Leviste

v CA GR L-29184

TOPIC: Legal Ethics, contingent fees

FACTS:
On September 7, 1963, Leviste, a practicing attorney, entered into a written agreement
with the Rosa del Rosario to appear as her counsel in a petition for probate of the
holographic will of the late Maxima C. Reselva. It was agreed that the contigent fee
would be 35% of the property Rosa will receive upon the probate of the will. On August
20, 1965, Leviste received a letter from Ms. Del Rosario, informing him that she was
terminating his services as her counsel due to conflicting interest. On September 20,
1965, petitioner filed a motion to Intervene to Protect His Rights to Fees for Professional
Services but was soon denied since he had not filed a claim for attorneys fees nor
recorded his attorneys lien. On November 23, 1965, petitioner filed a formal statement
of Claim for Attorneys Fees and Recording of Attorneys Lien. Despite the denial of his
motion to intervene, Atty. LEviste kept on receiving copies of the courts orders, as well
the pleadings of the other parties in the case. He also continued to file pleadings. On
November 23, 1966, Del Rosario and Rita Banu, the special administratrix-legatee, filed a
motion To Withdraw Petition for Probate. They alleging that Del Rosario waived her
rights to the devise and agreed that the De Guzman brothers and sisters who opposed
her petition for probate, shall inherit all the properties left by the decedent. The trial
court denied the motion to withdraw the petition for being contrary to public policy. The
court disallowed the will, holding that the legal requirements for its validity were not
satisfied as only two witnesses. Atty. Leviste filed an appeal bond, notice of appeal, and
record on appeal. The private respondents filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on the
ground that petitioner was not a party in interest. Atty. Leviste opposed the motion
claiming that he has a direct and material interest in the decision sought to be reviewed.
He also asked that he be substituted as party-petitioner but was denied. Upon appeal to
the Court of Appeals, he suffered the same fate. Leviste brought this case to the
Supreme Court asserting Art. 1052 of the Civil Code: ART. 1052: If the heir repudiates the
inheritance to the prejudice of his own creditors, the latter may petition the court to
authorize them to accept it in the name of the heir. The acceptance shall benefit the
creditors only to an extent sufficient to cover the amount of their credits. The excess,
should there be any, shall in no case pertain to the renouncer, but shall be adjudicated
to the persons to whom, in accordance with the rules established in this Code, it may
belong. Thus, Leviste asserts he has a right to accept for his client Del Rosario to the
extent of 35% thereof the devise in her favor (which she in effect repudiated) to protect
his contigent attorneys fees.

ISSUE:
Whether or not an attorney who was engaged on a contingent fee basis may, in order to
collect his fees, prosecute an appeal despite his clients refusal to appeal the decision of
the trial court.

HELD:
No. The Supreme Court held Article 1052 of the Civil Code does not apply to this case.
That legal provision protects the creditor of a repudiating heir. Petitioner is not a
creditor of Rosa del Rosario. The payment of his fees is contingent and dependent upon
the successful probate of the holographic will. Since the petition for probate was
dismissed by the lower court, the contingency did not occur. Attorney Leviste is not
entitled to his fee. Also, Article 1052 presupposes that the obligor is an heir. Rosa del
Rosario is not a legal heir of the late Maxima C. Reselva. The contract for contingent
attorneys fees neither gives, nor purports to give, to the lawyer any right whatsoever,
personal or real, in his clients share of the properties. The amount thereof is simply a
basis for the computation of said fees. SC claimed that the lower court did not err in
holding that notice of an attorneys lien did not entitle the attorney-appellant to
subrogate himself in lieu of his client. It only gives him the right to collect a certain
amount for his services in case his client is awarded a certain sum by the court.

DENIED for lack of merit

Licudan vs. Court of Appeals
(G.R. No. 91958 January 24, 1991)

Facts:
The petitioners fault the respondent Court for its failure to exercise its inherent power to
review and determine the propriety of the stipulated attorney's fees in favor of the
respondent lawyer and accuse the respondent lawyer of having committed an unfair
advantage or legal fraud by virtue of the Contract for Professional Services devised by
him after the trial court awarded him attorney's fees for P1,000.00 only instead of
respecting the trust and confidence of the highest level reposed on him
considering the close blood and affinal relationship between him and his clients. The
petitioners contend that under the award for professional services, they may have won
the case but would lose the entire property won in litigation to their uncle-lawyer. They
would be totally deprived of their house and lot and the recovered damages considering
that of the 271.5 square meters of the subject lot, the respondent lawyer is claiming
121.5 square meters and the remaining portion of 150 square meters would also go to
attorney's fees since the said portion pertains to the lawyer's son by way of usufruct for
ten (10) years.

Issue:
Whether or not the award of attorney's fees in this case is reasonable, being in the
nature of contingent fees?

Held:
The instant petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals' decision of September 12,
1989 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Atty. Domalanta is awarded reasonable
attorney's fees in the amount of P20,000.00.


Ratio Decidendi:

The practice of law is a profession rather than trade. Courts must guard against the
charging of unconscionable and excessive fees by lawyers for their services when
engaged as counsel. Under Canon 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer
shall charge only fair and reasonable fees. In determining whether or not the lawyer fees
are fair and reasonable, Rule 20-1 of the same Code enumerates the factors to be
considered in resolving the said issue. A similar provision is contained under Section 24,
Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court which partly states that:

Sec. 24. Compensation of attorneys; agreement as to fees. An attorney
shall be entitled to have and recover from his client no more than a
reasonable compensation for his services, with a view to the importance of the
subject matter of the controversy, the extent of the services rendered,
and the professional standing of the attorney. . . . A written contract for
services shall control the amount to be paid therefor unless found by the court
to be unconscionable or unreasonable.

Retuya v. Gorduiz

Facts:
o Ana F. Retuya filed for a claim of workmens compensation against Eastern Shipping
Lines, the employer of her husband who died in 1968.
o In a decision by the Workmens Compensation Unit at Tacloban City, Ana was awarded
a sum for compensation benefits, medical and hospitalization expenses, burial
expenses, and attorneys fees of Atty. Inego Gorduiz (P300).
o In the appeal, a compromise claim was proposed, and subsequently accepted by Ana.
The employer paid a reduced award.
o Ana sent the receipt and release, wherein she also explained that Gorduiz did not sign
the joint motion to dismiss the claim because he wanted 20% of the award as his
attorneys fees. She was willing to give him 10% only.
o After cashing the check, she was not able to contact Gorduiz and pay his fee.
Unexpectedly, she was served with a warrant of arrest. To avoid detention, she posted
bail.
o It turned out that Atty. Gorduiz executed an affidavit stating that Ana had
misappropriated his attorneys fees amounting to three hundred pesos, that he had
demanded payment but she had refused to make payment. So she went to Cebu.
o On the basis of such affidavit, the acting chief of police filed against Ana a complaint
for estafa.
o She filed a motion to quash where she explained that she did not accede to his
demand. She stated that the estafa case was filed merely to harass her. The motion to
quash was denied and Judge Equipilag required Ana to produce a copy of the decision
awarding her workmens compensation.

o The case of estafa was not tried. Instead, Atty. Diola, lawyer of Ana, offered Gorduiz a
sum of five hundred pesos as settlement of the case. The offer was accepted.
o The dismissal was eventually released.
o Despite the dismissal, Ana felt aggrieved and asked for the disbarment or suspension
of Atty. Gorduiz and Judge Equipilag.

Held/Ratio:

o Court found no justification in suspending respondent judge. He is however
admonished to be more prudent.
o In the case of Gorduiz, the Solicitor General, disagreeing with the recommendation of
the provincial fiscal of Southern Leyte, filed in this court a case against Gorduiz a
complaint where he prayed that Gorduiz be suspended for six months because in filing
the estafa case, he had promoted a groundless suit.
o Ana testified that she was willing to pay Gorduiz an amount of P650 but he demanded
a bigger amount. He then filed an estafa case against her, which was later dismissed
when Ana paid Gorduiz a sum of P500.
o In his testimony, Gorduiz denied that he demanded attorneys fees higher than P300.
He explained that he filed the estafa case because after Ana received the payment of the
award, she did not turn it over desmise promises and demands.
o He further declared that it was only filed to evade payment of attorneys fees. He also
filed the case because he thought that Ana had absconded when she stayed in Cebu for
a long time. He also said that he used his own money in looking for evidence in the
workmens compensation case.
o The Court finds justification for suspending the respondent.
o The respondent acted precipitately in filing a criminal action against his client for the
supposed misappropriation. It is not clear that the client had swindled him, and there is
basis that contrary to his lawyers oath, he had filed a suit against her and had harassed
and embarrassed her.
o Rule 20.02: A lawyer shall avoid controversies with clients concerning his
compensation and shall resort only to judicial action only to prevent imposition, fraud,
or injustice.
o Canon 20: A lawyer shall charge only fair and reasonable fees.

FEDERICO N. RAMOS, complainant, vs. ATTY. PATRICIO A. NGASEO, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This is a complaint for suspension of respondent Atty. Patricio A. Ngaseo for violation of
the Code of Professional Responsibility and Article 1491 of the Civil Code by demanding
from his client, complainant Federico N. Ramos, the delivery of 1,000 square meters of
land, a litigated property, as payment for his appearance fees.
The facts as narrated by the complainant are as follows:

Sometime in 1998, complainant Federico Ramos went to respondent Atty. Patricio

Ngaseos Makati office to engage his services as counsel in a case[1] involving a piece of
land in San Carlos, Pangasinan. Respondent agreed to handle the case for an acceptance
fee of P20,000.00, appearance fee of P1,000.00 per hearing and the cost of meals,
transportation and other incidental expenses. Complainant alleges that he did not
promise to pay the respondent 1,000 sq. m. of land as appearance fees.[2]
On September 16, 1999, complainant went to the respondents office to inquire about
the status of the case. Respondent informed him that the decision was adverse to them
because a congressman exerted pressure upon the trial judge. Respondent however
assured him that they could still appeal the adverse judgment and asked for the
additional amount of P3,850.00 and another P2,000.00 on September 26, 2000 as
allowance for research made.[3]
Although an appeal was filed, complainant however charges the respondent of
purposely failing to submit a copy of the summons and copy of the assailed decision.
Subsequently, complainant learned that the respondent filed the notice of appeal 3 days
after the lapse of the reglementary period.
On January 29, 2003, complainant received a demand-letter from the respondent asking
for the delivery of the 1,000 sq. m. piece of land which he allegedly promised as
payment for respondents appearance fee. In the same letter, respondent also
threatened to file a case in court if the complainant would not confer with him and settle
the matter within 30 days.
Respondent alleged that sometime in the late 1997, a former client, Federico Ramos and
his brother, Dionisio, went to his Makati office to engage his professional services in
connection with a 2-hectare parcel of land situated in San Carlos, Pangasinan which the
complainants family lost 7 years earlier through an execution sale in favor of one Alfredo
T. Castro. Complainant, who was deaf and could only speak conversational Tagalog
haltingly, was assisted by his brother Dionisio. They came all the way from Pangasinan
because no lawyer in San Carlos City was willing to handle the case. Complainant,
through Dionisio, avers that he has consulted 2 local lawyers but did not engage their
services because they were demanding exorbitant fees. One local lawyer was willing to
handle the case for at least one-half of the land involved as his attorneys fee, plus cash
expenses, while the other asked for of the land in addition to a large sum of money.
Respondent agreed to handle the case for an acceptance fee of P60,000.00 plus an
appearance fee of P3,000.00 per hearing. Complainant told him that he would consult
his siblings on the matter.
Six months later, i.e., in April 1998, complainant, assisted by one Jose Castillo, went to
respondents office to discuss the legal fees. Complainant, through Castillo, told
respondent that he was willing to pay an acceptance fee of P40,000.00, P20,000.00 of
which shall be paid upon engagement and the remaining P20,000.00 to be paid after
their treasure hunt operations in Nueva Viscaya were terminated. Further, complainant
offered, in lieu of P3,000.00 per appearance, 1,000 sq. m. of land from the land subject
matter of the case, if they win, or from another piece of property, if they lose. In
addition, complainant also offered to defray the expenses for transportation, meals and
other incidental expenses. Respondent accepted the complainants offer.

Respondent claims that after the trial court dismissed Civil Case No. SCC 2128, he filed a
timely notice of appeal and thereafter moved to be discharged as counsel because he
had colon cancer. Complainant, now assisted by one Johnny Ramos, implored
respondent to continue handling the case, with an offer to double the 1,000 sq. m. piece
of land earlier promised and the remaining balance of P20,000.00 acceptance fee.
Johnny Ramos made a written commitment and gave respondents secretary P2,000.00
of the P3,850.00 expenses for the preparation of the appellants brief.
On July 18, 2001, the Court of Appeals rendered a favorable decision ordering the return
of the disputed 2-hectare land to the complainant and his siblings. The said decision
became final and executory on January 18, 2002. Since then complainant allegedly failed
to contact respondent, which compelled him to send a demand letter on January 29,
2003.
On February 14, 2003, complainant filed a complaint before the IBP charging his former
counsel, respondent Atty. Ngaseo, of violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility
for demanding the delivery of 1,000 sq. m. parcel of land which was the subject of
litigation.
In a report dated July 18, 2003, IBP Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala found the
respondent guilty of grave misconduct and conduct unbecoming of a lawyer in violation
of the Code of Professional Responsibility and recommended that he be suspended from
the practice of law for 1 year.[4]
On August 30, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XVI-2003-47 the
full text of which reads:[5]
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report
and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case,
herein made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex A; and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and
rules, with modification, and considering that respondent have violated the Code of
Professional Responsibility for grave misconduct and conduct unbecoming of a lawyer
Atty. Patricio A. Ngaseo is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6)
months.
On December 11, 2003, respondent filed a petition for review assailing IBP Resolution
No. XVI-2003-47 for having been issued without or in excess of jurisdiction.[6]
Respondent argues that he did not violate Article 1491 of the Civil Code because when
he demanded the delivery of the 1,000 sq. m. of land which was offered and promised to
him in lieu of the appearance fees, the case has been terminated, when the appellate
court ordered the return of the 2-hectare parcel of land to the family of the complainant.
Respondent further contends that he can collect the unpaid appearance fee even
without a written contract on the basis of the principle of quantum meruit. He claims
that his acceptance and appearance fees are reasonable because a Makati based legal
practitioner, would not handle a case for an acceptance fee of only P20,000.00 and
P1,000.00 per court appearance.
Under Article 1491(5) of the Civil Code, lawyers are prohibited from acquiring either by
purchase or assignment the property or rights involved which are the object of the
litigation in which they intervene by virtue of their profession.[7] The prohibition on

purchase is all embracing to include not only sales to private individuals but also public
or judicial sales. The rationale advanced for the prohibition is that public policy disallows
the transactions in view of the fiduciary relationship involved, i.e., the relation of trust
and confidence and the peculiar control exercised by these persons.[8] It is founded on
public policy because, by virtue of his office, an attorney may easily take advantage of
the credulity and ignorance of his client and unduly enrich himself at the expense of his
client.[9] However, the said prohibition applies only if the sale or assignment of the
property takes place during the pendency of the litigation involving the clients property.
Consequently, where the property is acquired after the termination of the case, no
violation of paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the Civil Code attaches.
Invariably, in all cases where Article 1491 was violated, the illegal transaction was
consummated with the actual transfer of the litigated property either by purchase or
assignment in favor of the prohibited individual. In Biascan v. Lopez, respondent was
found guilty of serious misconduct and suspended for 6 months from the practice of law
when he registered a deed of assignment in his favor and caused the transfer of title
over the part of the estate despite pendency of Special Proceedings No. 98037 involving
the subject property.[10] In the consolidated administrative cases of Valencia v.
Cabanting,[11] the Court suspended respondent Atty. Arsenio Fer Cabanting for six (6)
months from the practice of law when he purchased his client's property which was still
the subject of a pending certiorari proceeding.
In the instant case, there was no actual acquisition of the property in litigation since the
respondent only made a written demand for its delivery which the complainant refused
to comply. Mere demand for delivery of the litigated property does not cause the
transfer of ownership, hence, not a prohibited transaction within the contemplation of
Article 1491. Even assuming arguendo that such demand for delivery is unethical,
respondents act does not fall within the purview of Article 1491. The letter of demand
dated January 29, 2003 was made long after the judgment in Civil Case No. SCC-2128
became final and executory on January 18, 2002.
We note that the report of the IBP Commissioner, as adopted by the IBP Board of
Governors in its Resolution No. XVI-2003-47, does not clearly specify which acts of the
respondent constitute gross misconduct or what provisions of the Code of Professional
Responsibility have been violated. We find the recommended penalty of suspension for
6 months too harsh and not proportionate to the offense committed by the respondent.
The power to disbar or suspend must be exercised with great caution. Only in a clear
case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an
officer of the Court and member of the bar will disbarment or suspension be imposed as
a penalty.[12] All considered, a reprimand is deemed sufficient and reasonable.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty. Patricio A. Ngaseo is found
guilty of conduct unbecoming a member of the legal profession in violation of Rule 20.04
of Canon 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is REPRIMANDED with a
warning that repetition of the same act will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.


FELICISIMO M. MONTANO, complainant, vs. INTEGRATED BAR of the PHILIPPINES AND
Atty. JUAN S. DEALCA, respondents.
R E S O L U T I O N
KAPUNAN, J.:

In a verified complaint filed before this Court on March 9, 1994, complainant Felicisimo
M. Montano charged Atty. Juan Dealca with misconduct and prays that he be sternly
dealt wit administratively. The complainti[1] is summarized as follows:
1.
On November 14, 1992, the complainant hired the services of Atty. Juan S. Dealca
as his counsel in collaboration with Atty. Ronando L. Gerona in a case pending before the
Court of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 37467 wherein the complainant was the
plaintiff-appellant.
2.
The parties agreed upon attorneys fees in the amount of P15,000.00, fifty
percent (50%) of which was payable upon acceptance of the case and the remaining
balance upon the termination of the case. Accordingly, complainant paid respondent the
amount of P7,500.00 representing 50% of the attorneys fee.
3.
Thereafter, even before the respondent counsel had prepared the appellants
brief and contrary to their agreement that the remaining balance be payable after the
termination of the case, Atty. Dealca demanded an additional payment from
complainant. Complainant obliged by paying the amount of P4,000.00.
4.
Prior to the filing of the appellants brief, respondent counsel again demand
payment of the remaining balance of 3,500.00. When complainant was unable to do so,
respondent lawyer withdrew his appearance as complainants counsel without his prior
knowledge and/or conformity. Returning the case folder to the complainant, respondent
counsel attached a Note dated February 28, 1993,ii[2] stating:
28 February 1994
Pepe and Del Montano,
For breaking your promise, since you do not want to fulfill your end of the bargain, heres
your reward:
Henceforth, you lawyer for yourselves. Here are your papers.
Johnny
Complainant claimed that such conduct by respondent counsel exceeded the ethical
standards of the law profession and prays that the latter be sternly dealt with
administratively. Complainant later on filed motions praying for the imposition of the
maximum penalty of disbarment.
After respondent counsel filed his comment on the complaint, the Court in the
Resolution of August 1, 1994, referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
The Investigating Commissioner found respondent counsel guilty of unprofessional
conduct and recommended that he be severely reprimanded. However, in a
Resolutioniii[3] by the IBP Board of Governors on July 26, 1997, it was resolved that the
penalty recommended by the Investigating Commissioner meted to respondent by

amended to three (3) months suspension from the practice of law for having been found
guilty of misconduct, which eroded the public confidence regarding his duty as a lawyer.
Respondent counsel sought reconsideration of the aforementioned resolution of the IBP,
alleging that the latter misapprehended the facts and that, in any case, he did not
deserve the penalty imposed. The true facts, according to him, are the following:
1. Complainant is being represented by Atty. Ronando L. Gerona in his case on appeal;
2. Due to the ailment of Atty. Geronas daughter, he could not prepare and submit
complainants appellants brief on time;
3. Complainant went to the respondent to do just that, i.e., prepare and submit his
appellants brief on time at the agreed fee of P15,000.00, 50% down and 50% upon its
completion;
4. Working overtime, respondent was able to finish the appellants brief ahead of its
deadline, so he advised the complainant about its completion with the request that the
remaining balance of P7,500.00 be paid. Complainant paid P4,000.00 only, promising to
pay the P3,500.00 tomorrow or on later particular date. Please take note that, at this
juncture, there was already a breach of the agreement on complainants part.
5. When that tomorrow or on a later particular date came, respondent, thru a
messenger, requested the complainant to pay the P3,500.00 as promised but word was
sent that he will again pay tomorrow or on later date. This promise-non-payment cycle
went on repeatedly until the last day of the filing of the brief. Please take note again that
it was not the respondent but the complainant who sets the date when he will pay, yet
fails to pay as promised;
6. Even without being paid completely, respondent, of his own free will and accord, filed
complainants brief on time;
7. After the brief was filed, respondent tried to collect from the complainant the
remaining balance of P3,500.00, but the latter made himself scarce. As the records
would show, such P3,500.00 remains unpaid until now;
8. Sensing that something was amiss, respondent sent the February 28, 1993 note and
case folder to the complainant, hoping that the latter would see personally the former
about it to settle the matter between them;
9. However, instead of seeing the respondent, complainant filed this case;
10. Respondent was constrained to file his withdrawal with the Court of Appeals because
of this case to avoid further misunderstanding since he was the one who signed the
appellants brief although Atty. Gerona was his counsel of record. Such withdrawal was
accordingly granted by the appellate court;
xxx xxx xxx.iv[4]
Respondent counsel further averred that complainants refusal to pay the agreed lawyers
fees, measly as it was, was deliberate and in bad faith; hence, his withdrawal as counsel
was just, ethical and proper. Respondent counsel concluded that not only was the
penalty of suspension harsh for his act of merely trying to collect payment for his
services rendered, but it indirectly would punish his family since he was the sole
breadwinner with children in school and his wife terminally ill with cancer.
In its Resolution No. XIII-97-129 dated October 25, 1997, the IBP denied Atty. Dealcas
motion for reconsideration, to wit:

xxx
RESOLVED TO DENY Atty. Dealcas Motion For Reconsideration of the Boards Decision in
the above-entitled case there being no substantive reason to reverse the finding therein.
Moreover, the motion is improperly laid the remedy of the respondent is to file the
appropriate pleading with the Supreme Court within fifteen (15) days from receipt of
notice of said Decision pursuant to Sec. 12 [c] of Rule 139-B.v[5]
On December 10, 1997, this Court noted the following pleadings filed in the present
complaint,
(a) notice and a copy of Resolution No. XII-97-154 dated July 26, 1997 of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines amending the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner
of reprimand to three (3) months suspension of respondent from the practice of law for
having been found guilty of misconduct which eroded the public confidence regarding
his duty as a lawyer;
(b) complainants motion for praying for the imposition of the maximum penalty of
disbarment;
(c) motion dated September 15, 1997 of respondent for reconsideration of the aforesaid
resolution of July 26, 1997;
(d) comment/opposition of respondent praying that the motion for the imposition of the
maximum penalty be denied;
(e) comment of complainant praying that the penalty of three (3) months suspension for
the practice of law as recommended by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines pursuant to
Resolution No. XII-97-154 be raised to a heavier penalty;
(f) comment/manifestation/opposition of complainant praying that the respondent be
disbarred; and
(g) rejoinder of respondent praying that this case be dismissed for being baseless.vi[6]
and referred the same to the IBP for evaluation and report.
In compliance therewith, on March 28, 1998, the IBP issued Resolution No. XIII-98-42
referring the above-entitled case to Commissioner Vibar for evaluation, report and
recommendation in view of the Motion for Reconsideration granted by the Supreme
Court.
The Investigating Commissioner, after referring the case, recommended that his original
recommendation of the imposition of the penalty of reprimand be maintained, noting
that respondent counsel had served the IBP well as President of the Sorsogon
Chapter.vii[7] Accordingly, on February 23, 1999, the IBP Board of Governors, issued the
following resolution:
RESOLUTION NO. XIII-99-48

xxx
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report
and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case,
herein made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex A; and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and
rules, the Motion for Reconsideration be granted and that the penalty of REPRIMAND
earlier recommended by the Investigating Commissioner be imposed on Atty. Juan S.
Dealca.viii[8]

Complainant asked the IBP to reconsider the foregoing resolution but the motion was
denied.ix[9]
On April 10, 2000, complainant filed with this Court a petition for review on certiorari in
connection with Administrative Case No. 4215 against the IBP and respondent counsel
averring that the IBP Board of Governors committed grave abuse of discretion when it
overturned its earlier resolution and granted respondent counsels motion for
reconsideration on February 23, 1999. He claimed that the earlier resolution denying the
motion for reconsideration issued on October 25, 1997 had already become final and
executory; hence, any further action or motion subsequent to such final and executory
judgment shall be null and void.
When the Court issued the resolution of December 10, 1997 treating the several
pleadings filed in the present complaint, it should be noted that the IBP resolution
denying respondents motion for reconsideration (Resolution No. XIII-97-129) dated
October 25, 1997, for some reason, had not yet reached this Court. As of that date, the
only IBP resolution attached to the records of the case was Resolution No. XII-97-54
amending the administrative sanction from reprimand to three months suspension.
Hence, at the time the pleadings were referred back to the IBP in the same resolution,
the Court was not aware that the IBP had already disposed of the motion for
reconsideration filed by respondent counsel.
Thus, when the IBP was informed of the said Court resolution, it construed the same as
granting Atty. Dealcas motion for reconsideration and as an order for IBP to conduct a
re-evaluation of the case. The IBP assumed that its resolution of October 25, 1997 was
already considered by this Court when it referred the case back to the IBP. It failed to
notice that its resolution denying the motion for reconsideration was not among those
pleadings and resolution referred back to it.
Hence, on the strength of this Courts resolution which it had inadvertently misconstrued,
the IBP conducted a re-evaluation of the case and came up with the assailed resolution
now sought to be reversed. The Court holds that the error is not attributable to the IBP.
It is regrettable that the procedural infirmity alleged by complainant actually arose from
a mere oversight which was attributable to neither party.
Going into the merits, we affirm the findings made by the IBP that complainant engaged
the services of respondent lawyer only for the preparation and submission of the
appellants brief and the attorneys fees was payable upon the completion and
submission of the appellants brief and not upon the termination of the case.
There is sufficient evidence which indicates complainants willingness to pay the
attorneys fees. As agreed upon, complainant paid half of the fees in the amount of
P7,500.00 upon acceptance of the case. And while the remaining balance was not yet
due as it was agreed to be paid only upon the completion and submission of the brief,
complainant nonetheless delivered to respondent lawyer P4,000.00 as the latter
demanded. This, notwithstanding, Atty. Dealca withdrew his appearance simply because
of complainants failure to pay the remaining balance of P3,500.00, which does not
appear to be deliberate. The situation was aggravated by respondent counsels note to
complainant withdrawing as counsel which was couched in impolite and insulting
language.x[10]

Given the above circumstances, was Atty. Dealcas conduct just and proper?
We find Atty. Dealcas conduct unbecoming of a member of the legal profession. Under
Canon 22 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, lawyer shall withdraw his services
only for good cause and upon notice appropriate in the circumstances. Although he may
withdraw his services when the client deliberately fails to pay the fees for the
services,xi[11] under the circumstances of the present case, Atty. Dealcas withdrawal
was unjustified as complainant did not deliberately fail to pay him the attorneys fees. In
fact, complainant exerted honest efforts to fulfill his obligation. Respondents
contemptuous conduct does not speak well of a member of the bar considering that the
amount owing to him was only P3,500.00. Rule 20.4 of Canon 20, mandates that a
lawyer shall avoid controversies with clients concerning his compensation and shall
resort to judicial action only to prevent imposition, injustice or fraud. Sadly, for not so
large a sum owed to him by complainant, respondent lawyer failed to act in accordance
with the demands of the Code.
The Court, however, does not agree with complainants contention that the maximum
penalty of disbarment should be imposed on respondent lawyer. The power to disbar
must be exercised with great caution. Only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously
affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court and member
of the bar will disbarment be imposed as a penalty. It should never be decreed where a
lesser penalty, such as temporary suspension, would accomplish the end desired.xii[12]
In the present case, reprimand is deemed sufficient.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty. Juan S. Dealca is REPRIMANDED
with a warning that repetition of the same act will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED

FEDERICO C. SUNTAY, complainant, vs. ATTY. RAFAEL G. SUNTAY, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
BELLOSILLO, J.:

This Complaint for disbarment was filed by Federico C. Suntay against his nephew, Atty.
Rafael G. Suntay, alleging that respondent was his legal counsel, adviser and confidant
who was privy to all his legal, financial and political affairs from 1956 to 1964. However,
since they parted ways because of politics and respondent's overweening political
ambitions in 1964, respondent had been filing complaints and cases against
complainant, making use of confidential information gained while their attorney-client
relationship existed, and otherwise harassing him at every turn.
Complainant enumerated the following cases filed by respondent to harass him: (a) Civil
Case No. 4306-Mxiii[1] for injunction and damages in 1975, "Carlos Panganiban v. Dr.
Federico Suntay," where respondent appeared as counsel for the plaintiff involving
fishponds which respondent had previously helped to administer; (b) Civil Case No.
4726-M,xiv[2] "Narciso Lopez v. Federico Suntay," in 1970 where respondent appeared
as counsel for the plaintiff to determine the real contract between the parties likewise
involving the two (2) fishponds which respondent had previously helped to administer;
(c) Civil Case No. 112764,xv[3] "Magno Dinglasan v. Federico Suntay," for damages

where respondent appeared as counsel for the plaintiff; and, (d) I.S. No. 77-1523,
"Magno Dinglasan v. Federico Suntay," for false testimony and grave oral defamation
before the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan involving complainant's same
testimony subject of the complaint for damages in Civil Case No. 112764.
In addition, complainant alleged that respondent relentlessly pursued a case against him
for violation of PD No. 296xvi[4] for the alleged disappearance of two (2) creeks
traversing complainant's fishpond in Bulacan covered by TCT No. T-15674. Complainant
alleged that respondent's possession and examination of the TCT and the blueprint plan
of the property while he was still counsel for complainant provided him with the
information that there used to be two (2) creeks traversing the fishpond, and that since
respondent helped in the administration of the fishpond, he also came to know that the
two (2) creeks had disappeared.
Required to answer the charges respondent filed a "Motion to Order Complainant to
Specify His Charges" alleging that complainant failed to specify the alleged "confidential
information or intelligence" gained by him while the attorney-client relationship existed
but which he allegedly used against complainant when the relationship terminated.
Complainant filed his Comments thereon as required in our Resolution of 26 July 1978.
Thereafter this case was referred to the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) for
investigation, report, and recommendation in our Resolution dated 23 October 1978.
After almost four (4) years the OSG submitted its Report and Recommendation dated 14
October 1982 enumerating the following findings against respondent, to wit:
The evidence presented by complainant which was largely unrebutted by respondent
establish two counts of malpractice against respondent, one count of violating the
confidentiality of client-lawyer relationship and one count of engaging in unethical
conduct.
1. Respondent committed malpractice when he represented Magno Dinglasan in the
case for false testimony and grave oral defamation filed by Magno Dinglasan against
complainant before the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan (I.S. No. 77-1523).
The case stemmed from the testimony given by complainant on December 21, 1976,
before the Court of First Instance of Bulacan in Civil Case No. 3930-M. When asked why
Magno Dinglasan had testified against him in that case, complainant stated that he once
declined the demand of Magno Dinglasan, a former official of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue, for P150,000.00 as consideration for the destruction of complainants record in
the Bureau.
On account of that testimony, Magno Dinglasan charged complainant on July 29, 1977
with the crime of false testimony and grave oral defamation (Exhibits G and G-1). During
the preliminary investigation of the case by the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan,
respondent acted as counsel for Magno Dinglasan. When the case was dismissed by the
Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan and it was elevated to the Ministry of Justice on
appeal, respondent continued to be the lawyer of Magno Dinglasan.
Complainant testified in this disbarment proceeding that he consulted respondent, who
was then his counsel, about the demand made in 1957 or 1958 by Magno Dinglasan for
P150,000.00 as consideration for the destruction of complainants record in the Bureau
of Internal Revenue. Respondents advice was for complainant to disregard the demand

as it was improper. Later, when Magno Dinglasan reduced the amount to P50,000.00,
complainant again consulted respondent. Respondent likewise advised complainant not
to heed the demand (pp. 61-62, tsn, May 21, 1981).
Respondents representation of Magno Dinglasan in I.S. No. 77-1523 constitutes
malpractice (Section 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court) for respondent was previously the
lawyer of complainant and respondent was consulted by complainant regarding the very
matter which was the subject of the case. By serving as the lawyer of Magno Dinglasan,
in I.S. No. 77-1523, respondent thus represented an interest which conflicted with the
interest of his former client.
2. Respondent again committed malpractice when he served as lawyer of Magno
Dinglasan in Civil Case No. 112764 before the Court of First Instance of Manila.
Civil Case No. 112764 was an action for damages filed by Magno Dinglasan against
complainant based, among others, on the same testimony that complainant gave on
December 21, 1976 before the Court of First Instance of Bulacan in Civil Case No. 3930-
M.
For the same reasons set forth above, respondents representation of Magno Dinglasan
in Civil Case No. 112764 constitutes malpractice as thereby he represented conflicting
interests.
3. In filing a charge against complainant for alleged illegal destruction of dikes,
respondent violated the confidentiality of information obtained out of a client-lawyer
relationship.
In his capacity as lawyer of complainant from 1956 to 1964, respondent had the
following functions:
Witness
A: He was my lawyer from 1956 from the time he passed the bar up to
sometime in 1964 and my legal adviser on political matters and legal matters.
ATTY. AQUINO:
Q: As your lawyer from 1956 to 1964, will you kindly inform the Honorable
Hearing Officer what was the nature of the work of Atty. Suntay?
A: He handled my cases on the titling of our properties. He served as my legal
counsel in the Hagonoy Rural Bank of which my family is the majority
stockholders. He used to help me manage my fishpond. He is our legal adviser
on legal matters. He is our confidant. We have no secrets between us. He has
complete access in our papers (tsn, May 21, 1981)
Complainant owned several fishponds in Bulacan, among them, the fishpond covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-15674. This fishpond was previously traversed by two
creeks, Sapang Malalim and Sapang Caluang. The existence of the creeks is shown by the
certificate of title and the blue print plan of the fishpond. In the certificate of title, the
fishpond is bounded on the north and northeast by Sapang Caluang and on the west by
Sapang Malalim (please see Exhibit 6).
In a letter dated March 17, 1973, respondent reported the disappearance of the two
creeks to the authorities. The Chief State Prosecutor referred the letter to the Office of
the Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan. The Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan required the
Public Works to conduct a re-survey. (Exhibit 6).

In 1974, the Ministry of Public Works conducted a relocation survey of the fishpond. The
relocation survey disclosed that there were no more creeks traversing the fishpond.
Sapang Malalim and Sapang Caluang had disappeared.
Respondent was requested to file a formal complaint with supporting affidavits, for
violation of Presidential Decree No. 296. Respondent did so and the complaint was
docketed as I.S. No. 74-193. (Exhibit 6)
From the foregoing facts, it is clear that respondent made use of the information he
gained while he was the lawyer of complainant as basis for his complaint for the building
of illegal dikes. His possession and examination of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-
15674 and the blueprint plan provided him the information that there used to be two
creeks traversing the fishpond covered by the title. Since he helped in the administration
of the fishpond, he also came to know that the two creeks had disappeared. Thus, he
gained the data which became the basis of his complaint when he was a lawyer and part
administrator of complainant. Under the circumstances, there is a violation of
professional confidence.
4. The evidence also establishes the commission of unethical conduct by respondent for
serving as lawyer of Panganiban and Lopez x x x and for himself filing criminal charges
against complainant which were later dismissed. The cases wherein respondent served
as lawyer for the adversary of complainant or filed by respondent himself against
complainant are the following:
1. Carlos Panganiban v. Federico Suntay, Civil Case No. 4306-M, CFI, Branch VII, Malolos,
Bulacan;
2. Narciso Lopez v. Federico Suntay, Civil Case No. 4726-M, CFI, Branch II, Malolos,
Bulacan;
3. Magno Dinglasan v. Federico Suntay, I.S. No. 77-1523, Office of the Provincial Fiscal of
Bulacan;
4. Magno Dinglasan v. Federico Suntay, Civil Case No. 112764, CFI, Branch XX, Manila;
and
5. Rafael G. Suntay and Magno Dinglasan v. Federico C. Suntay, I.S. No. 74-193, Office of
the Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan, for violation of P.D. 296.
While there may be validity to respondents contention that it is not improper for a
lawyer to file a case against a former client, especially when the professional relationship
had ended several years before, yet under the over-all circumstances of the case at bar it
can not be said that respondent acted ethically. Complainant was not a mere client of
respondent. He is an uncle and a political benefactor. The parties for whom respondent
filed cases against complainant were former friends or associates of complainant whom
respondent met when he was serving as the lawyer and general adviser of complainant.
The cases filed by respondent were about properties which respondent had something
to do with as counsel and administrator of complainant.
x x x x
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, undersigned respectfully submit that the evidence
establishes commission by respondent of malpractice for violating the confidentiality of
client-lawyer relationship and engaging in unethical conduct x x x xxvii[5]

Resolution of this case was delayed despite receipt of the foregoing Report and
Recommendation in view of the Omnibus Motion to Remand Case to the Office of the
Solicitor General; Motion to Disqualify Solicitor Rogelio Dancel to Act on this Case and
Motion to Suspend Period to File Answer dated 18 January 1983 filed by respondent
principally accusing handling Solicitor Dancel of having given unwarranted advantage
and preference to the complainant in the investigation of the case.
After several pleadings on the issue were filed by both respondent and Solicitor Rogelio
Dancel, the Court in its Resolution dated 22 August 1983 denied respondent's motion to
disqualify Solicitor Dancel and required the OSG to proceed with the investigation of this
case. However, no further proceedings were conducted by the OSG until the records of
the case together with other cases were turned over to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) on 19 May 1988.
After almost three (3) years from the time the records of this case were turned over to it,
the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline submitted to this Court on 11 May 2001 Resolution
No. XIV-2001-169 adopting and approving the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner finding respondent guilty as charged. The IBP recommended
that respondent Atty. Suntay be suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years for
immoral conduct. In so recommending the Investigating Commissioner adopted in toto
the findings of the OSG in its Report and Recommendation dated 14 October 1982. In our
Resolution of 5 September 2001 we noted the foregoing IBP Resolution. However, in
view of the penalty involved, this case was referred to the Court En Banc for final action
pursuant to our Resolution dated 18 January 2000, Sec. 2, par. (b), in A.M. No. 99-12-08-
SC.xviii[6]
After a review of the records of this case, the Court finds the IBP Recommendation to be
well taken. As found by both the OSG and the IBP Investigating Commissioner,
respondent Atty. Rafael G. Suntay acted as counsel for clients in cases involving subject
matters regarding which he had either been previously consulted by complainant or
which he had previously helped complainant to administer as the latter's counsel and
confidant from 1956 to 1964. Thus in Civil Cases Nos. 4306-M and 4726-M respondent
acted as counsel for estranged business associates of complainant, namely, Carlos
Panganiban and Narciso Lopez, the subject matter of which were the two (2) fishponds
which respondent had previously helped to administer.
On the other hand, I.S. No. 77-1523 for false testimony and grave oral defamation before
the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan, and Civil Case No. 112764 for damages
before the then Court of First Instance of Manila, were filed in behalf of Magno
Dinglasan, a former Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) official, regarding whose alleged
demand for P150,000.00 from complainant in exchange for the destruction of the
latter's record in the BIR, respondent had previously advised complainant to disregard.
Civil Case No. 117624 and I.S. No. 77-1523 were precisely filed against complainant
because the latter had previously testified on the alleged demand made by Dinglasan.
Although respondent denied that there was ever such a demand made by Dinglasan, the
point is that his word on the matter, i.e., whether there was in fact such a demand,
would carry much weight against complainant considering that he was the latter's
counsel in 1957 or 1958 when the alleged demand was made. In addition, respondent

initiated the prosecution of complainant in I.S. No. 74-193 for violation of P.D. No.
296xix[7] for the disappearance of the two (2) creeks, namely, Sapang Malalim and
Sapang Caluang, previously traversing complainant's fishpond in Bulacan covered by TCT
No. T-15674 by using information obtained while he was in possession of the certificate
of title and the blueprint plan of the property.
As the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Rule 21.01. - A lawyer shall not reveal the confidences or secrets of his client except:
a) When authorized by the client after acquainting him of the consequences of the
disclosure;
b) When required by law;
c) When necessary to collect his fees or to defend himself, his employees or associates
or by judicial action.
Rule 21.01. - A lawyer shall not, to the disadvantage of his client, use information
acquired in the course of employment, nor shall he use the same to his own advantage
or that of a third person, unless the client with full knowledge of the circumstances
consents thereto.
A lawyer shall preserve the confidences and secrets of his clients even after termination
of the attorney-client relation.xx[8] As his defense to the charges, respondent averred
that complainant failed to specify the alleged confidential information used against him.
Such a defense is unavailing to help respondent's cause for as succinctly explained in
Hilado v. David - xxi[9]
Communications between attorney and client are, in a great number of litigations, a
complicated affair, consisting of entangled relevant and irrelevant, secret and well
known facts. In the complexity of what is said in the course of the dealings between an
attorney and a client, inquiry of the nature suggested would lead to the revelation, in
advance of the trial, of other matters that might only further prejudice the complainants
cause. And the theory would be productive of other unsalutary results. To make the
passing of confidential communication a condition precedent, i.e., to make the
employment conditioned on the scope and character of the knowledge acquired by an
attorney in determining his right to change sides, would not enhance the freedom of
litigants, which is to be sedulously fostered, to consult with lawyers upon what they
believe are their rights in litigation. The condition would of necessity call for an
investigation of what information the attorney has received and in what way it is or it is
not in conflict with his new position. Litigants would in consequence be wary in going to
an attorney, lest by an unfortunate turn of the proceeding, if an investigation be held,
the court should accept the attorneys inaccurate version of the facts that came to him x
x x x
Hence, the necessity of setting down the existence of the bare relationship of attorney
and client as the yardstick for testing incompatibility of interests. This stern rule is
designed not alone to prevent the dishonest practitioner from fraudulent conduct, but
as well to protect the honest lawyer from unfounded suspicion of unprofessional
practice x x x x It is founded on principles of public policy, on good taste x x x x [T]he
question is not necessarily one of the rights of the parties, but as to whether the
attorney has adhered to proper professional standard. With these thoughts in mind, it

behooves attorneys, like Caesars wife, not only to keep inviolate the clients confidence,
but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing. Only thus can litigants
be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their attorneys which is of paramount
importance in the administration of justice.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, IBP Resolution No. XIV-2001-169 dated 29 April
2001 is adopted and approved. For violating the confidentiality of lawyer-client
relationship and for unethical conduct, respondent Atty. Rafael G. Suntay is SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for two (2) years effective upon the finality hereof.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines and all courts throughout the country.
SO ORDERED

ELMER CANOY, complainant, vs. ATTY. JOSE MAX ORTIZ, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
TINGA, J.:

There are no good reasons that would justify a lawyer virtually abandoning the cause of
the client in the midst of litigation without even informing the client of the fact or cause
of desertion. That the lawyer forsook his legal practice on account of what might be
perceived as a higher calling, election to public office, does not mitigate the dereliction
of professional duty. Suspension from the practice is the usual penalty, and there is no
reason to deviate from the norm in this case.
A Complaint[1] dated 10 April 2001 was filed with the Office of the Bar Confidant by
Elmer Canoy (Canoy) accusing Atty. Jose Max Ortiz (Atty. Ortiz) of misconduct and
malpractice. It was alleged that Canoy filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against his
former employer, Coca Cola Bottlers Philippines. The complaint was filed with the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) Regional Arbitration Board VI in Bacolod
City.[2] Atty. Ortiz appeared as counsel for Canoy in this proceeding. In 1998, the labor
arbiter hearing the complaint ordered the parties to submit their respective position
papers. Canoy submitted all the necessary documents and records to Atty. Ortiz for the
preparation of the position paper. Thereafter, he made several unfruitful visits to the
office of Atty. Ortiz to follow-up the progress of the case. After a final visit at the office of
Atty. Ortiz in April of 2000, during which Canoy was told to come back as his lawyer was
not present, Canoy decided to follow-up the case himself with the NLRC. He was shocked
to learn that his complaint was actually dismissed way back in 1998, for failure to
prosecute, the parties not having submitted their position papers.[3] The dismissal was
without prejudice. Canoy alleged that Atty. Ortiz had never communicated to him about
the status of the case, much less the fact that he failed to submit the position paper.
The Comment[4] filed by Atty. Ortiz is the epitome of self-hagiography. He informs the
Court that since commencing his law practice in 1987, he has mostly catered to indigent
and low-income clients, at considerable financial sacrifice to himself. Atty. Ortiz claims
that for more than ten years, his law office was a virtual adjunct of the Public Attorneys
Office with its steady stream of non-paying clients in the hundreds or thousands.[5] At
the same time, he hosted a legal assistance show on the radio, catering to far-flung

municipalities and reaching the people who need legal advice and assistance.[6] Atty.
Ortiz pursued on with this lifestyle until his election as Councilor of Bacolod City, a
victory which he generously attributes to the help of the same people whom he had
helped by way of legal assistance before.[7]
Canoy was among those low-income clients whom Atty. Ortiz deigned to represent. The
lawyer was apparently confident that the illegal dismissal case would eventually be
resolved by way of compromise. He claims having prepared the position paper of Canoy,
but before he could submit the same, the Labor Arbiter had already issued the order
dismissing the case.[8] Atty. Ortiz admits though that the period within which to file the
position paper had already lapsed. He attributes this failure to timely file the position
paper to the fact that after his election as Councilor of Bacolod City, he was frankly
preoccupied with both his functions as a local government official and as a practicing
lawyer. Eventually, his desire to help was beyond physical limitations, and he withdrew
from his other cases and his free legal services.[9]
According to Atty. Ortiz, Mr. Canoy should have at least understood that during all that
time, he was free to visit or call the office and be entertained by the secretary as [he]
would normally report to the office in the afternoon as he had to attend to court trials
and report to the Sanggunian office.[10] He states that it was his policy to inform clients
that they should be the ones to follow-up their cases with his office, as it would be too
difficult and a financial burden to attend making follow-ups with hundreds of clients,
mostly indigents with only two office personnel.[11]
Nonetheless, Atty. Ortiz notes that the dismissal of Canoys complaint was without
prejudice, thus the prescriptive period had been tolled. He claims not being able to
remember whether he immediately informed Canoy of the dismissal of the case, though
as far as he could recall, Canoy had conveyed a message to him that he had a lawyer to
handle the case, thus his office did not insist on refiling the same.[12]
The matter was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report and recommendation.[13] Canoy eventually submitted a motion withdrawing the
complaint, but this was not favorably acted upon by the IBP in view of the rule that the
investigation of a case shall not be interrupted or terminated by reason of withdrawal of
the charges.[14] Eventually, the investigating commissioner concluded that clearly, the
records show that [Atty. Ortiz] failed to exercise that degree of competence and
diligence required of him in prosecuting his clients (sic) claim, and recommended that
Atty. Ortiz be reprimanded.[15] The IBP Commission on Discipline adopted the
recommendation, with the slight modification that Atty. Ortiz be likewise warned that a
repetition of the same negligence shall be dealt with more severely in the future.
The Court is sensitive to the difficulties in obtaining legal representation for indigent or
low-income litigants. Apart from the heroic efforts of government entities such as the
Public Attorneys Office, groups such as the IBP National Committee on Legal Aid and the
Office of Legal Aid of the UP College of Law have likewise been at the forefront in the
quest to provide legal representation for those who could not otherwise afford the
services of lawyers. The efforts of private practitioners who assist in this goal are
especially commendable, owing to their sacrifice in time and resources beyond the call
of duty and without expectation of pecuniary reward.

Yet, the problem of under-representation of indigent or low-income clients is just as

grievous as that of non-representation. Admirable as the apparent focus of Atty. Ortizs
legal practice may have been, his particular representation of Canoy in the latters illegal
dismissal case leaves much to be desired.
Several of the canons and rules in the Code of Professional Responsibility guard against
the sort of conduct displayed by Atty. Ortiz with respect to the handling of Canoys case.
CANON 17A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE
MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.
CANON 18A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.
. . .
Rule 18.03A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence
in connection therewith shall render him liable.
Rule 18.04A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall
respond within a reasonable time to the clients request for information.
. . .
CANON 22A LAWYER SHALL WITHDRAW HIS SERVICES ONLY FOR GOOD CAUSE AND
UPON NOTICE APPROPRIATE IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES.
. . .
Rule 22.02 A lawyer who withdraws or is discharged shall, subject to a retainer lien,
immediately turn over all papers and property to which the client is entitled, and shall
cooperate with his successor in the orderly transfer of the matter, including all
information necessary for the proper handling of the matter.
Atty. Ortiz should have filed the position paper on time, owing to his duty as counsel of
Canoy to attend to this legal matter entrusted to him. His failure to do so constitutes a
violation of Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, a lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and
must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. He must serve the
client with competence and diligence and champion the latter's cause with
wholehearted fidelity, care and devotion. Elsewise stated, he owes entire devotion to
the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his client's rights,
and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability to the end that nothing be taken or
withheld from his client, save by the rules of law, legally applied. This simply means that
his client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense that is
authorized by the law of the land and he may expect his lawyer to assert every such
remedy or defense. If much is demanded from an attorney, it is because the entrusted
privilege to practice law carries with it the correlative duties not only to the client but
also to the court, to the bar and to the public. A lawyer who performs his duty with
diligence and candor not only protects the interest of his client; he also serves the ends
of justice, does honor to the bar and helps maintain the respect of the community to the
legal profession.[16]
If indeed Atty. Ortizs schedule, workload, or physical condition was such that he would
not be able to make a timely filing, he should have informed Canoy of such fact. The
relationship of lawyer-client being one of confidence, there is ever present the need for
the client to be adequately and fully informed of the developments of the case and

should not be left in the dark as to the mode and manner in which his/her interests are
being defended.[17]
There could have been remedies undertaken to this inability of Atty. Ortiz to file on time
the position paper had Canoy been told of such fact, such as a request for more time to
file the position paper, or maybe even the hiring of collaborating counsel or substitution
of Atty. Ortiz as counsel. Since Atty. Ortiz did not exercise the necessary degree of care
by either filing the position paper on time or informing Canoy that the paper could not
be submitted seasonably, the ignominy of having the complaint dismissed for failure to
prosecute could not be avoided.
That the case was dismissed without prejudice, thus allowing Canoy to refile the case,
hardly serves to mitigate the liability of Atty. Ortiz, as the failure to file the position
paper is per se a violation of Rule 18.03.[18]
Neither is the Court mollified by the circumstance of Atty. Ortizs election as a City
Councilor of Bacolod City, as his adoption of these additional duties does not exonerate
him of his negligent behavior. The Code of Professional Responsibility does allow a
lawyer to withdraw his legal services if the lawyer is elected or appointed to a public
office.[19] Statutes expressly prohibit the occupant of particular public offices from
engaging in the practice of law, such as governors and mayors,[20] and in such instance,
the attorney-client relationship is terminated.[21] However, city councilors are allowed
to practice their profession or engage in any occupation except during session hours, and
in the case of lawyers such as Atty. Ortiz, subject to certain prohibitions which are not
relevant to this case.[22] In such case, the lawyer nevertheless has the choice to
withdraw his/her services.[23] Still, the severance of the relation of attorney-client is not
effective until a notice of discharge by the client or a manifestation clearly indicating that
purpose is filed with the court or tribunal, and a copy thereof served upon the adverse
party, and until then, the lawyer continues to be counsel in the case.[24]
Assuming that Atty. Ortiz was justified in terminating his services, he, however, cannot
just do so and leave complainant in the cold unprotected.[25] Indeed, Rule 22.02
requires that a lawyer who withdraws or is discharged shall, subject to a lien,
immediately turn over all papers and property to which the client is entitled, and shall
cooperate with his successor in the orderly transfer of the matter. Atty. Ortiz claims that
the reason why he took no further action on the case was that he was informed that
Canoy had acquired the services of another counsel. Assuming that were true, there was
no apparent coordination between Atty. Ortiz and this new counsel.
In fact, it took nearly two years before Canoy had learned that the position paper had
not been filed and that the case had been dismissed. This was highly irresponsible of
Atty. Ortiz, much more so considering that Canoy was one of the indigent clients whom
Atty. Ortiz proudly claims as his favored clientele. It does not escape the Courts attention
that Atty. Ortiz faults Canoy for not adequately following up the case with his office.[26]
He cannot now shift the blame to complainant for failing to inquire about the status of
the case, since, as stated above, it was his duty as lawyer to inform his clients of the
status of cases entrusted to him.[27]
The appropriate sanction is within the sound discretion of this Court. In cases of similar
nature, the penalty imposed by the Court consisted of either a reprimand, a fine of five

hundred pesos with warning, suspension of three months, six months, and even
disbarment in aggravated cases.[28] Given the circumstances, the Court finds the
penalty recommended by the IBP too lenient and instead suspends Atty. Ortiz from the
practice of law for one (1) month. The graver penalty of suspension is warranted in lieu
of an admonition or a reprimand considering that Atty. Ortizs undisputed negligence in
failing to timely file the position paper was compounded by his failure to inform Canoy
of such fact, and the successive dismissal of the complaint.
Lawyers who devote their professional practice in representing litigants who could ill
afford legal services deserve commendation. However, this mantle of public service will
not deliver the lawyer, no matter how well-meaning, from the consequences of
negligent acts. It is not enough to say that all pauper litigants should be assured of legal
representation. They deserve quality representation as well.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Jose Max S. Ortiz is ordered SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for one (1) month from notice, with the warning that a repetition of the
same negligence will be dealt with more severely. Let a copy of this decision be attached
to respondent's personal record in the Office of the Bar Confidant and copies be
furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to all the courts in
the land.
SO ORDERED.