Loida Nicolas-Lewis vs.

COMELEC
Loss and Re-acquisition of Philippine Citizenship
Doctrine: Art. 5, Sec. 2 provides an exception to the residency requirement in section 1
of the 1987 constitution
>Petition for certiorari and mandamus, petitioners, referring to themselves as "duals"
or dual citizens, pray that they and others who retained or reacquired Philippine
citizenship under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225, the Citizenship Retention and
Re-Acquisition Act of 2003, be allowed to avail themselves of the mechanism provided
under the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 1 (R.A. 9189)
> to allow them to vote and register as absentee voters under the aegis of R.A. 9189.
Whether or not petitioners and others who might have meanwhile retained
and/or reacquired Philippine citizenship pursuant to R.A. 9225 may vote as
absentee voter under R.A. 9189. ----YES
>no provision in - R.A. 9225 - requiring "duals" to actually establish residence and
physically stay in the Philippines first before vote.
> By the doctrine of necessary implication in statutory construction, , the strategic
location of Section 2 indicates that the Constitutional Commission provided for an
exception to the actual residency requirement of Section 1 with respect to qualified
Filipinos abroad ------ petition is GRANTED.
MACALINTAL VS COMELEC
A petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by Romulo Macalintal, a member of the
Philippine Bar, seeking a declaration that certain provisions of RA 9189 (The Overseas
Absentee Voting Act of 2003) suffer from constitutional infirmity. actual and material
legal interest: public funds : taxpayer and as lawyer.
>appropriates funds under Section 29 of RA-- supplemental budget on the General
Appropriations Act Petitioner raises three principal questions for contention:
Issue 1>That Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 allowing the registration of voters, who are
immigrants or permanent residents by mere act of executing an affidavit expressing
their intention to return to the Philippines, violates the residency requirement in Art. V,
Sec. 1 of the Constitution
2>That Section 18.5 empowering the COMELEC to proclaim the winning President and
the VicePresident, violates the constitutional mandate under Art. VII, Sec. 4 should be
by Congress
3>That Section 25 of the same law, allowing Congress (through the Joint Congressional
Oversight Committee created in the same section) to exercise the power to review,
revise, amend, and approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of
COMELEC violates the independence of the COMELEC under Art. IXA, Sec. 1.
Holding:
1.valid per section 2 Art V. Congress shall provide a system for securing the secrecy
and sanctity of the ballot as well as a system for absentee voting by qualified Filipinos
abroad. exception to the residency requirement found in Section 1. (in fact the subject
of debate when Senate Bill No. 2104, which later became R.A. No. 9189)
2. Yes, Section 18.5 is unconstitutional. Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 is far too
sweeping Congress could not have allowed the COMELEC to usurp a power that
constitutionally belongs to it
3. Yes, Section 25 creating the JCOC is unconstitutional. The Commission on Elections
is a constitutional body. It is intended to play a distinct and important part in our
scheme of government. In the discharge of its functions, it should not be hampered
with restrictions that would be fully warranted in the case of a less responsible
organization.
CORDORA v. COMELEC
Loss and Re-acquisition of Philippine Citizenship.
Doctrine: Dual citizenship is not a ground for disqualification from running for any
elective local position. However, concern is of those who were naturalized at a foreign

country, and were made to renounce their allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.
Regarding those instances, they are only allowed to retain their Filipino citizenship by
swearing allegiance to the supreme authority of the Republic of the Philippines.
FACTS: Cordora accused Gustavo Tambunting for false assertions in his certificate of
candidacy), COC: (1)a Natural Born/Filipino Citizen; (2) No. 9 - 36 years of residence in
the Philippines and 25 years in the Constituency.
>Cordora presented a certification from Bureau of Immigration: Tambunting claimed
he is an American: (1) upon arrival in the Philippines on 16 December 2000, and (2)
upon departure from the Philippines on 17 June 2001, Tambunting acquired American
Citizenship through naturalization on 2 December 2000.
> Tambunting presented birth certificate: Filipino mother and an American father.
Denied: naturalized American. Tambunting also took an oath of allegiance on 18
Nov. 2003 pursuant to R.A. 9225. He maintained he resided in the Philippines
since birth, imbibed the Filipino culture, spoken the Filipino language, and
educated in Filipino schools, and that his loyalty is proofed by his service as
a councilor of Paranaque.
Holding: W/N the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion after ruling
that there is no sufficient evidence to support a finding of probable cause to
hold Tambunting for violation of Sec. 74 in relation to Sec. 262 of the
Omnibus Election Code ----NO, Petitioner failed to substantiate and support his
accusations against Tambunting by not being able to present sufficient and convincing
evidence. W/N Tambunting should be prosecuted for knowingly making
untruthful statements in his certificates of candidacy----No. Tambunting does
not deny: Filipino mother and an American father, nor underwent the process involved
in INS Form I-130 (petition for relative) due to his fathers citizenship. He claims that
because of his parents differing citizenship, he is both a Filipino and American by
birth, while Cordora insists that he was naturalized. Therefore, Tambuntings
statement that he is a Filipino citizen, is not untruthful.
Bengson III VS HRET
Case of citizenship of Teodoro CruzCruz = natural-born San Clemente, Tarlac on April
27, 1960: Filipino parents (1935 consti effective)Nov 5, 1985: Cruz enlisted at
USMC US Marine Corpsw/o RP consent, took oath of allegiance to USA lost PH
citizenship c/o CA 63, section 4.June 5, 1990: Thoroughly X Filipino, naturalized as US
citizenMarch 17, 1994: c/o RA 2630, repatriated, reacquired PH citizenshipMay 11,
1998: elected as representative of pangasinan, 2nd district, 26,671 votes vs Antonio
Bengson III, rival. oBengson filed for QUO WARRANTO AD COUTILAM w/ HRET as
respondent, claiming Cruz = not qualified as HR rep. since he isnt natural-born citizen
through Article 6, sec 6 of Consti. March 2, 2000: HRET dismissed petition, declared
Cruz as elected rep.
April 27, 2000: HRET dismissed reconsideration
ISSUE: Can Cruz still be considered natural-born through reqcquisition
even if he came US Citizen?
Held: YES.Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the
same in the manner provided by law. C.A. No. 63 enumerates the 3 modes by which
Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen:1. by naturalization,2. by
repatriation, and 3. by direct act of Congress.
R.A. No. 2630 provides:
Sec 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering service to, or
accepting commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States, or after separation
from the Armed Forces of the United States,
acquired United States citizenship, may reacquire Philippine citizenship by taking an
oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines and registering the same with Local Civil Registry in the
place where he resides or

last resided in the Philippines. The said oath of allegiance shall contain a renunciation
of any other citizenship.
Note: o Repatriation may be had if (1) deserter Of AF (2) served in WW2 (3) service to
USA AF (4) marriage of Filipino woman to alien (5) political economic necessity
JAPZON vs COMELEC
>Petitioner Manuel B. Japzon (Japzon) and respondent Jaime S. Ty (Ty) were candidates
for the Office of Mayor of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar in the
local elections held May 14, 2007.
>Japson filed: COMELEC a petition to disqualify Tys COC misrepresentation - alleged
that Ty had been an American citizen and had been residing in the USA for the last 25
years and when Ty applied for certificate of candidacy, he never actually resided in
Samar for a period of one year immediately preceding the date of election as required
under Section 39 of RA 7160, and even after filing Tys application for reacquisition of
his Philippine citizenship, he continued to make trips to the US.
>Ty admits natural-born Filipino, went to the US to work and become a naturalized
American citizen. Prior to filing his COC for Mayor Gen. Macarthur, Eastern Samar, he
performed the following acts:
1) Filed with the Philippine Consulate General in Los Angeles, California, an
application for reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship ; 2) Executed an
Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on October 2, 2005 before
Noemi T. Diaz, Vice Consul in Los Angeles; 3) Applied for a Philippine passport
indicating that his residence in the Philippines was at A. Mabini St., Barangay 6,
Poblacion, Gen. Macarthur, Eastern Samar;
4) Personally secured and signed his Community Tax Certificate (CTC) from the
Municipality of Gen. Macarthur on March 8, 2006 and on January 4, 2007, where he
stated that his address was at Barangay 6,
5) Registered as a voter n July 17, 2006 in Barangay 6, Poblacion, 6) On March 19,
2007, executed a duly notarized Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship, ..Ty later
on filed his COC on March 28, 2007 and a resident of the Municipality of Gen.
Macarthur, Eastern Samar, prior to the May 14, 2007 elections
Issues and Holding: Whether or not Ty was able to meet the citizenship and
residency requirements.
>YES YES Yes, Ty was repatriated under RA 9225 by his renunciation of his foreign
citizenship and by executing his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.
Tys intent to establish a new domicile of choice in Samar became apparent when ,
immediately after reacquiring his Philippine citizenship, he applied for passport
indicating his residence in the Philippines. the local tax jurisdiction of Eastern Samar
by paying community tax and securing CTCs from the said municipality. In addition,
there is no basis for the court to require Ty to stay in and never leave at all the
municipality for the full oneyear period prior to the local elections.
Reagan vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue
G.R. Number, Case Date: G.R. No. L-26379, December 27, 1969
Raegan, citizen of US and employee of Bendix Radio, a company that provides
technical assistance to the US Air Force He imported on April 22, 1960 a tax-free 1960
Cadillac car with accessories valued at $6,443.83, including freight, insurance and
other charges. On July 11, 1960, petitioner requested the Base Commander for a
permit to sell the car, which was granted provided that the sale was made to a
member of the US Armed Forces or a US citizenOn the same date, petitioner sold his
car for $6,600.00 to Willie Johnson Jr. in Clark Air Base. Sold to Fred Meneses for
$32,000.00>>>>As a result respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue fixed his
net taxable income arising from such transaction the amount of 17, 912.34, rendering
him liable for income tax in the sum of P2,979.00. >>>After paying the sum, he
sought a refund claiming that he was exempt, seeking recovery of the sum of
P2,979.00 plus the legal rate of interest. The Court of Tax Appeals denied.

Would a sale that took place in Clark Air Base be subject to the tax laws of
the Philippines?
Yes. It would still be subjected to the tax laws of the Philippines
Philippines as independent and sovereign, its authority may be exercised over its
entire domain. There is no portion thereof that is beyond its power. Within its limits, its
decrees are supreme, its commands paramount. It has to be exclusive. If it were not
thus, there is a diminution of its sovereignty.
It is to be admitted that any state may, by its consent, express or implied, submit to a
restriction of its sovereign rights. A state then, if it chooses to, may refrain from the
exercise of what otherwise is illimitable competence. Its laws may as to some persons
found within its territory no longer control. It is not precluded from allowing another
power to participate in the exercise of jurisdictional right over certain portions of its
territory. an alien character. They retain their status as native soil. lease to the
American armed forces by virtue of the military bases agreement of 1947--cannot be
foreign territory.
Filartiga vs Pena-Irala
Plaintiffs are citizens of the Republic of Paraguay. Dr. Joel Filartiga, a physician,
opponent of the government of President Alfredo Stroessner, which held power in
Paraguay since 1954. His daughter, Dolly Filartiga, arrived in the US in 1978 under a
visitor's visa, and applied for permanent political asylum.
oThe Filartigas brought this action in the Eastern District of New York
against Americo Norberto Pena-Irala (Pena), also a citizen of Paraguay, for
wrongfully causing the death of Dr. Filartiga's seventeen-year old son,
Joelito. March 29, 1976 - Joelito Filartiga was kidnapped and tortured to death by
Pena, who was then Inspector General of Police in Paraguay. marks of severe torture.
Dr. Filartiga's attorney was arrested, threathened and disbarred without just cause.
>During the course of the Paraguayan criminal proceeding, which is apparently still
pending after four years, another man, Hugo Duarte, confessed to the murder,
member of the Pena household, claimed that he had discovered his wife and Joelito in
flagrante delicto. Duarte not convicted. July of 1978 - Pena sold his house in Paraguay
and entered the US under a visitor's visa. The couple remained in the US beyond the
term of their visas.>>when Dolly Filartiga, learned of their presence. Acting on
information provided by Dolly the Immigration and Naturalization Service arrested
Pena and his companion, both of whom were subsequently ordered deported on April
5, 1979 following a hearing. They had then resided in the US for more than 9
months.>>>Dolly caused Pena to be served with a summons and civil complaint at
the Brooklyn Navy Yard, where he was being held pending deportation.
The complaint alleged that Pena had wrongfully caused Joelito's death by
torture and sought compensatory and punitive damages of $10,000,000. The
Filartigas also sought to enjoin Pena's deportation to ensure his availability for
testimony at trial. The cause of action is stated as arising under "wrongful death
statutes; the U. N. Charter; the Universal Declaration on Human Rights; the U. N.
Declaration Against Torture; the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man;
and other pertinent declarations, documents and practices constituting the customary
international law of human rights and the law of nations," as well as 28 U.S.C. 1350,
Article II, sec. 2 and the Supremacy Clause of the U. S. Constitution. Jurisdiction is
claimed under the general federal question provision, 28 U.S.C. 1331 and, principally
on this appeal, under the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. 1350.3
>Judge Nickerson stayed the order of deportation, and Pena immediately moved to
dismiss the complaint on the grounds that subject matter jurisdiction was absent and
for forum non conveniens. On the jurisdictional issue, there has been no suggestion
that Pena claims diplomatic immunity from suit.
ISSUES: Is torture as a violation of the law of nations? YES. The Filartigas submitted the
affidavits of a number of distinguished international legal scholars, who stated
unanimously that the law of nations prohibits absolutely the use of torture as alleged
in the complaint. customary international law is derived the usage of nations, judicial

opinions and the works of jurists we conclude that official torture is now
prohibited by the law of nations. The prohibition is clear and unambiguous, and
admits of no distinction between treatment of aliens and citizens.
>. Does US have jurisdiction over cases in violation of international law? YES. >
Common law courts of general jurisdiction regularly adjudicate transitory tort claims
between individuals over whom they exercise personal jurisdiction, wherever the tort
occurred. Congress provided for federal jurisdiction over suits by aliens where
principles of international law are in issue. The constitutional basis for the Alien Tort
Statute is the law of nations, which has always been part of the federal common law. .
A state or nation has a legitimate interest in the orderly resolution of disputes among
those within its borders, and where the lex loci delicti commissi ["law of the place
where the delict [tort] was committed"] is applied, it is an expression of comity to give
effect to the laws of the state where the wrong occurred.
Article I, sec. 8, cl. 10,
which grants to the Congress the power to "define and punish . . . offenses against the
law of nations."
Among the rights universally proclaimed by all nations, as we have noted, is
the right to be free of physical torture. Indeed, for purposes of civil liability,
the torturer has become like the pirate and slave trader before him hostis
humani generis, an enemy of all mankind.
Del Mar v. Philippine Veterans Adm (PVA), 51 SCRA 340 (1973)
Del Mar averred that he served during WW II as chief judge advocate of the Cebu Area
Command (a duly recognized guerrilla org.) w/ the rank of major; that he subsequently
obtained an honorable discharge from the service on 10/20/46 on a cert. of permanent
total physical disability; Phil. Veterans Bd granted him a monthly life pension of P50
effective 1/28/47; that in 3/50, discontinued payment of monthly life pension on the
ground that his receipt of similar pension from the US Govt, thru the US Veterans
Admin. by reason of military service rendered in the US in the Far East during the war,
that he wrote the said Bd. twice, demanding the continued payment. And petition for
mandamus was filed w/ CFI-Cebu. The PVA argues that the court a quo was w/o
jurisdiction to try the civil case bec. it involves a money claim against PVA- a mere
agency of the Govt performing governmental functions w/ no juridical personality of its
own- and, in reality, partakes of an action against the Phil. Govt w/c is immune from
suit w/o its consent.
HELD: As a general proposition, the rule on the immunity of the Govt from suit w/o its
consent holds true in all actions resulting in "adverse consequences on the public
treasury, whether in the disbursements of funds or loss of prop. Needless to say, in
such actions, w/c, in effect, constitute suits against the Govt, the court has no option
but to dismiss them. Nonetheless, the rule admits of an exception. action against
functionary who fails to complystatutory duty to release amt.claimed for public funds
already approp for claimants benefit. RULING: GRANTED but not allowance for each
children.. failed to apply req RA 65.
SHAUF vs CA
FACTS: By reason of her non-selection to a position at Clark Air Base, Shauf filed an
equal opportunity complaint against officers of Clark Air Base, for alleged
discrimination against the former by reason of her nationality and sex. She then filed
a complaint for damages with the RTC. Respondents filed a MTD on the ground that as
officers of the US Armed Forces performing official functions in accordance with the
powers vested in them, they are immune from suit.
Shauf contends that the officers are being sued in their private capacity for
discriminatory acts performed beyond their authority, hence the instant action is not a
suit against the US Govt. which would require its consent. According to respondents,
the complaint is barred by the immunity of the US since the acts sued upon are
governmental activities of the US.
HELD:

1. The general rule is that a state may not be sued without its consent. While the
doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is also
applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed
by them in the discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the judgment against such
officials will require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same,
such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages awarded against
them, the suit must be regarded as against the state itself, although it has not been
formally impleaded.
2. It is a different matter where the public official is made to account in his capacity as
such for acts contrary to law and injurious to the rights of plaintiff. Inasmuch as the
State authorizes only legal acts by its officers, unauthorized acts of govt. officials or
officers are not acts of the State, and an action against the officials or officers by one
whose rights have been invaded or violated by such acts, for the protection of his
rights, is not a suit against the State within the rule of immunity of the State from suit.
The doctrine of state immunity cannot be used as an instrument for perpetrating an
injustice.
3. The cloak of immunity is removed from the moment the public official is sued in his
individual capacity such as where he acts without authority or in excess of the powers
vested in him. A public official may be liable in his personal capacity for whatever
damage he may have caused by his act done with malice and in bad faith, or beyond
the scope of his authority or jurisdiction. In this case, the officers are liable for
damages.
Republic Vs Villasor
Republic of the Philippines, petitioner, vs. Hon. Guillermo P. Villasor, as Judge of the CFI
of Cebu, Branch I,
Facts:
The Republic in a motion of certiorari and prohibition order declared a decision final
and executory and of an alias writ of execution directed against the funds of the AFP
subsequently issued >July 3, 1961 a decision was made in favor of the private
respondents confirming the arbitration award in the amount of P1,712,396.40.
>June 24, 1969 respondent Judge issued an order declaring the July 3 order final and
executory, directing respondent sheriffs to execute the same. > Alias Writ of Execution
was executed. Respondent Rizal Sheriff served notices with several banks specially on
the monies due the AFP in the form of deposits sufficient to cover the amount
mentioned in the Writ of Execution. The Philippine Veterans Bank (PVB) received the
same on June 30, 1969. The money of the AFP deposited in PVB and PNB are public
funds duly appropriated and allocated as per citation on July 3, 1969.
Whether or not the Republic was right in filing of the certiorari and
prohibition as the State may not be sued without its consent?
oYes, the Republic was right in filing. As stated by Justice Malcolm "A rule which has
never been seriously questioned, is that money in the hands of public officers,
although it may be due government employees, is not liable to the creditors of these
employees in the process of garnishment. One reason is, that the State, by virtue of its
sovereignty, may not be sued in its own courts except by express authorization by the
Legislature, and to subject its officers to garnishment would be to permit indirectly
what is prohibited directly. Another reason is that moneys sought to be garnished, as
long as they remain in the hands of the disbursing officer of the Government, belong
to the latter, although the defendant in garnishment may be entitled to a specific
portion thereof. And still another reason which covers both of the foregoing is that
every consideration of public policy forbids it."

BEGOSA v PVA GR No. L-25916

Begosa enlisted in the Philippine Commonwealth Army-Battle of Bataan-Liberation
Drive against enemies. Became permanently incapacitated. Obtain benefits on Mar 4,

1955 but the defendants disapproved on the basis of a dishonorable discharge which
took place five years after the end of the war (11/07/1950) while he was in the service
of a different organization and denied his claim on June 21, 1955.
>approval of claim came on Sept 2, 1964 but became effective on Oct 5 for an amount
much less than what he was entitled to under the law (30 instead of 50; rate increased
to 100 a month by June 22, 1957 [Section 9 was amended by RA 1920]) PVA: he is in
fact suing the government. No consent.
Exemption to Doctrine of non-suability? Yes. It is equally well-settled that where a
litigation may have adverse consequences on the public treasury, whether in the
disbursements of funds or loss of property, the public official proceeded against not
being liable in his personal capacity, then the doctrine of non-suability may
appropriately be invoked. It has no application, however, where the suit against such a
functionary had to be instituted because of his failure to comply with the duty imposed
by statute appropriating public funds for the benefit of plaintiff or petitioner. Ruiz v
Cabahug: the suit is not one against the Government, or a claim against it, but one
against the officials to compel them to act
Is the exhaustion of administrative remedies required? Not necessarily.
Exhaustion of administrative remedies is not applicable where the question in dispute
is purely a legal one, or where the controverted act is patently illegal or was
performed without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or where the respondent is a
department secretary, whose acts as an alter-ego of the President bear the implied or
assumed approval of the latter, unless actually disapproved by him, or where there are
circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention.
Republic of the Philippines vs. Feliciano
On 22 January 1970, respondent Feliciano filed a complaint with the then CFI against
the Republic : Land Authority, for the recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel
of land. >Respondent bought the property from Victor Gardiola dated 31 May 1952,
followed by a deed of absolute sale on 30 October 1954.
On 1 November 1954, President Magsaysay issued Proclamation No. 90 reserving for
settlement purposes, under the administration of the National Resettlement and
Rehabilitation Administration (NARRA), a tract of land situated in the Municipalities of
Tinambac and Siruma, Camarines Sur.
Plaintiff prayed that he be declared the rightful and true owner of the property in question
consisting of 1,364.4177 hectares; that his title of ownership based on informacion posesoria of his
predecessor-in-interest be declared legal valid and subsisting and that defendant be ordered to
cancel and nullify all awards to the settlers. >>On August 29, 1970, the trial court ruled Lot No. 1,
with an area of 701.9064 hectares, to be the private property of the plaintiff, "being covered by a
possessory information title in the name of his predecessor-in-interest" and declaring said lot
excluded from the NARRA other portions reverted to the public domain. >>>A motion to intervene
and to set aside the decision was filed by 86 settlers, alleging in possession of the land for more
than 20 years under claim of ownership. On August 21, 1980, the trial court, through Judge

Esteban Lising, issued the questioned order dismissing the case: ground of nonsuability of the State and also on the ground that the existence and/or authenticity of
the purported possessory information title >>Feliciano went to the Intermediate
Appellate Court on petition for certiorari, reversing the trial courts order. Can the
State be sued for the recovery of ownership and possession of the parcel of
land?
No. The doctrine of non-suability of the State has proper application in this case. The
plaintiff has impleaded the Republic of the Philippines as defendant in an action for
recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land, bringing the State to court
just like any private person who is claimed to be usurping a piece of property. A suit
for the recovery of property is not an action in rem, but an action in
personam.
Can the consent of the petitioner be read from the Proclamation itself?
Private respondent contends that the consent of petitioner may be read from the
Proclamation itself, when it established the reservation " subject to private rights, if
any there be." We do not agree. No such consent can be drawn from the language of

the Proclamation. The exclusion of existing private rights from the reservation
established by Proclamation No. 90 cannot be construed as a waiver of the immunity
of the State from suit. Waiver of immunity, being a derogation of sovereignty, will not
be inferred lightly, but must be construed in strictissimi juris. Moreover, the
Proclamation is not a legislative act. The consent of the State to be sued must
emanate from statutory authority. Waiver of State immunity can only be made by an
act of the legislative body. RULING: affirming the order of the court a quo,
dismissing the complaint filed by the respondent Pablo Feliciano against the
Republic of the Philippines. (not in favor of Feliciano)
SHAUF V. CA
FACTS:
Clark Air Base, a base established and maintained by US authorities by the agreement
between the Philippines and the United States. Lodia Q. Shauf, a Filipino married to an
American member of the US Air Force applied for the vacant position of Guidance
Counselor for which she was eminently qualified
One application was received, and 2 more were retrieved from the applicants supply file Mrs. Jean
Hollenshead, Ms. Lydia Gaillard, and Mrs. Loida Shauf. Mr. Persi retained the other two, and felt that
Mrs. Shauf's application was complete except of a reply regarding an inquiry stating that the
National Records Center, St. Louis, Missouri was unable to find an official personnel folder for Mrs.
Shauf, which raised questions in his mind as to the validity of her work experience. Mr. Persi
requested inquiry to the Central Oversea Rotation and Recruiting Office (CORRO) for a list of highly
qualified candidates. However, instead of receiving a list of candidates for consideration, CORRO
sent a message on 15 December, 1976 stating that a Mr. Edward B. Isakson from Maine, was
selected for the position.

Rudolph Duncan, an appeals and grievance examiner: Shauf's credentials also make
her highly qualified
for the position. By reason of her non-selection to a position at Clark Air Base, Shauf
filed an equal opportunity complaint against officers of Clark Air Base, for alleged
discrimination against the former by reason of her nationality and sex. She then filed
a complaint for damages with the RTC. Respondents filed a MTD on the ground that as
officers of the US Armed Forces performing official functions in accordance with the
powers vested in them, they are immune from suit.
Shauf contends that the officers are being sued in their private capacity for
discriminatory acts performed beyond their authority, hence the instant
action is not a suit against the US Govt.
HELD:
W/N the respondents committed discriminatory acts for not hiring petitioner Mrs. Loida
Shauf on account of her sex, color and origin. YES. Defendant Persi did not even
consider the application of the petitioner, but referred the vacancy to CORRO which
appointed Mr. Iakson. Defendant Detwiler was also undoubtedly discriminatory.
Petitioner applied for the position twice, and her appointment was rejected by Detwiler.
RULING: IN FAVOR OF SHAUF. Not against STATE. It is a different matter where the
public official is made to account in his capacity as such for acts contrary to law and
injurious to the rights of plaintiff. Inasmuch as the State authorizes only legal acts by
its officers, unauthorized acts of govt. officials or officers are not acts of the State and
the doctrine of state immunity cannot be used as an instrument for perpetrating an
injustice. The cloak of immunity is removed from the moment the public official is sued
in his individual capacity such as where he acts without authority or in excess of the
powers vested in him.
WYLIE VS RARANG
In February, 1978, Petitioner M. H. Wylie was the assistant administrative officer, Petitioner Capt.
James Williams was the commanding officer of the U. S. Naval Base in Subic Bay.
Private respondent Aurora I. Rarang was an employee in the Office of the Provost Marshal
assigned as merchandise control guard.

M. H. Wylie supervised the publication of the "Plan of the Day" (POD) which was
published daily by the US Naval Base station. >In the "action line inquiry" of the POD,

it was published that someone had observed that Merchandise Control

inspector/inspectress are (sic) consuming for their own benefit things they have
confiscated from Base Personnel. The observation is even more aggravated by
consuming such confiscated items as cigarettes and food stuffs PUBLICLY. This is not to
mention 'Auring' who is in herself, a disgrace to her division and to the Office of the
Provost Marshal. >>>The private respondent was the only one who was named
"Auring" in the Office of the Provost Marshal conclusively proven when on February 7,
1978, M. H. Wylie wrote her a letter of apology for the "inadvertent" publication.
>>action for damages in the Court of First Instance of Zambales (now Regional Trial
Court) against M. H. Wylie, Capt. James Williams and the U.S. Naval Base. She alleged
article constituted false, injurious, and malicious defamation and libel tending to
impeach her honesty, virtue and reputation exposing her to public hatred, contempt
and ridicule and
oDefendants M. H. Wylie and Capt. James Williams acted in the performance of their
official functions as officers of the United States Navy and are, therefore, immune from
suit The US Naval Base is an instrumentality of the US government which cannot be
sued without its consent and
HELD: in favor of RARANG. >Our laws and do not allow the commission of crimes in the
name of official duty. The imputation of theft contained in the POD dated February 3,
1978 is a defamation against the character and reputation of the private respondent.
Wylie himself admitted that the Office of the Provost Marshal explicitly recommended
the deletion of the name Auring if the article were published. Did not delete->Such
act or omission is ultra vires and cannot be part of official duty
Republic vs Nolasco
-Agno River Flood Control Project (Project), a public works project, is delayed due to
the present petition. The projects funding was to be taken primarily from a loan from
the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC). A Bid and Awards Committee
(BAC) was constituted by the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) to
conduct an international competitive bidding for the procurement of the contract Six
contractors submitted their bids for the project, among which were Daewoo
Engineering and Construction Co., Ltd (Daewoo), and China International Water and
Electric Corp. (China International)
-19 Feb 2002: Emiliano R. Nolasco, taxpayer, claims he obtained copies of
Confidential Reports from Unnamed DPWH Consultant and based on these
reports, Daewoos bid was unacceptable and the supposed award to
Daewoo, illegal, immoral, and prejudicial to the government and to Filipino
taxpayers. Invoking his right as a taxpayer, Nolasco prayed that DPWH and
BAC be restrained from awarding the contract to Daewoo and that Daewoo
be disqualified as a bidder. Dismissed: against state.
>W/N Nolascos petition was a suit against the State without its consent
Yes. We find no error on the part of the RTC in regarding Nolascos petition as a suit
against the State without the latters consent. An unincorporated government agency
such as the DPWH is without any separate juridical personality of its own and hence
enjoys immunity from suit . Even in the exercise of proprietary functions incidental to
its primarily governmental functions, an unincorporated agency still cannot be sued
without its consent. Moreover, it cannot be said that the DPWH was deemed to have
given its consent to be sued by entering into a contract, for at the time the petition
was filed by Nolasco, the DPWH had not yet entered into a contract with respect to the
Project.
More importantly, the Court, the parties, and the public at large are bound to respect
the fact that official acts of the Government, including those performed by
governmental agencies such as the DPWH, are clothed with the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duty and cannot be summarily, prematurely
and capriciously set aside. Such presumption is operative not only upon the courts, but
on all persons, especially on those who deal with the government on a frequent basis.

MOBIL PHILIPPINES EXPLORATION, INC., vs. CUSTOMS ARRASTRE SERVICE

and BUREAU of CUSTOMS
November, 1962- Four (4) cases of rotary drill parts were shipped from abroad on
S.S. Leoville, consigned to Mobil Phil. Exploration Inc., Manila>>April 10, 1963shipment arrived at the Port of Manila, discharged to the Customs Arrastre Service
(unit only),-later delivered three (3) cases only of the shipment.
April 4, 1964- Plaintiff filed suit in the Court of First Instance of Manila against the
defendant to recover the value of the undelivered case in the amount of P18,493.37
plus other damages.
WoN the Bureau Of Customs, as operator of the arrastre service at the Port of Manila,
is discharging proprietary functions and as such, can be sued by private individuals
NO. The Rules of Court, in Section 1, Rule 3, provide:
SECTION 1.Who may be parties.Only natural or juridical persons or entities
authorized by law may be parties in a civil action. The fact that a non-corporate
government entity performs a function proprietary in nature does not necessarily
result in its being suable. If said non-governmental function is undertaken as an
incident to its governmental function, there is no waiver thereby of the sovereign
immunity from suit extended to such government entity. The Bureau of Customs, to
repeat, is part of the Department of Finance (Sec. 81, Rev. Adm. Code), with no
personality of its own apart from that of the national government. Its primary function
is governmental, that of assessing and collecting lawful revenues from imported
articles and all other tariff and customs duties, fees, charges, fines and penalties (Sec.
602, R.A. 1937). Clearly, therefore, although said arrastre function may be deemed
proprietary, it is a necessary incident of the primary and governmental function of the
Bureau of Customs, so that engaging in the same does not necessarily render said
Bureau liable to suit.
RULING: the order of dismissal appealed from is hereby affirmed.

Republic v Sandoval, 220 SCRA 124 (1993)

FACTS: The heirs of the 12 rallyists who perished during the Mendiola massacre filed
an action for damages. Such action was filed against the government. This was by
virtue of a recommendation made by the Citizen's Mendiola Commission (created for
the purpose of conducting an investigation of the disorder, deaths and casualties that
took place during the Mendiola incident.) that the heirs and wounded victims of the
incident be compensated by the Govt. Notwithstanding such recommendation, no
concrete form of compensation was received by the victims. The Caylo Group (the
group of marchers in the said incident) filed a formal letter of demand from the govt.
Still unheeded for almost a year, the group filed an action against the govt, together
w/ the military officers and personnel involved in the incident before the trial court.
Resp. Judge dismissed the complaint as against the RP on the ground that there was
no waiver by the State.
HELD:
1. The principle of immunity from suit is based on the very essence of sovereignty, and on the
practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on
which the right depends. It also rests on reasons of public policy -- that public service would be
hindered, and the public endangered, if the sovereign authority could be subjected to law suits at
the instance of every citizen and consequently controlled in the uses and dispositions of the means
required for the proper administration of the government.
2. This is not a suit against the State with its consent. Firstly, the recommendation made by the
Mendiola does not mean that liability automatically attaches to the State.-- not final and executory.
Secondly, whatever acts or utterances that President Aquino may have done or said, the same are
not tantamount to the State having waived its immunity from suit.

3. Some instances when a suit against the State is proper are: (1) when the Republic is
sued by name;
(2) when the suit is against an unincorporated govt. agency; (3) when the suit is on its
face against officer but the case is such that the ultimate liability will belong not to the
officer but to the govt.
In this case, while the Republic is sued by name, the ultimate liability does not pertain
to the govt. Although the military officers were discharging their official functions when
the incident occurred, their functions ceased to be official the moment they
exceeded their authority. Immunity from suit cannot institutionalize
irresponsibility and non-accountability nor grant a privileged status not
claimed by any other official of the Republic. They are therefore liable for
damages not the State.
Gascon vs Arroyo (Executive Secretary to the President)
Petitioners seek to annul and set aside the "Agreement to Arbitrate" entered into by
and between the \ Philippines, rep by Arroyo, and ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation,
rep by President, Eugenio Lopez, Jr.
Lopez family is the owner of 2 television stations, namely: Channels 2 and 4.> When
martial law was declared on Sept 21, 1972, Ch. 4 was closed by the military taken over by Kanlaon
Broadcasting System (KBS) which operated it as a commercial TV station >In 1978, KBS was taken
over by the National Media Production Center (NMPC), which operated it under Maharlika
Broadcasting System TV 4 (MBS-4)
After the February 1986 Edsa Revolution, the PCGG sequestered the TV stations and the Office of
Media Affairs took over the operation of Ch. 4 >On. April 17, 1986, the Lopez family

requested Pres. Aquino to order to return to them Chs. 2 and 4 >On October 18 1986,
Ch 2 was returned to the Lopez family
Whether or not the Agreement to Arbitrate, as an alternative to a lawsuit
against the State, is valid? YES.
1.The Executive Secretary, in entering into the "Agreement to Arbitrate," was acting
for and in behalf of the President -valid and binding upon the Republic of the
Philippines.
2.Where the government takes property from a private landowner for public
use without going through the legal process of expropriation or negotiated
sale, the aggrieved party may properly maintain a suit against the
government without thereby violating the doctrine of governmental

immunity from suit without its consent. That is, as it should be, for the
doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument
for perpetrating an injustice to a citizen
3.At the time of the signing of the said agreement, the President was exercising both
the legislative and executive powers of the Government, and since the "Agreement to
Arbitrate" is valid, it is "enforceable and irrevocable, save upon such grounds as exist
at law for the revocation of any contract.
Legal Standing: NONE Petitioners not shown that they have a legal interest in TV
Station Channel 4 and that they will be adversely affected if and when the said
television station is returned to the Lopez family.

EPG Construction Company vs Vigilar

1983 the Ministry of Human Settlement (MHS), through the BLISS Development
Corporation, initiated a housing project on a government property along the east bank
of the Manggahan Floodway in Pasig City. The MHS entered into a Memorandum of
Agreement (MOA) with (DPWH), where the latter undertook to develop the housing site
and construct thereon 145 housing units. The DPWH created individual contracts
with the petitioners. The contract covered only the construction and funding for 2/3
of each housing unit. The DPWH Undersecretary Aber Canlas forwarded a VERBAL
request and assurance than upon completion, additional funding will be available for
the payment of the remaining 1/3. The petitioners agreed even in the absence of
appropriations and a written contract. They proceeded with the construction. unpaid
balance of P5,918,315.63. November 14, 1988 The petitioners sent a demand letter
to DPWH Secretary. July 30, 1992 DPWH Sec Jose De Jesus requested the funds from
the Secretary of DBM. December 20, 1994 The Unsec of DBM issued a letter
releasing P5,819,316.00 December 27, 1995 In an Indorsement, COA stated that
they will proceed with the audit after payment was made. August 26, 1996 In a
letter, DPWH Sec Gregorio Vigilar denied the money claims prompting the petitioners
to file a case in the RTC The RTC denied the petition.
Do the petitionercontractors have the right of compensation for the public
works housing project?
The instant petition is GRANTED: Ministerio vs. CFI of Cebu that the doctrine of
governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an
injustice on a citizen.
US v GUINTO GR No. 76607
Respondents are suing officers of the US Air Force in Clark Air Base. On Feb 24, 1986,
bids (REPAIR) were being solicited and the respondents were among the bidders. The
bidding was won by a Ramon Dizon who allegedly made a bid for four facilities
including the Civil Engineering Area which was not included in the invitation to
bid.The respondents complained to the Philippine Area Exchange. PHAX
representatives Reeves and Smouse (petitioners) explained that the CEA was not
awarded to Dizon as a result of the 02/04 solicitation but that he was operating the
concession and his contract had been extended from June 30 to August 31.On June
30, the respondents filed a complaint to compel PHAX and the individual petitioners to
cancel the award given to Dizon. Petitioners argued that the action was in effect a suit
against USA which had not waived its non-suability. As official employees, they were
also immune from suit.
The court denied the petitioners motion to dismiss on October 10, 1988
Is the case considered a suit against the USA without its consent? Are the
petitioners immune from suit?
When the state enters into a contract, it is deemed to have descended to the level of
the contracting part and thus divested of its sovereign immunity from suit. The United
States of America is not conferred with a blanket immunity for all acts done by it or its

agents in the Philippines. Neither may the other petitioners claim that they are also
insulated from suit in this country merely because they have acted as agents of the
United States in the discharge of their official functions. Officers then cannot be
immune because the ruling on US v Ruiz cannot apply to them because their contracts
arent operating on sovereign functions.

Barbershops are commercial enterprises operated by private persons. They are not
agencies of the US Armef Forces nor their facilities demandable by right. Ruling:
petition is DISMISSED