepancy between the two, then
the journal/proceedings would be taken as a standard of veracity and
the act [statute/bill] would be rejected To my mind, nothing can be
more certain than that the acceptance of this doctrine by the Court
would unsettle the entire statute law of the State. We have before us
some evidence of the little reliability of these legislative journals. . . .
Can any one deny that if the laws of the State are to be tested by a
comparison with these journals, so imperfect, so unauthenticated, the
stability of all written law will be shaken to its very
foundations?Ruling: we deem it unnecessary to decide the
question of whether the senators and representatives who
were ignored in the computation of the necessary threefourths vote were members of Congress within the meaning of
section 1 of Article XV of the Philippine Constitution.

Aguinaldo vs. Santos, GR No. 94115, Aug 21, 1992

Rule of Law:
Articles VII (17) and X (4) of the 1987- see issue 2
Article XI of the 1973 Constitution, Section 2 of which specifically provided as
follows Sec. 2. The National Assembly shall enact a local government code which
may not thereafter be amended except by a majority vote of all its Members,
defining a more responsive and accountable local government structure with an
effective system of recall, allocating among the different local government units
their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and providing for the qualifications,
election and removal, term, salaries, power, functions, and duties of local
government officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and
operation of the local units. However, any change in the existing form of local
government shall not take effect until ratified by a majority of the votes cast in the
plebiscite called for the purpose.///Section 3, Article X of the 1987 Constitution
Doctrine: When a people have elected a man to office, it must be assumed that
they did this with knowledge of his life and character, and that they disregarded or
forgave his fault or misconduct, if he had been guilty of any. His reelection to office
operates as a condonation of the officer's previous misconduct.

January 17, 1988. Aguinaldo was elected Governor of the province of

Cagayan. Shortly after December 1989 coup d'etat was crushed,
respondent Secretary of Local Government sent a telegram and a lette,
to petitioner requiring him to show cause why he should not be
suspended or remove from office December 7, 1989. The mayors of
the municipalities of Gattaran, Tuao and Lasam, all in Cagayan filed a
sworn complaint for disloyalty to the Republic and culpable violation of
the Constitution against petitioner for his acts in then coup. January 5,
1990 the Department of Local Government received a letter from
petitioner dated December 29, 1989 in reply to respondent Secretary.
In his letter, petitioner denied being privy to the planning or actively
participating in the coup, though he admitted that he was sympathetic
to the cause of the rebel soldiers.Secretary suspended petitioner from
office for sixty (60) days from notice, pending the outcome of the
formal investigation.Petitioner neither presented evidence nor even
crossexamined the complainant's witnesses. Respondent Secretary
found petitioner guilty and installed Vice Gov. Melvin Vargas as
Governor of Cagayan. THE PETITION: Thus, this petition for certiorari
and prohibition with preliminary mandatory injunction and/or
restraining order. Aguinaldo assails the decision of respondent
Secretary dated March 19,1990 in Adm. Case dismissing him on the
ground that (1) the power of the Secretary of Local Government to
dismiss local government official under Section 14, Article I, Chapter 3
and Sections 60 to 67, Chapter 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 337,
otherwise known as the Local Government Code, was repealed by the
effectivity of the 1987 Constitution (2) that since Secretary no longer
has power to suspend or remove petitioner, the former could not
appoint Vargas as Governor and (3) the alleged act of disloyalty
committed by petitioner should be proved by proof beyond reasonable
doubt, and not be a mere preponderance of evidence, because it is an
act punishable as rebellion under the RPC. While this case was
pending before this Court, petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy
for the position of Governor of Cagayan for the May 11, 1992
elections.3 separate petitions for his disqualification were filed, all
based on the ground that he had been removed from office by virtue of
the March 19, 1990 resolution of the Secretary. The COMELEC granted
the petitions by way of a resolution dated May 9, 1992. Thus, petitioner
may still be voted upon as a candidate for governor pending the final
outcome of the disqualification cases. May 14, 1992. SC issued a TRO
to cease and desist from enforcing its May 9, 1992 resolution, allowing
the canvassing of the votes and returns to proceed. However, the
Commission was ordered not to proclaim a winner until this Court has
decided the case. (in Rodolfo E. Aguinaldo v. Commission on Elections,
et al filed: May 13, 1993) June 9, 1992. SC granted the petition and
annulling the May 9, 1992 resolution of the Commission on the ground
that the decision of respondent Secretary has not yet attained finality
and is still pending review with this Court. As petitioner won by a
landslide margin in the elections, the resolution paved the way for his
eventual proclamation as Governor of Cagayan.
1. See THE PETITION (on Condonation)
The SC finds the pending administration case moot and academic. It
appears that after the canvassing of votes, petitioner garnered the
most number of votes among the candidates by a landslide margin as
held by this Court in Aguinaldo v. Comelec et al
In Pascual v. Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija, the Court has ruled that
the weight of authority, however, seems to incline to the ruled denying
the right to remove from office because of misconduct during a prior
term to which we fully subscribe. >Offenses committed, or acts done,
during a previous term are generally held not to furnish cause for
removal and this is especially true were the Constitution provides that
the penalty in proceeding for removal shall not extend beyond the
removal from office, and disqualification from holding office for a term
for which the officer was elected or appointed. >Offenses committed
during a previous term are generally held not to furnish cause for
removal and this is especially true were the Constitution provides that
the penalty in proceeding for removal shall not extend beyond the
removal from office, and disqualification from holding office for a term
for which the officer was elected or appointed.>A condonation and a
right of people to elect officers>The Court should never remove a
public officer for acts done prior to his present term of office. To do
otherwise would be to deprive the people of their right to elect their
officers. When a people have elected a man to office, it must be

assumed that they did this with knowledge of his life and character,
and that they disregarded or forgave his fault or misconduct, if he had
been guilty of any. His reelection to office operates as a condonation of
the officer's previous misconduct. However, this rule finds no app to
criminal cases pending against petitioner for acts he may have
committed during the failed coup.
2. W/N respondent Secretary has no power to dismiss local government
official under Section 14, Article I, Chapter 3 and Sections 60 to 67,
Chapter 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code, was repealed by the effectivity of the 1987
Constitution
We do not agree. The power of respondent Secretary to remove local
government officials is anchored on both the Constitution and a
statutory grant from the legislative branch. The constitutional basis is
provided by Articles VII (17) and X (4) of the 1987 Constitution which
vest in the President the power of control over all executive
departments, bureaus and offices and the power of general supervision
over localn governments, and by the doctrine that the acts of the
department head are presumptively the acts of the President unless
expressly rejected by him. And the constitutional roots of B.P. Blg. 337
Article XI of the 1973 Constitution, Section 2 has a similar provision is
found in Section 3, Article X of the 1987 Constitution, then it cannot be
said that BP Blg. 337 was repealed by the effective of the present
Constitution.
3. W/N the alleged act of disloyalty committed by petitioner should be
proved by proof beyond reasonable doubt, and not be a mere
preponderance of evidence, because it is an act punishable as rebellion
under the RPC Petitioner is not being prosecuted criminally under the
provisions of the Revised Penal Code, but administratively with the end
in view of removing petitioner as the duly elected Governor of Cagayan
Province for acts of disloyalty to the Republic where the quantum of
proof required is only substantial evidence. //petitioner is hereby
GRANTED
Other Notes Moreover, in Bagabuyo et al. vs. Davide, Jr., et al., 7 this court had the
occasion to state that B.P. Blg. 337 remained in nforce despite the effectivity of the
present Constitution, until such time as the proposed Local Government Code of
1991 is approved.

Lico v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 205505,

September 29, 2015
Article VI, Sec. 17, 1987 Constitution.
Doctrine: The equipoise doctrine provides that when the evidence in an issue of
fact is in equipoise, that is, when the respective sets of evidence of both parties
are evenly balanced, the party having the burden of proof fails in that issue.

Facts:
The instant case involves two rival factions of the same party-list
organization, the Adhikaing Tinataguyod ng Kooperatiba (Ating Koop).
One group is headed by petitioner Atty. Isidro Q. Lico (the Lico Group),
who represents th organization in the House of Representatives, and
the other group by Amparo T. RImas (respondents herein, or the RImas
Group).Ating Koop is a multi-sectoral party-list organization which was
registered on November 16, 2009
under RA No 7941 (Party-List
System Act).03/10/2010. Ating Koop filed with the COMELEC the list of
its nominees, with Lico as the first nominee, and Mascaria as the
second nominee.06/09/2010. Ating Koop issued Central Committee
Resolution 2010-01, which incorporated a term-sharing agreement
signed by its nominees, wherein Lico was to serve as Party-List
Representative for the first year of the three-year term.12/09/2010.
Lico took his oath of office and thereafter assumed office, as Ating
Koop won in the elections. 05/14/2011. Ating Koop held its Second
National Convention during which it introduced amendments to its
Constitution and By-laws.Among the salient changes was the
composition of the Central Committee, which would still be composed
of 15 representatives but with five each coming from Luzon, Visayas
and Mindanao (5-5-5 equal representation). The amendments likewise
mandated the holding of an election of Central Committee members
within six months after the Second National Convention. In effect, the
amendments cut short the three-year term of the incumbent members
(referred to hereafter as the Interim Central Committee) of the Central
Committee.13 The Interim Central Committee was dominated by
members of the Rimas Group. 12/05/2011. Lico was expelled from
Ating Koop on the grounds of malversation, graft and corruption, and
disloyalty. Licos refusal to honor the term-agreement was the factual
basis for disloyalty. 12/19/2011. The Lico Group held a special
meeting in Cebu City where new members of the Central Committee,
as well as new set of officers, were elected. 01/21/2012. The Rimas
Group held a Special National Convention in Paraaque City, at which
a new Central Committee and a new set of officers were constituted.
Members of the Rimas Group won the election and occupied all the
corresponding seats. 03/16/2012. The Rimas Group filed with
COMELEC a petition praying that Lico be ordered to vacate the office of
Ating Koop in the House of Representatives, and for the succession of
Mascaria as Ating Koops representative. 04/14/2012. The Rimas
Group filed an Amended Petition impleading the entire Lico Group, and
praying that the COMELEC nullify the Cebu meeting and recognize the
Paraaque convention. 07/18/2012. The COMELEC Second Division
upheld the expulsion of petitioner Lico from Ating Koop and declared
Mascaria as the duly qualified nominee of the party-list group. The
Second Division characterized the issue of the validity of the expulsion
of petitioner Lico from Ating Koop as an intra-party leadership dispute,
which it could resolve as an incident of its power to register political
parties. 01/31/2013. COMELEC en banc denied Licos subsequent
Motion for Reconsideration, holding that his expulsion from Ating Koop
affected his qualifications as member of the House, and therefore it
was the HRET that had jurisdiction over the petition. At the same
time, COMELEC upheld the validity of Licos expulsion from the partylist, explaining that when the Interim Central Committee ousted him,
the said Committees members remained in hold-over capacity even
after their terms had expired, and that the COMELEC was not in a
position to substitute its judgment for that of Ating Koop with respect
to the cause of the expulsion. The COMELEC En Banc recognized the
Rimas Group as the legitimate representative of Ating Koop considering
that: 1) it found nothing in the records to show that the Lico Group
made a valid call for the special election of Central Committee
members as required under the Amended Constitution and By-Laws;2)
there is nothing on record indicating that a minimum of 100 attended
the Cebu meeting; and 3) the Paraaque convention was in accordance
with Ating Koop' s Amended Constitution and By-Laws.
1)Does the COMELEC have jurisdiction over the expulsion of a
Member of the House of Representatives from his party-list
organization?
No, COMELEC does not have jurisdiction. HRET has the sole jurisdiction
on cases regarding the qualifications of its bona fide members. In the
case of party-list representatives, the HRET acquires jurisdiction over a
disqualification case upon proclamation of the winning party-list group,
oath of he nominee, and assumption of office as member of the House
of Representatives. In this case, COMELEC proclaimed Ating Koop as a
winning party-list group; Lico took his oath and assumed office. Thus, it
is the HRET that has jurisdiction over the disqualification case.
2)Which group is the legitimate leadership of Ating Koop?
The legitimate leadership lies in the Interim Central Commitee. The
COMELECs jurisdiction to settle the struggle for leadership within the
party is well-established, as it is incident to its enforcement powers.
Neither of the elections held in Cebu and Paraaque was valid, as the
amendments to the constitution was not registered with the COMELEC.
Moreover, both meetings failed to establish due notice and a quorom.

Since both groups failed to establish their cases (doctrine of

equipoise), the legitimate leadership is the Interim Central Committee,
whose members remain as such in a hold-over capacity. The existing
Interim Central Committee is still a legitimate entity with full authority
to bind the party-list and to carry out powers despite the lapse of the
term of its members on November 14, 2011, since no successors had
been validly elected at the time, or since.
Ruling: Petition is GRANTED. The COMELEC en banc resolution and
COMELEC Second Division Resolution are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. A
new one is entered DECLARING that the legitimate Central Committee
and set of officers legitimately representing Ating Koop are the Interim
Central Committee and set of officers prior to the split of Ating Koop.

Duenas, Jr. vs. HRET, GR No. 185401, July 21, 2009

Rule of Law: HRET Rule 88 RULE 88. Pilot Precincts; Initial Revision. Any provision
of these Rules to the contrary notwithstanding, as soon as the issues in any
contest before the Tribunal have been joined, it may direct and require the
protestant and counter-protestant, in case the protest or counter-protest involves
more than 50% of the total number of precincts in the district, to state and
designate in writing within a fixed period at most twenty-five (25%) percent of the
total number of precincts involved in the protest or counter-protest, as the case
may be, which said party deems as best exemplifying or demonstrating the
electoral irregularities or frauds pleaded by him; and the revision of the ballots
and/or reception of evidence shall begin with such pilot precincts designated. Upon
the termination of such initial revision and/or reception of evidence, which
presentation of evidence should not exceed ten (10) days, and based upon what
reasonably appears therefrom as affecting or not the officially-proclaimed results of
the contested election, the Tribunal may direct motu propio [of its own accord] the
continuation of the revision of ballots in the remaining contested precincts, or
dismiss the protest, or the counter-protest, without further proceedings.
Doctrine: HRET can continue/discontinue revision proceedings of its own accord.
Hornbrook Doctrine- jurisdiction, once acquired, is not lost at the instance of the
parties but continues until the case is terminated.

Facts: Duenas and Reyes were rival candidates for the position of
congressman in the 2nd legislative district of Taguig City in the election
of May 14, 2007. Duenas was proclaimed the winner. (28,564 votes to
27,107 votes)
June 4, 2007 Reyes filed an election protest in the HRET, praying for a
revision(recount) in 170 of 732 precincts of the 2nd legislative district
of Taguig City alleging he was cheated through insidious and wellorchestrated electoral frauds and anomalies which resulted in the
reduction of his votes and the increase of Duenas votes.June 25,
2007 Duenas filed an answer and counter-protested 560 precincts,
claiming that fraud was also committed against him in those precincts.
Sept 18, 2007 HRET started the revision of ballots (100% of the
pretested precincts and 25% pilot of the counter-protested precincts)
Sept 25, 2008 in an order, HRET continued revision of the remaining
75% of the counter-protested precincts pursuant to Rule 88 of HRET
Rules, since they couldnt come to a conclusive determination yet but
they did find fake/spurious ballots in some of the protested and
counter-protested precincts. Oct 21, 2008 HRET denied Duenas
motion for reconsideration and also ordered him to augment his cash
deposit with P320,000 to cover the expenses of the revision of the
ballots in the remaining 75% of the counter-protested precincts Oct
27, 2008 Instead of complying, Duenas filed an urgent motion to
withdraw/abandon the remaining counter-protested precincts Nov 27,
2008 HRET issued a resolution, denying Duenas motion and reiterating
its order to continue with the revision, but also recalling the order
requiring Duenas to augment his cash deposit and ordering the use of
its own funds to cover the expenses. HRET invoked Rule 88 of the
HRET Rules and settled jurisprudence, ruling that it had the discretion
either to dismiss the protest/counter-protest, or to continue with the
revision if necessitated by reasonable and sufficient grounds affecting
the validity of the election. HRET said that the mere filing of a motion
to withdraw/abandon the unrevised precincts didnt automatically
divest it of its jurisdiction over the same. Duenas argues that Reyes
had the burden of proving his cause and if he fails to do so the protest
should have been dismissed. The HRETs failure to ascertain the true
will of the electorate after the complete revision of the protested
precincts is already a demonstration of Reyes failure to prove his
cause. Thus the HRET committed grave abuse of discretion when it
continued with the revision of ballots in the remaining unrevised
counter-protested precincts- its as if the HRET is helping Reyes prove
his cause this way. HRET also committed grave abuse of discretion by
assuming the burden of the costs- their funds should not be used for
the benefit of a private party. HRETs discretion w/n to continue with
revision may only be exercised when the results of the initial revision
shows that it can reasonably affect the outcome of the elections.
However, the total number of the alleged fake/spurious ballots were
only 75, only 5% of his lead vote.
Reyes argues that Under Rule 88, HRET had the discretion to
continue and a mere filing of a motion to withdraw/abandon does not
divest the HRET of its jurisdiction over the election protest. The HRET
could use its funds to shoulder the cost of revision, otherwise it would
render its mandated functions meaningless.
Power of HRET to Deny the Motion to Withdraw/Abandon
Counter-Protest
Duenas says there is no point in continuing since, after the revision of
the protested precincts and 25% of the counter-protested precincts, he
still has a lead of more than 1000 votes.732 total precincts. 170
protested precincts. 560 counter-protested precincts, 25% of which is
140. Thus only 310 precincts were checked and there are 420 more
which may affect the election outcome if it contains a significant
number of fake/spurious ballots.Such a determination is far from
arbitrary and thus the HRET has not committed grave abuse of
discretion when it decided to continue the revision based on
this.Meaning of Rule 88 is plain. HRET has the discretion to continue
the revision. Even if Duenas was to be allowed to withdraw his counterprotest, HRET can still continue the revision, and his mere filing does
not divest the tribunal of its jurisdiction over the case. *Hornbrook
Doctrine.The Court also cannot decide if the evidence found during
the initial revision is sufficient enough to warrant a continuation of the
revision- to do so would be to encroach on the jurisdiction of the HRET
as the sole judge of all contests relating to election, returns and

qualifications of its members. as provided for in the

Constitution.Court also agrees that to determine that the filing of a
motion to withdraw protest effectively withdraw the precincts from the
protest would be to deprive HRET of its jurisdiction.
Discretion of HRET to use its own funds in the Revision
ProceedingsHRETs order to use its own funds for the revision was
an exercise of power necessary or incidental to its function as sole
judge of election protest cases.Duenas contends that even if the
HRET could lawfully continue the revision, RA 9498 (2008 GAA) did not
authorize it to use its own funds for the purposeif petitioner
hypothetically admits that the HRET has the power to order the
continuation of the revision of the 75% remaining counter-protested
precincts, then he should also necessarily concede that there is
nothing to prevent the HRET from using its own funds to carry out such
objective. Otherwise, the existence of such power on the part of the
HRET becomes useless and meaningless.
Section 1, Chapter 1 of RA 9498 provides that the HRET has an
allotted budget for the "Adjudication of Electoral Contests Involving
Members of the House of Representatives." The provision is general
and encompassing enough to authorize the use of the HRETs funds for
the revision of ballots, whether in a protest or counter-protest.even
assuming that RA 9498 did not expressly authorize the HRET to use its
own funds for the adjudication of a protest or counter-protest, it had
the inherent power to suspend its own rules and disburse its funds for
any lawful purpose it deemed best.The use of the funds in this
manner cannot be considered as giving Reyes an unwarranted
benefit, advantage, or preference since it is the electorate who will
benefit. In an election protest, any benefit to a party would simply be
incidental.
Ruling Petition dismissed. HRET Resolution affirmed. Case
remanded to the HRET so that the revision proceedings may
continue.
OpinionQuisimbing, J dissent
The decision gives the HRET unbridled discretion to proceed with the revision of
ballots even if the protestant failed to show that the results of the initial revision
reasonably affected the officially proclaimed results, in direct contravention of the
parameters and guidelines that the HRET itself has set.It was grave abuse of
discretion for the HRET to order the continuation of the revision of ballots based on
pure conjecture. (fake/spurious ballots were inconsequential)Allowing a
protestant to rely on the results of the precincts not included in his protest is
tantamount to allowing him to substantially amend his protest by broadening its
scope at a later date- not allowed under HRET Rule 28Allotted budget of HRET
never intended by GAA to be used to cover the revision of ballots. HRET may relax
its rules, but only if there is sufficient evidence to do so.
Nachura, J separate opinion
Concurs that the HRET has the discretion to continueBUT cannot agree that
HRET may use its funds to cover the expenses of the revision.Therefore, grant
the petition.

Seneres vs. COMELEC, GR No. 178678, April 16, 2009,

June 22, 2010
HRET has sole jurisdiction on all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of respective members (after proclamation, oath-taking and after
candidate assumes office)
Hold-over Doctrine: Authorities are almost unanimous that one who continues
with the discharge of the functions of an office after the expiration of his or her
legal term no successor having, in the meantime, been appointed or chosen
is commonly regarded as a de facto officer, even where no provision is made by
law for his holding over and there is nothing to indicate the contrary (not the

Petition:Petition for Certiorari w/ prayer for TRO &/or Preliminary

Injunction to nullify & enjoin the implementation of the July 19, 2007
resolution of COMELEC w/c declared

1999- Robles elected as Pres of BUHAY (partylist). Consti of

buhay provides for 3 year term w/o reelection2001 & 2004
Buhay Participated in elections with Robles as Pres.> All req.
documents Manifestation of Desire to Participate & Cert. of
nominations) to participate in elections bore Robles signature
as pres.Jan 26, 2007- Buhay filed req. to participate in May
2007 elections, it bore Robles signature as pres.May 27,
2007 Hans Seneres, as acting pres. And Sec Gen. of BUHAY,
filed Cert of Nominations for 2007 elections (containing his
name w/ 3 other candidates)May 29, 2007- Robles filed Cert
of Nominees with different set of namesApril 17, 2007Seneres filed petition w/ comelec to deny due course to Cert
of Nomination filed by Robles. He alleged:He was acting
pres. And sec since Aug 17, 2004 (when robles vacated
position). So Robles nominations were null and void since he
did not have the authority to file them.Under the Consti,
Robles was disqualified to be an officer for a political party
since he was an Acting Administrator for a GOCC LRTA. (Civil
service members not allowed to participate in partisan
political activity)May 10, 2007 Seneres was expelled from
BUHAY by its Nat. Council for submitting Cert of Nimination
without authority from said council.June 30- Robles filed
petition to declare null and void Seneres Cert of Nominations
and Cert of AcceptancesJuly 9 & 18 Comelec proclaimed
Buhay as winning party list and is entitled to 3 House
seatsJuly 19, 2007- Comelec en banc recognized and

declared Robles as pres. Since no party election was held to

replace him and he is then holding the position in a hold-over
capacity. Comelec also disposed of partisan pol. Party issue as
Seneres claim were unconvincing.Nominees took their oath
and assumed office as member of HR
WON petition has merit?Petition of Certiorari as an
improper remedy
According to Art VI sec 17 of the 1987 Constitution, HRET
shall be the sole judge of all contest relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of their respective members. This is
reiterated in Rule 14 of the 1991 Revised Rules of the
Electoral Tribunal of the HR.The use of sole emphasizes
the exclusive character of the jurisdiction conferred. The role
of the Electoral Tribunal is described as intended to be
complete and unimpaired (Lazatin v House Electoral
Tribunal)The jurisdiction is passed from COMELEC to
Electoral Tribunal, the moment the winning candidate has
been proclaimed, taken his oath and assumed office as a
member of the HR Petitioner should have instead filed quo
warranto before HRET within ten days from receipt of July 19,
2007 resolution and not a petition for certiorari before this
court. Since Petitioner failed to file quo warranto within 10
days from receipt of said resol., proclamation of COMELEC has
already become final and executory. Petition is now moot.
Petition Dismissed. Comelecs ruling reaffirmed.

Bondoc vs. Pineda, GR No. 97710, Sept 26, 1991

The tribunal was created to function as a nonpartisan court although two-thirds of
its members are politicians. It is a non-political body in a sea of politicians.>To be
able to exercise exclusive jurisdiction, the House Electoral Tribunal must be
independent. Its jurisdiction to hear and decide congressional election contests is
not to be shared by it with the Legislature nor with the Courts.

>In the local and congressional elections held on May 11,

1987, Marciano M. Pineda of the Laban ng Demokratikong
Pilipino (LDP) and Dr. Emigdio A. Bondoc of the Nacionalista
Party (NP) were rival candidates for the position of
Representative for the Fourth District of the province of
Pampanga.
On May 19, 1987, Pineda was proclaimed winner in the
election.Bondoc filed a protest (HRET Case No. 26) in the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET for
short).Bondocs protest was submitted for decision in July,
1989.By October 1990, a decision had been reached in which
Bondoc won over Pineda by a margin of twenty-three (23)
votes. At that point, the LDP members in the Tribunal insisted
on a reappreciation and recount of the ballots cast in some
precincts, thereby delaying by at least four (4) months the
finalization of the decision in the case.The reexamination and
re-appreciation of the ballots resulted in increasing Bondocs
lead over Pineda to 107 votes, Congressman Camasura voted
with the Supreme Court Justices and Congressman Cerilles to
proclaim Bondoc the winner of the contest.Congressman
Camasura revealed on March 4, 1991, to his Chief,
Congressman Jose S. Cojuangco, Jr., LDP Secretary General,
not only the final tally in the Bondoc case but also that he
voted for Bondoc consistent with truth and justice and selfrespect, and to honor a gentlemens agreement among the
members of the HRET that they would abide by the result of
the appreciation of the contested ballot" Congressman
Camasuras revelation stirred a hornets nest in the LDP which
went into a flurry of plotting appropriate moves to neutralize
the pro-Bondoc majority in the Tribunal. On March 13, 1991,
the eve of the promulgation of the Bondoc decision,
Congressman Cojuangco informed Congressman Camasura by
letter2 that on February 28, 1991 yet, the LDP Davao del Sur
Chapter at Digos, Davao del Sur, by Resolution No. 0391, had
already expelled him and Congressman Benjamin Bautista
from the LDP for having-o allegedly helped to organize the
Partido Pilipino of Eduardo Danding Cojuangco, >o and for
allegedly having invited LDP members in Davao del Sur to join
said political party. The House of Representatives, during its
plenary session on March 13, 1991, decided to withdraw the
nomination and rescind the election of Congressman
Camasura, Jr. to the House of Electoral Tribunal. The three (3)
Justices-members of the Supreme Court, being of the opinion

that this development undermines the independence of the

Tribunal and derails the orderly adjudication of electoral
cases, they have asked the Chief Justice, in a letter of even
date, for their relief from membership in the
Tribunal.Congressman Cerilles also manifested his intention
to resign as a member of the Tribunal.
Congressmen Aquino, Ponce de Leon, Garcia, Jr., and
Calingasan also manifested a similar intention. This Court
resolved to direct the Justices to return to their duties in the
Tribunal. Petitioner prays this court to: oAnnul the decision of
the House of Representatives of March 13, 1991, to withdraw
the nomination and to rescind the nomination of
Representative Juanito G. Camasura, Jr. to the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal.
oIssue a writ of prohibition restraining respondent Palacol or
whomsoever may be designated in place of respondent
Camasura from assuming, occupying and discharging
functions as a member of the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal;oIssue a writ of mandamus ordering
respondent Camasura to immediately reassume and
discharge his functions as a member of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal; oGrant such other relief as
may be just and equitable.Respondents argue: oCongress
being the sole authority that nominates and elects from its
members, Upon recommendation by the political parties
therein, those who are to sit in the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal (and in the Commission on Appointments as
well), hence, it allegedly has the sole power to remove any of
them whenever the ratio in the representation of the political
parties in the House or Senate is materially changed on
account of death, incapacity, removal or expulsion from the
political party;oA Tribunal members term of office is not coextensive with his legislative term, for if a member of the
Tribunal who changes his party affiliation is not removed from
the Tribunal, the constitutional provision mandating
representation based on political affiliation would be
completely nullified; oThe expulsion of Congressman
Camasura from the LDP, is purely a party affair of the LDP9
and the decision to rescind his membership in the House
Electoral Tribunal is the sole prerogative of the House of
Representatives, hence, it is a purely political question beyond
the reach of judicial review.
May the House of Representatives, at the request of
the dominant political party therein, change that
partys representation in the House Electoral Tribunal
to thwart the promulgation of a decision freely reached
by the tribunal in an election contest pending therein?
No, The resolution of the House of Representatives violates
the independence of the HRET. Disloyalty to party is not a
valid cause for termination of membership in the HRET.
Expulsion of Congressman Camasura violates his right to
security of tenure. Membership in the House Electoral Tribunal
may not be terminated except for a just cause, such as, the
expiration of the members congressional term of office, his
death, permanent disability, resignation from the political
party he representsin the tribunal, formal affiliation with
another political party, or removal for other valid cause. A
member may not be expelled by the House of Representatives
for party disloyalty short of proof that he has, formally
affiliated with another political group.
May the Supreme Court review and annul that action of
the House?
Yes, The judicial power of this Court has been invoked by
Bondoc for the protection of his rights against the strong arm
of the majority party in the House of Representatives. The
Court cannot be deaf to his plea for relief, nor indifferent to
his charge that the House of Representatives had acted with
grave abuse of discretion in removing Congressman
Camasura from the House Electoral Tribunal. He calls upon the
Court, as guardian of the Constitution, to exercise its judicial
power and discharge its duty to protect his rights as the party
aggrieved by the- action of the House. The Court must
perform its duty under the Constitution even when the
violator be the highest official of the land or the Government
itself.
Ruling: WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus is granted. The decision of the House of Representatives

withdrawing the nomination and rescinding the election of Congressman

Juanito G. Camasura, Jr. as a member of the House Electoral Tribunal is
hereby declared null and void abinitio for being violative of the
Constitution, and Congressman Juanito G. Camasura, Jr. is ordered
reinstated to his position as a member of the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal. The HRET Resolution No. 910018 dated March
14,1991, cancelling the promulgation of the decision in HRET Case No. 26
(Dr. Emigdio Bondoc vs. Marciano A. Pineda) is also set aside.
Considering the unconscionable delay incurred in the promulgation of
that decision to the prejudice of the speedy resolution of electoral cases,
the Court, in the exercise .of its equity jurisdiction, and in the interest of
justice, hereby declares the said decision DULY PROMULGATED, effective
upon service of copies thereof on the parties, to be done immediately by
the Tribunal Costs against respondent Marciano A. Pineda.

of the political parties, mandated by the Constitution, must be

recognized and respected; no matter how politically motivated It might
be. Constitutional law, it is said, is concerned with power not with
policy, wisdom or expediency. The question that:must be asked in
testing the validity of such legislative act is, does the House of
Representatives have the power to do what it has done and not
whether the House of Representatives should have done what it has
done -The judicial department, in my opinion, has no power to review
even the most arbitrary and unfair action of the legislative department,
taken in the exercise of power committed exclusively to it by the
Constitution.

Dissenting Opinion:

-I vote to dismiss the petition-Can the Court annul an act of Congress,

revamping its House Electoral Tribunal?is a political question and a
question in which the Court can not intervene.-Evidently, Congressman
Camasuras ouster from the Tribunal was a result of political
maneuvers within the lower house. This Court, however, is above
politics and Justices should be the last persons to get involved in the
dirty world of politics. If they do, they risk their independence.

Padilla, J. -I vote to DISMISS the petition -Can the House of

Representatives withdraw the nomination extended to a member of the
electoral tribunal (representing the House of Representatives) after the
majority party in the House has expelled him from its; ranks? I believe
it can. The power to appoint or designate a member of the House of
Representatives- to be a member of the House Electoral Tribunal
must, to my mind, necessarily include the power to remove said
member. A withdrawal of the nomination of a member of the Tribunal
-where such withdrawal will maintain the proportional representation

Sarmiento, J.