Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
Questions in
Civil Law
( 1975- 2007 )
Eduardo A. Labitag
Editor
CONTENTS
FOREWORD.......................................... ..................
iii
23
44.
70
90
110
132
2000 ...............................................................
149
198
223
1996 ...............................................................
246
.
:
293
318
336
353
377
1989 ................................................................
393
415
1987 ...............................................................
446
XI
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J
MecUt f Distinguish the following concepts:
Ootm*>'o/i; <5^*,//^^ n
OrftfW*; l*v,tCt + nkfrt oXt
(a)
Occupation v. possession.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a
(a)
Occupation can take place only with respect to
property without an owney while possession can refer to
all kinds of property, whether with owner or without an
owner. Occupation itself, when proper, confers ownership
but possession does not by itself give rise to ownership
(Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil
Code o f the Philippines [1999 ed .], vol. II, p. 489).
FIRST ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Occupation is an original mode of acquiring ownership
(Art. 712, NCC). Things appropriable by nature which are
without an owner, such as atiimals that are the object of
hunting and fishing, hidden treasure and abandoned
movables, are acquired by occupation (Art. 713, NCC).
However, ownership of a piece of land cannot be acquired
by occupation (Art. 714, NCC).
On the other hand, possession is the holding of a
thing or the enjoyment, of a right, as provided in Article
523 of t ie New CiVil Code. Possession can be in the
conceptofan owner-orin the concept of a holder (Art. 525,
NCC).
SECOND ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Occupation is a mode of acquiring dominion by the
seizure of corporeal things which have no owner, with the
intention o f acquiring the ownership thereof. It is an
original mode of acquiring ownership upon seizure of a
(b)f
<
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(b)
Illegal and impossible conditions in a simple
donation are considered as not written. Such conditions
shall, therefore, be disregarded but the donation remains
valid (Article 727, NCC).
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a)fThe platform is an immovable property under
Article 415 (9) NCC., which provides that docks and
structures which, though floating, are intem|gd by their
nature and object to remain at a fixed place on a river,
lake or coast. Since the floating platform is a petroleum
operation facility, it is intended to remain permanently
where it is situated, even if it is tethered to a ship which
is anchbred to the seabed.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
The platform is a movable property because it is
attached to a movable property, i.e. the vessel which was
merely anchored to the seabed. The fact that the vessel
is merely anchored to the seabed only shows that it is not
intended to remain at a fixed place; hence, it remains a
movable property. If the intention was to make the
platform stay permanently where it was moored, it would
not have been simply tethered to a vessel but itself
anchored to the seabed.
(b)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(bjH'he equipment and living quarters of the crew are
immovable property under Article 415 (3) NCC, classifies
as an immovable everything attached to an immovable
in a fixed manner, in such a way that it cannot be
separated therefrom without breaking the material or
* deterioration of the object. Both the equipment and the
living quarters are permanently attached to the platform
which is also an immovable.
J
Explkin the following concepts and doctrines and give
an example of each:
(a)
. ,
'
SUGGESTED ANSWER:'
(a)
A constructive trust is a trust not created by any
word or phrase, either expressly or impliedly, evincing a
direct intention to create a trust, but is one that arises in
order to satisfy the demands of justice. It does not come
about by agreement or intention but mainlyjfperation of
law and construed as a trust against one who; by fraud,
duress or abuse of confidence, obtains or holds the legal
right to property which he ought not, in equity and good
conscience, to hold (Heirs o f Lorenzo Yap v. Court o f
Appeals, 371 Phil. 523 [1999]).
The following are examples of constructive trust:
1. Article 1456 NCC which provides:
If property is acquired through
mistake^ or fraud, the person obtaining it
is, by force of law considered a trustee o f an
implied trust for the benefit of the person
from whom the property comes.
(b)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
V
IV
(1 0 % )
'
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SUGGESTED ANSWER:
MCT No.
(a)
The governing law is the Land Registration Act
as amended by the Property Registration Decree (Act No.
496 as amended by P.D. No. 1529).
[Note:
It is respectfully recommended that full
credit be given to examinees who did not give the exact
title or number of the law but merely stated a description
o f the law.]
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
In general, the governing law relating to registration
and acquisition of title to land is Act 496 o f 1902 as
amended by P.D. No. 1529, otherwise known as the
Property Registration Decree of June 11, 1978.
Pec*-*
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
b)
c)
9.
(b)
SUGGESTEDANSWER:
(b)^The following properties are not registrable:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
1.^Properties of public dominium intended for public
use, like roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges
constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and
the like, are incapable of private appropriation, much
less registration (Article 420, New Civil Code).
This
10
4. otefcjaAiv Lcith*nb}
V
(10 % )
OWf^hOM M^ MI
O* f / ;
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*>e~hv
delicts;
quasi-delicts;
solution indebiti',
negotiorum gestio, and
all other obligations arising from law.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Obligations without an agreement refer to the
juridical relation of^au asi-c o n tra ct which arise from
certain lawful, voluntary and unilateral acts to the end
that no one shall be unjustly enriched or benefited at
the expense of another. (Art. 2142, NCC)
Fiifst example of ah obligation without an agreement
is* a 'c a s e 'b f negotiorum aestio, whereby one who
voluntarily takes charge of the agency or management of
the business or property of another, without any power
from the latter, is obliged to continue the same until the
termination of the affair and its incidents, or to require
the person concerned to substitute him, if the owner is in
a position to do so (Art. 2144, NCC).
Second example, a case of solution indebiti may also
give rise to an obligation without an agreement. This
refers to the obligation to return which arises when
something is received when there is no right to demand
it, and it was unduly delivered through mistake (Art.
2154, NCC).
11
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YJ
(1 0 % )
***,.
"* -* 7
12
(emo'f**
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
^Probate should be denied. The requitement that
the testator and at least three (3) witnesses must all sign
in the presence of one another was not complied with.
Benjamin who notarized the will is disqualified as a
witness, hence, he cannot be counted as one of the three
witnesses (CruZ v. Villasor, 54 SCRA 31 [1973]). The
testatrix and the other witnesses signed the will not in
the presence o f Roberta because she was in the restroom
for extended periods of time. Inside the restroom, Roberta
could not have possibly seen the testatrix and the other
witnesses sign the will by merely casting her eves in the
proper direction (Jaboneta v. Gustilo, 5 Phil. 541 [1906];
Nera v. Rimando, 18 Phil. 451 [1914]). Therefore, the
testatrix signed her will in the presence of only two
witnesses, and only two witnesses signed the will in the
presence of the testatrix and of one another.
It is to be noted, however, that a^thumbmark
intended by the testator to be his signature in executing
his last will and testament is valid (Payadv. Tolentino, 62
Phil. 848 [1936]; Matias v. Salud, L-104 Phils. 1046, 23
June [1958]). The problem, however, states that Clara
said that she can sign her full name later; Hence, she
did not consider her thumb-mark as her complete
signature, and intended further action on her part. The
testatrix and the other witness signed the will in the
presence of Hannah, because she was aware of her function
and role as witness and was in a position to see the
testatrix and the other witness sign by merely casting
her eyes in the proper direction.
*.
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SUGGESTEDANSWER:
SUGGESTEDANSWER:
FALSE. fThe five-year prescriptive period for filing
legal separation runs'from the occurrence of each act of
sexual infidelity. Hence, the prescriptive period for the
sexual infidelity committed in 2002 runs from 2002; for
the sexual infidelity cpmmitted in 2003, the prescriptive
period runs from 2003 and so on. The action for legal
separation for the last act of sexual infidelity in 2005 will
prescribe in 2010.
14
3.
SUGGESTEDANSWER:
FALSE.^The absolute community of property is liable
for the ante-nuptial debts of either spouse in so far as the
same redounded to the benefit o f the family (Art. 94[7],
Family Code).
,v.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
FALSE. The deb t is already the responsibility of the
community property,, because the property already
constitutes absolute community o f property under Art.
91 ofthe Family Code which took effectin 1988 while the
house and lot here''involved was purchased in 1990.
There is n o indication that the spouse who bought the
property had legitimate descendants by a former marriage,
which would exclude the house and lot from the
community property, (Art. 92[3], Family Code). If the
spouses established a conjugal partnership, the property
belongs to the individual spouse if full ownership was
vested before the marriage. (Art. 118, Family Code).
4.
SUGGESTEDANSWER:
FALSE.^Marsha is not estopped from filing an
annulment case against John on the ground of his
impotence, because she learned o f his impotence after
the celebration of the marriage and not before. Physical
incapability to consummate the marriage is a valid ground
15
SUGGESTEDANSWER:
16
bailor;
bailee;
comodatario;
all of the above;
letters a and b
SUGGESTED ANSWERS:
1.
e (letters a & b)
17
..
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
1.
a voluntary deposit;
c)
a necessary deposit;
d)
e)
letters a and b
SUGGESTEDANSWER:
2.
3.
c (necessary deposit)
^ A contract of antichresis is always:
a)
a written contract;
b)
c)
d)
e)
letters a and b.
SUGGESTEDANSWER:
3.
4.
18
a)
,.i..
' 1
'
b)
c)
d)
;"
SUGGESTEDANSWER:
4. ' (c)
5.
b)
c)
d)
e)
letters a and b.
SUGGESTEDANSWER:
5.
19
( 10%)
For purposes of this question, assume all formalities
and procedural requirements have been complied with.
In 1970, Ramon and Dessa got married. Prior to their
marriage, Ramon had a child, Anna. In 1971 and 1972,
Ramon and Dessa legally adopted Cherry and Michelle,
respectively. In 1973, Dessa died while giving birth to Larry.
Anna had a child, Lia. Anna never married. Cherry, on the
other hand, legally adopted Shelly. Larry had twins, Hans
and Gretel, with his girlfriend, Fiona. In 2005, Anna, Larry,
and Cheriy died in a car accident. In 2007, Ramon died.
Who may inherit from Ramon and who may not? Give your
reasons briefly.
fR<>f67
* oe*f*
SUGGESTEDANSWER:
U*
/Wi\
20
1.
2.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
The problem expressly mentioned the dates of the
adoption of Cherry and Michelle as 1971 and 1972.
During that time, adoption was governed by the New Civil
Code. Under the New Civil Code, husband and wife were
allowed to adopt separately or not jointly with the other
spouse. And since the problem does not specifically and
categorically state, it is possible to construe the use of
the word respectively in the problem as indicative of
the situation that Cherry was adopted by Ramon alone
and Michelle was adopted by Dessa alone. In such a case
of separate adoption the alternative answer to the problem
will be as follows:
Only Lia will inherit from Ramon in representation
of Ramons illegitimate daughter Anna. Although Lia is
an illegitimate child, she is not barred from inheriting
from Ramon because her mother Anna is herself
illegitimate.
21
22
At**40iu J- Pn/rify
P+imttrf Arttum'h)
fi>-lr^r r4W<fv, *,
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The rationale of the provision is that a child below
7 years old needs the love and care which only its mother
can give. The welfare of the child is given the highest
priority and the interest of the child prevails over
procedural rules.
(2) Give at least 3 examples of compelling reasons
which justify the taking away from the mothers custody of
her child under 7 years of age. 2.5%
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The following have been considered as compelling
reasons to deprive a mother of custody: (1) neglect, (2)
abandonment, (31 unemployment. (4) immorality [Espiritu
v. CA, 242 SCRA 362 [1995]), (5) alcoholism, (6) drug
addiction, (7) maltreatment, (8) insanity, (9) highly
communicable serious disease, (10) grave physical
handicap, (11) serious and credible threat by the child to
harm himself if separated from his mother [Luna v. CA,
13 7 SCRA 7 [1985])'
/.
^
23
5%
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
t As judge, I will deny the petition. A petition for legal
separation may be filed only by the aggrieved spouse.
Since Saul was unfaithful and was in fact caught in
flagrante by his wife, he is not an aggrieved spouse
* entitled to the relief. Hevwho comes to court must come
with clean hands. And even assuming that the attempt on
his life by the wife is a ground for legal separation, he is
. still not entitled to the relief because of his infidelity.
The law does not allow legal separation if both parties
have given ground for legal separation.
24
111
*</#*. con-yzf
*/ *-<-
SUGGESTEDANSWER:
^Ed is the father of Alvin because Alvin was conceived
and bom during the marriage o f his mother to Ed. Under
... the law, the child born during the marriage of the mother
to.her husband fe presumed to be the legitimate child of
the husband [Concepcion v. Almonte, 468 SCRA 438
t,
[2005D- While it is true that there was no written consent 0/Uif q__tm
by the husband to the artificial insemination, absence o f'
such consent may only give the husband a ground to
impugn the legitimacy of the child but will not prevent
the child from acquiring the status of legitimate child of
the husband at the time of its birth.
ANOTHER SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Ed is the father of Alvin if he gave his written
consent to the artificial insemination o f his wife.
Otherwise, the child is the illegitimate child o f Andy.
Under the Family Code, children conceived as a result of
artificial insemination of the wife with the sperm of the
husband or that of a donor or both are legitimate children
of the husband and the wife, provided that both of them
authorized or ratified such insemination in a written
^ instrument executed and signed by both of them befpre
the birth of the child.
25
(2)
-What are the requirements, if any, in order for Ed
to establish his paternity over Alvin? 2.5%
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
To establish Eds paternity over Alvin, only two
requirements must concur: (1) the fact that Ed and the
mother of Alvin are validly married, and (2) the fact that
Alvin was conceived or born during the subsistence of
such marriage.
ANOTHER SUGGESTED ANSWER:
To establish E d s paternity over Alvin, two
requirements must obtain: (1) both spouses authorized
or ratified the insemination in a written document
executed and signed by them before the birth o f the chilcT;
and (2) the instrument is recorded in the civil registry
together with the birth certificate of the child.
IV
of
26
VwV(
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
*
The marriage between Gigi and Ric is void because
a minister has no authority to solemnize a marriage
between contracting parties who were both not members
of the ministers religious sect. Under the Family Code,
a minister or a priest has authority to solemnize a
marriage but only if one or both contracting parties are
members of the religious sect of the priest or minister.
Since neither Ric or Gigi was a member of the Baptist
Church because both of them were Catholic, the Baptist
Minister did not have authority to solemnize their
marriage.
Ric and Gigi cannot claim that they believed in good
faith and that the Baptist Minister had the authority to
solemnize the marriage and invoke Article 35 (2) o f the
Family Code to make the marriage valid. The provision of
the Family Code applies only to a mistake of fact, and not
to a mistake of law. Hence, the fact that the Ministers
license was expired will not affect the validity o f the
marriage if Ric or Gigi believed in good faith that the
Minister had a valid license. That would be a mistake of
fact. However, believing that the Minister had authority
to solemnize the marriage even if none of the contracting
parties was a member of the Ministers religious sect is a
mistake of law. This is because the law expressly provides
that the Minister has authority only if one or both
contracting parties are members of the Ministers religious
sect. A mistake of law does not excuse from noncompliance therewith.
ANOTHER SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The marriage between Ric and Gigi is valid. Assuming
that the parents of Ric and Gigi did not give their consent
to the marriage, the marriage would have been voidable.
However, it was ratified when Ric and Gigi continued
cohabiting for 2 years after they attained the age of 21.
It must be noted that they had 5 years of married life or
until they were 23 years old.
27
I
28
(4) Ifyou were the counsel for Gigi, what action/s will
you take to enforce and protect her interests? Explain. 2.5%
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
As counsel for Gigi, I will Hie an action for the
declaration of nullity of Gigis marriage to Ric on the
ground of absence of authority of the Baptist Minister to
solemnize the marriage between Ric and Gigi who were
both non-members of the Baptist Church.
29
corh,;l
(1)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
*
eutmerrf-
"f The suit will prosper. The sale was void because
Linda did not give her written consent to the sale. In
Jad.er-Mana.lo v. Camaisa, 374 SCRA 498 (2002), the
Supreme Court has ruled that the sale of conjugal property
is void if both spouses have not given their written
consent to it and even if the spouse who did not sign the
Deed of Sale participated in the negotiation of the
contract. In Abalos v. Macatanaau. 439 SCRA649(20041.
the Supreme Court even held that for the sale to be valid,
the signatures of the spouses to signify their written
consent must be on the same document. In this case,
Linda, although she was the one who negotiated the sale,
did not give her written consent to the sale. Hence, the
sale is void. However, Linda will not be entitled to
damages because Ray is not in anyway in bad faith.
ANOTHER SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The suit will not prosper because the contract o f sale
has already been perfected and partly consummated. The
contract of sale is perfected upon the meeting of the
^ . minds, of. the buyey and seller on to the thing to be sold
,/ aj^d pn,u.the. price , thereof. In this case, Linda had a
meeting of minds with Ray when they agreed that the
property will be sold for 2 million pesos at the conclusion
of her negotiations with him, while Biong had a meeting
of minds with Ray when he signed the Deed of Sale and
accepted the 2 million-peso payment by Ray. Linda is
estopped from questioning the validity o f the contract
she herself negotiated with Ray.
(2)
Does Ray have any cause of action against Biong
and Linda? Can he also recover damages from the spouses?
Explain. 2.5%
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
^ Yes, Ray has a cause of action against Linda and
30
Biong for the return of the 2 million pesos he paid for the
property. He may recover damages from the spouses, if
it can be proven that they were in bad faith in backing out
from the contract, as this is an act contrary to morals and
good customs under Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code.
ANOTHER SUGGESTEDANSWER:
Assuming that the contract of sale has been perfected,
' Ray may file a counterclaim against Linda and Biong for
specific performance or rescission, with damages in
, either .case. Linda has breached the obligation created by
the contract when she filed an action for nullification of
sale. On account of Linda's bad faith or fraud, Ray may
ask for damages under Article 1170 of the Civil Code.
VI
Gemma filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of
her marriage with Am ell on the ground of psychological
incapacity. She alleged that after 2 months o f their marriage,
Am ell showed signs of disinterest in her, neglected her and
went abroad. He returned to the Philippines after 3 years but
did not even get in touch with her. Worse, they met several
times in social functions but he snubbed her. When she got
sick, he did not visit her even if he knew of her confinement
in the hospital. Meanwhile, Am ell met an accident which
disabled him from reporting for work and earning a living to
support himself.
Will Gemmas suit prosper? Explain. 5%
SUGGESTEDANSWER:
Gemmas suit will not prosper. The acts o f Am ell
complained about''do not by themselves constitute
psychological incapacity. It is not enough to prove the
commission of those acts or the existence of his abnormal
behavior. It must be shown that those acts or that
behavior was manifestation of a serious mental disorder *****&*
and that it is the root cause why he was not able
31
It
/M'~n fry
Alberto and Janine migrated to the United States of
America, leaving behind their 4 children, one of whom is
Manny. They own a duplex apartment and allowed Manny to
live in one of the units. While in the United States, Alberto
died. His widow and all his children executed an Extrajudicial
32
ft*"**;
IX
A drug lord and his family reside in a small bungalow
where they sell shabu and other prohibited drugs. When the
police found the illegal trade, they immediately demolished
the house because according to them, it was a nuisance per
se that should be abated. Can this demolition be sustained?
Explain. 5%
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, the demolition cannot be sustained/The house
cannot be considered as nuisance perse. To be considered
per se, the act, occupation, or structure must be a
33
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it
Don died after executing a Last Will and Testament,
'
leaving his. estate valued at P12 Million to his common-law
wife Roshelle. He is survived by his brother Ronie and his
half-sister Michelle.
(1)
Was Dons testamentaiy disposition of his estate in
accordance with the law on succession? Whether you agree
or not, explain your answer. 2.5%
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, the testamentary disposition is in accordance
with the law on succession. Don was not survived bv anv
compulsory heir. Hence, he could will his entire estate to
34
35
XI
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37
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X II
Tony bought a Ford Expedition from a car dealer in
Muntinlupa City. As payment, Tony issued a check drawn
against his current account with Premium Bank. Since he
has a good reputation, the car dealer allowed him to
immediately drive home the vehicle merely on his assurance .
that his check is sufficiently funded. When the car dealer
deposited the check, it was dishonored on the ground of
Account Closed. After an investigation, it was found that an
employee of the bank misplaced Tonys account ledger. Thus,
the bank erroneously assumed that his account no longer
exists. Later, it turned out thatTonys account has more than
sufficient funds to cover the check. The dealer however,
immediately filed an action for recovery of possession of the
vehicle against Tony for which he was tem bly humiliated and
embarrassed. Does Tony have a cause of action against
Premium Bank? Explain. 5%
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
' Yfes; Tony has a cause of action against Premium
Bank. According to Art. 2176, whoever by act or omission
causes damages to another, there being fault or negligence,
is obliged to pay for the damage done. The proximate
cause of the injury which is the dishonor of Tonys check,
was the banks negligence in misplacing his account
ledger. The fiduciary nature of banking requires high
standards of integrity and performance necessitating
banks to treat the accounts of its depositors with
meticulous care.
, ^
x iii
'
38
1.
Can Dennis file an independent civil action against
Carlos and his father Benjamin for damages based on quasi
delict? Explain. 2.5%
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes," Dennis can file an independent civil action
against Carlos and his father, Benjamin. The independent
' civil action against Carlos can be based on Article 2176
of the Civil Code, which states that, whoever by act or
omission causes damage to another, there, being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. The
proximate cause of the injury suffered by Dennis, was the
negligent driving of Carlo. He can thus be held personally
liable by the former for said injuries.
2.
Assuming Dennis action is tenable, can Benjamin
raise the defense that he is not liable because the vehicle is
not registered in his name? Explain. 2.5%
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, Benjamin cannot raise the defense that he is not
liable because the vehicle is not registered in his name.
Had Dennis sued Benjamin based on the latters liability
as the owner of the vehicle, the non-registration o f the
vehicle in his name would have been a valid defense. As
held in the case of BA Finance Corporation v. CA (215
SCRA 715 [1992]), it is the registered owner of any
vehicle, who should be primarily responsible to the
public or third persons for injuries caused the latter while
the vehicle is being driven. In this case, Arturo was not
sued. If sued, Arturo should be held liable for the injury
incurred by Dennis.
. . ,, ,
However, Benjamin is^rfot being sued based on his
ownership of the registered, vehicle, but rather for his
responsibility as the-^pajent o f a minor child whose
negligent act resulted to damage or injury to another. As
provided in Article 2180 of the Civil Code, as amended by
Article 221 of the Family Code, the father and mother are
responsible for the damages caused by the fault and
negligence of the minor children who live in their
39
1.
What entries in the Civil Registry may be changed
or corrected without a judicial order? 2.5%
40
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Only clerical or typographical errors may be
corrected, and only the first name or nickname may be
changed, without judicial order under RA 9048.
2.
May an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her
natural father, use the surname of her natural mother as her
middle name? 2.5%
SUGGESTEDANSWER:
^ Yes, an illegitimate child who is adopted by his
natural father may carry the surname of his biological
mother as his middle name. The Supreme Court has ruled
that there is no law allowing or prohibiting such child
from doing so. What is not prohibited is allowed. Likewise,
the use of the surname of the mother, even of legitimate
children is in accord with Filipino customs and traditions
and will serve the best interest of the child who will not
be confused by wondering why he has no middle name. (In
Re: Adoption o f Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia, 454
SCRA 541 [2005]).
XVI i.
to h
.- h ,,)
l.
Under Article 2219 of the Civil Code, moral damages
may be recovered in the cases specified therein, several of
which are enumerated below.
Choose the case wherein you cannot recover moral
damages. Explain. 1.5%
a)
b)
c)
d)
e)
41
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Nagger
Gay or lesbian
Congenital sexual pervert
Gambler
Alcoholic
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The gay or lesbian is psychologically incapacitated.
Being gay or lesbian is a mental disorder which prevents
the afflicted person from performing the essential duties
of married life. He or she will not be able to perform his
42
43
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>A*. () <<'***
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^
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V^M^
A.
Gabby and Mila got married at Lourdes Church in
Quezon City on July 10, 1990. Prior thereto, they executed
a marriage settlement whereby they agreed on the regime of
conjugal partnership of gains. The marriage settlement was
registered in the Register of Deeds of Manila, where Mila is a
resident. In 1992, they jointly acquired a residential house
and lot, as well as a condominium unit in Makati. In 1995,
they decided to change their property relations to the regime
of complete separation of property. Mila consented, as she
w as then engaged in a lucrative business. The spouses then
signed a private document dissolving their conjugal
partnership and agreeing on a complete separation of property.
Thereafter, Gabby acquired a mansion in Baguio City,
and a 5-hectare agricultural land in Oriental Mindoro, which
he registered exclusively in his name.
In the year 2000, Milas business Venture failed, and her
creditors sued her for PIO.OOO.OOO.OO. After obtaining a
favorable judgment, the creditors sought to execute on the
spouses' house and lot and condominium unit, as well as
G abbys mansion and agricultural land.
a)
Discuss the status of the first and the amended
marriage settlements. (2%)
, , . ^
_
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
A. 1)
The first m arriage settlement w as valid
becau se it w a s1in writing, S ign e d by the parties and
-^executed before the celebration o f the m arriage.
2)
The subsequent agreem ent of the parties
w as void as a m odification o f their m arriage settlement;
To be valid, the m odification m ust be executedbefore the
celebration of the m arriage. T he subsequent agreem ent
o f the parties did not effect a dissolution o f their conjugal
partnership and a separation o f their properties because
44
fWf -
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
1 b) Since the marriage settlement was binding
between the piarties, conjugal partnership of gains was
the regime of their property relations. Under the regime
of conjugal partnership of gains, all properties acquired
by the spouses during the marriage, jointly or by either
one of them, through their work or industry are conjugal.
Therefore, the residential house and lot, and the
condominium unit are conjugal having been jointly
acquired by the couple during the marriage. Inasmuch as
the subsequent agreement on dissolution o f the conjugal
partnership and separation o f property was invalid,
conjugal partnership subsisted between the parties.
Therefore, the mansion and the agricultural land are also
conjugal having been acquired by one o f the spouses
during the marriage.
c) What properties may be held answerable for
Mila's obligations? Explain. (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
c)
The marriage settlement cannot prejudice third
parties, such as the creditors, because it was not registered
with the local civil registrar where the marriage was
recorded. To bind third parties, the Family Code requires
registration of the marriage settlement not only with the
proper registers of deeds but also with the local civil
registrar where the marriage was recorded. Hence, if the
rules on conjugal partnership will prejudice the creditors,
the rules on absolute community will be applied instead.
However, insofar as debts contracted by one spouse
without the consent of the other are concerned, the rule
45
e*<tortci A'klVff*-*
c)
Explain the status of the mairiage between Lulu
and Tirso. (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
c) The marriage between Lulu and Tirso is also void
ab initio because Lulu is still validly married to Sonny.
d) Explain the respective filiation of James, John
and Verna. (2%)
SUGGESTEDANSWER:
d) James and John are the illegitimate children of
Sonny and Auring because they were conceived and boro
outside a valid marriage. Verna is an illegitimate child of .
Lulu and Tirso having been conceived and born to the 'I ' '
invalid marriage of Lulu and Tirso. Verna cannot be
presumed as the legitimate child of Sonny because of th e.
supervening marriage that was celebrated between Liilu
- !?.
and Tirso even though such marriage is void ab initio.
The case o f Liyao v. L iy a o ________ :__ is not applicable
because in that case the wife begot a child by another
man during her marriage to her estranged husband but no
marriage was celebrated between the wife and the father
of the child. The child in that case was presumed to be the
legitimate child of the estranged husband.
e) u. Who are. the heirs of Sonny? Explain. (2%)
i- -
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
e)
The heirs of Sonny are his wife Lulu, and his 2
illegitimate children James and John. The void remarriage
of Lulu to Tirso did not incapacitate her to succeed
Sonny.
JUrcMfion;
i&y txceeA^n>j
III
Emil, the testator, has three legitimate children. Tom,
Heniy and Warlito; a wife named Adette; parents named Pepe
and Pilar; an illegitimate child, Ramon; brother, Mark; and a
Wf*;
P200.000.00 (legitime)
200,000.0,0 (legitime)
200,000.00 (legitime)
200,000.00 (legitime)
400,000.00 (P 100,000 as legitime,
and P 300,000 as free
portion)
............P I, 200,000.00
; n*.
1.
?>*; Ac* f. ft j
faft'vA tv
J
2>
ar
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a)
Yes, Joey has such a cause of action against
Tintin. While the Family Code has repealed the provisions
of the New Civil Code on proof o f filiation, said repeal did
not impair vested rights. Joey was bora an illegitimate
child in 1981. As an illegitimate child, he had acquired,
at birth, the right to prove his filiation in accordance with
the provisions of the New Civil Code in force at that time.
Under the New Civil Code, an illegitimate child mav file
an action to compel his recognition even after the death
fa
of the putative father when the father died during the
minori ty o f the child. While the Family Code has repealed
this provision, it will not operate to prejudice Joey who
has already acquired a vested right thereto.
ALTERNATIVE SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a) The Family Code governs the capacity of his
heirs to inherit, since Steve died in 1993. The Family
Code requires that because the illegitimate child has no
documentary proof of his filiation, the action to establish
his filiation must be brought during the lifetime o f his
alleged father, whose death occurred in 1993.
Hence, the illegitimate child Joey has no cause of
action.
b)
(2%)
49
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
b)
The defenses of Tintin are not tenable. The fact
that Joey's birth certificate does not show that Steve was
his father is of no moment. The law does not require such
mention. Besides, the New Civil Code provides that when
the father did not sign the birth certificate, his name
should not be disclosed therein. While it is true that
capacity to inherit is determined at the time of the death
of the decedent and that filiation is an element of
capacity to inherit, filiation is determined not at the
time of the death of the decedent but at the time of the
birth of the child who is born with a status. Such status
may subsequently change such as in legitimation, but
legitimation is deemed to retroact to the time of birth. In
the same manner, recognition when given voluntarily by
the father, or decreed by the court, retroacts to the time
o f the child's birth.
c)
Supposing that Joey died during the pendency of
the action, should the action be dismissed? Explain. (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
c)
If Joey filed the action and died when the New'
Civil Code was still in force, his action would be dismissed
because the action was not transmissible to the heirs of
the illegitimate child (Conde v. Abaya, 13 Phil. 249
[1909])). But if the action was filed after effectivity of the
Family Code, and Joey died during the pendency o f the
action for recognition, it should not be dismissed. Under
the present Family Code, an action commenced by a
legitimate child to claim his legitimate filiation is not C*U
extinguished by his death. The Family Code makes this
provision applicable to the action for recognition filed by
an illegitimate child. Joey has the right to invoke this
provision because it does not impair any vested rights.
(Art. 175, Family Code)
50
V
In 1984, Eva, a Filipina, went to work as a nurse in the
USA. There she met and fell in love with Paui, an American
citizen, and they got married in 1985. Eva acquired American
citizenship in 1987. During their sojourn in the Philippines
iri 1990, they filed a joint petition for the adoption of Vicky,
a 7-year-old daughter of Evas sister. The government,
through the Office of the Solicitor General, opposed the
petition on the ground that the petitioners, being both
foreigners, are disqualified to adopt Vicky.
a)
(2 %)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a) Yes, the position of the government is tenable.
Foreigners are disqualified to adopt unless they fall in
any of the exceptions provided for in the law. Eva and
Paul are both foreigners. Eva, falls in one of the exceptions.
She is qualified to adopt because she is a former Filipino^
citizen who wishes to adopt a relative by consanguinity.
Unfortunately, Paul is not qualified to adopt because he
does not fall in any of the exceptions. Hence, they cannot
adopt jokrffy. When husband and wife are adopting
jointly, (both p f them must be qualified to adopt in their
own rigntLiSva cannot, alone by herself, adopt her niece
because husband and wife must adopt jointly unless they
fall in any of the exceptions provided for in the law. They
cannot adopt separately because they do not fall in any
of the exceptions. Hence, whether separately or jointly,
Eva and Paul cannot adopt Vicky in the Philippines.'
(Domestic Adoption Law [RA 8552]
b)
Would your answer be the same if they sought to
adopt Eva's illegitimate daughter? Explain. (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
b)
51
VI
Hans.Herber, a German national, and his Filipino wife,
Rhoda, are permanent residents of Canada. They desire so
much to adopt Magno, an 8-year old orphaned boy and a
baptismal godson of Rhoda. Since the accidental death of
Magnos parents in 2004, he has been staying with his aunt
who, however, could hardly afford to feed her own family.
Unfortunately, Hans and Rhoda cannot com e to the
Philippines to adopt Magno although they possess all the
qualifications as adoptive parents.
52
<h*u&n<
VTI
v *
fn, fnrn+v
Don was the owner of an agricultural land with no
access to a public road. He had been passing through the
land of Ernie with the latters acquiescence for over 20 years.
Subsequently, Don subdivided his property into 20 residential
lots and sold them to different persons. Ernie blocked the
pathway and refused to let the buyers pass through his land.
a)
Did Don acquire an easement of right of way?
Explain. (2%)
i.
I
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
j,
i)
53
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foysr
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|WlVnAy
VIII
State with reason whether each of the following is a
nuisance, and if so, give its classification, whether public or
private.
a)
A squatters hut (1 %)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
#
According to Article 694of the Civil Code, a nuisance
is any: act, omission, establishment, business condition
of property, or anything else which:
(1) Injures or endangers the health or safety of
others; or
(2) Annoys or offends the senses; or
(3) Shocks, defies, or disregards decency or morality;
or , ,
(4) Obstructs or interferes with the free passage of
any public highway or street, or any body of water; or
(5) Hinders or impairs the use of property,
A nuisance may be either public or private. Under
Article 685, a jwMin nnknnrp affects a community or
neighborhood or any considerable number or persons,
although the extent of the annoyance, danger o f damage
upon individuals may be unequal; A private nuisance, on
the other hand, is one that violates only private rights
and produces damage to but one or a few persons.
r'
b)
Could Ernie close th.e pathway and refuse to let the
buyers pass? Give reasons. (2%)
SUGGESTEDANSWER:
(c)
b)
A swimming pool (1 %)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
bj^ A swimming pool is not a nuisance and is an
exception to the attractive nuisance doctrine (Hidalgo v. I
.
Guillermo, 91 Phil. 488 [1952]). It generally does n o tl^frCTJ*
cause an injury, harm or prejudice to an individual or the
public (Article 694, par. 1).
***"*
c)
A house of prostitution (1 %)
SUGGESTEDANSWER:
c )* A house of prostitution is a public nuisance
because it shocks or disregards the decency or morality
of the community. (Article 694 par; 3, Civil Code)
d)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
d) * A noisy or dangerous factory even if built in a
private land may be considered a nuisance if it offends
the senses of the owners of the adjacent property or poses
a danger to their safety (Article 694, par; 1, Civil*Code).
This kind o f nuisance may be classified as a public
nuisance if it affects and annoys those who come within
its sphere.
e)
Uncollected garbage (1 %)
SUGGESTEDANSWER:
e) 'f Uncollected garbage can be injurious to health
and even the environment. It is thus, considered a public
nuisance.
*
t Carty,iJr;
IX
V-
56
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a) ^ The withdrawal o f Maryras offer is valid because
there was no consideration paid for the option. An option,
is a separate contract from the contract which is the/
subject o f the offer, and if not supported by apyv,
consideration, the option contract is not deemed
perfected. Thus, Marvin may withdraw the offer at any
time before acceptance o f the offer.
b)
Will your answer be the same if Carlos paid Marvin
P10,000.00 as consideration for that option? Explain. (2%)
SUGGESTEDANSWER:
b) ^ If Carlos paid P10.000.00 as consideration for
that option, Marvin cannot withdraw the offer prior to
expiration of the option period. The option is a separate
contract and if founded on consideration is a perfected
option contract and must, be respected by Marvin.
teer Kc)
Supposing that Carlos accepted the offer before
Marvin could,communicate his withdrawal thereof? Discuss
the legal consequences. (2%)
SUGGESTEDANSWER:
c)
If Carlos has already accepted the offer and such
acceptance has been communicated to Marvin before
Marvin communicates the withdrawal, the acceptance
creates a perfected construction contract. e_ven if no f
consideration was as yet paid for the option. If Marvin
nut perform his obligations under the perfected
contract of construction, he shall be liable for all
consequences arising from the breach thereof based on
57
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a) A ssum ing that the land is a residen tial
subdivision project under P.D. No. 957 (The Subdivision
and Condominium Buyers Protective Decree), DEVLANDs
action is not proper because under Section 23 of said
Decree, no installment payment shall be forfeited to the
owner or developer when the buyer, after due notice, ^
desists from further payment due to the failure of the
owner-developer to develop tn'e subdivision according to
the approved plans and within the time limit for complying
with the same.
b) D iscuss the righ ts o f B ernie u n d er the
circumstances. (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
b)
Under the same Section of theDecree, Bem ie may,
at his option, be reimbursed the total amount paid including
amortization interests but excluding delinquency interests
at the legal rate. He may also ask the Housing and Land Use ,
58
1 o t f b jH . S 'n
r
Before he left for Riyadh to work as a mechanic, Pedro
left his Adventure van with Tito, with the understanding that
the latter could use it for one year for his personal or family
use while Pedro works in Riyadh. He did not tell Tito that the
brakes of the van were faulty. Tito had the van tuned up and
the brakes repaired. He spent a total amount of P15.000.00.
After using the vehicle for two weeks, Tito discovered that it
consumed too much fuel. To make up for the expenses, he
leased it to Annabelle. Two months later, Pedro returned
to the Philippines and asked Tito to return the van.
59
A a V
60
SUGGESTEDANSWER:
KW.
d)
^ Both Tito and Pedro shall bear equally the costs
o f the extraordinary expenses, having been incurred on
the occasion of actual use of the van by Tito, the bailee, *
even though he acted without fault. (Art. 1949(2), Civil
Code)
* Crc&t -irvli+cHofU; /t-*W
XII
On July 14, 2004; Pedro executed in favor o f Juan a
De.ed o f Absolute. Sale over a parcel of land covered by TCTNo.
6245. It appears in the Deed of Sale that Pedro received from
JuanP120,000.00aspurchaseprice. However, Pedro retained
the owners duplicate of said title. Thereafter, Juan, as lessor,
and Pedro, as lessee, executed a contract of lease over the
property for a period of one (1) year with a monthly rental of
P I, 000.00. Pedro, as lessee, was also obligated to pay the
realty taxes on the property during the period of lease.
Subsequently, Pedro filed a complaint aqainst Juan for the
reformation of the Deed o f Absolute Sale, alleging that the
... transaction covered by the deed was an equitable mortgage.
-In his verified answer to the complaint, Juan alleged that the
prbp:eiJy.;Was, Sbfd |o,.htm under the Deed of Absolute Sale,
and interposed counterclaims to recover possession of the
property and to compel Pedro to turn over to him the owners
duplicate of title.
Resolve the case with reasons. (6%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
An/Equitable mortgage arises from a transaction,
regardls&s of its form, wtiietfresults into a security, or an offer
or attempt to pledge land as security for a debt or liability. Its
essence is the intent of the parties to create a mortgage, lien
or charge on the property sufficiently described or identified
to secure an obligation, which intent must be clearly
established in order that such a mortgage may exist.
61
tetter
Rod, the owner of an FX taxi, found in his vehicle an
envelope containing TCT No. 65432 over a lot registered in
Cesars name.. Posing as Cesar, Rod forged Cesars signature
on a Deed of Sale in Rods favor. Rod registered the said
document with the Register of Deeds, and obtained a new title
in his name. After a year, he sold the lot to Don, a buyer in
good faith and for value, who also registered th e lot in his
name.
a)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a) Rod did not acquire title to the land covered by T .C.
T. No. 65432of Cesar. A forged deed is an absolute nullity and
conveys no title.
62
b)
(2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
b) Don acquired a goodtitle to the land. Under the
T o rren s System, a fo rg ed d eed can be th e ro o t o f a g o o d
title. Since the certificate of title was already transferred
to Rod, upon the subsequent transfer thereof to Don, an
innocent purchaser in good faith, Don acquired a g o o d
title to the land. The registration of the land in the name
of Rod was conclusive notice to the whole world. Persons
dealing with registered land have the legal right to rely on
the face of the Torrens title and to dispense with the need
to look beyond the certificate and investigate the title of
the vendor appearing in the certificate in the absence of
facts and circumstances what would impel a reasonably
cautious man to make such inquiry. This is the Mirror i>
Principle" of the Torrens system.
c)
In an ejectment case filed by Don against Cesar,
can the latter ask for the cancellation of Dons title considering
that he (Cesar) is the rightful owner of the lot? Explain. (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
c)
Cesar cannot ask for cancellation of Dons title
in the ejectment case filed by Don against him. Under
Section 48 of PD 152^hePreperty Registration Decree, J?
a Torrens title shall/not pe subject to collateral attack. It
cannot be altered, modified or cancelled except in a
direct proceeding in accordance with law. The ejectment
proceeding does not provide the proper forum for the
cancellation of Dons title. While Cesars counterclaim
for cancellation of Dons title m aybe considered a direct
attack, the same should nevertheless be denied on
procedural grounds because a Municipal or Metropolitan
Trial Court is without jurisdiction to cancel a Torrens
title.
63
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a) Yes, the action
of the lease will
prosper because Joel cannot assign the lease to Ernie
without the consent ofVictor. (Art. 1649, Civil Code). But
Joel may sublet to Conrad because there is no express
prohibition (Art. 1650, Civil Code; Alipio v. Court of
Appeals, 341 SCRA 441 [2000]).
Victor can rescind the contract of lease with Joel,
and the assignment of the lease to Emie, on the ground
of violation of law and of contract. The sub-lease to
Conrad remained valid for two (2) years from January 1,
1991, and had not yet lapsed when the action was filed
on May 15, 1992.
b)
In case of rescission, discuss the rights and
obligations of the parties. (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
b)
r*v*r cf
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S uit.
cruritt'clM* fn*
**
'S'tJtv'
65
SUGGESTEDANSWER:
, .
%40*r>UfJ
b)
Under Article 2180, employers shall be liable for
the damages caused by their employees and household^
helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks,
eyen though the former are not engaged in any business
or industry. As the domestic helper was then in the
exercise of her duties and acting within the scope o f her
assigned tasks, her employer is also liable for the damage
she has caused to the fish vendor;
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER
b) The act of slapping the fish vendor" is not
within the scope of the assigned tasks of the domestic
helper. Hence, under Article 2180, the employer is not
liable for the damages caused by the domestic helper to
the fish vendor.
c)
A carpenter in a construction company accidentally
hits the right foot of his co-worker with a hammer. Explain.
(2 %)
SUGGESTEDANSWER:
66
SUGGESTEDANSWER:
e)
These persons identified by law to be liable may
raise the defense that they exercised proper diligence
require/! under the circumstances. Their responsibility
will cease when they prove that, they observed all the
diligence of a good father Of family tn prpypnt rtamnap..
As regards the employer, if he shows to the satisfaction
of the court that in the selection and in the supervision
o f his employees he has exercised the care and diligence
of a good father of a family, the presumption is overcome
and he is relieved from liability. (Layugan v. 1AC, 167
SCRA 363 [1988]).
/. tbrfi t,
fi?i\*ttitortdvtAXVI
Dr. and Mrs. Almeda sire prominent citizens o f the
country and are frequent travelers abroad. In 1996, they
booked round-trip business class tickets for the ManilaHongkong-Manila route of the Pinoy Airlines, where they are
holders of Gold Mabalos Class Frequent Flier cards. On their
return flight, Pinoy Airlines upgraded their tickets to first
class without their consent and, inspite of their protestations
to be allowed to remain in the business class so that they
could be with their friends, they were told that the business
class was already fully booked, and that they were given
priority in upgrading because they are elite members/holders
of Gold Mabalos Class cards .Since they were embarrassed at
the discussions with the flight attendants, they were forced
to take the flight at the first class section apart from their
friends who were in the business class. Upon their return to
Manila, they demanded a written apology from Pinoy Airlines.
67
69
2004 B A R 'E X A M IN A T IO N
fricr+0ftvu<4
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f*ri*nyhn; tj-ubn^r
I
ye'~t4y if ^ > / _ /VCr '
A.
Mr. ZY lost P 100,000 In a card game called-Russian w i-vy'
poker, but he had no more cash to pay in full the winner at
the time session ended. He promised to pay PX, the winner,
I
two weeks thereafter. But he failed to do so despite the lapse
t
of two months, so PXfiled in court a suit to collect the amount
j
of P50.000 that he won but remained unpaid. Will the
1
collection suit against ZY prosper? Could Mrs. ZY file in turn
.
a suit against PX to recover the P 100,000 that her husband
;
lost? Reason. (5%)
] QUESTION No. I
SUGGESTEDANSWER:
^
A. 1. The suit by PX to collect the balance of what
he won from ZY will hot prosper. Under Article 2014 of
the Civil Code, no action can be maintained by the
winner for the collection of what he has won in a game
of chance. Although poker may depend in part on ability,
it is fundamentally a game of chance.
2) If the money paid by ZY to PX was conjugal or
community property, the wife of ZY could sue to recover
it because Article 117(7) of the Family Code provides
that losses in gambling or betting are borne exclusively
by the loser-spouse. Hence, conjugal or community
funds may not be used to pay for such losses. If the
money were exclusive property of ZY, his wife may also
sue to recover it under Article 2016 of the Civil Code if
she and the family needed the money for support.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER to I-A (2):
A.
(2). Mrs. ZY cannot file a suit to recover what her
husband lost. Art 2014 o f the Civil Code provides that
any loser in a game of chance may recover his loss from
the winner, with legal interest from the time he paid the
amount lost. This means that only he ran fllfi t.h suit.
Mrs. ZY cannot recover as a spouse who has interest in
70
'*r.' !
< ** 1. AtoUhjk
3.
4.
5.
3
s.
t- 7Srfy*
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
A.
ooncx#*
LyfaUt'el vmM
72
73
^ flrfiii* (
If <t run he proved that DTs pain in his arm and wrist
occasioned by the transfer of luggage was caused by fault
or negligence on the part of the airlines stewardess,
actual damages may be recovered.
The airline may be liable for moral damages pursuant
to Art. 2219 (10) if the cause of action is based on Article n-KLl
21 or an act contrary: to morals in view of the humiliation <**<*}*>
suffered by DT and MT when they were separated from
their guests and were threatened to be offloaded.
QUESTION No. Ill
cju* * }
v- /W>
A.
RN and DM, without any impediment to marry each
other had been living together without benefit of church
blessings. Their common-law union resulted in the birth of
ZMN. Two years later, they got married in a civil ceremony.
Could ZM N be legitimated? Reason. (5%)
74
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
A.
ZMN was legitimated by the subsequent
marriage of RN and DM because at the time he was
conceived, RN and DM could have validly married each
other. Under the Family Code children conceived and
bom outside of wedlock of parents who, atthe time of the
formers conception, were not disqualified by any ^
impediment to marry each other are legitimated by the
subsequent marriage of the parents.
B.
Dr. ALX is a scientist honored for work related to
the human genome project. Among his pioneering efforts
concern stem cell research for the cure of Alzheimers disease.
Under ^corporate sponsorship, he helped develop a microbe
that ate and digested oil spills in the sea.
Now he leads a college team for cancer research in
MSS State. The team has experimented on a mouse whose
body cells replicate and bear cancerous tumor, .. Called
oncomouse, it is a life-form useful for medical research and
it is a novel creation. Its body cells do not naturally occur in
nature but are the product of mans intellect, industry' and
ingenuity. However, there is a doubt whether local property
laws and ethics would allow rights of exclusive ownership on
any life-foim. Dr. ALX needs.your advice: (1) whether the
reciprocity principle in private international law could be
applied in our jurisdiction; and (2) whether there are legal
and ethical reasons that could frustrate his claim of exclusive
ownership over the life-form called oncomouse in Manila?
What wlll be your advice to him? (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
B.
(1)
The reciprocity principle in private
international law may be applied in our jurisdiction.
Sectiojn 3 of R.A. 8293, the Intellectual Property Code,
provides for reciprocity, as follows: Any person who is
a nationaJ, or who is domiciled, or has a real and
effective industrial establishment in a country which is
a party to any conventionr treaty or agreement relating
to intellectual property rights or the repression o f
75
76
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V fU i &
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j,
fryervy j (.ViWk'/y;
iUvt:
JTactfSb'oA;
6ie.ufth<
0*'
A.
JV, owner of a parcel of land, sold it to PP. But the
deed of sale was not registered. One year later, JV sold the
parcel again to RR, who succeeded to register the deed and
to obtain a transfer certificate of title over the property in his
own name.
77
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
A.
It depends on whether or not RR is an innocent
purchaser for value.
Under the Torrens System, a deed or instrument
operated only as a contract between the parties and as
evidence o f authority to the Register of Deeds to make
the registration. It is the registration of the deed or the
instrument that is the operative act that conveys or
affects the land. (Sec. 51, P.D. No. 1529). L
In cases of double sale of titled land, it is a wellsettled rule that the buyer who first registers the sale in
good faith acquires n hp-tter right to the land. (Art. 1544,
Civil Code).
Persons dealing with property covered by Torrens
title are not required to go beyond what appears on its
face. (Orquiola v. CA 386, SCRA 301, [2002]; Domingo v.
Races 401 SCRA 197, [2003]). Thus, absent any showing
that RR knew about, or ought to have known the prior
sale of the land to PP or that he acted in bad faith, and
being first to register the sale, RR acquired a good and a
clean title to the property as against PP.
B.
CX executed a special power of attorney authorizing
DY to secure a loan from any bank and to mprtgage his
property covered by the owners certificate of title. In
securing a loan from Mbank, DY did not specify that he was
acting for CX in the transaction with said bank.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
B.
CX is liable for the bank loan because he
authorized the mortgage on his property to secure the
78
|P?'
P
r
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
[i.:
CX is not personally liable to the bank loan because
[y
.itwas contracted by DY in' his pejsoiial capacity. Only the
[
prpperty of pX is liabI<&. Hence, while CX has authorized
I
theniOTtgag6 On his property to secure the loan of DY, the
f .J: kr* < bank cannot Sue CX to collect the loan in case DY defaults
t
I- thereon. The bank can only foreclose the property of CX.
C- And if the proceeds of the foreclosure are not sufficient
^ i*.-,'.,
to pay the loan in full, the bank cannot run after CX for
VaV v'- the deficiency.
H.**
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
While as a general rule the principal is not liable for the contract entered into by his agent in case the agent
acted in his own name without disclosing his principal,
such rule does not apply if the contract involves a thinff CrUIO*U
W tt ,
^ belonging to the principal. In such case, the: principal is
C A v i. it f c i
liable under Article 1883 of the Civil Code. The contract^
is deemed made on his behalf (Sy-juco y. Sy-juco 40 Phil.
63411920]).
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
CX would not be liable for the bank loan. CX's
property would also not be liable on the mortgage. Since
DY did not specify that he was acting for CX in the
transaction with the bank, DY in effect acted in his own
name. In the case of Rural Bank ofBombon v. CA, 212
SCRA, (1992), the Supreme Court, under the same facts,
ruled that in order to bind the principal by a mortgage
on real property executed.by an agent, it must upon its
face purport to be made, signed and sealed in the name
o f the principal, otherwise, it will bind the agent only.
It is not enough merely that the agent was in fa ct
authorized to make the mortgage, if he, has not acted in
the Tiame o f the principal. Neither is it ordinarily
79
. <#(cy c<vr*-fr/
. A.
DPO went to a store to buy a pack of cigarettes
worth P225.00 only. He gave the vendor, RRA, a P500-peso
bill. The vendor gave him the pack plus P375.00 change.
Was there a discount, an oversight, or an error in the amount
given? What would be DPOs duty, if any, in case of an excess
in the amount of change given by the vendor? How is this
situational relationship between DPO and RRA denominated?
Explain. (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
A. There was error in the amount of change given
by RRA. This is a case o f SOlutio indebiti in that DPO->f
received something that is not due him. He has the
obligation to return the P100.Q0; otherwise, he will
unjustly enrich himself at the expense of RRA. (Art.
2154. Civil Code)
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
DPO has the duty to return to RRA the excess P100
as trustee under Article 1456 of the Civil Code which
i provides: . I f property is acquired through mistake or
fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force o f law,
considered a trustee o f an implied trust f o r the benefit
o f the person from whom the property comes. There is,
in this case, an implied or constructive trust in favor of
RRA.
'
B.
OJ was employed as professional driver of MM
Transit bus owned by Mr. BT. In the course of his work, OJ
hit a pedestrian who was seriously injured and later died in
80
*1
81
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
A. The shares of stock cannot be deemed owned by
ABC upon default of MNO. They have to be foreclosed.
Under Article 2088 of the Civil joc&e, the creditor cannot
appropriate the things given by way of pledge. And even
if the parties have stipulated that ABC becomes the
owner o f the shares in case MNO defaults on the loam,
such stipulation is void for beinfi a pactum commissorium. %
B. As an agent, AL was given a guarantee commission,
in addition to his regular commission, after he sold 20 units
of refrigerators to a customer, HT Hotel. The customer,
however, failed to pay for the units sold. ALs principal, DRBI,
demanded from AL payment for the customers accountability.
AL objected, on the ground that his job was only to sell and
not to collect payment for units bought by the customer.
i
)
SUGGESTEDANSWER:
B.
No, ALs objection is not valid and DRBI can
collect from AL.
Since AL accepted a guarantee
commission, in addition to his regular commission, he
4 agreed to bear the risk of collection and ^to pay the *
principal the proceeds of the stde on the same terms
agreed upon with the purchaser (Article 1907, Civil Code)
QUESTION No. v n
a. IQ/P;
9*C*f/>on'fp
A.
PH and LV are HK Chinese. Their parents are now
Filipino citizens who live in Manila. While still students in
MNS State, they got married although they are first cousins.
It appears that both in HK and in MNS State first cousins
could marry legally.
They plan to reside and set up business in the Philippines.
But they have been informed, however, that the marriage of
first cousins here is considered void from the beginning by
reason of public policy. They are in a dilemma. They dont
82
fsrUfiml,
My advise is as follows:
83
. itioti&o;
A.
A Filipino couple, Mr. And Mrs. BM, Jr., decided to
adopt YV, an orphan from St. Claires orphanage in New York
City. They loved and treated her like a legitimate child for
they have none of their very own. However, BM, Jr., died In
an accident at sea, followed to the grave a year later by his
sick father, BM, Sr. Each left a sizable estate consisting of
bank deposits, lands and buildings in Manila. May the
adopted child, YV, Inherit from BM, Jr.? May she also inherit
from BM, Sr.? Is there a difference? Why? Explain. (5%)
SUGGESTEDANSWER: A.
84
85
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
A.
B.
DON, an American businessman, secured parental
consent for the employment of five minors to play certain
roles in two movies he was producing at home in Makati.
They worked at odd hours of the day and night, but always
accompanied by parents or other adults. The producer paid
the children talent fees at rates better than adult wages.
But the social worker, DEB, reported to OSWD that
these children often missed going to school. They sometimes
drank wine, aside from being exposed to drugs, In some
scenes, they were filmed naked or in revealing costumes. In
his-defense,. DON .contended all these were part o f artistic
freedom and qultural creativity.
None o f the parents
complained, said DON. He also said they signed a contract
containing a waiver of their right to file any complaint in any
office or tribunal concerning the working conditions o f their
children acting in the movies.
Is the waiver valid and binding?
Explain. (5%)
SUGGESTEDANSWER:
B.
The waiver is not valid. Although the contracting
parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms
86
* / '- W *
. . _
87
a
a* Lory?
B.
In his lifetime, a Pakistani citizen, ADIL, married
three times under Pakistani law. When he died an old
widower, he left behind six children, two sisters, three
homes, and an estate worth at least 30 million pesos in the
Philippines. He was bom in Lahore but last resided in Cebu
City, where he had a mansion and where two of his youngest
children now live and work. Two o f his oldest children are
farmers in Sulu, while the two middle-aged children are
employees in Zamboanga City. Finding that the deceased left
no will, the youngest son wanted to file intestate proceedings
before the Regional Trial Court o f Cebu City. Two other
siblings objected, arguing that it should be in Jolo before a
Sharia court since his lands are in Sulu. But Adils sisters
in Pakistan want the proceedings held in Lahore before a
Pakistani court.
Which court has jurisdiction and is the proper venue for
the intestate proceedings? The law of which country shall
govern succession to his estate? (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
B.
In so far as the properties of the deceden
1 located in the Philippines are concerned, they are governed
by Philippine law (Article 16, Civil Code). Under Philippine
law, the proper venue for the settlement of the estate is
the domicile of the decedent at the time of his deat^,
Since the decedent last resided in Cebu City, that is the
proper venue for the intestate settlement of his estate.
88
89
5%
It is said that equity follows the law What do you understand
by this phrase, and what are its basic implications?
su eq esT E D Q w sw eR
Equity follows the law means that courts exercising
equity jurisdiction are bound by rules of law and have no
arbitrary discretion to disregard them. (Arsenal v. IAC, 143
SCRA 40[1986]. Equity is applied only in the absence of but
never against statutory law. (Toyota Motor Phil. v. CA 216
SCRA 236 [1992]).
5%
Gene and Jane, Filipinos, met and got married in England while
both were taking up post-graduate courses there. A few years
after their graduation, they decided to annul their marriage. Jane
filed an action to annul her marriage to Gene in England on the
ground of the latters sterility, a ground for annulment of marriage
in England. The English court decreed the marriage annulled.
Returning to the Philippines, Gene asked you Whether or not he
would now be free to marry his former girlfriend. What would your
legal advice be?
suG G san ex>cw svoeR i
No, Gene is not free to marry his former girlfriend. His
m arriage to Jane if valid according to the form s and
solemnities of British law, is valid here (Article 17, 1st par.,
NCC). However, since Gene and Jane are still Filipinos,
FR'IVl
III
T v tfc i/P *
V itiir w p 0
5%
Miss Universe, from Finland, came to the Philippines on a tourist
viSa.: While in this;country, she fell in love with and married a
Filipino doctor. Her'tourist visa having expired and after the
maximum extension allowed therefor, the Bureau of Immigration
and Deportation (BID) is presently demanding that she immediately
leave the country but she refuses to do so, claiming that she is
already a Filipino citizen by her marriage to a Filipino citizen. Can
the BID still order the deportation of Miss Universe? Explain.
s u Q a e s n e r > c m s u T g ie .
Yes, the BID can order the deportation of Miss Universe.
The marriage of an alien woman to a Filipino does not
automatically make her a Filipino citizen. She must first prove
in an appropriate proceeding that she does not have any
disqualification for Philippine citizenship. (Yung Uan Chu v.
91
NOT
-fas
5%
If a pregnant woman passenger of a bus were to suffer an
abortion following a vehicular accident due to the gross negligence
of the bus driver, may she and her husband claim damages from
the. bus company for the death of their unborn child? Explain.
S U Q Q e S lE P Q N S V P g R .
the law allows Indemnity only for loss of life of persons. Thie
mother, however, may recover damages for the bodily injury
she suffered from the loss of the fetus which is considered
part of her internal organs. The parents may also recover
damages for injuries that are inflicted directly upon them, e.g.,
moral damages for mental anguish that attended the loss of
the unborn child. Since there is gross negligence, exemplary
damages can also be recovered. (Geluz v. CA, 2 SCRA 801
[1961]).
! OUttjt^A'oru e CtxlfracSr} Ct+tfacuft}
'w
C v r k & id j
Of
Cf
5%
Jo-Ano asked her close friend, Aissa, to buy some groceries
for her in the supermarket. Was there a nominate contract entered
into between Jo-Ann and Aissa? In. the affirmative, what was it?
Explain.
s u G o e s je p a w s w e R
Yes, there was a nominate contract. On the assumption
that A|ssa accepted the request of her.close friend Jo-Ann to
buy some groceries for her in the supermarket, what they
entered into was the nominate contract of Agency. Article
1868 of the New Civil code provides that by the contract of
agency a person binds himself to render some service or to
do something in representation or on behalf of another, with
the consent or authority of the latter.
cuLTCRrernve awsvueit
Yes, they entered into a nominate contract of lease of
_service in the absence of a relation of principal and agent
between them (Article 1644, New Civil Code).
....
VI
5%
c*A-; V**/
1'
rt* n h h o f-
*4.
-fi*
aw.
(ii)
(iii) If the husband discovers after the marriage that his wife
has been a prostitute before they got married.
(iv) If the husband has a serious affair with his secretary and
refuses to stop notwithstanding advice from relatives and
friends.
(v)
S U G G C S JE D C W S W gR :
.
,
Inniwiii
(ii)
If the wife refuses to come home for three (3) months
from the expiration of her contract, she is presumed to have
abandoned the husband and he may file an action for judicial
separation of property. If the refusal continues for more than
0*,/
one yearfrom the expiration of her contract, the husband-may
partrii'9/1 file the action for legal separation under Art. 55 (10) of the
Family Code on the ground o f a b a n d o n m e n t o f p e titio n e r hy*f
respondent without justifiable cause for more than one year.
: '
th e wife is deemed to have abandoned the husband when
she leave.s the. conjugal dwelling without any intention of
returning (Articie 101, FC). The intention not to return cannot
be presumed during the 3-year period of her contract.
94
VII
f^esrz;
cL*Lcyb't>~ -J.
OontHc
****; h V
r i* * f
4 tf+ .
A^VM,.
5%
Lina, a former Filipina who became an American citizen shortly
after her marriage to an American husband, would like to adopt in
the Philippines, jointly with her husband, one of her minor brothers.
Assuming that all the required consents have been obtained, could
the contemplated joint adoption in the Philippines prosper? Explain.
SU C K 5eST rgX >0->aS1A ?0:
Yes. Lina and her American husband can jointly adopt a
minor brother o f Lina because she and her husband are both~^
qualified to adopt. Lina, as a former Filipino citizen, can adopt
her minor brother under Sec. 7(b)(i) of RA 8552 (Domestic
Adoption Act of 1998), or under Art. 184(3)(a) of the Family
Code. The alien husband can now adopt under Sec. 7[b] of
RA 8552. The Supreme Court has held in several cases that
95
fa-C+Jx/
VIII
If during class hours, while the teacher was chatting with other
teachers in the school corridor, a 7-year old male pupil stabs the
eye of another boy with a ballpen during a fight, causing permanent
blindness to the victim, who could be liable for damages for the.
; boys injury: the teacher, the school authorities, or the guilty boys
parents? Explain.
SU G qeST E pgN SW gR :
^
5%
Andres is a riparian owner of a parcel of registered land. His
land, however, has gradually diminished in area due to the current
96
Man'o
PonovtiSn*)
(?) t in i r&owHon (%) toym
5%
In 1950, Dr. Alba donated a parcel of land to Central University
on condition that the latter must establish a medical college on
97
,'
,
the land to be named after him. In the year 2000, the heirs of Dr.
Alba filed an action to annul the donation and for the reconveyance
of the property donated to them for the failure, after 50 years, of
the University to establish on the property a medical school named
after their father. The University opposed the action on the ground
of prescription and also because it had not used the property for
some purpose other than that stated in the donation. Should the
opposition of the University to the action of Dr. Alba's heirs be
sustained? Explain.
s u G o e s T e p c w s w e R
98
X|
5%
i W i<
99
*1
'
cy * f^i*>'Y
u*''-bVn*k.e
>rt-fpK~~U cht**~, l*irS,X'
5%
(a) Luis was survived by two legitimate children, two
illegitimate children, his parents, and two brothers. He left an estate
; of P1 million. Who are the compulsory heirs of Luis, how much is
the legitime of each, and how much is the free portion of his estate,
if any?
(b) Suppose Luis, in the preceding question (a), died intestate.
Who are his intestate heirs, and how much is the share of each in
his estate?
S t iG O e S T fiE P C W S W e K ;
(a) The compulsory heirs are the two legitimate children
S .V \
ajid the two illegitimate children. The parents are excluded
.
. . - ... by the legitim ate children, w hile the brothers are not
compulsory heirs at all.
Their respective legitimes are:
(1) The legitime of the two (2) legitimate children is onehalf (Vij of the estate (P500,000.00) to be divided betweenthem
equally, or P250,000.00 each.
(2) The legitime of each illegitimate child is one-half (1/
2) the legitime of each legitimate child or P125,000.00.
Since the total legitim es of the compulsory heirs is
P750t000.00, the balance of P250,000.00 is the free portion.
(b) The intestate heirs are the two (2) legitimate children
and the two (2) illegitimate children. In intestacy the estate of
the decedent is divided among the legitimate and illegitimate
children such that the share of each illegitimate child is onehalf the share of each legitimate child.
Their shares are:
For each legitimate child
-P333.333.33
100
p 0 r each
\
;f
xiii
*****
5 %
Are the following obligations valid, why, and if they are valid,
when is the obligation demandable in each case?
(a)
to pay;
(b)
(c)
(d)
cancer,
S U G G e S T g D Q T fe W e fe
2.
101
- _ ..
.'.I-
Vl\/
XIV
^
-
t;
* jc^
5%
A,
B, C, D, and E made themselves solidarity indebted to X for
the amount of P50.000.00. When X demanded payment from A,
the latter refused to pay on the follovying grounds:
(a) B is only 16 years old.
(b) C has already been condoned by X.
(c) D is insolvent.
(d) E was given by X an extension of 6 months without the
consent of the other four co-debtors.
State the effect of each of the above defenses put up by A on
his obligation to pay X, if such defenses are found to be true.
SUGGeS3PQHSWeR:
V (a) A may avail the minority of B as a defense, but only
for Bs share of P10,000,00. A solidary debtor may avail himself
of any defense which personally belongs to a solidary codebtor, but only as to the share of that co-debtor.
o^i
(b)
A may avail of the condonation by X of Cs share of
P10,000.00. A solidary debtor may, in actions filed by the
creditor, avail himself of all defenses which are derived from
the nature of the obligation and of those which are personal
to him or pertain to his own share. With respect to those which
personally belong to others, he may avail himself thereof only
as regards that part of the debt for which the latter are
responsible. (Article 1222, NCC).
(cj A may not interpose the defense of insolvency of D
as a defense. Applying the principle of mutual guaranty
among solidary debtors, A guaranteed the payment or U's
share and of all the other co-debtors. Hence, A cannot avail
of the defense of Ds insolvency.
102
XV
J ' <Sc*k* j
i.
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5%
(a) May a person sell something that does not belong to him?
Explain.
^,5-. -juJf
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XVI
5% .
...
v:-
^
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!!
!:
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jl
ji
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, X is riot correct. In the sale of immovable property,
even though it may have been stipulated, as in this case, that
upon failure to pay the price at the time agreed upon the
rescission of the contract shall of right take place, the vendee
may pay, even after the expiration of the period, as Iona as noy
demand for rescission of the contract has been made upon'5'
him either*judicially or by a ^ o ta ria l act (Article 1592, New
Civil Code). Since no demand for rescission was made on Y,
either judicially or by a notarial act, X cannot refuse to accept
the payment offered by Y three (3) days after the expiration of
the period.
a j^ T H g R S U G e e S T E D Q T g W e R :
This is a contract to sell and not a contract of absolute
sale, since as there has been no delivery of the land. Article
1592 of the New Civil Code is not applicable. Instead, Article
1595 of the New Civil Code applies. The seller has two
a lte rn a tiv e rem edies: ( 1) specific perform ance* or ( 2) '
rescission or resolution under Article 1191 of the New Civil
Code. In both remedies, damages are due because of default.
Q lT g R N a T IV e Q N S W e R
reGtrVrt*
XVII
t.
flr b t
I'/cnwirtvt
5%
104
j
]
<
i
tt
' '(aj Is, it necessary for X to reserve his right to institute a civil
action for damages against both taxicab owners before he can
file a civil action for damages against them? Why?
(b)
May both taxicab owners raise the defense of due
diligence in the selection and supervision of their drivers to be
absolved from liability for damages to X? Reason.
su G o es^reD aw su T gR .
i
(a) It depends. If the separate civil action is to recover
dam ages arisin g from the crim inal act, reservation is
necessary. If the civil action against the taxicab owners is
based on culpa contractual, or on quasi-delict, there is no
need for reservation.
!
<
|
a fTKPKtTTVeONSWgR;
(a) No, such reservation is not necessary. Under Section
1 of Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure, vyhat
is deemed instituted with the criminal action is only the
action to recover civil liability arising from the crime or ex
delicto. All the other civil actions under Articles 32, 33, 34, .. . .
and 2176 of the New Civil Code are no longer .deemed
instituted, and may be filed separately and prosecuted
independently even without any reservation in the criminal
action (Section 3* Rule 111, fb/d^.The failure to make a
reservation in the criminal action is not a Waiver of the right
to file a separate and independent civil action based on these
articles of the New Civil Code (Casupananv. Laroya GR No.
145391, August 26, 2002).
;
j
j
j
;j
!
i
SUGGeS^EDa^SUTeR;
dejfriSt of/ ^
^
(b) It depends. If the ci vil action is based on a quasi-delict *
the taxicab owners may raise the defense of diligence of a
good father of a family in the selection and supervision of the
driver; if the action against them is based on culpa contractual r
or civil liability arising frnm a crime, they cannot raise the
defense.
i
j
:
M; *
;
i,
Y V III
/i ' iAv *-
5%
in 1970, the spouses Juan and Juana de la Cruz, then Filipinos,
bought a parcel of unregistered land in the Philippines on which
they built a house which became their residence. In 1986, they
migrated to Canada and became Canadian citizens.
Thereafter, in 1990, they applied, opposed by the Republic, for
the registration of the aforesaid land in their names. Should the
application of the spouses de la Cruz be granted over the
Republic's opposition? Why?
S U G <3S JE D aN S U ?gR ;
XIX
$o/ 0
fify]Urfw
106
g fK K 3 S 3 E g > Q W S W e R .
No, Z s demand is not valid. A building is immovable or
real property whether it.is erected by the owner of the land,
by a usufructuary, or by a lessee. It may be treated as a
movable by the parties to a chattel mortgage but such is
b in d in g on ly betw een them and not on th ird parties
(Evangelista v. Alto Surety Co., Inc. 103 Phil. 401 [1958]). In
this case, since the bank is not a party to the chattel mortgage,
it is not bound by it. As far as the Bank is concerned, the
chattel m ortgage does not exist. Moreover, the chattel
mortgage- is void because it was hot registered. Assuming
that it is valid, it does not bind the Bank because it was not
annotated on the title of the land mortgaged to the barik. Z
cannot demand that the Bank pay him the loan Z extended to
X, because the Bank was not privy to such loan transaction.
O J O T H e R S U G G eS 3E P C tiN S U 3eR ;
No, Zs demand against the bank:is not valid. His demand
that the bank reconvey to him Xs house presupposes that he
has a real right over the house. All that Z has is a personal
rightagainst X for damages for breach of the contract of loan.
The treatment of a house, even if built on rented land, as
movable property is void insofar as third persons, such as
the bank, are concerned. On the other hand, the Bank already
had a real right over the house and lot when the mortgage
was annotated at the back of the Torrens title. The bank later
became the owner in the foreclosure sale.
Z cannot ask the bank to pay for Xs loan plus interest.
There is no privity of contract between Z and the bank.
c u L ig m c tT iv e o m w e g ;
The answer hinges on whether or not the bank is an
innocent mortgagee in good faith or a mortgagee in bad faith.
In the former case, Zs demand is not valid. In the latter case,
Z s demand against the bank is valid and sustainable.
Under the Torrens system of land registration, every person
dealing with registered land may rely on the correctness of
the certificate of title and the law will not in any way oblige
him to look behind or beyond the certificate in order to
107
XX
X.cysrk'^.b'j*"
a- (&te; ta tty
(nip;
f it 1
*-
5%
Louie, before leaving the country to train as a chef in a five-star
hotel in New York, U.S.A., entrusted to his firsc-degree cousin
Dewey an application for registration, under the Land Registration
Act, of a parcel of land located in Bacolod Gity. A year later, Louie
returned to the Philippines and discovered that Dewey registered
the land and obtained an Original Certificate of Title over the
property in his Deweys name. Compounding the matter, Dewey
sold the land to Huey, an innocent purchaser for value. Louie
promptly filed an action for reconveyance of the parcel of land
against Huey.
(a)
iwtf *c^,rfJ- **
jj
SUQQCSIEPCWSWgR:
A. The marriage with Querica is void. The exemption from
the requirement of a marriage license under A rt 34, Family
Code, requires that the man and woman must have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years and
without any legal impediment to marry each other during those
five years. The cohabitation of Facundo and Querica for six
n fT g R W a T W e O W S W e R :
A.
The marriage of Facundo and Querica is VALID. The
second marriage was solemnized on July^t-fZOOO w fteathe
Family Code was already effective. The. Family CocJjk took
effect on August 3,1988. Under the Family^Sedermfmarriage
license is required if the parties have been cohabiting for the
period of five years and there is no legal impediment. There
must be no legal impediment ONLY AT THE TIME OF T H E ^ g ^
SOLEMNIZATION OF THE MARRIAGE, and not the whole fiveyear period. This is clearly the intent of the code framers
mu *
(see Minutes of the ISO"1 joint Civil Code and Family Law
Committees held on August 9, 1986). Also, in Manzano v. Jc
Sanchez, AM No. MT-OQ-129, March 8,2001, the Supreme Court 4 ^
said that, as one of the requisites for the exception to apply, e
x>i
there must be no legal impediment at the time of the marriage.
The Supreme Court did not say that the legal impediment must ,
exist all throughout the five-year period.
This is different from the case of Nifial v. Bayadog, (328
SCRA 122 [2000]). In the said^caserttre>ituation occurred 1
.v; during the regime of the New Civil Code Where Article 76 J
.v
thereof clearly provides that during theJBvg^year cohabitation. 1
the parties must be unmarried. This is not so. anymore in the J
Family Code. The change in Family Code is significant If the
, second marriage occurred before the effectivity of the Family
, Code, the answer would be that the marriage is void.
4
Ill
II
A.
G ive a brief definition or explanation of the term
psychological incapacity as a ground for the declaration of nullity
of a marriage. (2%)
B.
If existing at the inception of marriage, would the state of
being of unsound mind or the concealment of drug addiction,
habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism be considered
indicia of psychological incapacity? Explain. (2%)
C.
If drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or
homosexuality should occur only during the marriage, would these
constitute grounds for a declaration of nullity or for legal separation,
or would they render the marriage voidable? (1 %)
8U qaeS3EPQ H SU302:
A.
Psychological incapacity is a mental disorder o f the
m ost serious type showing the incapability of one or both
spouses to comply with the essential marital obligations of
love, respect, cohabitation, mutual help and support, trust
and commitment. It must be characterized by *0uridicalf
4 antecedence?gravity and incurability and its root causes must
be clinically identified or examined. (Santos v. CA, 240 SCRA
20[1995])
B.
In the case of Santos v. Court o f Appeals, 240 SCRA
j
20 (1995), the Supreme Court held that being of unsound mind,
'r*\
d ru g a d d ic tio p rJ ia b itu a i a lc o h o lis m , le s b ia n is m o r tfuU
homosexuallty m a y fte indicia of psychological incapacity, I*'*"
depending on tW dgree of severity of the disorder. However, -j
the concealm ent of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, U
lesbianism or homosexuality is a ground for annulment of
marriage.
C.
In accordance with law, if drug addiction* habitual
alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality should occur only
during the marriage, they:
112
(1 )
n u llity
w ill n o t c o n s titu te a s
g ro u n d s
fo r
d e c la ra tio n
of
r i ^ i t ; t u c c * < # ,b ; M V ;
i.
( IO ;
mwCx*A**'
113
. V w..'"j.'
s u Q o e g jg p c m s w e ^
A.
(1)
The divorce secured by Fe/zpe in California is
recognjzable and valid in the Philippines because he was no
longer a Filipino at the time he secured it. Aliens may obtain
divorces abroad which may be recognized in the Philippines
provided that they are valid according to their national law
(Van Dorn V. Romilio, Jr., 139 SCRA 139 [1985]); Quita y. Court
of Appeals, 300 SCRA 406 [1998]; Llorente v. Court of
Appeals, 3.45 SCRA 592 [2000]).
JSi
Ii ShOttlWU
0 lrfrUr*JL.
p'n' P
a./W.**,Fc
-* H)
rT]**y **<*
^ * lAW^i'd/,
IM4-
(2)
With respect to Felipe the divorce is Valid, but
with respect to Felisa it is not. The divorce will not capacitate
Felisa to te marry because she and Felipe were both Filipinos
at the tim e of their marriage. However, in DOJ Opinion No.
134 series of 1993, Felisa is allowed to remarry because the
injustice sought to be corrected by Article 26 also obtains in
her case.
B.
The foreigner who executes his will in the Philippines
may observe the formalities prescribed in:
1)
the law or the country 6 f which he is a citizen
under Article 817 of the New Civil code, or
2)
the law of the Philippines being the law o f the
plaice of execution under Article 17 of the New Civil Code.
Art. Mr,
Mtc
C.
Ph ilippine law will not govern the instrinsic validity of
the will. Article 16 of the New Civil Code provides that intrinsic
validity of testamentary provisions shall be governed by the
national law off the person w hose succession is under
consideration. California law will govern the intrinsic validity
of the w ill.
,
)
co-oum^Aya-
N.
Antonio, Bart, and Carlos are brothers. They purchased from
their parents specific portions of a parcel of land as evidenced by
three separate deeds of sale, each deed referring to a particular
114
lot in metes and bounds. When the deeds were presented for
r e g i s t r a t i o n , the Register of Deeds could not issue separate
c e r t i f i c a t e s of t i t l e due to the absence of a subdivision plan. The
new title had to be issued, therefore, in the names of the brothers
as co-owners of the entire property. The situation has not changed
up to now, but each of the brothers has been receiving rentals
exclusively from the lot actually purchased by him. Antonio sells
his lot to a third person, with notice to his brothers. To enable the
buyer to secure a new title in his name, the deed of sale was
made to refer to an undivided interest in the property of the seller
(Antonio), with the metes and bounds of the lot sold being stated.
Bart and Carlos reacted by signifying their exercise of their right
of redemption as co-owners. Antoniot in his behalf and in behalf
of his buyer, contends that they are no longer co-owners, although
the title covering the property has remained in their names as
such.
May Barf iand Carlos still redeem the lot sold by Antonio?
Explain. (5%)
s u q o e s jg D c m s u jg R :
No, they may not redeem because there was no coownership among Antonio, Bart and Carlos to start with. Their
'parents already partitioned the ia nd in selling separate
portions to them. The situation is the same as in the case 57
v. Court o f Appeals, (342 SCRA 653 [2000]).
IY
<*>
** f r w /
Trus-fj /UO
r
'
suoeesjepcfrisweig:
Senens action will prosper. Article 494 of the New Civil
Code provides that no prescription shall run in favor of a
co-owner or co-heir against h is co-owners or co-heirs so long
as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.
Peter has never renounced the co-ownership nor notified
Senen of his having repudiated the same.
^
Q Q g R m T iv e c m s w e R :
ro d e n t
fa u lty t
116
Q W O J M g R q jiS W g R :
J Hernando is not correct Article 637 of the New Civil Code
provides that the owner o f the higher estate cannot make
works which will Increase the burden on the servient e state .
(Remman Enterprises, Inc. v. CA, 330 SCRA 145 [2000]) The
owner of the higher estate may be compelled to pay damages
to the owner of the lower estate.
* * * * * * ** * * !
Wlnda now files a suit against Verde for the annulment of the
sale on the ground that she did not consent to the sale. In answer,
Verde contends that, in accordance with the Spanish Civil Code
117
******* J
which was then in force, the sale In 1948 of the property did not
need her concurrence. Verde contends that in any case the action
has prescribed, or is barred by laches. Winda rejoins that her
Torrens title covering the property is indefeasible, and
imprescriptible.
A.
B.
(3% )
s u o q g s ^ jg p c m s w e s fc
Q iig R w g J w e a w m g R :
B.
Wihdas clajm that her Torrens Title covering the
property fsjndefeasible end imprescriptible [does not hold
water] is not tenable. The rule of indefeasibility of a Torrens
Title means that after one year from the date of Issue o f the
decree of registration or if the land has fallen Into the hands
o f an innocent purchaser for value, the title becomes
incontestibie and incontrovertible. ImprescriptibiSity, on the
other hand, means that no title to the land in derogation of
that of the registered owner may be acquired by adverse
118
p o s s e s s io n o r
ow ner d oes
reco ver
n o t lo s e b y
A.
A modal institution is the institution of an heir made i n w ^ .
for a certain purpose or cause (Arts. 871 and 882, NCC). J
Substitution is the appointment of another heir so that he
mav enter into this inheritance in default of the heir originally J
instituted. (Art. 857, NCC).
|n a s im p le s u b s titu tio n o f heirs, th e te s ta to r - \ siwxelc
designates one or more persons to substitute the heirs J
119
C.
Betina has a cause of action against Divino. This is a
case of a testamentary disposition subject to a mode and the
will itself provides for the consequence if the mode is not
complied with. To enforce the mode, the will itself gives
Betina the right to compel the return of the property to the
heirs o f Theodore. (Rabadiiia v. Coscoiuella, 334 SCRA 522
[2000] G R 113725, 29 June 2000).
IX.
Stockton is a stockholder of Core Corp. He desires to sell his
shares in Core Corp. in view of a Court suit that Core Corp. has
filed against him for damages in the amount of P10 million, plus
attorneys fees of PI million, as a result of statements published
by Stockton which are allegedly defamatory because it was
calculated to injure and damage the corporations reputation and
goodwill.
The articles of incorporation of Core Corp. provide for a right
of first refusal in favor of the corporation. Accordingly, Stockton
gave written notice to the corporation of his offer to sell his shares
of P10 million. The response of Core Corp. was an acceptance
pf the offer in the exercise of its rights of first refusal, offering for
the purpose payment in form of compensation or set-off against
the amount of damages it is claiming against him, exclusive of the
claim for attorneys fees. Stockton rejected the off;er of the
corporation, arguing that compensation between the value of the
shares and the amount of damages demanded by the corporation
cannot legally take effect. Is Stockton correct? Give reasons for
your answer. (5%)
120
guG O gsnnR p o i^ w e R :
Stockton is correct. There is no right of compensation
between his price of P10 million and Core Corp.s unliquidated
claim for damages. In order that compensation may be proper,
the two debts must be liquidated and demandable. The case
for the PTOmTITFon damages being still pending in court, the
corporation has as yet no claim which is due and demandable
against Stockton.
a w c m ^ R
m q iw
a ^ s w e e
121
SUQQeSJg3?QNSM?eE:
No, the contentions o f Printado are untenable.
Printado having failed to pay for the printing paper covered
by the delivery Invoices on time, Suplico has the right to cease
making further
delivery. And the latter did not violate the order agreement
(Integrated Packaging Corporation v. Court o f Appeals, (333
SCRA 170, G.R. No. 115117. June 8. [2000]).
Suplico cannot be held liable for damages, for breach of
contract, as it was not he w ho violated the order agreem ent
but Printado.
Suplico cannot be held liable for Prihtados breach of
contract with Publico. He is not a party to the agreement
entered into by and between Printado and Publico. Theirs is
not a stipulation oourautrui. [Aforesaid! Such contracts do ]
could not affect third persons like Suplico because of the
basic civil law principle o f relativity of contracts which ^
provides that contracts can only bind the parties who entered
into it, and it cannot favor or prejudice a third person, even if
he is aware of such contract and has acted with knowledge
thereof, (integrated Packaging Corporation v. CA, supra.)
122
'
X I.
h*
SUQ Q CSJED O m w eR :
A. Carlos is a buyer in bad faith. The notice of lis pendens
was still annotated at the back of the title at the time he bought
the land from Bart. The uncancelled notice of lis pendens
operates as constructive notice of its contents as well as
interests, legal or equitable, included therein. All persons
are charged with the knowledge of what it contains.
In an earlier case,-it was held that a notice of an adverse
claim remains effective and binding notwithstanding the lapse
of the 30 days from its inscription in the registry. This ruling
is even more applicable in a lis pendens.
Carlos is a transferee pendente life insofar as Sanchos
share in the co-ownership in the land is concerned because
the land was transferred to him during the pendency of the
appeal.
123
A.
Pacifico can protect his right as a co-owner by
pursuing hisappeal; asking the Court of Appeals to order the
re-annotation of the lis pendenson the title of Carlos, and by
invoking his right of redemption of Barts share under Article
1620 o f the New Civil Code.
a jL T g R T c r n v e c w s w e R :
A.
C*
A&J-ytbnj
A lii
Adela and Beth are co-owners of a parcel of land. Beth sold
her undivided share of the property to Xandro, who promptly
notified Adela of the sale and furnished the latter a copy of the
deed of absolute sale. When Xandro presented the deed for
registration, the register of deeds also notified Adela of the sale,
enclosing a, copy of the deed with the notice. However, Adela
ignored the notices. A year later, Xandro filed a petition for the
partition of the property. Upon receipt of summons, Adela
124
[m s ^ o a e R m r 7 i^ M a w a T < s u 7 e it '
Adela can no longer exercise her right of redemption. As
co-owner, she had only 30 days from the time she received
Written notice of the sale which in this case took the form of
a copy of the deed of sale being given to her (Conejero v. CA,
16 SCRA 775 [1966]). The law does not prescribe any
particular form of written notice, nor any distinctive method
for notifying the redemptioner (Etcuban v. CA, 148 SCRA 507
[1987]). So long as the redemptioner was informed in writing,
he has no cause to complain (Distrito v. CA, 197 SCRA 606,
609 [1991]). In fa c t in Distrito, a written notice was held
unnecessary where the co-owner had actual knowledge of
the sale, having acted as middleman and being present when
the vendor signed the deed of sale.
4. In fill, J C Q fib rf-o il J
XIII
hx*
(2%)
B.
(3%)
C.
Should the Philippine court assume jurisdiction over the
case? Explain. (5%)
A.
Lex loci contractus may be understood in two senses,
as follows:
(1)
It is the law of the place where contracts, wilts,
and.other public instruments are executed and governs their
forms and solemnities, pursuant to the first paragraph,
Article 17 of the New .Civil Cod; or
( 2 ) : ., . S t j s i h e , p r o p e r l a w o f t h e c o n t r a c t ; i . e . , t h e s y s t e m
o f S a w i n t e n d e d t o g o v e r n t h e e n t i r e c o n t r a s t , ( i n c l u d i n g .its
s s s e r s t l a l r e q u i s i t e s , I n d i c a t i n g the l a w o f the p l a c e w i t h w h i c h
th e o rs tra c i h a s its c lo s e s t c o n n e c t io n o r w ta r@ th e m a in
l e m e s i t s f f f i e c o n t r a c t c o n v e r g e . A s i l l u s t r a t e d f e y Zatemea
y. Curt o f Appeals (228 SCRA 23 {1993]), i t i s t h e S a w o f th@
126
O J L T e fe M c rc n w e o
h s w
&&
A.
U n d e r the doctrine of Sex loci contractus, as a general
rule, the law of the place where a contract is made or entered
into governs with respect to its nature and*validity, obligation
and*interpretation. This has been said to be the rule eyen
though the pi ape where tlie contract was made is different
from the place where it is to be perfofmed, and particularly
so, if the place of the making and the place of performance
are the same {United Airline v. CA, G.R. No. 124110, April 20,
2001).
s iio q e s je a > Q w s u 3 g iz s 5
B.
Forum non conveniens means th at a court has
discretionary authority to decline jurisdiction over a cause of
action when it is of the view that the action mav be iustlv and
effectively adjudicated elsewhere.
C.
No, the Philippine courts cannot acquire Jurisdiction
over the case of Felipe. Firstly, under the rule offo ru m non
conveniens. the Philippine court is not a convenient forum
as all the incidents o f the case occurred outside the
Philippines. Neither are both Coals and Energy doing
business inside the Philippines. Secondly, the contracts were
^ Viot perfected in the Philippines. Under the principle of lex
loci contractus, t h e law of the place where the contract is
made shall apply. Lastly, t h e Philippine court has no power
to determine the f a c t s surrounding t h e execution of said
contracts. And e v e n if a proper d e c i s i o n c o u l d b e reached,
such w o u l d h a v e n o b i n d i n g e f f e c t o n C o a l s a n d E n e r g y as
the-court w a s n o t a i b S e t o a c q u i r e j u r i s d i c t i o n o v e r t h e -said
. c o r p o r a t i o n s . (Manila Hotel Corp. v. NLRC, 3 4 3 S C R A 1 ,1 3 14[2000|)
127
xs v .
Bert offers to buy Sim eons property under the following terms
r and conditionsf'PI million purchase price, ^0% option money, the
\ balance payable in cash upon the clearance of the property of all
illegal occupants. The option money is promptly paid and Simeon
clears the property of all illegal occupants in no time at all. However,
when Bert tenders payment of the balance and asks Simeon for
the deed of absolute sale, Simeon suddenly has a change of heart,
claiming that the deal is disadvantageous to him as he has found
out that the property can fetch three times the agreed purchase
price. Bert seeks specific performance but Sim&on contends that
he has merely given Bert an option to buy and nothing more, and
offers to return the option mpney which Bert refuses to accept.
A.
B.
Will B erts action for specific performance prosper?
Explain. (4%)
C.
May Simeon justify his refusal to proceed with the sale
by the fact that the deal is financially disadvantageous to him?
Explain. (4%)
8UQqeSJgDaWSH?i!3g
^ A.
An option contract is one granting a privilege to buy
or sell within an agreed fim* anri at 3 determined price. It
must be supported bv a consideration distinct from the price.
(Art. 1479 and 1482, NCC)
4B .
Berts action for specific performance will prosper
because there was a binding agreement of sal, not jyst an
^ to <y
option contract. The sale was perfected upon acceptance by
Simeon of 10% of the agreed price. This amount is in reality
^ [ 7*
earnest money which, under Art. 1 4 8 2 , shall be considered
as part of the price and as proof of the perfection of the
contract. (Topacio v. CA, 2 1 1 SCRA 2 3 1 [ 1 9 9 2 ] ; Villongco
bu> Realty v. Bormaheco, 6 5 SCRA 3 . 5 2 [ 1 9 7 5 ] ) .
128
, HOTl-cjy**
C.
Simeon cannot justify hterefusal to proceed with the
sale by the fact that the deal is financially disadvantageous
to him. Having made a bad bargain is not a legal ground for
pulling out of a binding contract of sale, in the absence of
som e actionable wrong by the other party (Vales v. Villa, 35
Phil. 769 [1916]), and no such wrong has been committed by
Bert.
XV.
Carlos sues Dino for (a) collection on a promissory note for a
loan, with no agreement on interest, on which Dino defaulted,
and (b) damages caused by Dino on his (Carlos) priceless
Michaelangelo painting on which Dino accidentally spilled acid
while transporting it. The court finds Dino liable on the promissory
note and awards damages to Carlos for the damaged painting*
with interests for both awards. What rates of interest may the court
impose with respect to both awards? Explain. (5% )
XVI.
Ortillo contracts Fabricato, Inc. to supply and install tile
materials in a building he is donating to his province. Ortillo pays
50% of the contract price as per agreement. It is also agreed that
the balance would be payable periodically after every 10%
performance until completed. After performing about 93% of the
contract, for which it has been paid an additional 40% as per
agreement, Fabricato, Inc. did not complete the project due to its
129
1
sudden cessation of operations. Instead, Fabricato, inc. demands
payment of the last 10% of the contract despite its non-completion
of the project. Ortillo refuses to pay, invoking the stipulation that
payment of the last amount of 10% shall be upon completion.
Fabricato, Inc. brings suit for the entire 10%, plus damages,
Ortillo counters with claims for (a) moral damages for Fabricato,
Inc. s unfounded suit which has damaged his reputation as a
philanthropist and respected businessman in his community, and
(b) attorneys fees.
A.
Does Ortillo have a legal basis for his claim for moral
damages? (2%)
B.
How about his claim for attorneys fees, having hired a
lawyer to defend him? (3%)
A.
There is no legal basis to Ortillos claim for moral
damages. It does not fall under the coverage of Article 2219
of the New Civil Code*,.,
,
^ B.
O rtillo is e n title d to a tto
s fe e s because
Fabricatos complaint is a case of rna
s prosecutionfor a
clearly unfounded civil action. (A rt 2208 [4] and [11], NCC).
i. TwH*
Jrn
XY|| , /0 tP;fcHV
L'minlty
130
a n d .
A.
B.
(1%)
C.
Does the presence of the owner inside the vehicle causing
damage to a third party affect his liability for his drivers negligence?
Explain. (2%)
S U G G e S ie D C m S W g R S :
^ nor
% A.
No. Mechanical defects of a motor vehicle do not
constitute fortuitous event, since the presence of such defects
would have been readily detected by diligent maintenance
check. The failure to maintain the vehicle in safe running
condition constitutes negligence.
End
131
SUGGESTEDANSWER
The daughter should prevail because Article 16 of
the N ew Civil Code provides that intestate andtestamentary succession shall be governed by the national 11
law of the person whose succession is under consideration.
__
n
** rjor*-
SUGGESTED ANSWER
The motion to dismiss the petition for adoption
should be denied. The law that should govern the action
132
4- ALTERNATIVE ANSWER
The motion has to be granted. The new law shall
govern their Qualification to adopt and under the new
law, the German couple is disqualified from adopting.
T h e y cannot claim that they have already acquired a
vested right because adoption is not a right but a mere
privilege. No one acquires a vested right on a privilege.
[Note: If the examinee based his answer on the
current law, RA 8552, his answer should be considered
correct. This question is based on the repealed provision
of the Family Code on Adoption.]
/,
jV-jAfs 8
2)
(3/o)
OevJL
SUGGESTED ANSWER
1) Yes, Mike is a builder in good faith. There is no
showing that when he built his house, he knew that a
portion thereof encroached on Jose's lot. Unless one is
versed in the science o f surveying, he cannot d e t e r m i n e
the precise boundaries or location of his property by
merely examining his title. In the absence of contrary
proof, the law presumes that the encroachment was done
in good faith [Technogas Phils, v. CA, 268 SCRA 5, 15
(1997)],
2)
None of the preferences shall be followed. The
preference of Mike cannot prevail because under Article
448 o f the Civil Code, it is the owner of the land who has
the option or choice, not the builder. On the other hand,
the option belongs to Jose, he cannot demand that the
portion' of the house encroaching on his land be destroyed
or removed because this is not one of the options given
by law to the owner of the land. The owner may choose
between the'appropriation of what was built afterpayment
of indemnity, or to compel the builder tofpay for the land
if the value of the land is not considerably more than that
of the building. Otherwise, the builder shall pay rent for
the portion of the land encroached.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER
1)
Mike cannot be considered a builder in good
faith because he built his house without first determining
the com ers and boundaries o f his lot to make sure that
his construction was within the perimeter of his property.
He could have done this with the help of a geodetic
engineer as an ordinary prudent and reasonable man
would do under the circumstances.
2)
Jose's preference should be followed. He may
lhave the building removed at the expense o f Mike,
appropriate the building as his own, oblige Mike to buy
the land and ask for damages in addition to any o f the
three options. (Articles 449, 450, 451, CC)
134
<j.
Vutnur;
I/. 4*'Vlp>C>-
IV
For many years, the Rio Grande river deposited soil
along its bank, beside the titled land of Jose. In time, such
deposit reaehed an area o f one thousand square meters. With
the permission of Jose, Vicente cultivated the said area. Ten
years later, a big flood occurred in the river and transferred
the 1000 square meters to the opposite bank, beside the land
of Agustin. The land transferred is now contested by Jose
and Agustin as riparian owners and by Vicente who claims
ownership by prescription. Who should prevail,? Why? (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER
Jose should prevail. The disputed area, which is an
alluvion, belongs by right of accretion to Jose, the
reparian owner (Art. 457 CC). When, as given in the
problem, the very same area was transferred by flood
waters to the opposite bank, it became an avulsion and .
ownership thereof is retained by Jose who has two veatre g
to remove it (Art. 459, CC). Vicente's claim based on
prescription is baseless since his possession was by mere
tolerance of Jose and, therefore, did not adversely affect
Joses possession and ownership (Art. 537, CC). Inasmuch
as his possession is merely that of a holder, he cannot
acquire the disputed area by prescription.
>MoA'
'b
135
SUGGESTED ANSWER
The complaint for cancellation of easement of right
of w ay must fall. The failure to annotate the easement
upon the title of the servient estate is not among the
grounds for extinguishing an easement under Art. 631 o f
the Civil Code.
Under Article 617, easements are
inseparable from the estate to which they actively or
passively belong.
Once it attaches, it can only be
extinguished under Art. 631, and they exist even if they
are not stated or annotated as an encumbrance on the
Torrens title of the servient estate, (n Tolentino 326,
1987 ed.)
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER
Under Section 44, PD No. 1529, every registered
owner receiving a certificate of title pursuant to a decree
of registration, and every subsequent innocent purchaser
for value, shall hold the same free from all encumbrances' *?****
except those noted on said certificate. This rule, however,
admits o f exceptions.
Under Act 496, as amended by Act No. 2011, and
Section 4, Act 3621, an easement if not registered shall
remain and shall be held to pass with the land until cut
off or extinguished by the registration of the servient
, .estate. However /this provision has been suppressed in
Section 44* PD No.1529. In other words, the registration
of the servient estate did not operate to cut-off or
extinguish the right o f way. Therefore, the complaint for
the cancellation o f the right of way should be dismissed.
Because her eldest son Juan had been pestering her for
capital to start a business, Josefa gave him P100.000.00.
Five years later, Josefa died, leaving a last will and testament
in which she instituted only her four younger children as her
sole heirs. At the time of her death, her only property left was
136
SUGGESTED ANSWER
was no preterition o f the oldest son because
the testatrix donated 100,000pesos to him* This donation
1is considered an advance on the sonfs inheritance. There
being no preteritioni the institutions in the will shall be
respected but the legitime o f the oldest son has to be
completed if he received less.
After collating the donation of P100.000 to the
remaining property of P900.000, the estate o f the testatrix
is PljDO.OOO. O f this amount, one-half or P P500.000, is
the legitime of the legitimate children and it follows that
the legitime o f onie legitimate child is P100,000, The
legitime, tnerefore, of the oldest son is i'lUU.UOLS. However,
since the donation given him was P100.000, he has
already received in full his legitime and he will not
receive anything anymore from the decedent. The
remaining P900.000, therefore, shall go to the four
younger children by institution in the will, to be divided
equally among them. Bach will receive P 225,000.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER
Assuming that the donation is valid as to form and
substance, Juan cannot invoke preterition because he
actually had received a donation inter vivos from the
testatrix (m Tolentino 183,1992 ed.). He would only have
a right to a completion of his legitime under Art. 906 of
the Civil Code. The estate should be divided equally
among the five children who will each receive P225,000.00
because the total hereditary estate, after collating the
donation to Juan (Art. 1061, CC), would be P I million. In
the actual distribution o f the net estate, Juan gets
nothing while his siblings will get P225,000.00 each.
vn
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
------ sThe fourth student is correct. His liability is only
H ointyhence, pro rata. There is solidary liability only
wbn the^obligation expressly so states/jr when th ela w
or nature o f the obligation requires solidarity (Art. 1207,
CC). The contract of lease in the problem does not, in any
way, stipulate solidarity.
r3*Crfi t/ n4cc*t, ' u*y,
v ra
To secure a loan obtained from a rural bank, Purita
assigned her leasehold rights over a stall in the public market
in favor o f the bank. The deed of assignment provides that
in case o f default in the payment o f the loan, the bank shall
have the right to sell Puritas rights over the market stall as
her attomey-in-fact, and to apply the proceeds to the payment
of the loan.
1)
Was the assignment of leasehold rights a mortgage
or a cession? Why? (3%)
2)
Assuming the assignment to be a mortgage, does
the provision giving the bank the power to sell Puritas rights
constitute pactum commissorium or not? Why? (2%)
138
SUGGESTEDANSWER
1)
The assignment was a mortgage, not a cession,
of the leasehold rights. A cession would have transferred
ownership to the bank. However, the grant of authority ^
to the bank to sell the leasehold rights in case o f default / ---------is proof that no such ownership was transferred and that
a mere encumbrance was constituted. There would have
been no need for such authority had there been a cession.
2)
No, the .clause in question fa nnt n pnntum
cammissorium. It is pactum commissorium when default
in the payment o f the loan automatically vests ownership
of the encumbered property in the bank. In the problem
given, the bank does not automatically become owner of
the property upon default of the mortgagor. The bank
has to sell the property and apply the proceeds to the
indebtedness.
lA.
;j
'
J. TtoU&Morf
CMfrwelt;
Ab t/wlwfriil iVier**iof /tlte*.?/
trjt^~n\r,
of-1 **'"?**
i
'
i.'
i;
j'i'
SUGGESTED ANSWER;
I
The action will prosper. While it is true that the
interest ceilings set by the Usury Law are no longer in
force, it has been held that PD No. 1684 and CB Circular
No. 905 merely allow contracting parties to stipulate
freely on any adjustment in the interest rate on a loan or
139
t Ct>fhUf;Ccvh^t4i,'
x
O n July 1, 1998, Brian leased an office space in a
building for a period of five years at a rental rate of P 1,000.00
a month. The contract of lease contained the proviso that in
case of inflation or devaluation of the Philippine peso, the
monthly rental will automatically be increased or decreased
depending, on the devaluation or inflation of the peso to the
dollar:"* Starting March 1, 2001, the lessor, increased the
rental to P2.000.00 a month, on the ground of inflation
proven by the fact that the exchange rate of the Philippine
peso to the dollar had increased from P25.00=$1.00 to
P50.00=$1.00. Brian refused to pay the increased rate and
an action for unlawful detainer was filed against him. Will the
action prosper? Why? (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER
The unlawful detainer action will not prosper.
Extraordinary inflation or deflation is defined as the
sharp decrease in the purchasing power of the peso. It
does not necessarily refer to the exchange rate o f the
peso to the
dollar. Whether or not there exists an
extraordinary inflation or deflation is for the courts to
decide. There being no showing that the purchasing
power o f the peso hat! been reduced tremendously, there
could be no inflation that would justify the increase in
the amount of rental to be paid. Hence, Brian could
refuse to pay the increased rate.
140
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER.
I
The action will not prosper. The existence of
inflation or deflation regnirp.a an official declaration by
the Bangko Sentrai Jiff Pilipinas'.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
The unlawful detainer action will prosper. It is a
given fact in the problem, that there was inflation, which
caused the exchange rate to double. Since the contract
itself authorizes the increase in rental in the event of an
inflation or devaluation of the Philippine peso, the
doubling of the monthly rent is reasonable and is therefore
a valid act under the very terms of the contract. Brians
retusal to pay is thus a ground for ejectment.
XI
The sugar cane planters of Batangas entered into a long
term milling contract.-with the Central Azucarera de Don
Pedro Inc. Ten years later, the Central assigned its .rights to
... the,said.milling contract to a Taiwanese group which would
take over the-operations of the sugar mill. The planters filed
an action to annul the said assignment on the ground that
the Taiwanese group was not registered with the Board of
Investments. Will the action prosper or not? Explain briefly.
(5%)
(Note: The question presupposes knowledge and
requires the application o f the provisions o f the Omnibus
investment Code, which properly belongs to Commercial
law)
SUGGESTED ANSWER
The action will prosper not on the ground invoked
but on the ground that the farmers have not given their
consent to the assignment. The milling contract imposes
141
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER
The assignment is valid because there is absolute
freedom to transfer the credit and the creditor need not
get the consent o f the debtor. He only needs to notify
him.
4 . 'S e tfe t
fe*/
S ^ A .-
ftnff ~tb
SUGGESTEDANSWER:
(a) The first buyer has the better right if his sale
was first to be registered, even though the first buyer
142
4.
**vti4
r; r/w&; a^r^Le,'*J.
SUGGESTED ANSWER
Joe, the capitalist partner, m ay engage in the-i
restaurant business because it is not the same kind o f r
business the partnership is engaged in. On the other
hand, Rudy m ay not engage in any other business unless *i
their partnership expressly perm its him to do so because r
as an industrial partner he has to devote his full time to
the business o f the partnership (Art. 1789, CC).
1.
x rv
* Ojrhm'h; Cv'tfrrvcdr;
,rj4. ''. !
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, the action will not prosper. The implied renewal
of the lease on a month-to-month basis did not have the
effect o f extending the life of the option to purchase
which expired at the end Of the original lease period. The
lessor is correct in refusing to sell on the ground that the
option had expired.
I.Ayer*?;
OxyflU
SUGGESTED ANSWER
The revocation is not valid. The power of attorney
given to the buyer is irrevocable because it is coupled
] with an interest: the agency is the means of fulfilling the
jtmetfocAtjL*
obligation of the buyer to pay the price of the land (Article
1927, CC). In other words, a bilateral contract (contract
to buy and sell the land) is dependent on the agency.
,
r
I
144
A < 3 A ;
XVI
of
^<Vvj^W ^ .cent^fA^,
<Se* f * t f < X f J O , t c
P50 000.00
(Sgd.) Arturo
Does this receipt evidence a contract to sell?
Why?
(5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER
,'.,.It is a contract of sale because the seller did not
rvc ownership until he was fully paid.
I- ^4fenj /Ut
X V II
Cesar bought a residential condominium unit from High
Rise Co. and paid the price in full. He moved into the unit,
but somehow he was not given the Condominium Certificate
ofTitle covering the property. Unknown to him, High Rise Co.
subsequently mortgaged the entire condominium building to
Metrobank as security for a loan of P500 million. High Rise
Co. failed to pay the loan and the bank foreclosed the
mortgage. At the foreclosure sale, the bank acquired the
building, being the highest bidder. When Cesar learned
about this, he filed an action to annul the foreclosure sale
insofar as his unit was concerned. The bank put up the
defense that it relied on the condominium certificates of title
presented by High Rise Co., which were clean. Hence, it was
145
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
r aa
<ec*rt
r*J
1 -T b r jtX
____
XVm
(.UWU/i;
n tm -
SUGGESTED ANSWER
The insurance company is not liable because when
the accident occurred, Alberto was not acting within the
assigned tasks o f his employment.
It is true that under Art. 2180 (par. 5), employers are
liable for damages caused by their employees who were
acting within the scope of their assigned tasks. However,
146
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
The insurance company is liable if Alberto was
negligent in the operation of the car and the car was
assigned to him for thebenefit of the insurance company,
and even though he was not within the scope of his ,
assigned tasks when the accident happened. In one case
decided by the Supreme Court, where an executive o f a
pharmaceutical company was given the use of a company
car, and after office hours, the executive made personal
use of the car and met an accident, the employer was also
made liable under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code for the
injury caused by the negligent operation of the car by the
executive, on the ground that the car which caused t h e i ^ though
W;
injury was assigned to the executive by the employer for f
5c*wr*i the prestige o f the company. The insurance company'**^
l y *
cmrhp**
was held liable even though the employee was not
***
ft ham/J performing within the scope of his assigned tasks when
the accident happened [Valenzuela v. CA, 253 SCRA 303
."frM , t3 1**
(1996)].
/.
tif
<rfcvft H
X IX
Betty and Lydia were co-owners of a parcel of land. Last
January 31, 2001, when she paid her real estate tax, Betty
discovered that Lydia had sold her share to Em m a. on
November 10, 2000. The following day, Betty offered to
147
redeem her share from Emma, but the latter replied that
Bettys right to redeem has already prescribed. Is Emma
correct or not? Why? (5%)
SUGGESTEDANSWER:
Emma, the buyer, is not correct. Betty can still
enforce her right o f legal redemption as a co-owner.
Article 1623 of the Civil Code gives a^eo=owner 30 days
from written notice of the sale by thy vendor jto exercise
his right of legal redemption. In the pre&entjSroblein, the
30-day period for the exercise by Betty o f her right of
redemption had not even begun tn rim because no notice
in writing of the sale appears to have been given to her by
Lydia.
4 . P r v f4 ~ + f; f b jiv s v b r , -
XX
Mario sold his house and lot to Carmen for P I million
payable in five (5) equal annual installments. The sale was
registered and title was issued in Carmens name. Carmen
failed to pay the last three installments and Mario filed an.
action for collection, damages and attorneys fees against her.
Upon filing o f the complaint, he caused a notice of lis pendens
to be annotated on Carmens title. Is the notice of Us pendens
proper or not? Why? (5%)
w..
>
SUGGESTEDANSWER..
The notice o f Iis pendens is not proper for the
reason that the case filed by Mario against Carmen is only
for collection, damages, and attomeyis fees.
, 'if. , }- -V.. . *
|
1
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The levy is not proper there being no showing that the
surety agreement executed by the husband redounded to the
benefit of the family. An obligation contracted by the husband
alone is chargeable against the conjugal partnership only
when it was contracted for the benefit of the family. When the
obligation was contracted on behalf of the family business
the law presumes that such obligation will redound to the
benefit of the family. However, when the obligation was to
guarantee the debt of a third party, as in the problem, the
obligation is presumed for the benefit of the third party, not
the family. Hence, for the obligation under-the surety
agreement to be chargeable against the partnership it must
be proven that the family was benefited and that the benefit
was a direct result of such agreement. [Ayala Investment v.
Ching, 286 SCRA 272)
b)
OnAprll 15,1980, Rene and Angelina were married
to each other without a marriage settlement. In 1985, they
acquired a parcel of land in Quezon City. On June 1, 1990,
when Angelina was away in Baguio, Rene sold the said ldt to
Marcelo. Is the sale void or voidable? (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The sale is void. Since the sale was executed in 1990,
the Family Code is the law applicable. Under Article 124 of
149
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Tony and Susan are entitled to the house and lot as co
owners in equal shares. Under Article 147 of the Family Code,
when a man and a woman who are capacitated to m an y each
other lived exclusively with each other as husband and wife,
the property acquired during their cohabitation are presumed
to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry
and shall be owned by them in equal shares. This is true even
though the efforts of one of them consisted merely in his or
her care and maintenance of the family and of the household.
150
b)
Would it make any difference if Tony could not
marry Susan because he was previously married to Alice
from whom he is legally separated ? (2%)
SUGGESTEDANSWER:
Yes, it would make a difference. Under Article 148 of the
Family Code, when the parties to the cohabitation could not
marry each other because of ah impediment, only those
properties acquired by both of them through their actual
joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be
owned by them in common in proportion to their respective
contributions. The efforts of one of the parties in maintaining 1
the family and household are not considered adequate J
fTivi
contribution in the acquisition of the properties.
* cT??rf*t>
.**
Since Susan did not contribute to the acquisition of the
house and lot, She has no share therein. If Tony cohabited'
with Susan after his legal separation from Alice, the. house
i
and lot is his exclusive property. If he cohabited with Susan I
before his legal separation from Alice, the house and lot 'madtttsUyjLi
p ,j
belongs to his community of partnership with Alice,
m.
a)
Manuel, a Filipino, and his American wife Eleanor,
executed a Joint Will in Boston, Massachusetts when they
were residing in said city. The law of Massachusetts allows
the execution of Joint wills. Shortly thereafter, Eleanor died.
Can the said Will be probated in the Philippines for the
settlement of her estate ? (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, the will may be probated in the Philippines insofar
as the estate of Eleanor is concerned. While the Civil Code
prohibits the execution of Joint wills here and abroad, such
prohibition applies only to Filipinos. Hence, the joint will
which is valid where executed is valid in the Philippines but
only with respect to Eleanor. Under Article 819, it is void with
respect to Manuel whose Joint will - remains void in the
Philippines despite being valid where executed.
151
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
The will cannot be probated In the Philippines, even
though valid where executed, because it is prohibited under
Article 818 o f the Civil Code and declared void under Article
819. The prohibition should apply even to the American wife
because the joint will is offensive to public policy. Moreover,
It is a single juridical act which cannot be valid as to one
testator and void as to the other.
rki
b)
Cristy and her late husband Luis had two children.
Rose and Patrick. One summer, her mother-in-law, aged 70,
took the two children, then aged 10 and 12, with her on a boat
trip to Cebu. Unfortunately, the vessel sank en route, and the
bodies o f the three were never found. None o f the survivors
ever saw them on the water. On the settlement of her motherin-laws estate, Cristy files a claim for a share of her estate on
the ground that the same was inherited by her children from
their grandmother in representation o f their father, and she
inherited the same from them. Will her action prosper? (2%)
SUGGESTEDANSWER:
'
H O |r r r v p .
' ^
fa nrfc
No, her action will not prosper. Since there was no proof
as to who died first, all the three axe deemed to have died at
the same time and there was no transmission of rights from
one to another, applying Article 43 of the New Civil Code.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
No, her action will not prosper. Under Article 43 o f the
New Civil Code, inasmuch as there is no proof as to who died
first, all the three are presumed to have died at the same time
and there could be no transmission o f rights among them.
Her children not having inherited from their grandmother,
Cristy has no right to share in her mother-in-laws estate. She
cannot share in her own right as she Is not a legal heir of her
mother-in-law. The survivorship provision of Rule 131 o f the
Rules o f Court does not apply to the problem. I t ; ipplies only
to those cases where the issue involved is not s accession.
vsiii
152
' '"""I
rv
In his last will and testament, Lamberto 1) disinherits
his daughter Wilma because she is disrespectful towards me
and raises her voice talking to me", 2) omits entirely his
spouse Elvira, 3) leaves a legacy o f P100,000.00 to his
mistress Rosa and P50,000.00 to his driver Em ie and 4)
institutes his son Baldo as his sole heir. How will you
distribute his estate o f P I,000,000.00? (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The disinheritance o f Wilma was ineffective because the
ground relied upon b y the testator does not constitute
maltreatment under Article 919(6) of the New Civil Code.
Hence, the testamentary provisions in the will shall be
annulled but only to the extent that her legitime was impaired.
The total omission of Elvira does not constitute preterition
because she is not a compulsory heir in the direct line. Only *
compulsory heirs In the direct line may be the subject of
preterition. Not having been preterited, she will be entitled
only to her legitime. The legacy in favor of Rosa is void under
Article 1028 for being in consideration o f her adulterous
relation with the testator. She is, therefore, disqualified to
receive the legacy o f 100,000 pesos. The legacy of 50,000
pesos In favor o f Em ie is not inofficious not having exceeded
the free portion. Hence, he shall be entitled to receive it. The
institution of Baldo, which applies only to the free portion,
shall be respected. In sum, the estate of Lamberto will be
distributed as follows:
3 Baldo----------------- w ilm a ----- ---------r-vnK) Elvira-----------------Em ie------------------
450,000
250,000
250,000 }J
50,000
1,000,000
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
i- 'U j
.UfU
. W
....
iT ^
il~< .; fts'tftm
i
; tfzaO'm _
* iJifc: i UfCf- c&'M
*
: f 2Sct
>
if.
sfajv.enj
u*j,
N
fan
Heir
Legitime
Baldo
Elvira
Ernie
500.000
250.000
50.000
50,000
TOTAL 750,000
50,000
Institution
Legacy
TOTAL
200,000
200,000
700.000
250.000
1.000.000
Legitime
of Wilmas
Baldo'- ,250,0000
Wilma(250.000)
^' *
. 250.000
Emle
TOTAL
500.000
125,000
Distribution
Legacy Institution TOTAL
Legitime
200,000
575,000
125,000
375,000
50,000
50,000
250.000
50,000
154
200,000
L,000,000
V.
Sometime in 1990, Sarah,, bom a Filipino but by then a
naturalized American citizen, and her American husband
Tom, filed a petition in the Regional Trial Court of Makati, for
the adoption of the minor child of her sister, a Filipina. Can
the petition be granted? (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
It depends. If Tom and Sarah have been residing in the
Philippines for at least 3 years prior to the effectivity of RA
8552, the petition may be granted. Otherwise, the petition
cannot be granted because the American husband Is not
qualified to adopt.
While the petition for adoption was filed in 1990, it was
considered reflled upon the effectivity of RA8552, the Domestic
Adoption Act of 1998. This is the law applicable, the petition
being still pending with the lower court.
Under the Act, Sarah and Tom must adopt jointly
because they do not fall in any of the exceptions where one
of them may adopt alone. When husband and wife must
adopt jointly, the Supreme Court has held in a line of cases
that both of them must be qualified to adopt. While Sarah, an
alien, is qualified to adopt under Section 7(b)(1) of the Act for
being a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative
within the 4th;idegrefe of consanguinity or affinity, Tom, an
alien, is not qualified because he is neither a former Filipino
citizen nor married to a Filipino. One of them not being
qualified to adopt, their petition has to be denied. However,
if they have been residents of the Philippines three years prior
to the effectivity of the Act and continues to reside here until
the decree of adoption is entered, they are qualified to adopt
the nephew of Sarah under Section 7(b) thereof, and the
petition may be granted.
155
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Since the petition was filed before the effectivity of the
Domestic Adoption Act of 1998, the Family Code Is the law
applicable.
Under the FC, Sarah and Tom must adopt jointly
because they do not fall In any of the exceptions where one
of them may adopt alone. Under a long line of cases decided
by the Supreme Court, when husband and wife must adopt
jointly, both of them must be qualified to adopt. While Sarah
, is qualified to adopt under Article 184(3) (a) for being a former
Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by consanguinity,
TOm Is not. He is not a former Filipino citizen and neither is
he married to a Filipino. One of them not being qualified to
adopt, the petition must be denied.
VI
The coconut farm of Federico is surrounded by the lands
of Romulo. Federico seeks a right of way through a portion
of the land of Romulo to bring his coconut products to the
market. He has chosen a point where he will pass through
a housing project of Romulo. The latter wants him to pass
another way which is one kilometer longer. Who should
prevail? (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
YCtiAfc
156
vn
a)
Arturo borrowed P500,OQdOO from his father.
After he had paid P300,000.00, his father died. When the
administrator of his fathers estate requested payment of the
balance of P200,000.00, Arturo replied that the same had
been condoned by his father as evidenced by a notation at the
back of his check payment for the P300.000.00 reading: In
full payment of the loan". Will this be a valid defense in an
action for collection? (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
It depends. If the notation in full payment of the loan
was written by Arturos father, there was an i mpl i edcondonation of the balance that discharges the obligation. In
such case, the notation is an act of the father from which
condonation maybe inferred. The condonation being implied,
it need not comply with the formalities of a donation to be
effective. The defense of full payment will, therefore, be valid.
When, however, the notation was written by Arturo
himself, it merely proves his intention in making that payment
but in no way does it bind his father {Yam u. CA, G.R. No.
104726, 11 February 1999). In such case, the notation was
not the act of his father from which condonation may be
inferred. There being no condonation at all, the defense of full
payment will not be valid.
A T
' T P D W 4 T T I7 P
M O U 7P P .
l express condonat
with tEe formalities of a donation to be valid under the 2nd
paragraph of Article 1270 of the New Civil Code. Since the
amount of the balance is more than 5,000 pesos, the
acceptance by Arturo of the condonation must also be in
writing under Article 748. There being no acceptance in
writing by Arturo, the condonation is void and the obligation
to pay the balance subsists. The defense of full payment is,
therefore, not valid. In case the notation was not written by
Arturos father, the answer is the same as the answers above.
157
.vor
<^7
*
b)
Anastacia purchased a house and lot on installments
at a housing project in Quezon City. Subsequently, she was
employed in California and a year later, she executed a deed
of donation, duly authenticated by the Philippine Consulate
in Los Angeles, California, donating the house and lot to her
friend Amanda. The latter brought the deed of donation to
the owner of the project and discovered that Anastacia left
unpaid installments and real estate taxes. Amanda paid
these so that the donation in her favor can be registered in the
project owner's office. Two months later, Anastacia died,
leaving her mother Rosa as her sole heir. Rosa filed an action
to annul the donation on the ground that Amanda did not
give her consent in the deed of donation or in a separate
public instrument. Amanda replied that the donation was an
, onerous one because she had to pay unpaid installments and
taxes; hence her acceptance may be implied. Who is correct?
... ( 2 % )
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Rosa is correct because the donation is void. The
property donated was an immovable. For such donafciaTvtp be
valid. Article 749 of the New Civil Code requlresfbothythe
d on ation and th^acceptance to be In a public instrument.
There being no showing that Amandas acceptance was made
in a public instrument, the donation is void. The contention
that the donation is onerous and, therefore, need not comply
with Article 749 for validity is without merit. The donation is
not onerous because it did not impose on Amanda the
obligation to pay the balance on the purchase price or the
arrears
Amanda took it upon herself to
pay those amounts voluntarily. For a donation to be onerous,
the burden must be imposed by the donor on the donee. In
the problem, there is no such burden imposed by the donor
on the donee. The donation not being onerous, it must
comply with the formalities of Article 749.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Neither Rosa nor Amanda is correct. The donation Is
onerous only as to the popttea-of the property corresponding
to the value of the installments and taxes paid by Amanda.
158
160
IX
a)
Demetrio knew that a piece of land bordering the
beach belonged to Ernesto. However, since the latter was
studying in Europe and no one was taking care o f the land,
Demetrio occupied the same and constructed thereon nipa
sheds with tables and benches which he rented out to people
who want to have a picnic by the beach. When Emesto
returned, he demanded the return of the land. Demetrio
agreed to do so after he has removed the nipa sheds. Emesto
refused to let Demetrio remove the nipa sheds on the ground
161
f V;
/'
' 4
" ,
S *
b)
In good faith, Pedro constructed a flve-doo
commercial building on the land o f Pablo who was also in
iju
good faith. When Pablo discovered the construction, he
j
opted to appropriate the building by paying Piedro the cost
It** thereof. However, Pedro insists that he should be paid the
current market value o f the building, which was much higher
because o f inflation. >
1) W ho is coirect, Pedro or Pablo ? (1%)
2) In the meantime that Pedro is not yet paid, who is
entitled to the rentals of the building, Pedro or
Pablo? (1%)
S U G G E S T E D
ANSWER:
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Pedro Is correct. In Pecson v. CA, it was held that
Article 546 of the New Civil Code does not .specifically state
how the value of useful improvements should be determined
in fixing the amount of indemnity that the owner of the land
should pay to the builder in good faith. Since the objective of
the law is to adjust the rights of the parties in such manner
as "toadministercom^letejttsiie^tobothoftheminsuchaway
as neither one nor the other may enrich himself of that which
does not belong to him, the Court ruled that the basis of
reimbursement should be the fair market value of the building.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
2)
Pablo is entitled to the rentals of the building. As the
owner of the land, Pablo is also the owner of the building
being an accession thereto. However. Pedro who is entitled to
retain the building is also entitled to retain the rentals. He,
however, shall apply the rentals to the Indemnity payable to
him after deducting reasonable cost of repair and
maintenance.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
_
a)
Ambrosio died, leaving his three daughters, Belen,
Rosario and Sylvia a hacienda which was mortgaged to the
Philippine National Bank. Due to the failure of the daughters
to pay the bank, the latter foreclosed the mortgage and the
hacienda was sold to it as the highest bidder. Six months
later, Sylvia won the grand prize at the lotto and used part of
163
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Sylvia is not correct. The 3 daughters are the co-owners
of the hacienda being the only heirs of Ambrosio. When the
property w is foreclosed, the right of redemption belongs also
to the 3 daughters. When Sylvia redeemed the entire property
before the lapse of the redemption period , she also exercised
the right of redemption of her co-owners on their behalf^ As
such she is holding the shares of her two sisters in the
property, and all the fruits corresponding thereto, in trust for
them. Redemption by one co-owner inures to the benefit of all
{Adille v. CA, 157SCJ?A 455). Sylvia, however, is entitled to be
reimbursed the shares of her two sisters in the redemption
price.
b)
Felix cultivated a parcel of land and planted it to
sugar cane, believing it to be his own. When the crop was
eight months old, and harvestaible after two more months* a
resurvey of the land showed that it really belonged to Fred.
What are the options available to Fred?' (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
As to the pending crops planted by Felix in good faith,
Fredhas the option of allowing Felisto continue the cultivation
and to harvest the crops, o a o continue the cultivation and
harvest the crops himself, in the latter option, however, Felix
shall have the right to a part of the expenses of cultivation
and to a part of the net harvest, both in proportion to the time
of possession. (Art. 545 NCC).
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Since sugarcane is not a perennial crop, Felix is
considered a sojjfer in good faith. Being so. Art. 448 applies.
The options available to Fred are: (a) to appropriate the crop
164
XI
Eugenio died without issue, leaving several parcels of
land in Bataan. He was survived by Antonio, his legitimate
brother; Martina, the only daughter of his predeceased sister
Mercedes; and five legitimate children of Joaquin, another
predeceased brother. Shortly after Eugenios death, Antonio
also died, leaving three legitimate children. Subsequently,
Martina, the children OfJoaquin and the children of Antonio
executed an extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Eugenio,
dividing it among themselves. The succeeding year, a
petition to annul the extrajudicial settlement was filed by
Antero.' an illegitimate son of Antonio, who claims he is
entitled to snare in tne estate ot Eugenio. The defendants
filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that Antero is barred
by Article 992 of the Civil Code from inheriting from the
legitimate brother of his father. How will you resolve the
motion? (5%)
v
\
SUGGESTEDANSWER:
The motion to dismiss should be granted. Article 992
does not apply. Antero is not claiming any Inheritance from
Eugenio. He is claiming his share in the inheritance of his
father consisting of his fathers share in the Inheritance of Nor Eugenio (Dela Merced v. Dela Merced, G.R. No. 126707, 25
of
February 1999).
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
It depends. If Antero was not acknowledged by Antonio,
the motion to dismiss should be granted because Antero is
not a legal heir of Antonio. If Antero was acknowledged , the
motion should be denied because Article 992 is not applicable.
This is because Antero is claiming his inheritance from his
illegitimate father, not from Eugenio.
165
xn
In 1979 . Nestor applied for and was granted a Free
Patent over a parcel of agricultursd land with an area bf 30
Hectares, located in General Santos City: He presented the
Free Patent to the Register of Deeds, and he was Issued a
corresponding^briginal Certificate of Tide (OCT) No. 375.
Subsequently, Nestor sold the land to Eddie. The deed of sale
was submitted to the Register of Deeds and on the basis
thereof, OCT No. 375 was cancelled ancFfVansfer Certificate
of Title (TCT) No. 4576 was issued in the name of Eddie. In
1986, the Director of Lands filed a complaint for annulment
of OCT No. 375 and TCT No. 4576 on the ground that Nestor
obtained the Free Patent through fraud. Eddie filed a motion
to dismiss on the ground that he was an innocent purchaser
for value and in good faith and as such, he has acquired a title
to the property which is valid, unassailable and indefeasible.
Decide the motion. (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The motion of Nestor tq dismiss the complaint for
- annulment of O.C.T. No. 375 and T.C.T. No. 4576 should be
denied for the following reasons:
1)
Eddie cannot claim protection as an innocent
purchaser for value nor can he interpose the defense of
indefeasibility of his title, because his TCT is rooted on a void
title. Under Section 91 ofCA No. 141, as amended, otherwise
known as the Public Land Act, statements of material facts
In the applications for public land must be under oath.
Section 91 of the same act provides that such statements
shall be considered as essential conditions and parts of the
concession, title, or permit issued, any false statement
therein, or omission of facts shall ipso facto produce the
cancellation of the concession. The patent Issued to Nestor in
this case is void ab initio not only because it was obtained by
fraud but also because it covers 30 hectares which is far
beyond the maximum of 24 hectares provided by the free
patent law.
?
Lfwc a.iu* Lav i
166
2)
The government can seek annulment or the original
and transfer certificates of title and the reversion of the land
to the state. Eddies defense is untenable. The protection
afforded by the Torrens System to an innocent purchaser for
value can be availed of only if the land has been titled thru
judicial proceedings where the issue of fraud becomes^
academic aiter the lapse of one (1) year from the issuance of
i**
the decree of registration. In public land grants, the action 'r* ^
of the government to annul a title fraudulently obtained does
f*.__
not prescribe such action and will not be barred by the AcH ^ mic
transfer of the title to an innocent purchaser for value.
i
xrn
Prispilla purchased a rnndorninhirn linlt in Makati City
from the Citiland Corporation for a price of P10 Million,
payable P3 Millibn down and the balance with interest
thereon at 14% per annum payable in sixty (60) equal
monthly.instailmentsofP198,333.33. They executed a Deed
of Conditional Sale in which it is stipulated that should the
vendee fail to pay three (3) successive installments, the sale
shall be deemed automatically rescinded without the necessity
ofjudicial action and all payment's made by the vendee shall
be forfeited in favor of the vendor by way of rental for the use
and occupancy of the unit and as liquidated damages. For
46 months, Priscilla paid the monthly installments religiously,
but on the 47th and 48th months, she failed to pay. On the
49th month, she tried to pay the installments due but the
vendor refused to receive the payments tendered by her. The
following month, the vendor sent her a notice that it was
rescinding the Deed of Conditional Sale pursuant to the
stipulation for automatic rescission, and demanded that she
vacate the premises. She replied that the contract cannot be
rescinded without Judicial demand or notarial act pursuant
to Article 1592 of the Civil Code*
a)
b)
167
**< *
4+4
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
> eenefcmW>i'
a)
Artlgl^l.592 of the Civil Code does not apply to a
^ conditional ^ale* *In valarao u. CA. 304 SCRA 155, the
(*>-' Supreme Court held that Article 1592 applies only to a
contract of sale and not to a Deed of Conditional Sale where
the seller has reserved title to the property until full payment
of the purchase price. The law applicable is the Maceda Law.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
b)
No, the vendor cannot rescind the contract under
the circumstances. Under the Maceda Law, which is the law
applicable, the seller on installment may not rescind the
contract till after the lapse of the mandatoiy grace period of
30 days for every one year of installment payments, and only
after 30 days from notice of cancellation or demand for
rescission by a notarial act. In this case, the refusal of the
seller to accept payment from the buyer on the 49th month
was not justified because the buyer was entitled to 60 days
grace period and the payment was tendered within thjat
period. Moreover, the notice of rescission served by the seller
on the buyer was not effective because the notice was not by
a notarial act. Besides, the seller may still pay within 30 days
from such notarial notice before rescission may be effected.
All these requirements for a valid rescission were not complied
with by the seller. Hence, the rescission is invalid.
XIV
Kristina brought her diamond ring to a jewelry shop for
cleaning. The Jeweliy shop undertook to return the ring by
Febmary 1, 1999. When the said date arrived, the jewelry
shop informed Kriistiria that the job was not yet finished.
They asked her to return five days after. On February 6.
1999, Kristina went to the shop to claim the ring, but she was
informed that the same was stolen by a thief who entered the
shop the night before. Kristina filed an action for damages
against the jewelry shop which put up the defense of force
majeure. Will the action prosper or not? (5%)
SUGGESTEDANSWER:
.
tfifbk
XV
a)
Lolita was employed in a finance company. Because
she could not account for the funds entrusted to her, she was
charged with estafa and ordered arrested. In order to secure
her release frOmjail, her parents executed a promissory note
to pay the finance company the amount allegedly
misappropriated by their daughter. The finance company
then executed an affidavit of desistance which led to the
withdrawal of the information against Lolita and her release
from jalL The parents failed to comply with their promissory
note and the finance company sued them for specific
performance. Will the action prosper or not? (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The action will prosper. The promissory note executed
by Lolitas parents is valid and binding, the consideration ft ^ (
being the extinguishment of Lolitas civil liability and not the^
stifling of the criminal prosecution.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
The action will not prosper because the consideration
for the promissory note was the non-prosecution of the
criminal case for estafa. This cannot be done anymore
because the information has already been filed in court and
to do it is illegal. That the consideration for the promissory
note is the stifling of the criminal prosecution is evident from
the execution by the finance company Of the. affidavit of
desistance immediately after the execution by Lolitas parents
of the promissory note. The consideration being illegal, the
promissory note is invalid and may not be enforced by court
action.
169
b)
Pedro promised to give his grandson a car if the latter
will pass the bar examinations. When his grandson passed
the said examinations, Pedro refused to give the car on the
ground that the condition was a purely potestative one. Is he
correct or not? (2%)
S U G G E S T E D A N S W E R :
?f j
XVI
In an action brought to collect a sum of money based on
a surety agreement, the defense ofiaches was raised as the
claim was filed more than seven years from the maturity of
the obligation. However, the action was brought within the
ten-year prescriptive period provided by law wherein actions
based on written contracts can be instituted.
a) Will the defense prosper? Reason. (3%)
b) What are the essential elements of laches? (2%)
S U G G E S T E D
ANSWER:
ut
No, the defense will not prosper. The problem dip not
give facts from which laches may be inferred. Mere delay in
filing an action, standing alone, does not constitute laches
(Agra v. PNB, 309 SCRA 509).
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
b)
The four basic elements of iaches are: (1) conduct on
the part of the defendant or of one under whom he claims,
giving rise to the situation of which complainant seeks a
remedy; (2) delay in asserting the complainants rights, the
complainant having had knowledge or notice of the defendants
conduct and having been afforded an opportunity to institute
suit; (3) lack of knowledge on the part o f the defendant that
170
xvn.
I1**
i^
itfo
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
RamOn is wrong on both counts: prescription and
laches. His possession as co-owner did not give rise to
acquisitive prescription. Possession by a co-owner is deemed
not adverse to the other co-owners but is, on the contrary,
deemed beneficial to them {Pangan v. CA, 166 SCRA 375).
Ramons possession will become adverse only when he has
repudiated the co-ownership and such repudiation was
made known to Rosario. Assuming that the sale in 1985
"wEere Ramon claimed he Was the sole heir of his parents
am ounted to a repudiation o f the co-ownership, the
prescriptive period began to run only from that time. Not.
more than 30 years having lapsed since then, the claim of
Rosario has not as yet prescribed. The claim of laches is not
also meritorious. Until the repudiation of the co-ownership
was made known to the other co-owners, no right has been
violated for the said co-owners to vindicate. Mere delay In
vindicating the right, standing alone, does not constitute
laches.
171
wo"T
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Ramon has acquired the land by acquisitive prescription,
and because of laches on the part of Rosario. Ramon!s
possession o f the land was adverse because he asserted sole
ownership thereof and never shared the harvest thprpfmpv
His . adverse possession having been continuous and
uninterrupted for more than 30 years, Ramon has acquired
the land by prescription. Rosario is also guilty o f iaches not
having asserted her right to the harvest for more than ^0
years.
xvm
A foreign munufacturer of Computers and a Philippine
distributor entered into a contract whereby the distributor
agreed to order 1,000 units of the manufacturers computers
every month and to resell them in the Philippines at the
manufacturers suggested prices plus 10%. All unsold units
at the end of the year shall be bought back by the manufacturer
at the same price they were ordered. The manufacturer shall
hold the distributor free and harmless from any claim for
defects in the units. Is the agreement one for sale or agency?
(5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The contract is one cff agency yiot sale. The notion of sale
is negated by the followingtndieisC; (1) the price Is fixed by the |
m anufacturer with the 10/o mark-up constituting t h e y
commission;/(2) the manufacturer reacquires the unsold I
units at exactly the same price j/and (3) warranty for the units \ '
was borne by the manufacturer. The foregoing Indicia negate ' ^
sale because they indicate that ownership over the units was ^
never intended to transfer to the distributor.
XIX.
a)
A leased his house to B with a condition that the
leased premises shall be used for residential purposes only.
B subleased the house to C who used It as a warehouse for
fabrics. Upon learning this-, A demanded that C stop using
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, Mark is not entitled to a reduction. Under Article
1680 of the Civil Code, the lessee of a rural land is entitled to
a reduction of the rent only in case of loss of more than 1 /9.
o f the fruits through extraordinary and unforeseen fortuitous
events. While the drought brought about by the El Nino"
phenomenon may be classified as extraordinary, it is not
considered as unforeseen.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Yes, Mark is entitled to a reduction o f the rent. His loss
was more than 1/2 of the fruits and .the loss was due to an
extraordinary and unforeseen fortuitous event. The El Nino"
phenomenpn is extraordinary because it is uncommon; it
does not occur with regularity. And neither could the parties
have foreseen its occurrence. The event should be foreseeable
by the parties so that the lessee can change the time for his
planting, or refrain from planting, or take steps to avoid the
loss.To be foreseeable, the time and the place of the occurrence.
173
*.
W-, .
Xa .
a)
Silvestre leased a car from Ayis-Rent-A-Car Co. at
the Mactan International Airport. No sooner had he driven
the car outside the airport when, due to his negligence, he
bumped an FX taxi owned and driven by Victor, causing
damage to the latter in the amount of P100.000.00. Victor
filed an action for damages against both Silvestre and Avis,
based on quasi-delict. Avis filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint against it on the ground of failure to state a cause
of action. Resolve the motion. (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The motion to dismiss should be granted. AVIS is not the
employer of Silvestre; hence, there is no right of action
'against AVIS under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Not being
the employer, AVIS has no duty to supervise Silvestre.
Neither has AVIS the duty to observe due diligence In the
selection of its customers. Besides* It was given In the
problem that the cause of the accident was the negligence of
Silvestre.
!
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
t if e 'l
U. e~+
q o
rights. Two days later, an armed hijacker uiu ai.i'L.uij/b-whijack a PAL flight to Cebu. Although he was subdued by the
other passengers, he managed to fire a shot which hit and
killed a female passenger. The victims parents sued the
airline for breach of contract, and the airline raised the
defense of force mqjeure. Is the airline liable or not? (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The airline is liable. In case of death of a passenger,
common carriers are presumed to have been at fanH or to, V jN Jg S
eoP
have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed 1
tW vW extraordinary diligence (Article 1756, Civil Cede). The failure
of the airline to take extra precautions despite a police
warning that an attempt to hijack the plane would be made,
was negligence on the part of the airline. Being negligent, it
is liable for the death of the passenger. The defense offorce
mqjeure is not tenable since the shooting Incident would not
have happened had the airline taken steps that could have
prevented the hijacker from boarding the plane.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
hi*.
175
I.
Elated that her sister who had been married for five
years w as pregnant for the first time, Alm a donated
P100,000.00 to the unborn child. Unfortunately, the baby
died one hour after delivery. May Alm a recover the
P10Q,000.00 that she had donated to said baby before it
was bom considering that the baby died? Stated otherwise,
is the donation valid and binding? Explain. (5%)
ANSWER:
The donation is valid and binding, being an act fa
vorable to the unborn child, but only if the baby had an
intra-uterine life of not less than seven months and pro
vided there was due acceptance of the donation by the
proper person representing said child. If the child had
less than seven months of intra-uterine life, it is not
deemed born since it died less than 24 hours following
its delivery, in which case the donation never became
effective since the donee never became a person, birth
being determinative of personality.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Even if the baby had an intra-uterine life o f more
than seven months and the donation was properly ac
cepted, it would be void for not having conformed with
the proper form. In order to be valid, the donation and
acceptance of personal property exceeding five thousand
pesos should be in writing. (Article 748, par. 3)
II.
Mr. and Mrs, Cruz, who are childless, met with a seri
ous motor vehicle accident with Mr. Cruz at the wheel and
Mrs. Cruz seated beside him, resulting in the instant death
176
of Mr. Cruz. Mrs. Cruz was still alive when help came but
she also died on the way to the hospital. The couple ac
quired properties worth One Million (P I,000,000.00) Pesos
during their marriage, which are being claimed by the par
ents of both spouses in equal shares. Is the claim of both
sets of parents valid and why? (3%)
(b) Suppose in the preceding question, both Mr. and
Mrs. Cruz were already dead when help came, so that no
body could say who died ahead of the other, would you an
swer be the same to the question as to who are entitled to
the properties of the deceased couple? (2%)
ANSWER:
(a)
No, the claim of both parents is not valid.
When Mr. Cruz died, he was succeeded by his wife and
his parents as his intestate heirs who will share his es
tate equally. His estate was 0.5 Million pesos which is
his half share in the absolute community amounting to
1 Million Pesos. His wife, will, therefore, inherit 0.25
Million Pesos aiid his parents will inherit 0.25 Million
Pesos.
When Mrs. Cruz died, she was succeeded by her par
ents as her intestate heirs. They will inherit all o f her
estate consisting of her 0.5 Million half share in the ab
solute community and her 0.25 Million inheritance from
her husband, or a total of 0.750 Million Pesos.
In sum, the parents of Mr. Cruz will inherit 250,000
Pesos while the parents of Mrs. Cruz will inherit 750,000
Pesos.
(b) This being a case of succession, in the absence
of proof as to the time of death of each of the spouses, it
is presumed they died at the same time and no transmis
sion of rights from one to the other is deemed to have
taken place. Therefore, each of them is deemed to have
an estate valued at P500,000.00, or one-half of their
conjugal property of P I million. Their respective par
177
III.
What is the status of the following marriages and why?
(a) A marriage between two 19-year olds without pa
rental consent. (2%)
(b) A marriage between two 21 -year olds without pa
rental advice. (2%)
(c) A marriage between, two Filipino first cousins in
Spain where such marriage is valid. (2%)
(d) A marriage between two Filipinos in Hong kong
before a notary public. (2%)
(e) A marriage solemnized by a town mayor three
towns away from his jurisdiction. (2%)
ANSWER:
(a) The marriage is voidable. The consent o f the
parties to the marriage was defective. Being below 21
years old, the consent of the parties is not full without
the consent of their parents. The consent of the parents
o f the parties to the marriage is indispensable for its
validity.
(b) Between 21-year olds, the marriage is valid de
spite the absence of parental advice, because such ab
sence is merely an irregularity affecting a formal requi
site i.e., the marriage license-and does not affect the
validity o f the marriage itself. This is without prejudice
to the civil, criminal, or administrative liability of the
party responsible therefor.
(cj By reason of public policy, the marriage between
Filipino first cousins is void [Art. 38, par. (l)j Family
180
IV.
Ben and Eva were both Filipino citizens at the time of
their marriage in 1987. When their marriage turned sour,
Ben went to a small countiy in Europe, got himself natural
ized there, and then divorced Eva in accordance with the
law of that country. Later, he returned to the Philippines
with his new wife.
181
V.
What do you understand by presumptive legitime) in
what case or cases must the parent deliver such legitime to
the children, and what are the legal effects in each case if
the parent fails to do so? (5%)
ANSWER
Presumptive legitime is not defined in the law. Its
definition must have been taken from Act 2710, the Old
Divorce Law, which required the delivery to the legiti
mate. children of "the equivalent o f what would have
been due to them as their legal portion if said spouse
liad died intestate immediately after the dissolution of
the community of property. As used in the Family Code,
presumptive legitime is understood as the equivalent of
the legitimate childrens legitimes assuming that the
spouses had died immediately after the dissolution of
the community o f property.
Presumptive legitime i3 required to be delivered to
the common children o f the spouses when the marriage
is annulled or declared void ab initio and possibly, when
the conjugal partnership or absolute community is dis
solved as in the case o f legal separation. Failure o f the
parents to deliver the presumptive legitime will make
their subsequent marriage hull and void under Article 53
o f the Family Code.
VI.
(a)
Two (2) months after the death of her husband
who was shot by unknown criminal elements on his way
home from office, Rose married her childhood boyfriend, and
seven (7) months after said marriage, she delivered a baby.
In the absence of any evidence from Rose as to who is her
childs father, what status does the law give to said child?
Explain. (2%)
182
(b)
Nestor is the illegitimate son of Dr. Perez. When
Dr. Perez died, Nestor intervened in the settlement of his
fathers estate, claiming that he is the illegitimate son of
said deceased, but the legitimate family of Dr. Perez is deny
ing Nes,tor?s claim. What evidence or evidences should Nestor
present so that he may receive his rightful share in his fathers
estate? (3%)
ANSWER:
(a) The child is legitimate of the second marriage
under Article 168(2) of the Family Code which provides
that a child bom after one hundred eighty days follow
ing the celebration of the subsequent marriage isconsid
ered to have been conceived during such marriage, even
though it be bora within three hundred days after the
termination o f the former marriage.
(b) To be able to inherit, the illegitimate filiation
o f Nestor must have been admitted by his father in any
o f the following: (1) the record of birth appearing in the
civil register, (2) a final judgment, (3) a public document
signed by the father, or (4) a private handwritten docu
ment signed by the father (Article 175 in relation to Ar
ticle 172 of the Family Code).
vn.
(a) Mr. Cruz, widower, has three legitimate children,
A, B and C. He executed a Will instituting as his heirs to his
estate of One Million (I5!, 000,000.00) Pesos his two children
A and B, and his friend F. Upon his death, how should Mr.
Cruzs estate be divided? Explain. (3%)
(b) In the preceding question, suppose Mr. Cruz in
stituted his two children A and B as his heirs in his Will,
but gave a legacy of P 100,000.00 to his friend P. How should
the estate of Mr. Cruz be divided upon his death? Explain.
(2 %)
183
A N S W ER :
(a) Assuming that the Institution of A, B and F were
to the entire estate, there was preterition of C since C is
a compulsory heir in the direct line. The preterition will
result in the total annulment of the institution o f heirs.
Therefore, the institution of A, B and F will be set aside
and Mr. Cruzs estate will be divided, as in intestacy,
equally among A, B and C as follows: A - P333,333.33; B
- P333,333.33; and C - P333,333.33.
(b) On the same assumption as letter (a), there was
preterition of C. Therefore, the institution of A and B is
annulled but the legacy o f P100,000.00 to F shall be
respected for not being inofficious. Therefore, the remain
der o f P900,000.00 will be divided equally among A, B
and C.
VIII.
(a.) Mr. Palma, widower, has three daughters D, D -l
and D-2. He executes a Will disinheriting D because she
married a man he did not like, and instituting daughters D1 and D-2 as his heirs to his entire estate of P 1,000,000.00.
Upon Mr. Palmas death, how should hi estate be divided?
Explain. (5%)
(b.) Mr. Luna died, leaving an estate of Ten Million
(PIO,000,000.00) Pesos. His widpw gave birth to a child
four months after Mr. Lunas death, but the child died five
hours after birth. Two days after the childs death, the widow
of Mr. Luna also died because she had suffered from diffi
cult childbirth. The estate of Mr. Luna is now being claimed
by his parents, and the parents of his widow. Who is en
titled to Mr. Lunas estate and why? (5%)
ANSWER:
(a)
This is a case o f ineffective disinheritance be
cause marrying a man that the father did not approve of
Is not a ground for disinheriting D. Therefore, the insti-
184
tution o f D -l and D-2 shall be annulled insofar as it prejud i c e s the legitime of D, and the institution of D - l and D 2 shall only apply on the free portion in the amount; of
P500,000.00. Therefore, D, D -l and D-2 will get their
legitimes o f P500,000.00 divided into three equal parts
and D -l and D*2 will get a reduced testamentary disposi
tion o f P25Q,000.00 each.. Hence, the shares will be:
D
D -l
D-2
P166,666.66
P166,666.66 + P250,000.00
P166,666.66 + P250,000.00
185
IX.
(a) Because of confusion as to the boundaries of the
adjoining lots that they bought from the same subdivision
company, X constructed a house on the adjoining lot of Y in
the honest belief that it is the land that he bought from the
subdivision company. What are the respective rights of X
and Y with respect to Xs house? (3%)
(b) Suppose X was in good faith but Y knew that X
was constructing on his (Ys) land but simply kept quiet
about it, thinking perhaps that he could get X s house later.
What are the respective rights of the parties over Xs house
in this case? (2%)
186
ANSWER:
(a) The rights of Y, as owner of the lot, and of X, as
builder o f a house thereon, are governed by Art. 448 of
the Civil Code which grants to Y the right to choose be
tween two remedies: (a) appropriate the house by in
demnifying X for its value plus whatever necessary ex
penses the latter may have incurred for the preservation
o f the land, or (b) compel X to buy the land if the price of
the land is not considerably more than the value of the
house. If it is, then X cannot be obliged to buy the land
but he shall pay reasonable rent, and in case of disagree*
ment, the court shall fix the terms of the lease.
(b). Since the lot owner Y is deemed to be in bad
faith (Art. 453), X as the party in good faith may (a) re
move the house and demand indemnification for dam
ages suffered by him, or (b) demand payment o f the value
of the house plus reparation for damages (Art. 447, in
relation to Art. 454). Y continues as owner of the lot and
becomes, under the second option, owner of the house
as well, after he pays the sums demanded.
X.
The spouses X and Y mortgaged a piece of registered
land to A, delivering as well the OCT to the latter, but they
continued to possess-and cultivate the land, giving 1/2 of
each harvest to A in partial payment of their loan to the
latter. A, however, without the knowledge of X and Y, forged
a deed of sale of the aforesaid land in favor of himself, got a
TGT in his name, and then sold the land to B, who bought
the land relying on As title, and who thereafter also got a
TCT in his name. It was only then that the spouses X and Y
learned that their land had been titled in Bs name. May
said spouses file an action for reconveyance of the land in
question against b? Reason. (5%)
187
ANSWER:
The action of X and Y against B for reconveyance of
the land will not prosper because B has acquired a clean
title to the property being an innocent purchaser for
value.
A forged deed is an absolute nullity and conveys
ho title. The fact that the forged deed was registered
and a certificate of title was issued in his name, did not
operate to vest upon A ownership over the property o f X
and Y. The registration o f the forged deed will not cure
the infirmity. However, once the title to the land is reg
istered in the name of the forger and title to the land
thereafter falls into the hands of an innocent purchaser
for value, the latter acquires a clean title thereto. A buyer
o f a registered land is not required to explore beyond
what the record in the registry indicates on its face in
quest for any hidden defect or inchoate right which may
subsequently defeat his right thereto. This is the mir
ror principle of the Torrens system which makes it pos^
sible for a forged deed to be the root of a good title.
Besides, it appears that spouses X and Y are guilty
of contributory negligence when they delivered this OCT
to the mortgagee without annotating the mortgage
thereon. Between them and the innocent purchaser for
value, they should bear the loss.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
If the buyer B, who relied on the seller A s title, was
not aware of the adverse possession of the land by the
spouses X and Y, then the latter cannot recover the prop
erty from B. B has in his favor the presumption of good
faith which tan only be overthrown by adequate proof of
bad faith. However, nobody buys land without seeing
the property, hence, B could not have been unaware of
such adverse possession. If after learning of such pos
session, B simply closed his eyes and did nothing about
it, then the suit for reconveyance will prosper as the
buyers bad faith will have become evident.
188
XI.
In 1997, Manuel bound himself to sell Eva a house and
lot which is being rented by another person, if Eva passes
the 1998 bar examinations. Luckily for Eva, she passed
said examinations.
(a) Suppose Manuel had sold the same house and lot
to another before Eva passed the 1998 bar examinations, is
such sale valid? Why? (2%)
(b) Assuming that it is Eva who is entitled to buy said
house and lot, is she entitled to the rentals collected by
Manuel before she passed the 1998 bar examinations? Why?
(3%)
.
ANSWER:
(a)
Yes, the sale to the other person is valid as a
sale with a resolutory condition because! what operates
as a suspensive condition for Eva operates a resolutory
condition for the buyer.
XII.
In 1950, the Bureau of Lands issued a Homestead patent
to A. Three years later, A sold the homestead to B. A died in
1990, and his heirs filed an action to recover the homestead
from B cn the ground that its sale by their father to the
latter is void under Section 118 of the Public Land Law. B
contends, however, that the heirs o f A cannot recover the
homestead from him anymore because their action has pre
scribed and that furthermore, A was in pari delicto. Decide.
(5%)
ANSWER;
The sale of the land by A to B 3 years after issuance
of the homestead patent, being in violation of Section
118 of the Public Land Act, is void from its inception.
190
191
XIII.
What are the so-called Maceda and Recto laws in
connection with sales on installments? Give the most im
portant features of each law. (5%)
ANSWER:
The Maceda Law (R.A. 655) is applicable to sales of
immovable property on installments. The most impor
tant features are(Rillo v. CA, 247 SCRA 461):
(1)
After having paid installments for at least two
years, the buyer is entitled to a mandatory grace period
o f one month for every year of installment payments
made, to pay the unpaid installments without interest.
If the contract is cancelled, the seller shall refund
to the buyer the cash surrender value equivalent to fifty
percent (50%) of the total payments made, and after five
years o f installments, an additional five percent (5%)
every year but not to exceed ninety percent (90%) of the
total payments made.
192
XIV.
(a) May a lessee sublease the property leased without
the consent of the lessor, and what are the respective liabili
ties of the lessee and sub-lessee to the lessor m case of such
sublease? (3%)
(b) Under what circumstances would an implied new
lease oi a tacita reconduccion arise? (2%)
ANSWER:
(a)
Yes, provided that there is no express prohibi
tion against subleasing. Under the law, when in the con
tract of'lease of things there is no express prohibition,
the lessee may sublet the thing leased without prejudice
to his responsibility for the performance of the contract
toward the lessor. (Art. 1650)
193
XV.
194
XVI.
(a) Distinguish a contract of chattel mortgage from a
contract of pledge. (2%)
(b) Are the right of redemption and the equity of re
demption given by law to a mortgagor the same? Explain.
(2 %)
196
(d)
No, the answer would not be the same. This is
a valid stipulation and does not constitute pactum
commissorium. In pactum commissortum, the acquisi
tion is automatic without need of any further action. In
the instant problem another act is required to be per
formed, namely, the conveyance of the property as pay
ment ( dacion en pago\.
197
I.
Juan is a Filipino citizen residing in Tokyo, Japan.
State what laws govern:
1.
Answer:
1.
Juans capacity to contract marriage is
governed by Philippine law - i.e., the Family Ccsdte pursuant to Art. 15, Civil Code, which provides that our
laws relating to, among others, legal capacity o f persons
are binding upon citizens o f the Philippines even though
living abroad.
dnswjen
2.
By way of exception to the general rule of lex fei
sitae prescribed by the first paragraph of Art. 16, Civil
Code, a person's successional rights are governed by the
national law o f the decedent (2nd par.. Art. 16). Since
Juan's deceased father was a Filipino citizen, Philippine
law governs Juan's successional rights,
Another Answer:
2.
Juan's successional rights are governed by Phil
ippine law, pursuant to Article 1039 and the second
paragraph of Article 16, both of the Civil Code. Article,
1039, Civil Code, provides that capacity to succeed shall
be governed by the law o f the nation" of the decedent,
i.e., his national law. Article 16 provides in paragraph
198
Answer:
3.
The extrinsic validity of Juan's will is governed
by (a) Swiss law, it being the law where the will was made
(Art. 17, 1st par. Civil Code), or (b) Philippine law, by
implication from the provisions of Art. 816, Civil Code,
which allows even an alien who is abroad to make a will
in conformity with our Civil Code.
Answer;
4.
The intrinsic validity of his will is governed by
Philippine law, it being his national law. (Art. 16, Civil
Code)
n.
Francis Albert, a citizen and resident of New Jersey,
U.S.A., under whose law he was still a minor, being only 20
years of age, was hired by ABC Corporation of Manila to serve
for two years as its chief computer programmer. But after
serving for only four months, he resigned to Join XYZ Corpo
ration, which enticed him by offering more advantageous
terms. His first employer sues him in Manila for damages
arising from the breach of his contract of employment. He
sets up his minority as a defense and asks for annulment of
the contract on that ground. The plaintiff disputes this by
alleging that since the contract was executed in the Philip
pines under whose law the age of majority is 18 years, he was
no longer a minor at the time of perfection of the contract.
1.
2.
Suppose XYZ Corporation Is impleaded as a co
defendant, what would be the basis of its liability, if any? [2%J
Answer:
1.
The suit will not prosper under Article 15, Civil
Code. New Jersey law governs Francis Alberts capacity
199
. 2.
N o liability arises. The statement o f the prob
lem does not in any way suggest intent, malice, or even
knowledge, on the part o f XYZ Corporation as to the
contractual relations between Albeit and ABC Corpora
tion.
HI.
Jaime, who Is 65, and his soil, Willy, who is 25, died in
a plane crash. There is no proof as to who died first. Jaimes
only surviving heir is his wife, Julia, who is also Willys
mother. Willys surviving heirs are his mother, Julia and his
wife, Wilma.
T.
In the settlement of Jaimes estate, can Wilma
successfully claim that her late husband, Willy had a heredi
tary share since he was much younger than his father and,
therefore, should be presumed to have survived longer? [3%]
2.
Suppose Jaime had a life Insurance policy with his
wife, Julia, and his son, Willy, as the beneficiaries. Can
Wilma successfully claim that one-half of the proceeds
should belong to Willys estate? [2%j
dxmter;
1.
No, Wilma cannot successfully claim that Willy
&ad a hereditary share in his father's estate. Under Art.
43, Civil Code, two person* who are called to succeed
each other are presumed to have died at the same time,
In the absence of proof as to which of them died first.
This presumption of simultaneous death applies In cases
involving the question of succession as between the two
who died, who in this case are mutual heirs, being father
and feoft'
201
Answer;
2.
Yes, Wilma cam invoke the presumption of
survivorship and claim that one-half o f the proceeds
s h o u ld belong to Willy's estate, under Sec. 3 (jj) par. 5
Rule 131, Rules o f Court, as the dispute does not Involve
succession. Under this presumption, the person between
the ages Of 15 and 60 years is deemed to have survived
one whose age was over 60 at the time o f their deaths.
The estate of Willy endowed with juridical personality
stands in place and stead of Willy, as beneficiary.
IV
Using a falsified managers check, Justine, as the buyer,
was able to take delivery of a second hand car which she had
just bought from United Car Sales, Inc. The sale was
registered with the Land Transportation Office. A week later,
the seller learned that the check had been dishonored, but by
that time, Justine was nowhere to be seen. It turned out that
Justine had sold the car to Jerico, the present possessor who
knew nothing about the falsified check. In a suit by United
Car Sales, Inc. against Jerico for recovery of the car, plaintiff
> alleges it had been unlawfully deprived of its property through
fraud and should, consequently, be allowed to recover it
without having to reimburse the defendant for the price the
latter had paid. Should the suit prosiper? [5%1
Answer:
The suit should prosper as to the recovery of the car.
However, since Jerico was not guilty o f any fraud and
appears to be an innocent purchaser for value, he should
be reimbursed for the price he paid. This Is without
prejudice to United Car Sales, Inc. right of action against
Justine. As between two innocent parties, the party
causing the injury should suffer the loss. Therefore,
United Car Sales, Inc. should suffer the loss.
Alternative Answer:
Yes, the suit will prosper because the criminal act Of
estafa should be deemed to come within the meaning of
unlawful deprivation under Art. 559, Civil Code, as
without it plaintiff would not have parted with the
possession of its car.
202
Another Answer;
No, the suit will not prosper. The sale is valid and
Jerico is a buyer in good faith.
A n o th e r A nsw er:
Under the law on Sales, when the thing sold is
delivered by the seller to the buyer without reservation
o f ownership, the ownership is transferred to the buyer.
Therefore In the suit of United Car Sales, InC; against
Jerico for the recovery of the car, the plaintiff should not
be allowed to recover the car without reimbursing the
defendant for the price that the latter paid. (EDCA
Publishing and Distributing Corp. vs. Santos, 184 SCRA
614, April 26, 1990)
V
In 1973, Mauricio, a Filipino pensioner of the U.S.
Government, contracted a bigamous marriage with Erlinda,
despite the fact that his first wife, Carol, was still living. In
1975, Mauricio and Erlindajointlybought a parcelof riceland,
with the title being placed jointly in their names. Shortly
thereafter, they purchased another property (a house and lot)
which was placed in her name alone as the buyer. In 1981,
Mauricio died, and Carol promptly filed an action against
Erlinda to recover both the riceland and the house and lot,
claiming them to be conjugal property of the first marriage.
Erlinda contends that she and the late Mauricio were co
owners of the riceland; and with respect to the house and lot,
she claims she is the exclusive owner. Assuming she fails to
prove that she had actually used her own money in either
purchase, how do you decide the case? [5%]
A nswer;
Carol's action to recover both the riceland and the
house and lot is well-founded. Both are conjugal prop
erty, in view of the failure of Erlinda, the wife in a
bigamous marriage, to prove that her own money was
used in the purchases made. The Supreme Court in a case
applied Art. 148, Family Code, despite the fact that the
husband's death took place prior to the effect!vity o f said
law. However, even under.Art, 144, Civil Code, the same
203
204
Answer;
1.
th e
la w
Another Answer:
1.
Sofia, being her deceased son's legal heir con
curring with his surviving spouse (Arts. 985, 986 and
997, Civil Code), may rightfully claim that the house and
lot are not conjugal but belong to the hereditary estate of
Bob, the value of the land being more than the cost of the
improvement (Art. 120, Family Code).
Answer:
2. Yes, the answer would still be the same. Since
Bob and Issa contracted their marriage way back in 1970,
then the property relations that will govern is still the
relative community or conjugal partnership of gains
(Article 119, Civil Code). It will not matter if Bob died
before or after August 3, 1988 (effectivity date of the
Family Code), what matters is the date when the marriage
was contracted. As Bob and Issa contracted their mar
riage way back in 1970, the property relation that
governs them is still the conjugal partnership of gains.
(Art. 158, Civil Code)
Another Answer:
2.
date the Family Code took effect, the answer will not be
the same. Art. 158, Civil Code, would then apply. The
land would then be deemed conjugal, along with the
house, since conjugal funds were used in constructing ltr
The husband's estate would be entitled to a reimburse
ment o f the value o f the land from conjugal partnership
funds.
vn.
J u an and his sister Juana inherited from their mother
two parcels of farmland with exactly the same areas. For
convenience, the Torrens certificates of title covering both
lots were placed in Ju ans name alone. In 1996, Juan sold
to an Innocent purchaser one parcel In its entirety without
the knowledge and consent of Juana, and wrongfully kept for
him self the entire price paid.
1.
W hat rights of action, if any. does Juana have
against and/or the buyer? [3%1
2.
Since the two lots have the same area, suppose
Ju an a files a complaint to have herself declared sole-owner
of the entire remaining second lot, contending that her
brother had forfeited his share thereofby wrongfully dispos
ing of her undivided share in the first lot, will the suit
prosper? [2%]
Answ er:
1.
When, for convenience, the Torrens title to the
two parcels of land were placed in Juan's name alone,
there was created an implied trust (a resulting trust) for
the benefit of Juana with Juan as trustee of one-half
undivided or ideal portion of each of the two lots.
Therefore, Juana can file an action for damages against
Juan for having fraudulently sold one o f the two parcels
which he partly held in trust for Juana's benefit. Juana
m ay claim actual or compensatory damage for the loss of
her share In the land; moral damages for the mental
anguish, anxiety, moral shock and wounded feelings she
had suffered; exemplary damage fey way f example for
the common good, and attorney's fees.
206
207
AMitiQnal Answer;
1.
Juana can file an action for damages against
Juan for having fraudulently sold one of the two parcels
which he partly held in trust for Juana's benefit. Juana
m ay claim actual or compensatory damage for the loss of
her share in the land; moral damages for the mental
anguish, anxiety; moral shock And wounded feelings she
had suffered; exemplary damage by way o f example for
the common good, and attorney's fees.
Juana has no cause of action against the buyer who
acquired the land for value and in good faith, relying on
the transfer certificate showing that Juan is the registered
owner o f the land.
A n s w e r;
2.
Juana's suit to have herself declared as sole
owner o f the entire remaining area will not prosper
because while Juan's act in selling the other lot was
wrongful, it did not have the legal effect of forfeiting his
share in the remaining lot. However, Juana can file an
action against Juan for partition or termination of the
co-ownership with a prayer that the lot sold be adjudicated
to Juan, and the remaining lot be adjudicated and
reconveyed to her.
Another Answer:
2.
The suit will prosper, applying the ruling in
Imperial vs. CA cited above. Both law and equity author
ize such a result, said the Supreme Court.
Strictly speaking, Juana's contention that her brother
had forfeited his share in the second lot is incorrect.
Even if the two lots have the same area, it does not follow
that they have the same value. Since the sale o f the first
lot on the Torrens title in the name of Juan was valid, all
that Juana may recover is the value of her undivided
interest therein, plus damages. In addition, she can ask
for partition or reconveyance of her undivided interest in
the second lot, without prejudice to any agreement
between them that in lieu of the payment of the value of
Juana's share in the first lot and damages, the second lot
be reconveyed to her.
208
2.
The suit will not prosper, since Juan's wrongful
act o f pocketing the entire proceeds o f the sale of the first
lot is not a ground for divesting him of his rights as a coowner o f the second lot. Indeed, such wrongdoing by
Juan does not constitute, for the benefit o f Juana, any of
the modes f aeqaM ng ownership under Art. 712, Civil
Code.
V III.
2
. Will your answer be the same if Jose did mail his
acceptance letter but it was received by Pedro in Manila days
after Joses death? [3%]
Answer:
1.
None. There is no perfected donation. Under
Article 748 of the Civil Code, the donation of a movable
may be made orally or in writing. If the value of the
personal property donated exceeds five thousand pesos,
the donation and the acceptance shall be made in writ
ing. Assuming that the value o f the thing donated, a
vintage sports car, exceeds P5,000.00, then the donation
and the acceptance must be in writing. In this instance,
the acceptance of Jose was not in writing, therefore, the
donation is void. Upon the other hand, assuming that the
sports car costs less than P5,000.00, then the donation
m ay be oral, bat still, the simultaneous delivery of the car
is needed and there being none, the donation was never
perfected.
209
A w im n
2.
Yes, the answer is the same. If Jose's mail
containing his acceptance of the donation was received
by Pedro after the former's death, then the donation is
still void because under Article 734 of the Civil Code, the
donation is perfected the moment the donor knows of the
acceptance by the donee. The death of Jose before Pedro
could receive the acceptance indicates that the donation
was taever perfected. Under Article 746 acceptance must
be made dwdmg the lifetime of both the donor and the
donee.
IX.
Emesto donated in a public instrument a parcel of land
to Demetrio, who accepted it in the same document. It is there
declared that the donation shall take effect immediately, with
the donee having the right to take possession of the land and
receive its fruits but not to dispose of the land while Emesto
is alive as well as for ten years following his death. Moreover,
Emesto also reserved In the same deed his right to sell the
property should he decide to dispose of it at any time - a right
which he did not exercise at all. After his death, Ernestos
heirs seasonably brought an action to recover the property,
alleging that the donation was void as it did not comply with
the formalities of a will. Will the suit prosper? [5%]
6nsm sn
Yes, the suit will prosper as the donation did not
com ply with the formalities of a will. In this instance, the
fact that the donor did not Intend to transfer ownership
or possession of the donated property to the donee until
the dohor'sdeathc would result in a donation mortis causa
and in this kind of disposition, the formalities o f a will
should be compiled with, otherwise, the donation is void.
In this instance, donation mortis causa embodied only in
a public instrument without the formalities o f a will
could not have transferred ownership of disputed prop
erty to another.
Alternative Answer:
One o f the essential distinctions between a donation
inter vivos and a donation mortis causa is that while the
210
r ig h t to
Vs. C A ,
fir s t re fu s a l w ill n o t p ro s p e r. (A n y
2 3 8
S C R A 6 0 2 ).
en banc
d e c is io n
fo u n d e d
u p o n
tio n s h ip
c o v e re d
a n d
u n ju s t
H e n c e th e
S u p re m e
fo ru m
T h e
th a t
th e
c o n tra c t
b y
C o u rt
fo r th e
is
r ig h t
b u t
th e
o n
o f
a
(A rt.
in
fir s t
Yu Asuncion
a u n a n im o u s
re fu s a l
is
q u a s i-d e lic tu a l
p r in c ip le s
e n r ic h m e n t
o n ly a c tio n
C o u r t r u le d
o f h u m a n
1 9 ,
e t
seq .
n o t
r e la
r e la tio n s
C iv il
C o d e ).
t h a t w ill p r o s p e r a c c o r d in g t o
a n
a c tio n
fo r
d a m ag e s
in
th e
p ro p e r
p u r p o s e .
X I.
Answer:
A rtic le
b ro th e rs
1 0 0 1
a n d
o f
th e
s is te r s
C iv il
o r th e ir
C o d e
p r o v id e s ,
c h ild r e n
s u r v iv e
S h o u ld
w ith
th e
w id o w
o r w id o w e r , t h e la t t e r s h a ll b e e n t it le d t o o n e - h a lf
in h e r ita n c e
th e
c h ild r e n
to
th e
T e s s ie 's
a c q u ir e d
a n d
th e
b ro th e rs
a n d
c o n s is ts
o f a
s is te r s
o r th e ir
o th e r h a lf."
g ro s s
d u rin g
e s ta te
h e r
m a r r ia g e ,
m a k in g
h o u s e
it
a n d
p a rt
o f
lo t
th e
c o m m u n it y p r o p e r ty . T h u s , o n e - h a lf o f t h e s a id p r o p e r t y
w o u l d h a v e t o b e s e t a s i d e a s M a r i o s c o n j u g a l s h a r e f r o m
th e
c o m m u n ity p r o p e r ty .
o n e m illio n
T h e
o t h e r h a lf,, a m o u n t in g
to
p e s o s , is h e r c o n ju g a l s h a r e ( n e t e s t a t e ) , a n d
s h o u ld b e d is t r ib u t e d t o h e r in t e s t a t e h e ir s . A p p ly in g t h e
a b o v e
p r o v is io n
n ie c e s ,
w o rth
a re
o n e
o f la w ,
e n title d
m illio n
to
M ic h e lle
o n e -h a lf
pesos,
o th e r o n e -h a lf a m o u n tin g
T e s s ie 's
e n title d
s u r v iv in g
to
o r
to
a n d
o f
5 0 0 ,0 0 0
P 5 0 0 .0 0 0
s p o u s e . M ic h e lle
P 2 S O .O O O
p eso s
s h a re .
212
e a c h
J o r e lle ,
h e r
pesos,
w ill g o to
th e ir
s h a re
w h ile
a n d J o r e lle
as
T e s s ie 's
c o n ju g a l
th e
M a rio ,
a re
th e n
h e r e d ita r y
xn.
Enrique died, leaving a net hereditary estate of P I . 2
million. He is survived by his widow, three legitimate
children, two legitimate grandchildren sired by a legitimate
child who predeceased him, and two recognized illegitimate
children. Distribute the estate in intestacy. [5%]
Answer:
U n d e r th e
th e o ry o f C o n c u rre n c e , th e s h a re s a re as
fo llo w s :
(le g itim a te
c h ild ) = P 2 0 0 .0 Q 0
(le g itim a te
c h ild ) = P 2 0 0 .0 0 0
(le g itim a te
c h ild ) = P 2 0 0 .0 0 0
(le g it im a t e
c h ild ) = 0
(le g itim a te
c h ild
o f D )
P 1 0 0 ,0 0 0
b y
r ig h t
o f
c h ild
o f D )
P 1 0 0 .0 0 0
b y
r ig h t
o f
[p re d e c e a s e d ]
r e p r e s e n ta tio n
F
(le g itim a te
r e p r e s e n ta tio n
G
(ille g itim a te
le g it im a t e
H
(ille g itim a te
le g it im a t e
W
c h ild ) =
P 1 0 0 .0 0 0
1 /2
s h a re
o f a
c h ild )
P 1 0 0 .0 0 0
1 /2
s h a re
o f a
c h ild
c h ild
(W id o w ) s P 2 0 0 . 0 0 0
s a m e
s h a re
a s le g itim a te
c h ild
Another Answer:
U n d e r
th e
(P 3 0 0 .0 0 0 ),
c h ild r e n
le g it im e .
is
a n d
th e o ry
O f
d is tr ib u te d
is
g iv e n
A ll o th e r
to
E x c lu s io n
o n ly
th e m
in te s ta te
th e
a m o n g
in
h e ir s
fre e
th e
to
a d d itio n
a re
p o rtio n
le g itim a te
e n title d
th e ir
o n ly
to
t h e i r r e s p e c t iv e le g it im e s . T h e d is t r ib u t io n is a s fo llo w s :
Legitime
A (legitimate child)
B (legitimate child)
C (legitimate child)
D (legitimate child)
B (legitimate child of D)
F (legitimate child of D)
G (illegitimate child)
H (illegitimate child)
W (Widow)
Total
Free Portion
P i 5 0 ,0 0 0
P 1 5 0 .0 0 0
P 1 5 0 .0 C 0
0
P 7 5 ,0 0 0
P 75 ,0 0 0
P 75 ,0 0 0
P 7 5,000
P 1 5 0 ,0 0 0
213
P 7 5 ,0 0 0
P 1 5 0 .0 0 0
P 7 5 ,0 0 0
0
+ P 35 ,5 0 0
+ P 37 ,5 0 0
, 0
0
- P 225.000
P 2 2 5 .0 0 0
a P 2 2 5 .0 0 0
0
P I 12,500
P I 12,500
o p 7 5 ,5 0 0
7 5 ,5 0 0
o P I 50 , 0 0 0
b
XIII.
A G alan t driven by John and owned by Art, and a Corolla
driven by its owner, Gina, collided somewhere along Adriatico
Street. A s a result of the accident, Gina had a concussion.
Subsequently, Gina brought an action for damages against
John and Art. There is no doubt that the collision is due to
Johns negligence. Gan Art, who was in the vehicle al the time
of the accident, be held solidarily liable with his driver. John?
[5%)
Answer:
T e s .
w as
A r t m a y b e h e ld
p ro v e n
th a t
th e
s o lid a r y lia b le w it h
fo rm e r
c o u ld
h a v e
m is f o r t u n e w i t h t h e u s e o f d u e d ilig e n c e *
th e
C iv il C o d e
s o lid a r y
th e
s ta te s :
lia b le
v e h ic le ,
p re v e n te d
w ith
c o u ld
th e
h is
In
J o h n , if it
p re v e n te d
th e
A r tic le 2 1 8 4 o f
m o t o r m i s h a p s , t h e o w n e r is
d r iv e r , i f t h e
h a v e ,
b y
th e
m is fo r tu n e , z
fo rm e r, w h o
u s e
o f d u e
w a s
in
d ilig e n c e ,
Alternative Answer:
1 .
Suprem e
It d e p e n d s . T h e
Underwood ( 2 7
a u to m o b ile ,
c o n tin u e
in
P h il 3 7 4 ) , h e ld :
o r o t h e r v e h ic le ,
a
v io la tio n
o f
C o u r t in
Chapman vs.
A n o w n e r w h o s its in h is
a n d
la w
p e r m its
b y
th e
h is
d r iv e r to
p e rfo rm a n c e
o f
n e g lig e n t a c t s , a f t e r h e h a s h a d a r e a s o n a b le o p p o r t u n it y
to
o b s e rv e
th e m
a n d
to
d ir e c t
th a t
th e
d r iv e r
cease
t h e r e f r o m , b e c o m e s h im s e lf r e s p o n s ib le f o r s u c h a c t s , z
x
O n
th e
o th e r h a n d , if th e
n e g lig e n c e ^
a n d
w ith o u t th e
d r iv e r , b y
s u d d e n
o w n e r h a v in g
a c t o f
r e a s o n a b le
o p p o r t u n it y t o p r e v e n t th e a c t o r its c o n tin u a n c e , in ju r e s
a
p e rs o n
o r v io la te s
th e
c r im in a l la w , t h e
a u t o m o b ile , a lth o u g h p r e s e n t t h e r e in
w a s
c o m m itte d
c r im in a lly ,
c o n tin u e d
is
n o t
th e re fo r.
r e s p o n s ib le ,
T h e
a c t
th a t
th e
d r iv e r 's
a c t h ie
o w n e r, b y
h is
e ith e r
c o m p la in e d
in th e p re s e n c e o f th e
o f tim e
o w n e r o f th e
a t th e tim e th e a c t
c iv illy
o f
m u s t
o r
b e
o w n e r fo r s u c h a le n g th
a c q u ie s c e n c e , m a k e s
h is
o w n .
X IV .
1.
Define compensation as a mode of extinguishing
an obligation, and distinguish it from payment. [2%1
214
2.
X, who has a savings deposit with Y Bank in the
sum o f P I ,000.000.00. incurs a loan obligation with the said
Bank in the sum of P800.000.00 which has become due.
When X tries to withdraw his deposit, Y Bank allows only
P200.000.00 to be withdrawn, less service charges, claiming
that compensation has extinguished its obligation under the
savings account to the concurrent amount of Xs debt. X
contends that compensation is improper when one of the
debts, as here, arises from a contract o f deposit. Assuming
that the promissory note signed by X to evidence the loan
does not provide for compensation between said loan and his
savings deposit, who is correct? [3%]
Answer;
1.
C o m p e n s a t io n is a m o d e o f e x t i n g u is h in g t o t h e
c o n c u r r e n t a m o u n t, t h e o b lig a tio n s o f th o s e p e r s o n s w h o
in
t h e ir o w n r ig h t a re r e c ip r o c a lly d e b to rs
a n d c re d ito r s
o fe a c h o th e r (
s im u lta n e o u s
b a la n c in g
e x tin g u is h t h e m
Is
c o v e re d
b y
o f
tw o
o b lig a tio n s
in
o rd e r
to
to th e e x t e n t in w h ic h th e a m o u n t o f o n e
th a t
o f th e
o th e r.
o f a n
In
c a p a c ity
p a y m e n t,
c a p a c ity to
o b lig a tio n
r e c e iv e
to
c r e d ito r , r e s p e c tiv e ly :
becau se
la w
a n d
th e
th e re
m a y
th e
th in g
p a id
a n d
fo r d e b to r a n d
c o m p e n s a tio n
a c t o f th e
m u s t be
be
o f th e
in c o m p e n s a t io n , s u c h c a p a c i t y is
n e c e s s a ry ,
p e rfo rm a n c e
d is p o s e
o f m o n e y b u t a ls o
1 2 3 2 , C iv il C o d e ).
p a y m e n t a re r e q u ir e d
n o t
n o t b y
(A r tic le
p a r tie s .
c o m p le te ; w h ile
p a r tia l
e x tin g u is h m e n t
In
in
o f
o p e ra te s
b y
p a y m e n t, th e
c o m p e n s a tio n
a n
o b lig a tio n
supra)
(T o le n tin o ,
Answer;
2.
b a n k
n o t a p p ly .
p re s e n t.
is
A ll th e
In
th e
c o rre c t. A rt.
r e q u is ite s
case o f
S u p r e m e C o u r t h e ld :
r e g a r d in g
p o rtio n s
1 2 8 7 ,
o f A rt.
C iv il C o d e , d o e s
1 2 7 9 , C iv il C o d e a re
P h il. 5 1 9 ) , t h e
T h e C iv il C o d e c o n ta in s p r o v is io n s
c o m p e n s a tio n
o f P h ilip p in e
(s e t
la w
o ff)
p r o v id e
a n d
d e p o s it.
th a t
T h es e
c o m p e n s a tio n
s h a ll t a k e p la c e w h e n t w o p e r s o n s a r e r e c ip r o c a lly c r e d it o r
a n d d e b to r o f e a c h o th e r.
In
t h is c o n n e c tio n , i t h a s b e e n
215
h a s
a r ig h t o f s e t o f f o f th e
fo r th e
p a y m e n t o f a n y In d e b te d n e s s
a d e p o s ito r .
th e
H e n c e , c o m p e n s a tio n
m u t u a l o b lig a tio n s
o f X
a n d T
A s a g e n e r a l r u le ,
d e p o s its in
to
its
it o n th e
to o k
h a n d s
p a rt o f
p la c e b e tw e e n
b a n k .
XV.
Joey, Jovy arid Jojo are solidary debtors under a loan
obligation of P300,000.00 which has fallen due. The creditor
has, however, condoned Jojos entire share in the debt. Since
Jovy has become insolvent, the creditor makes a demiand on
Joey to pay the debt.
1.
|2%1
2.
To what extent. If at all, can Jojo be compelled by
Joey to contribute to such payment? [3%J
Answer:
1 .
J o e y c a n b e c o m p e lle d t o p a y o n ly th e r e m a in in g
b a la n c e
s h a re
o f P 2 0 0 .0 0 0 ,
b y
th e
c r e d ito r .
in
v ie w
(A rt.
o f th e
r e m is s io n
o f J o jo 's
1 2 1 9 , C iv il C o d e )
Answer;
2 ,
J o jo
P 5 0 .0 0 0 . A r t.
o n e
o f th e
v e n c y ,
c a n
be
c o m p e lle d
1 2 1 7 , p a r.
s o lid a r y d e b to r s
r e im b u r s e
h is
b y
J o e y
3 . C iv il C o d e
to
c o n tr ib u te
p r o v id e s ,
W h e n
c a n n o t( b e c a u s e o f h is in s o l
s h a re
to
th e
d e b to r
p a y in g
th e
o b lig a tio n , s u c h s h a re s h a U b e b o r n e b y a ll h is c o -d e b to rs ,
in
p r o p o r tio n
S in c e t h e
to
th e d e b t o f e a c h .
in s o lv e n t d e b t o r 's s h a r e w h ic h J o e y p a id
w a s P IO O .O O O , a n d t h e r e a r e o n ly t w o r e m a in in g d e b t o r s
- n a m e ly J o e y a n d J o jo - th e s e tw o s h a ll s h a re e q u a lly th e
b u rd e n
b y J o e y
o f r e im b u r s e m e n t.
to
c o n tr ib u te
J o jo
m a y
P 5 0 ,O O O .O O .
216
th u s b e
c o m p e lle d
XVI.
Distinguish between:
1.
2.
3.
Answer;
1.
C o n tin u o u s
e a s e m e n ts
a re
th o s e
th e
use
o f
w h ic h is o r m a y b e in c e s s a n t , w it h o u t t h e in t e r v e n t io n o f
a n y a c t o f m a n . w h ile d is c o n tin u o u s e a s e m e n ts a r e th o s e
w h ic h a r e
m a n .
u s e d a t in te r v a ls a n d
d e p e n d u p o n th e
a c ts o f
(A rt* 6 1 5 , C iv il C o d e )
Answer:
2 .
k n o w n
A p p a r e n t e a s e m e n ts a re th o s e w h ic h
a re
m a d e
a n d a r e c o n t i n u a ll y k e p t i n v ie w b y e x t e r n a l s ig n s
t h a t r e v e a l th e u s e a n d e n jo y m e n t o f th e s a m e , w h ile n o n a p p a re n t
e a s e m e n ts
In d ic a tio n
a re
th o s e
w h ic h
o f t h e ir e x is te n c e .
s h o w
n o
e x te rn a l
(A rt. 6 1 5 , C iv il C o d e )
Answer;
3 .
u p o n
th e
a llo w in g
w h ile
P o s itiv e
e a s e m e n ts
o w n e r o f th e
s o m e th in g
n e g a tiv e
to
a re
b e
e a s e m e n ts
d o n e
a re
c o u ld
la w fu lly d o i f t h e
o r
th o s e
o w n e r o f t h e s e r v ie n t e s ta te fr o m
h e
th o s e
s e r v ie n t e s ta te
w h ic h
th e
o f d o in g
w h ic h
Im p o s e
o b lig a tio n
it
o f
h im s e lf,
p r o h ib it th e
d o in g s o m e t h in g w h ic h
e a s e m e n t d id
n o t e x is t. (A rt.
6 1 5 , C iv il C o d e )
XVH .
Dielle, Karlo and Una are general partners in a mer
chandising firm. Having contributed equal amounts to the
capital, they also agree on equal distribution of whatever net
profit is realized per fiscal period. After two years of opera
tion, however, Una conveys herwhole interest In the partner
ship to Justine, without the knowledge and consent of Dielle
and Karlo.
217
1.
2.
What are the rights of Justine, if any, should she
desire to participate in the management of the partnership
and i n the distribution of a net profit of P360,000.00 which
was realized after heir purchase of Una's interest? [3%J
Answer:
1 .
N o ,
In t e r e s t In
p a r tn e rs h ip
c o n v e y a n c e
p a r tn e r s h ip
In
th e
b y
do es
p a rtn e r
o f
h is
w h o le
n o t o f It s e lf d is s o lv e
a b s e n c e o f a n a g re e m e n t.
th e
(A rt. 1 8 1 3 ,
C iv il C o d e )
A n sw er:
2.
J u s tin e
c a n n o t in te r fe r e
m a n a g e m e n t o r a d m in is tr a tio n
o r p a r tic ip a te
o f th e
in
p a r tn e r s h ip
th e
b u s i
n e s s o r a ffa ir s . S h e m a y , h o w e v e r , r e c e iv e t h e n e t p r o fits
t o w h ic h U n a w o u ld h a v e o t h e r w is e b e e n e n t it le d .
c a s e , P 1 2 0 .0 0 0
(A rt.
In
th is
1 8 1 3 , C iv il C o d e )
X V III.
1.
Distinguish usufruct from commodatiirn and state
whether these may be constituted over consumable goods.
[2 %]
2.
Distinguish consensual from real contracts and
name at least four (4) kinds of real contracts under the
present law. [3%]
Answer:
1 .
U s u fr u c t
(u s u fru c tu a ry ) to
o b lig a tio n
o f
is
e n jo y t h e
p r e s e r v in g
r ig h t
g iv e n
to
p r o p e r ty o f a n o th e r w ith
its
fo rm
a n d
s u b s ta n c e .
p e rs o n
th e
(A rt.
5 6 2 , C iv il C o d e )
O n
w h ic h
th e
o n e
o th e r
o f
th e
h a n d ,
c o m m o d a tu m
p a r tie s
(b a ilo r )
is
d e liv e r s
c o n tra c t b y
to
a n o th e r
( b a ile e ) s o m e t h in g n o t c o n s u m a b le s o t h a t t h e l a t t e r m a y
use it
fo r a
c e r ta in
tim e
a n d
re tu rn
it.
In u s u fr u c t th e u s u fr u c tu a r y g e ts th e r ig h t to th e u s e
a n d t o t h e f r u it s o f t h e s a m e , w h ile
218
in
c o m m o d a tu m , th e
b a ile e
its
o n ly
a c q u ir e s
th e
u se
o f th e
th in g
lo a n e d
b u t n o t
fr u its .
U s u fr u c t m a y b e c o n s titu te d
o f th e
fr u its
o f th e
o n t h e w h o le
564,
th in g . (A rt,
O r a p a rt
C iv il C o d e ).
It
m a y
e v e n b e c o n s t it u t e d o v e r c o n s u m a b le s lik e m o n e y , ( A l
v. Vetoso, 52
545).
P h il.
O n
th e
o th e r
unan
h a n d ,
in
c o m m o d a t u m , c o n s u m a b le g o o d s m a y b e s u b je c t t h e r e o f
o n ly
w h e n
th e
s u m p tio n
tio n .
p u rp o s e
o f th e
1936,
(A rt.
o f th e
c o n tra c t
o b je c t, a s w h e n
i t is
is
n o t
m e r e ly
th e
c o n
fo r e x h ib i
C iv il C o d e )
Another Answer;
1.
T h e r e a re s e v e r a l p o in ts o f d is t in c t io n b e tw e e n
u s u fru c t a n d
la w ,
c o m m o d a tu m .
b y ' c o n tra c t,
p r e s c r ip tio n
re a l
r ig h t
th e
o f
c o n s titu te d
s u c c e s s io n ,
C iv il C o d e ).
fr u its
b y
o r
b y
U s u fru c t c re a te s
a n o t h e r 's
p ro p e rty ,
w h ile
c re a te s o n ly a p u r e ly p e r s o n a l r ig h t t o u s e
p ro p e rty , a n d
t h e b a ile e t o
U s u f r u c t is
te s ta m e n ta ry
1933,
(A rt;
to
c o m m o d a tu m
a n o t h e r 's
b y
r e q u ir e s
s tip u la tio n
to
e n a b le
m a k e u s e o f th e fr u its (A rts .
C iv il C o d e ). U s u fr u c t m a y b e o n e ro u s w h ile c o m m o d a tu m
is
a lw a y s
o r
e s s e n tia lly
C iv il C o d e ).
T h e
g r a tu ito u s
s e n s u a l, w h ile c o m m o d a t u m
(A rts .
c o n tr a c t c o n s titu tin g
u s u f r u c t is
o n ly b y d e liv e r y o f th e s u b je c t m a t t e r th e r e o f).
b o th
In v o lv e
th e
e n jo y m e n t b y a p e rs o n
O f a n o th e r , d iffe r in g
s u c h e n jo y m e n t
o th e r);
b o th
o n ly
as to
(jusjruendi i n
m a y
h ave
as
c o n
is a r e a l c o n t r a c t ( p e r f e c t e d
th e
e x te n t a n d
m a tte r
p ro p e rty
sco p e
utendi i n
o n e an d J u s
s u b je c t
H o w e v e r,
o f th e
e ith e r
o f
th e
a n
im
m o v a b le o r a' m o v a b le ; a n d , b o t h m a y b e c o n s t i t u t e d o v e r
c o n s u m a b le
goods
(A rts .
574 Ac 1936,
C iv il C o d e )-
A c o n s u m a b le t h in g m a y b e t h e s u b je c t - m a tt e r o f a n
a b n o rm a l u s u fr u c t b u t in
a n o r m a l u s u fr u c t, th e s u b je c t-
m a t t e r m a y b e u s e d o n ly f o r e x h ib itio n .
o f a
c o n s u m a b le
th in g
m a y
e x h ib it in g , n o t c o n s u m in g
b e
o n ly
A c o m m o d a tu m
fo r
th e
p u rp o s e
o f
it.
Answer;
2.
fe c te d
C o n s e n s u a l c o n tra c ts
b y
c o n tra c ts
o f th e
m e re
a re
c o n s e n t
th o s e
o b je c t o f th e
(A rt,
w h ic h
a re
o b lig a tio n .
219
a re
th o s e
1315,
p e rfe c te d
(A rt.
w h ic h
C iv il
b y
1316,
a re
C o d e ).
th e
p e r
R e a l
d e liv e r y
C iv il C o d e )
220
XX.
In 1965, Renren bought from Robyn a parcel of regis
tered land evidenced by a duly executed deed of sale. The
owner presented the deed of sale and the owner's certificate
of title to the Register of Deeds. The entry was made in the
day book and corresponding fees were paid as evidenced by
official receipt. However, no transfer of certificate of title was
issued to Renren because the original certificate of title in
Robyns name w as temporarily misplaced after fire partly
gutted the Office of the Register of Deeds. Meanwhile, the
land had been possessed by Robyns distant cousin, Mikaelo,
openly, adversely and continuously in the concept of owner
since 1960. It was o n ly in April 1998 that Renren sued
Mikaelo to recover possession. Mikaelo invoked a) acquisitive
prescription and b) laches, asking that he be declared owner,
of the land. Decide the case by evaluating these defenses.
15%]
Answer;
a)
la n d
R e n r e n 'a
a c tio n
w ill p ro s p e r.
R o b y n , h e
In
to
1 9 6 5 ,
s u b m itte d th e
re c o v e r
p o s s e s s io n
a fte r b u y in g
D e e d o f S a le t o
th e
o f
la n d
th e
fro m
th e R e g is tr y o f
D e e d s f o r r e g is t r a t i o n t o g e t h e r w i t h t h e o w n e r 's d u p li c a t e
c o p y o f t h e t i t l e , a n d p a id t h e c o r r e s p o n d in g r e g is t r a t io n
fe e *.
U n d e r S e c t io n 5 6 o f P .D . N o . 1 5 2 9 , t h e D e e d o f S a le
t o R e n r e n la c o n s id e r e d r e g is t e r e d f r o m
w as
e n te re d
in
th e
D a y
B o o k
(n o w
th e t im e t h e s a le
c a lle d
th e
P r im a r y
E n t r y B o o k ).
F o r
a ll
c o n s id e r e d t h e
w as
n o t
is s u e
th e
h is
le g a l in t e n t s
fa u lt th a t
th e
c o r r e s p o n d in g
M ik a e lo 's
s u s ta in e d .
a n d
p u rp o s e s ,
r e g is te r e d o w n e r o f th e
R e g is tr y
d e fe n s e
o f
is
A fte r a ll, i t
o f D eed s
tr a n s fe r c e r tific a te
A T o rre n s title
R e n re n
la n d .
c o u ld
n o t
o f title .
p r e s c r ip tio n
c a n
is Im p r e s c r ip t ib l e .
n o t
b e
N o title
to
r e g is te r e d la n d in d e r o g a tio n o f th e t it l e o f th e r e g is te r e d
o w n e r s h a ll b e
a c q u ir e d b y
s e s s io n . ( S e c t io n
la n d
p r e s c r ip tio n
4 7 , P .D . N o .
T h e
r ig h t
to
lik e w is e
do es
n o t
re c o v e r
o r a d v e rs e
p o s
1 5 2 9 )
p o s s e s s io n
p r e s c r ib e
b ecau se
o f r e g is te r e d
p o s s e s s io n
is
J u s t a n e c e s s a ry In c id e n t o f o w n e rs h ip ,
b )
M ik a e lo 's
d e fe n s e
t o b e m o r e s u s ta in a b le .
th e
o f la c h e s , h o w e v e r ,
a p p e a rs
R e n r e n b o u g h t t h e la n d a n d h a d
s a le r e g is t e r e d w a y b a c k
in
221
1 9 6 5 .
F ro m
th e
fa c ts , it
a p p e a r s t h a t I t w a s o n ly in
1 9 9 8
o r a f t e r a n in e x p lic a b le
d e la y o f 3 3 y e a r s t h a t h e t o o k t h e f ir s t s te p a s s e r tin g h is
r ig h t to
th e
la n d .
I t
w a s n o t e v e n
a n
o w n e n h i p b u t o n ly p o s s e s s io n o f t h e
a c tio n
la n d .
to
re c o v e r
B y o r d in a ry
s t a n d a r d s , 3 3 y e a r s o f n e g le c t o r I n a c t i o n is t o o lo n g a n d
m a y b e
c o n s id e r e d
S u p re m e
s o m e tim e s
C o u rt,
h a s
la c h e s w h ic h
c la im
in to
to
p r in c ip le
y ie ld
to
o fte n
h e ld
b y
th e
im p r e s c r ip tib ility
e q u ita b le
p r in c ip le
o f
d e m a n d .
c la im
o f la c h e s , h o w e v e r , Is w e a k in s o f a r
the e l e m e n t o f e q u i t y i s
s h o w i n g inth
ef a c t s h o w h e
as
a n d
th e
As
o f
c a n c o n v e r t e v e n a r e g is t e r e d la n d o w n e r 's
a S ta le
M lk a e lo 'S
u n r e a s o n a b le .
th e
p o s s e s s io n o f t h e
c o n c e rn e d ,
e n te re d
la n d .
-end-
222
in to
th e re
th e
b e in g
n o
o w n e rs h ip
Question No. 1:
How would you compare the Civil Law system in Its
governance and trend with that of the Common Law system?
Answer:
As regards "governance":
Governance in Civil Law is codal, statutory and written
law. It is additionally derived from case law. Common law is
basically derived from case law.
As regards "trend":
Civil law is now tending to rely more and more on
decisions of the courts explaining the laws. Common law is
now codifying laws more and more. So they are now merging
towards similar systems.
Additional Answers:
X
1. Common law refers to the traditional part of the law
as distinct from legislation: it refers to the universal part of
law as distinct from particular local customs {Encyclopedia
Americana, Vol. 7).
On the other hand, civil law is understood to be that
branch of law governing the relationship of persons in respect
of their personal and private interests as distinguished from
both public and international laws.
In common law countries, the traditional responsibility
has for the most part been with the judges; in civil law
countries, the task is primarily reposed on the lawmakers.
Contemporary practices, however, so indicate a trend towards
centralizing that function to professional groups that may.
indeed, see the gradual assimilation in time of both systems.
(Vltug, Civil Law and Jurisprudence, p. XX)
2. In Civil Law, the statutes theoretically take prec
edence over court decisions interpreting them; while in
223,
Question No. 2:
In 1977, Mario and Clara, both Filipino citizens, were
married in the Philippines. Three years later, they went to the
United States of America and established their residence in
San Francisco, California. In 1987, the couple applied for,
and were granted, U.S. citizenship. In 1989, Mario, claiming
to have been abandoned by Clara, was able to secure a decree
of divorce in Reno, Nevada, U.S.A.
In 1990, Mario returned to the Philippines and married
Juana who knew well Marios past life.
(a) Is the marriage between Mario and Juana valid?
(b) Would the renvoi doctrine have any relevance to the
case?
Answer:
(a) Yes. In relation to Art. 15 of the Civil Code, Conflict
of Laws provides that the recognition of an absolute divorce
granted in another State rests on the citizenship of the
parties at the time the divorce was granted (Paras, PhiL
Conflict o f Laws, p. 259). Applied in this case, the divorce
decree issued to Clara and Mario will be recognized as valid
here considering that at the time the foreign decree was
granted, both Clara and Mario are citizens of the U.S_A., a
country which grants/allows absolute divorce. Since the
marriage between Mario and Clara has been validly termi
nated, Mario and Juana can freely marry each other.
(b) No. The renvoi doctrine is relevant In cases where
one country applies the domiciliary theory and the other the
224
Question No. 3:
In the context that the term is used In Civil Law, state
the (a) concept, (b) requisites and (c) consequences of a
prejudicial question.
Answer:
(a)
Concept
Requisites
Additional Answer:
1. The civil action involves an issue similar or
intimately related to the issue raised In the
criminal action, and
225
C onsequences
Question No. 4.
Luis and Rizza, both 26 years of age and single, live
exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the
benefit of marriage. Luis is gainfully employed. Rizza is not
employed, stays at home, and takes charge of the household
chores.
After living together for a little over twenty years, Luis
was able to save from his salary earnings during that period
the amount of P200.000.00 presently deposited in a bank. A
house and lot worth P500.000.00 was recently purchased for
the same amount by the couple. Of the P500.000.00 used
by the common-law, spouses to purchase the property,
P200.000.00 had come from the sale of palay harvested from
the hacienda owned by Luis and P300,000.00 from the
rentals of a building belonging to Rizza. In fine, the sum of
P500.000.00 had been part of the fruits received during the
period of cohabitation from their separate property. A car
worth P 100,000.00, being used by the common-law spouses,
was donated Just months ago to Rizza by her parents.
Luis and Rizza now decide to terminate their cohabitation,
and they ask you to give them your legal advice on the
following:
(a) How, under the law, should the bank deposit of
P200.000.00, the house and lot valued at P500.000.00 and
the car worth p 100.000.00 be allocated to them?
(b) What would your answer be (to the above question)
had Luis and Rizza been living together all the time, Le.. since
twenty years ago, under a valid marriage?
226
Answer:
a) Art. 147 of the Family Code provides In part that
when a man and a woman who are capacitated to m any each
other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage,
their wages and salaries shall be owned by them In equal
shares and the property acquired by both of them through
their work or industry shall be governed by the rules of coownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties
acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to have
been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industiy, and
shall be owned by them in equal shares. A party who did not
participate in the acquisition by the other party of any
property shall be deemed to have contributed Jointly in the
acquisition thereof if the formeris efforts consisted in the care
and maintenance o f the family and of the household.
Thus:
1} the wages ana salaries of Luis in the amount of
P200,000.00 shall be divided equally between
Luis and Rizza.
2) the house and lot valued at P500.000.00
having been acquired by both of them through
work or Industry shall be divided between them
in proportion to their respective contribution,
in consonance with the rules on co-ownership.
Hence, Luis gets 2\5 while Rizza gels 3\5 of
P500.000.00.
3)
(b)
The property relations between Luis and Rizza, their
marriage having been celebrated 20 years ago (under the
Civil Code) shall be governed by the conjugal partnership of
gains, under which the husband and wife place in a common
fund the proceeds, products, fruits and income from their
separate properties and those acquired by either or both
spouses through their efforts or by chance, and upon
dLssolution of the marriage or of the partnership, the net
227
Question No. 5:
Under what conditions, respectively, may drug addic
tion be a ground. If at all, (a) for a declaration of nullity of
marriage, (b) for an annulment of the marriage contract, and
(c) for legal separation between the spouses?
Answer;
(a) Declaration of nullity of marriage:
1. The drug addiction must amount to psycho
logical incapacity to comply with the essential
obligations of marriage;
2. It must be antecedent (existing at the time of
marriage), grave and incurable:
3. The case must be filed before August 1, 1998.
Because if they got married before August 3,
1998, it must be filed before August 1, 1998.
(b) Annulment of the Marriage Contract:
1. The drug addiction must be concealed:
2. It must exist at the time of marriage;
3. There should be no cohabitation with full
knowledge of the drug addiction;
228
Question No. 6:
Pedro is the registered owner of a parcel of land situated
in Malolos, Bulacan. In 1973, he mortgaged the land to the
Philippine National Bank (PNB) to secure a loan of
P 100.000.00. For Pedro's failure to pay the loan, the PNB
foreclosed on the mortgage in 1980, and the land was sold at
public auction to PNB for being the highest bidder. PNB
secured title thereto in 1987.
In the meanwhile. Pedro, who was still in possession of
the land, constructed a warehouse on the property. In 1988,
the PNB sold the land to Pablo. The Deed of Sale was
amended in 1989 to include the warehouse.
Pedro, claiming ownership of the warehouse, files a
Complaint to annul the amended Deed of Sale before the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, where he resides,
against both the PNB and Pablo. The PNB filed a motion to
dismiss the complaint lor improper venue contending that
the warehouse is real property under Article 415(1) of the
Civil Code and therefore the action should have instead been
filed in Malolos, Bulacan. Pedro claims otherwise. The
question arose as to whether the warehouse should be
considered as real or as personal property.
If consulted, what would your legal advice be?
Answer:
The warehouse which is a construction adhered to the
soil is an Immovable by nature under Art. 415 (I), and the
229
No, 7:
230
Answer:
I would decide in favor of Marcelino since he is considered
a finder by chance of the hidden treasure, hence, he is
entitled to one-half (1/2) of the hidden treasure. While
Marcelino may have had the intention to look for the hidden
treasure, still he is a finder by chance since it is enough that
he tried to look for it. By chance in the law does not mean
sheer luck such that the finder should have no intention at
all to look for the treasure. By chance means good luck,
implying that one who Intentionally looks for the treasure is
embraced in the provision. The reason is that it is extremely
difficult to find hidden treasure without looking for it delib
erately.
Marcelino is not a trespasser since there is no prohibition
for him to enter the premises, hence, he is entitled to half of
the treasure.
Alternative Answers:
1. Marcelino did not find the treasure by chance because
he had a map. he knew the location of the hidden treasure
and he intentionally looked for the treasure, hence, he is not
entitled to any part of the treasure.
2. Marcelino appears to be a trespasser and althpugh
there may be a question of whether he found it by chance of
not, as he has found the hidden treasure by means of a
treasure map, he will not be entitled to a finder's share. The
hidden treasure shall belong to the owner.
3. The main rule is that hidden treasure belongs to the
owner of the land, building or other property on which it is
found. If it is found by chance by a third person and he is not
a trespasser, he is entitled to one-half (1/2). If he is a
trespasser, he loses everything.
231
Question No. 8 :
On 1 January 1980. Minerva, the owner of a building
granted Petronlla a usufruct over the property until 01 June
1998 when Manuel, a son of Petronlla, would have reached
his 30th birthday. Manuel, however, died on 1 June 1990
when he was only 26 years old.
Minerva notified Petronlla that the usufruct had been
extinguished by the death of Manuel and demanded that the
latter vacate the premises and deliver the same to the former.
Petronlla refused to vacate the place on the ground that the
usufruct In her favor would expire only on 1June 1998 when
Manuel would have reached his 30th birthday and that the
death of Manuel before his 30th birthday did not extinguish
the usufruct.
Whose contention should be accepted?
Answer:
Petronila's contention is correct. Under Article 606 of
the Civil Code, a usufruct granted for the time that may
elapse before a third person reaches a certain age shall
subsist for the number of years specified even If the third
person should die unless there is an express stipulation In
the contract that states otherwise. In the case at bar, there
is no express stipulation that the consideration for the
usufruct is the existence of Petronila's son. Thus, the general
rule and not the exception should apply In this case.
Alternative Answer:
This Is a usufruct which Is clearly Intended for the
benefit of MariueL until he reaches 30 yrs. of age, with
Petronlla serving only as a conduit, holding the property in
trust for his benefit. The death of Manuel at the age of 26,
therefore, terminated the usufruct.
Question No. 9:
(a)
Distinguish between "possession" and "occupation"
as these terms are commonly used in Book II and Book III of
the Civil Code.
232
(b)
Are the effects of illegal and Immoral conditions on
simple donations the same as those effects that would follow
when s u c h conditions are imposed on donations con causa
onerosa?
Answer:
(a) Possession is a real right, while occupation is one oi
the original modes of acquiring ownership and other real
rights. Possession, the holding of a thing or the exercise of
a right, does not in itself constitute ownership. Whereas,
occupation is a mode of acquiring ownership. There can be
possession without ownership.
Additional Answer:
Possession is the holding of a thing or the enjoyment of
a right (Art. 532, CC). It can refer to all kinds of property
whether with of without an owner while occupation can take
place only.withrespect to property without an owner (Articles
5$1 & 713). Occupation in itself, when proper, confers
ownership but possession does not by itself give rise to
ownership.
Answer:
233
Additional Answer:
No. In simple or pure donation, only the illegal or
impossible condition is considered not written but the donation
remains valid and becomes free from conditions. The con
dition or mode being a mere accessory disposition, its nullity
does not affect the donation unless it clearly appears that the
donor would not have made the donation without the mode
or condition. On the other hand, onerous donation is
governed by the rules on contracts. Under Article 1183,
Impossible or illegal conditions shall annul the obligation
which depends upon them. In these cases, both the obligation
and the condition are void.
Question No. l'O:
Johnny, with no known living relatives, executed a
notarial w ill giving all his estate to his sweetheart. One day,
he had a serious altercation with his sweetheart. A few days
later, he was introduced to a charming lady who later became
a dear friend. Soon after, he executed a holographic will
expressly revoking the notarial will and so designating his
new friend as sole heir. One day when he was clearing up his
desk. Johnny mistakenly burned, along with other papers,
the only copy o f his holographic, will. His business associate,
Eduardo, knew well the contents of the will which was shown
to him b y Johnny the day it was executed. A few days after
the burning incident, Johnny died. Both wills were sought
to be probated in two separate petitions.
W ill either or both petitions prosper?
Answer:
The probate o f the notarial will will prosper. The
holographic will cannot be admitted to probate because a
holographic will can only be probated upon evidence of the
will itself unless there is a photographic copy. But since the
holographic will was lost and there was no other copy, it
cannot be probated and therefore the notarial will will be
admitted to probate because there is no revoking will.
Additional Answers:
1.
In the case of Gan vs. Yap (104 Phi] 509), the ex
ecution and the contents of a lost or destroyed holographic
234
Alternative Answer:
Shares in Intestacy
T - decedent
Estate: P 120,000.00
Survived by:
M - M other....................... .-.......... None
236
'
Explanation:
1) The mother (M) cannot Inherit from Tbecause under
Art. 985 the ascendants shall inherit in default of legitimate
children and descendants of the deceased.
2) The widow's share is P30.000.00 because under Art.
996 it states that if the widow or widower and legitimate
children or descendants are left, the surviving spouse has in
the succession the same share as that of each of the children.
\
Answer:
The heirs are B, W. C and D. A inherits nothing because
of his renunciation. B inherits a legitime of P90.000.00 as the
nearest and only legitimate descendant, inheriting in his own
right not by representation because of A's renunciation. W
gets a legitime equivalent to one-half (1/2) that of B amounting
to P45.000. C and D each gets a legitime equivalent to onehalf (1 /2) that of B amounting to P45.000.00 each. But since
the total exceeds the entire estate, their legitimes would have
to be reduced correspondingly to P22.500.00 each (Art. 895,
CC). The total of all of these amounts to P180.000.00.
237
Alternative Answer:
INTESTATE SUCCESSION
ESTATE: P180.000.00 '
W - (widow gets 1/2 share)
A- (son who repudiated his
inheritance)
B - (Granddaughter)
C - (Acknowledged
illegitimate child)
D - (Acknowledged
illegitimate child)
PS0.000.00
(Art. 998;'
None
None
(Art. 97 7)
P45.000.00
(Art.998)
P45.000.00
(Art. 998)
Answ er:
The matter should be decided in favor of Remigio
(trustee) because the action has not prescribed. The case at
bar involves an express trust which does not prescribe as
long as they have not been repudiated by the trustee (Diaz vs.
Gorricho, 103 Phil. 261).
238
Answer:
I would advise Maria not to bother running after Juan
for the latter to make good his promise. [This is because a
promise is not an actionable wrong that allows a party to
recover especially when she has not suffered damages resulting
from such promise. A promise does not create an obligation
on the part of Juan because it is not something which arises
from a contract, law, quasi-contracts or quasi-delicts (Art.
1157)). Under Art. 1182, Juan's promise to Maria is void
because a conditional obligation depends upon the sole will
of the obligor.
As regards Perla, the document is an express acknowl
edgment of a debt, and the promise to pay what he owes her
when he feels like it is equivalent to a promise to pay when
his means permits him to do so, and is deemed to be one with
an indefinite period under Art. 1180. Hence the amount is
recoverable after Perla asks the court to set the period as
provided by Art. 1197, par. 2.
239
Answer:
(a) In a contract of sale, ownership is transferred to the
buyer upon delivery of the object to him while in a contract
to sell, ownership Is retained by the seller until the purchase
price is fully paid. In a contract to sell, delivery of the object
does not confer ownership upon the buyer. In a contract of
sale, there is only one contract executed between the seller
and the buyer, while In a contract to sell, there are two
contracts, first the contract to sell (which is a conditional or
preparatory sale) and a second, the final deed of sale or the
principal contract which is executed after full payment of the
purchase price.
(b) A conditional sale is one where the vendor is granted
the right to unilaterally rescind the contract predicated on
the fulfillment or non-fulfillment, as the case may be, of the
prescribed condition. An absolute sale is one where the title
to the property is not reserved to the vendor or if the vendor
is not granted the right to rescind the contract based on the
fulfillment or non-fulfillment, as the case may be, of the
prescribed condition.
240
Answer:
Yes, he can recover the deficiency. The action of A B to
go after the surety bond cannot be taken to mean a waiver of
his right to demand payment for the whole debt. The amount
received from the surety is only payment pro tanto, and an
action may be maintained for a deficiency debt.
Answer:
a)
No. The death of the lessee will not extinguish the
lease agreement, since lease is not personal in Character and
the right is transmissible to the heirs. (Heirs ofDimaculangan
Vs. LAC, 170 SCRA 393).
(b) Yes. The death of a partner will terminate the
partnership, by express provision of par. 5, Art. 1830 of the
Civil Code.
(c) Yes. The death of an agent extinguishes the agency,
by express provision of par. 3, Art 1919 of the Civil Code.
Answer:
W e submit that there is no pactum commissortum here.
Deposits of money in banks and similar institutions are
governed by the provisions on simple loans (Art. 1980, Civil
Code). The relationship between the depositor and a bank Is
one of creditor and debtor. Basically this Is a matter of
compensation as all the elements of compensation are present
In this case (BPI vs. CA, 232 SCRA 302).
Additional Answer:
Where the security for the debt is also money deposited
in a bank, it is not illegal for the creditor to encash the time
deposit certificates to pay the debtor's overdue obligation.
[Chu vs. CA. etaL, G .R 78519, September 26, 1989).
Answer:
(a) The employers liability for damage based on culpa
aquiliana under Art. 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code is
primary, while that under Art. 103 of the Revised Penal Code
is subsidiary.
(b) The defense of diligence in the selection and super
vision of the employee under Article 2180 of the Civil Code is
available only to those primarily liable thereunder, but not to
those subsidiarily liable under Article 103 of the Revised
Penal Code (Yumul vs. Juliano, 11 Phil. 94).
242
Answer:
"If fraud be discovered in the application which led to the
issuance of the patent and Certificate of Title, this Title
becomes ipso facto null and void. Thus, in a case where a
person who obtained a free patent, knowingly made a false
statement of material and essential facts in his application
for the same, by stating therein that the lot in question was
part of the public domain not occupied or claimed by any
243
Other person, his title becomes ipso facto canceled and con
sequently rendered null and void."
"It is to the public interest that one who succeeds in
fraudulently acquiring title to public land should not be
allowed to benefit therefrom and the State, through the
Solicitor General, may file the corresponding action for
annulment of the patent and the reversion of the land
involved to the public domain" (Dinerc vs. Director of Lands-,
Kayabanvs. Republic L-33307.8-20-73; Director ofLands vs.
Hon. Pedro Samson Animas, L-37682, 3-29-74.)
This action does not prescribe.
With respect to Perctvals action for reconveyance, it
would have prescribed, having been filed more than ten (10)
years after registration and issuance of an O.C.T. in the name
of Melvin, were it not for the inherent infirmity Of the latter's
title. Under the facts, the statute of limitations will no t apply
to Percival because Melvin knew that a part of the land
covered by his title actually belonged to Percival. So, instead
of nullifying in totothe title of Melvin, the court, in the exercise
of equity and jurisdiction, may grant prayer for the
reconveyance of Lot B to Percival who has actually possessed
the land under a claim of ownership since 1947. After all, if
Melvin's title Is declared void ab initio and the land is reverted
to the public domain, Percival would just the same be entitled
to preference right to acquire the land from the government,
Besides, well settled is the rule that once public la n d has
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious posses
sion under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership for
the period prescribed by Section 48 of the Public Land Act,
the same ipsoJure ceases to be public and in contemplation
of law acquired the character of private land.
Thus,
reconveyance of the land from Melvin to Percival would be the
better procedure. (Vitale vs. Anore, 90 Phil. 855; Pena, Land
Titles and deeds, 1982, Page 427)
Alternative Answer:
The action of the Solicitor General should prosper,
considering that the doctrine of indefeasibility of title does
not apply to free patent secured through fraud. A certificate
of title cannot be used as shield to perpetuate fraud. The
State is not bound by the period of prescription stated in Sec.
38 of Act 496. (Director of Lands vs. AbaniMa, 124 SCRA 358)
244
245
Question No. 1:
*
Answer:
Juridical capacity is the fitness to be the subj ect of legal
relations while capacity to act is the power or to do acts with
legal effect. The former is inherent in every natural person
and is lost only through death while the latter is merely
acquired and may be lost even before death (Art. 37, NCC).
Alternative Answer:
Juridical capacity, as distinguished from capacity to
act: (a) the former is passive while the latter is active, (b) the
former is inherent in a person while the latter is merely
acquired, (c) the former is lost only through death while the
latterm ay be lost through death or restricted by causes other
246
Answer:
The marriage is valid. The irregularity in the issuance
of a valid license does not adversely affect the validity of the
marriage. The marriage license is valid because it was in fact
issued by a Civil Registrar (Arts. 3 and 4, FC).
Alternative Answer:
It depends. If both or one of the parties was a
member of the religious sect of the solemnizing officer, the
marriage is valid. If none of the parties is a member of the sect
and both of them were aware of the fact, the marriage is void.
249
Question No. 5:
1)
Flor and Virgilio were married to each other in Roxas
City in 1980. In 1984, Flor was offered a teaching job in
Canada, which she accepted. In 1989, she applied for and
w as granted Canadian citizenship. The following year, she
sued for divorce from Virgilio in a Canadian court. After
Virgilio was served with summons, the Canadian court tried
the case and decreed the divorce. . Shortly thereafter, Flor
married a Canadian.
Can Virgilio m an y again in the Philippines? Explain.
Answer:
No, Virgilio cannot validly remarry. His case is not
covered b y Article 26 of the Family Code. For said Article to
be applicable, the spouse who filed for divorce must be a
foreigner at the time of the marriage. Since both of them were
Filipinos at the time o f the marriage, the divorce obtained by
Flor did not capacitate Virgilio to remariy. The fact that Flor
was already an alien at the time she obtained the divorce does
not give Virgilio the capacity to remarry under Philippine
Law.
250
Alternative Answers:
a) Yes, Virgilio can validly remarry. Art. 26 of the FC,
merely states the alien spouse without taking into considera
tion his or her nationality at the time of the marriage. While
his case is not covered by the letter of Article 26 FC, it is,
however, covered by the spirit of said Article. The injustice
to the Filipino spouse sought to be cured by said Article is
present in this case. (Department of Justice Opinion No. 134
Series of 1993).
b) Although the marriage originally involved Filipino
citizens, it eventually became a marriage between an alien
and a Filipino after Flor became a Canadian citizen. Thus,
the divorce decree was one obtained by an alien spouse
married.to a Filipino. Although nothing is said about whether
such divorce did capacitate Flor to remarry, that fact may as
well be assumed since the problem states that she married
a Canadian shortly after obtaining the divorce. Hence,
Virgilio can marry again under Philippine law, pursuant to
Art. 26, FC which applies because Flor was already an alien
at the time of the divorce.
2)
Bert and Baby were married to each other on
December 23, 1988. Six months later, she discovered that he
was a drug addict. Efforts to have him rehabilitated were
unsuccessful.
f
251
1)
On the occasion of Digna's marriage to George, her
father gave her a donation propter nuptias of a car. Subse
quently, the marriage was annulled because o f the psycho
logical immaturity of George.
May Digna's father revoke the donation and get back the
car? Explain.
Answer:
No, Digna's father may not revokie the donation because
Digna was not In bad faith, applying Art. 86(3) of the Family
Code.
Alternative Answer:
a) Yes, the donation is revocable. Since the ground for
the annulment of the marriage is the psychological immatu
rity of George, the j udgment was in the nature o f a declaration
of nullity under Art. 36 of the FC and, therefore, the donation
m aybe revoked under Art. 86(1) of the FC for the reason that
the marriage has been judicially declared void ab initio.
b) No, the donation cannot be revoked.
The law provides that a donation by reason of marriage
may be revoked by the donor if, among other cases, the
marriage is judicially declared void ab initio [par. (1) Art. 86,
Family Code], or when the marriage is annulled and the
donee acted in bad faith Ipar. (3), Id.]. Since the problem
states that the marriage was annulled and there is no
intimation of bad faith on the part of the donee Digna, the
conclusion is that the donor cannot revoke the donation.
252
253
Answer:
' A chapel is a useful improvement. Bartolome may
remove the chapel if it can be removed without damage to the
land, unless Eric chooses to acquire the chapel. In the latter
case, Bartolome has the right to the reimbursement of the
value of the chapel with right of retention until he is reim
bursed. (Art. 448 in relation to Art. 546 & 547, NCC).
Alternative Answer:
Assuming that Eric acted in good faith, Bartolome's
rights will depend upon what option Eric chooses. Eric, the
owner o f the land, may choose to acquire the chapel, which
is a useful expense or to sell the land to the builder (Bartolome).
I f Eric chooses to acquire the chapel, he has the right to
reimbursement for useful expenses, with a right of retention
until paid.
If Eric chooses to sell the land to Bartolome, Bartolome
m ay refuse to buy the land if the value of the land is
considerably miore than the value of the building, in which
case, there will be a forced leased between them.
A d d itio n a l Answer:
If Eric acted in bad faith, then Bartolome has the right
of absolute removal of the chapel, plus damages. However,
If Eric chooses to acquire the chapel, then Bartolome has the
right to reimbursement, plus payment of damages, with right
o f retention (Art. 454 in relation of Art. 447, NCC)
2)
Answer:
Bartolome, under Art. 449 of the NCC, loses whatever he
built, without any right to indemnity.
A lte r n a tiv e Answer:
It is th e o w n e r o f the la n d w h o h a s the rig h t to a c q u ir e
th e c h a p e l w ith o u t p a y in g in d e m n ity , p lu s d a m a g e s , o r to
254
r e q u ir e B a r t o lo m e lo re m o v e the c h a p e l, p l u s d a m a g e s o r to
re q u ire B a r t o lo m e to b u y th e la n d , w it h o u t a n y o p tio n to
r e fu s e to b u y it.
(A rts. 4 4 9 a n d 4 5 8 , N C C )
If Eric acted in bad faith, then his bad faith cancels the
bad faith of Bartolome, and both will be taken to have acted
in good faith. (Art. 453, NCC)
3)
Answer:
Bartolome has the right to remove the improvement if it
is possible to do so without causing damage to the property
(Art. 579, NCC). He may also set off the improvement against
any damages which the property held in usufruct suffered
because o,f his act or the acts ofhis assignee. (Art. 580, NCC).
4)
Answer:
The owner of the land, as lessor, can acquire the
improvement by paying for one-half of its value. Should the
lessor refuse to reimburse said amount, the lessee may
remove the improvement, even though the principal thing
may suffer damage thereby (Art. 1678, NCC).
Question No. 8 :
David is the owner of the subdivision in Sta. Rosa,
Laguna, without an access to the highway. When he applied
for a license to establish the subdivision, David represented
that he will pu rchase a rice field located between his land and
the highway, and develop it into an access road. But, when
the license was already granted, he did not bother to buy the
rice field, which remains unutilized until the present.'instead,
he chose to connect his subdivision with the neighboring
subdivision of Nestor, which has an access to the highway.
Nestor allowed him to do this, pending negotiations on the
compensation to be paid. When they failed to arrive at an
agreement, Nestor built a wall across the road connecting
with Davids subdivision. David filed a complaint in court, for
the establishment of an easement of right of way through the
255
256
258
261
Answer:
No, the action will not prosper. The action for rescission
may be brought only by the aggrieved party to the contract.
Since it was Salvador who failed to comply with his condi
tional obligation, he is not the aggrieved party who may file
the action/for rescission but the Star Semiconductor Com
pany. The. company, however, is not opting to rescind the
contract but has chosen to waive Salvador's compliance with
the condition which it can do under Art. 1545, NCC.
Alternative Answer:
The action for rescission will not prosper. The buyer has
not committed any breach, let alone a substantial or serious
one, to warrant the rescission/resolution sought by the
vendor. On the.contrary, it is the vendor who appears to have
failed to comply with the condition imposed by the contract
the fulfillment of which would have rendered the obligation
to pay the balance of the purchase price demandable. Fur
ther, far from being unable to comply with what is incumbent
upon it, te., pay the balance of the price - the buyer has
offered to pay it even without the vendor having complied
with the suspensive condition attached to the payment of the
price, thus waiving such condition as well as the 60-day term
in its favor. The stipulation that the P100,000.00 down
payment shall be returned by the vendor to the vendee if the
squatters are not removed within six months, is also a
covenant for the benefit of the vendee, which the latter has
validly waived by implication when it offered to pay the
balance of the purchase price upon the execution of a deed
of absolute sale by the vendor. (Art. 1545, NCC)
Question No. 14:
Ubaldo is the owner oi a building which has been leased
by Remigio for the past 20 years. Ubaldo has repeatedly
assured Remigio that if he should decide to sell the building,
he will give Remigio the right of first refusal. On June 30,
1994, Ubaldo informed Remigio that he was willing to sell the
building for P5 Million. The following day, Remigio sent a
letter to Ubaldo offering to buy the building at P4.5 Million.
Ubaldo did not reply. One week later, Remigio received a
letter from Santos informing him that the building has been
sold to him by Ubaldo for P5 Million, and that he will not
262
263
265
Alternative Answer:
Yes, Marcial should be held liable. Art. 2184, NCC
makes, an owner of a motor vehicle solidarity liable with the
driver if, being in the vehicle at the time of the mishap, he
could have prevented it by the exercise of due diligence. The
traffic conditions along EDSA at any time of day or night are
such as to require the observance o f utmost care and total
alertness in view of the large number of vehicles running at
great speed. Marcial was negligent in that he rendered
him self oblivious to the traffic hazards by reading a book
instead of focusing his attention on the road and supervising
the m anner in which his car was being driven. Thus he failed
to prevent his driver from attempting to beat the traffic light
at the junction of Quezon Avenue and EDSA, which Marcial,
without being a driver himself, could have easily perceived as
a reckless course of conduct.
Question No. 17:
In 1989, the heirs of Gavino, who died on August 10,
1987, filed a petition for reconstitution of his lost or destroyed
Torrens Title to a parcel of land'in Ermita, Manila. This was
opposed by Marilou, who claimed ownership of the said land
by a series of sales. She claimed that Gavino had sold the
property to Bernardo way back in 1941, and as evidence
thereof, she presented a Tax Declaration in 1948 in the name
of Bernardo, which cancelled the previousTax Declaration in
the name of Gavino. Then she presented two deeds of sale
duly registered with the Register of Deeds, the first one
executed by Bernardo in 1954, selling the same property to
Carlos, and the second one executed by Carlos in 1963,
selling the same property to her. She also claimed that she
and her predecessors in interest have been in possession of
the property'Since 1948.
If you were the judge, how will you decide the petition?
Explain.
Answer:
If I were the judge, I will give due course to the petition
of the heirs of Gavino despite the opposition of Marilou forthe
following reasons:
266
<
268
Question No. 1:
1. What is easement? Distinguish easement from
usufruct.
2. Can there be (a) an easement over a usufruct? (b)
a usufruct over an easement? (c) an easement over another
easement? Explain.
Answer:
1 .' A n easement or servitude is an encumbrance im
posed upon an immovable for the benefit of another im
movable belonging to a different owner. (Art. 613, NCC)
Usufruct gives a right to enjoy the property of another
with the obligation of preserving its form and substance,
unless the title Constituting it or the law otherwise provides.
(Art. 562, NCC). An easement or servitude is an encum
brance imposed upon an immovable for the benefit of
another immovable belonging to a different owner (Art. 613,
NCC).
Alternative Answer:
Easement is an encumbrance imposed upon an im
movable for the benefit of another immovable belonging to a
different owner in which case it is called real or predial
easement, or for the benefit of a community or group of
persons in which case it is known as a personal easement.
The distinctions between usufruct and easement are:
a. Usufruct includes all uses o f the property and for all
purposes, inclu din gju sJruendL Easement is limited to a
specific use.
b. Usufruct may be constituted on immovable or
movable property. Easement may be constituted only on an
immovable property.
269
270
(c)
There can be no easement over another easement for
the same reason as in (a). An easement, although it is a real
right over ah immovable, is not a corporeal right. There is a
Roman maxim which says that: There can be no servitude
over another servitude.
Question No. 2:
While in Afghanistan, a Japanese by the name of Sato
sold to Ramoncito, a Filipino, a parcel of land situated in the
Philippines which Sato inherited from his Filipino mother.
1. What law governs the formality in the execution of
the contract of sale? Explain your answer and give its legal
basis.
Answer:
Under Art. .16 par. 1, NCC, real property is subject to the
law of the country where it is situated. Since the property is
situated in the Philippines, Philippine law applies. The rule
o f lex rei sitae in Article 16 prevails over lex loci contractus in
Article 17 of the NCC.
Alternative Answer:
Afghanistan law governs the formal requirements of the
contract since the execution is in Afghanistan. Art. 17 of the
Civil Code provides that the forms and solemnities of contracts,
wills, and other public instruments shall be governed by the
laws of the country in which they are executed. However, if
the contract was executed before the diplomatic or consular
officials o f the Republic of the Philippines in Afghanistan,
Philippine law shall apply.
2. What law governs the. capacity of the Japanese to
sell the land? Explain your answer and give its legal basis.
Answer:
Japanese law governs .the capacity of the Japanese to
sell the land being his personal law on the basis of an
interpretation of Art. 15, NCC.
271
Alternative Answers:
a) Since capacity to contract is governed by the personal
law of an individual, the Japanese seller's capacity should be
governed either by his national law (Japanese law) or by the
law of his domicile, depending upon whether Japan follows
the nationality or domiciliary theory of personal law for its
citizens.
b) Philippine law governs the capacity of the Japanese
owner in selling the land. While as a general rule capacity of
persons is governed by the law of his nationality, capacity
concerning transactions involving property is ari exception.
Under Article 16 of the NCC, the capacity of persons in
transactions involving title to property is governed by the law
o f the country where the property Is situated. Since the
property is in the Philippines, Philippine law governs the
Capacity of the seller.
3.. What law governs the capacity of the Filipino to buy
the land? Explain your answer and give its legal basis.
Answer:
Philippine law governs the capacity of the Filipino to buy
the land. In addition to the principle of lex rei sitae given
above. Article 15 of the NCC specifically provides that Philip
pine laws relating to legal capacity of persons are binding
upon citizens of the Philippines no matter where they are.
Question No. 3:
In 1980 spouses Felisa and George, both Filipino citi
zens, migrated to the United States. Six years later they
became American citizens. In 1989 they jointly filed a
petition before the Regional Trial Court of Malabon seeking
to adopt Gilda, the 10-year old daughter of Helen, Felisa's
younger sister. The government opposed the petition on the
ground that Felisa and George were disqualified since they
were already American citizens.
1.
1?
Explain.
Answer:
1. The petition should be denied because George is not
qualified to adopt. As husband and wife, they have to adopt
jointly under Article 185 of the Family Code. Their case does
not fall in any of the exceptions, where a spouse may adopt
alone. In Republic u. Toledano, (233 SCRA 9), the Court ruled
that both spouses must be qualified.to adopt when required
by law to adopt jointly. Being aliens, Felisa and George are,
as a rule, disqualified to adopt under Art. 184 of the FC.
While Felisa falls in one of the exceptions to this rule, being
a former Filipino who seeks to adopt a relative by consan
guinity, George does not. He does not seek to adopt his
relative by consanguinity, or a legitimate child of his spouse
and neither is his spouse a Filipino. One of the spouses being
disqualified to adopt, the petition has to be denied.
Alternative Answer:
Since the adopters are former Filipino" citizens and the
child sought to be adopted is a relative by Consanguinity of
one of them, and since the rule of joint adoption by spouses
is duly complied with, the petition should be granted.
2. The answer will be the same if George were a
natural-bom American. He will still not fall in any of the
exceptions to the disqualification of aliens.
Alternative Answer:
No, my answer will be different because in that case,
while Felisa is qualified to adopt, the petition for joint
adoption cannot be granted. It should be converted into a
petition only by Felisa. It cannot be granted as ajoint petition
but can be granted as an individual petition.
273
Rachelles
Answer:
1.
Yes, Rachelles suit will prosper because all ele
ments for i n action for reconveyance are present, namely:
a.
Alternative Answer:
Yes. The property registered is deemed to be held in
trust for the real owner by the person in whose name it is
registered. The Torrens system was not designed to shield
one who had committed fraud or misrepresentation and thus
holds the title inbad faith. [WaLs trom v.Mapa, Jr., (G.R 38387,
29 Jan. 1990) as cited in Martinez, D ., Summary o f SC Deci
sions, January to June, 1990, p. 359].
2.
A notice of lis pendens may be canceled even before
final judgment upon proper showing that the notice Is for the
purpose of molesting or harassing the adverse party or that
the notice o f lis. pendens is not necessary to protect the right
of the party who caused it to be registered. (Section 77, P.D.
No. 1529)
In this case, it is given that Rachelle is the legitimate
owner of the land in question. It can be said, therefore, that
when she filed her notice of lis pendens her purpose was to
protect her interest in the land and not just to molest
Rommel. It is necessary to record the lis pendens to protect
her interest because if she did not do it, there is a possibility
that the land will fall into the hands of an innocent purchaser
for value and in that event, the court loses control over the
land making any favorable judgment thereon moot and
academic. For these reasons, the notice of lis pendens may
not be canceled.
Question No. 5:
O liv ia o w n s a v a st m a n g o p la n ta tio n w h ic h s h e c a n no
lo n g e r p r o p e r ly m a n a g e d u e to a lin g e rin g illn e ss. S in c e sh e
275
Answer:
1. A contract o f antichresis was entered into between
Olivia and Peter. Under Article 2132 of the New Civil Code,
by a contract of antichresis the creditor acquires the right to
receive the fruits of an immovable of his debtor, with the
obligation to apply them to the payment of the interest, and
thereafter to the principal of his credit.
2. Peter must pay taxes and charges upon the land and
bear the necessary expenses for preservation and repair
which he may deduct from the fruits. (Art. 2135, NCC)
3. The amount of the principal and interest must be
specified in writing, otherwise the antichresis will be void.
(Art. 2134, NCC)
4. No. Art. 2136 specifically provides that the debtor
cannot re-acquire the enjoyment of the immovable without
first having totally paid what he owes the creditor. However,
it is potestative on the part of the creditor to do so in order to
exempt him from his obligation under Art. 2135, NCC. The
debtor cannot re-acquire the enjoyment unless Peter compels
Olivia to enter again the enjoyment of the property.
Question No. 6:
On 10 September 1988 Kevin, a 2.6-year old business
man, married Karla, a winsome lass of 18. Without the
276
"T7r?W
knowledge of their parents or legal guardians, Kevin and
Karla entered into an antenuptial contract the day before ,
their marriage stipulating that conjugal partnership of gains
shall govern their marriage. At the time of their marriage
Kevins estate was worth 50 Million while Karlas was valued
at 2 Million.
A month after their marriage Kevin died in a freak
helicopter accident. He left no will, no debts, no obligations.
Surviving Kevin, aside from Karla, are his only relatives: his
brother Luis and first cousin Lilia.
1. What property regime governed the marriage of
Kevin and Karla? Explain.
2.
is each
Answer:
1. Since the marriage settlement was entered into
without the consent and without the participation of the
parents (they did not sign the document), the marriage
settlement is invalid applying Art. 78, F.C. which provides
that a minor who according to law may contract marriage
may also enter into marriage settlements but they shall be
valid only if the person who may give consent to the marriage
are made parties to the agreement. (Karla was still a minor
at the time the marriage settlement was executed in Septem
ber 1988 because the law, R.A. 6809, reducing the age of
majority to 18 years took effect on 18 December 1989). The
marriage settlement being void, the property regime govern
ing the marriage is,, therefore, absolute community of
property, under Art. 75 of the FC.
2. All the properties which Kevin and Karla owned at
the time of marriage became community property which
shall be divided equally between them at dissolution. Since
Kevin owned 50 Million and Karla, 2 Million, at the time of the
marriage, 52 Million constituted their community property.
Upon the death of Kevin, the community was dissolved and
277
Question No. 7:
Abraham died intestate on 7 January 1994 survived by
his son Braulio. Abrahams older son Carlos died on 14
February 1990.
Danilo who claims to be an adulterous child of Carlos
intervenes in the proceedings for the settlement of the estate
of Abraham in representation of Carlos. Danilo was legally
adopted on 17 March 1970 by Carlos with the consent of the
latters wife.
1. Under the Family Code, how may an illegitimate
filiation be proved? Explain.
2. As lawyer for Danilo, do you have to prove Danilos
illegitimate filiation? Explain.
3 . Can Danilo inherit from Abraham in representation
of his father Carlos? Explain.
Answer:
1.
Under Art. 172 in relation to Art. 173 and Art. 175
of the FC, the filiation of illegitimate children may be estab
lished in the same w ay and by the same evidence as legiti
mate children. Art. 172 provides that the filiation o f legiti
mate children is established by any o f the following: (1) the
record o f birth appearing in the civil register or a final
Judgment; or (2) an admission of legitimate filiation in a
public document or a private handwritten instrument and
signed by the parent concerned. In the absence of the
foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) the open and continuous possession o f the status of a
legitimate child; or (2) any other means allowed by the Rules
of Court and special laws.
278
Alternative Answer:
An'adopted childs successional rights do not include
the right to represent his deceased adopter in the inheritance
of the latters legitimate parent, in view of Art. 973 which
provides that in order that representation may take place, the
representative must himself be capable of succeeding the
decedent. Adoption by itself did not render Danilo an heir of
the adopters legitimate parent. Neither does his being a
grandchild o f Abraham render him an heir of the latter
because as an illegitimate child of Carlos, who was a legiti
mate child of Abraham, Danilo is incapable of succeeding
Abraham under Art. 992 of the Code.
Question No. 8:
Pauline, Patricia and Priscilla formed a business part
nership for the purpose of engaging in neon advertising for a
term of five (5) years. Pauline subsequently assigned to Philip
her interest in the partnership. When Patricia and Priscilla
learned of the assignment, they decided to. dissolve the
partnership before the expiration o f its term as they had an
unproductive business relationship with Philip in the past.
On the other hand, unaware of the move of Patricia and
Priscilla but sensing their negative.reaction to his acquisition
of Paulines interest, Philip simultaneously petitioned for the
dissolution o f the partnership.
1.
Is the dissolution done by Patricia and Priscilla
without the consent of Pauline or Philip valid? Explain.
279
2.
Does Philip have any right to petition for the disso
lution of the partnership before the expiration of its specified *
term? Explain.
Answer:
1. Under Art. 1830 (1) (c) of the NCC, the dissolution by
Patricia and Priscilla is valid and did not violate the contract
of partnership even though Pauline and Philip did not
consent thereto. The consent of Pauline is not necessary
because she had already assigned her interest to Philip. The
consent of Philip is not also necessary because the assign
ment to him of Pauline's interest did not m akehim a partner,
under Art, 1813 of the NCC.
Alternative Answer:
Interpreting Art. 1830 (1) (c) to mean that if one of the
partners had assigned his interest on the partnership to
another the remaining partners may hot dissolve the part
nership, the dissolution by Patricia and Priscilla without the
consent of Pauline or Philip is not valid.
2. No, Philip has no right to petition for dissolution
because he does not have the standing of a partner (Art. 1813
NCC).
Question No. 9:
Tim came into possession of an old map showing where
a purported cache of gold bullion was hidden. Without any
authority from the government Tim conducted a relentless
search and finally found the treasure buried in a new river
bed formerly part of a parcel of land owned by spouses Tirso
and Tessie. Tlie old river which used to cut through the land
of spouses Ursula and Urbito changed its course through
natural causes.
1. To whom shall the treasure belong? Explain.
2. Suppose Tirso and Tessie were married on 2 August
1988 without executing any antenuptial agreement. One
year after their marriage, Tirso while supervising the clearing
of Tessies inherited land upon the latters request, acciden
tally found the treasure not in the new river bed but on the
280
property o f Tessie.
Explain.
Answer:
1. The treasure was found in a properly of public
dominion, the new river bed. Since Tim did not have
authority from the government and, therefore, was a tres
passer, he is not entitled to the one-half share allotted to a
finder o f hidden treasure. All of it will go to the State. In
addition, under Art. 438 of the NGC, in order that the finder
be entitled to the 1/2 share, the treasure must be found by
chance, that is by sheer luck. In this case, since Tim found
the treasure not by chance but because he relentlessly
searched for it, he is not entitled to any share in the hidden
treasure.
Alternative Answer:
The law grants a one-half share to a finder of hidden
treasure provided he is not a trespasser and the finding is by
chance. It is submitted that Tim is not a trespasser despite
his not getting authority from the government, because the
new river bed where he found the treasure is property for
public use (Art. 420 NCC), to which the public has legitimate
access. The question, therefore, boils down to whether or not
the finding was by chance in view of the fact that Tim
conducted a relentless search" before finding the treasure.
The strict or literal view holds that deliberate or intentional
search precludes entitlement to the one-half Share allotted
b y law to the finder since the phrase by chanCe means by
accident", meaning an unexpected discovery. The liberal
view, however, would sustain Tims right to the allocated
share interpreting the phrase in question as meaning by a
stroke o f good fortune", which does not rule out deliberate or
intentional search. It is submitted that the liberal view
should prevail since in practical reality, hidden treasure is
hardly ever found without conscious effort to find it, and the
strict view would tend to render the codal provision in
question illusory.
2. Since Tirso and Tessie were married before the
effectivity of the Family Code, their property relation is
governed by conjugal partnership of gains. Under Art. 54 of
the Civil Code, the share of the hidden treasure which the law
281
282
Alternative Answer:
If the violation of the contract was attended with bad
faith, there is a ground to recover moral damages. But since
there was a federal regulation which was the basis of the act
complained of, the airline cannot be inbad faith. Hence, only
actual damages can be recovered. The same is true with
regards to exemplary damages.
Question No. 11:
Armando owns, a row of residential apartments in San
Juan, Metro Manila, which he rents out to tenants. On 1
April 1991 he left for the United States without appointing
any administrator to manage his apartments such that
uncollected rentals accumulated for three (3) years, Amparo,
a niece of Armando, concerned with the interest ofh er uncle,
took it upon herself to administer the property. As a
consequence, she incurred expenses in collecting the rents
and in some instances even spent for necessary repairs to
preserve the property.
1, W h at ju rid ica l relation between Am paro and
Armando, if any, has resulted from Amparos unilateral act
of assuming the administration of Armandos apartments?
Explain.
2. What rights and obligations, if any, does Amparo
have under the circumstances? Explain.
Answer:
1. Negotiorum gestio existed between Amparo and
Armando. She voluntarily took charge of the agency or
management of the business or property ofher uncle without
any power from her uncle whose property was neglected. She
is called the gestor negotiorum or officious manager. (Art.
2144, NCC)
2. It is recommended by the Committee that an enu
meration o f any two {2} obligations and two (2) rights as
enumerated in Arts. 2145 to 2152, NCC, would entitle the
examinee to full credit.
Art. 2145. The officious manager shall perform his
duties with all the diligence of a good father of a family, and
283
Answer:
1. The furniture-making machinery is movable pro
perty because it was not installed by the owner of the
tenement. To become immovable under Art. 415 (5) of the
NCC, the machinery must be installed by the owner of the
tenement.
Alternative Answer:
It depends on the circumstances of the case. If the
machinery was attached in a fixed manner, in such a way
that It cannot be separated from the tenement without
breaking the material or causing deterioration thereof, it is
immovable property [Art. 415 (3), NCC], However, if the
machinery can be transported from place to place without
impairment of the tenement to which they were fixed, then it
is movable property. [Art. 416 (4), NCC}
2. It is Immovable property. When there is a provision
in the lease contract making the lessor, at the end of the
lease, owner of the machinery installed by the lessee, thesaid
machinery is considered to have been installed by the lessor
through the lessee who acted merely as his agent. Having
been installed by the owner of the tenement; the machinery
became immovable under Art. 415 of the NCC. (Davao
Sawmill v. Castillo, 61 Phil. 709)
Question No. 14:
Yvette was found to be positive for HIV virus, considered
sexually transmissible, serious and incurable. Her boyfriend
Joseph was aware of her condition and yet married her. After
two (2) years of cohabiting with Yvette, and in his belief that
she would probably never be able to bear him a healthy child,
Joseph now wants to have his marriage with Yvette annulled.
Yvette opposes the suit contending that Joseph is estopped
from seeking annulment oftheir'marriage since he knew even
before their marriage that she was afflicted with HIV virus.
Can the action of Joseph for annulment of his marriage
with Yvette prosper? Discuss fully.
287
Answer:
No. Joseph knew that Yvette was HIV positive at the
time o f the marriage. He is, therefore, not an injured party.
The FC gives the right to annul the marriage only to an
injured party. [Art. 47 (5), FC]
Alternative Answer:
The action for annulment can prosper because the
prescriptive period of five (5) years has not yet lapsed. [Art. 45
(6), FC].
Question No. 15:
Michelle, the French daughter of Penreich, a German
national, died in Spain leaving real properties in the Philip
pines as well as valuable personal properties in Germany.
1. What law determines who shall succeed the de
ceased? Explain your answer and give its legal basis.
2. What law regulates the distribution of the real
properties in the Philippines? Explain your answer and give
its legal basis.
3. What law governs the distribution of the personal
properties in Germany? Explain your answer and give its
legal basis.
Answer:
Assuming that the estate of the decedent is being settled
in the Philippines)
1.
The national law of the decedent (French law) shall
govern in determining who will succeed to his estate. The
legal basis is Art. 16 par. 2, NCC.
Alternative Answer:
French law shall govern the distribution of his real
properties in the Philippines except when the real property is
land which may be transmitted to a foreigner only by
hereditary succession.
288
290
void ab initio on the following grounds: (a) they had not given
their consent to the marriage of their son; (b) there was no
marriage license: (c) the solemnizing officer had no authority
to perform the marriage; and, (d) the solemnizing officer did
not file an affidavit of marriage with the proper civil registrar.
1. Resolve eacn of the contentions ([a] to [d]) raised by
the parents of Isidro. Discuss fully.
2. Does Irma have any successional rights at all?
Discuss fully.
Answer:
1.
(a) The fact that the parents o f Isidro and of Irma did
not give their consent to the marriage did not
make the marriage void ab initio. The marriage
is merely voidable under Art 45 of the FG.
(b) Absence of marriage license did not make the
marriage void ab initio. Since the marriage was
solemnized in articulo mortis, it was exempt from
the license requirement under Art. 31 of the FC.
(c) On the assumption that the assistant pilot was
acting for and in behalf of the airplane chief who
was under disability, and by reason of the extra
ordinary and exceptional circumstances of the
case (le . hostage situation), the marriage was
solemnized by an authorized officer under Art. 7
(3) and Art. 31, of the FC.
(d) Failure of the solemnizing officer to file the
affidavit of marriage did not affect the validity of
the marriage. It is merely an irregularity which
may subj ect the solemnizing officer to sanctions.
Alternative Answer:
Considering that the solemnizing officer has no author
ity to perform the marriage because under Art. 7 the law
authorizes only the airplane chief, the marriage is void,
hence, a, c, and d are immaterial.
2. Irma succeeded to the estate of Isidro as his
surviving spouse to the estate of her legitimate child. When
291
292
Question No. 1:
In Private International Law (Conflict of Laws) what is:
1)
Cognovit?
2) A borrowing statute?
3)
Characterization?
Alternative Answers:
1) a) Cognovit is a confession of judgment whereby a
portion of the complaint is confessed by the defendant who
denies the rest thereof [Philippine law Dictionary, 3rd Ed.)
(Ocampo v. Florenciano, L-M 13553, 2/23/50).
b) Cognovit is a statement of confession . Often
times, it is referred to as a power of attorney" or simply as a
power", it is the written authority of the debtor and his
direction to the clerk of the district court, or justice of the
peace to enter judgment against the debtor as stated therein.
[Words and Phrases, vol. 7, pp. 115-166).
c) Cognovit is a plea in an action which acknow
ledges that the defendant did undertake and promise as the
plaintiff in its declaration has alleged, and that it cannot deny
that it owes and unjustly detains from the plaintiff the sum
claimed by him in his declaration, and consents that ju dg
ment be entered against the defendant for a certain sum.
(Words and Phrases, vol. 7, pp. 115-166).
d)
C o g n o v it is a n o te a u th o riz in g a la w y e r fo r c o n
fe s s io n o f j u d g m e n t b y d e fe n d a n t .
2)
B o r r o w in g S ta tu te " - L a w s o f th e s ta te o r j u r i s d i c
293
Question No. 3:
1) What is the procedure of consulta when an instru
ment is denied registration?
2) Distinguish the Torrens system of land registration
from the system of recording of evidence o f title.
3) How do you register now a deed o f mortgage o f a
parcel of land originally registered under the Spanish Mort
gage Law?.
~
Alternative Answers:
1)
a)
(1) The Register of Deeds shall notify the
interested party in writing, setting forth the defects of the in
strument or the legal ground relied upon for denying the reg
istration, and advising that if he is not agreeable to such
ruling, he may, without withdrawing the documents from the
Registry , elevate the matter by Consulta to the Administrator
of the Land Registration Authority (LRA).
(2) Within five (5) days from receipt of notice
of denial, the party in interest shall file his Consulta with the
Register o f Deeds concerned and pay the consulta fee.
(3) After receipt of the Cons ulta and payment
295
b)
Torrens system of land registration is that which
is prescribed in Act 496 (now PD 1529), which is either
judicial or quasi-judicial. System or recording of evidence of
title is merely the registration of evidence of acquisitions of
land with the Register of Deeds, who annotates the same on
the existing title, cancels the old one and issues a new title
based on the document presented for registration.
3)
a) After the Spanish Mortgage Law was abrogated by
P.D. 892 on February 16, 1976, all lands covered by Spanish
titles that were not brought under the torrens system within
six (6) months from the date thereof have been considered as
unregistered private lands.
Thus, a deed o f mortgage aiTecting land originally regis
tered under the Spanish Mortgage Law is now governed by
the system of registration of transactions or instruments
affecting unregistered land under Section 194 of the Revised
Administrative Code as amended by Act No. 3344. Underthis
law, the instrument or transaction affecting unregistered
land is entered in a book provided for the purpose but the
registration thereof Is purely voluntary and does not ad
versely affect third persons who have a better right.
b)
By recording and registering with the Register of
Deeds of the place where the land is located, in accordance
with Act 3344. However, P.D. 892 required holders of
Spanish title to bring the same under the Torrens System
within 6 months from its effectivity on February 16, 1976.
Question No. 4:
1) Are decisions of the Court of Appeals considered
laws?
2) What are the binding effects of an obiter dictum and
a dissenting opinion?
297
3)
aside?
Alternative Answers:
1). a) No, but decisions of the Court of Appeals may
serve as precedents for inferior courts on points of law not
covered by any Supreme Court decision, and a ruling of the
Court of Appeals may become a doctrine. (Miranda v.
Im p eria l,77 Phil. 1066).
b)
No. Decisions of the Court of Appeals merely
have persuasive, and therefore no mandatory effect. However, a conclusion or pronouncement which covers a point of
law still undecided may still serve as judicial guide and it is
possible that the same maybe raised to. the status of
doctrine, if after it has been subjected to test in the crucible
of analysis, the Supreme Court should find that it has
merits and qualities sufficient for its consideration as a rule
of jurisprudence [Civil Code, Paras).
2) None. Obiter dictum and opinions are not necessary
to the determination of a cas.e. They are not binding and
cannot have the force of official precedents. It is as if the
Court were turning aside from the main topic of the case to
collateral subjects: a dissenting opinion affirms or overrules
a claim, right or obligation. It neither disposes nor awards
anything it merely expresses the view of the dissenter. (Civil
Code, Paras) ,
3) A decision ofa division of the Supreme Court may be
set aside by the Supreme Court sitting en banc: a Supreme
Court decision may be set aside by a contrary ruling of the
Supreme Court itself or by a corrective legislative act.of
Congress, although said laws cannot adversely affect those
favored prior to the Supreme Court decision. (Civil Code,
Paras).
Question No. 5:
1) Can a husband and wife form a limited partnership
298
299
partnerships;
2) The Articles of Partnership must provide that
all partners will manage the partnership, and
they shall be jointly and severally liable; and
3)
c)
No. A corporation may not be
because the principle of mutual agency in general
ship allowing the other general partner to bind the
tion will Violate the corporation law principle that
board of directors may bind the corporation.
a general partner
partner
corpora
only the
3)
No, for the same reasons given in the Answer to
Number 2 above.
Question No. 6 :
Paulita left the conjugal home because of the excessive
drinking o f her husband, Alberto. Paulita, out o fh e r own
endeavor, was able to buy a parcel of land which she was able
to register under her name with the addendum Widow. She
also acquired stocks in a listed corporation registered in her
name. Paulita sold the parcel of land to Rafael, who first
examined the original of the transfer certificate of title.
1) Has Alberto the right to share in the shares of stock
acquired by Paulita?
2) Can Alberto recover the land from Rafael?
Alternative Answers:
1.
a) Yes. The Family Code provides that all prop
erty acquired during the marriage, whether the acquisition
appears to have been made, contracted or registered in the
name of one or both spouses, is presumed to be absolute
community property unless the contrary is proved.
b)
Yes. The shares are presumed to be absolute
community property having been acquired during the mar
300
riage despite the fact, that those shares were registered only
in her name. Albertos right to claim his share will only arise,
however, at dissolution.
c) The presumption is still that the shares of stock
are owned in common. Hence, they will form part of the
absolute community or the conjugal partnership depending
on what the property regime is.
d) Since Paulita acquired the shares of stock by
onerous title during the marriage, these are part of the
conjugal or absolute community property as the case may be
(depending on whether the marriage was celebrated prior to,
or after, the effectivity of the Family Code). Her physical
separation from her husband did not dissolve the community
o f property. Hence, the husband has a right to share in the
shares of stock.
2)
a) Under a community of property, whether abso
lute or relative, the disposition of property belonging to such
community is void if done by just one spouse without the
consent of the other or authority o f the proper court. How
ever, the land was registered in the name of Paulita as
widow". Hence, the buyer has the right to rely upon what
appears In the record of the Register of Deeds and should,
consequently, be protected. Alberto cannot recover the land
from Rafael but would have the right of recourse against his
wife.
b) The parcel of land is absolute community pro
perty having been acquired during the marriage and through
Paulitas industry despite the registration being only in the
name of Paulita. The land being community property, its sale
to Rafael without the consent of Alberto is void. However,
since the land is registered in the name of Paulita as widow,
there is nothing in the title which would raise a suspicion for
Rafael to make inquiry. He, therefore, is an innocent
purchaser for value from whom the land may no longer be
recovered.
c) No. Rafael is an innocent purchaser in good faith
who, upon relying on the correctness of the certificate of
301
302
Alternative Answers:
1) a) It depends on whether or not Bing was at least
18 years old at the time Carol asserts the prerogative to take
custody of Bing. If she.was at least 18 years old, then she is
no longer under parental authority and neither Carol nor
Norma can assert the prerogative to take custody. However,
if she was less than 18 years old, then Norma has a better
right since the adoption by Norma of Bing terminates the
parental authority of Carol over Bing.
_b)
The natural mother, Carol, should have the
better right in light of the principle that the childs welfare is
the paramount consideration in custody rights. Obviously,
Bings continued stay in her adopting parents house,' where
interaction with the call' girls is inevitable, would be detri
mental to her moral and spiritual development. This could
be the reason for Bings expressed desire to return to her
natural mother. It should be noted, however, that Bing is no
longeF a minor, being 19 years of age now. It is doubtful that
a court can still resolve the question of custody over one who
is sui ju ris and not otherwise incapacitated.
2) a) On the assumption that Bing is still a minor or
otherwise incapacitated, Carol may petition the proper court
for resolution or rescission o f the decree of adoption on the
ground that the adopting parents have exposed. Or are
exposing, the child to corrupt influence, tantamount to
giving her corrupting orders or examples. She can also ask
for the revesting in her of parental authority over Bing. If,
however, Bing is already 19 years of age and therefore no
longer a minor, it is not Carol but Bing herself who can
petition the court for judicial rescission of the adoption,
provided she can show a ground for disinheritance of an
ascendant.
b)
Carol may file an action to deprive Norma of
parental authority under Article 231 of the F amily Code or file
an action for the rescission of the adoption under Article 191
303
304
305
Question No. 9:
1) The complete publication of the Family Code was
made on August 4, 1987. On September 4, 1987, Junior
Cruz and Gemma Reyes were married before a municipal
mayor. Was the marriage valid?
2) Suppose the couple got married on September 1,
1994 at the Manila Hotel before the Philippine Consul
General to Hongkong* who was on vacation In Manila. The
couple executed an affidavit consenting to the celebration of
the marriage at the Manila Hotel. Is the marriage valid?
Answer:
1) a) Yes, the marriage is valid. The Family Code took
effect on August 3, 1988. At the time of the marriage on
September 4, 1987, municipal mayors were empowered to
solemnize marriage under the Civil Code of 1950.
2) a) The marriage is not valid. Consuls and viceconsuls are empowered to solemnize marriages between
Philippine citizens abroad in the consular office of the foreign
country to which they were assigned and have no power to
solemnize marriage on Philippine soil.
b) A Philippine consul is authorized by law to solem
nize marriages abroad between Filipino citizens. He has no
authority to solemnize a marriage in the Philippines. Conse
quently, the marriage in question is void, unless either or
both of the contracting parties believed in good faith that the
consul general had authority to solemnize their marriage in
which case the marriage is valid.
Questian No. 10:
On his deathbed, Vicente was executing a will. In the
room were Carissa, Carmela, Comelio and Atty. Cimpo, a
notary public. Suddenly, there was a street brawl which
caught Comelios attention, prompting him to look out the'
window. Comelio did not see Vicente sign a will. Is the will
valid?
306
Alternative Answers:
a) Yes. The will is valid. The law does not require
a witness to actually see the testator sign the will. It is
sufficient if the witness could have seen the act of signing had
he chosen to do so by casting his eyes to the proper direction.
307
b)
c)
d)
e)
2)
No. The mortgage being an accessory contract
prescribed with the loan. The novation of the loan, however,
did not expressly include the mortgage, hence, the mortgage
is extinguished under Article 1296 of the NCC. The contract
has been extinguished by the novation or extinction of the
principal obligation Insofar as third parties are concerned.
Question No. 12:
Rosa and Ariel were married in the Catholic Church of
Tarlac, Tarlac on January 5, 1988. in 1990, Ariel went to
Saudi Arabia to work. There, after being converted into
Islam, Ariel married Mystica. Rosa learned of the second
marriage of Ariel on January 1, 199.2 when Ariel returned to
the Philippines with Mystica. Rosa filed an action for legal
separation on February 5, 1994.
1) Does Rosa have legal grounds to ask for legal
separation?
2)
308
Alternative Answers:
1) a) Yes, the abandonment of Rosa by Ariel for more
than one (1) year is a ground for legal separation unless upon
returning to the Philippines, Rosa agrees to cohabit with Ariel
which is allowed under the Muslim Code. In this case, there
is condonation.
1
b)
Yes. The contracting of a subsequent bigamous
marriage whether in the Philippines or abroad is a ground for
legal separation under Article 55(7) of the Family Code.
Whether the second marriage is valid or not, Ariel having
converted into Islam, is immaterial.
2) No. Under Article 57 of the Family Code, the
aggrieved spouse must file the action Within five (5) years
from the occurrence of the cause. The subsequent marriage
o f Ariel could not have occurred earlier than 1990, the time
he went to Saudi Arabia. Hence, Rosa has until 1995 to bring
the action under the Family Code.
Question No. 13:
In 1991, Victor established judicially out of conjugal
property, a family home in Manila worth P200,000.00 and
extrajudicially a second family home in Tagaytay worth
P50.000.00. Victor leased the family home in Manila to a
foreigner. Victor and his family transferred to another house
of his in Pasig.
Can the two family homes be the subject of execution on
a judgment against Victors wife for non-payment Of the
purchase in 1992 of household appliances?
Answer:
The two (2) so-called family homes can be the subject of
execution. Neither of the abodes are considered family
homes because for purposes of availing the benefits under
the Family Code, there can only be one (1) family home which
309
5)
Answer:
1) Raffy may recover the amount of the promissory
note o f P I million, together with Interest at the legal rate from
the date o f judicial or extrajudicial demand. In addition,
however, Inasmuch as the debtor is in bad faith, he is liable
for all damages which may be reasonably attributed to the
non-performance of the obligation. (Art. 2201(2;), NCC).
2) Yes, under Article 2220, NCC moral damages are
recoverable in case of breach of contract where the defendant
acted fraudulently or in bad faith.
3) Nominal damages may not be recoverable in this
case because Raffy may already be indemnified of his losses
with the award of actual and compensatory damages. Nominal
damages are adjudicated only in order that a right of the
plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the defendant
may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of
indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him.
310
311
312
b)
No, the contention of the accused is not correct
because upon appeal to the Appellate Court, the court
acquired jurisdiction over the entire case, criminal as well as
civil. Since the conviction of homicide had been appealed,
there is no finality in the amount of indemnity because the
civil liability arising from the crime and the judgment on the
crime has not yet become final.
c) Yes. Since the'civil indemnity is an award in the civil
action arising from the criminal offense, the rule that a party
cannot be granted affirmative relief unless he himself has
appealed should apply. Therefore, it was error for the Court1
of Appeals to have expanded the indemnity since the ju dg
ment on the civil liability had become final.
d) No. Courts can review matters not assigned as
errors. (Hydro Resource vs. CA , 204 SCRA 309).
Question No. 17;
Dino sued Ben for damages because the latter had failed
to deliver the antique Marcedes Benz car Dino had purchased
from Ben, which was by agreement due for delivery on
December 31, 1993. Ben, in his answer to Dinos complaint,
said Dinos claim has no basis for the suit, because as the car
313
315
b)
No. Dannys right as pledgee is to sell the pledged
shares at a public sale and keep the proceeds as collateral for
the loan. There is no showing that the fall in the value o f the
pledged property was attributable to the pledgers fault or
fraud. On the contrary, the economic crisis was the culprit.
Had the pledgee been deceived as to the substance or quality,
of the pledged shares of stock, he would have had the right
to claim another thing in their place or to the immediate
1 payment of the obligation. This is not the case here.
Question No. 20:
Able, a corporation domiciled in State A, but, doing
business in the Philippines, hired Eric, a Filipino engineer,
for its project in State B. In the contract of employment
executed by the.parties in State B, it was stipulated that the
contract could be terminated at the companys will, which
stipulation is allowed in State B. When Eric was summarily
dismissed by Able, he sued Able for damages in the Philip
pines.
316
317
Question No. 1:
A and B, both 18 years old, were sweethearts study
ing In Manila. On August 3, 1988, while in first year col
lege, they eloped. They stayed In the house of a mutual
friend in town X, where they were able to obtain a mar
riage license. On August 30, 1988, their marriage was
solemnized by the town mayor of X in his office. Thereaf
ter, they returned to Manila and continued to live sepa
rately In their respective boarding houses, concealing from
their pareints, who were living in the province what they
had done. In. 1992, after graduation from college, A and B
decided to break their relation and parted ways. Both
went home to their respective towns to live and work.
lj Was the marriage of A and B solemnized on Au
gust 30, 1988 by the town mayor of X in his office a valid
marriage? Explain your answer.
Answer:
The marriage of A and B is void because the solem
nizing officer had no legal authority to solemnize the mar
riage. But if either or both parties believed in good faith
that the solemnizing officer had the legal authority to do
so, the marriage is voidable because the marriage between
the. parties, both below 21 years of age, was solemnized
without the consent of the parents. (Art. 35, par. (2) and
Art. 45 par. (1),,Family Code)
2)
Cari either or both of them contract marriage with
another person without committing bigamy? Explain your
answer.
Answer:
E it h e r o r b o th o f the p a rtie s c a n n o t c o n tra c t m a r r ia g e
in th e P h ilip p in e s w ith a n o t h e r p e r s o n w ith o u t c o m m ittin g
b ig a m y , u n le s s
th e re is
c o m p lia n c e w ith
th e r e q u ir e
m e n t s o f A rtic le 52 F a m ily C o d e, n a m e ly : th ere m u s t be a
318
321
Can A recover his car from the savings and loan asso
ciation? Explain your answer.
Answer:
. Under the prevailing rulings of the Supreme Court, A
can recover the car from the Savings and Loan Association
provided he pays the price at which the Association bought
the car at a public auction. Under that doctrine, there
has been an unlawful deprivation by B of A of his car and,
therefore, A can recover it from any person in possession
thereof. But since it was bought at a public auction in
good faith by the Sayings and Loan Association, he must
reimburse the Association at the price for which the car
was bought.
Alternative Answer:
Yes, A can recover his car from the Savings and Loan
Association. In a Chattel Mortgage, the mortgagor must
be the absolute owner o f the thing morgaged. Further
more. the person constituting the mortgage must have the
free disposal of the property, and in the absence thereof,
m ust be legally authorized for the purpose. In the case at
bar, these essential requisites did not apply to the mortga
gor B, hence the Chattel Mortgage was not valid.
Question No. 6 :
On January 2, 1986, A executed a deed of donation
inter vivos of a parcel of land to Dr. B who had earlier
constructed thereon a building in which researches on the
dreadpd disease AIDS were being conducted.
The deed,
acknowledged before a notary public, was handed over by
A to Dr. B who received it. A few days after, A flew to
Davao City. Unfortunately, the airplane he was riding
crashed on landing killing him. Two days after the Unfor
tunate accident. Dr. B v upon advice o f a lawyer, executed
a deed acknowledged before a notary public accepting the
donation.
Is the donation effective? Explain your answer.
322
Answer:
No, the donation is not effective. The law requires
that the separate acceptance of the donee of an immovable
must be done in a public document during the lifetime of
the donor (Art. 746 & 749, Civil Code) In this case, B exe
cuted the deed o f acceptance before a notary public after
the donor had already died.
Question No. 7:
Maria, to spite her husband Jorge, whom she sus
pected was having an affair with another woman, executed
a will, unknown to him, bequeathing all the properties she
inherited from her parents, to her sister Miguela. Upon
her death, the will was presented for probate. Jorge op
posed probate o f the will on the ground that the will was
executed by his wife without his knowledge, much less
consent, and that it deprived him of his legitime. After all,
he had given her no cause for disinheritance, added Jorge
in his opposition.
How will you rule on Jorges opposition to the probate
o f Marias will, if you were the Judge?
Answer;
As Judge, I shall rule as follows: Jorges opposition
should be sustained in part and denied in part. Jorges
omission as spouse of Maria is not preterition of a compul
sory heir in the direct line.
Hence, Art. 854 of the Civil
Code does not apply, and the institution of Miguela as heir
is valid, but only to the extent of the free portion of onehalf. Jorge is still entitled to one-half o f the estate as his
legitime. (Art. 1001, Civil Code)
Alternative Answers:
a)
As Judge, I shall rule as follows: Jorges opposi
tion should be sustained in part and denied in part,
This is a case o f ineffective disinheritance under Art. 918
of the Civil Code, because the omission of the compulsory
heir Jorge by Maria was intentional. Consequently, the
institution of Miguela as heir is void only insofar as the le
gitime of Jorge is prejudiced. Accordingly; Jorge is en
titled to his legitime of one-half of the estate, and Miguela
gets the other half.
323
.
Answer:
BPI is not correct in cancelling the contract with LT.
In Lina Topacio v. Court o f Appeals and BPI Investment
(G. R. No. 102606, July 3. 1993, 211 SCRA 291). the
Supreme Court held that the earnest money Is part of the
purchase price and is proof o f the perfection of the con
tract. Secondly, notarial or judicial rescission under Art.
1592 and 1991 of the Civil Code is necessary [Taguba v.
de Leon, 132 SCRA 722.)
Alternative Answer:
BPI is correct in cancelling its contract with LT but
BPI must do so by way of judicial rescission under Article
1191 Civil Code. The law requires a judicial action, and
mere notice of rescission Is insufficient if it is resisted. The
law also provides that slight breach is not a ground for re
scission (Song Fo & Co. vs. Hawaiian PhiL Co., 47 Phils.
821). Delay in the fulfillment of the obligation (Art. 1169,
Civil Code) is a ground to rescind, only,if time Is o f the
essence. Otherwise, the court may refuse the rescission if
there is a just cause for the fixing of a period.
325
Question No. 9:
A is the owner o f a lot on which he constructed a
building in the total cost of P 10,000,000.00. O f that
amount B contributed P5.000,000.00 provided that the
building as a whole would be leased to him (B) for a period
of ten years from January 1, 1985 to December 31. 1995
at a rental of P I 00,000.00 a. year. To such condition, A
agreed. On December 20, 1990, the building was totally
burned.
Soon thereafter, A s workers cleared the debris
and started construction of a new building. Bi then served
notice upon A that he would occupy the building being
constructed upon completion, for the unexpired portion of
the lease term, explaining that he had spent partly for the
construction of the building that was burned. A rejected
Bs demand.
Did A do right in rejecting Bs demand?
Answer:
Yes, A was correct in rejecting the demand of B. As a
result o f the total destruction of the building by fortuituous event, the lease was extinguished. (Art. 1655, Civil
Code.)
Question No. 10:
A, B and C formed a partnership for the purpose of
contracting With the Government in the construction of
one of its bridges. On June 30, 1992, after completion of
the project, the bridge was turned over by the partners to
the Government.
On August 30, 1992, D, a supplier of
materials used in the project sued A for collection of the
indebtedness to him. A moved to dismiss the complaint
against him on the ground that it was the ABC partnership
that is liable for the debt. D replied that ABC partnership
was dissolved upon completion of the project for which
purpose the partnership was formed.
Will you dismiss the complaint against B if you were
the judge?
Answer:
As Judge, I would not dismiss the complaint against
A, because A is still liable as a general partner for his pro
326
Answer:
Yes, the Able Construction, Inc. is entitled to the re
lie f sought under Article 1267, Civil Code. The law pro
vides: When the service has become so difficult as to be
manifestly beyond the contemplation of the parties, the
obligor may also be released therefrom, in whole or in
part.
Question No. 12:
On January 2, 1980, A and B entered into a contract
whereby A sold to B a parcel of land for and in considera
tion of P10,000.00, A reserving to himself the right to
repurchase the same. Because they were friends, no pe
riod was agreed upon for the repurchase of the property.
1)
chase?
327
2)
If A fails to redeem the property within the allow
able period, what would you advise B to do for his better
protection?
Answer:
1) A can exercise his right of repurchase within four
(4) years from the date of the contract (Art. 1606; Civil
Code).
2) I would advise B to file an action for consolidation
of title and obtain a judicial order of consolidation which
must .be recorded in the Registry of Property (Art. 1607,
Civil Code).
Question No. 13:
In September, 1972, upon'declaration of martial rule
in the Philippines, A, together with his wife and children,
disappeared from his residence along A. Mabini Street.
Ermita, Manila. B, his immediate neighbor, noticing that
mysterious disappearance of A and his family, closed the
doors and windows of his house to prevent it from being
burglarized. Years passed without B hearing from A and
his family. B' continued taking care of A's house, even
causing minor repairs to be done at his house to preserve
it. In 1976, when business began to perk up in the area,
an enterprising man, C, approached B and proposed that
they build stores at the ground floor of the house and
convert its second floor into a pension house. B agreed to
C's proposal and together they spent for the construction
of stores at the ground floor and the conversion of the sec
ond floor into a pension house.
While construction was
going on, fire occurred at a nearby house. The houses at
the entire block, including As, were burned. After the
EDSA revolution in February 1986, A and hts family re
turned from the United States where they took refuge in
1972. Upon learning of what happened to his h ou se,A
sued B for damages. B pleaded as a defense that he
merely took charge of his house under the principle of
negoliorum geslio. He was not liable as Ihe burning of the
house is a fortuitous event.
Is B liable to A for damages under the foregoing
circumstances?
328
Answer:
No, B is not liable for damages, because he is a gestor
in negotiorum gestio (Art ; 2144, Civil Code)
Furthermore, B is not liable to A because Article 2147
of the Civil Code is not applicable.
B did not undertake risky operations which the owner
was not accustomed to embark upon:
a) he has not preferred his own interest to that of the
owner:
b) he has not failed to return the property or busi
ness after demand by the owner; and
c) he has not assumed the management in bad faith.
Alternative Answer:
He would be liable under Art. 2147 (1) of the Civil
Code, because he used the property for an operation which
the operator is not accustomed to, and in so doing, he
exposed the house to increased risk; namely the operation
of a pension house on the second floor and stores on the
first floor.
Question No. 14:
Peter Co, a trader from Manila, has dealt business
with Allied Commodities in Hongkong for five years. All
through the years, Peter Co accumulated an indebtedness
of P500.000.00 with Allied Commodities. Upon demand
by its agent in Manila, Peter Co paid Allied Commodities
by check the amount owed. . Upon deposit in the payees
account in Manila, the check was dishonored for insuffi
ciency of funds. For and in consideration of P I.00, Allied
Commodities assigned the credit to Hadji Butu who brought
suit against Peter Co in the RTC of Manila for recovery of
the amount owed. Peter Co moved to dismiss the com
plaint against him on the ground that Hadji Butu was not
a real party in interest and, therefore, without legal capa
city to sue and that he had not agreed to a subrogation of
creditor.
329
15:
330
Answer:
1) No, the Motion to Dismiss should not be granted.
Article 236 of the Family Code as amended by Republic
Act 6809, provides in the third paragraph that nothing in
this Code shall be construed to derogate from the duty or
responsibility o f parents and guardians for children and
wards below twenty-one years of age mentioned in the
second and third paragraphs of Article 2180 of the Civil
Code".
2) The liability of Julios parents to Jakes parents
arises from quasi-delict (Arts. 2176 and 2180 Civil
Code) and shall cover specifically the following:
a) P50.000.00 for the death of the son;
b)
c)
moral damages.
Answer:
Art. 651 of the Civil Code provides that the width of
the easement must be sufficient to meet the needs of the
dominant estate, and may accordingly change from time to
time. It is the need of. the dominant estate which deter
mines the width of the passage. These needs may vary
from time to time. As Tomas' business grows, the need for
use of m odem conveyances requires widening of the ease
ment.
Alternative Answer:
The facts show that the need for a wider right of way
arose from the increased production owing to the acquisi
tion by Tomas of an additional area. Under Art. 626 of the
Civil Code, the easement can be used only for the immov
able originally contemplated. Hence, the increase in width
is justified and should have been granted.
Question No. 17:
Joaquin Reyes bought from Julio Cruz a residential
lot o f 300 square meters in Quezon City for which Joaquin
paid Julio the amount of P300,000.00. When the defed
was about to be prepared Joaquin told Julio that it be
drawn in the name of Joaquina Roxas, his acknowledged
natural child. Thus, the deed was so prepared and exe
cuted by Julio. Joaquina then built a house on the lot
where she, her husband and children resided.
Upon
Joaquins death; his legitimate children sought to recover
possession and ownership of the lot, claiming that Joaquina
Roxas was but a trustee of their father.
Will the action against Joaquina Roxas prosper?
Answer:
Yes, because there is a presumed donation in favor of
Joaquina under Art. 1448 of the Civil Code (De los Santos
v. Reyes, 27 January 1992, 206 SCRA 437). However, the
donation should be collated to the hereditary estate and
the legitime of the other heirs should be preserved.
332
Alternative Answer:
Yes, the action against Joaquina Roxas will prosper,
but only to the extent of the aliquot hereditary rights of
the legitimate children as heirs. Joaquina will be entitled
to retain her own share as an illegitimate child. (Arts.
1440 and 1453, Civil Code; Art. 176, F. C.)
Question No. 18:
A, upon request, loaned his passenger jeepney to B to
enable B to bring his sick wife from Paniqui, Tarlac to the
Philippine General Hospital in Manila for treatment. On
the w ay back to Paniqui, after leaving his wife at the hos
pital, people stopped the passenger Jeepney. B stopped for
them and allowed them to ride on board, accepting pay
ment from them just as in the case of ordinary passenger
jeepneys plying their route. As B was crossing Bamban,
there was an onrush of lahar from Mt. Pinatubo. The jeep
that was loaned to him was wrecked.
1) What do you call the contract that was entered
into by A and B with respect to the passenger jeepney that
was loaned by A to B to transport the latters sick wife to
Manila?
2) Is B obliged to pay A for the use of the passenger
jeepney?
3) Is B liable to A for the loss of the jeepney?
Answer:
1) The contract is called commodatum. (Art. 1933,
Civil Code)
2) No, B Is not obliged to pay A for the use of the
passenge-r jeepney because commodatum is essentially
gratuitous. (Art. 1933, Civil Code)
3) Yes, because B devoted the thing to a purpose dif
ferent from that for which it has been loaned (Art. 1942,
par. 2, Civil Code)
333
Alternative Answer:
No, because an obligation which consists in the deli
very of a determinate thing shall be extinguished if it should
be lost or destroyed without the fault of the debtor, and
before he has incurred in delay. {Art. 1262, Civil Code)
Question No. 19:
Maria and Luis, both Filipinos, were married by a
Catholic priest in Lourdes Church, Quezon City in 1976.
Luis was drunk on the day of his wedding. In fact, he
slumped at the altar soon after the ceremony. After mar
riage, Luis never had a steady job because he was drunk
most o f the time. Finally, he could not get employed at
all because o f drunkenness. Hence, it was Maria who had
to earn a living to support herself and her child begotten
with Luis. In 1986, Maria filed a petition in the church
matrimonial court in Quezon City to annul her marriage
with Luis on the ground of psychological incapacity to
comply with his marital obligation.
Her petition was
granted by the church matrimonial court.
1) Can Maria now get married legally to another man
under Philippine laws after her marriage to Luis was an
nulled by the church matrimonial court? Explain.
2) What must Maria do to enable her to get married
lawfully to another man under Philippine laws?
Answers:
1) No, Maria cannot validly contract a subsequent
marriage without a court declaration o f nullity of the first
marriage. The law does not recognize the church declara
tion of nullity of a marriage.
2) To enable Maria to get married lawfully to another
man, she must obtain a judicial declaration of nullity of
the prior marriage under Article 36 Family Code.
Question No. 20:
On June 30, 1986, A filed in the RTC of Abra an
application lor registration of title to a parcel of land under
P. D. No. 1529, claiming that since June 12, 1945, he has
334
335
Answer:
(a) Rico and Cora are the co-owners of the riceland. The
regime is that of co-ownership (Art. 147, Family Code, first,
paragraph).
(Optional Addendum: However, alter Ricos marriage to
Letty, the half interest of Rico in the riceland will then become
absolute community property of Rico and Letty.)
(b) Rico is the exclusive owner of the coconut land. The
regime is a sole/singleproprietorship (Art. 148, Family Code,
first paragraph is applicable, and not Art. 147 Family Code).
(Optional Addendum: However, after Ricos marriage to
Letty, the coconut land of Rico will then become absolute
community property of Rico and Letty.)
(c) Rico and Letty are the co-owners. The regime is the
Absolute Community of Property (Arts. 75,90 and 91, Family
Code).
Question No. 3:
In June 1988, X obtained a loan from A and executed
with Y as solidary co-maker a'promissory note In favor of A
for the sum of P200.000.00. The loan was payable at
P20.000.00 with, interest monthly within the first week of
each month beginning July 1988 until maturity in April
1989. To secure the payment of the loan, X put up as security
a chattel mortgage on his car, a Toyota Corolla sedan.
Because of failure of X and Y to pay the principal amount of
338
Answer:
(a). This first defense of Y is untenable. Y is still liable
as solidary debtor. The creditor may proceed against any one
of. the solidary debtors. The demand against one does not
preclude further demand against the others so long as the
debt is not fully paid.
(b) The second defense ofY is untenable. Y is still liable.
The chattel mortgage is only given as a security and not as
payment for the debt in case of failure to pay. Y as a solidary
co-maker is not relieved of further liability on the promissory
note as a result of the foreclosure of the chattel mortgage.
(c) The third defense of Y is untenable. Y is a surety of
X and the extrajudicial demand against the principal debtor
is not inconsistent with ajudicial demand against the surety.
A suretyship may co-exist with a mortgage.
339
(d)
The fourth defense of Y iis untenable. Y is liable for
the entire prestation since Y incurred a solidary obligation
with X.
(Arts. 1207; 1216, 1252 and 2047 Civil Code; Bicol
Savings and Loan Associates vs. Guinhawa 188 SCRA 642)
Question Number 4:
A owns a parcel of residential land worth P500.000.00
Unknown to A, a residential house costing P100.000.00 is
built on the entire parcel by B who claims ownership of the
land. Answer all the following questions based on the
premise that B is a builder in good faith and A is a landowner
in good faith.
a)
340
Question Number 5:
F had three (3) legitimate children: A, B, and C. B has
one (1) legitimate child X. C has two (2) legitimate children:
Y and Z.
Graphically illustrated, the relationships are as follows;
341
Answer:
(a) B = 1/2
(c)
X = 1/2 by representation of B
C = 1/2
Y = 1/4 by representation of C
(b) B = 1/2
Z = 1/4 by representation of C
C = 1/2
loan.
3. B engaged a contractor to build a concrete fence all
around the lot.
4.
Answer:
(a) Yes. A s sole decision to repair the foundation is
binding upon B and C. B and C must contribute 2/3 of the
expense. Each co-owner has the right to compel the other co
owners to contribute to the expense of preservation of the
thing (the house) owned in common in proportion to their
respective interests (Arts. 485 and 488, Civil Code).
(b) The mortgage shall not bind the 1/3 right and
interest of A and shall be deemed to cover only the rights and
interests of B and C in the house and lot. The mortgage shall
be limited to the portion (2/3) which may be alloted to B and
343
Question Number 7:
A owned a parcel of unregistered land located on the
Tarlac side of the boundary between Tarlac and Pangasinan.
His brother B owned the adjoining parcel of unregistered land
on the Pangasinan side.
A sold the Tarlac parcel to X in a deed of sale executed
as a public instrument by A and X. After X paid in full the
price o f the sale, X too k possession of the Pangasinan parcel
in the belief that it was the Tarlac parcel covered by the deed
of sale executed by A and X.
After twelve (12) years,, a controversy arose between B
and X on the issue of the ownership of the Pangasinan parcel.
B claims a vested right of ownership over the Pangasi
nan parcel because B never sold that parcel to X or to anyone
else.
Oil the other hand, X claims a vested right of ownership
over the Pangasinan parcel by acquisitive prescription, be
cause X possessed this parcel for over ten (10) years under
claim o f ownership.
344
Answer:
At this point in time, X cannot claim the right of vested
ownership over the Pangasinan parcel by acquisitive pre
scription. In addition to the requisites common to ordinary
and extraordinary acquisitive prescription consisting of
uninterrupted, peaceful, public, adverse and actual posses
sion in the concept of owner, ordinary acquisitive prescrip
tion for ten (1.0) years requires (1) possession in good faith
and (2) ju st title. Just title means that the adverse claimant
came into possession of the property through one of the
modes recognized by law for the acquisition of ownership but
the grantor was not the owner or could not transmit any right
(Art. 1129, Civil Code). In this case, there is no j ust title and
no mode*1that can be invoked by X for the acquisition of the
Pangasinan parcel. There was no constructive delivery of the
Pangasinan parcel because it was not the subject-matter of
the deed of sale.
Hence, B retains ownership of the Pangasinan parcel of
land.
Question Number 8:
A as principal appointed B is his agent granting him
general and unlimited management over A s properties,
stating that A withholds no power from B. and that the agent
may execute such acts as he may consider appropriate.
Accordingly, B leased A s parcel of land in Manila to C
for four (4) years at P60.000.00 per year, payable annually in
advance.
B leased another parcel o f land o f A in Caloocan City to
D without a fixed term at P3.000.00 per month payable
monthly.
B sold to E a third parcel of land belonging to A located
in Quezon City for three (3) times the price that was listed in
the inventory by A to B.
All those contracts were executed by B while A was
confined due to illness in the Makati Medical Center.
345
Answer:
The agency couched in general terms comprised only
acts of administration (Art. 1877, Civil Code). The lease
contract on the Manila parcel is not valid, not enforceable
and not binding upon A. F orB to .lease the property to C, for
more than one (1) year, Am ust provide B with a special power
o f attorney (Art. 1878, Civil Code).
The lease of the Caloocan City property to D is valid and
binding Upon A. Since the lease is without a fixed term, it is
understood to be from month to month, since the rental is
payable monthly (Art. 1687, Civil Code).
The sale Of the Quezon City parcel to E is not valid and
not binding upon A. B needed a special power of attorney to
validly sell the land (Arts. 1877 and 1878, Civil Code). The
sale of the land at a very good price does not cure the defect
of the contract arising, from lack of authority.
Question Number 9:
X and Y staged a daring bank robbery in Manila at 10:30
A.M. in the morning of a regular business day, and escaped
with their loot of two (2) bags, each bag containingP50,000.00.
During their flight to elude the police, X and Y entered
the nearby locked house of A, then working in his Quezon
City office. From A s house, X and Y stole a box containing
cash totalling P50,000.00 which box A had been keeping in
deposit for his friend B.
In their huriy, X and Y left in A s bedroom one (1) of the
bags which they had taken from the bank.
With X and Y now at large and nowhere to be found, the
bag containing P50.000.00 is now claimed by B, by the Mayor
of Manila, and by the bank.
346
Answer:
B would have no rignt to claim the money. Article 1990
of the Civil Code is not applicable. The law refers to another
thing received in substitution of the object deposited and is
predicated upon something exchanged.
The Mayor of Manila cannot invoke. Article 719 of the
Civil Code which requires the finder to deposit the thing with
the Mayor only when the previous possessor is unknown.
In this case, a must return the bag of money to the bank
as the previous possessor and known Owner (Arts. 719 and
1990. Civil Code).
c)
Answer:
(a) No. The owner of the bus cannot raise thie defense
because the carriers liability is based on breach of contract.
(b) Yes. D can raise the defense because his liability is
based on a quasi-delict.
(c) Because X suffered physical injuries,. X can claim
moral damages against D. B ut as against the owner o f the
bus, X can claim moral damages only if X proves reckless
negligence of the carrier amounting to fraud.
(d) Z ca n claim moral damages against both defendants
because the rules on damages arising from death due to a
quasi-delict are also applicable to death of a passenger
caused by breach of contract by a Common carrier (Arts.
1755, 1756, 1764, 2206 and 2219, Civil Code).
Answer:
The essential elements are: (1) that the petitioner has
a real or dominical right; (2) that he has been deprived thereof
through fraud; (3) that the petition is filed within one (1) year
from the issuance of the decree ; and (4) that the property has
not yet been transferred to an innocent purchaser (Rublieo
vs. Orellana 30 SCRA 511; Libudan vs. Gil 45 SCRA 17).
Optional extended answer:
Petition for review of the Decree of Registration. A
remedy expressly provided in Section 32 of P. D. No. 1529
348
(formerly Section 38, Act 496), this remedy has the following
elements:
a. The petition must be filed by a person claiming
dominical or other real rights to the land registered in the
name of respondent.
b. The registration of the land in the name of respon
dent was procured by means of actual, (not just constructive)
fraud, which must be extrinsic, Fraud is actual if the
registration was made through deceit or any other inten
tional act of downright dishonesty to enrich oneself at the
expense of another. It is extrinsic when it is something that
was not raised, litigated and passed upon in the main
proceedings.
c. The petition must be filed within one (1) year from
the date of the issuance of the decree.
d. Title to the land has not passed to an innocent
purchaser for value (Libudan vs. Gil, 45. SCRA 27, 1972),
Rublico vs. Orrelana, 30 SCRA 511, 1969); RP vs. CA, 57 G.
R. No. 40402, March 16, 1987).
1. The buyer in good faith of a registered parcel of
land does not have to look beyond the torrens title in search
for any hidden defect or inchaote right which may later
invalidate or diminish his right to what he purchased (Lopez
vs. CA, G. R. 49739, January 20, 1989).
Answer:
A should be hired as Secretary. The decision for the
hiring of A prevails because it is an act of administration
which can be performed by the duly appointed managing
partners, W and X.
B cannot be hired, because in case of a tie in the decision
of the managing partners, the deadlock must be decided by
the partners owning the controlling interest. In this case, the
opposition o fX and Y prevails because Y owns the controlling
interest (Art. 1801, Civil Code).
Answer:
(a) The juridical relation is that of the quasi-contract of
negotiorum gestio. Y is the gestor or.officious manager"
and X is the owner (Art. 2144, Civil Code).
(b) Y must render an account, of his operations and
deliver to X the price he received for the sale of the harvested
fish (Art. 2145, Civil Code),
(c) X must pay the loan obtained by Y from W because
X must answer for obligations contracted with third persons
in the interest o f the owner (Art. 2150, Civil Code).
(d) Express ratification by X provides the effects o f an
express agency and X is liable to pay the commissions
habitually received by the gestor as manager (Art. 2149 . Civil
Code).
Question Number 14:
X and Y entered into a contract in Australia, whereby it
was agreed that X would build a commercial building for Y in
the Philippines, and in payment for the construction, Y will
transfer and convey his cattle ranch located in the United
States in favor of X.
What law would govern:
a) The validity of the contract?
b) The performance of the contract?
c)
Answer:
(a)
The validity of the contract will be governed by Aus
tralian law, because the validity refers to the element of the
making of the contract in this case:
351
352
Question Number 1:
A. How does the 1987
family as an institution?
Answer:
A. Sec. 2, Article II of the Constitution provides that:
The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and
shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autono
mous social institution. It shall wqually protect the life of the
mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The
natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing
of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral
character shall receive the support of the Government.
Section I, Article XV, further'provides that:
The State recognizes the Filipino family as the
foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall
strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its
total development.
(Note: The Committee recommends that a citation of
either one of the provisions be credited as a Complete
answer).
Answer:
B.
No, the Constitutional policy, as well as the support
ing provision, does not amount to a prohibition to Congress
to enact a law on divorce. The Constitution only meant to
help the marriage endure, to strengthen its solidarity and
actively promote its total development."
353
Alternative Answer:
B.
Yes, Congress is barred from enacting a law allowing
divorce, since Section 2 of Article XV provides:
Sec. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social
institution, is the foundation of the family and
shall be protected by the State.
Since marriage is inviolable, it cannot be dissolved
by an absolute divorce.
Question Number 2:
On her third month of pregnancy, Rosemarie, married
to Boy, for reasons known only to her, and without informing
Boy, went to the clinic ofX , a known abortionist, who, for a
fee, removed and expelled the foetus from her womb. Boy
learned of the abortion six (6) months later.
Availing of that portion of Section 12 of Article II o f the
1987 Constitution which reads:
The State x x x shall equally protect the life of
the mother and the life of the unborn from concep
tion. x x x"
which he claims confers a civil personality on the unborn
from the moment of conception. Boy filed a case for damages
against the abortionist, praying therein that the latter be
ordered to pay him: (a) P30,000.00 as indemnity for the
death o f the foetus, (b) P I 00,000.00 as moral damages for the
mental anguish and anxiety he suffered, (c) P50.000.00 as
exemplary damages, (d) P20,000-Q0 as nominal damages,
and (e) P25;000.00 as attorneys fees.
(a) Is Boys, interpretation o f the above con
stitutional provision correct?
(b) Is Boy entitled to the foregoing damages
and attorneys fees?
(c)
Answer:
A. No. Because under the Child and Youth Welfare
Code, the personality of the child commences from the time
of conception for purposes favorable to him, subject to the
requirement that it is bom alive at the time of the complete
delivery from the mothers womb.
B. He is not entitled to damages claimed under (a) and
(d) because the foetus had no civil personality and no
property right has been invaded. But Boy is entitled to
damages under (b), (c) and (e). Moral damages are due
because they are the proximate result of the defendants
wrongful act. Exemplary damages are due by way of example
or correction for the public good. Attorneys fees are due if
exemplary damages or double judicial costs are awarded,
and the"court deems the recovery of attorneys fees equitable,
C. The amount of the exemplary damages need not be
proved, but the plaintiff must show that he is entitled to
moral* temperate or compensatory damages. (Art. 2234,
Civil Code).
D. Yes, provided that the pecuniary loss suffered should
be substantiated and duly proved.
D.
Yes. provided that the pecuniary loss suffered should
be substantiated and duly proved.
Question Number 3:
Bar Candidates Patricio Mahigugrriaon and Rowena
Amor decided to marry each other before the .last day o f the
1991 Bar Examinations: They agreed to execute a Marriage
Settlement. Rowena herself prepared the document in her
own handwriting. They agreed on the following: (1) a
conjugal partnership of gains; (2) each donates to the other
fifty percent (50%) of his/her present property; (3) Rowena
shall administer the conjugal partnership property; and (4)
neither may bring an action for the annulment or declaration
of nullity of their marriage. Both signed the agreement in the
presence of two (2) witnesses. They did not, however,
acknowledge it before a notary public.
(a) As to form, is the Marriage Settlement
valid? May it be registered in the registry of
property? If not, what steps must be taken to make
it registerable?
(b) Are the stipulations valid?
(c) If the Marriage Settlement is valid as to
form and the above stipulations are likewise valid,
does it now follow th at said Marriage Settlement is
valid and enforceable?
Answer:
A. Yes, it is valid as to form, because it is in writing.
No, it cannot be registered in the registry of property
because it is not a public document. To make it registerable,.
it must be reformed and has to be notarized.
B. Stipulations (1) ana (3) are valid because they are
noi contrary to law. Stipulation (4) is void because it is
contrary to law. Stipulation (2) is valid up to 1/5 of their
respective present properties but void as to the excess (Art.
84, Family Code).
356
C.
No, on September 15,1991, the marriage settlement
is nbt yet valid and enforceable until the celebration of the
marriage, to take place before the last day of the 1991 bar
Examinations.
Alternative Answers:
A. Yes, it is valid as between the parties but not as
against third persons. No, because, it is not a public
document. To make it registerable, it must be reformed and.
has to be notarized.
B. It depends. As between the parties, stipulations (1)
and [3) are valid because they are not Contrary to law.
. Stipulation (2) is void because, it is contrary to law. Stipu
lation (2) is valid up to 1/5 of their respective present
properties but void as to the excess (Art. 84, Family Code).
Question Number 4:
A. One of the grounds for annulment of marriage is
that either party, at the time of their marriage was.afflicted
with a sexually-transmissible disease, found to be serious
and appears incurable. Two (2) years after theif marriage,
which took place on 10 October 1988., Bethel discovered that
her husband James has a sexually-transmissible disease
which he contracted even prior to their marriage although
James did not know it himself until he was examined two (2)
years later when a child was already born to them. Bethel
sues James for annulment of their marriage. James opposes
the annulment on the ground that he did not even know that
he had such a disease so that there was no fraud or bad faith
on his part.
Decide.
B. Suppose that both parties at the time of their
marriage were similarly afflicted with sexually-transmissible
diseases, serious and incurable, and both knew of their
respective infirmities, can Bethel or James sue for annul
ment of their marriage?
357
Answer:
A. The marriage can be annulled, because good faith is
not a defense when the ground is based upon sexuallytransmissible disease on the part of either party.
B. Yes, the marriage can still be annulled because the
fact that both of them are afflicted with sexually-transmissible diseases does not efface or nullity the ground.
Alternative Answer:
B.
No, the marriage can no longer be annulled, because
the fact that both were afflicted arid that both knew o f their
respective infirmities constitutes a waiver of that ground.
Question Number 5:
In June 1985, James married Maiy. InSeptember 1988,
he also married Ophelia with whom he begot two (2) children,
A and B. In July 1989, Mary died. In July 1990, he married
Shirley and abndorted Ophelia. During their union, James
and Ophelia acquired a residential lot worth P300.000.00.
Ophelia sues James for bigamy and prays that his
marriage with Shirley be declared null and void. James, on
the other hand, claims that since his marriage to Ophelia was
contracted during the existence of his marriage with Mary,
the former is not binding upon him, the same being void ab
initio; he further claims that his marriage to Shirley is valid
and binding as he was already legally capacitated at the time
he married her.
(a) Is the contention of James correct?
(b) What property regime governed the union of James
and Ophelia?
(c) Is the estate of Mary entitled to a share in the
residential lot acquired by James and Ophelia?
358
Answer:
A. Yes. His marriage to Ophelia is void ab initio
because of his subsisting prior marriage to Mary. His
marriage to Shirley, after Marys death, is valid and binding.
Answ er:
B. The provisions Of Art 148 of the Family Code, shall
govern:
Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under
the preceding Article, only the properties acquired by both of
the parties through their actual joint contribution of money,
property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in
proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence
of proof to the contrary, their contributions and correspond
ing shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and
presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and
evidences o f credit.
C. It should be distinguished when the property was
acquired.
If it was acquired before Marys death, the estate of
Mary is entitled to 1/2 of the share of James.
359
He
Q u estion N u m ber 6:
(a) For purposes of succession, when is death deemed
to occur or take place?
(b) May succession be conferred by contracts or acts
inter vivos? Illustrate.
(c) Is th ere any law which allows the delivery to compul
sory heirs of their presumptive legitimes during the lifetime
o f their parents? If so, in what instances?
A nsw er:
A. Death as a fact is deemed to occur when.it actually
takes place. Death is presumed to take place in the circum
stances under Arts. 390-391 of the Civil Code. The time of
death is presumed to be at the expiration of the 10-year
period as prescribed by Article 390 and at the moment of
disappearance under Article 391.
B. Under Art. 84 of the Family Code amending Art. 130
of the Civil Code, contractual succession is no longer possible
since the law now requires that donations of future property
be governed by the provisions on the testamentary succes
sion and formalities of wills.
360
362
Alternative Answer:
A.
W hen a contract has a foreign element such as in the
factual setting stated in the problem where one of the parties
is a foreign corporation, the contract can be sustained as
valid particularly the stipulation expressing that the contract
is governed by the laws o f the foriegn country. Given this
generally accepted principle of international law, the con
tract between Maritess and JAL is valid and it should
therefore be enforced.
Question Number 8 :
Jacob, a Swiss national, married Lourdes, a Filipina, in
Berne, Switzerland. Three years later, the couple decided to
reside in the Philippines. Jacob subsequently acquired
several properties in the Philippines with the money he
inherited from his parents. Forty years later, Jacob died
intestate, and is survived by several legitimate children and
duly recognized illegitimate daughter Jane, all residing in the
Philippines.
(a) Suppose that Swiss law does not allow illegitimate
children to inherit, can Jane, who is a recognized illegitimate
child, inherit part of the properties of Jacob under Philippine
law?
(b) Assuming that Jacob executed a will leaving certain
properties to Jane as her legitime in accordance with the law
of succession in the Philippines, will such testamentary
disposition be valid?
Answer:
A.
Yes. As stated in the problem, Swiss law does not
allow illegitimate children to inherit. Hence. Jane cannot
inherit the property of Jacob under Philippine law.
364
B.
The testamentary disposition will not be valid if it
would contravene Swill law; otherwise, the disposition would
be valid. Unless the Swiss law is proved, it would be
presumed to be the same as that of Philippine law under the
doctrine of processual presumption.
Question Number 9:
Roland, a basketball star, was under contract for one
year to play-for-play exclusively for Lady Love, Inc. However,
even before the basketball season could open, he was offered
a more attractive pay plus fringes benefits by Sweet Taste,
Inc. Roland accepted the offer and transferred to Sweet
Taste. Lady Love sues Roland and Sweet Taste for breach of
contract. Defendants claim that the restriction to play for
Lady Love alone is void, hence, unenforceable, as it consti
tutes an undue interference with the right o f Roland to enter
into contracts and the impairment of his freedom to play and
enjoy basketball.
Can Roland be bound by the contract he entered into
with Lady Love or can he disregard the same? Is he liable at
all? How about Sweet Taste? Is it liable to Lady Love?
Answer:
Roland is bound by the contract he entered into with
Lady Love and he cannot disregard the same, under the
principles of obligatoriness of contracts. Obligations arising
from contracts have the force of law between the parties.
Yes, Roland is liable under the contract as far as Lady
Love is concerned.
He is liable for damages under Article 1170 of the Civil
Code since he contravened the tenor of his obligation. Not
being a contracting party, Sweet Taste is not bound by the
contract but it can be held liable under Art. 1314. The basis
of its liability is not prescribed by contract but is founded on
quasi-delict, assuming that- Sweet Taste knew of the con
tract. Article 1314 of the Civil Code provides that any third
person who induces another to violate his contract shall be
liable for damages to *he other contracting party.
365
Alternative Answer:
It is assumed that Lady Love knew of the contract.
Answ er:
A. I will not uphold the theory of X for the nullification
of the sale and for the recovery of the property on the ground
that the so-called sale was only an equitable mortgage. An
equitable mortgage may arise only if, in truth, the sale was
one with the right of repurchase. The facts of the case state
that the right to repurchase was granted after the.absolute
deed of sale was executed. Following the rule in Cruzo vs.
Carriaga (174 SCRA 330), a deed of repurchase executed
independently of the deed of sale where the two stipulations
are found in two instruments instead of one document, the
right of repurchase would amount only to one option granted
by the buyer to the seller. Since the contract cannot be
upheld as a contract of sale with the right to repurchase, Art.
1602 of the Civil Code on equitable mortgage will not apply.
The rule could have .been different if both deeds were exe
cuted on the same occasion or date, in which case, under the
ruling in spouses Claravall v. CA (190 SCRA 439), the
contract may still be sustained as an equitable mortgage,
given the circumstances expressed in Art. 1.602. The re
served right to repurchase is then deemed an original inten
tion.
B. If I were to decide in favor oi Romeo and Y, I wo uld
not uphold the validity of the promise to sell, so as to enforce
it by an action for specific performance. The promise to sell
would only amount to a mere offer and, therefore, it is not
enforceable unless it was sought to be exercised before a
withdrawal or denial thereof.
367
Answer;
B is not correct. Her action cannot prosper. Article 1311
requires that the third person intended to be benefited must
communicate his acceptance to the obligor before the revo
cation. There is no showing that B manifested her accep
tance to Y at any time before the death of A and before the
sale. Hence, B cannot enforce any right under the alleged
stipulation pour atrui.
368
Answ er:
A.
The sale of the land to Juan is not valid, being
contrary to law. Therefore, no transfer of ownership of the
land was effected from the deliquent taxpayer to him. The
original certificates of title obtained by Maria thru a free
patent grant from the Bureau of Lands (under Chapter VII,
CA 141) is valid but in view o f her delinquency, the said title
is subject to the right of the City Government to sell the Iand
at public auction. The issuance of the OCT did not exempt
the land from the tax sales. Section 44 of P.D. No. 1529
provides that every registered owner receiving a Certificate of
Title shall hold the same free from all encumbrances, subject
to certain exemptions.
369
A lternative Answer:
Alternative Answer:
The action for specific performance will not prosper.
The filing of the ejectment suit by the seller was precisely in
compliance with his obligations and should not, therefore, be
faulted if no decision has yet been reached by the Court on
the matter.
Answer:
Ferdinand has no right to recover the land. It is true that
the donation was revocable because of breach of the condi
tions. But until and unless the donation was revoked, it
remained valid. Hence, Spouses Michael and Linda had no
right to sell the land to Ferdinand. One cannot give what he
does not have. What the donors should have done first was
to have the donation annulled or revoked. And after that was
371
Alternative Answer:
A. Until the contract of donation has been resolved or
rescinded under Article 1191 of the Civil Code or revoked
under Art. 764 of the Civil Code, the donation stands effective
and valid. Accordingly, the sale made by the donOr to
Ferdinand cannot be said to have conveyed title to Ferdi
nand, who, thereby, has no cause o f action for recovery of the
land acting for and in his behalf.
B. The donation is onerous. And being onerous, what
applies is the law on contracts, arid not the law on donation
(tie Luna vs. Abrige, 81 SCRA 156). Accordingly, the pre
scriptive period for the filing of such an action would be the
ordinary prescriptive period for contacts which may either be
six or ten depending upon whether it is verbal or written. The
filing o f the Case five years later is within the prescriptive
period and, therefore, the action can prosper.
Alternative Answer:
The law on donation lays down a special prescriptive
period in the case of breach of condition, which is four years
from non-compliance thereof (Article 7.64 Civil Code). Since
the action has prescribed, the suit will not prosper.
Answer:
The complaint for the annulment of Catalinos Title will
prosper. In the first place, the second owners copy of the title
secured by,him from the Land Registration Court is void ab
initio, the owner's copy thereof having never been lost, let
alone the fact that said second owners copy of the title was
fraudulently procured and improvidently issued by the Court.
In the second place, the Transfer Certificate of Title procured
by Catalino is equally null and void, it having been issued on
the basis of a simulated or forged Deed of Sale. A forged deed
is an absolute nullity and conveys no title.
The mortgage in favor of Desiderio is likewise null and
void because the mortgagor is not the owner of the mortgaged
property. While it may be true that under the Mirro
Principle of the Torrens System of Land Registration, a
buyer or mortgagee has the right to rely on what appears on
the Certificate of Title, and in the absence of anything to
excite suspicion, is under no obligation to look beyond the
certificate and investigate the mortgagors title, this rule does
not find application in the case at hand because here,
Catalinos title suffers from two fatal infirmities, namely:
1. The fact that it emanated from a forged deed of a
simulated sale;
2. The fact that it was derived from a fraudulently
procured or improvidently issued second owners copy, the
real owners copy being still intact and in the possession of
the true owner, Bruce.
The mortgage to Desiderio should be cancelled without
prejudice to his right to go after Catalino and/or the govern
ment for compensation from the assurance fund.
373
Answer:
A, Yes. It will prosper (Art. 2180) because at the time
he drove the vehicle, he was not performing his assigned
tasks as provided for by Art. 2180. With respect to SSPA, it
is not liable for the acts of Peter because the latter was not an
employee as held by Supreme Court in Filamer Christian
Institute vs. CA, (190 SCRA 485).
Peter belongs to a special category of students who
render service to the school in exchange for free tuition fees.
B. I would maintain the same answer because the
incident did not occurwhile the employee was in the perform
ance o f his duty as such employee. The incident occured at
night time, and, in any case, there was no indication in the
problem that he was performing his duties as a driver.
374
C.
In the case of Peter, if he were to be considered as
employee, the exercise of due diligence in the selection and
supervision o f peter would not be a material issue since the
conviction of Peter would result in a subsidiary liability where
the defense would not be available by the employer.
In the case of Paul, since the basis of subsidiary
liability is the paterfamilias rule under Art. 2180, the defense
of selection and supervision of the employee would be a valid
defense.
Alternative Answer:
C.
In the case of Peter, if he were to be considered an
employee, the exercise of due diligence in the selection and
supervision of Peter would not be a material issue since the
conviction o f Peter would result in a subsidiary liability where
the defense would not be available by the employer.
to the case of Paul,, since he was in the performance
of his work at the time the incident oceured, the school may
be held subsidiarily liable not because of the conviction of
Peter, but because of the negligence of Paul under Art. 2180.
376
Question Number 1:
A vacant lot several blocks from the center, of the town
was leased by its owner to a young businessman B, for a term
of fifteen (15) years renewal upon agreement of the parties.
After taking possession of the lot, the lessee built thereon a
building of mixed materials and a store. As the years passed,
he expanded his business, earning more profits. By the tenth
(10th) year of his possession, he was.able to build a three (3)storey building worth al least P300,000.00. Before the end
of the term of the lease, B negotiated with the landowner for
its renewal, but despite their attempts to do so, they could not
agree on the new conditions for the renewal. Upon the
expiration of the term of the lease, the landowner asked B to
vacate the premises and remove his building and other
improvements. B refused unless he was reimbursed for
necessary and, useful expenses. B claimed that he was a
possessor and builder in good faith, with right of retention.
This issue is now before the court for resolution in a pending
litigation.
a)
Question Number 2:
In 1950s, the Government acquired a big landed estate
In Central Luzon from the registered owner for subdivision
Into small farms and redistribution of bona fid e occupants.
F w as a former lessee of a parcel of land, five hectares in area.
After completion of the resurvey and subdivision, F applied
to buy the said land in accordance with the guidelines of the
implementing agency. Upon full payment of the price in
1957, the corresponding deed of absolute sale was executed
in his favor and was registered, and in 1961, a new title was
issued in his name. In 1963, F sold the said land to X; and
in 1965 X sold it to Y. New titles were successively issued in
the names o f the said purchasers.
In 1977, C filed an action to annul the deeds of sale to
F, X and Y and theii titles, on the ground that he (C) had been
in actual physical possession of the land, and that the sale to
F and the subsequent sales should be set aside on the ground
of fraud. Upon motion of defendants, the trial court dis
missed the complaint, upholding their defenses of their being
innocent purchasers for value, prescription and laches.
Plaintiff appealed.
(a) Is the said appeal meritorious? Explain your an
swer.
(b) Suppose the government agency concerned joined C
in filing the said action against the defendants, would that
change the result of the litigation? Explain.
Answer:
(a)
The appeal is not meritorious. The trial court ruled
correctly in granting defendants motion to dismiss for the
following reasons:
1.
While there is the possibility that F, a former lessee
of the land was aware of the fact that C was the bona fid e
occupant thereof and for this reason his transfer certificate
of title may be vulnerable, the transfer of the same land and
the issuance of new TCTs to X and Y who are innocent
purchasers for value, render the latters titles indefeasible. A
person dealing with registered land may safely rely on the
correctness of the certificate of title and the law will not in any
378
Question Number 3:
/
379
Answer:
Yes, the action will proper. The donation is a donation
mortis causa because the reservation is to dispose of all the
property donated and, therefore, the donation is revocable at
will. Accordingly, the donation requires the execution of a
valid will, either notarial or holgraphic. (Arts 755, 728 Civil
Code)
Question Number 3:
Mr. and Mrs. R own a bumed-out building, the firewall .
o f which collapsed and destroyed the shop occupied by the
family o f Mr. and Mrs. S, which resulted in injuries to said
couple and the death of their daughter. Mr. and Mrs. S haid
been warned by Mr. Mrs. R to vacate the shop in view of its
proximity to the weakened wall but the former failed to do so.
Mr. and Mrs. S filed against Mr. and Mrs. R an action for
recovery of damages the former suffered as a result of the
collapse of the firewall. In defense, Mr. and Mrs. Rrely on the
doctrine of last clear chance alleging that Mr. and Mrs. S
had the last clear chance to avoid the accident if only they
heeded the formers warning to vacate the shop, and there
fore Mr. and Mrs. Rs prior negligence should be disregarded.
If you were the judge, how would you decide the case?
State your reasons.
A nsw er:
I would decide in favor of Mr. and Mrs;. S. The proprietor
of a building or structure is responsible for the damages
resulting from its total or partial collapse, if it should be due
to the lack of necessary repairs. (Article 2190, Civil Code).
As regards the defense of Mr. and Mrs. R relying on the
doctrine o f last clear chance, the same is not tenable
because according to the Supreme Court in one case (DeRoy
v. Court o f Appeals, G. R. L-80718, January 29, 1988, 157
SCRA 757) the doctrine of last clear chance is not applicableto instances covered by Art. 2190, Civil Code.
380
Question Number 5:
D sold a second-hand car to E for P150,000.00 The
agreement between D and E was that half of the purchase
price, or P75.000.00, shall be paid upon delivery of the car to
E and the balance of P75.000.00 shall be paid in five equal
monthly installments of P15.000.00 each. The car was
delivered to E, and E paid the amount of P75.000.00 to D.
Less than one month thereafter, the car was stolen from Es
garage with no fault on Es part and was never recovered. Is
E legally bound to pay the said unpaid balance of P75.000.00?
Explain your answer.
Answ er:
Yes, E is legally bound to pay the balance of P75.000.00.
The ownership of the car sold was acquired by E from the
moment it was delivered to him. Having acquired ownership.
E bears the risk of the loss of the thing under the doctrine of
res peril domino. (Articles 1496, 1497, Civil Code).
Question Number 6:
A leased a parcel of land to- B for a period of two years.
The lease contract did not contain any express prohibition
against the assignment of the leasehold or the subleasing of
the leased premises, During the third year of the lease, B
subleased the land to C. In turn, C, without A's consent,
assigned the sublease to D. A then filed an action for the
rescission of the contract of lease on the ground that B has
violated the terms and conditions of the lease agreement. If
you were the judge, how would you decide the case, particu
larly with respect to the validity of:
(a) Bs sublease to C? and
381
A n sw er:
Question Number 7;
X was the owner of a 10,000 square meter property. X
married Y and out of their union. A, B and C were bom. After
the death of Y, X married Z and they begot as children, D, E
and F. After the death of X, the children of the first and
second marriages executed an extrajudicial partition of the
aforestated property on May 1, 1970. D, E and F were given
a one thousand square meter portion of the property. They
were minors at the time of the execution of the document. D
was 17years.old, Ewas 14andFwas 12; and they were made
to believe by A, B and C that unless they sign the document
they will not get any share. Z was not presesnt then. In
January 1974, D.Eand F filed an action in court to nullify the
suit alleging they discovered the fraud only in 1973.
(a). Can the minority of D, E and F be a basis to nullify
the partition? Explain your answer.
382
Question Number 8:
B and G (college students, both single and not disquali
fied to marry each other) had a romantic affair. G was seven
months in the family way as of the graduation of B. Right
after graduation B went home to Cebu City. Unknown to G,
B had a commitment to C (his childhood sweetheart) to marry
her after getting his college degree. Two weeks after B
marriage in Cebu City, G gave birth to a son E in Metro
Manila.
After ten years of married life in Cebu, B became a
widower by the sudden death of C in a plane crash. Out of
the. union of B and C. two children, X and Y, were bom.
Unknown to C, while on weekend trips to Manila during the
last 5 years of their marriage, B invariably visited G and lived
at her residence and as a result of which, they renewed their
relationship. A baby girl F was bom to B and G two years
before the death of C. Bringing his family later to Manila, B
finally .married G. Recently, G died.
What ate the rights of B's four children: X and Y of his
first marriage; and E and F, his children with G? Explain
your answer.
383
Ausioer:
Under the facts stated, X and Y are legitimate children
of B and G. E is the legitimate children of B and G. E is the
legitimated child of B & G. F is the illegitimate child of B and
C. As legitimate children of B and C, X and Y have the
following rights:
(1) To bear the surnames of the father and the mother,
in conformity with the provisions of the Civil Code on
Surnames;
(2) To receive support from their parents, their ascen
dants. and in proper cases, their brothers and sisters, in
conformity with the provisions of the Family Code on Sup
port; and
(3) To be entitled to the legitime and other successional
rights granted to them by the Civil Code. (Article 174, Family
Code). E is the legitimated child of B and G. Under Art. 177
of the Family Code, only children conceived and bom outside
of wedlock of parents who, at the time of the concepcion of the
former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry
each other may be legitimated. E will have the same rights
as X and Y. F is the illegitimate child of B and G. F has the
right to use the surname of G, her mother, and is entitled tO
support as well as the legitime consisting of 1/2 of that of
each o fX , Y and E. (Article 176, Family Code)
Question Number 9:
H died leaving a last will and testament wherein it is
stated that he was legally married to W by whom he had two
legitimate children A and B. H devised to his said forced heirs
the entire estate except the free portion which he gave to,X
who was living with him at the time of his death.
In said will he explained that he had been estranged
from his wife W for more than 20 years and he has been living
with X as man and wife since his separation from his
legitimate family.
In the probate proceedings, X asked for the issuance of
letters testamentary in accordance with the will wherein she
Is named sole executor. This was opposed by W and her
children.
384
Answer:
(a) Yes, the will may be probated if executed according
to the formalities prescribed by law.
(b) The institution giving X the free portion is not valid,
because'the prohibitions under Art. 739 of the Civil Code on
donations also apply to testamentary dispositions (Article
1028, Civil Code). Among donations which are considered'
void are those made between persons who were guilty of
adultery or concubinage at the time of the donation.
(c) As a general rule, the will should be admitted in
probate proceedings if all the necessary requirements for its
extrinsic validity have been met, and the court should not
consider the intrinsic validity of the provisions of said will.
However, the exception arises when the will in effect contains
only one testamentary disposition. In effect, the only testa
mentary disposition under the will is the giving of the free
portion to X, since legitimes are provided by law. Hence, the
trial court may consider the intrinsic validity of the provi
sions of said will. (Dfuguid u. Nuguid, e tai , No. L-23445, June
23, 1966, 17 SCRA; Nepomucenov. CA, L-62952, 9 October
1985, 139.SCRA 206).
385
Answer:
(a)
H, or either spouse for that matter, can marry again
after complying with the provisions of Article 52 of the.Family
Code, namely, there must be a partition and distribution of
the properties of the ,spouses, and the delivery of the chil
dren's presumptive legitimes, which should be recorded in
the; appropriate civil registry and registries o f property. H
should be so advised.
Answer:
(1) a. If the testator who is a Filipino citizen executes his
will in the Philippines, Philippine law will govern the formali
ties,
b. If said Filipino testator executes his will in another
country, the law Of the country where he may be or Philippine
law will govern the formalities. (Article 815, Civil Code)
(2) a. If the testator is a foreigner residing in the Philip
pines and he executes his will in the Philippines, the law of
the country of which he is a citizen or Philippine law will
govern the formalities.
b. If the testator is a foreigner and executes his will
in a foreign country, the law of his place of residence or the
law o f the country of which he is a citizen or the law o f the
place of execution, or Philippine law will govern the formali
ties (Articles 17, 816, 817, Civil Code),
388
Answer:
(a)
Under Art. 173 of the Civil Code, the action is barred
by prescription because the wife had only ten (10) years from
the transaction and during the marriage to file a suit for the
annulment of the mortgage deed.
389
Answer:
G himself should file the complaint under Article 45 of
the Fariiily Code, and no longer the parents because G4s
already 22 years of age.
391
Answer:
(a) Yes, there is sufficient compliance. The law itself
prescribes the requisites of publication for its effectivity, and
all requisites have been complied with. (Article 2, Civil Code)
(b) The law takes effect upon compliance with all the
conditions for effectivity, and the last condition was complied
with on July 10, 1990. Hence, the law became effective on
that date.
(c) No. It was not yet effective when it was approved by
Congress on July 1, 1990 and approved by the President oh
July 3, 1990. The other requisites for its effectivity were not
yet complete at the time,
e
392
Answer:
If the marriage was performed in accordance with the
laws of California and valid there, then the marriage is
likewise valid in the Philippines.
Alternative Answer:
Since the problem does not state the California law on
marriage by proxy, the presumption in Private International
L a w is that the California la w is the same as the Philippine
law. Therefore, the marriage would be void.
(2) W hile X, an Associate Justice of thg Court of
Appeals, was vacationing in Cebu City, he was requested to
solemnize the marriage of Serge and Joan in the residence of
Serges parents. X could not refuse the request of both the
parents of the couple because they were his relatives. On the
393
Answer:
YeSj because the requirement that the marriage be
solemnized in a public place is not an essential requisite of
the law.
Question No. 2:
(1) Paul, a 17-yea:r old Filipino and a permanent resi
dent in the United States, married Jean, a 16-year old
American in Las Vegas, Nevada. The parents of both gave
their consent to the marriage. The marriage is valid in
Nevada. Is its also valid in the Philippines? Give your
reasons.
Answer;
No, the marriage is not valid. Under the Family Code,
the law requires that the contracting parties are at least
eighteen (18) years of age.
Alternative Answer:
If the marriage took place before the effectivity of the
Family Code, the marriage will be valid since under the
provisions of the Civil Code a marriage valid in the place of
celebration is valid in the Philippines except bigamous, polygamous, and incestuous marriages as determined by Philip
pine law. The minimum age under the old law was sixteen
(16) for the male and fourteen (14) for the female.
(2) Cesar and Baby contracted marriage on June 15,
1983. A year later, Baby bore a child, X The following
year, the couple acquired a car and a residential lot in Metro
394
Answer:
If there was a liquidation of the properties of the first
marriage and the presumptive legitime of X was duly
delivered, the second marriage is valid. If there was no such
compliance, then the marriage is void. The child is
legitimate since Y was born a full year after the
termination of the first marriage and during the second
marriage.
Alternative Answers:.
A. The Family Code requires the registration of the
judgment of nullity, the partition of the properties and the
delivery of the legitimes to be made with the appropriate
civil registry and registries of property. It further provides
that failure to comply with the said requirement shall render
the marriage null and void. If there was such a recording,
the marriage is valid. Otherwise, the marriage is void.
Nevertheless, child Y is a legitimate child because it was
born during the marriage of Cesar and Rosa.
B. Since the problem does not state that there was
compliance with the requirements as to recording of judg
ment of nullity and the liquidation and delivery of the
presumptive legitime of the child X , the marriage of Cesar
and Rosa is void. However, the child Y is legitimate
because it was born during the marriage of Cesar and Rosa.
Question No. 3:
(1)
W hat properties are excluded from the regime of
absolute community of property between spouses?
Answer:
The following shall be excluded from the community
property:
(1) Property acquired during the marriage by
gratuitous title by either spouse, and the fruits as well as the
income thereof, if any, unless it is expressly provided by the
donor, testator Or grantor that they shall form part of the
community property;
(2) Property for personal and exclusive use of either
spouse; however, jewelry shall form part of the community
property;
(3) Property acquired before the marriage by either
spouse who has legitimate descendants by a former
marriage, and the fruits as well as the income, if any, of such
property.
(2)
W hen should the property relations of the spouses
be mandatorily governed by the regime of complete separa
tion of property?
Answer:
Should the surviving spouse contract a subsequent
marriage without complying with the requirement that the
community or conjugal property be liquidated judicially or
extra-judicially within one year from the death of the
deceased spouse, a mandatory regime of complete separation
of property shall govern the property relations of the
subsequent marriage.
Question No. 4:
(1) Cadio and Corona contracted marriage on June 1,
396
397
Question No. 5:
(1)
of a child?
Answer:
Legitimacy of a child may be impugned only on the
following grounds:
(1) That it was physically impossible for the husband to
have sexual intercourse with his wife within the first 120
days of the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth
of the child because of:
(a) the physical incapacity of the husband to have
sexual intercourse with his wife;
(b) the fact that the husband and wife were
living separately in such a way that sexual inter
course was not possible; or
(c) serious illness of the husband, which ab
solutely prevented sexual intercourse:
(2) That it is proved that for biological or other scien
tific reasons, the child could not have been that of the husbandj except in the instance provided in the second para
graph of Art. 164; or
(3) That in case of children conceived through artificial
insemination, the written authorization or ratification of
either parent was obtained through mistake, fraud, violence;
intimidation, or undue influence.
(2)
Felix, a Filipino doctor of medicine, married
Monique, an Italian nurse, in 1985. It was later discovered
that Monique cannot bear a child so that the couple decided
398
to adopt one. Can they jointly adopt Marie, the 19-year old
niece of Monique? Explain.
Answer:
Since the child to be adopted is an Italian citizen, the
joint adoption cannot be effected. Had the child been a
relative by consanguinity of the Filipino spouse, the adop
tion would have been valid under the Philippine law.
Question No. 6:
(1)
uished?
Answer:
Usufruct gives a right to enjoy the property of another
with the obligation of preserving its form and substance,
unless the title constituting it or the law otherwise provides.
Usufruct is extinguished:
(1) By the death of the usufructuary, unless a contrary
intention clearly appears;
(2) By the expiration of the period for which it was
constituted, or by the fulfillment of any resolutory condition
provided in the title creating the usufruct;
(3) By merger of the usufruct and ownership in the
same person;
(4) By renunciation of the usufructuary;
(5) By the total loss of the thing in.usufruct;
(6) By the termination of the right of the person consti
tuting the usufruct;
(7) By prescription.
R E C O M M E N D A T IO N O F T H E C O M M IT T E E :
An enumeration of four (4) should be given full credit.
399
(2)
Spouses A and B are registered owners of lot 1
consisting of 20,000 square meters while spouses C and
D are owners of lot 2. These lots are separated by a
river. For a period of more than 40 years, the river
overflowed its banks yearly and the property of the spouses
" C and D gradually received deposits of soil from the
effects of the current of the river so that, an alluvial deposit of
29,000 square meters was added to their lot, 11,000 square
meters of which used to be part of lot 1. Spouses A and
B contend that accretion should not extend to registered
land because to allow the spouses C and D to acquire
title over the accretion will be in derogation of the indefeasi
bility of the Torrens Title o f spouses A and B . Is this
contention correct? Explain.
Answer:
No, the contention of A and B is not correct because the
registration under the Torrens L a w does not protect the
owner against the diminution of his land through gradual
changes due to the effects of the current of the river. The
accretion will benefit C and D .
Question No. 7:
(1)
X ' mortgaged his land to the Philippine National
Bank (PNB) to secure a promissory note. He defaulted in the
payment of the loan so that the land was sold at public auc
tion on January 20, 1960, for P3,500 with the PNB as the
highest bidder. On January 20, 1970, X offered to redeem
the property in the amount of P3,500. He enclosed a postal
money order for P I ,000 as partial payment and stated that
the balance is to be paid in 12 monthly installments. The
PNB then discovered that the sheriffs certificate of sale
prepared after the public auction of the land was not
registered so that it cause the same to be registered On
January 30, 1970. The PNB refused the offer of X
400
401
Question No. 8:
(1) Distinguish an implied contract from a quasi
contract.
Answer:
402
Question No. 9:
(1) If the same thing should have been sold to different
vendees, to whom shall the ownership be transferred?
Answer:
If the same thing should have been sold to different
vendees; the ownership shall be transferred to the person
who may have first taken possession thereof in good faith, if
it should be movable property .
Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall
belong to the person acquiring it who in good faith first
recorded it in the Registry of Property.
Should there be an inscription, the ownership shall per
tain to the person who in good faith was first in the posses
sion; and, in the absence thereof, to the person who presents
the oldest title, provided there is good faith.
(2) X used his savings from his salaries amounting to
a little more than P2,000 as capital in establishing a restau
rant. Y gave the amount of P4,000 toX as financial
assistance with the understanding that Y would be
entitled to 22% of the annual profits derived from the
operation of the restaurant. After the lapse of 22 years, Y
filed a case demanding his share in the said profits. X
denied that there was a partnership and raised the issue of
prescription as Y did not assert his rights anytime within
ten (10) years from the start of the operation of the restau
rant. Is Y a partner of X in the business? Why? W hat is
the nature of the right to demand ones share in the profits of
a partnership? Does this right prescribe?
403
Answer:
Yes, because there is an agreement to contribute to a
common fund and an intent to divide profits. It is founded
upon an express trust. It is imprescriptible unless repudiated.
Alternative Answer :
No, Y is not a partner because the amount is extended
in the form of a financial assistance and therefore it is a loan,
and the mere sharing of profits does not establish a partner
ship. The right is founded upon a contract of loan whereby
the borrower is bound to pay principal and interest like all
ordinary obligations. Yes, his right prescribes in six or ten
years depending upon whether the contract is oral or
written.
2. Unilateral
3. Formal or Solemn
4. Ambulatory or revocable
404
Answer:
A
Q uestioriN o.il:
I
Answer:
The will is void. The acknowledging officer cannot
serve as attesting witness at the same time. In effect there are
only two witnesses since the notary cannot swear before him
self.
(2) Jose and Ana are husband and wife. O n January 10,
1980, Jose learned that Ana was having illicit relations with
juan. In fact, Jose personally saw his wife and Juan leaving a
motel on one occasion. Despite all the evidence he had at
hand, Jose did not bring any action for legal separation
against Aria. Instead, Jose simply prepared a will wherein he
disinherited Ana for her acts of infidelity. The validity of the
disinheritance was questioned by Ana upon Joses death. If
you were the judge, how would you resolve this question?
Give your reasons.
405
Answer:
The disinheritance is valid. Under the Civil Code, the
legal ground for disinheriting a spouse is that the spouse has
given cause for legal separation. Therefore, a final judgment
is riot needed.
Alternative Answer:
The disinheritance is not valid. The facts indicate that
Answer:
1. Real estate mortgage is an accessory contract. A con
tract of sale with right of repurchase is a principal contract.
2. Real estate mortgage involves no transfer of title. A
contract of sale involves a conditional transfer of title.
3. Real estate mortgage involves no transfer of posses^
siori. A contract of sale involves a conditional transfer of
possession.
4. In a real estate mortgage the creditor has no rights to
the fruits. In a contract of sale, the vendee is entitled to the
fruits,
5- In a real estate mortgage, upon default the creditor
is not the owner. In a contract of sale, upon consolidation*
the vendee is the owner.
R E C O M M E N D A T IO N O F T H E C O M M IT T E E :
Any three (3) of the foregoing distinctions should be
given full credit.
406
(2)
Does an action to foreclose a real estate mortgage
affecting registered land under the Torrens System prescribe?
Give your reasons.
Answer:
Even if the property given as collateral is covered by a
Torrens Title, the right to foreclose a real estate mortgage
thereon prescribes. This is really an action to enforce collec
tion of the loan.
Question N o. 13:
(1)
X offered to buy the house and lot of Y for
P3OO,OO0. Since X had only P200,000 in cash at the time,
he proposed to pay the balance of Pl00,000 in four (4) equal
monthly installments. As the title to the property was to be
immediately transferred to the buyer, X , to secure the
payment of the balance of purchase price,' proposed to
constitute a first mortgage on the property in favor of Y.
Y agreed to the proposal so that on April 15, 1987, the
contract of sale in favor of X was executed and on the same
date (April l 5, 1987), X constituted the said first mortgage.
When the first installment became due. X defaulted in the
payment thereof. Y now brings an action to rescind the
contract of sale, which X opposed. H ow would you decide
the conflict? Give your reasons.
Answer:
407
Alternative Answers:
C. Considering that the default covers only P25,000.00
and the sum of P200,000.00 has already been paid, there is
only, a slight or casual breach negating the right of the seller
to rescind the contract of sale.
D. Rescission is available provided that the vendor give
the vendee the 60-day period as required by the Maceda L aw
or the Realty Installment Buyers Law .
(2)
X came across an advertisement in the Manila
Daily Bulletin about the rush sale of three slightly used
T O Y O T A cars, Model 1989 for only P200,000 each. Finding
the price to be very cheap and in order to be sure that he gets
ohe unit ahead of the others, X immediately phoned the
advertiser Y and place an order for one car. Y accepted
the order and promised to deliver the ordered unit on July
15, 1989. O n the said date, however, Y did not deliver the
unit. X brings an action to compel Y to deliver the unit.
W ill such action prosper? Give your reasons.
Answer:
The contract in this case has been perfected. However,
the contract is unenforceable under the statute of frauds.
The action will prosper if there is no objection to the oral
evidence, which amounts to a waiver of the statute of frauds.
408
409
R E C O M M E N D A T IO N O F T H E C O M M IT T E E :
If the above alternative answer is given, two (2) distinc
tions for each should be given full credit.
(2)
A diamond ring and a female cow were pledged to
secure a loan in the amount of P100,000. The pledge
appeared in a public instrument. A month later, the cow
gave birth. W hen the amount of the loan was not paid upon
its maturity date, the pledged caused to be sold at a public
auction the ring, the cow and the cows offspring and the
amount of P I 50,000 as realized. The pledgor, upon learning
of the sale, demanded from the pledgee the excess in the
price over and above the amount of the principal obligation,
claiming that he is entitled to the excess and that the
offspring was not included in the pledge. The pledgee
refused to comply with the demand. H ow 'w ould you decide
this conflict? Give your reasons..
Answer:
Debtor/pledgor is not entitled to the excess unless the
contrary is agreed upon. The offspring shall pertain to the
pledgor but is subject to the pledge if there is no stipulation
to the contrary.
410
411
Answer:
Civil obligations give a right of action to compel their
performance. Natural obligations, not being based on
positive law but on equity and natural law, do not grant a
right of action to enforce their performance, but after volun
tary fulfillment by the obligor, they authorize the retention
of what has been delivered on rendered by reason thereof.
Example ot a natural obligation (one example out of
any of the following):
1. W hen a right to sue upon a civil obligation has
lapsed by extinctive prescription, the obligor who volun
tarily performs the contract cannot recover what he has
delivered or the value of the service he has rendered .
2. W hen without the knowledge or against the will of
, the debtor a third person pays a debt which the obligor is not
legally bound to pay because the action thereon has
prescribed, but the debtor later voluntarily reimburses the
third person, the obligor cannot recover what he has paid.
3. W hen a minor between eighteen and twenty-one
years of age who has entered into a contract without the
consent of the parent or guardian, after the annulment of the
contract voluntarily returns the whole thing or price re
ceived, notwithstanding the fact that he has not been
benefited thereby, there is no right to demand the thing;or
price thus returned.
4. W hen a minor between eighteen and twenty-one
years of age, who has entered into a contract without the
consent of the parent or guardian, voluntarily pays a sum of
money or delivers a fungible thing in fulfillment of the
obligation, there shall be no right to recover the same from
the obligee who has spent or consumed it in good faith.
5. W hen, after an action to enforce a civil obligation has
failed, the defendant voluntarily performs the obligation, he
cannot demand the return of what he has delivered or the
payment of the value of the service he has rendered,
6. W hen a testate or intestate heir voluntarily pays a
412
'
Answer:
The Land Registration Act and P D 1529 apply to
registration of land only. It may include the building as an
accessory but the building cannot be registered independent
ly of the land because registration contemplated under this
Act refers only to ownership of land.
The owner of the building should file an opposition or
answer to the application for registration and ask the court
that his right to the building be annotated in the decree and
later in the certificate of title.
(2) A is the owner of a registered land. The Torrens
Title is entrusted to B, his clerk secretary, who forges A s
signature on a deed of sale of said land in his (Bs) favor. A
new title is issued in the name of B, upon registration.
Does B have a valid title over the land? If B sells the
property to C , does the latter acquire a valid title over it?
413
l,v
Answer:
A forged deed is an absolute nullity and conveys no title
but it can be the root of a title. If title to the land has been
transferred to a party based upon a forged deed, and later on
after the issuance of such title the property is transferred to
another who is an innocent purchaser for value, then the
latter acquires a valid title.
414
Question No. 1:
(a) What is' a prejudicial question? W hat are its ele
ments? What is its effect upon a criminal action?
(b) Mojar, a passenger in a bus operated by Times
Transit Co., suffered serious physical injuries as a result of a
vehicular accident. An information was filed against Ailes,
driver of the bus, for serious physical injuries through reck
less imprudence. Ailes was, however, acquitted on the merits
of the case because, according to the judgment of acquittal,
he was not negligent. Subsequently, Mojar instituted an
action'against Times Transit Co., to recover damages. W ill
the action prosper? Give your reasons.
(c) As a rule, once the criminal action has been com
menced, the civil action for damages arising from the offense
charged shall be suspended until the final termination of the
criminal action. What are the exceptions to said rule as
provided by the Civil Code?
Answer:
(a)
A prejudicial question is a question which arises in a
case, the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the
issue involved in said case, and the cognizance of which per
tains to another tribunal (People vs. Aragon 94 Phil. 357;
Jimenez vs. Aceria 22 SCRA 1380).
It has two elements. They are: First, that it must be
determinative of the guilt or innocense of the accused in the
criminal case* and second, jurisdiction to try said question
must be lodged in another tribunal (Ibid.)
Its effect upon a criminal case i to suspend it if one has
already been commenced (Article 36, C C ). This is of course,
415
416
417
418
419
Answer:
(a) Continuous and apparent easements are acquired
either by virtue of a title or by prescription of ten years (Art.
620, C C ), while continuous nonapparent easements and
discontinuous easements whether apparent or nonapparent,
can only be acquired by virtue of a title (Art. 622, C C ).
(b) In order that an easement may be acquired by pre
scription, the time of possession shall be computed thus: In
positive easements, from the day o.n which the owner of the
dominant estate, or. the person who may have made use of
420
421
Answer;
(A) W hen the Civil Code speaks of law as a distinct
mode of acquiring ownership, it refers to those instances
where the law, independently, of the other modes of
acquiring ownership, automatically and directly vests the
ownership of the thing in a certain individual once the pre
scribed requisites or conditions are present or complied with.
Examples of this are:
(1) Land which belongs exclusively to either of the
spouses where a building is constructed with conjugal
funds. Here, the ownership of the. land is vested auto
matically in the conjugal partnership once the condition
that its value has been reimbursed to the owner has been
complied with (Art. 158, par. 2, C C .)
(2) Hidden treasure which a stranger discovers by
chance on anothers property. Here, one-half of the
treasure belongs by right of occupation to the stranger,
while the other half belongs by Operation of law to the
proprietor. (Art. 438, par.,2,,CC.)
(3) Abandoned beds, when a river or stream sudden
ly changes its course to traverse private lands. The
former owners of the new bed shall be the owners of
the abandoned bed in proportion to the area lost by
each. (Art. 58, P.D. No. 1067.)
(4) Fruits naturally falling from a tree upon adjacent
422
423
424
425
Answer:
Preterition or pretermission, as it is sometimes called
may be defined as the omission in the testators will of one,
some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line,
whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born
after the death of the testator (Art. 854, C C ). Stated in
another way, it consists in the omission in the testators will
of the compulsory heirs in the diret line, or of anyone of
them, either because they are not mentioned therein, or,
though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heir nor
expressly disinherited (Neri vs. Akutin, 74 Phil. 185; Nuguid
vs. Nuguid, 17 S C R A 449). Its requisites are:
(1) The heir omitted must be a compulsory heir in
the direct line;
(2) The ommission must be total and complete; and
(3) The omitted heir must survive the testator.
The effect is to annul entirely the institution of heirs but
legacies and devises shall be valid insofar as they are not in
officious. (Art. 854, C C .)
(b) There are four limitations. They are:
(1) The substitution.must not go beyond one degree
from the heir originally instituted (Art. 863, C C ).
(2) The fiduciary and the fideicommissary must be
living at the time of the death of the testator (Ibid).
(3) The.substitution must not burden the legitime of
compulsory heirs (Art. 864, CC).
(4) The substitution must be made expressly (Art.
865, par. 1, C C .)
(c) In general, compulsory heirs are those for whom the
lawr has reserved a portion of the testators estate which is
known as the legitime..
In particular, the following are compulsory heirs:
(1)
Legitimate children and descendants, with res
pect to their legitimate parents and ascendants;
426
427
428
429
430
431
432
433
434
Answer:
There is no implied novation in this case. W e see no
valid objection to the judgment debtor and the judgment
creditor in entering into an agreement regarding the
monetary obligation of the former under the judgment
referred to. The payment by the judgment debtor of the
435
436
438
439
Answer:
(a) The action would not prosper in such a case. Ac
cording to the law, in the sale of immovable property, even
though it may have been stipulated that upon failure to pay
the price at the time agreed upon the rescission of the
contract shall of right take place, the vendee may pay, even
after the expiration of the period, so long as no demand for
the rescission of the contract has been made upon him either
judicially or by notarial act. After the demand, the court
may not grant him a new term. (Art. 1592, C C .) Here, at
the time B tendered payment of the purchase price, there
was still no demand made upon him by A for the payment of
said purchase price either judicially or by notarial act.
(b) (1) W hile the death of the principal in 1954 ended
the authority of the agent to sell the land, it has not been
shown that he Was aware of his principals demiseHence, the act of such agent is valid and shall be fully
effective with respect to third persons which may have
contracted with him in good faith in conformity with
Art. 1931 of the Civil Code. (Buason vs. Panuyas, 105
Phil. 795, Herrera vs. Luy, 110 Phil. 1020.)
(2)
As the case at bar is a case of double sale of re
gistered land he who recorded the sale in good faith has
a better right in conformity with Art. 1544 of the Civil
Code. Since D was not aware of the previous sale, he
had to rely on the face of the certificate of title of the
registered owner. Hence, he now has a better right to
theland. (Buason vs. Panuyas, supra.)
(c) In actions based on quasi-delicts, before the person
injured can recover damages from the defendant, it is
440
441
Answer:
(a) 1) No because under Section 47, P.D. 1529, no title
to registered land in derogation of that of the registered
owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse pos
session. A similar provision is found in the Civil Code.
The reason is that once a piece of land is registered
under the Torrens System, it operates as a notice to the
whole World. All persons are bound by it. No one can
plead ignorance of the registration.
(2) The right to recover the. land from another per
son holding it is equally imprescriptible, the reason
being that possession is a mere consequence of owner
ship.
(3) While a Torrens Title is imprescriptible, under
certain exceptional circumstances, it may yield to the
equitable principle of laches. In other ward's, certain
circumstances such as inaction or utter neglect on the
part of the owner and the intervention of rights by third
parties may, for reasons of equity, convert the claim of
imprescriptibility into a stale demand. (Mejia vs. Gamponia,. 1B0 Phil. 277; Miguel vs. Catalino, G.R.
L-23072, Nov. 29, 1968; Heirs of Batiog Lacamen vs.
Heirs of Laruan, G.R. L-27058, July 31, 1985).
(b) To be registerable, a voluntary document affecting
registered land must be sufficient in law. (Section 51, P.D.
1529) Sufficiency refers to both substance and form. As to
form, it is the R O D s responsibility to check such items as the
full name and signature of vendor or grantor, the marital
consent of the wife if the land sold is conjugal, the full name.,
442
Answer:
(a)
No, he cannot. This is so, because the Statute of
Frauds aims to prevent and hot to protect fraud. It is wellsettled that when the law declares that an agreement which
by its terms is not to be performed within a year from the
making thereof is unenforceable by action, unless the same,
or some note or memorandum thereof, be in writing, and
subscribed by the party charged, or by his agent, it refers only
to an agreement which by its terms is not to be performed on
either side within a year fom the execution thereof. Hence.
444
445
Question No. 1:
Alma, a Filipino citizen went to the United States on
a tourist visa. Wanting to legalize her stay and obtain per
manent employment, she married John, an American citizen,
for a fee, with the understanding that after a year, John
would divorce her. As agreed upon the two obtained a
divorce in Reno, Nevada.
(a) Suppose that after the divorce Alma consults you
on the question of how she can now marry her childhood
sweetheart Rene, in the Philippines preferably, or if that
cannot be done, in some other country where Alma and Rene
are prepared to go so that they can be joined in wedlock and
live the life they had dreamed about. What advice will you
give Alma. Explain.
(b ) Suppose on the other hand that Alma arid John
decided to give their marriage a try. They had seven years
of marriage. Alma eventually became an American citizen,
but the marriage soured and ended up in a divorce, just the
same.
This time Alma wants a martiage for keeps, so she
comes back to the Philippines to Rene: who, ever faithful,
has waited for seven long years. Can she and Rene contract
a valid marriage? Explain.
Answer:
(First Assumption)
a. Assuming that the marriage of Alma and John is
valid, then the divorce obtained by them is void
because of Article 15 of the Civil Code. Hence a
marriage between Alma and Rene in the Philippines
446
Question No. 2:
Ato was the registered owner of a passenger jeepney,
which was involved in a collision accident with a vegetable
truck, resulting in the death of four passengers and injuries
to three. At the time of the accident, Ato was legally married
to Maria but was cohabiting with Tonia in a relationship
akin to that of husband and wife.
Could the heirs of the dead passengers and the injured
447
(c) Tania?
Explain each case.
Answer:
a, Ato Yes. Insofar as the dead passengers are con
cerned, the heirs can recover damages on the basis of
culpa contractual. If the injured persons are also pas
sengers, Ato is likewise liable on the same basis of
culpa contractual. However, if . the injured persons
are not .passengers, then the liability for damages of
Ato will be on the basis of a quasi-delict.
b,. Maria In view of the ruling in Juaniza y. Jose (89
SCRA 306) that the passenger jeepney acquired by
the husband during an illicit cohabitation with
the paramour is conjugal property, Maria is liable
to the same extent as Ato insofar as the conjugal
property in the marriage between Ato and Maria
could be answerable.. But as regards her paraphernal
property, Maria cannot be held answerable.
c, Tonia No, In Juaniza v. Jose the paramour of the
owner of the passenger jeepney that figured in an
accident was held to be not a co-owner, and therefore
not liable for damages. Article 144 is inapplicable.
Question No, 3;
Celso Lim would like to correct an allegedly wrong
entry in the birth certificate of one of his sons, Celso Jr.,
describing the latter as a Chinese national and not as a Fili
pino. Among the evidence Celso Lim had are his own birth
certificate describing him as a Filipino, the birth certificate
of his other children, all describing them as Filipinos and a
448
Answer:
a. Celso must file a petition in an adversary proceeding
to correct the erroneous entry. In the case o f Republic v.
Valencia, (L-32181, March 5, 1986), it was ruled that not
only clerical errors can be the subject-matter o f the petition,
but even the controversial entries can be corrected.
b. Under Rule 108 of the Rules o f Court, he should
notify the Civil Registrar and all the persons affected or who
have an interest in the subject matter of the petition, in
cluding the Solicitor General.
Question No. 4:
Angel died intestate leaving considerable properties
accumulated during 25 years of marriage. He is survived by
his widow, a legally adopted son, the child of a deceased
legitimate daughter, two illegitimate children duly recognized
by Angel before his death and his ailing 93-year old mother
who has wholly dependent on him.
How would you distribute the estate indicating by
fractions the portions of the following who claim to be
entitled to inherit:
(a) the widow?
(b) the adopted son?
(c) the child of the deceased legitimate daughter?
(d ) the two recognized illegitimate children?
449
Question No. 5:
Tomas, Rene and Jose entered into a partnership under
the firm name Manila Lumber. Subsequently, upon mutual
agreement, Tomas withdrew from the piartnership and the
partnership was dissolved. However, the remaining partners,
Rene and Jose, did not terminate the business of Manila
Lumber. Instead o f winding up the business of the partner
ship and liquidating its assets, Rene and Jose continued the
business in the name of Manila Lumber apparently with
out objection from Tomas. The withdrawal o f Tomas from
the partnership was not published in the newspapers.
450
Answer:
Yes. Tomas can be held liable under the doctrine of
Question No. 6:
M/S Philippines, operated by United Shipping Lines,
loaded in Japan for shipment to Manila 50 crates of pipes
consigned to Standard Blooming Mills. The shipment was
insured againts marine risks with Marine Insurance Company.
Enroute, the ship caught fire resulting in the total loss of
ship and cargo. The insurance company paid the consignee
and thereafter sought recovery and reimbursement from the
United Shipping Lines as subrogee unto the rights of the
insured. Evidence was presented establishing the fact that
from the time the goods were stored in the ships hatch, nO
regular inspection was made during the voyage such that the
fire must have started 24 hours before it was noticed.
Could the insurance company claim reimbursement of
the amount it had paid its insured from the United Shipping
Lines? Explain.
Answer:
Yes. Under Article 2207, the insurer is subrogated to
the rights of the insured against the wrongdoer or the person
451
Question No. 7:
Fred sold to Juan a parcel of land, belonging to his
minor son, Lino, then under his guardianship, without judi
cial approval. After the sale, Juan immediately took pos
session o f the land, built a house iand religiously paid the
taxes' thereon. Nine years thereafter, Lino, no longer a minor,
rented the ground floor of the house built by Juan, Lino paid
the rent for the first month, then stopped paying. Two
years thereafter, when pressed for payment o f the accrued
rent. Lino refused, claiming ownership over the property,
alleging that the sale o f the property to Juan while he was
a minor without the approval of the guardianship court ren
dered the sale null and void.
Is the claim of Lino valid and meritorious.? Explain.
Answer:
No, Linos claim is not valid and not meritorious be
cause Lino is in estoppel. A lessee cannot assail the right and
title of the lessor and cannot claim ownership as against the
lessor. The fact that the sale was made while Lino was a
minor is of no moment because he recognised and ratified
the contract after he was already of majority age.
A nswer:
No, Linos claim is not valid and riot meritorious be
cause Juan had already become the owner of the land by
ordinary acquisitive prescription through adverse possession
o f the land for over ten (10) years.
452
A n sw er:
No, Lino's claim is not valid and not meritorious. Lino
can no longer recover the land because o f laches.
Question No. 8:
Miguel, Carlos and Lino are neighbors. Miguel owned a
piece of registered land which both Carlos and Lino wanted
to buy. Miguel sold the land to Carlos. The sal was not.
registered upon the request o f Miguel. Later on, the same
property was sold by Miguel to Lino. Miguel told Carlos
about the second sale. Carlos immediately tried to see Lino
to discuss the matter and inform him of the previous sale to
him (Carlos) o f the Same property but Lino refused to see
Carlos.' Thereupon Carlos annotated in the Registry of Pro
perty his adverse claim On the property. A week later, Lino
registered the sale on his favor and had a new transfer certi
ficate of title issued in his name. However, the adverse claim
of Carlos was duly annotated in the title. Notwithstanding,
Lino took possession o f the property and built a small
bungalow thereon.
(a) Who is the rightful owner of the property? Explain.
(b ) To whom would the bungalow built by Lino on the
property belong? Explain.
Answer:
a. In double sales, under Article 1544. the land sold
belongs to the first registrant in good faith. If none, it be
longs to the first possessor in good faith. If none it belongs
to the person with the oldest title, provided there is good
faith. Carlos, who has the oldest title, is therefore the right
ful owner of the property, because there was no registration
in good faith by Lino.
b. The bungalow built by Lino belong? to Carlos. Lino
is a builder in bad faith. Article 449 provides that he who
builds in bad faith on the land of another loses what it built
453
Question No. 9:
Rita owned a valuable painting which was stolen from
her house. The theft was duly reported to the authorities.
A year after, Rita saw the painting hanging in the office of
Mario. When queried, Mario said that he bought the painting
in a gallery auction. Th painting was positively identified as
the one stolen from the house of Rita.
(a) Could Rita recover the painting? i f so, would
Mario be entitled to reimbursement of the amount he paid
for the painting? Explain.
(b ) Supposing Mario bought the painting from a
friend, would your answer be the same? Explain.
Answer:
a. Yes, Rita could recovcr the painting, but Mario is
454
Answer:
It appearing that the additional work was done upon
verbal request and authority of a duly authorized represent
ative of Lino, and the bene Tits have been received by Lino in
consequence o f the actual repair and the additional work,
the defense put up by Lino is not valid on the ground that
no person may unjustly enrich himself at the expense of
another.
Question N o, 11 :
Ana rented a safety deposit box at the Alto Bank, paid
the rental fee and was given the key. Ana put her jewelry and
gold coins in the box. Days after, three armed men gained
entry into the Alto Bank, opening its vault and several safety
deposit boxes, including Anas and emptied them -of their
contents.
Could Ana hold the Alto Bank liable for the loss of the
contents of her deposit box? Explain'
Answer:
No, because under Article 1990 of the Civil Code, if
the depository by force majeure loses the thing and receives
money or another thing in its place, he shall deliver the sum
or other thing to be depositor. There being no showing that
there was anything received in place of the things deposited,
the Alto Bank is not liable foi the contents of the safety
box.
455
Answer:
The Alto Bank is not liable because the contract is not
a deposit but a rental o f the safety deposit box. Hence, the
Alto Bank is not liable for the loss of the contents o f the
box.
Answer:
The property is conjugal p r o p e r t y 1/2 belongs to
Martin and the other half of Tecla. However, 1/2 belonging
to Tecla will be divided among Martin and the two children,
each o f them getting 1/3 o f that 1/2.
456
Answer:
This is a proper case of reserva troncal. The prepositus is
Rico, the reservista is Jose and the reservatarios are Lilia (a
niece) and Nelia (an aunt), both o f them being relatives
within the 3rd degree of Rico (the prepositus) and belonging
to the maternal line represented by Mely. Accordingly, Nelia
as reservatario cannot claim any portion of the proindiviso
share of the property inherited by Jose from Rico. Lilia alone
should inherit because in reserva troncal, the successional
rights of relativeis who are reservatarios are determined by
the rules of intestate succession. In intestacy, nephews and
nieces exclude uncles and aunts. Hence, Lilia the niece,
excludes Nelia, the aunt, from the reservable property (De
Papa vs. Camacho 144 SCRA 281).
T h e rest of Joses estate, not subject to reserva, will be
inherited by his granddaughter Lilia as sole intestate heir.
457
Answer:
This is a proper case of reserva troncal. The prepositus
is Rico, the reservista and the reservatarios are Lilia arid
Nelia, both o f them being relatives within the 3rd degree
computed from Rico and belonging to the: maternal line
represented by Mely. Under the doctrine o f reserva integral
all the reservatarios in the nearest degree will inherit in equal
shares the reservable portion o f the pro-indiviso share of the
property inherited by Jose from Rico. The properties trans
mitted to Jose by Rico are the following:
Firstly, the property which Rico obtained from Mely
consisted o f his share in Melys interest as donee o f Rosas
land. The interest acquired by Rieo was 1/3, because 1/3
thereof was inherited by Jose and 1/3 by Nina. So the pro
perty that was obtained by Jose from Rico is the latters
i/3 interest o f the land.
In the case of BonOngs estate, the share of Mely was
1/2 and Nelias was the other half. Out of Melys share, 1/2
belonged to Rico and the other half belonged to Nina, both
Inheriting by right of representation.
Summarizing, the reservable estate is the 1/3 share o f
Rico in Rosas land which was donated to Mely, and the 1/2
interest o f Rico in Melys share of the estate o f Bonong.
These reservable properties should be divided equally bet
ween Nelia and Lilia (Article 891).
458
Answer:
No, Hugo cannot sue for a declaration of nullity of his
marriage with Lina. The marriage of Lina with Sixto was
void, so the marriage of Hugo with Lina is valid. There was
no need for a prior court action to declare the marriage with
Sixto as void (Yap vs. Court of Appeals, 145 SCRA 229).
Answer:
Yes, because the marriage of Hugo with Lina is not
valid, for the reason that there was no prior judicial decla
ration that the marriage with Sixto is void. Such judicial
declaration is required by law (Wiegel vs. Sempio Dy 143
SCRA 499\
459
case?
Answer:
a. The damages that can be claimed by the parents are the
following:
1. civil indemnity for death - P30,000.00,
460
'Answer:
1. The provision for their separation is.void.
2. The provision for the extra-judicial liquidation of
their conjugal assets is void.
3. The agreement to live separately is void.
4. The agreement that should either spouse find a more
compatible partner, the other would raise no ob
jection and would refrain from taking any judicial
action against the other is void.
The aforementioned stipulations are all Yoid because
they are contrary to law, morals, good custom, public order
and public policy. The specific provision o f law is Article 221
o f the Civil Code.
461
A nswer:
Mekanikos claim in untenable.
The fire of accidental origin which destroyed the equip
ment which is the object of the obligation in the instant caise
is clearly fortuitous in character. Therefore, the doctrine of
fortuitous events is applicable. The debtor or obligator,
Masipag, is not liable. In other words, the obligation is extin
guished.
The fact that the loss took place on March 16, 1985,
which is one day after Mekaniko had made a demand upon
Masipag to return the leased property, does not mean that
the loss took place after the obligor had already incurred in
delay, It must be noted that the lease agreement was exe
cuted on February 15, 1985, Obviously, on March 16, 1985.
Masipag had not yet incurred in delay.
462
Question No. 2:
Mr. Mamirapal, 19 years old and married, seeks to do
the following:
1. Lend his money at interest,
2.' Donate a piece of his land to his infant son.
3. Sell his car.
4. Sue his neighbor for damages.
The land, money, and car are Mamirapals separate property
derived from his own income. He is not sure whether he can
legally do all these things without his fathers consent and
assistance. He \comes to you for: advice. What advice will you
give him?
Answer:
I will advice Mamirapal: (1) to lend his money at inte
rest without securing his fathers consent or assistance;
(2) to donate a piece of his land to his infant son, but with
fathers consent; (3) to sell his car without fathers consent
or assistance; and (4) to sue his neighbor for damages, but
With his father's assistance. Although Mamirapal is already
emancipated, his emancipation is not perfect or plenary' in
character. Under the law, he cannot borrow money or alien-
463
Question No. 3:
After a whirlwind courtship of two weeks, Marikit;
starry-eyed and captivated, got married to Mr. Masanting.
Soon after the honeymoon, however, Marikit discovers that
Masanting was not the knight in shining armor she thought
she married. She received official information that Masanting
had been dishonorably discharged from the army for de
sertion. She also learned that Masanting had a string of liaisons
with all kinds of women during his army career. What infu
riated Marikit was that Masanting had concealed all of these
from her and, in fact, had woven tales of gallantry on the
battlefield and of deep religious conviction which made him
lead a pure life. Promptly upon discovering the truth about
Masanting and within the first year o f their marriage, Marikit
sues to annul the marriage on grounds of deception and
fraud. Will her action prosper? Explain.
Answer:
Her action for annulment will not prosper.
464
(3 )
465
Answer:
The action for damages for loss of the child (fetus) will
not prosper because as held by the Court in the case of Geluz
v. C.A., the foetus is not a person. But moral damages may
be recovered for mental anguish for loss of parental expect
ancy. Perhaps, even exemplary damages may be recovered.
466
Answer:
Mahinhin, the owner, still has a better right to the ring.
She had been unlawfully deprived of the ring, therefore, not
even an innocent purchaser in a pawnshop can claim a better
right. However, Mayaman has to be reimbursed.
467
Answer:
A co-owner can always sell his share in the co-ownership
469
Mayaman
was issued
Mayaman
was sche
A tiswer:
Magaling did not have the right to refuse the payment
of part of the obligation with a cashiers check.
The Central Bank Act provides that a check which has
been cleared and credited to the account of the creditor shall
be equivalent to a delivery to the creditor in cash in an
amount equal to the amount credited to his account.
Analyzing the above provision, it is clear that the
cashiers check of Far East Bank, a reputable bank, and
credited to the account of Mayaman has legal tender power.
Therefore, there was no basis for Magaling in refusing pay
ment of the obligation.
471
Answer:
The general rule according to commentators (Castan and
Manresa) is that dation extinguishes in full the obligationthe exception is a contrary agreement because then it be
comes assignment of rights hence valid only up to the
value.
472
473
Answer:
I would sustain the claim of Betis. A penal clause is
supposed to answer for damages without the introduction of
proof as to actual damages. It is to be noted that the penal
clause has been freely agreed upon between the parties pre
cisely with the intention of doing away with having to
present proof of damages.
474
p e lle d
475
Answer:
Abenturero does not have any right, whether personal
or real, to procedd against Commerciante.
In obligations to give, the creditor has a right to the
thing which is the object of the obligation and to the fruits
thereof when the obligation to deliver arises. The obligation
to deliver arises from the moment of the perfection of the
contract. In sales, once the contract is perfected, the vendor
is bound to deliver the thing sold and the fruits, unless there
is a stipulation to the contrary. In the instant problem, there
is a stipulation that delivery will be effected six months
from the execution of the deed of sale. Instead o f delivering
the mango plantation and the fruits o f Abenturero in accord
ance with the agreement, Nagbibili breached the contract
by delaying the delivery of the plantation beyond the period
agreed upon and by selling the fruits to Commerciante. How
ever, since there was still no delivery of the plantation and
the. fruits, it is obvious that the only right which Abenturero
476
Answer:
The estate o f Carlos worth P800,000 should be appor
tioned as follows:
1. Josefa one-half, or P400,000.00;
477
Josefa
1/2
Fe (w ife)
1/4
1/4
478
Answer:
The testamentary provision is not valid. According to
the Civil Code, there are four aspects of succession which are
governed by the national law o f the decedent if he is a
foreigner. They are: flrsj, the order of succession; second, the
amount of successional rights; third, the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions; and fourth, the capacity to succeed.
It is obvious that the proviso in Burnsides will providing
that his estate shall be distributed in accordance with Philip
pine Law is contrary to the explicit mandate of the Civil
Code, Therefore, it is void.
If Bumside had not made the above-stated testamentary
provision, applying the doctrine of single renvoi, the law of
the Philippines shall be applied. Under the law of the Phil
ippines, the national law of Bumside shall goVem. That
means the law of C alifornia. Now, what does the law o f Cali
fornia say? According to the conflicts-rule-law of California,
the internal law of Burnsides domicile shall govern and not
the law of California. So, the case is referred back (renvoi)
to the internal law of the Philippines. The law o f the Phil
ippines shall, therefore^ be applied in the distribution of
Burnsides estate.
479
Explain.
Answer:
480
481
the driver should first have been sued, held liable, and found
insolvent before Kanlungan could be proceeded against.
Are the bus companys defenses tenable? Explain.
Answer:
482
483
(c)
Suppose the rings, instead o f being pledged, had
been mortgaged to Matunod, would Matunod have been
entitled to the deficiency if the sales proceeds were less than
the indebtedness or to the excess, if the proceeds were
more? Explain.
'
Answer:
The C.C. on pledge provides that the foreclosure o f the
pledge extinguishes the principal obligation, whether the pro
ceeds o f the sale are more, or less than the obligation. Hence,
a)
b)
c)
Answer:
The son is still a stranger, and under the C.C. when a
share o f a co-owner is sold to a third person, the other co-
484
"B
Answer:
Under the doctrine of Campillo vs. CA. 129 SCRA 5.13,
Masigla has a better right because at the time of attachment
and sale at public auction, the property was still registered in
name of Mapusok hence the rule on Torrens Titled land
and Art: 1544 Civil Code of the Philippines (double sale)
will apply.
485
Answer:
The Torrens system protects only an innocent purchaser
for value who relies on the certificate of title of the vendor.
Hinandugan is not a purchase but a mere donee. Hence the
real owner Kamusmusan can recover the land from Hinan
dugan on the ground of constructive trust, which the court
ruled prescribes in 10 years.
486
Answer:
The marriage is void. Filipino citizens are bound by the
laws of the Philippines with regard to their capacity to marry,
regardless o f where the marriage is celebrated. This is an
487
488
Answers:
A)
1. The philosophy of the law is founded upon
public policy. The rule excludes ignorance as an excuse
for not complying with the; law. Acts contrary to law
should not have the same effects as when done conform
ably with the law merely because of ignorance.
2. The philosophy of the law is founded upon public
policy. The rule excludes ignorance as an excuse for not
complying with the law. Acts contrary to law should
not have the same effects as when done conformably
with the law merely because of ignorance. It is based on
necessity and expediency.
3. ignorance of the law does not excuse compliance
with the law of the land (Art. 3, Civil Code) whether
civil or penal and whether substantive or remedial. This
principle is founded not only on expediency and public
489
490
Question No. 2
A and B were married on January 1, 1980, Two
weeks later, on their way home from honeymoon, the
car A was driving turned turtle. A died instantly while
B was unharmed. A month thereafter, B had illicit re
lations with C. On October 15, 1980, B gave birth to X.
In X 's birth certificate, B declared that X's father is C,
Resolve the issue of X s paternity with reasons.
Answers:
1. X is presumed to be the legitimate child of A
because X was born after 180 days from the celebration
of the marriage and within 300 days after the dissolu
tion of the marriage due to the death of A. The declara
tion of B (the mother) has no legal effect.
491
dissolution,, or the separation of the spouses, is quasiconclusively presumed to be legitimate. Against this pre
sumption, no evidence shall be admitted other than that
of the physical impossibility of the husband having access
to his wife within the first 120 days (period of concep
tion) of the 300 days which preceded the birth of the
child. (Macadangdang vs. Court of Appeals, L-40542, 12
Sept. 1980).. This physical impossibility may be caused
by
1) The impotence of the husband;
2) The fact of the husband and wife living separate
ly in such a way that access was not possible; or
3) The serious illness of the husband.
(A rt. 255, Civil Code).
None of the above exclusionary instances are shown. Ac
cordingly. X must be considered a legitimate child of A
and B.
Question No. 3
A t the time of the dissolution of -the marriage by
the death of (the husband) A, he and his wife, B, were
possessed of the following properties:
1) A house and lot 1/3 of the price of which A paid
before his marriage, 1/3 during the marriage from his
salary, and the balance also during the marriage from
money B received in payment of a loan obtained from
her while still, single ; and
2) A n apartment house constructed on a parcel of
lot donated to B prior to the marriage.
Who owns the foregoing properties and what obliga
tions, if any, does the owner have for the improvements
introduced thereon? Discuss.
Answer:
1)
1. The house and lot ia a separate property of
A subject to reimbursement of 1/3 of the price to the
conjugal partnership and another /j to his wife B.
492
493
Question No. I
A ) Aside from the foregoing assets, A and B in the
preceding question had these obligations outstanding at
the time of A s death
1) A debt contracted by B for the repair of
the house and apartment building above referred
to; and
2) A shortage in A s account as cashier of the
firm where he was employed.Against whom are these obligations chargeable?
Score your reasons.
B ) H is fortune having been wiped out by business
reverses, A demands support from C, the descendant of
A s deceased illegitimate son.
Is C bound to give support to A? Discuss.
Answer's:
A)
1. With respect to the house since it is a sepa
rate property of the husband, minor repairs are to be
shouldered by the eonjugaJ partnership but major re
pairs are for the account of the owner (husband A ) .
W ith respect to the apartment building, which is conju
gal, then the major and minor repairs are for the account
of the conjugal partnership.
2) The debt i3 chargeable against the conjugal part
nership since it redounds to the benefit of the partner
ship
3) The debt contracted by B for the repair of the
house is an exclusive obligation of the husband A, but
the repair cost on the apartment house being conjugal
494
495
'
497
498
499
500
4.
The provisions on avulsion, rather than alluvion
apply. Accordingly, the action fo r the recovery o f the land
will still prosper. The law allows the owner of the segre
gated Iand to remove the same within two years from the
time avulsion takes place (A rt. 459). A, however, had lost
his right to. recover the coconut trees which can only be
claimed within 3ix months (A rt. 460).
Question No. 8
In a w ill executed in 1970, A instituted-his two (2 )
legitimate brothers, B and C, as sole heirs to all the pro
perties he then owned. B died in 1975, survived by his legi
timate daughter, D, while A died last, year, leaving an
estate, 1/2 of which was acquired after the execution of his
will.
'
Who will succeed A, how much and by what right will
the heir or each of the heirs, if more than one, inherit?
Reason out your answer.
Answ er:
1. Regarding 1/2 acquired after the execution of the
will it w ill be inherited by both D and C, C in his own
right and D by right of representation because this V2 is
inherited by intestate succession. With regard to the %
already owned at the time of the execution of the will, C
alone will get the property by right of institution and ac
cretion.
2. The half of the property existing at the time o f the
execution of the will should go to C, the portion pertaining
to him in his own right and the portion pertaining to B
by right of accretion.
The other half acquired after the execution of the
will passes by intestacy, equally to C in his own right and
to D in representation of B.
3. The whole estate will go to the second brother C by
right o f accretion and B gets nothing.
4. W ith respect to the will as made by the testator B
is a voluntary heir. He transmits no right to his heir D,
501
502
503
504
505
506
507
C)
An Englishman, who had resided in the Philip
pines for a long time, executed a w ill in France, dispos
ing of his real and personal properties in the Philippines.
What law governs the validity o f his will? Discuss.
Answers:
A ) 1. The action will prosper. A is not a possessor
in good faith of the land of C because A has no title or
mode of acquisition with respect to the land of C, What
A bought was the land of B. A cannot claim acquisition
of ownership by ordinary prescription of 10 years.
2) It depends whether it is under the Code of Civil
Procedure or under the New Civil Code. Under the Code
of Civil Procedure, A has acquired the land by prescrip
tion. Under the New Civil Code, there is no prescription
because there is no just title,
3) The action, absent the possible application of
laches, can prosper. The possession by A was without a
just title; such possession can thus only ripen into own
ership by acquisitive prescription after 30 years of open,
peaceful and continuous possession in the concept of an
owner (A rt. 11-37 and Art. 1129, in relation to Art. 1127)
B ) 1. With regard to the real estate mortgage, B
can foreclose the same because it includes future loans.
But with regard to the chattel mortgage, B cannot fore
close because of the affidavit of good faith which requires
that it be a just and valid debt, and, therefore, the chat
tel mortgage can not cover futurie loans.
2.
The mortgage is indivisible and therefore it ans
wers for both debts;. Therefore, both mortgages .can be
foreclosed.
C) 1. With respect to the intrinsic validity of the
will, it is English law in force at the time of his death.
That rule is absolute without any exception. With respect
however to the extrinsic or formal validity of the will,
it is the law of England or of France or of the Philippines
jn force at the time of the execution of the will.
2.
Article 16 Real property as well as personal pro
perty is subject to the law of the country where it is
508
r- f .7^ r ,>
A,
a Filipino, 18 years of age, married and residing
in a foreign country, having run out, of money, borrowed
P50,000.00 from B and to secure its payment, executed a
real mortgage on a house and lot owned by him in Manila.
Under the law of the country where he resides, he is
deemed to be of age and the real estate mortgage is valid.
The loan not having been paid on maturity, B brought aa
509
512
'
A)
1. This is a question of priority between the
vendors lien and the garnishment order. Concurrences
and preferences of credits are not applicable for the sim
ple reason that there is no special proceeding to convene
the creditors, but since both are preferred in the sense
that one is the vendor and the other has a garnishment
order, it is a question of who is preferred between the
two. Therefore, the vendors lien of A is superior because
the sale occurred before. The moment he sold the piano,
there already arose the vendors lien.
2.
The right of X should prevail over that of A. The
problem relates to the efficacy of the garnishment order
on B s receivables from the sale and not on the piano it
self. Accordingly, the unpaid sellers lien which is a lien
on the piano as the object of A s sale, not being really
513
514
person all or some of his duties, liable for the acts o f the
delegate. The nature o f their liability is solidary. ( Art. 2146).
Question No. H
A)
Within one year from the issuance of the decree
of registration and certificate pf title in A s name, B
brought an action for their annulment in the Regional
Trial Court on the ground that A obtained them thru
fraud. In his answer to the complaint, A -alleged that the
court had no jurisdiction over the case and averred,
by way o f counterclaim, that he has just discovered that
B succeeded 3 years ago in registering in his name, by
false and fraudulent representations, another parcel of
land owned and possessed by A . He, therefore, prayed
that Bs action be dismissed and that he be ordered to
transfer his title to him ( A ) . The trial court dismissed
both the complaint and counterclaim.
Comment on the legality o f the order o f dismissal.
B ) A fte r finding on a bus an envelope containing
two Torrens certificates of title in A's name, B posing as
A and forgin g his signature, sold the two parcels of land
described in the Titles to X who bought them in good
faith a.nd for value and to whom transfer certificates
were issued in his name. He then conveyed one parcel to
Y , a bonafide purchaser for value, while the other was
levied upon to satisfy the judgment against X.
Who has a better right to the aforementioned par
cels o f land, A, Y , or the judgment creditor? Discuss.
C ) The register of deeds refused to record a deed
of sale executed in favor of a Filipino woman on the
ground that she is an alien because her husband is an
alien and although she secured an absolute divorce from
him abroad, the divorce is void since our law, which
governs her status, does not recognize absolute divorce.
Rule on the legality of the register o f deeds refusal
to register.
515
A nsw ers:
A)
1. Under Section 32, P.D. 1529, a person who
owns a piece of land or any interest therein that was
fraudulently registered in anothers name is given the
right to file a petition to review or reopen the decree of
registration not later than one year from the date o f
entry thereof. This remedy will not lie, however, if title
to the land has been transferred to an innocent purchaser
for value.
The case at hand is denominated as an action for
annulment of both the decree and the title, based on fraud.
I f we treat this case as an ordinary civil action that was
filed with the RTC in the latters capacity as a court pf
general jurisdiction, I believe that the Court acted correctly
in dismissing it, because the proper remedy of the aggrieved
party would be a petition for review of the decree which
must be filed with the RTC, in its capacity as a land regist
ration court. The reason for this is that the case, in essence,
petition for review, a mere continuation of the original
proceedings, over which the RTC sitting as a land regist
ration court has exclusive jurisdiction. So, the RTC acted
correctly in dismissing the action for lack of jurisdiction.
On the other hand, if the case was filed with the RTC
in its Capacity as a land registration court, I believe the
dismissal was in error, because in that capacity it has
in fact exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide what
in essence is a petitiop for review of the decree. I think
mere error in nomenclature of the pleading should not
be a ground for dismissal.
But as a land registration court, the RTC acted-cor
rectly in dismissing the counterclaim of B because in
that capacity it enjoys only special and limited jurisdic
tion and, therefore, it can not take cognizance thereof.
The counterclaim for reconveyance of another parcel of
land ia an action in personam which falls properly within
the -competence of ordinary civil courts.
516
517
518
519
520
521
522
523
524
B.
525
the time (A rt. 85, par. 1). Alfredo cannot ask for the an
nulment of this marriage. The child Alice is legitimate
(A rt. 89).
The marriage of Alfredo to Benita is void, for being
bigamoys (A rt. 80, par. 4 ). The child Benedicta is a na
tural child by legal fiction (A rt, 89).
The marriage of Alfredo to Consuelo is valid, since
there was no pre-existing marriage, in view of the disso
lution of the marriage to Alicia upon the latter's death,
coupled with the fact that the marriage to Benita is void.
The child Connie is legitimate.
B.
Question No. 4
A entered into a twenty-year lease contract with B
for the use of Bs warehouse in connection with his ( A s)
527
528
Question No. 5
Believing that a piece of land belonged to him, A
erected thereon a building, using materials belonging to
C. B, the owner of the land, was aware of the construc
tion being made by A, but did not do anything'to stop
it.
What are the rights of A, B and C with respect to
the building and as against each other?
A n sioer:
A.
B,
regardless of his good or bad faith, becomes the
owner of the building (A rt. 445 and 448). However, A,
a builder in good faith, will be entitled to reimbursement
of his necessary and useful expenses, with a right to re
tain the same until paid. He may also remove the cons
truction, since B, the landowner, acted in bad faith in
not stopping the construction (A rt. 454, 447). C, the
owner of the materials shall have the right to reimburse
ment. C may also remove them but only if he can do so
without injury to the work (A rt. 447).
B.
529
530
Question. N o. 7
On January 1, 1978, A sold a typewriter to B. It
turned out, however that A had stolen the typewriter
from G.
In February, 1982, when C discovered that his type
writer was in Bs possession, he immediately filed an
action against B to recover it.
W ill the action prosper?
Answer:
A.
Question N o. 8
Spouses Guillermo and Pacita had three sons, name
ly, A , B and C. Beset by quarrels, their marriage broke
up. Guillermo left for and obtained a divorce in the
United States, where he subsequently married Juana, by
whom he had a son, D. Guillermo later died in the United
States without even knowing that C had died earlier,
leaving a wife, E, and a legitimate son, F.
State the shares, if any, of the following in the estate
of Guillermo: A, B, D, E, F, Pacita and Juana.
531
Answers:
A.
532
D,
cannot inherit. The illegitimate child cannot in
herit from the legitimate relatives of his father or mother.
(A rt. 992).
Question No. 10
A had two legitimate children, namely, B and G.
He made a will, instituting C and a friend, D, as his
heirs and giving a P10.000 legacy to E, his former driver.
He, however, expressly disinherited B without specifying
the reason therefor.
Assuming that A s net estate is worth ?100,000 upon
his death, how will it be distributed?
533
Answer-:
A. Furnished by Office of Justice Plana
The disinheritance of B is invalid, because there is
no specification o f the cause therefor. However, the ins
titution of the heirs will only be partially annulled inso
far as it may prejudice his legitime (Art. 918). The
legacies and other testamentary dispositions remain valid
insofar as it will not impair his legitime. B therefore geta
his legitime which is 1/4 of the estate, or P25,000.00. The
legacy o f P I 0,000.00 to E will be paid. The balance of
the estate of P65,000.00 w ill be divided equally between
the instituted heirs, C and P .
1
B.
534
535
536
Question No. 1U
For value received, Pedro promised to deliver to
Juan on or before August 15, 1984 a Mercedes Benz with
Plate No. 123 which he (Pedro) had just brought home
from Germany, as well as a 1984 18" Sony television set.
Unfortunately, before the scheduled delivery date, the
Mercedes Benz and the television set which Pedro had
intended to deliver to Juan were destroyed by an acci
dental fire.
Has the obligation of Pedro been extinguished? Ex
plain.
Answer:
A.
Question No. 15
On June 13, 1982, A sold to B in a public instrument
a parcel of land for P50,000. Simultaneously, B granted
A an option to buy the same property for P60,000.00 with
in one year. On June 13, 1983, B allowed A an extension
of the option to buy for another vear, this time at the
537
will
Answ er:
A,
Question No. 16
A bought a truck from B payable in installment
secured by a chattel mortgage executed by A on the truck.
As additional security, A 3 brother, C, executed a real
estate mortgage in favor of B.
A defaulted in the payment of several installments.
Consequently, B filed an action for replevin, repossessed
the truck, and foreclosed the chattel mortgage.
Can B proceed against the other 'properties of A and
the real estate mortgage executed by C to recover the de
ficiency, if any, after the chattel mortgage foreclosure
sale? Explain.
538
Answer :
A.
Question. No. 17
On January 1, 1983, A borrowed P10,000 from B pay
able on December 1, 1983. As security therefor, A pledged
his car to B with an agreement that B could use it. On
June 30,' 1983, A offered to pay the loan in full and aslced
for the return of his car.
Can A compel B to acceptthe payment and to return
the car? Why?
Answer'
A.
>
Question No. 18
More than one year had elapsed since the issuance of
the filial deeree of registration when A discovered that his
land had been fraudulently registered in the name of his
539
caretaker B.
What right of action, if any, does A have and against
whom? Explain.
Answer'.
A. Furnished by Office o f Justice Plana
The only remedy of A is to bring an action for re
conveyance against B, or' for damages if the property has
passed into the hands of an innocent purchaser for value.
Such a complaint would not seek a review of the decree or
the reopening o f the registration case which is already in
controvertible, but be for the enforcement o f a trust. Sec
tion 96 of PD No. 1529 provides that nothing in the A ct
shall be construed to deprive any party of any action
which he may have against any person for loss or damage
or deprivation of land or any interest therein. It may alsd
he stated that an action by A against B to compel him to
convey the property held in Bs name to A as the benefi
ciary, does not prescribe. (Caladiao, et. al. vs. Bias, 119
Phil 969).
B.
540
541
Question No. 20
A, a foreigner, married B, a Filipino, and settled in
the Philippnes. They begot a Son, C. Under the laws of A s
country, the system of complete separation of property is
followed, and the husband can freely dispose of his pro
perties without restriction.
During the marriage, A bought a large number of
shares o f Philex Mining Company out of his salary as a
World Bank consultant.
Upon A s death, it was found that he left a will leav
ing all his Philex shares the only property acquired
during his marriage exclusively to his brother D, total
ly omitting B and C. B and C, therefore, opposed the will
on the ground o f the preterition of C, among others. Add
itionally, B claimed that Vi! of the Philex shares of stock
should pertain to her as her conjugal share.
Is the will valid? I f you were the judge, how would
you rule on the issues raised by B and C?
Answ er:
A.
542
543
544
( Committee's
Answer)
545
( Examiners Answer)
As a possessor in bad faith, A may recover only the
neeessary expenses he may have incurred while in pos
546
in
the
bad
the
547
Answer
It is, in so far as the machinery is concerned but void
as to the building. The machinery is movable property as it
does not appear that A introduced it in the building in con
nection with any industry or works being carried on there
in, while the building is immovable property and conse
quently cannot be the subject of a chattel mortgage.
Q u estio n No. 6
Three of four brothers, the sole heirs of their deceased
parents, agreed to convert a ricefield in the estate into a
subdivision and spend the money, also left by their pa
rents, for developing the subdivision. The fourth son dis
agreed and brought a suit to enjoin his brothers from pro
ceeding with the subdivision and spending the money they
inherited for its development.
Will the action prosper? Why?
A nsw er
It will, in so fa r as it seeks to stop the conversion of
the ricefield into a subdivision, for this is an alteration
which requires the consent o f all the co-owners. But i f the
refusal o f the plaintiff is clearly prejudicial to the common
interest, the alteration may be allowed.
It will also prosper in so far as it prays that the mo
ney of the estate be not diverted to the development of
the subdivision. The expenditure is not a mere act o f ad
ministration but of dominion which requires the consent
of all.
With respect to the lease, the action will succeed i f it
created a real right; otherwise, it w ill fail.
Q u estio n No. 7
The deceased, A left a gross estate worth P360.000
and debts amounting to P60j000. He was survived by his
548
[P360,000.00
550
Question No. 10
A bound himself to deliver to B a 21-inch 1983 model
T V set, and the 13 cubic feet White Westinghouse refrige
rator, with Motor No. WERT-385, which B saw in A s
store, and to repair B's piano. A did none of these things.
May the court compel A to deliver the T V set and the
refrigerator and repair the piano? Why? I f not, what, re
lief may the court grant B? Why?
Answer
( Examiners. Answer)
Yes, in so far as his obligation to deliver' the Wesiinghouse, refrigerator is concerned, the thing to be given
being determinate, but no in so far as the 2 other obliga
tions are concerned, one being an obligation to give an
indeterminate thing, and the other being an obligation to
do. In these 2 cases, the court shall order the obligations
to be performed at A s expense.
{Com m ittee's Answ er)
551
(b )
(c )
(d )
552
(e )
(f)
(g )
Q u e stio n No. 12
A and B sold 1,000 sacks o'f rice to X and Y and, on
X s request, delivered them to him. X resold the rice,
without turning over any part of it or its price to Y.
May Y compel A and B to deliver what he bought? I f
so, to what extent?
A nsw er
Yes, Y may compel A to deliver 250 sacks of rice and
B the same quantity, the obligation being joint, not soli
dary.
Q u e stio n No. 13
A owes B P20.000 which became due and payable last
October 1, 1983. Oh that date, A offered B P10,000 the
only money he then had, but B refused to accept the pay
ment. A thereafter met C, Bs 22-year old son, to whom
he gave the P10,000 with the request that he turn the mo
ney over to B. The money was stolen while in Cs posses
sion.
Was B justified in refusing to accept the payment of
A ? May he still recover the full amount of his debt of
P20.000? Why?
A nsw er
Yes, the creditor cannot be compelled to receive par
tial payments of the obligation due him, there being no
stipulation to the contrary.
553
554
Question No. 15
On October 15, 1983. goods were loaded on a vessel
owned by a common carrier for transportation from Ma
nila to Cebu under a bill of lading which provided that
the carrier would not be responsible for loss arising from
theft or robbery. The goods were stolen while the vessel
was docked in Manila.
Sued for damages, the common carrier invoked the
cited stipulation to avoid liability for the loss of the cargo.
Additionally, the carrier, which is a corporation, argued
that it could not be held liable because it had done all
it could to prevent the loss by exercising the utmost dili
gence ift the- selection and supervision of its employees.
How valid are these defenses?
A nsw er
The defenses are not valid.
Common carriers cannot escape liability by stipula
tion in the bill of lading relieving them for responsibility
fo r the acts o f thieves or robbers who do not act with
grave or irresistible threat or force.
Common carriers are similarly forbidden from ex
empting themselves from liability for the acts or omis
sions of its employees by stipulations to that effect in
the bill of lading.
Q u estio n No. 16
A borrowed Bs truck. During a fire which broke out
in A s garage, he had time to save only one vehicle and
he saved his car instead of the. truck. Is he liable for
the loss of Bs truck? Why?
Answer
Yes. The bailee in a commodatum is liable for the
loss of the thing loaned even if thru a fortuitous event
555
556
557
559
560
561
562
563
564
566
567
568
Answer
The contention of the collateral heirs of W and
the administrator of the estate that the donation made
by W to her friend F is void because the donation
is a donation of future property is untenable. The reason
is crystal clear. According to the Civil Code, by future
property is understood anything which the donor cannot
dispose of at the time o f the donation. Obviously, W s
share in her husbands estate does not fall within the
purview of the definition. Because of the principle that
successional rights are transmitted at the very moment
of the death of th e. decedent, it is evident that W had
a perfect right to donate her share in her husband s
estate to her friend F .
(N o te : The above answer is based on Arts 777 and
751 of the Civil Code. The Committee recommends
most respectfully that if the bar candidate arrives
at the same conclusion by invoking the provisions of
Art. 493 of the Civil Code, he or she should be pro
perly credited.)
Q u estio n No. 11
A courted B", a beautiful girl, 25 years old. Be
cause of A s persistence and repeated promises to marry
her, she submitted her body to him. A fte r A had satis
fied his. lust, he became indifferent to the girl. Finally, he
refused to comply with his promise notwithstanding her
demands. B filed an action against A , for. moral, tem
perate and exemplary damages, alleging that she had
been seduced by defendants false promises to marry her,
and that she suffered social humiliation, mental anguish,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and moral shock.
Is Bs action tenable? Reason.
Answer
570
-TTSJ
' -i
571
Answer
B is not entitled to share in the inheritance not on
the ground that the disinheritance was ineffective because
X had not proved that he in fact refused to support the
572
Answer
Among the survivors, only the following shall par
ticipate in the division of the inheritance: A , in his
own right; B , in his own right; and C and D , by
right of representation. F , the daughter of A ", can
not participate because she is excluded by the latter apply
ing the rule of proximity. Consequently, the inheritance
shall be divided as fo llo w s :.
A one-third (1/3) of the inheritance;
B onerthird (1/3) of the inheritance;
C one-half (V i) of one-third (1/3) of the in
heritance by right of representation;
D one-half (V s) of one-third (1/3) of the in
heritance by right of representation.
Q u estio n No. 1 5
A Corporation, engaged in the sale of subdivision
residential lots, sold to B a lot of 1,000 square meters.
573
Answer
First Answer: The action for specific performance
should be dismissed on the ground that it is premature.
It is clear that the instant case falls within the purview
of obligations with a term or period which must be judi
cially fixed. Thus, B , instead of bringing an action for
specific performance, should bring an action asking the
court to determine the period within which A " Corpora
tion shall put up the artesian well with tank. Once the
court has fixed the period, once the court, let us say, has
declared that the period is six months, then that will be
come a part of the covenant between the contracting
parties. It can no longer be changed by them. I f the Cor
poration does not put up the artesian well with tank with
in the period fixed by the court, B can then bring an
action fo r specific performance.
Second Answer: Normally, before an action for
specific performance may be maintained by B against
A Corporation, the former must first bring an action
against the latter asking the court to fix the duration of
the term or period to install the artesian well with tank.
However, an action combining such action with that of
an action for specific performance may be allowed if. it
can be shown that a separate action for specific per
formance would be a mere formality because no additional
proofs other than the admitted facts will be presented and
would serve no purpose other than to delay. Here, there
is no obstacle to such course of action.
*
574
A nsw er
In this case, according to the Civil Code, the debt,
which is most onerous to the debtor, among those due,
shall be deemed satisfied.
Analyzing the four debts stated in the problem, the
most onerous is No. 4, the second most onerous is No. 2,
the third most onerous is No. 3, and the last onerous is
No. 1, Consequently, the payment should be applied in
that order.
575
Answer
It must be observed that there are two questions in
the case at bar They are:
(1 ) Is the agreement valid? The answer is yes. It
is a time-honored rule that even a. verbal agreement to
sell land is valid so long as there is already an agreement
with respect to the object and the purchase price.
(2 ) W ill an action by B against A for specific
performance prosper ? The answer is no, unless it is ratified.
The reason is obvious. The agreement, being an agree
ment of sale of real property, is covered by the Statute
of Frauds It cannot, therefore, be enforced by a court
action because it is not evidenced by any note or memorandurfl. or writing properly subscribed by the party
charged.
576
Answer
(a )
B and C may exercise the right of legal
redemption. In other words, they can be subrogated to all
of the rights of X under the same terms and conditions
stipulated in the contract. Should the two desire to exer
cise the right, they may only do so in proportion to their
respective shares in the thing owned in common.
(b) No, B cannot exercise the same right if A
had sold his share to C instead of to X . The reason
is obvious. C cannot be classified as a third person with
in the meaning of the law.
(c)
Yes, X may exercise the right of legal re
demption. For all legal purposes, he has already become
a cp-owner. Being a co-owner, he is, therefore entitled
to all of the rights of a co-owner, including the right of
legal redemption.
577
Answer
The contention of A B C Trading Co. that the chattel
mortgage has been novated Toy the real estate mortgage
executed by Mr. Y in favor of X " Bank is untenable.
WelL-settled is the rule that in order that there will be a
novation, there must be complete incompatibility between
the two obligations. And the test of incompatibility is sim
ple. A ll that we have to ask is : Can the two obligations
stand together. I f they can* then there is no incompati
bility. If there is no incompatibility, then there is no
novation. However * if they cannot stand together, then
there is incompatibility. I f there is incompatibility) then
there is a novation. Applying the test to the instant case,
it is clear that the two jobligations can stand together.
Therefore, there is no novation.
578
Answer
X s appeal is meritorious. True, arrears in pay
ment of rent for three months at any one time is a ground
for ejectment under Sec. 5 (b ) of Batas Pambansa Big.
25, but then the law cqntinues; provided, .that in case of
refusal to accept payment of the rental agreed upon, the
lessee shall either deposit, by Way of consignation, the
amount, in court or in a bank in thz name of and with
notice to the lessor. X , according to the facts, deposited
the amount in the P N B in the name of Y giving the
latter notice of the deposit. Therefore, under the law,
the lease is still covered by the rental law (B.P. Big. 25).
X " cannot be ejectedv The order of the court fixing the
period of the lease at one year is contrary to law.
579
Q u estio n N o. 1
S , a fourth year medical student, having failed to pay
rent for the room he occupied for three months, despite re
peated demands of O , the house owner, was warned that
unless he paid not later than 6:00 P.M. that day, he would be
locked out of the house. S said that the money from the pro
vince had not yet arrived and asked for an extension of ten
days, as the semester was ending and it was examination time.
O refused.
When S got back from school at 9:00 P.M., the house
was locked and all his clothes; toothbrush, etc., were outside
the house, but his books and notes were kept by O until he
could pay his rent. S became angry and started banging the
door and called O and his mother ugly names, which was
heard by the neighbors. S was so Upset that he failed in the
examinations.
a) S sued " O for damages. Can he recover? Rea
sons.
b) Suppose that O hired you as his lawyer, what
defense would you invoke for him, if any? Explain;
A nsw er
(a)
Yes, S can recover damages. There is a clear abuse of
rights on the part of O . He did not act with justice, he did
not give S - his due and he did not observe honesty and good
faith. His act is also wilful thus causing injury to S in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs and public
policy. S had already explained to him that money from the
province was forthcoming. He, therefore, asked for an exten
sion of ten days within which to pay his rent. He also ex
plained that it was the end of the semester and it was exami
nation time. Despite this explanation and plea, his room was
locked, his personal belongings were placed outside the house,
580
and worst of all, his books and notes were kept by O'" until he
could pay his rent. As a result, he failed in the examinations.
Under the Civil Code, O is clearly liable for damages.
{Note: The above answer is based on Arts. 19 and 21 of the
Civil Code. The Committee, however, respectfully recom
mends that if the bar candidate continues his answer by
discussing the damages recoverable, such as moral
damages under Art. 2219 and exemplary damages under
Art. 2219, and invokes recent decisions such as Manila
Gas Corp. vs, CA, Oct. 30, 1980; Grand Union Super
market vs. Espino, Dec. 28, 1979, and others; he should
be properly credited.)
(b)
I would invoke as defenses the oral defamation com
mitted by S against both 0 and the latters mother, as well
as Ss contributory fault.
It must be observed that S , in anger, called O and
his mother ugly names, which was heard by, the neighbors.
There is a clear case of oral defamation, at least, as far as Os
mother is concerned. She. is absolutely innocent.
It must also be observed that there was contributory fault
in the part of S . He failed to pay his rent fo r three months
despite repeated demands of O . Under the law on quasi
delicts and under the law on damages, the amount of damages
recoverable should be reduced.
(Note: The above answer is based on general principles of the
law on quasi-delicts as well as on Arts. 2179, 2214 and
other provisions of the Civil Code. Even the decisons in
Manila Gas Corporation (supra) and Grand Union Super
market (supra) with respect to contributory fault or negli
gence may be invoked.)
Question No. 2
D donated P100,000.00 to the unborn child of his preg
nant girlfriend, which she accepted. After six months of preg
nancy, the foetus was born and baptized Angel. Angel died
twenty (20) hours after birth. D sought to recover the
P100.000.00.
Is D entitled to recover? Explain.
581
Answer
*D is entitled to recover the P100,000.00. The reason is
that there is no donee. The supposed donee never acquired any
civil personality. Consequently, the donation is void or inexistent.
According to the Civil Code, for civil purposes, the foetus
is considered bom if it is ailive at the time it is completely deli
vered from the mothers womb. However, if the foetus had an
intra-uterine life of less than seven months, it is not deemed
born if it dies within twenty-four hours after its complete deli
very from the maternal Womb. The facts show that the foetus
in the instant case had an intra-uterine life of less than seven
months and that it died twenty hours after birth. Therefore,
the provisional or conditional civil personality which is ac
corded to a conceived child under both the Civil Code and the
Child and Youth Welfare Code is not present here. In other
words, Angel has not acquired any civil personality. Therefore,
the donation by D never produced any legal effect. It is inexistent.
(Note: The above answer is based on Arts. 40 and 41 of the
Civil Code and on Art. 5 of PD 603.)
Q uestion No. 3
M , an unwed mother, gave her child for adoption to a
childless couple, B-C , for which B-C paid M P20,000.00.
In the civil register o f births, the father was listed as father
unknown.
'
Two years later, after B-C learned to love the child as
their own and adoption proceedings commenced with the re
quired publication, F , father of the child appeared to op
pose the adoption and to seek custody of the child. M sided
with B-C claiming that F had abandoned her when he
learned that she was pregnant and declaring that she wanted
B-C to keep the child.
a) Could F frustrate the adoption and custody of the
child? Explain.
b) Could B-C recover the P20,000.00 they had paid
from either F or M ? Rteasons.
Answer
(a) F cannot frustrate the adoption and custody of the
child.
The Child and Youth Welfare Code, which is now the gov
erning law on adoption, expressly states that the written con
sent of the maternal parents is necessary. Correlated with per
tinent provisions of both the Welfare Code and the Civil Code,
the words natural parents can refer only to the parent or
parents with parental authority. Thus, if the child is spurious,
the one with parental authority would be the mother; if the
rhilH is natural, the one with parental authority would be the
parent who is the first to'recognize the child. In the instant
case, it is obvious that M , not F , has parental authority
over the child. Consequently, her written consent to the
adoption would be sufficient. Besides, F has clearly aban
doned the child. Even on that score alone, he could not resist
, the adoption and custody of the child by B-C .
(Note: The above answer is based on Art. 31 of PD 603 and on
Arts; 288 and 311, par. 2, of the Civil Code.)
(b) B-C cannot recover the P20,000.00 which they had
paid to M from either F or M . The reason is obvious.
They bought the child from M ; th6 latter sold the child to
them. Under the law, M is criminally liable. The principle
of pari delicto (insofar as the money is concerned) is now appli
cable. The law will not aid either party to an illegal agreement;,
it leaves them where they are.
(Note: The above answer is based on Art. 14-11 of the Civil Code
in relation to Art. 59 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code.)
Question No. 4:
Spouses, husband H and wife W , Filipinos, with a
child, decided that H , a doctor, would go to the U.S. to find
employment there and then W would join him. When in the
U.S., H wrote that to establish U.S. residence, he would
have to obtain a divorce, marry an American girl, and once
a U.S. resident, divorce his American wife and then remarry
W W agreed.
583
(a)
pines.
584
585
Answer
(a) B s refusal is valid. The reason is obvious. There Was
already a partition* In the partition, brother A was awarded
the property north of the river, while brother B was awarded
the property south of the river. Consequently, the tie of coownership Or indivision was dissolved completely. Thus, the
problem of squatters in the portion allotted to A has become
his exclusive problem.
(Note: The above answer is based on general principles of coownership and partition. The Committee, however, res
pectfully recommends that if the bar candidate invokes
Art. 501 of the Civil Code or the principle of warranty
among partitioners, it should be properly credited.).
(b) A cannot prevent the sale of B of the portion allot
ted to him. That would constitute a violation of the jus disponendi or right of disposition of B . As a matter of fact, A
cannot evien avail of the right of legal redemption of adjacent
owners. Such right is not available because the two lands are
separated by a river.
(Note: The above answer is based on the general principles of
ownership (Art. 428, Civil Code) and'on Art. 1621, Civil
Code.)
Q uestion No. 6
A , owner of an agricultural land, which had no connection
with a public road, has been passing through a pathway across
the land of B with the latters tolerance for over twenty
years.
A subdivided his property into 20 residential lots and
sold them to different persons. B blocked the pathway and
refused to let the buyers pass.
a) Did A acquire an easement of right of way? Why?
586
588
instituted his wife and his son as heirs in equal shares. Undet
our law on revocation of wills, a wiU may be revoked by another
will. The revocation may be effected either expressly or impliodly.
Since there is no express revocation, is there an implied revoca
tion in the instant case? It is undeniable that there is an implied
revocation if the testamentary dispositions found in the first
will are totally or partially incompatible with those found in
the second will. It is also undeniable that the incompatibility
must be absolute in character in the sense that the testamen
tary dispositions cannot stand together. The real issue,
therefore, is whether the two testamentary dispositions found
in the first will can stand together with the single testamentary
disposition found in the second will.
There are two views.
According to one view, reading the two wills together
it is clear that the testatorial intention is that only the testator's
wife and son shall inherit. They are instituted as universal
heirs with respect to the hereditary estate in its totality.
Therefore, the second will in its totality cannot stand together
with the first will in its totality. Consequently, the incompati
bility between the testamentary dispositions found in the first
will and those found in the second will is both total and absolute
in character. Hence, the first will is impliedly revoked by the
second will. The testators widow and his son are, therefor^,
entitled to the ricefield
According to a second view, only the institution of A
and B in the first will as heirs and that portion or part of the
bequest given to the Church Which will impair the legitime of
the testators soii and widow are revoked by the second will.
The reason is that it is only to that extent that there is absolute
incompatibility between the testamentary dispositions found
in the first will and, those found in the second will. Consequently,
the Church shall be entitled to the ricefield but only to the
extent that it does not encroach upon the legitime of the
testators son and widow.
(Note: The above answers are based on the law on revocation
of wills, such as Arts. 830, et. seq., Civil Code and on well
settled principles in American jurisprudence. The Committee
589
b e considered correct.)
Suggested answer for those who adhere the second
view siatedabove:
590
591
592
Answer
Os suit is legally untenable.
By express provisions of Art. 1485 of the Civil Code, the
preceding article (Art. 1484) shall be applied to contracts
purporting to be leases of personal property with option to
buy, when the lessor has deprived the lessee of the possession
or enjoyment of the thing. Consequently, applying Art. 1484,
upon taking possession of the copying machine, 0 has no
further action against L to recover the unpaid rents.
(Note: The above answer is based on the Recto Law (Arts. 1484,
No. 3, and 1485, Civil Code) and on U.S. Commercial Co.
vs. Halili, 93, Phil. 371.)
Q uestionNo.il
S , an American resident of Manila, about to leave on a
vacation, sold his car to B for U.S. $2,000.00, the payment
to be made ten days after delivery to X , a third party deposi
tary agreed upon, who shall deliver the car to B upon receipt
by X of the purchase price. It was stipulated that ownership
is retained by S until delivery of the car to X . Five days
after delivery of the car to X ", it was destroyed in a fire which
gutted the house of X , without the fault of either X
or B .
a) Is buyer B still legally obligated to pay the
purchase price? Explain.
b) May seller S demand payment in U.S. dollar?
Why?
Answer
(a)
Yes, buyer B is still legally obligated to pay the
purchase price. It must be observed that S had already deli
vered the car to X , the third party depositary or bailee. It
was agreed that ownership is retained by S until delivery to
X . Therefore, in effect, there was already a transfer of the
right of ownership over the car to B . Consequently, B
shall assume the fortuitous loss of the car. As a matter of fact,
even if it was agreed that S shall retain the ownership of the
593
car until the purchase price has been paid by B , the end
result will still be the same. Since eventually, the purpose is to
secure performance by the buyer of his obligation to pay the
purchase price, by express mandate of the law, the fortuitous
loss of the car shall be assumed by B .
(Note: The above answer is based on Art. 1504 of the Civil Code.)
(b)
The seller S cannot demand payment in U.S. dollars.
According to the law, an agreement that payment shall be
made in currency other than Philippine currency is void
because it is contrary to public policy. That does not mean,
however, that S cannot demand payment from B". He can
demand payment, but not in American dollars. Otherwise,
there would be unjust enrichment at the expense of another.
Payment, therefore, should be made in Philippine currency.
(Note: The above answer is based on. R.A. No. 529 and on
Ponce vs. CA, May 31,1979.)
Q uestion N o. 12
S , a landowner of an urban lot covered by a Torrens title,
sold it to B . B saw that the land was occupied by lessees
who paid rent on a month to month basis. S told B that
some lessees had been renting the parcels of land for twelve (12)
years, other for eight (8) years. Unknown to S and B is
that the area had been declared as urban land reform area.
a) May S terminate the lease contracts and eject
the lessees? Reasons
b) I f the lessees went to you for legal assistance, what
would be your advice? Explain briefly,
c) Does B have a right against S in the event
he is unable to obtain possession? Why?
Answer
(a)
I t is respectfully submitted that there is a typographical
error here. The question should read may B terminate
the lease contracts and eject the lessees? A t any rate, let us
answer both questions.
594
595
596
597
598
599
Answer
The Court of First Instance, sitting as a Land Registration
Court, cannot continue to take cognizance of the case and
resolve the issue posed.
It is apparent that the Court, sitting as a land registration
court, cannot alter the description of the civil status of the
petitioner in the transfer.certificates of title in question. It will
have to receive evidence and determine the civil status of said
petitioner. This requires a full-dressed trial, tKus rendering the.
summary proceeding envisaged in Sec. 112 of Act 496 inadequate.
Therefore, the remedy of W against her husband H or
of H against his wife W would be to thresh Out the question
of their status in a separate and independent action filed for
that purpose.
(Note: The above answer is based On Martinez vs. Evangelista,
L-26399, Jan. 31,1981.)
However, the Committee respectfully recommends that a
contrary answer may also be considered as a correct answer.
Under Section 2 of P.D. No. 1529, the jurisdiction of a Court of
First Instance acting as a Land Registration Court has been
broadened.
Question No. 18
State whether the following statements are legally correct
or false. I f true, state the basis. I f false, state in what respect it
is false, and the reason therefor.
(a) In cases Of defamation, a civil action for civil liability
can be commenced and prosper even while a criminal case is
pending.
(b) A woman loses her citizenship when she marries a
foreigner and Under the national law of the husband she
automatically acquires his citizenship by marriage.
(c) The records of a person's birth, as kept by the Civil
Registrar, is a public record and may be inquired into by a
person interested.
601
:i
(d) To the owners of lands adjoining the sea belong the
accretion which they gradually receive from effects of the
current on the waters.
(e) A stipulation that the arbitrators aWard shall be final
is valid.
Answer
(a) True. The civil action for civil liability is an independent
civil action under the Civil Code. (Art. 33).
(b) False. Under the 1973 Constitution, a female citizen of
the Philippines who marries an alien shall retain her citizenship.
Consequently, she does not necessarily acquire her husbands
nationality.
(c) False. According to the Child and Youth Welfare Code,
the records of a person's birth shall be kept strictly confidential
and no information relating thereto shall be issued except in
certain cases enumerated in the law. (See Art. 7).
(d) False. The principle of alluvium cannot be applied to
accretions due to the action of the current of the sea. It can be
applied only to accretions due to the action of the current of a
river, lake, creeks or torrent. (Art. 457, Civil Code)
(e) True. According to the Civil Code, any stipulation that
the arbitrators award or decision shall be final is. valid, without
prejudice to certain pertinent provisions on compromise
wherein the award may be revoked. (Art, 2044)
(Note: The Committee respectfully submits that an answer of
False may also be correct provided that the bar candidate
states the above-stated reason.)
602
603
then that this condition has been fulfilled, both house and
lot are conjugal in character. One-half (1/2) thereof be
longs to A , while the other one-half (1/2) belongs to
the estate of B .
To whom shall the estate of B pass? Assuming
that B died intestate and assuming further that the re
latives of B are brothers a,nd sisters and/or nephews
and nieces, one-half (1/2) thereof shall pass to A and
the other one-half (1/2) shall pass to such relatives in
accordance with the rules of intestacy. However, if such
relatives are not brothers arid sisters and/or nephews and
nieces, the entire estate shall pass to- A alone in accord
ance with the rules of intestacy,
( N o t e : The above answer is based on Art. 158, par. 2,
(a )
C , a Filipino, resident of the U.S., sent to his
father D in Manila $500.00 through X Bank which
604
(a )
Y.es, the Bank is entitled to recover the $4,500
from D . W e have in this case an example of a quasi
contract of solutio indebiti which arises whenever a per
son unduly delivers a thing through mistake to another
who has no right to demand it (A r il 215b, Civil Code). Its
requisites a re :
(1 ) There must be a payment or delivery made by
one person to another;
(2 ) The person who made the payment or delivery
was under no obligation to do so; and
(2 ) The person who made the payment or delivery
was under no obligation to do so; and
(3 ) The payment or delivery was made by reason of
mistake.
It is obvious that the above requisites are present in
the instant case.
605
(b )
1. The decree of absolute divorce obtained by
E in California is not valid in the Philippines for the
following reasons:
(a ) Absolute divorce is not recognized in the
Philippines, According to the Civil Code, laws re
sulting to family rights and duties, or to the status,
condition, and legal capacity o f persons are binding
upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living
abroad (Art.. 15).
(b j Well-settled is the rule that absolute divorce
is contrary to public policy. According to the Civil
Code, this declaration of public policy cannot be ren
dered megatory by the decree of absolute divorce ob
tained by E in California (A rt. 17, par. S).
2.
The marriage o f E to G is not valid. It is
void from the very beginning by reason of a prior sub
sisting marriage (A rt. 83, par. 1, Civil Code). From the
point of view of Philippine law, since the decree of abso
lute divorce obtained by "E in California is not valid,
he is still married to F .
3.. H and I are natural children by legal fiction.
The reason is that they are children bom of a marriage
which is void (A rt. 89, Civil Code).
Q u e stio n N o. I l l
(a ) Several families had erected their houses on the
river bank portion o f a lot owned by X . The construc
tion o f the houses was with the knowledge and consent of
X , The latter did not collect rentals. About five years
later, X being in need o f the lot, demanded that the
families vacate. The latter refused contending that they
were not squatters considering that X had allbwed their
occupation and is, therefore, estopped from ejecting them.
1) A re th"e families squatters ? 2) Do they have a
right to. continue in the occupation o f the land?
(b ) J and his family lived in his house in Metro
Manila. Adjoining Js house was a vacant lot. M ERAL-
606
607
608
609
611
612
613
614
615
levied on the materials. E E objected to the levy olaiming that the materials belong to him.
Who is the owner of the materials CC , the un
paid lessor, or E E , the unpaid vendor?
A nsw er
(a ) BB should be held for damages. True, accord
ing to the Civil Code, the principal may revoke the agency
at will. But there are exceptions. These exceptions are
sometimes denominated as agency coupled with an in
terest. One o f them is when the agency is the means of
fulfilling an obligation already contracted. It is obvious
that the agency is the means of fulfilling an obligation al
ready contracted in favor of A A . BB has clearly
breached his contract or undertaking by revoking the
agency before the expiration of the term or period o f five
years.
(N
ote ,-
616
Question No. IX
(a ) F F and GG executed a promissory note bind^
ing themselves, jointly and severally, to pay X Bank
P10,000.00 within 90 days from January 10, 1979. F F
signed the note as principal and GG as guarantor. Upon
failure to pay the note on due date X bank sued F F
and GG for payment. GG interposed the defense that
he was just a guarantor and the Bank must first exhaust
all the remedies against the principal F F
Is GGs defense tenable?
(b ) H H , I I , and JJ inherited from their pa
rents a large parcel of land. H H and I I went abroad
to reside in Canada. In their absence, JJ applied for
the registration of the whole land in his name Only. In
due time, JJ obtained a Torrens Title for the land.
When H and H returned from Canada after
seven years, they found out what JJ did and sued him
for their respective shares. JJ contended that the de
cree of title can no longer be reviewed or changed ,because
of the lapse of more than one year from its issuance.
In whose favor would you decide?
A nsw er
(a )
GGs defense is untenable. Had he not bind
himself solidarity with F F to pay the obligation, un
doubtedly, as guarantor, he. could have availed of the de
fense of benefit of excussion. In other words, he cannot be
compelled to pay.the creditor unless the latter has ex
hausted all the property of the debtor and he resorted to
all the legal, remedies against the said debtor. But then
in the promissory note, he bound himself jointly and, sev
erally with F F to pay the obligation to the creditor.
According to the law, such a defense now invoked by GG
is no longer available.
(N o te : The above answer is based on Arts. 2058, 2059,
Civil Code.)
618
(b )
MM ,, driver of X Bus Co. drove the bus reck
lessly and injured N N , a pedestrian. N N sued X
Bus Co. for damages. The bus company is liable to N N
either under the Revised Penal Code or under the Civil
Code.
Explain and distinguish the liability of the bus com
pany under the Revised Penal Code and under the Civil
Code with respect to the nature of such liability and the
defense/s that may be interposed.
A nsw er
(a ) If. L L acted in good faith, K K is entitled to
recover from him as compensatory damages those conse
quences which are natural, probable and which the par-.
ties had foreseen at the time when the obligation was
constituted.
However, if L L acted in bad faith, K K is entitled
to recover from him as compensatory damages those con
sequences which may be reasonably attributed to the nonperformance of the obligation. Additionally, he may even
be entitled to recover moral damages, exemplary damages
and attorneys fees.
( N ote : The above answer is based on Arts. 2201, 2220,
619
620
621
622
623
624
625
Question No. VI
In 1951, PE occupied the bank of the river in San
Mateo which was called Libis. By force of the current of
the river, silt was deposited on this river bank so that it
gradually became wider and wider until it measured about
2 hectares. In 1976, VA, the registered owner of the land
adjoining the old river bank, demanded that PE vacate
the land but the latter refused claiming he had acquired
the alluvial deposits by prescription. V A then filed an
action to quiet the title and recover possession. Will the
action prosper? Why?
Answ er
The action will prosper. According to the Civil Code,
to. the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong
the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects
of the current of the waters. The silt or alluvial deposit
occiipied by defendant PE, therefore, belongs to VA, the
ripariaij owner. However, since the latter never sought
registration of the accretion in accordance with the Land
Registration Law, said accretion never became registered
property. It was therefore possible for PE to become ab
solute o\vner thereof by extraordinary acquisitive pres
cription. Since obviously, he was in bad faith, thirty years
of continuous, public and peaceful possession in concept
of owner would be necessary in order that he shall become
the absolute owner of the accretion by prescription. He
took possession of the property in 1951; the action of V A
against him was filed in 1976. That means that he has been
in continuous possession for only twenty five years.. The
defense of acquisitive prescription, therefore, is untenable.
(See Grande vs. CA L-17652, June 30, 1962).
627
628
629
630
631
632
633
634
A married B in 1950. bringing into the marriage a 10hectare piece of unregistered land in Antipolo which, he
inherited from his father. Of the marriage two daughters
were born. On February 10, 1955 A and his two daughters
went to Baguio. On the way they met an accident and A
died instantly on the spot while the two daughters died two
days later in the hospital where they were brought. In
1960 B sold the land .to C. In 1977 B died so D, the only
brother of A, asked C to' reconvey the land to him. Upon
Cs refusal, D filed a complaint for recovery of the land.
C raised the defense o f prescription. Should -the defense
be sustained? Why?
A nsw er
The defense should be sustained but only with, respect
to one-third of the subject property; however, with .respect
to the other two-thirds, it should not be sustained.
It must be observed that' when A died the subject
property passed by intestate succession to his w ife B and
his two daughters in the proportion o f one-third for each.
When the two daughters died two hours later, their, onethird shares passed by intestate succession to their mother
B. These shares which B acquired by operation of law
from her two daughters became reservable. In other words,
by mandate of the law, upon acquiring the two-thirds share
of her daughters she was obliged to reserve such share
for the benefit of relatives of her two deceased daughters
who are within the third degree and who belong to the
live from whence the reservable property came. A ll of
the requisites o f reserva troncal are, therefore, present.
In the first place, the property was acquired by a descend
ant from an ascendant or from a brother or sister by
gratuitous title; in the second place, said descendant died
without any legitimate issue in the direct descending line
635
who can inherit from him; in the third place; the property
13 inherited by another ascendant by operation of law;
and in the fourth place, there are relatives of the descend
ant who are within the third degree and who belong to the
line from which said property came. Consequently, when
C bought the subject property from B in 1960, he acquired
only that which B had and nothing more. In other words,
when B, the ascendant resefvista sold the property to C
in 1960, the latter acquired the one-third share which B
had inherited from A without any condition whatsoever.
However, with respect to the other two-thirds share which
is reservable, C acquired a limited and revocable title only.
Therefore, when B, the ascendant-reservista vendor finally
died, in 1977, automatically, by operation of law, the twothirds share which is reservable passed to D, who is the
reservee or reservatario.
Premises considered, the defense of prescription can
only be. sustained with respect to the one-third share of B
which she had inherited from A in 1955. The computation
o f the 10-year period of prescription must commence from
196.0. In the case o f the two-thirds share which is reservable, the computation must commence from 1977 when
B, the ascendant-rssermsta, died. When D, the reserva
tario, therefore, filed his action after the death of B, he
w&s very much in time to do so. ( Ckua vs. C FI, 78 SCRA
412),
Question No. XV
636
Answ er
637
638
639
Answer
The action will prosper. It is submitted that the 400
heads of N ew Zealand cows were pledged by D L to T & Co.
in order to secure the payment of the loan of P200,000.00.
As an adjunct of the accessory contract of pledge, the
parties also agreed that the cows shall be kept at the ranch
of T & Co. for pasture, that the personnel of the latter shall
take care of them, and that for these services, the latter
shall be entitled to one-half of the offspring. Unfortunately,
they all died without the fault of anybody. Now, what is
the effect of the loss? Since the loss was due to a fortuitous
event, it is clear that both the accessory contract of pledge
and the corrollary contract of services are totally extin
guished. The principal contract of loan, however, still sub
sists; As a matter of fact, the obligation of DL to pay
the loan plus interest has become immediately demandable
(see Art. 1198, par. 3, Civil Code).
Question No. XIX
640
641
642
643
644
other for the annulment of their marriage and the abovementioned non-disclosure is not one of them- Besides, and
this is decisive, the law itself declares that no other mis
representation or deceit as to chastity shall constitute such
fraud as w ill give a ground for the annulment of marriage.
2.
The fact of pregnancy of the w ife at the time of
the marriage by a man other than the husband is not in
itself a ground for annulment of marriage. The law is
explicit. It is the concealment by the w ife of the fact that
at the time of the marriage, she was pregnant by a man
other than her husband which is a ground for annulment.
So, if there was no concealment or even the possibility
of concealment, such as when the w ife was already six
months pregnant at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, there would be no ground for annulment. A t such
an advanced stage of pregnancy, concealment would be
impossible.
(N o te : The above answers are based on Articles 85, No.
5, and 86 of the Civil Code anti on Buccat vs.
Buccat, 72 Phil. 19.)
Question N q. Il-b
1.
The relationship of A and B with regard to pro
perty acquired by either or both of thern through their
2.
B must show that she and A were living together
as husband and w ife without getting married; that the
property was acquired by either or both of them through
their work or industry or their wages and salaries during
the period o f her cohabitation with A ; and that she and
A had really contributed to the acquisition of the property.
(N o te : The above answers are based on Article 144 of
the Civil Code and on Yaptinchcty vs. Torres, 28
SCRA 489.)
Q u e stio n No. Ill-a
A and B, a year after marriage, built a residential
house on land belonging to the latter as her. paraphernal
property, using conjugal funds for its construction. Their
marital life proving unhappy, they agreed to separate.
Neither took the trouble to obtain judicial separation.
Sometime later, a big fire reduced the house to ashes. Upon
the death of B, the wife, there was a liquidation of, the
conjugal property. A, the surviving spouse, contended
that the lot should form part of the conjugal estate. The
heirs o f B, the deceased wife, claimed that after the house
Was burned, having the lot vacant once more, it reverted
to its status of being paraphernal. Decide the case with
reasons.
A nsw er
A s contention that the lot should form part of the
conjugal estate is not correct. Under the Civil Code, B
retains her right of ownership of the lot until she is paid
its yalue. It is now a well-settled doctrine that payment of
the value of the lot can be made only once the conjugal
partnership is dissolved and there is a subsequent liquida
tion bf the conjugal partnership properties. In other words,
before the lot cain be converted or transformed into conjugal
property, it is essential that the condition that its value
shall be reimbursed to B or her legal heirs must be complied
646
ote:
647
648
649
650
651
652
653
Answer
1. Gifts bestowed by the deceased father during his
lifetime to the spouse o f his son should not be subject to
collation. This means that the law will not consider such
gifts as advances made by the decedent of the legitime of
his son, and therefore, chargeable against such legitime
during the partition of the hereditary estate. Instead, the
law considers such gifts as ordinary donations inter vivos
made to a stranger, and therefore, chargeable against the
disposable free portion o f the estate. It would be different
i f the gifts are bestowed to the spouses jointly; In such
case, one-half (y2) o f the value of such gifts would then
be charged against the legitime of the son and the other
One-half ( y2) against the disposable free portion.
2. Money paid by the deceased parent during his life
time fo r the debts of a son should be brought to collation.
In reality, what we have here is a donation inter vivos
made to a compulsory heir. From the point of view of
the law, the money is considered as an advance of the
legitime. Consequently, in the portion of the hereditary
estate, the amount should be charged against the legitime
of the son.
(NOTE: The above answers are based on Arts. 1066 and
1069 of the Civil Code and on the view sustained
by practically all commentators on the real mean
ing of collation under Arts. 1061, et seq., of the
Civil Code.)
Q u e stio n N o. VII-b
A leased a cold storage plant to B at a daily rental.
B stored its foodstuffs in said storage plant while the re
frigeration facilities of one (1) of its vessels was out of
order. A fte r seven (7 ) days B found out that the foodstuffs
stored in said storage plant were contaminated by rats and
not fit for consumption. They were, therefore, thrown out
to the sea. B sued A for recovery of the loss of the food
stuffs disposed of. Is A liable? Reasons?
654
Answer
Yes, A is liable for the loss of the foodstuffs disposed
of. According to the Civil Code, the provisions of the Civil
Code on warranty, contained in the law on sales, shall be
applicable to lease. Now, according: to the law on sales
with respect to warranty against hidden defects, the vendor
(lessor) is responsible to the vendee (lessee) for any
hidden faults or defects in the thing sold (leased), even
though he was not aware thereof. Under this provision,
it is clear that A is liable to B for the loss of the food
stuffs.
(NOTE: The above answer is based
Supreme Court in United
San Miguel Brewery, 10
Arts. 1653, 1566 and 1567
on the
States
SCRA
of the
decision of the
Lines, Inc. vs.
808, applying
Civil Code:)
ote:
on
655
Answer
ote
A nsw er
(to second question)
I distinguish. I f the stipulation limits the carriers
liability to an agreed valuation such as the value of the
goods appearing in the bill of landing, unless the shipper
or owner declares a greater value, it. is valid. As a matter
of fact, this is stated in the law on common carriers^ I f
the stipulation limits the carriers liability to an agreed
valuation without any qualification whatsoever such as the
value of the- goods appearing in the bill of lading, as a
rule, it is contrary to public policy, and therefore, void.
However, if' it can be shown to be reasonable and just
under the circumstances, and had been fairly and freely
agreed upon, then it is perfectly valid.
( N o t e : The above answer is based on Arts'. 1749 and 1750
of the Civil Code, and on decided cases, It is sug
gested that an answer based oh Art. 1749 alone
should be considered a perfect answer.)
656
ote:
T h e a b o v e a n s w e r is b a se d on
657
Title null and void on the ground that the land covered
thereby is forest land. Decide the case, with reasons.
Answer
The annulment and cancellation o f a homestead patent
and the consequent reversion of the property to the State
are matters between the State and the grantee or his heirs.
Hence, the government may take appropriate steps to
annul the-grant and assert title to the homestead. Assum
ing then that the action in the instant case is for reversion
o f th e land, obviously, it will still prosper. The period of
prescription is five years, not one year, to be counted from
the time the right to such action has accrued. However, if
the action merely seeks a review of the homestead award,
the period o f prescription is one year.
(N o te : The above answer is based on decided cases, more
specifically, Lopez vs. Padilla, L-27559, May 18,
1972, De la Cruz vs. Corpus, 62 Off. Gaz, 49, p.
9271, Dec. 5, 1966, CA. The period of prescription
of five years is based on Art. 1149, Civil Code.)
Q u e stio n No. IXrb
A s fatner was the original homesteader of a parcel
of land covered by a homestead patent issued on June 3,
1932. On April 27, 1958, A s father sold said property to
B. On July 15, 1962, A s father died. On 'March 15, 1963,
A sought to repurchase the property from B. B refused.
Can A repurchase the property? Give reasons for your
answer.
A nsw er
Yes, A can repurchase the property. According to the
Public Land Law, every conveyance of land acquired under
the free patent or homestead provisions, when proper, shall
be subject to repurchase by the applicant, his widow, or
legal heirs, within a period of five years from the date of
conveyance. The homestead was sold by the applicant on
April 27, 1958. A, the legal heir of the applicant sought
to repurchase the land on March 15, 1963. It is evident that
658
ote:
Q u estio n No. X
Ana and Basilio, both Filipino citizens and of legal,
age, werie married in 1950 in Antique but they never lived
together. Ana subsequently left the Philippines and secured
a divorce in Nevada, United States in. 1953 on the ground
o f extreme mental cruelty. In 1955, Ana sought papal
dispensation of the marriage and then married Carl, an
American, in Nevada. She lived with him in California and
begot children. She acquired American citizenship in 1959.
1. W ill the divorce decree obtained abroad be accorded
validity in the Philippines? What law' supports your
answer ?
2. What is the status of the marriage of Ana and Carl
under our laws? Reasons for your answer.
A nsw er
1.
The divorce decree obtained abroad is not accorded
validity in the Philippines. The following laws support
this answer:
(a ) The Civil Code states that laws relating to
family rights and duties, or to the status, condition
and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens
of the Philippines, even though living abroad. I t is
clear that the divorce decree, which affects the status
and conditions of Ana and Basilio, is. not valid under
Philippine laws.
(b ) It is a well-settled rule in this jurisdiction
that absolute divorce is contrary to public policy. The
Civil Code states that a declaration of public policy
cannot be rendered ineffective by a judgment promul
gated in a foreign country.
659
660
661
Answer
The following are the exceptions to the rule that laws
shall have no retroactive effect:
(1 ) When the law itself expressly provides for its
retroactivity (A rt. 4, CC).
(2 ) When the law is penal insofar as it favors the
accused who is not a habitual criminal, even
though at the time of the enactment of such law
final sentence has already been rendered (A rt. 22,
Rev. Penal Code).
(3 ) When the law. is procedural so long as it does not
affect or change vested rights ( Aguillon vs. Dir.
of L a n d s ,A l Phil. 560).
(4 ) When the law creates new substantive rights
(Arts. 2253, 2263, CC; Bona vs. Briones, 38
PhiL 276).
(5 ) When the law is curative in character in the sense
that the purpose for its enactment is. to cure
defects or imperfections in judicial or adminis
trative proceedings.
Q u estio n No. I-b
Cite five (5 ) provisions of the New Civil Code which
recognize the operation of foreign laws upon residents of
the Philippines.
Answer
Some of the provisions o f the Civil Code which sanc
tion the operation of foreign laws upon Philippine residents
a re:
(a ) Art. 16, paragraph 2,. which states, that intestate
and testamentary successions, both with respect
to the order of succession and to the amount of
successional rights and to the intrinsic validity
of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by
the national law of the person whose succession
is under consideration.
663
664
665
Spouses H and W filed a petition to adopt S, the 4year old brother of W. The City Fiscal objected, because
the adoption would result in an incongruity, where S
would be the son of his own sister . Should the petition
be granted?
Answer
666
667
668
private
land by
aliens
and
other
Constitutional
limitations.
Q uestion No. IH-b
H donated a parcel of land to W, his common-law
wife. Later, they married, but soon afterwards H died,
survived only by a sister, S and W. S sued to recover the
property donated, but W resisted. Decide with reasons.
Answer
The action will prosper but only \vith respect to onehalf of the property. As held by the Court o f Appeals in
a 1954 decision (Buenaventwa vs. Bautista, 50 Off. Gaz.
3679), the prohibition of donations between spouses during
the marriage is applicable to common-law relationship for
the following reasons: The reason behind the law that
the donation was probably due to undue and improper
influence is also true with greater force in extra-marital
relations. Besides, so long as marriage remains the corner
stone of our family law, reason and morality demand that
the disabilities which are attached to marriage should like
wise be attached to extra-marital relation.
The lack of validity of the donation made by H to
W, however, does not mean that the entire property shall
be given to S Because of her marriage to H, W is entitled
to one-half of the property and the plaintiff, as the sur
viving sister, to the other half (Art. 1001, Civil Code).
Question No. III-c
669
670
671
672
Answer
A. Fruits received:
1. Possessor in good faith is entitled to fruits received
while his possession is still in good faith (Art. 544,
Civil Code).
2. Possessor in bad faith shall reimburse fruits re
ceived or which legitimate possessor could have
received, subject to Art. 443 (Art. 549, Civil Code).
B. Pending fruits:
1. Possessor in good faith and legitimate possessor
shall be liable for expenses of cultivation and shall
share in net harvest in proportion to the time of
their possession ( A 1^. 645, par. 1, CivirCode),
2. Possessor in bad faith shall not have any right.
C. Charges:
Possessor, whether in good or bad faith, and
legitimate possessor shall share charges in proportion
673
Expenses:
1. Necessary expenses
a. Rights of possessor in good faith:
(1) Right of reimbursement (A rt. 546, par. 1,
Civil Code).
(2 ) Right of retention (A rt. 546, par. 1, Civil
Code);
b. Rights of possessor in bad faith: Right of re
imbursement only (Art. 546, par. 1, Civil Code).
2. Useful expenses
a- Rights of possessor in good faith:
(1 ) Right of .reimbursement.
(2 ) Right of retention (A rt. 546, par. 2, Civil
Code).
(3 ) Limited right of remoyal (A rt. 547, Civil
Code).
b. Rights of possessor in bad faith: None.
3. Ornamental expenses
a. ^Rights of possessor in good fa ith : Limited right
o f removal (548, Civil Code).
b, Rights of possessor in bad faith: Limited right
of removal (549, Civil Code).
E. Deterioration or loss:
674
675
676
Answer
There are two requisites of usufruct the essential
and the accidental. The essential requisite is the right 'to
enjoy the property of another, while the accidental .requi
site is the obligation of preserving the form and substance
o f such property. The latter is accidental, because the title
constituting the usufruct or the law may otherwise provide
as in the case of abnormal usufruct. (4 Manresa 322.)
A usufruct may be constituted: (1 ) by law, (2 ) by
the will of private persons expressed in acts inter vivos,
(3 ) by the will of private persons expressed in a last will
and testament, and (4 ) by prescription (A rt. 563, Civil
Code).
I
677
678
679
680
means of identification.)
681
Answer
The debtor F bears the loss of the sugp.r. Although
the sugar was constructively delivered by F to W, it was
only a security for the payment of the debt. The owner
ship of the sugar remained with F . By reason o f the
principle of res perit domino, the owner F should bear the
loss.
Q u estio n No. V M -b
The bill of lading specified in fine print that the car
rier's liability was limited to P100.00 per box unless a
higher value was declared and extra freight paid. No
higher value was declared and no extra freight was paid
and the shipment was lost. Can shipper S collect the true
value of the lost shipment (f2,000.00) on the ground that
the loss was caused by the lack of care of carrier C?
A nsw er
I distinguish. I f the shipper S read the stipulation
specified in fine print in the bill of lading or was aware
thereof, then he cannot collect the true value of the lost
shipment. Such a stipulation is considered by law valid
and binding (Arts. 1749, 1750, Civil Code). I f he was
not aware thereof, then he can collect the true value of
the lost shipment. There can be no presumption that S
read the stipulation. It was. written in fine print.
Q u e stio n N o. VIII-c
Distinguish between alternative and facultative obli
gations: and between suspensive and resolutory conditions
in obligations.
A nsw er
Facultative obligations may be distinguished from
alternative Obligations in the following ways:
(1 )
A s to object due: In facultative obligations only
one object is due, whereas in alternative obligations several
objects are due.
682
683
684
IX rc
685
A nsw er
Compensation may be distinguished from payment in
the following ways:
686
687
688
First Answer
I f the testator has no compulsory heirs, he may par
tition his estate in favor o f any person having capacity
to succeed. I f he has compulsory heirs, he may partition
his estate provided that he does not contravene the pro
visions of the Civil Code with regard to the legitime of
said heirs. (See Art. 842, Civil Code.)
Second Answer
Under the Civil Code, the testator may partition his
estate either by an act inter vivos or by a will, In either
case, such partition shall be respected, insofar as it does
not prejudice the legitime of his compulsory heirs (A rt.
1080). He may even intrust the mere power to make the
partition to a third person (A rt. 1081); and i f he so de
sires, he may even prohibit the partition, in which case
the period of indivision shall not exceed twenty years
(A rt. 1083),
Question No. XI-c
State the order o f intestate succession.
Answer
We. must distinguish between the order o f intestate
succession i f the decedent is a legitimate person and the
order i f said decedent is an illegitimate person.
I f the decedent is a -legitimate person, the order is:
(1 )
(2 )
(3 )
(4 )
689
690
691
692
693
694
695
696
697
Answer
Conventional redemption takes place when the vendor
reserves the right to repurchase the thing sold with the
obligation to reimburse to the vendee the price of the sale,
the expenses of the contract, other legitimate payments
made by reason of the sale, as well as necessary and useful
expenses made on the thing sold. (Arts. 1601, 1616, Civil
C ode).
Legal redemption takes place when there is a right .
to be subrogated upon the same terms and conditions stipu
lated in the contract, in the place of one who acquires a
thing by purchase or dation in payment, or by any other
transaction whereby ownership is transmitted by onerous
title, (A rt. 16i9, Civil Code).
( N o te : Enumeration o f the different instances when the
right o f redemption takes place should also be
accepted as sufficient answers.)
Q u e stio n No. XVI-<i
When may a contract of sale of realty be presumed to
be an equitable mortgage? Cite five (5 ) instances.
A nsw er
The contract shall be presumed to be an equitable
mortgage, in any of the following cases:
(1 ) When the price of sale with right to repurchase
is unusually inadequate;
(2 ) When the vendor remains in possession ,as lessee
or otherwise^
(3 ) When upon or after-the expiration of the right
to repurchase another instrument extending the period of
redemption or granting a new period is executed ;
(4 ) When the purchaser retains for himself a part
Of the purchase price;
(5 ) When the vendor binds himself to pay the taxes
on the thing sold;
698
699
700
land is not registered under Act No. 496, the rule is differ
ent. The reason is that the purchased of unregistered land
at a sheriff's sale only steps into the shoes of the judgment
debtor, and merely acquires the latter's interest in the
property as of the time the property was levied upon, as
provided in Sec. 35 o f Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
( Ccvrv/niba vs. Cov/rt of Appeals. 31 SCRA 558.)
Q u estio n No. XVIII-b
Under what circumstances nlay a decree of registration
Under Act No. 496 be reviewed?
Answ er
The circumstances under which a decree of registra
tion under Act 496 may be reviewed are:
(1 ) That the petitioner is the owner of the land or
dered registered in the name of another, or that his lien
or interest therein does not appear in the decree or title
issued;
(2 ) that the registration was procured through actual
fraud, or that the omission of the lien or interest was
fraudulent;
(3 ) that the property has not yet been transferred to
an innocent purchaser fo r value; and
(4 ) that the action is filed within one year from the
issuance and entry of the decree of registration. (Grtiz
vs. Navarro, G.R. No. L-27644, Nov. 29, 1973.)
Q u estio n No. X lX -a
When the conflicts rule of the forum refers a matter
to a foreign law fo r decision, is the reference to the
corresponding conflicts rule of that foreign law, or is
the reference to the purely internal rules of the foreign
system?
A nsw er
The reference is to the corresponding conflicts rule
o f the foreign law. This was the answer of the Supreme
701
Court -in the Christensen case ( Aznar vs. ChristensenGcurcia) where it accepted the renvoi. I f guch conflicts rule
says that the internal law o f the decedents domicile shall
govern, and he was domiciled in the Philippines at the
time o f his death, the case is referred back ( rewvoi) to
the internal law of the Philippines. The Philippine court
must, therefore, apply the law of the Philippines.
Q u e stio n No. XlX-b
A was considered a Chinese citizen under Nationalist
China laws and a Japanese under the laws of Japan. He
died in Manila, leaving properties in the Philippines.
Before his death, he was domiciled in Japan. How should
a Philippine Court adjudicate the successional rights to
his estate?
A nsw er
The Philippine Court should adjudicate the succes
sional rights to A s estate in accordance with Japanese
law. This solution is in confirmity with the theory of
effective nationality and the conflict of nationality laws
of the Hague Convention. It is obvious that A himself
preferred Japanese Jaw to Chinese law because he was
not only a citizen but also a domicilliary of Japan. True,
we adhere to the nationality theory (A rt. 16, Civil Code),
but here, the domicilliary theory merely comes to the rescue
of the nationality theory.
Q u e stio n No. XX-a
Rights may be waived. In what cases may waiver be
prohibited and declared null and void?
A nsw er
W aiver is prohibited when it is contrary to law, public
order, public policy, morals or good customs, or prejudicial
to a third person with a right recognized by law. (A rt.
6, Civil C od e).
702
703
Q u e s t io n N o .
I-h
704
705
1
2.
Yes, because the general rule is that when a cri
minal action is filed, the civil action is impliedly instituted
in the same criminal case.
Q u e stio n No. Il-a
A , 19, male and B, 17, female contract marriage. May
the marriage be annulled on the ground o f underage?
Explain.
A nsw er
It depends on whether the parental consent was given
to the marriage. I f the parents did not give their consent,
the marriage may be annulled; otherwise it cannot be
annulled.
Q u e stio n No. Il-b
May it be annulled i f B concealed the fact that she
was no longer a virgin at the time of the marriage or if
A became impotent afterwards. Explain.
A nsw er
The marriage cannot be annulled on either ground
because concealment of non-virginity does not constitute
fraud. It is concealment by the w ife that at the time of
marriage she was pregnant by a man other than her
husband, which constitute fraud. Misrepresentation as to
chastity does not constitute a ground for annulment.
Impotence* to he considered a ground for annulment,
must exist at time of the marriage. A s A became impo
tent after the marriage, it ia not a ground fo r annulment.
Q u e stio n No. II-c
I f B is only 13 but her parents give their consent,
is the marriage valid? Explain.
A nsw er
No. The marriage is void.
Q u e stio n N o. Ill-a
A fte r a whirlwind courtship, A and B decide to marry
each other and consult you on property rights. W ill a
706
707
Answer
Yes, under Article 27 of P.D. 603, any person of age
and in full possession of his civil rights may adopt: Pro
vided, (1 ) That he is in a position to support and care
for his legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural
children by legal fiction, or other illegitimate children, in
keeping with the means, both material and otherwise, of
the fam ily; and (2 ) The children by nature, 14 years and
above of the. adopting parents give written consent to the
adoption.
Q u e stio n No. IV-b
I f A is a non-resident Italian, may he adopt a Filipino
child? Explain.
A nsw er
It depends, i f he is qualified by the law of Italy to
adopt, then he may so adopt provided that the Philippines
has not broken off diplomatic relations with Italy; but
i f he is so disqualified, then he may not adopt.
Q u estio n No. IV-c
Who may not adopt?
Answer
Under Article 28, P.D. 603, the following persons
may not adopt:
(a). A married person without the written consent
o f the spouse;
(b ) The guardian with respect to the ward prior to
final approval of his accounts;
(c ) Any person who has been convicted of a crime
involving moral turpitude;
(d ) An alien who is disqualified to adopt accordihg
to the laws of his own country or one with whose
government the Republic of the Philippines has
broken diplomatic relations.
708
law
shall
govern
Answer
Article 16, paragraph 2 provides that successional
rights shall be regulated by the national law of the person
whose succession is under consideration. Since B is a
citizen of Texas, the law that should govern successional
rights should be the law of Texas. However, if the law
of Texas recognizes the domiciliary rule that successional
rights shall be governed by the law of the domicile of the
decedent, then, Philippine Law on Sugcession' shall apply.
Question No. V-c
May our courts take judicial notice of the laws of
Texas, U.S.A.? Explain.
Answ er
709
710
A nsw er
711
712
713
714
715
716
717
Question No. IV
The plaintiff, a first year law student, met the defend
ant in March, 1968. A fter several meetings, they became
engaged on September 19, 1968 and were married on
November 28, 1968. A fter living together for only 88 days,
the defendant gave birth to a child of nine (9 ) months on
February 23, 1969. As a result, the plaintiff abandoned the
defendant and then filed a suit fo r annulment of marriage
alleging that his consent to. the marriage was secured by
the assurance of the defendant that she was a virgin. De
cide the case.
A nsw er
Annulment should not be granted. To constitute fraud
as a ground for annulment, the w ife must have concealed
the fact, that at the time of marriage, she was pregnant
by another man. The w ife having given birth less than
3 months after the marriage was already 6 months preg
nant at the time of the marriage so that the husband
knowing o f the pregnancy of the w ife at the time of
marriage is deemed to have acknowledged the paternity
of the child. (A rt. 258)
Q u e stio n No. V
What are the grounds for legal separation?
A nsw er
Under Article 97 of the Civil Code, a petition
legal separation may be filed:
(1 ) F or adultery on the part of the w ife and
concubinage Qn the part o f the husband as defined in
Penal Code; and
(2 ) An attempt by one spouse against the life of
other.
for
for
the
the
Q u e stio n N o. VI
The husband sold with right of repurchase a parcel
of land belonging to the conjugal partnership without his
w ifes consent. Later the w ife consented to the extension
718
719
720
721
722
723
724
725
r-5
726
'