Hontiveros vs.

RTC
GR No. 125465, June 29, 1999

FACTS:
Petitioner spouses Augusto and Maria Hontiveros filed a complaint for damages against private
respondents Gregorio Hontiveros and Teodora Ayson. The petitioners alleged that they are the owners
of a parcel of land in Capiz and that they were deprived of income from the land as a result of the filing
of the land registration case. In the reply, private respondents denied that they were married and
alleged that Gregorio was a widower while Teodora was single. They also denied depriving petitioners
of possession of and income from the land. On the contrary, according to the private respondents, the
possession of the property in question had already been transferred to petitioners by virtue of the writ
of possession. Trial court denied petitioners motion that while in the amended complaint, they alleged
that earnest efforts towards a compromise were made, it was not verified as provided in Article 151.

ISSUE: WON the court can validly dismissed the complaint due to lack of efforts exerted towards a
compromise as stated in Article 151.

HELD:
SC held that the inclusion of private respondent Teodora Ayson as defendant and Maria Hontiveros as
petitioner takes the case out of the scope of Article 151. Under this provision, the phrase members of
the same family refers to the husband and wife, parents and children, ascendants and descendants,
and brothers and sisters whether full or half-blood. Religious relationship and relationship by affinity
are not given any legal effects in this jurisdiction. Teodora and Maria as spouses of the Hontiveros are
regarded as strangers to the Hontiveros family for purposes of Article 151.

G.R. No. 109068 January 10, 1994

GAUDENCIO GUERRERO, petitioner, vs. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ILOCOS NORTE, BR. XVI, JUDGE
LUIS B. BELLO, JR., PRESIDING, and PEDRO G. HERNANDO, respondents.
Filed by petitioner as an accion publicana 1 against private respondent, this case assumed another
dimension when it was dismissed by respondent Judge on the ground that the parties being brother-inlaw the complaint should have alleged that earnest efforts were first exerted towards a compromise.
Admittedly, the complaint does not allege that the parties exerted earnest towards a compromise and
that the same failed. However, private respondent Pedro G. Hernando apparently overlooked this
alleged defect since he did not file any motion to dismiss nor attack the complaint on this ground in his
answer. It was only on 7 December 1992, at the pre-trial conference, that the relationship of petitioner
Gaudencio Guerrero and respondent Hernando was noted by respondent Judge Luis B. Bello, Jr., they
being married to half-sisters hence are brothers-in-law, and on the basis thereof respondent Judge
gave petitioner five (5) days "to file his motion and amended complaint" to allege that the parties were
very close relatives, their respective wives being sisters, and that the complaint to be maintained
should allege that earnest efforts towards a compromise were exerted but failed. Apparently,
respondent Judge considered this deficiency a jurisdictional defect.
On 11 December 1992, Guerrero moved to reconsider the 7 December 1992 Order claiming that since
brothers by affinity are not members of the same family, he was not required to exert efforts towards a
compromise. Guerrero likewise argued that Hernando was precluded from raising this issue since he
did not file a motion to dismiss nor assert the same as an affirmative defense in his answer.
On 22 December 1992, respondent Judge denied the motion for reconsideration holding that "[f]ailure
to allege that earnest efforts towards a compromise is jurisdictional such that for failure to allege same
the court would be deprived of its jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case." He warned that unless
the complaint was amended within five (5) days the case would be dismissed.
On 29 January 1993, the 5-day period having expired without Guerrero amending his complaint,
respondent Judge dismissed the case, declaring the dismissal however to be without prejudice.
Guerrero appeals by way of this petition for review the dismissal by the court a quo. He raises these
legal issues: (a) whether brothers by affinity are considered members of the same family contemplated
in Art. 217, par. (4), and Art. 222 of the New Civil Code, as well as under Sec. 1, par. (j), Rule 16, of the
Rules of Court requiring earnest efforts towards a compromise before a suit between them may be
instituted and maintained; and, (b) whether the absence of an allegation in the complaint that earnest
efforts towards a compromise were exerted, which efforts failed, is a ground for dismissal for lack of
jurisdiction.
The Constitution protects the sanctity of the family and endeavors to strengthen it as a basic
autonomous social institution. 2 This is also embodied in Art. 149, 3 and given flesh in Art. 151, of the
Family Code, which provides:
Art. 151. No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the
verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the
same had failed. If it is shown that no such efforts were in fact made, the case must be dismissed.
This rule shall not apply to cases which may not be the subject of compromise under the Civil Code.
Considering that Art. 151 herein-quoted starts with the negative word "No", the requirement is
mandatory 4 that the complaint or petition, which must be verified, should allege that earnest efforts
towards a compromise have been made but that the same failed, so that "[i]f it is shown that no such
efforts were in fact made, the case must be dismissed."
Further, Art. 151 is contemplated by Sec. 1, par. (j), Rule 16, of the Rules of Court which provides as a
ground for motion to dismiss "(t)hat the suit is between members of the same family and no earnest
efforts towards a compromise have been made."

The Code Commission, which drafted the precursor provision in the Civil Code, explains the reason for
the requirement that earnest efforts at compromise be first exerted before a complaint is given due
course

This rule is introduced because it is difficult to imagine a sadder and more tragic spectacle than a
litigation between members of the same family. It is necessary that every effort should be made
toward a compromise before a litigation is allowed to breed hate and passion in the family. It is known
that a lawsuit between close relatives generates deeper bitterness than between strangers . . . A
litigation in a family is to be lamented far more than a lawsuit between strangers . . . 5
But the instant case presents no occasion for the application of the
above-quoted provisions. As early as two decades ago, we already ruled in Gayon v. Gayon 6 that the
enumeration of "brothers and sisters" as members of the same family does not comprehend "sistersin-law". In that case, then Chief Justice Concepcion emphasized that "sisters-in-law" (hence, also
"brothers-in-law") are not listed under Art. 217 of the New Civil Code as members of the same family.
Since Art. 150 of the Family Code repeats essentially the same enumeration of "members of the
family", we find no reason to alter existing jurisprudence on the matter. Consequently, the court a quo
erred in ruling that petitioner Guerrero, being a brother-in-law of private respondent Hernando, was
required to exert earnest efforts towards a compromise before filing the present suit.
In his Comment, Hernando argues that ". . . although both wives of the parties were not impleaded, it
remains a truism that being spouses of the contending parties, and the litigation involves ownership of
real property, the spouses' interest and participation in the land in question cannot be denied, making
the suit still a suit between half-sisters . . ." 7
Finding this argument preposterous, Guerrero counters in his Reply that his "wife has no actual interest
and participation in the land subject of the . . . suit, which the petitioner bought, according to his
complaint, before he married his wife." 8 This factual controversy however may be best left to the
court a quo to resolve when it resumes hearing the case.
As regards the second issue, we need only reiterate our ruling in
O'Laco v. Co Cho Chit, 9 citing Mendoza v. Court of Appeals, 10 that the attempt to compromise as well
as the inability to succeed is a condition precedent to the filing of a suit between members of the same
family, the absence of such allegation in the complaint being assailable at any stage of the proceeding,
even on appeal, for lack of cause of action.
It is not therefore correct, as petitioner contends, that private respondent may be deemed to have
waived the aforesaid defect in failing to move or dismiss or raise the same in the Answer. On the other
hand, we cannot sustain the proposition of private respondent that the case was, after all, also
dismissed pursuant to Sec. 3, Rule 17, of the Rules of Court 11 for failure of petitioner to comply with
the court's order to amend his complaint.
A review of the assailed orders does not show any directive which Guerrero supposedly defied. The
Order of 7 December 1992 merely gave Guerrero five (5) days to file his motion and amended
complaint with a reminder that the complaint failed to allege that earnest efforts were exerted towards
a compromise. The Order of 22 December 1992, which denied Guerrero's motion for reconsideration,
simply stated that "Plaintiff if it (sic) so desire must
amend the complaint otherwise, the court will have to dismiss the case (emphasis supplied) . . ." The
Order of 29 January 1993 dismissing the case without prejudice only made reference to an earlier order
"admonishing" counsel for Guerrero to amend the complaint, and an "admonition" is not synonymous
with "order". Moreover, since the assailed orders do not find support in our jurisprudence but, on the
other hand, are based on an erroneous interpretation and application of the law, petitioner could not
be bound to comply with them. 12
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the appealed Orders of

7 December 1992, 22 December 1992 and 29 January 1993 are SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court of
Laoag City, Branch 16, or whichever branch of the court the case may now be assigned, is directed to
continue with Civil Case
No. 10084-16 with deliberate dispatch.
SO ORDERED.

HIYAS SAVINGS and LOAN BANK, INC. vs. HON. EDMUNDO T. ACUA
G.R. NO. 154132 August 31, 2006
Facts:
On November 24, 2000, Alberto Moreno (private respondent) filed with the RTC a complaintagainst
Hiyas Savings and Loan Bank, Inc. (petitioner), his wife Remedios, the spouses Felipe and Maria Owe
and the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City for cancellation of mortgage contending that he did not
secure any loan from petitioner, nor did he sign or execute any contractof mortgage in its favor;
That his wife, acting in conspiracy with Hiyas and the spouses Owe, who were the ones that benefited
from the loan, made it appear that he signed the contract of mortgage; that he could nothave
executed the said contract because he was then working abroad.
On May 17, 2001, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that private respondent failed to
comply with Article 151 of the Family Code wherein it is provided that no suit between members of the
same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified complaint or petition that earnest
efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed.
Private respondent filed his Comment on the Motion to Dismiss with Motion to Strike Out and to
Declare Defendants in Default.
He argues that in cases where one of the parties is not a member of the same family as contemplated
under Article 150 of the Family Code, failure to allege in the complaint that earnest efforts toward a
compromise had been made by the plaintiff before filing the complaint is not a ground for a motion to
dismiss.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioners are covered with the provisions of Article 151 of the Family Code
Held:
The court agrees with plaintiff that earnest efforts towards a compromise is not required before the
filing of the instant case considering that the above-entitled case involves parties who are strangers to
the family. Cited in one of the decisions of the SC, if one of the parties is a stranger, failure to allege in
the complaint that earnest efforts towards a compromise had been made by plaintiff before filing the
complaint, is not a ground for motion to dismiss.
Hence, once a stranger becomes a party to a suit involving members of the same family, the law no
longer makes it a condition precedent that earnest efforts be made towards a compromise before the
action can prosper.
In the first place, Article 151 of the Family Code and Article 222 of the Civil Code are clear that the
provisions therein apply to suits involving "members of the same family" as contemplated under
Article 150 of the Family Code, to wit:
ART. 150. Family relations include those :

(1) Between husband and wife; (2) Between parents and children; (3) Among other ascendants and
descendants; and (4) Among brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half blood.
and Article 217 of the Civil Code, to wit:
ART. 217. Family relations shall include those:
(1) Between husband and wife;
(2) Between parent and child;
(3) Among other ascendants and their descendants;
(4) Among brothers and sisters.
Suffice it to say that since the Court has ruled that the requirement under Article 151 of the Family
Code is applicable only in cases which are exclusively between or among members of the same family,
it necessarily follows that the same may be invoked only by a party who is a member of that same
family
Mondequillo vs Breva
GR. No. 86355, May 31, 1990

FACTS:
The sheriff levied on a parcel of residential land located at Poblacion Malalag, Davao del Sur on July
1988, registered in the name of Jose Mondequillo and a parcel of agricultural land located at
Dalagbong Bulacan, Malalag, Davao de Sur also registered in the latters name. A motion to quash
was filed by the petitioner alleging that the residential land is where the family home is built since
1969 prior the commencement of this case and as such is exempt from execution, forced sale or
attachment under Article 152 and 153 except for liabilities mentioned in Article 155 thereof, and that
the judgment sought to be enforced against the family home is not one of those enumerated. With
regard to the agricultural land, it is alleged that it is still part of the public land and the transfer in his
favor by the original possessor and applicant who was a member of a cultural minority. The residential
house in the present case became a family home by operation of law under Article 153.

ISSUE: WON the subject property is deemed to be a family home.

HELD:
The petitioners contention that it should be considered a family home from the time it was occupied
by petitioner and his family in 1969 is not well-taken. Under Article 162 of the Family Code, it provides
that the provisions of this Chapter shall govern existing family residences insofar as said provisions are
applicable. It does not mean that Article 152 and 153 shall have a retroactive effect such that all
existing family residences are deemed to have been constituted as family homes at the time of their
occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family Code and are exempt from the execution for payment
of obligations incurred before the effectivity of the Code. The said article simply means that all
existing family residences at the time of the effectivity of the Family Code, are considered family
homes and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under the FC. The
debt and liability which was the basis of the judgment was incurred prior the effectivity of the Family
Code. This does not fall under the exemptions from execution provided in the FC.
As to the agricultural land, trial court correctly ruled that the levy to be made shall be on whatever
rights the petitioner may have on the land. Petition was dismissed.

Manacop vs. CA
GR No. 104875, November 13, 1992

FACTS:
Florante Manacop and his wife Euaceli purchased on March 1972, a residential lot with a bungalow
located in Quezon City. The petitioner failed to pay the sub-contract cost pursuant to a deed of
assignment signed between petitioners corporation and private respondent herein (FF Cruz & Co).
The latter filed a complaint for the recovery for the sum of money with a prayer for preliminary
attachment against the former. Consequently, the corresponding writ for the provisional remedy was
issued which triggered the attachment of a parcel of land in Quezon City owned by the Manacop
Construction President, the petitioner. The latter insists that the attached property is a family home
having been occupied by him and his family since 1972 and is therefore exempt from attachment.

ISSUE: WON the subject property is indeed exempted from attachment.

HELD:
The residential house and lot of petitioner became a family home by operation of law under Article 153
of the Family Code. Such provision does not mean that said article has a retroactive effect such that
all existing family residences, petitioners included, are deemed to have been constituted as family
homes at the time of their occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family Code and henceforth, are
exempt from execution for the payment of obligations incurred before the effectivity of the Family
Code on August 3, 1988. Since petitioner incurred debt in 1987, it preceded the effectivity of the Code
and his property is therefore not exempt form attachment.
The petition was dismissed by SC.

FLORANTE F. MANACOP, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and F.F. CRUZ & CO., INC., respondents.

Following the dismissal of his petition for certiorari in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 23651 by the Thirteenth Division
of respondent Court (Justice Buena (P), Gonzaga-Reyes and Abad Santos, Jr., JJ.; Page 60, Rollo),
petitioner airs his concern over the propriety thereof by claiming in the petition at hand that the
disposition, in practical effect, allows a writ of preliminary attachment issued by the court of origin
against his corporation to be implemented on his family home which is ordinarily exempt from the
mesne process.
Owing to the failure to pay the sub-contract cost pursuant to a deed of assignment signed between
petitioner's corporation and private respondent herein, the latter filed on July 3, 1989, a complaint for
a sum of money, with a prayer for preliminary attachment, against the former. As a consequence of
the order on July 28, 1989, the corresponding writ for the provisional remedy was issued on August 11,
1989 which triggered the attachment of a parcel of land in Quezon City owned by Manacop
Construction President Florante F. Manacop, herein petitioner.
In lieu of the original complaint, private respondent submitted an amended complaint on August 18,
1989 intended to substitute Manacop Construction with Florante F. Manacop as defendant who is
"doing business under the name and style of F.F. Manacop Construction Co., Inc.". After the motion for
issuance of summons to the substituted defendant below was granted, petitioner filed his answer to
the amended complaint on November 20, 1989.
Petitioner's Omnibus Motion filed on September 5, 1990 grounded on (1) irregularity that attended the
issuance of the disputed writ inspite the absence of an affidavit therefor; (2) the feasibility of utilizing
the writ prior to his submission as party-defendant, and (3) exemption from attachment of his family
home (page 3, Petition; page 8, Rollo), did not merit the serious consideration of the court of origin.
This nonchalant response constrained petitioner to elevate the matter to respondent court which, as
aforesaid, agreed with the trial court on the strength of the ensuing observations:

Anent the petitioner's claim that the writ of attachment was issued without jurisdiction because of the
lack of supporting affidavit, We subscribe to the recent ruling of the Highest Tribunal that a verified
statement incorporated in the complaint without a separate affidavit is sufficient and valid to obtain
the attachment (Nasser vs. Court of Appeals, 191 SCRA 783). In the case at bar, the original as well as
the amended complaint filed by herein private respondent were verified, in substantial compliance
with the requirements of the law.
Finally, the petitioner insists that the attached property is a family home, having been occupied by him
and his family since 1972, and is therefore exempt from attachment.
The contention is not well-taken.
While Article 153 of the Family Code provides that the family home is deemed constituted on a house
and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence, it does not mean that said article has a
retroactive effect such that all existing family residences, petitioner's included, are deemed to have
been constituted as family homes at the time of their occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family
Code and henceforth, are exempt from execution for the payment of obligations incurred before the
effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 (Mondequillo vs. Breva, 185 SCRA 766). Neither does
Article 162 of said Code state that the provisions of Chapter 2, Title V thereof have retroactive effect. It
simply means that all existing family residences at the time of the effectivity of the Family Code are
considered family homes and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home
under the Family Code (Mondequillo vs. Breva, supra). Since petitioner's debt was incurred as early as
November 25, 1987, it preceded the effectivity of the Family Code. His property is therefore not
exempt from attachment (Annex "O", Plaintiff's Position Paper and Memorandum of Authorities, p. 78).
(pp. 5-6, Decision; pp. 64-65, Rollo).
The attempt to reconsider respondent court's stance was to no avail (page 75, Rollo); hence, the
petition at bar.
Did respondent court err in dismissing the challenge posed by petitioner against the denial of his
omnibus motion?

We are not ready to accept the negative aspersions put forward by petitioner against respondent court
in the petition before Us.
Petitioner harps on the supposition that the appellate court should not have pierced the veil of
corporate fiction because he is distinct from the personality of his corporation and, therefore, the writ
of attachment issued against the corporation cannot be used to place his own family home in custodia
legis. This puerile argument must suffer rejection since the doctrine in commercial law adverted to and
employed in exculpation by petitioner, during the pendency of his petition for certiorari in the
appellate court and even at this stage, may not be permitted to simply sprout from nowhere for such
subtle experiment is prescribed by the omnibus motion rule under Section 8, Rule 15 of the Revised
Rules of Court, thus:
A motion attacking a pleading or a proceeding shall include all objections then available, and all
objections not so included shall be deemed waived.
The spirit that surrounds the foregoing statutory norm is to require the movant to raise all available
exceptions for relief during a single opportunity so that multiple and piece-meal objections may be
avoided (Rafanan, et al. vs. Rafanan, 98 Phil. 162 [1955]; 1 Martin, Rules of Court with Notes and
Comments, 1989 Rev. Edition, p. 492; Savit vs. Rodas, 73 Phil. 310 [1941]).
Another mistaken notion entertained by petitioner concerns the impropriety of issuing the writ of
attachment on August 11, 1989 when he "was not yet a defendant in this case." This erroneous
perception seems to suggest that jurisdiction over the person of petitioner, as defendant below, must
initially attach before the provisional remedy involved herein can be requested by a plaintiff. A
contrario, Chief Justice Narvasa obliterated this unfounded assertion in Davao Light and Power Co., Inc.
vs. Court of Appeals (204 SCRA [1991]) whose dissertation on the subject as related and applied to the
present inquiry is quite enlightening:
It is incorrect to theorize that after an action or proceeding has been commenced and jurisdiction over
the person of the plaintiff has been vested in the court, but before the acquisition of jurisdiction over
the person of the defendant (either by service of summons or his voluntary submission to the court's
authority), nothing can be validly done by the plaintiff or the court. It is wrong to assume that the
validity of acts done during this period should be dependent on, or held in suspension until, the actual
obtention of jurisdiction over the defendant's person. The obtention by the court of jurisdiction over
the person of the defendant is one thing; quite another is the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person
of the plaintiff or over the subject-matter or nature of the action, or the res or object thereof.

An action or proceeding is commenced by the filing of the complaint or other initiatory pleading. By
that act, the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter or nature of the action or proceeding is
invoked or called into activity, and it thus that the court acquires over said subject matter or nature of
the action. And it is by that self-same act of the plaintiff (or petitioner) of filing the complaint (or other
appropriate pleading) by which he signifies his submission to the court's power and authority that
jurisdiction is acquired by the court over his person. On the other hand, jurisdiction over the person of
the defendant is obtained, as above stated, by the service of summons or other coercive process upon
him or by his voluntary submission to the authority of the court.
The events that follow the filing of the complaint as a matter of routine are well known. After the
complaint is filed, summons issues to the defendant, the summons is then transmitted to the sheriff,
and finally, service of the summons is effected on the defendant in any of the ways authorized by the
Rules of Court. There is thus ordinarily some appreciable interval of time between the day of filing of
the complaint and the day of service of summons of the defendant. During this period, different acts
may be done by the plaintiff or by the Court, which are of unquestionable validity and propriety. Among
these, for example, are the appointment of a guardian ad litem, the grant of authority to the plaintiff to
prosecute the suit as a pauper litigant, the amendment of the complaint by the plaintiff as a matter of
right without leave of court, authorization by the Court of service of summons by publication, the
dismissal of the action by the plaintiff on mere notice.

This, too, is true with regard to the provisional remedies of preliminary attachment, preliminary
injunction, receivership or replevin. They may be validly and properly applied for and granted even
before the defendant is summoned or heard from.
A preliminary attachment may be defined, paraphrasing the Rules of Court, as the provisional remedy
in virtue of which a plaintiff or other proper party may, at the commencement of the action or at any
time thereafter, have the property of the adverse party taken into the custody of the court as security
for the satisfaction of any judgment that may be recovered. It is a remedy which is purely statutory in
respect of which the law requires a strict construction of the provisions granting it. Withal no principle,
statutory or jurisprudential, prohibits its issuance by any court before acquisition of jurisdiction over
the person of the defendant.
Rule in fact speaks of the grant of the remedy "at the commencement of the action or at any time
thereafter," The phrase, "at the commencement of the action," obviously refers to the date of the filing
of the complaint which, as above pointed out, is the date that marks "the commencement of the
action; and the reference plainly is to a time before summons is served on the defendant, or even
before summons issues. What the rule is saying quite clearly is that after an action is properly
commenced by the filing of the complaint and the payment of all requisite docket and other fees
the plaintiff may apply for and obtain a writ of preliminary attachment upon fulfillment of the pertinent
requisites laid down by law, and that he may do so at any time, either before or after service of
summons on the defendant. And this indeed, has been the immemorial practice sanctioned by the
courts: for the plaintiff or other proper party to incorporate the application for attachment in the
complaint or other appropriate pleading (counterclaim, cross-claim, third-party claim) and for the Trial
Court to issue the writ ex-parte at the commencement application otherwise sufficient in form and
substance. (at pp. 347-350.)
Petitioner seeks to capitalize on the legal repercussion that ipso facto took place when the complaint
against him was amended. He proffers the idea that the extinction of a complaint via a superseding
one carries with it the cessation of the ancilliary writ of preliminary attachment. We could have agreed
with petitioner along this line had he expounded the adverse aftermath of an amended complaint in
his omnibus motion. But the four corners of his motion in this respect filed on September 5, 1990 are
circumscribed by other salient points set forth by Us relative to the propriety of the assailed writ itself.
This being so, petitioner's eleventh hour effort in pressing a crucial factor for exculpation must be
rendered ineffective and barred by the omnibus motion rule.
Lastly, petitioner is one of the belief that his abode at Quezon City since 1972 is a family home within
the purview of the Family Code and therefore should not have been subjected to the vexatious writ.
Yet, petitioner must concede that respondent court properly applied the discussion conveyed by Justice
Gancayco in this regard when he spoke for the First Division of this Court in Modequillo vs. Breva (185
SCRA 766 [1990]) that:
Article 155 of the Family Code also provides as follows:
Art. 155. The family home shall be exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except:
(1) For non-payment of taxes;

(2) For debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family home;
(3) For debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such constitution; and
(4) For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders, materialmen and others who have
rendered service for the construction of the building.
The exemption provided as aforestated is effective from the time of the constitution of the family home
as such, and lasts so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein.
In the present case, the residential house and lot of petitioner was constituted as a family home
whether judicially or extrajudicially under the Civil Code. It became a family home by operation of law

under Article 153 of the Family Code. It is deemed constituted as a family home upon the effectivity of
the Family Code on August 3, 1988 not August 4, one year after its publication in the Manila Chronicle
on August 4, 1987 (1988 being a leap year).
The contention of petitioner that it should be considered a family home from the time it was occupied
by petitioner and his family in 1969 is not well-taken. Under Article 162 of the Family Code, it is
provided that "the provisions of this Chapter shall also govern existing family residences insofar as said
provisions are applicable." It does not mean that Articles 152 and 153 of said Code have a retroactive
effect such that all existing family residences are deemed to have been constituted as family homes at
the time of their occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family Code and are exempt from execution
for the payment of obligations incurred before the effectivity of the Family Code. Article 162 simply
means that all existing family residences at the time of the effectivity of the Family Code, are
considered family homes and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home
under the Family Code. Article 162 does not state that the provisions of Chapter 2, Title V have a
retroactive effect.
Is the family home of petitioner exempt from execution of the money judgment aforecited? No. The
debt or liability which was the basis of the judgment arose or was incurred at the time of the vehicular
accident on March 16, 1976 and the money judgment arising therefrom was rendered by the appellate
court on January 29, 1988. Both preceded the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988. This
case does not fall under the exemptions from execution provided in the Family Code. (at pp. 771-772).
Verily, according to petitioner, his debt was incurred in 1987 or prior to the effectivity on August 3,
1988 of the Family Code (page 17, petition; page 22, Rollo). This fact alone will militate heavily against
the so-called exemption by sheer force of exclusion embodied under paragraph 2, Article 155 of the
Family Code cited in Modequillo.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED, with costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

Patricio vs. Dario IIIG.R. No. 170829, November 20, 2006Facts:

Facts:
Marcelino V. Dario died intestate. He was survived by his wife, petitioner Perla G. Patricio and their two
sons, Marcelino Marc Dario and private respondent Marcelino G. Dario III. Among the properties he left
was a parcel of land with a residential house and a pre-school building built thereon. Petitioner Perla,
Marcelino Marc and, Marcelino III, extra judicially settled his estate. Thereafter, Perla and Marcelino

Marc formally advised Marcelino III of their intention to partition the subject property and terminate the
co-ownership. Private respondent refused to partition the property claiming that the subject property
which is the family home duly constituted by spouses Marcelino and Perla Dario cannot be partitioned
while a minor beneficiary is still living therein namely, his 12-year-old son, the grandson of the
decedent. He argued that as long as the minor is living in the family home, the same continues as such
until the beneficiary becomes of age. Hence petitioner and Marcelino Marc instituted an action for
partition.
Issue:
Whether or not the partition of the family home is proper where one of the co-owners refuse to accede
to such partition on the ground that a minor beneficiary still resides in the said home.
Held:
The law explicitly provides that occupancy of the family home either by the owner thereof or by any
of its beneficiaries must be actual. Actual occupancy, however, need not be by the owner of the
house specifically. Rather, the property may be occupied by the beneficiaries enumerated in Article
154 of the Family Code, which may include the in-laws where the family home is constituted jointly by
the husband and wife. But the law definitely excludes maids and overseers.
They are not the beneficiaries contemplated by the Code. Article 154 of the Family Code enumerates
who are the beneficiaries of a family home: (1) The husband and wife, or an unmarried person who is
the head of a family; and (2) Their parents, ascendants, descendants, brothers and sisters, whether
the relationship be legitimate or illegitimate, who are living in the family home and who depend upon
the head of the family for legal support. To be a beneficiary of the family home, three requisites must
concur: (1) they must be among the relationships enumerated in Art. 154 of the Family Code; (2) they
live in the family home; and (3) they are dependent for legal support upon the head of the family.
Moreover, Article 159 of the Family Code provides that the family home shall continue despite the
death of one or both spouses or of the unmarried head of the family for a period of 10 years or for as
long as there is a minor beneficiary, and the heirs cannot partition the same unless the court finds
compelling reasons therefor. This rule shall apply regardless of whoever owns the property or
constituted the family home.
As to the first requisite, the beneficiaries of the family home are: (1) The husband and wife, or an
unmarried person who is the head of a family; and (2) Their parents, ascendants, descendants,
brothers and sisters, whether the relationship be legitimate or illegitimate. The term descendants
contemplates all descendants of the person or persons who constituted the family home without
distinction; hence, it must necessarily include the grandchildren and great grandchildren of the
spouses who constitute a family home.
As to the second requisite, minor beneficiaries must be actually living in the family home to avail of the
benefits derived from Art. 159. Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV, also known as Ino, the son of private
respondent and grandson of the decedent Marcelino V. Dario, has been living in the family home since
1994, or within 10 years from the death of the decedent, hence, he satisfies the second requisite.
However, as to the third requisite, Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV cannot demand support from his
paternal grandmother if he has parents who are capable of supporting him. The liability for legal
support falls primarily on Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IVs parents, especially his father, herein private
respondent who is the head of his immediate family. The law first imposes the obligation of legal
support upon the shoulders of the parents, especially the father, and only in their default is the
obligation imposed on the grandparents. Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV is dependent on legal support
not from his grandmother, but from his father. Legal support has the following characteristics: (1) It is
personal, based on family ties which bind the obligor and the obligee; (2) It is intransmissible; (3) It
cannot be renounced; (4) It cannot be compromised; (5) It is free from attachment or execution; (6) It
is reciprocal; (7) It is variable in amount
Andal vs. Macaraig

GR No. 2474, May 30, 1951

FACTS:
Mariano Andal, a minor, assisted by his mother Maria Duenas, filed a complaint for the recovery of the
ownership and possession of a parcel of land owned by Emiliano Andal and Maria Duenas. Eduvigis
Macaraig, herein defendant, donated the land by virtue of donation propter nuptias in favor of
Emiliano. The latter was suffering from tuberculosis in January 1941. His brother, Felix, then lived with
them to work his house and farm. Emiliano became so weak that he can hardly move and get up from
his bed. Sometime in September 1942, the wife eloped with Felix and lived at the house of Marias
father until 1943. Emiliano died in January 1, 1943 where the wife did not attend the funeral. On June
17, 1943, Maria gave birth to a boy who was, herein petitioner.

ISSUE: WON Mariano Andal is a legitimate child of the deceased.

HELD:
Considering that Mariano was born on June 17, 1943 and Emiliano died on January 1, 1943, the former
is presumed to be a legitimate son of the latter because he was born within 300 days following the
dissolution of the marriage. The fact that the husband was seriously sick is not sufficient to overcome
the presumption of legitimacy. This presumption can only be rebutted by proof that it was physically
impossible for the husband to have had access to his wife during the first 120 days of the 300 days
next preceding the birth of the child. Impossibility of access by husband to wife includes absence
during the initial period of conception, impotence which is patent, and incurable; and imprisonment
unless it can be shown that cohabitation took place through corrupt violation of prison regulations.
Marias illicit intercourse with a man other than the husband during the initial period does not preclude
cohabitation between husband and wife.
Hence, Mariano Andal was considered a legitimate son of the deceased making him the owner of the
parcel land.

TEOFISTA BABIERA vs. PRESENTACION B. CATOTAL G.R. No. 138493 June 15, 2000
Facts:
Teofista Babiera claims that she was born to the spouses Eugenio and Hermogena Babiera then 65
and 54 years old respectively, at the time of her birth. Presentacion Babiera-Catotal, daughter of the
late spouses Eugenio and Hermogena counters this claim, saying that she saw with her own eyes that
Teofista was actually born to their housemaid named Flora Guinto. Presentacion testified that Teofista
was born through the help of a hilot and that her mother Flora forged the Teofistas birth certificate,
making it appear that Hermogena Babiera was the mother by forging Hermogenas signature.
Presentacion further claims that Teofistas real surname is Guinto, her mother being single; the father,
a carpenter, refused to sign the birth certificate. Teofista on her defense, claims that Presentacion has
no legal capacity to file the instant petition pursuant to Article 171 of the Family Code which states
that only the father could impugn the child's legitimacy, and that the same was not subject to a
collateral attack.
Issue:
Whether or not such petition may prosper considering Teofistas claim that Presentacion has no legal
capacity to file the instant petition and can the presumption of regularity in the issuance of her birth
certificate be upheld.
Ruling:
Yes, the petition may prosper. The case at bar is not covered by Article 171 for the prayer therein is
not to declare that Teofista is an illegitimate child of Hermogena, but to establish that the former is not
the latter's child at all. The present action does not impugn Teofistas filiation to Spouses Eugenio and
Hermogena Babiera, because there is no blood relation to impugn in the first place. Presentacion only
aims to assail and cancel Teofistas birth certificate for the void and simulated birth certificate of the
latter would affect the formers hereditary rights. Also, Teofistas birth certificate cannot be taken into
consideration for there were already irregularities regarding the birth certificate itself. It was not signed
by the local civil registrar. More importantly, the Court of Appeals observed that the mothers signature
therein was different from her signatures in other documents presented during the trial. The most
significant piece of evidence, however, is the deposition of Hermogena Babiera which states that she
did not give birth to Teofista, and that the latter was not hers nor her husband Eugenios.
TEOFISTA BABIERA, petitioner, vs. PRESENTACION B. CATOTAL, respondent.
A birth certificate may be ordered cancelled upon adequate proof that it is fictitious. Thus, void is a
certificate which shows that the mother was already fifty-four years old at the time of the child's birth
and which was signed neither by the civil registrar nor by the supposed mother. Because her
inheritance rights are adversely affected, the legitimate child of such mother is a proper party in the
proceedings for the cancellation of the said certificate.
Statement of the Case
Submitted for this Court's consideration is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, seeking reversal of the March 18, 1999 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals3 (CA) in CAGR CV No. 56031. Affirming the Regional Trial Court of Lanao del Norte in Special Proceedings No.
3046, the CA ruled as follows:
IN VIEW HEREOF, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED. Accordingly, the instant appeal is
DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs against the defendant-appellant, TEOFISTA BABIERA, a.k.a. Teofista
Guinto.4
The dispositive portion of the affirmed RTC Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing findings and pronouncements of the Court, judgment is hereby
rendered, to wit[:]
1) Declaring the Certificate of Birth of respondent Teofista Guinto as null and void "ab initio";

2) Ordering the respondent Local Civil Registrar of Iligan to cancel from the registry of live birth of
Iligan City BIRTH CERTIFICATE recorded as Registry No. 16035;
Furnish copies of this-decision to the Local Civil Registrar of Iligan City, the City Prosecutor, counsel for
private respondent Atty. Tomas Cabili and to counsel for petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
The Facts
The undisputed facts are summarized by the Court of Appeals in this wise:
Presentacion B. Catotal (hereafter referred to as PRESENTACION) filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Lanao del Node, Branch II, Iligan City, a petition for the cancellation of the entry of birth of Teofista
Babiera (herafter referred to as TEOFISTA) in the Civil Registry of Iligan City. The case was docketed as
Special Proceedings No. 3046.
From the petition filed, PRESENTACION asserted "that she is the only surviving child of the late spouses
Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena Cariosa, who died on May 26, 1996 and July 6, 1990 respectively;
that on September 20, 1996 a baby girl was delivered by "hilot" in the house of spouses Eugenio and
Hermogena Babiera and without the knowledge of said spouses, Flora Guinto, the mother of the child
and a housemaid of spouses Eugenio and Hermogena Babiera, caused the registration/recording of the
facts of birth of her child, by simulating that she was the child of the spouses Eugenio, then 65 years
old and Hermogena, then 54 years old, and made Hermogena Babiera appear as the mother by forging
her signature . . .; that petitioner, then 15 years old, saw with her own eyes and personally witnessed
Flora Guinto give birth to Teofista Guinto, in their house, assisted by "hilot"; that the birth
certificate . . . of Teofista Guinto is void ab initio, as it was totally a simulated birth, signature of
informant forged, and it contained false entries, to wit: a) The child is made to appear as the legitimate
child of the late spouses Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena Cariosa, when she is not; b) The signature
of Hermogena Cariosa, the mother, is falsified/forged. She was not the informant; c) The family name
BABIERA is false and unlawful and her correct family name is GUINTO, her mother being single; d) Her
real mother was Flora Guinto and her status, an illegitimate child; The natural father, the carpenter,
did not sign it; that the respondent Teofista Barbiera's birth certificate is void ab initio, and it is
patently a simulation of birth, since it is clinically and medically impossible for the supposed parents to
bear a child in 1956 because: a) Hermogena Cariosa Babiera, was already 54 years old; b)
Hermogena's last child birth was in the year 1941, the year petitioner was born; c) Eugenio was
already 65 years old, that the void and simulated birth certificate of Teofista Guinto would affect the
hereditary rights of petitioner who inherited the estate of cancelled and declared void and theretofore
she prays that after publication, notice and hearing, judgment [be] render[ed] declaring . . . the
certificate of birth of respondent Teofista Guinto as declared void, invalid and ineffective and ordering
the respondent local civil registrar of Iligan to cancel from the registry of live birth of Iligan City BIRTH
CERTIFICATE recorded as Registry No. 16035.

Finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance, the trial court issued an order directing the
publication of the petition and the date of hearing thereof in a newspaper, the Local Civil Registrar of
Iligan City, the office of the City Prosecutor of Iligan City and TEOFISTA.
TEOFISTA filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that "the petition states no cause of action, it being
an attack on the legitimacy of the respondent as the child of the spouses Eugenio Babiera and
Hermogena Cariosa Babiera; that plaintiff has no legal capacity to file the instant petition pursuant to
Article 171 of the Family Code; and finally that the instant petition is barred by prescription in
accordance with Article 170 of the Family Code." The trial court denied the motion to dismiss.
Subsequently, "Attys. Padilla, Ulindang and Padilla appeared and filed an answer/opposition in behalf of
private respondent Teofista Babiera, [who] was later on substituted by Atty. Cabili as counsel for
private respondent."

In the answer filed, TEOFISTA averred "that she was always known as Teofista Babiera and not Teofista
Guinto; that plaintiff is not the only surviving child of the late spouses Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena
C. Babiera, for the truth of the matter [is that] plantiff Presentacion B. V. Catotal and [defendant]
Teofista Babiera are sisters of the full-blood. Her Certificate of Birth, signed by her mother Hermogena
Babiera, . . . Certificate of Baptism, . . . Student's Report Card . . . all incorporated in her answer, are
eloquent testimonies of her filiation. By way of special and affirmative defenses, defendant/respondent
contended that the petition states no cause of action, it being an attack on the legitimacy of the
respondent as the child of the spouses Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena Carioza Babiera; that plaintiff
has no legal capacity to file the instant petition pursuant to Article 171 of the Family Code; and finally
that the instant petition is barred by prescription in accordance with Article 170 of the Family Code.5
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals held that the evidence adduced during trial proved that petitioner was not the
biological child of Hermogena Babiera. It also ruled that no evidence was presented to show that
Hermogena became pregnant in 1959. It further observed that she was already 54 years old at the
time, and that her last pregnancy had occurred way back in 1941. The CA noted that the supposed
birth took place at home, notwithstanding the advanced age of Hermogena and its concomitant
medical complications. Moreover, petitioner's Birth Certificate was not signed by the local civil
registrar, and the signature therein, which was purported to be that of Hermogena, was different from
her other signatures.
The CA also deemed inapplicable Articles 170 and 171 of the Family Code, which stated that only the
father could impugn the child's legitimacy, and that the same was not subject to a collateral attack. It
held that said provisions contemplated a situation wherein the husband or his heirs asserted that the
child of the wife was not his. In this case, the action involved the cancellation of the child's Birth
Certificate for being void ab initio on the ground that the child did not belong to either the father or the
mother.
Hence, this appeal.6
Issues
Petitioner presents the following assignment of errors:
1) Respondent (plaintiff in the lower court a quo) does not have the legal capacity to file the special
proceeding of appeal under CA GR No. CV-56031 subject matter of this review on certiorari;
2) The special proceeding on appeal under CA GR No. CV-56031 is improper and is barred by [the]
statute of limitation (prescription); [and]
3) The Honorable Court of Appeals, the fifteenth division utterly failed to hold, that the ancient public
record of petitioner's birth is superior to the self-serving oral testimony of respondent.7
The Court's Ruling
The Petition is not meritorious.

First Issue: Subject of

the Present Action
Petitioner contends that respondent has no standing to sue, because Article 1718 of the Family Code
states that the child's filiation can be impugned only by the father or, in special circumstances, his
heirs. She adds that the legitimacy of a child is not subject to a collateral attack.
This argument is incorrect. Respondent has the requisite standing to initiate the present action. Section
2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, provides that a real party in interest is one "who stands to be benefited
or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit."9 The interest of

respondent in the civil status of petitioner stems from an action for partition which the latter filed
against the former. 10 The case concerned the properties inherited by respondent from her parents.
Moreover, Article 171 of the Family Code is not applicable to the present case. A close reading of this
provision shows that it applies to instances in which the father impugns the legitimacy of his wife's
child. The provision, however, presupposes that the child was the undisputed offspring of the mother.
The present case alleges and shows that Hermogena did not give birth to petitioner. In other words,
the prayer herein is not to declare that petitioner is an illegitimate child of Hermogena, but to establish
that the former is not the latter's child at all. Verily, the present action does not impugn petitioner's
filiation to Spouses Eugenio and Hermogena Babiera, because there is no blood relation to impugn in
the first place.
In Benitez-Badua v. Court of Appeals, 11 the Court ruled thus:
Petitioner's insistence on the applicability of Articles 164, 166, 170 and 171 of the Family Code to the
case at bench cannot be sustained. These articles provide:
xxx

xxx

xxx

A careful reading of the above articles will show that they do not contemplate a situation, like in the
instant case, where a child is alleged not to be the child of nature or biological child of a certain couple.
Rather, these articles govern a situation where a husband (or his heirs) denies as his own a child of his
wife. Thus, under Article 166, it is the husband who can impugn the legitimacy of said child by proving:
(1) it was physically impossible for him to have sexual intercourse, with his wife within the first 120
days of the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the child; (2) that for biological or other
scientific reasons, the child could not have been his child; (3) that in case of children conceived
insemination, the written authorization or ratification by either parent was obtained through mistake,
fraud, violence, intimidation or undue influence. Articles 170 and 171 reinforce this reading as they
speak of the prescriptive period within which the husband or any of his heirs should file the action
impugning the legitimacy of said child. Doubtless then, the appellate court did not err when it refused
to apply these articles to the case at bench. For the case at bench is not one where the heirs of the
late Vicente are contending that petitioner is not his child by Isabel. Rather, their clear submission is
that petitioner was not horn to Vicente and Isabel. Our ruling in Cabatbat-Lim vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 166 SCRA 451, 457 cited in the impugned decision is apropos, viz:
"Petitioners" recourse to Article 263 of the New Civil Code [now Art. 170 of the Family Code] is not welltaken. This legal provision refers to an action to impugn legitimacy. It is inapplicable to this case
because this is not an action to impugn the legitimacy of a child, but an action of the private
respondents to claim their inheritance as legal heirs of their childless deceased aunt. They do not claim
that petitioner Violeta Cabatbat Lim is an illegitimate child of the deceased, but that she is not the
decedent's child at all. Being neither [a] legally adopted child, nor an acknowledged natural child, nor
a child by legal fiction of Esperanza Cabatbat, Violeta is not a legal heir of the deceased. 12 (Emphasis
supplied.)
Second Issue: Prescription
Petitioner next contends that the action to contest her status as a child of the late Hermogena Babiera
has already prescribed. She cites Article 170 of the Family Code which provides the prescriptive period
for such action:
Art. 170. The action to impugn the legitimacy of the child shall be brought within one year from the
knowledge of the birth or its recording in the civil register, if the husband or, in a proper case, any of
his heirs, should reside in the city or municipality where the birth took place or was recorded.

If the husband or, in his default, all of his heirs do not reside at the place of birth as defined in the first
paragraph or where it was recorded, the period shall be two years if they should reside in the
Philippines; and three years if abroad. If the birth of the child has been concealed from or was unknown

to the husband or his heirs, the period shall be counted from the discovery or knowledge of the birth of
the child or of the fact of registration of said birth, whichever is earlier.
This argument is bereft of merit. The present action involves the cancellation of petitioner's Birth
Certificate; it does not impugn her legitimacy. Thus, the prescriptive period set forth in Article 170 of
the Family Code does not apply. Verily, the action to nullify the Birth Certificate does not prescribe,
because it was allegedly void ab initio. 1
Third Issue:
Presumption in Favor of the Birth Certificate
Lastly, petitioner argues that the evidence presented, especially Hermogena's testimony that
petitioner was not her real child, cannot overcome the presumption of regularity in the issuance of the
Birth Certificate.
While it is true that an official document such as petitioner's Birth Certificate enjoys the presumption of
regularity, the specific facts attendant in the case at bar, as well as the totality of the evidence
presented during trial, sufficiently negate such presumption. First, there were already irregularities
regarding the Birth Certificate itself. It was not signed by the local civil registrar. 14 More important,
the Court of Appeals observed that the mother's signature therein was different from her signatures in
other documents presented during the trial.
Second, the circumstances surrounding the birth of petitioner show that Hermogena is not the former's
real mother. For one, there is no evidence of Hermogena's pregnancy, such as medical records and
doctor's prescriptions, other than the Birth Certificate itself. In fact, no witness was presented to attest
to the pregnancy of Hermogena during that time.1awphil Moreover, at the time of her supposed birth,
Hermogena was already 54 years old. Even if it were possible for her to have given birth at such a late
age, it was highly suspicious that she did so in her own home, when her advanced age necessitated
proper medical care normally available only in a hospital.
The most significant piece of evidence, however, is the deposition of Hermogena Babiera which states
that she did not give birth to petitioner, and that the latter was not hers nor her husband Eugenio's.
The deposition reads in part:
q Who are your children?
a Presentation and Florentino Babiera.
q Now, this Teofista Babiera claims that she is your legitimate child with your husband Eugenio
Babiera, what can you say about that?
a She is not our child.
q Do you recall where she was born?
a In our house because her mother was our house helper.
q Could you recall for how long if ever this Teofista Babiera lived with you in your residence?
a Maybe in 1978 but she [would] always go ou[t] from time to time.
q Now, during this time, do you recall if you ever assert[ed] her as your daughter with your husband?
a No, sir. 15
Relying merely on the assumption of validity of the Birth Certificate, petitioner has presented no other
evidence other than the said document to show that she is really Hermogena's child; Neither has she
provided any reason why her supposed mother would make a deposition stating that the former was
not the latter's child at all.

All in all, we find no reason to reverse or modify the factual finding of the trial and the appellate courts
that petitioner was not the child of respondent's parents.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner. SO ORDERED.

Benitez-Badua vs. CA
GR No. 105625, January 24, 1994

FACTS:
Spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian were owners of various properties located in Laguna.
Isabel died in 1982 while his husband died in 1989. Vicentes sister and nephew filed a complaint for
the issuance of letters of administration of Vicentes estate in favor of the nephew, herein private
respondent. The petitioner, Marissa Benitez-Badua, was raised and cared by the deceased spouses
since childhood, though not related to them by blood, nor legally adopted. The latter to prove that she
is the only legitimate child of the spouses submitted documents such as her certificate of live birth
where the spouses name were reflected as her parents. She even testified that said spouses
continuously treated her as their legitimate daughter. On the other hand, the relatives of Vicente
declared that said spouses were unable to physically procreate hence the petitioner cannot be the
biological child. Trial court decided in favor of the petitioner as the legitimate daughter and sole heir of
the spouses.

ISSUE: WON petitioners certificate of live birth will suffice to establish her legitimacy.

HELD:
The Court dismissed the case for lack of merit. The mere registration of a child in his or her birth
certificate as the child of the supposed parents is not a valid adoption. It does not confer upon the

child the status of an adopted child and her legal rights. Such act amounts to simulation of the child's
birth or falsification of his or her birth certificate, which is a public document.
It is worthy to note that Vicente and brother of the deceased wife executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial
Settlement of the Estate of the latter. In the notarized document, they stated that they were the sole
heirs of the deceased because she died without descendants and ascendants. In executing such
deed, Vicente effectively repudiated the Certificate of Live Birth of the petitioner where it appeared
thathe was the petitioners father.

G.R. No. L-49162 July 28 1987

Jao vs CA

FACTS:
Arlene Salgado, Janice Marie's mother, filed a case for recognition and support against Perico V. Jao. Jao
denied the paternity so they agreed to a blood grouping test which was in due course conducted by
the NBI. The test came out indicating that Janice could not have been the possible offspring of Jao and
Arlene. Upon Arlene's motion for reconsideration, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court declared
the child the offspring of Jao. Jao appealed to the CA, arguing that the blood grouping test could have
been conclusive and disputable evidence of his non-paternity, because there was no showing of
irregularity or mistake in the conduct of the tests. CA upheld Jao's contention and reversed the trial
court decision.

ISSUE:Whether or not the result of blood grouping test is admissible and conclusive to prove paternity.

RULING:
Yes. SC denied the petition for review.

Supreme Court had given weight to the findings of the NBI in its blood grouping test. Thus, it cannot be
gainsaid that the competency of the NBI to conduct blood grouping tests has been recognized as early
as the 1950's. (Co Tao vs. CA, 101 Phil. 188)
In this jurisdiction, the result of blood tests, among other evidence, to, affirm paternity was dealt with
in Co Tao v. CA. In said case, the NBI expert"s report of the blood tests stated that "from their blood
groups and types, the defendant Co Tao is a possible father of the child." From this statement the
defendant contended that the child must have been the child of another man. The Court noted: "For
obvious reasons, the NBI expert cannot give assurance that the appellant was the father of the child;
he can only give his opinion that he is a "possible father." This possibility, coupled with the other facts
and circumstances brought out during the trial, tends to definitely establish that appellant is the father
of the child."
Where the issue is admissibility and conclusiveness of blood grouping tests to disprove paternity,
rulings have been much more definite in their conclusions. For the past three decades, the use of blood
typing in cases of disputed parentage has already become an important legal procedure. There is now
almost universal scientific agreement that blood grouping tests are conclusive as to non-paternity,
although inconclusive as to paternity that is, the fact that the blood type of the child is a possible
product of the mother and alleged father does not conclusively prove that the child is born by such
parents; but, if the blood type of the child is not the possible blood type when the blood of the mother
and that of the alleged father are crossmatched, then the child cannot possibly be that of the alleged
father.
In the United States jurisdiction, the admissibility of blood tests results to prove non-paternity has
already been passed upon in several cases. The positive results of blood tests excluding paternity, in a
case in which it was shown that proper safeguards were drawn around the testing procedures, were
recognized as final on the question of paternity (Gilpin v. Gilpin). Evidence of non-paternity consisting
of the result of blood grouping tests was admitted despite a finding that the alleged father had
cohabited with the mother within the period of gestation (Cuneo v. Cuneo). The Court said that the
competent medical testimony was overwhelmingly in favor of the plaintiff, and to reject such
testimony would be tantamount to rejecting scientific fact.

G.R. No. 104376 February 23, 1994

ARTEMIO G. ILANO, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and MERCEDITAS (sic) S. ILANO,
represented by her mother, LEONCIA DE LOS SANTOS, respondent.
After the great flood, man was commanded to go forth, be fertile, multiply and fill the earth. Others did
not heed the sequence of this command because they multiply first and then go. Corollarily, it is now
commonplace for an abandoned illegitimate offspring to sue his father for recognition and support.
The antecedent facts are narrated in the trial court's decision, as follows:
Leoncia first met petitioner Artemio G. Ilano while she was working as secretary to Atty. Mariano C.
Virata. Petitioner was one of the clients of
Atty. Virata. On several occasions, she and petitioner took lunch together. In less that a year's time,
she resigned from her work.
Sometime in 1957, Leoncia, then managing a business of her own as Namarco distributor, met
petitioner again who was engaged in the same business and they renewed acquaintances. Since then,

he would give her his unsold allocation of goods. Later, he courted her more than four years. Their
relationship became intimate and with his promise of marriage, they eloped to Guagua, Pampanga in
April, 1962. They stayed at La Mesa Apartment, located behind the Filipinas Telephone Company
branch office, of which he is the president and general manager. He came home to her three or four
times a week.
The apartment was procured by Melencio Reyes, Officer-in-Charge of the Filipinas Telephone Company
branch office. He also took care of the marketing and paid rentals, lights and water bills. 1 Unable to
speak the local dialect, Leoncia was provided also by Melencio with a maid by the name of Nena.
Petitioner used to give her P700.00 a month for their expenses at home.
In June, 1962, Leoncia, who was conceiving at that time, was fetched by petitioner and they
transferred to San Juan St., Pasay City. In October, 1962, she delivered a still-born female child at the
Manila Sanitarium. The death certificate was signed by petitioner. 2 Thereafter, while they were living
at Highway 54, Makati, private respondent Merceditas S. Ilano was born on December 30, 1963 also at
the Manila Sanitarium. Her birth was recorded as Merceditas de los Santos Ilano, child of Leoncia
Aguinaldo de los Santos and Artemio Geluz Ilano. 3 Leoncia submitted receipts issued by the Manila
Sanitarium to show that she was confined there from December 30, 1963 until January 2, 1964 under
the name of Mrs. Leoncia Ilano. 4
The support by petitioner for Leoncia and Merceditas was sometimes in the form of cash personally
delivered by him, thru Melencio, thru Elynia (niece of Leoncia) 5 or thru Merceditas herself; 6 and
sometimes in the form of a check like Manila Banking Corporation Check No. 81532, 7 the signature
appearing thereon having been identified by Leoncia as that of petitioner because he often gives her
checks which he issues at home and saw him sign the checks. 8 Both petitioner and his daughter
admitted that the check and the signature are those of the former. 9
During the time that petitioner and Leoncia were living as husband and wife, he showed concern as the
father of Merceditas. When Merceditas was in Grade I at the St. Joseph Parochial School, he signed her
Report Card for the fourth and fifth grading periods 10 as her parent. Those signatures were both
identified by Leoncia and Merceditas because he signed them in their residence in their presence and
of Elynia. 11 Since Merceditas started to have discernment, he was already the one whom she
recognized as her Daddy. 12 He treated her as a father would to his child. He would bring home
candies, toys, and anything a child enjoys. He would take her for a drive, eat at restaurants, and even
cuddle her to sleep. 13
When petitioner ran as a candidate in the Provincial Board of Cavite, he gave Leoncia his picture with
the following dedication: "To Nene, with best regards, Temiong." 14
In May, 1963, Ruth Elynia Mabanglo, niece of Leoncia, lived with Leoncia and petitioner. She
accompanied her aunt when she started having labor pains in the morning of December 30, 1963.
Petitioner arrived after five o'clock in the afternoon. When the nurse came to inquire about the child,
Leoncia was still unconscious so it was from petitioner that the nurse sought the information. Inasmuch
as it was already past seven o'clock in the evening, the nurse promised to return the following morning
for his signature. However, he left an instruction to give birth certificate to Leoncia for her signature, as
he was leaving early the following morning.

Prior to the birth of Merceditas, Elynia used to accompany her aunt and sometimes with petitioner in
his car to the Manila Sanitarium for prenatal
check-up. At times, she used to go to his office at 615 Sales St., Sta. Cruz, Manila, upon his instructions
to get money as support and sometimes he would send notes of explanation if he cannot come which
she in turn gave to her aunt. 15 They stayed at 112 Arellano St., then Sta. Cruz, Manila in 1966 before
they finally transferred to Gagalangin in 1967. Petitioner lived with them up to June, 1971 when he
stopped coming home.
Petitioner's defense was a total and complete denial of any relationship with Leoncia and Merceditas.
He disowned the handwritten answers and signatures opposite column 16 of the death certificate of a

female child surnamed Ilano, although in column 13 thereof opposite father's name the typewritten
name, Artemio G. Ilano, appears. He also denied the following: all the notes alleged to have been
received from him by Elynia for delivery to Leoncia; the signatures appearing in Merceditas' Report
Card; and being the source of a photo of himself with a handwritten dedication. He admitted that
Manila Banking Corporation Check No. 81532 including the signature is his. He was sick on December
30, 1963 and was hospitalized on January 7, 1964. 16 He does not understand why this case was filed
against him. 17
Melencio admitted that he was the one who procured the apartment for Leoncia, leased it in his name,
paid the rentals and bought the necessities therefor. He and Leoncia lived together and shared the
same bed. They later transferred to San Juan St., Pasay City and to Highway 54, Makati. He stopped
visiting her in March or April, 1963 because he planned to get married with another which he
eventually did in September, 1963.
Diosdado Datu, fish vendor, usually delivered to the apartment fishes ordered by Melencio which were
received by Leoncia.
Nilda Ilano Ramos, daughter of petitioner, does not know Leoncia; neither has she been brought to
their family home in Imus, Cavite. On December 30, 1963, her father was at their home because he
got sick on December 25, 1963 and was advised to have a complete bed rest. Her father was
hospitalized on January 7, 1964. She denied that her father was at the Manila Sanitarium on December
30, 1963; that he fetched a certain woman on January 2, 1964, at the Manila Sanitarium because he
was at their home at that time; and that her father lived with a certain woman in 1963 up to June,
1971 because all this time he was living with them in Imus, Cavite. He was working and reporting to
the office everyday and when he goes to Guagua or Manila on business, her mother or brother goes
with him.
Victoria J. Ilano, petitioner's wife, further corroborated the previous testimonies about petitioner's
sickness on December 30, 1963 and hospitalization on January 7, 1964. It could not be true that her
husband, during the years 1963 to 1968, lived three (3) times a week with a certain Leoncia de los
Santos because her husband never slept out of their house and that in his capacity as President and
Chairman of the Board of the Filipinas Telephone Company he does not go to Guagua even once a year
because they have a branch manager, Melencio Reyes.
After weighing the contradictory testimonies and evidence of the parties, the trial court was not fully
satisfied that petitioner is the father of Merceditas, on the basis of the following:
1) petitioner and Leoncia were not in cohabitation during the period of Merceditas' conception;
2) testimony of Melencio that he frequented the apartment where Leoncia was living, took care of all
the bills and shared the same bed with her;
3) the birth certificate of Merceditas was not signed by petitioner;
4) petitioner denied his signature in the monthly report card of Merceditas; and
5) there is no clear and sufficient showing that support was given by petitioner to Merceditas.
Thus it rendered judgment on April 24, 1981 dismissing the complaint. 18
Fortunately for private respondent, respondent Court of Appeals did not share the same view as the
trial court. A review of the testimonial and documentary evidenced adduced by private respondent led
respondent court to the firm conclusion that petitioner is her father, entitling her to support. The
dispositive portion of its decision dated December 17, 1991 reads:

WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is REVERSED and judgment is hereby rendered declaring
plaintiff MERCEDITAS S. ILANO as the duly acknowledged and recognized illegitimate child of defendant
ARTEMIO G. ILANO with all the right appurtenant to such status.

Defendant is directed to pay the plaintiff support in arrears at the rate of EIGHT HUNDRED (P800.00)
PESOS a month from the date of the filing of the complaint on August 16, 1972 up to August 15, 1975;
ONE THOUSAND (P1,000.00) PESOS a month from August 16, 1975 to August 15, 1978; ONE
THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED (P1,300.00) PESOS a month from August 16, 1978 to August 15, 1981;
and ONE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED (P1,500.00) a month from August 16, 1981 up to the time she
reached the age of majority on December 30, 1984.
Defendant is further ordered to pay the plaintiff the sum of P10,000.00 as attorney's fees plus the
costs.
SO ORDERED. 19
The motion for reconsideration was denied in the resolution dated February 26, 1992. 20
Hence, the present petition.
We shall resolve the following pertinent errors allegedly committed by respondent court:
1) in awarding "back support" even in the absence of recognition or of a judgment declaring petitioner
father of Merceditas with finality;
2) in not ruling that an adulterous child cannot file an action for recognition; and
3) in deciding matters of substance manifestly against established decisions of this Court.
Petitioner argues that since the complaint against him has been dismissed by the trial court, therefore
was absolutely no obligation on his part to give support to Merceditas. It would have been only from
the date of the judgment of the trial court that support should have commenced, if so granted. Under
the law in force when the complaint was filed, an adulterous child cannot maintain an action for
compulsory recognition. In order that the birth certificate may constitute a voluntary recognition, it
must be signed by the father. Equivocal act, such as signing under the caption "parent" in the report
card, is not sufficient. Merceditas has never been to the family home of petitioner at Imus, Cavite; nor
introduced to his family; nor brought around town by him, treated as his child, introduced to other
people as his child, led people to believe that she was part of his family.
The petition utterly lacks merit.
Under the then prevailing provisions of the Civil Code, illegitimate children or those who are conceived
and born out of wedlock were generally classified into two groups: (1) Natural, whether actual or by
fiction, were those born outside of lawful wedlock of parents who, at the time of conception of the
child, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other (Article 119, old Civil Code; Article
269, new Civil Code) and (2) Spurious, whether incestuous, were disqualified to marry each other on
account of certain legal impediments. 21 Since petitioner had a subsisting marriage to another at the
time Merceditas was conceived, 22 she is a spurious child. In this regard, Article 287 of the Civil Code
provides that illegitimate children other than natural in accordance with Article 269 23 and other than
natural children by legal fiction are entitled to support and such successional rights as are granted in
the Civil Code. The Civil Code has given these rights to them because the transgressions of social
conventions committed by the parents should not be visited upon them. They were born with a social
handicap and the law should help them to surmount the disadvantages facing them through the
misdeeds of their parents. 24 However, before Article 287 can be availed of, there must first be a
recognition of paternity 25 either voluntarily or by court action. This arises from the legal principle that
an unrecognized spurious child like a natural child has no rights from his parents or to their estate
because his rights spring not from the filiation or blood relationship but from his acknowledgment by
the parent. In other words, the rights of an illegitimate child arose not because he was the true or real
child of his parents but because under the law, he had been recognized or acknowledged as such a
child. 26 The relevant law on the matter is Article 283 of the Civil Code, which provides:
Art. 283. In any of the following cases, the father is obliged to recognize the child as his natural child:
(1) In cases of rape, abduction or seduction, when the period of the offense coincides more or less with
that of the conception;

(2) When the child is in continuos possession of status of a child of the alleged father by the direct acts
of the latter or of his family;
(3) When the child was conceived during the time when the mother cohabited with the supposed
father;
(4) When the child has in his favor any evidence or proof that the defendant is his father.
While the aforementioned provision speaks of the obligation of the father to recognize the child as his
natural child, for the purpose of the present case, petitioner is obliged to recognize Merceditas as his
spurious child. This provision should be read in conjunction with Article 289 of the Civil Code which
provides:
Art. 289. Investigation of the paternity or maternity of (other illegitimate) children . . . under the
circumstances specified in articles 283 and 284.
In reversing the decision of the trial court, respondent court found, as it is likewise our finding, that
private respondent's evidence to establish her filiation with and the paternity of petitioner is too
overwhelming to be ignored or brushed aside by the highly improbable and fatally flawed testimony of
Melencio and the inherently weak denials of petitioner:
Significantly, the Court a quo believed that plaintiff's mother and defendant carried an intimate
relations. It nonetheless was not satisfied that defendant is the father of the plaintiff because it is not
convinced that her mother and defendant were in cohabitation during the period of her conception,
and took into account the testimony of Melencio S. Reyes who frequented the apartment where
Leoncia de los Santos was living and who positively testified that he took care of all the bills and that
he shared the same bed with plaintiffs mother.
The court a quo completely ignored the fact that the apartment at Guagua was rented by the
defendant, and that Melencio Reyes, who was a mere employee and godson of the defendant with a
monthly salary of P560.00 was a mere subaltern of the latter, and only frequented the place upon
instruction of the defendant to take care of the needs of the plaintiff.
As pointed out by appellant, Leoncia and Artemio stayed in an apartment at the back of the Guagua
Telephone System owned by and of which Artemio was the General Manager (TSN, p. 46, 8/18/73) and
Melencio was the Officer-in-Charge in the absence of Artemio whose residence and main office was in
Cavite. There, for the first time, Leoncia met Melencio (TSN, pp. 3-4, 1/25/74). The apartment in
Guagua was rented in the name of Melencio. As Leoncia does not speak the Pampango dialect (TSN, p.
50, 8/18/73), Artemio gave Leoncia the instruction to call upon Melencio for whatever Leoncia needs
(TSN, pp. 11-12, 1/25/74). Thus, it was Melencio who procured all the supplies and services needed in
the apartment for which procurement Melencio gives to Leoncia the corresponding receipts of payment
for liquidation of cash advances Artemio or the Guagua Telephone System or Leoncia herself, gives to
Melencio (Exhs. A, A-1 to 14; TSN, p. 32, 8/13/73; TSN, pp. 7, 12 and 14, 1/25/74).
At the Guagua apartment, Artemio would visit Leoncia three of four times a week and sleeps there
(TSN, p. 47, 8/13/73). Artemio was giving Leoncia an allowance of P700.00 a month (TSN, p. 38,
7/18/73).
Leoncia got pregnant and Artemio found it difficult to commute between Cavite and Guagua so that in
June 1962, Artemio transferred Leoncia to Calle San Juan, Pasay City (TSN, pp. 19-20, 7/18/73) where
they were known as husband and wife (id. p. 41). In leaving Guagua for San Juan, Pasay City, Leoncia
was fetched by Artemio in a car driven by Artemio himself. (pp. 9-11, Appellant's Brief)
Even as Artemio and Leoncia lived and transferred to several places heretofore mentioned, Melencio
continued to be a trusted man Friday of Artemio who would deliver notes (Exhs. "F", "F-1" and "F-3")
and money from Artemio to Leoncia. For reference, among the notes identified by Leoncia as having
come from defendant were the following:
Exh. "F-1"

"Dear Ne,
Magsimula akong makausap ni Gracing ay nagkaroon ako ng diferencia sa paa at ngayon ay masakit
pa.
Si Miling ay ngayon lamang nakarating dito kung hindi ka aalis diyan ay si Miling na lamang ang utusan
mo sa Makati kung may kailangan ka dian.

Sgn."
"Mayroon akong nakitang bahay na mayayari malapit sa municipio ng Makati. Ipakikita ko sa iyo kung
papayag ka.
Sabihin mo kay Miling kung hindi ka aalis diyan bukas ay pupunta ako.
Walang makitang bahay sa San Juan.
Sgn."
Exh. "F-2"
"Ne, sa Viernes ay pupunta ako dian marami akong ginagawa.
Sgn."
Exh. "F-3"
"Ne, si Miling ay bukas pupunta dito ay sa tanghali ay pupunta ako diyan (11:30 am). Wala akong pera
ngayon kaya bukas na, sigurado yon.
Sgn."
Exh. "F-4"
"Dear Ne, Pacencia ka na at hindi ako nakapaglalakad gawa ng mataas ang dugo, kaya minsan-minsan
lamang ako makapunta sa oficena.
Ibigay mo ang bayad sa bahay sa Sabado ng umaga, pipilitin kong makarating dian sa Jueves.
Sgn."
The address "Ne" in the beginning of these notes refer to Leoncia whose nickname is "Nene" but which
Artemio shortens to "Ne". Miling is the nickname of Melencio. The "Gracing" mentioned in Exh. "F-1"
refers to Gracia delos Santos, a sister-in-law of Leoncia who was with Artemio when Leoncia was
removed from the hospital during the birth of Merceditas. (pp. 17-19, Appellant's Brief). These tiny bits
of evidence when pieced together ineluctably gives lie to defendants' diversionary defense that it was
with Melencio S. Reyes with whom the mother lived with during her period of conception.
The attempt of Melencio S. Reyes to show that he was the lover of Leoncia being in the apartment and
sharing the same bedroom and the same bed hardly inspires belief.
xxx xxx xxx
Undoubtedly, the role played by Melencio S. Reyes in the relationship between Leoncia and appellant
(sic) was that of a man Friday although appellant (sic) would not trust him to the hilt and unwittingly
required him to submit to Leoncia an accounting of his expenditures
(Exhs. A, A-1 to A-14) for cash advances given to him by Leoncia, Artemio or Guagua Telephone
System which would not have been the case, if it were true that there was an intimate relationship
between him and plaintiff's mother.

Evidently, following the instruction of his employer and Godfather, Melencio foisted on the court a quo
the impression that he was the lover and paramour of Leoncia but since there was really no such
relationship, he could not state the place in San Juan or Highway 54 where he took Leoncia, nor how
long they stayed there belying his pretense (sic) of an intimate relationship with plaintiffs mother. 27
Having discredited the testimonies of petitioner and Melencio, respondent court then applied
paragraph (2) of Article 283:
The court a quo did not likewise consider the evidences as sufficient to establish that plaintiff was in
continuous possession of status of a child in view of the denial by appellee of his paternity, and there is
no clear and sufficient evidence that the support was really given to plaintiff's mother. The belated
denial of paternity after the action has been filed against the putative father is not the denial that
would destroy the paternity of the child which had already been recognized by defendant by various
positive acts clearly evidencing that he is plaintiff's father. A recognition once validly made is
irrevocable. It cannot be withdrawn. A mere change of mind would be incompatible with the stability of
the civil status of person, the permanence of which affects public interest. Even when the act in which
it is made should be revocable, the revocation of such act will not revoke the recognition itself (1
Tolentino, pp. 579-580, 1983 Ed.).
To be sure, to establish "the open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child," it is
necessary to comply with certain jurisprudential requirements. "Continuous" does not, however, mean
that the concession of status shall continue forever but only that it shall not be of an intermittent
character while it continues (De Jesus v. Syquia, 58 Phil. 866). The possession of such status means
that the father has treated the child as his own, directly and not through other, spontaneously and
without concealment though without publicity (since the relation is illegitimate) (J.B.L. Reyes and R.C.
Puno, Outline of Philippine Civil Law, Vol. 1, 1964 ed., pp. 269-270 citing Coquia vs. Coquia, CA 50, O.G.
3701) There must be a showing of the permanent intention of the supposed father to consider the child
as his own, by continuous and clear manifestation of paternal affection and care. (Tolentino, Civil Code
of the Philippines, Vol. 1, 1983 ed., p. 602). (Mendoza vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 86302, September
24, 1991.)
It was Artemio who made arrangement for the delivery of Merceditas (sic) at the Manila Sanitarium and
Hospital. Prior to the delivery, Leoncia underwent prenatal examination by Artemio (TSN, p. 33,
5/17/74). After delivery, they went home to their residence at EDSA in a car owned and driven by
Artemio himself (id. p. 36).
Merceditas (sic) bore the surname of "Ilano" since birth without any objection on the part of Artemio,
the fact that since Merceditas (sic) had her discernment she had always known and called Artemio as
her "Daddy" (TSN, pp. 28-29, 10/18/74); the fact that each time Artemio was at home, he would play
with Merceditas (sic), take her for a ride or restaurants to eat, and sometimes sleeping with Merceditas
(sic) (id. p. 34) and does all what a father should do for his child bringing home goodies, candies,
toys and whatever he can bring her which a child enjoys which Artemio gives Merceditas (sic) (TSN, pp.
38-39, 5/17/74) are positive evidence that Merceditas (sic) is the child of Artemio and recognized by
Artemio as such. Special attention is called to Exh. "E-7" where Artemio was telling Leoncia the need
for a "frog test" to know the status of Leoncia.
Plaintiff pointed out that the support by Artemio for Leoncia and Merceditas (sic) was sometimes in the
form of cash personally delivered to her by Artemio, thru Melencio, thru Elynia (Exhs. "E-2" and "E-3",
and "D-6"), or thru Merceditas (sic) herself (TSN, p. 40, 5/17/74) and sometimes in the form of a check
as the Manila Banking Corporation Check No. 81532 (Exh. "G") and the signature appearing therein
which was identified by Leoncia as that of Artemio because Artemio often gives her checks and
Artemio would write the check at home and saw Artemio sign the check (TSN, p. 49, 7/18/73). Both
Artemio and Nilda admitted that the check and signature were those of Artemio (TSN, p. 53, 10/17/77;
TSN, p. 19, 10/9/78).
During the time that Artemio and Leoncia were living as husband and wife, Artemio has shown concern
as the father of Merceditas (sic). When Merceditas (sic) was in Grade 1 at the St. Joseph Parochial
School, Artemio signed the Report Card of Merceditas (sic) (Exh. "H") for the fourth and fifth grading

period(s) (Exh. "H-1" and "H-2") as the parent of Merceditas (sic). Those signatures of Artemio were
both identified by Leoncia and Merceditas (sic) because Artemio signed Exh. "H-1" and
"H-2" at their residence in the presence of Leoncia, Merceditas (sic) and of Elynia (TSN, p. 57, 7/18/73;
TSN, p. 28, 10/1/73). . . .
xxx xxx xxx
When Artemio run as a candidate in the Provincial Board of Cavite, Artemio gave Leoncia his picture
with the following dedication: "To Nene, with best regards, Temiong". (Exh. "I"). (pp. 19-20, Appellant's
Brief)
The mere denial by defendant of his signature is not sufficient to offset the totality of the evidence
indubitably showing that the signature thereon belongs to him. The entry in the Certificate of Live Birth
that Leoncia and Artemio was falsely stated therein as married does not mean that Leoncia is not
appellee's daughter. This particular entry was caused to be made by Artemio himself in order to avoid
embarrassment.

It is difficult to believe that plaintiffs mother, who is a mere dressmaker, had long beforehand
diabolically conceived of a plan to make it appear that defendant, who claims to be a total stranger to
be a total stranger, was the father of her child, and in the process falsified the latter's signatures and
handwriting. 28
Granting ex gratia argument that private respondent's evidence is not sufficient proof of continuos
possession of status of a spurious child, respondent court applied next paragraph (4) of Article 283:
. . . plaintiffs testimonial and documentary evidence . . . (is) too replete with details that are coherent,
logical and natural which cannot be categorized as mere fabrications of an inventive and malicious
mind of which Leoncia de los Santos was not shown to possess.
The natural, logical and coherent evidence of plaintiff from the genesis of the relationship between
Leoncia and appellee, their living together as circumstances of plaintiff's birth, the acts of appellee in
recognizing and supporting plaintiff, find ample support from the testimonial and documentary
evidence which leaves no room to reasonably doubt his paternity which may not be infirmed by his
belated denials.
Notably, the court a quo did not consider plaintiff's evidence as lacking in credibility but did not deem
as convincing proof that defendant is the father since the Certificate of Live Birth was not signed by
appellee and since the monthly report card is not sufficient to establish recognition, considering the
denial of the defendant of his signature appearing thereon.
While defendant's signature does not appear in the Certificate of Live Birth, the evidence indubitably
disclose(s) that Leoncia gave birth on December 30, 1963 to Merceditas (sic) at 4:27 p.m. at the Manila
Sanitarium. Artemio arrived at about 5:00 (TSN, p. 25, 5/17/74). At about 7:00 p.m., a nurse came (id.
p. 26) who made inquiries about the biodata of the born child. The inquiries were directed to Artemio in
the presence of Elynia who heard the answers of Artemio which the nurse took down in a sheet of
paper (id. p. 28). The inquiries were about the name of the father, mother and child. After the interview
the nurse told them that the information has to be recorded in the formal form and has to be signed by
Artemio (id. p. 30) but because there is no office, as it was past 7:00 p.m., the nurse would just return
in the morning for Artemio's signature. Artemio gave the instruction to the nurse to give the biodata to
Leoncia for her signature as he was leaving very early the following morning as in fact Artemio left at
5:00 a.m. of December 31, 1963 (id. p. 33). Artemio stayed in the hospital in the evening of December
30, 1963 (id. p. 26). As pointed out in Castro vs. Court of Appeals, 173 SCRA 656:
The ruling in Roces vs. Local Civil Registrar of Manila (102 Phil. 1050 [1958] and Berciles v.
Government Service Insurance System (128 SCRA 53 [1984] that if the father did not sign in the birth
certificate, the placing of his name by the mother, doctor, register, or other person is incompetent

evidence of paternity does not apply to this case because it was Eustaquio himself who went to the
municipal building and gave all the data about his daughter's birth. . . .
. . . the totality of the evidence, as pointed to above, is more than sufficient to establish beyond
reasonable doubt that appellee is the father of the plaintiff Merceditas (sic) Ilano.
As elucidated in Mendoza vs. Court of Appeals, Supra:
xxx xxx xxx
. . . although Teopista has failed to show that she was in open and continuous possession of the status
of an illegitimate child of Casimiro, we find that she has nevertheless established that status by
another method.
What both the trial court and the respondent did not take into account is that an illegitimate child is
allowed to establish his claimed affiliation by "any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and
special laws," according to the Civil Code, . . . Such evidence may consist of his baptismal certificate, a
judicial admission, a family Bible in which his name has been entered, common reputation respecting
his pedigree, admission by silence, the testimonies of witnesses, and other kinds of proof admissible
under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. 29
The last paragraph of Article 283 contains a blanket provision that practically covers all the other cases
in the preceding paragraphs. "Any other evidence or proof" that the defendant is the father is broad
enough to render unnecessary the other paragraphs of this article. When the evidence submitted in
the action for compulsory recognition is not sufficient to meet requirements of the first three
paragraphs, it may still be enough under the last paragraph. 30 This paragraph permits hearsay and
reputation evidence, as provided in the Rules of Court, with respect to illegitimate filiation. 31

As a necessary consequence of the finding that private respondent is the spurious child of petitioner,
she is entitled to support. In awarding support to her, respondent court took into account the following:
The obligation to give support shall be demandable from the time the person who has a right to
recover the same needs it for maintenance, but it shall not be paid except from the date of judicial or
extrajudicial demand. (Article 203, Family Code of the Philippines.)
The complaint in this case was filed on August 14, 1972. Plaintiff, having been born on December 30,
1963, was about nine (9) years old at the time and was already of school age spending about P400.00
to P500.00 a month for her school expenses alone, while defendant was earning about P10,000.00 a
month. She attained the age of majority on December 30, 1984 (Article 234, Supra). She is therefore
entitled to support in arrears for a period of twelve (12) years, four (4) months and fourteen (14) days,
which is hereby fixed at P800.00 a month for the first three (3) years; and considering the declining
value of the peso as well as her needs as she grows older, at a graduated increase of P1,000.00 a
month for the next three (3) years; P1,300.00 a month for the succeeding three (3) years; and
P1,500.00 a month for the last three (3) years, four (4) months and fourteen (14) days until she
attained the age of majority.
This being an action for legal support, the award of attorney's fees is appropriate under Article 2208
(6) of the Civil Code. Moreover, the court deems it just and equitable under the given facts and
circumstances that attorney's fees and expenses of litigation should be recovered. 32
We concur with the foregoing disposition, in the absence of proof that it was arrived at arbitrarily.
The other allegation of petitioner that the appeal was prosecuted almost ten years after the decision of
the trial court was rendered does not deserve any consideration because it appears that it is being
raised for the first time in this petition. 33
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of

the Court of Appeals dated December 17, 1991 and its resolution dated February 26, 1992 are
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 95229 June 9, 1992

CORITO OCAMPO TAYAG, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and EMILIE DAYRIT CUYUGAN,
respondent.
The instant petition seeks to reverse and set aside the decision 1 of respondent Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 20222, entitled "Corito Ocampo Tayag vs. Hon. Norberto C. Ponce, Judge, Regional Trial
Court of San Fernando, Pampanga and Emilde Dayrit Cuyugan," promulgated on May 10, 1990, and its
resolution denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration. 2 Said decision, now before us for review,
dismissed petitioner's Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction on the ground
that the denial of the motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 7938 of the court a quo is an interlocutory order
and cannot be the subject of the said special civil action, ordinary appeal in due time being petitioner's
remedy.
In said Civil Case No, 7938, herein private respondent, in her capacity as mother and legal guardian of
minor Chad D. Cuyugan, filed on April 9, 1987 a complaint denominated "Claim for Inheritance" against
herein petitioner as the administratrix of the estate of the late Atty. Ricardo Ocampo. The operative
allegations in said complaint are as follows:
2. Plaintiff is the mother and legal guardian of her minor son, Chad Cuyugan, by the father of the
defendant, the late Atty. Ricardo Ocampo; and the defendant is the known administratrix of the real
and personal properties left by her deceased father, said Atty. Ocampo, who died intestate in Angeles
City on September 28, 1983;
3. Plaintiff has been estranged from her husband, Jose Cuyugan, for several years now and during
which time, plaintiff and Atty. Ricardo Ocampo had illicit amorous relationship with each other that, as
a consequence thereof, they begot a child who was christened Chad Cuyugan in accordance with the
ardent desire and behest of said Atty. Ocampo;

4. Chad, the son of plaintiff by the late Atty. Ricardo Ocampo, who was born in Angeles City on October
5, 1980 bad been sired, showered with exceptional affection, fervent love and care by his putative
father for being his only son as can be gleaned from indubitable letters and documents of the late Atty.
Ocampo to herein plaintiff, excerpts from some of which are hereunder reproduced;
. . . Keep good keep faith keep Chad and yourself for me alone and for me all the time. As I have now I
shall save my heart to you and to Chad.
. . . Please take good care and pray to Sto. Nio for our sake and for the child sake.
. . . Keep him. Take good care of him.
. . . I'm proud that you are his mother. . . I'm proud of him and you. Let me bless him by my name and
let me entitle him to all what I am and what I've got.
. . . I have vowed to recognize him and be my heir.
. . . How is CHAD and you . . .
. . . Why should we not start now to own him, jointly against the whole world. After all we love each
other and CHAD is the product of our love.
5. The minor, Chad D. Cuyugan, although illegitimate is nevertheless entitled to a share in the
intestate estate left by his deceased father, Atty. Ricardo Ocampo as one of the surviving heirs;
6. The deceased Atty. Ricardo Ocampo, at the time of his death was the owner of real and personal
property, located in Baguio City, Angeles City and in the Province of Pampanga with approximate value
of several millions of pesos;
7. The estate of the late Atty. Ocampo has not as yet been inventoried by the defendant and the
inheritance of the surviving heirs including that of said Chad has not likewise been ascertained;
8. The only known surviving heirs of the deceased Atty. Ricardo Ocampo are his children, namely:
Corito O. Tayag, Rivina O. Tayag, Evita O. Florendo, Felina Ocampo, and said minor Chad, for and in
whose behalf this instant complaint is filed;

9. Plaintiff has no means of livelihood and she only depends on the charity of friends and relatives for
the sustenance of her son, Chad, such that it is urgent, necessary and imperative that said child be
extended financial support from the estate of his putative father, Atty. Ricardo Ocampo;
10. Several demands, verbal and written, have been made for defendant to grant Chad's lawful
inheritance, but despite said demands, defendant failed and refused and still fails and refused and still
fails and refuses to satisfy the claim for inheritance against the estate of the late Atty. Ocampo; 3
Plaintiff thereafter prays, among others, that judgment be rendered ordering defendant to render an
inventory and accounting of the real and personal properties left by Atty. Ricardo Ocampo; to
determine and deliver the share of the minor child Chad in the estate of the deceased; and to give him
support pendente lite.
Petitioner, as defendant therein, filed her answer with counterclaim on June 3, 1987, disputing the
material allegations in the complaint. She maintained by way of affirmative defenses, inter alia, that
the complaint states no cause of action; that the action is premature; that the suit as barred by
prescription; that respondent Cuyugan has no legal and judicial personality to bring the suit; that the
lower court was no jurisdiction over the nature of the action; and that there is improper joinder of
causes of action. 4
After the hearing of the motion to dismiss on the grounds asserted as affirmative defenses, the trial
court issued the following order on October 20, 1987:

The Court is of the considered opinion that there is a need of further proceedings to adduce evidence
on the various claims of the parties so as to hear their respective sides
WHEREFORE, resolution on the preliminary hearing which partakes of the nature of a motion to dismiss
requiring additional evidence is in the meantime held in abeyance. The Motion to Dismiss is hereby
denied and the case as set for pre-trial . . . 5
With the denial of her motion for reconsideration of said order on November 19, 1987, 6 petitioner filed
on December 10, 1987 a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the Court of Appeals, docketed
therein as CA-G.R. SP No. 13464, which was granted by the Sixth Division of respondent court on
August 2, 1989 and enjoined respondent judge to resolve petitioner's motion praying for the dismissal
of the complaint based on the affirmative defenses within ten (10) days from notice thereof. 7
In compliance with said decision of respondent court, the trial court acted on and thereafter denied the
motion to dismiss, which had been pleaded in the affirmative defenses in Civil Case No. 7938, in an
order dated October 24, 1989, resolving the said motion in the following manner:
The Court now resolves:
No. 1. The complaint sufficiently shows that a cause of action exists in favor of the plaintiff. A cause of
action being the "primary right to redress a wrong" (Marquez vs. Valera, 48 OG 5272), which
apparently on the face of the complaint, plaintiff has a right to enforce through this case. Defendant's
protestation that there is no sufficient cause of action is therefore untenable.
No. 2. The present action. despite the claim of defendant is not premature. It is exactly filed in order to
prove filiation, and then recognition. To go about the step by step procedure outlined by the defendant
by filing one action after another is definitely violative of the prohibition against splitting a cause of
action.
No. 3. It is not the plaintiff that is now bringing the case before the Court. It is (her) spurious child that
she represents as natural guardian that is instituting the action.
No. 4. Prescription has not set in if we consider that a spurious child may file an action for recognition
within four years from his attainment of majority (New Civil Code. Art, 285, No. 2). Whether the letters
of the putative father, Atty. Ocampo, is evidence, that should be inquired into in a hearing on the
merits.
No. 5. Several causes of action may be joined in one complaint as was done in this case. The
defendant's claim that there was a misjoinder is untenable.

No. 6. The Court being a court of general jurisdiction, and of special jurisdiction, such as a probate
court has capacity to entertain a complaint such as the one now before it.
The nature of the case "CLAIM FOR INHERITANCE" does not control the body of the complaint.
From all the foregoing, the Court finds that the complaint is sufficient' in form and substance and,
therefore, the motion to dismiss could not be granted until after trial on the merits in which it should
be shown that the allegations of the complaint are unfounded or a special defense to the action exists.
WHEREFORE, the Motion to Dismiss is hereby DENIED. 8
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of said order was denied by the trial court on January 30, 1990.
9 As a consequence, another petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction was filed
by petitioner on March 12, 1990 with respondent court, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 20222, praying
that the orders dated October 24, 1989 and January 30, 1990 of the trial court be annulled and set
aside for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
On May 10, 1990, as earlier stated, respondent court promulgated its decision dismissing the petition,
and likewise denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration in a resolution dated September 5, 1990,
hence the present petition for review on certiorari.

In elevating the case before us, petitioner relies on these grounds:

a. The Honorable Respondent Court of Appeals dismissed Petitioner's Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition in UTTER DISREGARD OF APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLE COURT providing
clear exceptions to the general rule that interlocutory orders may not be elevated by way of the
special civil action of certiorari;
b. Respondent Court refused to resolve certain issues raised by Petitioner before the Regional Trial
Court and before Respondent Court of Appeals involving QUESTIONS OF SUBSTANCE not theretofore
determined by this Honorable Court, such as the interpretation and application of Art. 281 of the Civil
Code requiring judicial approval when the recognition of an illegitimate minor child does not take place
in a record of birth or in a will: of Art. 175, Par. 2, in relation to Art. 172, Par. 2 of the Family Code,
providing for the prescriptive period with respect to the action to establish illegitimate filiation; and of
Art. 285 of the Civil Code, providing for the prescriptive period with respect to the action for
recognition of a natural child; and
c. Respondent Court has sanctioned a DEPARTURE by the Regional Trial Court from the accepted and
usual course of judicial proceedings. 10
Petitioner contends that the action to claim for inheritance filed by herein private respondent in behalf
of the minor child, Chad Cuyugan, is premature and the complaint states no cause of action, she
submits that the recognition of the minor child, either voluntarily or by judicial action, by the alleged
putative father must first be established before the former can invoke his right to succeed and
participate in the estate of the latter. Petitioner asseverates that since there is no allegation of such
recognition in the complaint denominated as "Claim for Inheritance," then there exists no basis for
private respondent's aforesaid claim and, consequently, the complaint should be dismissed.
The instant case is similar to the case of Paulino vs. Paulino, et al., 11 wherein the petitioner, as
plaintiff, brought an action against the private respondents, as defendants, to compel them to give her
share of inheritance in the estate of the late Marcos Paulino, claiming and alleging, inter alia, that she
is the illegitimate child of the deceased; that no proceedings for the settlement of the deceased's
estate had been commenced in court; and that the defendants had refused and failed to deliver her
share in the estate of the deceased. She accordingly prayed that the defendants therein be ordered to
deliver her aforesaid share. The defendants moved for the dismissal of her complaint on the ground
that it states no cause of action and that, even if it does, the same is barred by prescription.
The only difference between the aforecited case and the case at bar is that at the time of the filing of
the complaint therein, the petitioner in that case had already reached the age of majority, whereas the
claimant in the present case is still a minor. In Paulino, we held that an illegitimate child, to be entitled
to support and successional rights from the putative or presumed parent, must prove his filiation to the
latter. We also said that it is necessary to allege in the complaint that the putative father had
acknowledged and recognized the illegitimate child because such acknowledgment is essential to and
is the basis of the right to inherit. There being no allegation of such acknowledgment, the action
becomes one to compel recognition which cannot be brought after the death of the putative father.
The ratio decidendi in Paulino, therefore, is not the absence of a cause of action for failure of the
petitioner to allege the fact of acknowledgment in the complaint, but the prescription of the action.
Applying the foregoing principles to the case at bar, although petitioner contends that the complaint
filed by herein private respondent merely alleges that the minor Chad Cuyugan is an illegitimate child
of the deceased and is actually a claim for inheritance, from the allegations therein the same may be
considered as one to compel recognition. Further that the two causes of action, one to compel
recognition and the other to claim inheritance, may be joined in one complaint is not new in our
jurisprudence.
As early as 1922, we had occasion to rule thereon in Briz vs. Briz, et
al., 12 wherein we said:
The question whether a person in the position of the present plaintiff can any event maintain a
complex action to compel recognition as a natural child and at the same time to obtain ulterior relief in

the character of heir, is one which, in the opinion of this court must be answered in the affirmative,
provided always that the conditions justifying the joinder of the two distinct causes of action are
present in the particular case. In, other words, there is no absolute necessity requiring that the action
to compel acknowledgment should have been instituted and prosecuted to a successful conclusion
prior to the action in which that same plaintiff seers additional relief in the character of heir. Certainly,
there is nothing so peculiar to the action to compel acknowledgment as to require that a rule should be
here applied different from that generally applicable in other cases. . .
The conclusion above stated, though not heretofore explicitly formulated by this court, is undoubtedly
to some extent supported by our prior decisions. Thus, we have held in numerous cases, and the
doctrine must be considered well settled, that a natural child having a right to compel
acknowledgment, but who has not been in fact legally acknowledged, may maintain partition
proceedings for the division of the inheritance against his co-heirs . . .; and the same person may
intervene in proceedings for the distribution of the estate of his deceased natural father, or mother . . .
In neither of these situations has it been thought necessary for the plaintiff to show a prior decree
compelling acknowledgment. The obvious reason is that in partition suits and distribution proceedings
the other persons who might take by inheritance are before the court; and the declaration of heirship
is appropriate to such proceedings.
The next question to be resolved is whether the action to compel recognition has prescribed.
Petitioner argues that assuming arguendo that the action is one to compel recognition, private
respondent's cause of action has prescribed for the reason that since filiation is sought to be proved by
means of a private handwritten instrument signed by the parent concerned, then under paragraph 2,
Article 175 of the Family Code, the action to establish filiation of the illegitimate minor child must be
brought during the lifetime of the alleged putative father. In the case at bar, considering that the
complaint was filed after the death of the alleged parent, the action has prescribed and this is another
ground for the dismissal of the complaint. Petitioner theorizes that Article 285 of the Civil Code is not
applicable to the case at bar and, instead, paragraph 2, Article 175 of the Family Code should be given
retroactive effect. The theory is premised on the supposition that the latter provision of law being
merely procedural in nature, no vested rights are created, hence it can be made to apply retroactively.
Article 285 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 285. The action for the recognition of natural children may be brought only during the lifetime of
the presumed parents, except in the following cases:
(1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which case the latter may file the
action before the expiration of four years from the attainment of his majority;
On the other hand, Article 175 of the Family Code reads:
Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same
evidence as legitimate children.
The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when the action is
based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be brought during the
lifetime of the alleged parent.

Under the last-quoted provision of law, therefore, if the action is based on the record of birth of the
child, a final judgment, or an admission by the parent of the child's filiation in a public document or in
a private handwritten signed instrument, then the action may be brought during the lifetime of the
child. However, if the action is based on the open and continuous possession by the child of the status
of an illegitimate child, or on other evidence allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws, the view
has been expressed that the action must be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent. 13
Petitioner submits that Article 175 of the Family Code applies in which case the complaint should have
been filed during the lifetime of the putative father, failing which the same must be dismissed on the

ground of prescription. Private respondent, however, insists that Article 285 of the Civil Code is
controlling and, since the alleged parent died during the minority of the child, the action for filiation
may be filed within four years from the attainment of majority of the minor child.
Article 256 of the Family Code states that "[t]his Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does
not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws." It
becomes essential, therefore, to determine whether the right of the minor child to file an action for
recognition is a vested right or not.
Under the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, we hold that the right of action of the minor
child bas been vested by the filing of the complaint in court under the regime of the Civil Code and
prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. 14 We herein adopt our ruling in the recent case of Republic
of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, et al. 15 where we held that the fact of filing of the petition
already vested in the petitioner her right to file it and to have the same proceed to final adjudication in
accordance with the law in force at the time, and such right can no longer be prejudiced or impaired by
the enactment of a new law.
Even assuming ex gratia argumenti that the provision of the Family Code in question is procedural in
nature, the rule that a statutory change in matters of procedure may affect pending actions and
proceedings, unless the language of the act excludes them from its operation, is not so pervasive that
it may be used to validate or invalidate proceedings taken before it goes into effective, since procedure
must be governed by the law regulating it at the time the question of procedure arises especially
where vested rights may be prejudiced. Accordingly, Article 175 of the Family Code finds no proper
application to the instant case since it will ineluctably affect adversely a right of private respondent
and, consequentially, of the mind child she represents, both of which have been vested with the filing
of the complaint in court. The trial court is therefore, correct in applying the provisions of Article 285 of
the Civil Code and in holding that private respondent's cause of action has not yet prescribed.
Finally, we conform with the holding of the Court of Appeals that the questioned order of the court
below denying the motion to dismiss is interlocutory and cannot be the subject of a petition for
certiorari. The exceptions to this rule invoked by petitioner and allegedly obtaining in the case at bar,
are obviously not present and may not be relied upon.
WHEREFORE, the petition at bar is DENIED and the assailed decision and resolution of respondent
Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 108366 February 16, 1994

JOHN PAUL E. FERNANDEZ, ET AL., petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and CARLITO S.
FERNANDEZ, respondents.

The legal dispute between the parties began when the petitioners filed Civil Case No. Q-45567 for
support against the private respondent before the RTC of Quezon City. The complaint was dismissed on
December 9, 1986 by Judge Antonio P. Solano, 1 who found that "(t)here is nothing in the material
allegations in the complaint that seeks to compel (private respondent) to recognize or acknowledge
(petitioners) as his illegitimate children," and that there was no sufficient and competent evidence to
prove the petitioners filiation. 2
Petitioners plodded on. On February 19, 1987, they file the case at bench, another action for
recognition and support against the private respondent before another branch of the RTC of Quezon
City, Branch 87. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-50111.
The evidence shows that VIOLETA P. ESGUERRA, single, is the mother and guardian ad litem of the two
petitioners, CLARO ANTONIO FERNANDEZ and JOHN PAUL FERNANDEZ, met sometime in 1983, at the
Meralco Compound tennis courts. A Meralco employee and a tennis enthusiast, Carlito used to spend
his week-ends regularly at said courts, where Violeta's father served as tennis instructor.
Violeta pointed to Carlito as the father of her two sons. She claimed that they started their illicit sexual
relationship six (6) months after their first meeting. The tryst resulted in the birth of petitioner Claro
Antonio on March 1, 1984, and of petitioner John Paul on not know that Carlito was married until the
birth of her two children. She averred they were married in civil rites in October, 1983. In March, 1985,
however, she discovered that the marriage license which they used was spurious.
To bolster their case, petitioners presented the following documentary evidence: their certificates of
live birth, identifying respondent Carlito as their father; the baptismal certificate of petitioner Claro
which also states that his father is respondent Carlito; photographs of Carlito taken during the baptism
of petitioner Claro; and pictures of respondent Carlito and Claro taken at the home of Violeta Esguerra.
Petitioners likewise presented as witnesses, Rosario Cantoria, 3 Dr. Milagros Villanueva, 4 Ruby Chua
Cu, 5 and Fr. Liberato Fernandez. 6 The first three witnesses told the trial court that Violeta Esguerra
had, at different times, 7 introduced the private respondent to them as her "husband". Fr. Fernandez,
on the other hand, testified that Carlito was the one who presented himself as the father of petitioner
Claro during the latter's baptism.
In defense, respondent Carlito denied Violeta's allegations that he sired the two petitioners. He averred
he only served as one of the sponsors in the baptism of petitioner Claro. This claim was corroborated
by the testimony of Rodante Pagtakhan, an officemate of respondent Carlito who also stood as a
sponsor of petitioner Claro during his baptism. The Private respondent also presented as witness, Fidel
Arcagua, a waiter of the Lighthouse Restaurant. He disputed Violeta's allegation that she and
respondent Carlito frequented the said restaurant during their affair. Arcagua stated he never saw
Violeta Esguerra and respondent Carlito together at the said restaurant. Private respondent also
declared he only learned he was named in the birth certificates of both petitioners as their father after
he was sued for support in Civil Case No.
Q-45567.
Based on the evidence adduced by the parties, the trial court ruled in favor of petitioners, viz.:
In view of the above, the Court concludes and so holds that the plaintiffs minors (petitioners herein)
are entitled to the relief's prayed for in the complaint. The defendant (herein private respondent) is
hereby ordered to recognize Claro Antonio Carlito Fernandez, now aged 6, and John Paul Fernandez,
now aged 41/2 as his sons. As the defendant has admitted that he has a supervisory job at the
Meralco, he shall give the plaintiffs support in the amount of P2,000 each a month, payment to be
delivered to Violeta Esguerra, the children's mother and natural guardian, with arrears reckoned as of
the filing of the complaint on February 19, 1987.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal, the decision was set aside and petitioners complaint dismissed by the respondent Court of
Appeals 8 in its impugned decision, dated October 20, 1992. It found that the "proof relied upon by the
(trial) court (is) inadequate to prove the (private respondent's) paternity and filiation of (petitioners)."

It further held that the doctrine of res judicata applied because of the dismissal of the petitioners
complaint in Civil Case No. Q-45567. Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied on December
22, 1992.
Petitioners now contend that the respondent appellate court erred in: (1) not giving full faith and credit
to the testimony in of Violeta Esguerra; (2) not giving weight and value to the testimony of Father
Liberato Fernandez; (3) not giving probative value to the numerous pictures of respondent Carlito
Fernandez taken during the baptismal ceremony and inside the bedroom of Violeta Esguerra; (4) not
giving probative value to the birth certificates of petitioners; (5) giving so much credence to the selfserving and incredible testimony of respondent Carlito Fernandez; and (6) holding that the principle of
res judicata is applicable in the case at bar.
We find no merit in the petition.
The rule is well-settled that findings of facts of the Court of Appeals may be reviewed by this court only
under exceptional circumstances. One such situation is when the findings of the appellate court clash
with those of the trial court as in the case at bench. It behooves us therefore to exercise our
extraordinary power, and settle the issue of whether the ruling of the appellate court that private
respondent is not the father of the petitioners is substantiated by the evidence on record.
We shall first examine the documentary evidence offered by the petitioners which the respondent
court rejected as insufficient to prove their filiation. Firstly, we hold that petitioners cannot rely on the
photographs showing the presence of the private respondent in the baptism of petitioner Claro (Exh.
"B-8", Exh. "B-12", Exh. "H" and Exh. "I"). These photographs are far from proofs that private
respondent is the father of petitioner Claro. As explained by the private respondent, he was in the
baptism as one of the sponsors of petitioner Claro. His testimony was corroborated by Rodante
Pagtakhan.
Secondly, the pictures taken in the house of Violeta showing private respondent showering affection to
Claro fall short of the evidence required to prove paternity (Exhibits "B", "B-1", "B-2", "B-7", "B-14" and
"B-15"). As we held in Tan vs. Trocio, 192 SCRA 764, viz:
. . . The testimonies of complainant and witness Marilou Pangandaman, another maid, to show unusual
closeness between Respondent and Jewel, like playing with him and giving him paternity. The same
must be said of . . . (the) pictures of Jewels and Respondent showing allegedly their physical likeness to
each other. Said evidence is inconclusive to prove paternity and much less would prove violation of
complaint's person and honor. (Emphasis supplied)
Thirdly, the baptismal certificates (Exh. "D") of petitioner Claro naming private respondent as his father
has scant evidentiary value. There is no showing that private respondent participated in its
preparation. On this score, we held in Berciles vs. Systems, et al. 128 SCRA 53 (1984):
As to the baptismal certificates, Exh. "7-A", the rule is that although the baptismal record of a natural
child describes her as a child of the record the decedent had no intervening, the baptismal record
cannot be held to be a voluntary recognition of parentage. . . . The reason for this rule that canonical
records do not constitute the authentic document prescribed by Arts. 115 and 117 to prove the
legitimate filiation of a child is that such canonical record is simply proof of the only act to which the
priest may certify by reason of his personal knowledge, an act done by himself or in his presence, like
the administration of the sacrament upon a day stated; it is no proof of the declarations in the record
with respect to the parentage of the child baptized, or of prior and distinct facts which require separate
and concrete evidence.
In Macandang vs. Court of Appeals, 100 SCRA 73 (1980), we also ruled that while baptismal certificates
may be considered public documents, they can only serve as evidence of the administration of the
sacraments on the dates so specified. They are not necessarily competent evidence of the veracity of
entries therein with respect to the child's paternity.
Fourth, the certificates of live birth (Exh. "A"; Exh. "B") of the petitioners identifying private respondent
as their father are not also competent evidence on the issue of their paternity. Again, the records do no
show that private respondent had a hand in the preparation of said certificates. In rejecting these

certificates, the ruling of the respondent court is in accord with our pronouncement in Roces vs. Local
Civil Registrar, 102 Phil. 1050 (1958), viz:
. . . Section 5 of Act No. 3793 and Article 280 of the Civil Code of the Philippines explicity prohibited,
not only the naming of the father or the child born outside wedlock, when the birth certificates, or the
recognition, is not filed or made by him, but, also, the statement of any information or circumstances
by which he could be identified. Accordingly, the Local Civil Registrar had no authority to make or
record the paternity of an illegitimate child upon the information of a third person and the certificate of
birth of an illegitimate child, when signed only by the mother of the latter, is incompetent evidence of
fathership of said child. (Emphasis supplied)
We reiterated this rule in Berciles, op. cit., when we held that "a birth certificate no signed by the
alleged father therein indicated is not competent evidence of paternity."
We have also reviewed the relevant testimonies of the witnesses for the petitioners and we are
satisfied that the respondent appellate court properly calibrated their weight. Petitioners capitalize on
the testimony of Father Liberato Fernandez who solemnized the baptismal ceremony of petitioner
Claro. He declared on the witness stand:
Q Do you recall Father, whether on that occasion when you called for the father and the mother of the
child, that both father and mother were present?
A Yes.
Q Would you able to recognized the father and the mother who were present at that time?
A Yes.
Q Please point to the court?
A There (witness pointing to the defendant, Carlito Fernandez).
Q For instance, just give us more specifically what question do you remember having asked him?
A Yes, like for example, do you renounce Satan and his works?
Q What was the answer of Fernandez?
A Yes, I do.
Q I just want to be sure, Father, will you please look at the defendant again. I want to be sure if he is
the person who appeared before you on that occasion?
A I am sure.
(TSN, May 23, 1986, pp. 14-16)
However, on cross examination, Father Fernandez admitted that he has to be shown a picture of the
private respondent by Violeta Esguerra to recognize the private respondent, viz:
Q When was the, approximately, when you were first shown this picture by Violeta Esguerra?
A I cannot recall.
Q At least the month and the year?
A It must be in 1986.
Q What month in 1986.
A It is difficult. . .
Q When was the first time you know you are going to testify here?

A Let us see, you came there two times and first one was you want to get a baptismal certificate and
then the second time was I asked you for what is this? And you said it is for the court.
Q On the second time that Ms. Violeta Esguerra went to your place, you were already informed that
you will testify here before this Honorable Court?

A Yes.
Q And you were informed by this Ms. Violeta Esguerra that this man wearing the blue T-shirt is the
father?
A Yes, sir.
Q So, it was Violeta Esguerra who. . .
A Yes.
(TSN, May 23, 1986, pp. 18 to 22)
Indeed, there is no proof that Father Fernandez is a close friend of Violeta Esguerra and the private
respondent which should render unquestionable his identification of the private respondent during
petitioner Claro's baptism. In the absence of this proof, we are not prepared to concede that Father
Fernandez who officiates numerous baptismal ceremonies day in and day out can remember the
parents of the children he has baptized.
We cannot also disturb the findings of the respondent court on the credibility of Violeta Esguerra. Her
testimony is highly suspect as it is self-serving and by itself, is insufficient to prove the paternity of the
petitioners.
We shall not pass upon the correctness of the ruling of the respondent appellate court applying the
doctrine of res judicata as additional reason in dismissing petitioners action for recognition and
support. It is unnecessary considering our findings that petitioners evidence failed to substantiate their
cause of action.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DISMISSED and the Decision of the respondent court in CA-G.R. CV
No. 29182 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

Cabatania v ca
GR No. 124814
October 21, 2004
Facts:
Florencia filed a petition for recognition in behalf of her child Camelo, against Camelo. According to
her, when her husband left her, she sought employment as a household helper and it was there that
she met Camelo who hired her as house helper. While working as a maid, Camelo brought her to
Bacolod City where they had sexual intercourse. Twenty seven days after their sexual intercourse, she
discovered that she was pregnant. Their tryst was repeated in March, 1982. Camelos housewife,
suspecting her to be pregnant, sent her home. Instead of bringing her home, Camelo brought her to
Bacolod City where he rented a house for her. On September 9, 1982, she gave birth to Camelo. On the
other hand, Camelo, the alleged father, denied fathering Camelo the son. He averred that in the course
of her employment, Florencia would often go home to her husband and return to work the next
morning, which displeased his wife and sent home Florencia. On the way to Cadiz City, they were
onboard a Ceres bus so he invited her to dinner, where she confided that she was financially hard-up.
They had sexual intercourse, but felt something jerking. It was then that she admitted being pregnant.
The RTC, after trial, believed the testimony of Florencia, and declared that owing to the physical
resemblance between Camelo the father and Camelo the son who was presented in open court, there
can be no doubt that Camelo is the father of Camelo. Thus it ruled that Camelo is entitled to support
from Camelo the father. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the RTC. Camelo thus
elevated his case to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Florencia, a married househelp had sexual intercourse with Camelo Cabatania and allegedly had a
child from him named Camelo Regodos. Can the court compel petitioner Camelo Cabatania to
acknowledge Regodos as his illegitimate son and to give support to the latter?
APPLICABLE LAW:
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and
signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same
evidence as legitimate children.
RULING:

The Supreme Court:

Time and again, this Court has ruled that a high standard of proof is required to establish paternity
and filiation. An order for recognition and support may create an unwholesome situation or may be an
irritant to the family or the lives of the parties so that it must be issued only if paternity or filiation is
established by clear and convincing evidence.
The applicable provisions of the law are Articles 172 and 175 of the Civil Code:
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and
signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same
evidence as legitimate children.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Private respondent presented a copy of his birth and baptismal certificates, the preparation of which
was without the knowledge or consent of petitioner. A certificate of live birth purportedly identifying
the putative father is not competent evidence of paternity when there is no showing that the putative
father had a hand in the preparation of said certificate. The local civil registrar has no authority to
record the paternity of an illegitimate child on the information of a third person.
In the same vein, we have ruled that, while a baptismal certificate may be considered a public
document, it can only serve as evidence of the administration of the sacrament on the date specified
but not the veracity of the entries with respect to the childs paternity.[9] Thus, certificates issued by
the local civil registrar and baptismal certificates are per se inadmissible in evidence as proof of
filiation and they cannot be admitted indirectly as circumstantial evidence to prove the same.
Aside from Florencias self-serving testimony that petitioner rented a house for her in Singcang,
Bacolod City, private respondent failed to present sufficient proof of voluntary recognition.
We now proceed to the credibility of Florencias testimony. Both the trial court and the appellate court
brushed aside the misrepresentation of Florencia in the petition for recognition that she was a widow.
Both courts dismissed the lie as minor which did not affect the rest of her testimony. We disagree. The
fact that Florencias husband is living and there is a valid subsisting marriage between them gives rise
to the presumption that a child born within that marriage is legitimate even though the mother may
have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. The presumption
of legitimacy does not only flow out of a declaration in the statute but is based on the broad principles
of natural justice and the supposed virtue of the mother. The presumption is grounded on the policy to
protect innocent offspring from the odium of illegitimacy.
In this age of genetic profiling and deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) analysis, the extremely subjective test
of physical resemblance or similarity of features will not suffice as evidence to prove paternity and
filiation before the courts of law.
The fact that Florencias husband is living and there is a valid subsisting marriage between them gives
rise to the presumption that a child born within that marriage is legitimate even though the mother
may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. (Article 167 of
the Family Code)

In this age of genetic profiling and deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) analysis, the extremely subjective test
of physical resemblance or similarity of features will not suffice as evidence to prove paternity and
filiation before the courts of law.

G.R. Nos. 89224-25 January 23, 1992

MAURICIO SAYSON, ROSARIO SAYSON-MALONDA, BASILISA SAYSON-LIRIO, REMEDIOS SAYSON-REYES
and JUANA C. BAUTISTA, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, DELIA SAYSON, assisted
by her husband, CIRILO CEDO, JR., EDMUNDO SAYSON AND DORIBEL SAYSON, respondents.
At issue in this case is the status of the private respondents and their capacity to inherit from their
alleged parents and grandparents. The petitioners deny them that right, asserting if for themselves to
the exclusion of all others.
The relevant genealogical facts are as follows.
Eleno and Rafaela Sayson begot five children, namely, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, Remedios and
Teodoro. Eleno died on November 10, 1952, and Rafaela on May 15, 1976. Teodoro, who had married
Isabel Bautista, died on March 23, 1972. His wife died nine years later, on March 26, 1981. Their
properties were left in the possession of Delia, Edmundo, and Doribel, all surnamed Sayson, who claim
to be their children.
On April 25, 1983, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, and Remedios, together with Juana C. Bautista, Isabel's
mother, filed a complaint for partition and accounting of the intestate estate of Teodoro and Isabel
Sayson. It was docketed as Civil Case No. 1030 in Branch 13 of the Regional Trial Court of Albay. The
action was resisted by Delia, Edmundo and Doribel Sayson, who alleged successional rights to the
disputed estate as the decedents' lawful descendants.
On July 11, 1983, Delia, Edmundo and Doribel filed their own complaint, this time for the accounting
and partition of the intestate estate of Eleno and Rafaela Sayson, against the couple's four surviving
children. This was docketed as Civil Case No. 1042 in the Regional Trial Court of Albay, Branch 12. The
complainants asserted the defense they raised in Civil Case No. 1030, to wit, that Delia and Edmundo
were the adopted children and Doribel was the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and Isabel. As such,
they were entitled to inherit Teodoro's share in his parents' estate by right of representation.
Both cases were decided in favor of the herein private respondents on the basis of practically the same
evidence.
Judge Rafael P. Santelices declared in his decision dated May 26,
1986, 1 that Delia and Edmundo were the legally adopted children of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson by
virtue of the decree of adoption dated March 9, 1967. 2 Doribel was their legitimate daughter as
evidenced by her birth certificate dated February 27, 1967. 3 Consequently, the three children were
entitled to inherit from Eleno and Rafaela by right of representation.

In his decision dated September 30, 1986, 4 Judge Jose S. Saez dismissed Civil Case No. 1030,
holding that the defendants, being the legitimate heirs of Teodoro and Isabel as established by the
aforementioned evidence, excluded the plaintiffs from sharing in their estate.
Both cases were appealed to the Court of Appeals, where they were consolidated. In its own decision
dated February 28, 1989, 5 the respondent court disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, in Civil Case No. 1030 (CA-G.R. No. 11541), the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED. In
Civil case No. 1042 (CA-G.R. No. 12364), the appealed decision is MODIFIED in that Delia and Edmundo
Sayson are disqualified from inheriting from the estate of the deceased spouses Eleno and Rafaela
Sayson, but is affirmed in all other respects.
SO ORDERED.
That judgment is now before us in this petition for review by certiorari. Reversal of the respondent
court is sought on the ground that it disregarded the evidence of the petitioners and misapplied the
pertinent law and jurisprudence when it declared the private respondents as the exclusive heirs of
Teodoro and Isabel Sayson.
The contention of the petitioners is that Delia and Edmundo were not legally adopted because Doribel
had already been born on February 27, 1967, when the decree of adoption was issued on March 9,
1967. The birth of Doribel disqualified her parents from adopting. The pertinent provision is Article 335
of the Civil Code, naming among those who cannot adopt "(1) Those who have legitimate, legitimated,
acknowledged natural children, or natural children by legal fiction."

Curiously enough, the petitioners also argue that Doribel herself is not the legitimate daughter of
Teodoro and Isabel but was in fact born to one Edita Abila, who manifested in a petition for
guardianship of the child that she was her natural mother. 6
The inconsistency of this position is immediately apparent. The petitioners seek to annul the adoption
of Delia and Edmundo on the ground that Teodoro and Isabel already had a legitimate daughter at the
time but in the same breath try to demolish this argument by denying that Doribel was born to the
couple.
On top of this, there is the vital question of timeliness. It is too late now to challenge the decree of
adoption, years after it became final and executory. That was way back in 1967. 7 Assuming the the
petitioners were proper parties, what they should have done was seasonably appeal the decree of
adoption, pointing to the birth of Doribel that disqualified Teodoro and Isabel from adopting Delia and
Edmundo. They did not. In fact, they should have done this earlier, before the decree of adoption was
issued. They did not, although Mauricio claimed he had personal knowledge of such birth.
As the respondent court correctly observed:
When Doribel was born on February 27, 1967, or about TEN (10) days before the issuance of the Order
of Adoption, the petitioners could have notified the court about the fact of birth of DORIBEL and
perhaps withdrew the petition or perhaps petitioners could have filed a petition for the revocation or
rescission of the adoption (although the birth of a child is not one of those provided by law for the
revocation or rescission of an adoption). The court is of the considered opinion that the adoption of the
plaintiffs DELIA and EDMUNDO SAYSON is valid, outstanding and binding to the present, the same not
having been revoked or rescinded.
Not having any information of Doribel's birth to Teodoro and Isabel Sayson, the trial judge cannot be
faulted for granting the petition for adoption on the finding inter alia that the adopting parents were
not disqualified.
A no less important argument against the petitioners is that their challenge to the validity of the
adoption cannot be made collaterally, as in their action for partition, but in a direct proceeding
frontally addressing the issue.

The settled rule is that a finding that the requisite jurisdictional facts exists, whether erroneous or not,
cannot be questioned in a collateral proceeding, for a presumption arises in such cases where the
validity of the judgment is thus attacked that the necessary jurisdictional facts were proven [Freeman
on Judgments, Vol. I, Sec. 350, pp. 719-720]. (Emphasis supplied.)
In the case of Santos v. Aranzanso, 8 this Court declared:
Anent this point, the rulings are summed up in 2 American Jurisprudence, 2nd Series, Adoption, Sec.
75, p. 922, thus:
An adoption order implies the finding of the necessary facts and the burden of proof is on the party
attacking it; it cannot be considered void merely because the fact needed to show statutory
compliance is obscure. While a judicial determination of some particular fact, such as the
abandonment of his next of kin to the adoption, may be essential to the exercise of jurisdiction to enter
the order of adoption, this does not make it essential to the jurisdictional validity of the decree that the
fact be determined upon proper evidence, or necessarily in accordance with the truth; a mere error
cannot affect the jurisdiction, and the determination must stand until reversed on appeal, and hence
cannot be collaterally attacked. If this were not the rule, the status of adopted children would always
be uncertain, since the evidence might not be the same at all investigations, and might be regarded
with different effect by different tribunals, and the adoption might be held by one court to have been
valid, while another court would hold it to have been of no avail. (Emphasis supplied.)
On the question of Doribel's legitimacy, we hold that the findings of the trial courts as affirmed by the
respondent court must be sustained. Doribel's birth certificate is a formidable piece of evidence. It is
one of the prescribed means of recognition under Article 265 of the Civil Code and Article 172 of the
Family Code. It is true, as the petitioners stress, that the birth certificate offers only prima facie
evidence 9 of filiation and may be refuted by contrary evidence. However, such evidence is lacking in
the case at bar.
Mauricio's testimony that he was present when Doribel was born to Edita Abila was understandbly
suspect, coming as it did from an interested party. The affidavit of Abila 10 denying her earlier
statement in the petition for the guardianship of Doribel is of course hearsay, let alone the fact that it
was never offered in evidence in the lower courts. Even without it, however, the birth certificate must
be upheld in line with Legaspi v. Court of Appeals, 11 where we ruled that "the evidentiary nature of
public documents must be sustained in the absence of strong, complete and conclusive proof of its
falsity or nullity."

Another reason why the petitioners' challenge must fail is the impropriety of the present proceedings
for that purpose. Doribel's legitimacy cannot be questioned in a complaint for partition and accounting
but in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party.
The presumption of legitimacy in the Civil Code . . . does not have this purely evidential character. It
serves a more fundamental purpose. It actually fixes a civil status for the child born in wedlock, and
that civil status cannot be attacked collaterally. The legitimacy of the child can be impugned only in a
direct action brought for that purpose, by the proper parties, and within the period limited by law.
The legitimacy of the child cannot be contested by way of defense or as a collateral issue in another
action for a different purpose. . . 12 (Emphasis supplied.)
In consequence of the above observations, we hold that Doribel, as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro
and Isabel Sayson, and Delia and Edmundo, as their adopted children, are the exclusive heirs to the
intestate estate of the deceased couple, conformably to the following Article 979 of the Civil Code:
Art. 979. Legitimate children and their descendants succeed the parents and other ascendants, without
distinction as to sex or age, and even if they should come from different marriages.
An adopted child succeeds to the property of the adopting parents in the same manner as a legitimate
child.

The philosophy underlying this article is that a person's love descends first to his children and
grandchildren before it ascends to his parents and thereafter spreads among his collateral relatives. It
is also supposed that one of his purposes in acquiring properties is to leave them eventually to his
children as a token of his love for them and as a provision for their continued care even after he is
gone from this earth.
Coming now to the right of representation, we stress first the following pertinent provisions of the Civil
Code:
Art. 970. Representation is a right created by fiction of law, by virtue of which the representative is
raised to the place and the degree of the person represented, and acquires the rights which the latter
would have if he were living or if he could have inherited.
Art. 971. The representative is called to the succession by the law and not by the person represented.
The representative does not succeed the person represented but the one who the person represented
would have succeeded.
Art. 981. Should children of the deceased and descendants of other children who are dead, survive, the
former shall inherit in their own right, and the latter by right of representation.
There is no question that as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and thus the granddaughter of Eleno
and Rafaela, Doribel has a right to represent her deceased father in the distribution of the intestate
estate of her grandparents. Under Article 981, quoted above, she is entitled to the share her father
would have directly inherited had he survived, which shall be equal to the shares of her grandparents'
other children. 13
But a different conclusion must be reached in the case of Delia and Edmundo, to whom the
grandparents were total strangers. While it is true that the adopted child shall be deemed to be a
legitimate child and have the same right as the latter, these rights do not include the right of
representation. The relationship created by the adoption is between only the adopting parents and the
adopted child and does not extend to the blood relatives of either party. 14
In sum, we agree with the lower courts that Delia and Edmundo as the adopted children and Doribel as
the legitimate daughter of Teodoro Sayson and Isabel Bautista, are their exclusive heirs and are under
no obligation to share the estate of their parents with the petitioners. The Court of Appeals was
correct, however, in holding that only Doribel has the right of representation in the inheritance of her
grandparents' intestate estate, the other private respondents being only the adoptive children of the
deceased Teodoro.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, and the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED
in toto, with costs against the petitioners.

\Liyao vs. Liyao

GR No. 138961, March 7, 2002

FACTS:
William Liyao Jr., the illegitimate son of the deceased, as represented by her mother (Corazon), filed a
petition ordering Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao, Pearl L. Tan, Tita L. Tan and Linda Liyao to recognize and
acknowledge the former as a compulsory heir of the deceased and to be entitled to all successional
rights. Liyao Jr. was in continuous possession and enjoyment of the status as the child of the deceased
having been recognized and acknowledged as such child by the decedent during his lifetime. There
were two sides of the story. Corazon maintained that she and the deceased were legally married but
living separately for more than 10 years and that they cohabited from 1965 until the death of the
deceased. On the other hand, one of the chidren of the deceased stated that her mom and the
deceased were legally married and that her parents were not separated legally or in fact.

ISSUE: WON the petitioner can impugn his own legitimacy to be able to claim from the estate of the
deceased.

HELD:
Impugning the legitimacy of the child is a strictly personal right of the husband, or in exceptional
cases, his heirs for the reason that he was the one directly confronted with the scandal and ridicule
which the infidelity of his wife produced and he should be the one to decide whether to conceal that
infidelity or expose it in view of the moral and economic interest involved. Hence, it was then settled
that the legitimacy of the child can only be impugned in a direct action brought for that purpose, by
the proper parties and within the period limited by law.
Furthermore, the court held that there was no clear, competent and positive evidence presented by
the petitioner that his alleged father had admitted or recognized his paternity.

DE JESUS VS ESTATE OF DIZON

FACTS:
Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus got married on 23 August 1964. It was during this
marriage that Jacqueline A. de Jesus and Jinkie Christie A. de Jesus, herein petitioners, were born. In a
notarized document, dated 07 June 1991, Juan G. Dizon acknowledged Jacqueline and Jinkie de Jesus
as being his own illegitimate children by Carolina Aves de Jesus. Juan G. Dizon died intestate on 12
March 1992. Jacqueline and Jinkie filed a complaint on 01 July 1993 for "Partition with Inventory and
Accounting" of the Dizon estate with the Regional Trial Court. Respondent, the surviving spouse and
legitimate children of the decedent Juan G. Dizon, including the corporations of which the deceased
was a stockholder, sought the dismissal of the case, arguing that the complaint, even while
denominated as being one for partition, would nevertheless call for altering the status of petitioners
from being the legitimate children of the spouses Danilo de Jesus and Carolina de Jesus to instead be
the illegitimate children of Carolina de Jesus and deceased Juan Dizon. The trial court, ultimately,

dismissed the complaint of petitioners for lack of cause of action and for being improper. It decreed
that the declaration of heirship could only be made in a special proceeding in as much as petitioners
were seeking the establishment of a status or right.
ISSUE:
WON Jacqueline and Jinkie are illegitimate children of the late Juan Dizon
HELD:
No. A scrutiny of the records would show that petitioners were born during the marriage of their
parents. The certificates of live would also identify Danilo de Jesus as being their father. There is
perhaps no presumption of the law more firmly established and founded on sounder morality and more
convincing reason than the presumption that children born in wedlock are legitimate. Succinctly, in an
attempt to establish their illegitimate filiation to the late Juan G. Dizon, petitioners, in effect, would
impugn their legitimate status as being children of Danilo de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus.
This step cannot be aptly done because the law itself establishes the legitimacy of children conceived
or born during the marriage of the parents. The presumption of legitimacy fixes a civil status for the
child born in wedlock, and only the father, or in exceptional instances the latter's heirs, can contest in
an appropriate action the legitimacy of a child born to his wife. Thus, it is only when the legitimacy of a
child has been successfully impugned that the paternity of the husband can be rejected. The rule that
the written acknowledgement made by the deceased Juan G. Dizon establishes petitioners' alleged
illegitimate filiation to the decedent cannot be validly invoked to be of any relevance in this instance.
This issue, i.e whether petitioners are indeed the acknowledge illegitimate offsprings of the decedent,
cannot be aptly adjudicated without an action having been first instituted to impugn their legitimacy as
being the children of Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus born in lawful wedlock.
Jurisprudence is strongly settled that the paramount declaration of legitimacy by law cannot be
attacked collaterally, one that can only be repudiated or contested in a direct suit specifically brought
for that purpose. Indeed, a child so born in such wedlock shall be considered legitimate although the
mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as having been an
adulteress.

GR No. 123450, August 31, 2005

Concepcion vs almonte
Facts:
Petitioner Gerardo B. Concepcion and Ma. Theresa Almonte were married on December 29, 1989. They
lived in Fairview, Quezon City and a year later on December 8, 1990, Ma. Theresa gave birth to Jose
Gerardo.

On December 19, 1991, Gerardo filed a petition to have his marriage to Ma. Theresa annulled on the
ground of bigamy, alleging that her marriage with Mario Gopiao on December 10, 198- was never
annulled. Although Ma. Theresa did not deny marrying Mario, she averred that the marriage was a
sham and that she have never lived with Mario at all.
The trial court said otherwise, and ruled that Ma. Theresas marriage to Mario was valid and subsisting,
thus declaring her marriage to Gerardo as void ab initio. It deemed Jose Gerardo to be an illegitimate
child and the custody was awarded to Ma. Theresa while Gerardo was granted visitation rights. Also, it
allowed the child to use the surname of his father.
Ma. Theresa appealed and pleaded for the reverse of the courts decisions. The Court of Appeals ruled
that Jose Gerardo was not the son of Ma. Theresa by Gerardo but by Mario during her first marriage
considering the fact that the second marriage was void from the beginning. Therefore, the child Jose
Gerardo under the law is the child of the legal and subsisting marriage between Ma. Theresa and
Mario Gopiao.
Gerardo Concepcion moved for the reconsideration of the decision.

Issue:
Whether the child is the legitimate child of Ma. Theresa and Gopiao or the illegimate child of Ma.
Theresa and Gerardo.

Held:
The child, Jose Gerardo, is the legitimate child of Ma. Theresa and Mario Gopiao.
The status and filiation of a child cannot be compromised as per Art. 164 of the Family Code which
states, A child who is conceived or born during the marriage of his parents is legitimate. It is fully
supported by Art. 167 of the Family Code which states, The child shall be considered legitimate
although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an
adulteress.. The law requires that every reasonable presumption be made in favor of the legitimacy. It
is grounded on the policy to protect the innocent offspring from the odium of illegitimacy.
Since the marriage of Gerardo and Ma. Theresa was void from the very beginning, he never became
her husband and thus never acquired any right to impugn the legitimacy of her child. The minor cannot
be deprived of his/her legitimate status on the bare declaration of the mother and/or even much less,
the supposed father. In fine, the law and only the law determines who are the legitimate or illegitimate
children for ones legitimacy or illegitimacy cannot ever be compromised. It should be what the law
says and not what a parent says it is. Additionally, public policy demands that there be no compromise
on the status and filiation of a child. Otherwise, the child will be at the mercy of those who may be so
minded to exploit his defenselessness.
As a legitimate child, Jose Gerardo shall have the right to bear the surnames of his father Mario and
mother Ma. Theresa, in conformity with the provisions of the Civil Code on surnames. Also, there being
no such parent-child relationship between the child and Gerardo, Gerardo has no legally demandable
right to visit the child.
The State as parens patriae affords special protection to children from abuse, exploitation and other
conditions prejudicial to their development. It is mandated to provide protection to those of tender
years. Through its laws, the State safeguards them from every one, even their own parents, to the end
that their eventual development as responsible citizens and members of society shall not be impeded,
distracted or impaired by family acrimony. This is especially significant where, as in this case, the issue
concerns their filiation as it strikes at their very identity and lineage. The child, by reason of his mental
and physical immaturity, needs special safeguard and care, including appropriate legal protection
before as well as after birth. In case of assault on his rights by those who take advantage of his

innocence and vulnerability, the law will rise in his defense with the single-minded purpose of
upholding only his best interests.
WHEREFORE, the petition of Gerardo is hereby DENIED. The resolution of the Court of Appeals in favor
of respondents is AFFIRMED.

FACTS:
Gerardo Concepcion, the petitioner, and Ma. Theresa Almonte, private respondent, were married in
December 1989, and begotten a child named Jose Gerardo in December 1990. The husband filed on
December 1991, a petition to have his marriage annulled on the ground of bigamy since the wife
married a certain Mario Gopiao sometime in December 1980, whom according to the husband was still
alive and living in Loyola Heights, QC. Trial court ruled that the son was an illegitimate child and the
custody was awarded to the wife while Gerardo was granted visitation rights. Theresa argued that
there was nothing in the law granting visitation rights in favor of the putative father of an illegitimate
child. She further wanted to have the surname of the son changed from Concepcion to Almonte,
her maiden name, since an illegitimate child should use his mothers surname. After the requested
oral argument, trial court reversed its ruling and held the son to be not the son of Gerardo but of Mario.
Hence, the child was a legitimate child of Theresa and Mario.

HELD:
Considering that Theresas marriage with Gerardo was void ab initio, the latter never became the
formers husband and never acquired any right to impugn the legitimacy of the child. Theresas
contention was to have his son be declared as not the legitimate child of her and Mario but her
illegitimate child with Gerardo. In this case, the mother has no right to disavow a child because
maternity is never uncertain. Hence, she is not permitted by law to question the sons legitimacy.
Under Article 167 of the Family Code, the child shall be considered legitimate although the mother
may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. Having the
best interest of the child in mind, the presumption of his legitimacy was upheld by the Court. As a
legitimate child, the son shall have the right to bear the surnames of Mario and Theresa, in conformity
with the provisions of Civil Code on surnames. Gerardo cannot then impose his surname to be used by
the child, since in the eyes of the law, the child is not related to him in any way.

TIJING VS CA
FACTS:
Edgardo Tijing and Bienvenida Tijing, husband and wife, have six children. The youngest is Edgardo
Tijing, Jr. Petitioner Bienvenida served as the laundrywoman of Angelita Diamante. According to
Bienvenida, Angelita went to her house to fetch her for an urgent laundry job. Since Bienvenida was on
her way to do some marketing, she asked Angelita to wait until she returned. She also left her fourmonth old son, Edgardo, Jr., under her care, as she usually let Angelita take care of the child while
Bienvenida was doing laundry. When Bienvenida returned from the market, Angelita and Edgardo, Jr.,
were gone. She was told that her employer went out for a stroll and was told to come back later. She
returned to Angelita's house after three days, only to discover that Angelita had moved to another
place. Bienvenida and her husband looked for their missing son in other places. However, despite their
serious efforts, they saw no traces of his whereabouts. Four years later, Bienvenida read in a tabloid
about the death of Tomas Lopez, allegedly the common-law husband of Angelita. Thus, she went to to
Hagonoy, Bulacan, where she allegedly saw her son Edgardo, Jr., for the first time after four years. She
claims that the boy was already named John Thomas Lopez. She avers that Angelita refused to return
to her the boy despite her demand to do so. The spouses filed their petition for habeas corpus with the
trial court in order to recover their son. To substantiate their petition, petitioners presented two
witnesses. One of whom is Benjamin Lopez, the brother of Tomas Lopez. He, declared that his brother,
could not have possibly fathered John Thomas Lopez as the latter was sterile. The trial court concluded
that since Angelita and her common-law husband could not have children, the alleged birth of John
Thomas Lopez is an impossibility. The Court of Appeals however reversed the decision of the trial court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Edgardo Tijing, Jr., and John Thomas Lopez are one and the same person and is the son
of petitioners?
Whether or not habeas corpus is proper
HELD:
YES. A close scrutiny of the records of this case reveals that the evidence presented by Bienvenida is
sufficient to establish that John Thomas Lopez is actually her missing son, Edgardo Tijing, Jr.
First, there is evidence that Angelita could no longer bear children. From her very lips, she admitted
that after the birth of her second child, she underwent ligation in 1970, before she lived with Tomas
Lopez without the benefit of marriage in 1974.
Second, there is strong evidence which directly proves that Tomas Lopez is no longer capable of siring
a son. Benjamin Lopez declared in court that his brother, Tomas, was sterile because of the accident
and that Tomas admitted to him that John Thomas Lopez was only an adopted son. Moreover, Tomas
Lopez and his legal wife, Maria Lopez, had no children after almost fifteen years together. Though
Tomas Lopez had lived with private respondent for fourteen years, they also bore no offspring.
Third, the court found it unusual the fact that the birth certificate of John Thomas Lopez was filed by
Tomas Lopez instead of the midwife, four months after the alleged birth of the child. Under the law, the
attending physician or midwife in attendance at birth should cause the registration of such birth. Only
in default of the physician or midwife, can the parent register the birth of his child.
Fourth, the trial court observed several times that when the child and Bienvenida were both in court,
the two had strong similarities in their faces, eyes, eyebrows and head shapes. Resemblance between
a minor and his alleged parentis competent and material evidence to establish parentage.
Fifth, Lourdes Vasquez testified that she assisted in Bienvenida's giving birth to Edgardo Tijing, Jr., at
her clinic. Unlike private respondent, she presented clinical records consisting of a log book, discharge
order and the signatures of petitioners. All these considered, the SC was constrained to rule that
subject minor is indeed the son of the petitioner.

The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person
is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person
entitled thereto. The writ of habeas corpus is the proper legal remedy to enable parents to regain the
custody of a minor child even if the latter be in the custody of a third person of his own free will.

EDGARDO A. TIJING, et al. vs. COURT OF APPEALS, et al. G.R. No. 125901 March 8, 2001
Facts:
Edgardo and Bienvenida Tijing are husband and wife, they have six children, youngest of whom
is Edgardo Tijing Jr. In August 1989, Angelita Diamante fetched Bienvenida for an urgent laundry job.
Bienvenida left to Angelita her 4-month old child, Edgardo Jr. as she usually let Angelita take care of
her child while she was doing laundry. When Bienvenida returned from work to get her son, Angelita
was nowhere to be found, and despite her and her husbands efforts, they could not locate Angelita
and their childs whereabouts. Four years later, Bienvenida read about the death of Tomas Lopez, the
common-law husband of Angelita, whose interment is in Bulacan. She went there and allegedly saw
her son Edgardo Jr., now named John Thomas Lopez. John is now being claimed by Angelita as her own
son, sired by her common-law husband Tomas Lopez during their cohabitation. Bienvenida now alleges
that the child cannot possibly be born to Angelita and Tomas for it was the latters own brother who
admitted that Tomas was rendered sterile, caused by an accident. Tomas begot no children from his
legal marriage nor with the cohabitation with Angelita. Tomasbrother even testified that Tomas himself
admitted to him that the subject child was adopted.
Issue:
Who among the claimants is the true parent of the subject child.
Ruling:
Bienvenida. She presented sufficient clinical records, presenting the proper and credible
witnesses who assisted her in her childs birth. Not to mention that it could be readily observed that
Bienvenida and the child have strong similarities in their faces, eyes, eyebrows and head shapes.
Resemblance between a minor and his alleged parent is competent and material evidence to establish
parentage. Whereas, Angelita had been known to have undergone ligation years before the alleged
birth of the child and the admission of Tomasown brother that Tomas was sterile makes it impossible
that he and Angelita sired subject child. More importantly, the birth certificate of the child stated
Tomas Lopez and private respondent were legally married which is false because even Angelita had
admitted she is a common-law wife. This false entry puts to doubt the other data in said birth
certificate. In this case, the Supreme Court made mention of the DNA test for identification and
parentage testing.
The DNA from the mother, the alleged father and child are analyzed to establish parentage.
The use of DNA test as evidence is still open to challenge, but as the appropriate case comes, courts
should not hesitate to rule on its admissibility. Though it is not necessary in this case to resort to DNA
testing, in future it would be useful to all concerned in the prompt resolution of parentage and identity
issues.

[G.R. No. 162571. June 15, 2005.]

ARNEL L. AGUSTIN, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND MINOR MARTIN JOSE PROLLAMANTE,
REPRESENTED BY HIS MOTHER/GUARDIAN FE ANGELA PROLLAMANTE, respondents.
Facts:
Respondents Fe Angela and her son Martin Prollamante sued Martins alleged biological father,
petitioner Arnel Agustin, for support and support pendente lite before the Quezon City RTC.
In their complaint, respondents alleged that Arnel courted Fe, after which they entered into an intimate
relationship. Arnel supposedly impregnated Fe on her 34th birthday but despite Arnels insistence on
abortion, Fe decided to give birth to their child out of wedlock, Martin. The babys birth certificate was
purportedly signed by Arnel as the father. Arnel shouldered the pre-natal and hospital expenses but
later refused Fes repeated requests for Martins support despite his adequate financial capacity and
even suggested to have the child committed for adoption. Arnel also denied having fathered the child.
On January 2001, while Fe was carrying five-month old Martin at the Capitol Hills Golf and Country Club
parking lot, Arnel sped off in his van, with the open car door hitting Fes leg. This incident was reported
to the police. Several months later, Fe was diagnosed with leukemia and has, since then, been
undergoing chemotherapy. Fe and Martin then sued Arnel for support.
Fe and Martin moved for the issuance of an order directing all the parties to submit themselves to DNA
paternity testing, which Arnel opposed by invoking his constitutional right against self-incrimination
and moving to dismiss the complaint for lack of cause of action.
The trial court denied the MTD and ordered the parties to submit themselves to DNA paternity testing
at the expense of the applicants. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court, thus this petition.
Issue:
W/N the respondent court erred in denying the petitioners MTD
W/N the court erred in directing parties to subject to DNA paternity testing and was a form of
unreasonable search
Held:
1. No. The trial court properly denied the petitioners motion to dismiss because the private
respondents complaint on its face showed that they had a cause of action against the petitioner. The
elements of a cause of action are: (1) the plaintiffs primary right and the defendants corresponding
primary duty, and (2) the delict or wrongful act or omission of the defendant, by which the primary
right and duty have been violated. The cause of action is determined not by the prayer of the
complaint but by the facts alleged.
2. No. In Ople v. Torres,the Supreme Court struck down the proposed national computerized
identification system embodied in Administrative Order No. 308, we said:

In no uncertain terms, we also underscore that the right to privacy does not bar all incursions into
individual privacy. The right is not intended to stifle scientific and technological advancements that
enhance public service and the common good... Intrusions into the right must be accompanied by
proper safeguards that enhance public service and the common good.
Historically, it has mostly been in the areas of legality of searches and seizures, and the infringement
of privacy of communication where the constitutional right to privacy has been critically at issue.
Petitioners case involves neither and, as already stated, his argument that his right against selfincrimination is in jeopardy holds no water.

IN RE CHANGE OF NAME OF JULIAN LIN CARALUSAN

Case Doctrines:
The registered name of a legitimate, legitimated and recognized illegitimate child contains a given
name, a middle name and a surname.
Before a person can be authorized to change his name given him either in his certificate of birth or
civil registry, he must show proper or reasonable cause, or any compelling reason which may justify
such change. Otherwise, the request should be denied.
That the continued use of a middle name would cause confusion and difficulty does not constitute
proper and reasonable cause to drop it from one's registered complete name.

Facts:
Julian was born in Cebu City on February 20, 1998 to parents Anna Lisa Wang and Sing-Foe Wang who
were then not yet married to each other. When his parents subsequently got married on September 22,
1998, they executed a deed of legitimation of their son so that the childs name was changed from
Julian Lin Carulasan to Julian Lin Carulasan Wang.
Since the couple planned to live in Singapore where Julian will study together with a sister who was
born in Singapore, Anna Lisa decided to file a petition in the Regional Trial Court seeking to drop his
middle name and have his registered name in the Civil Registry changed from Julian Lin Carulasan
Wang to Julian Lin Wang. The reason given for the change of name sought in the petition is that Julian
may be discriminated against when he studies in Singapore because of his middle name since in
Singapore middle names or the maiden surname of the mother is not carried in a person's name.
After trial, the RTC denied the petition because the reason given did not fall within the grounds
recognized by law. The RTC ruled that since the State has an interest in the name of a person it cannot
just be changed to suit the convenience of the bearer of the name. The RTC said that legitimate
children have the right to bear the surnames of the father and the mother, and there is no reason why
this right should be taken from Julio considering that he was still a minor. When he reaches majority
age he could then decide whether to change his name by dropping his middle name, added the RTC.

Issues:

Was the RTC correct in denying the petition?

Held:
Yes. Middle names serve to identify the maternal lineage or filiation of a person as well as further
distinguish him from others who may have the same given name and surname as he has. When an
illegitimate child is legitimated by subsequent marriage of his parents or acknowledged by the father
in a public instrument or private handwritten instrument, he then bears both his mother's surname as
his middle name and his father's surname as his surname, reflecting his status as a legitimated child or
an acknowledged natural child. The registered name of a legitimate, legitimated and recognized
illegitimate child thus contains a given name, a middle name and a surname.
The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of identification,
and that a change of name is a privilege and not a right, so that before a person can be authorized to
change his name given him either in his certificate of birth or civil registry, he must show proper or
reasonable cause, or any compelling reason which may justify such change. Otherwise, the request
should be denied.

To justify a request for change of name, petitioner must show not only some proper or compelling
reason therefore but also that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. Among
the grounds for change of name which have been held valid are: (a) when the name is ridiculous,
dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change results as a legal
consequence, as in legitimation; (c) when the change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has
continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of alien
parentage; (e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good
faith and without prejudicing anybody; and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is
no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name
would prejudice public interest.
In the case at bar, the only reason advanced by petitioner for the dropping his middle name is
convenience. However, how such change of name would make his integration into Singaporean
society easier and convenient is not clearly established. That the continued use of his middle name
would cause confusion and difficulty does not constitute proper and reasonable cause to drop it from
his registered complete name.
In addition, petitioner is only a minor. Considering the nebulous foundation on which his petition for
change of name is based, it is best that the matter of change of his name be left to his judgment and
discretion when he reaches the age of majority. As he is of tender age, he may not yet understand and
appreciate the value of the change of his name and granting of the same at this point may just
prejudice him in his rights under our laws. (In Re: Petition for Change of Name and/or Correction of
Entry in the Civil Registry of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang G.R. 159966, March 30 2005, 454 SCRA 2155).

BRIONES vs. MIGUEL GR. No. 156343 October 18, 2004

Facts:
On March 5, 2002, petitioner Joey D. Briones filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus to obtain custody of his
minor child Michael Kevin Pineda. The petitioner alleges that the minor Michael Kevin Pineda is his
illegitimate son with respondent Loreta P. Miguel. He was born in Japan on September 17, 1996 as
evidenced by his Birth Certificate. The respondent Loreta P. Miguel is now married to a Japanese
national and is presently residing in Japan. The petitioner prays that the custody of his son Michael
Kevin Pineda be given to him as his biological father and has demonstrated his capability to support
and educate him.
Issue:
Whether or not the natural father may be denied the custody and parental care of his own child in the
absence of the mother who is away.
Ruling:
Having been born outside a valid marriage, the minor is deemed an illegitimate child of petitioner and
Respondent Loreta. Article 176 of the Family Code of the Philippines explicitly provides that
"illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother,
and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code." This is the rule regardless of whether the
father admits paternity. Parental authority over recognized natural children who were under the age of
majority was vested in the father or the mother recognizing them. If both acknowledge the child,
authority was to be exercised by the one to whom it was awarded by the courts; if it was awarded to
both, the rule as to legitimate children applied. In other words, in the latter case, parental authority
resided jointly in the father and the mother.

G.R. No. 156343

October 18, 2004

JOEY D. BRIONES, petitioner, vs. MARICEL P. MIGUEL, FRANCISCA P. MIGUEL and LORETA P. MIGUEL,
respondents.
An illegitimate child is under the sole parental authority of the mother. In the exercise of that authority,
she is entitled to keep the child in her company. The Court will not deprive her of custody, absent any
imperative cause showing her unfitness to exercise such authority and care.

The Case
The Petition for Review1 before the Court seeks to reverse and set aside the August 28, 2002
Decision2 and the December 11, 2002 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR SP No. 69400.4
The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. Respondent Loreta P. Miguel shall have custody over
the child Michael Kevin Pineda until he reaches ten (10) years of age. Once the said child is beyond ten
(10) years of age, the Court allows him to choose which parent he prefers to live with pursuant to
Section 6, Rule 99 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. The petitioner, Joey D. Briones,
shall help support the child, shall have visitorial rights at least once a week, and may take the child out
upon the written consent of the mother.
"Acting on the petitioners Urgent Motion for a Hold Departure Order, and finding it to be without
merit, the same is DENIED."5
The challenged Resolution denied reconsideration.
The Facts
The CA summarized the antecedents of the case in this wise:
"On March 5, 2002, petitioner Joey D. Briones filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus against respondents
Maricel Pineda Miguel and Francisca Pineda Miguel, to obtain custody of his minor child Michael Kevin
Pineda.
"On April 25, 2002, the petitioner filed an Amended Petition to include Loreta P. Miguel, the mother of
the minor, as one of the respondents.
"A Writ of Habeas Corpus was issued by this Court on March 11, 2002 ordering the respondents to
produce before this Court the living body of the minor Michael Kevin Pineda on March 21, 2002 at 2:00
oclock in the afternoon.
"The petitioner alleges that the minor Michael Kevin Pineda is his illegitimate son with respondent
Loreta P. Miguel. He was born in Japan on September 17, 1996 as evidenced by his Birth Certificate.
The respondent Loreta P. Miguel is now married to a Japanese national and is presently residing in
Japan.
"The petitioner further alleges that on November 4, 1998 he caused the minor child to be brought to
the Philippines so that he could take care of him and send him to school. In the school year 2000-2001,
the petitioner enrolled him at the nursery school of Blessed Angels L.A. School, Inc. in Caloocan City,
where he finished the nursery course.
"According to the petitioner, his parents, who are both retired and receiving monthly pensions, assisted
him in taking care of the child.
"On May 2, 2001, respondents Maricel P. Miguel and Francisca P. Miguel came to the house of the
petitioner in Caloocan City on the pretext that they were visiting the minor child and requested that
they be allowed to bring the said child for recreation at the SM Department store. They promised him
that they will bring him back in the afternoon, to which the petitioner agreed. However, the
respondents did not bring him back as promised by them.
"The petitioner went several times to respondent Maricel P. Miguel at Tanza, Tuguegarao City but he
was informed that the child is with the latters mother at Batal Heights, Santiago City. When he went
there, respondent Francisca P. Miguel told him that Michael Kevin Pineda is with her daughter at
Tuguegarao City.

"He sought the assistance of the police and the Department of Social Welfare to locate his son and to
bring him back to him, but all his efforts were futile.

"Hence, he was constrained to file a Petition for Habeas Corpus with the Regional Trial Court of
Caloocan City which was docketed as SPC No. 2711. However, the said case was withdrawn ex-parte.
"The petitioner prays that the custody of his son Michael Kevin Pineda be given to him as his biological
father and [as] he has demonstrated his capability to support and educate him.
"On May 6, 2002, the respondents filed their Comment, in compliance with the May 2, 2002 Resolution
of this Court.
"In their Comment, the respondent Loreta P. Miguel denies the allegation of the petitioner that he was
the one who brought their child to the Philippines and stated that she was the one who brought him
here pursuant to their agreement.
"Respondent Loreta P. Miguel likewise denies petitioners allegation that respondents Maricel P. Miguel
and Francisca P. Miguel were the ones who took the child from the petitioner or the latters parents.
She averred that she was the one who took Michael Kevin Pineda from the petitioner when she
returned to the Philippines and that the latter readily agreed and consented.
"Respondent Loreta P. Miguel alleges that sometime in October 2001, the petitioner was deported from
Japan under the assumed name of Renato Juanzon when he was found to have violated or committed
an infraction of the laws of Japan. She further stated that since the time the petitioner arrived in the
Philippines, he has not been gainfully employed. The custody of the child, according to respondent
Loreta P. Miguel was entrusted to petitioners parents while they were both working in Japan. She
added that even before the custody of the child was given to the petitioners parents, she has already
been living separately from the petitioner in Japan because the latter was allegedly maintaining an
illicit affair with another woman until his deportation.
"She likewise stated in her Comment that her marriage to a Japanese national is for the purpose of
availing of the privileges of staying temporarily in Japan to pursue her work so she could be able to
send money regularly to her son in the Philippines. She further stated that she has no intention of
staying permanently in Japan as she has been returning to the Philippines every six (6) months or as
often as she could.
"Respondent Loreta P. Miguel prays that the custody of her minor child be given to her and invokes
Article 213, Paragraph 2 of the Family Code and Article 363 of the Civil Code of the Philippines."
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Applying Article 213 (paragraph 2) of the Family Code, the CA awarded the custody of Michael Kevin
Pineda Miguel to his mother, Respondent Loreta P. Miguel. While acknowledging that petitioner truly
loved and cared for his son and considering the trouble and expense he had spent in instituting the
legal action for custody, it nevertheless found no compelling reason to separate the minor from his
mother. Petitioner, however, was granted visitorial rights.
Hence, this Petition.6

Issue
In his Memorandum, petitioner formulated the "ultimate" issue as follows: "x x x [w]hether or not [he],
as the natural father, may be denied the custody and parental care of his own child in the absence of
the mother who is away."7

The Courts Ruling

The Petition has no merit. However, the assailed Decision should be modified in regard to its erroneous
application of Section 6 of Rule 99 of the Rules of Court.
Sole Issue

Who Should Have Custody of the Child?

Petitioner concedes that Respondent Loreta has preferential right over their minor child. He insists,
however, that custody should be awarded to him whenever she leaves for Japan and during the period
that she stays there. In other words, he wants joint custody over the minor, such that the mother
would have custody when she is in the country. But when she is abroad, he -- as the biological father -should have custody.
According to petitioner, Loreta is not always in the country. When she is abroad, she cannot take care
of their child. The undeniable fact, he adds, is that she lives most of the time in Japan, as evidenced by
her Special Power of Attorney dated May 28, 2001,8 granting to her sister temporary custody over the
minor.
At present, however, the child is already with his mother in Japan, where he is studying,9 thus
rendering petitioners argument moot. While the Petition for Habeas Corpus was pending before the
CA, petitioner filed on July 30, 2002, an "Urgent Motion for a Hold Departure Order,"10 alleging therein
that respondents were preparing the travel papers of the minor so the child could join his mother and
her Japanese husband. The CA denied the Motion for lack of merit.11
Having been born outside a valid marriage, the minor is deemed an illegitimate child of petitioner and
Respondent Loreta. Article 176 of the Family Code of the Philippines12 explicitly provides that
"illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother,
and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code." This is the rule regardless of whether the
father admits paternity.13
Previously, under the provisions of the Civil Code, illegitimate children were generally classified into
two groups: (1) natural, whether actual or by legal fiction; and (2) spurious, whether incestuous,
adulterous or illicit.14 A natural child is one born outside a lawful wedlock of parents who, at the time
of conception of the child, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other.15 On the
other hand, a spurious child is one born of parents who, at the time of conception, were disqualified to
marry each other on account of certain legal impediments.16
Parental authority over recognized natural children who were under the age of majority was vested in
the father or the mother recognizing them.17 If both acknowledge the child, authority was to be
exercised by the one to whom it was awarded by the courts; if it was awarded to both, the rule as to
legitimate children applied. In other words, in the latter case, parental authority resided jointly in the
father and the mother.18
The fine distinctions among the various types of illegitimate children have been eliminated in the
Family Code.19 Now, there are only two classes of children -- legitimate (and those who, like the legally
adopted, have the rights of legitimate children) and illegitimate. All children conceived and born
outside a valid marriage are illegitimate, unless the law itself gives them legitimate status.20
Article 54 of the Code provides these exceptions: "Children conceived or born before the judgment of
annulment or absolute nullity of the marriage under Article 36 has become final and executory shall be
considered legitimate. Children conceived or born of the subsequent marriage under Article 53 shall
likewise be legitimate."
Under Article 176 of the Family Code, all illegitimate children are generally placed under one category,
without any distinction between natural and spurious.21 The concept of "natural child" is important
only for purposes of legitimation.22 Without the subsequent marriage, a natural child remains an
illegitimate child.
Obviously, Michael is a natural ("illegitimate," under the Family Code) child, as there is nothing in the
records showing that his parents were suffering from a legal impediment to marry at the time of his
birth. Both acknowledge that Michael is their son. As earlier explained and pursuant to Article 176,
parental authority over him resides in his mother, Respondent Loreta, notwithstanding his fathers
recognition of him.

David v. Court of Appeals23 held that the recognition of an illegitimate child by the father could be a
ground for ordering the latter to give support to, but not custody of, the child. The law explicitly
confers to the mother sole parental authority over an illegitimate child; it follows that only if she
defaults can the father assume custody and authority over the minor. Of course, the putative father
may adopt his own illegitimate child;24 in such a case, the child shall be considered a legitimate child
of the adoptive parent.25

There is thus no question that Respondent Loreta, being the mother of and having sole parental
authority over the minor, is entitled to have custody of him.26 She has the right to keep him in her
company.27 She cannot be deprived of that right,28 and she may not even renounce or transfer it
"except in the cases authorized by law."29
Not to be ignored in Article 213 of the Family Code is the caveat that, generally, no child under seven
years of age shall be separated from the mother, except when the court finds cause to order
otherwise.
Only the most compelling of reasons, such as the mothers unfitness to exercise sole parental
authority, shall justify her deprivation of parental authority and the award of custody to someone
else.30 In the past, the following grounds have been considered ample justification to deprive a
mother of custody and parental authority: neglect or abandonment,31 unemployment, immorality,32
habitual drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity, and affliction with a
communicable disease.
Bearing in mind the welfare and the best interest of the minor as the controlling factor,33 we hold that
the CA did not err in awarding care, custody, and control of the child to Respondent Loreta. There is no
showing at all that she is unfit to take charge of him.
We likewise affirm the visitorial right granted by the CA to petitioner. In Silva v. Court of Appeals,34 the
Court sustained the visitorial right of an illegitimate father over his children in view of the
constitutionally protected inherent and natural right of parents over their children.35 Even when the
parents are estranged and their affection for each other is lost, their attachment to and feeling for their
offspring remain unchanged. Neither the law nor the courts allow this affinity to suffer, absent any real,
grave or imminent threat to the well-being of the child.
However, the CA erroneously applied Section 6 of Rule 99 of the Rules of Court. This provision
contemplates a situation in which the parents of the minor are married to each other, but are
separated either by virtue of a decree of legal separation or because they are living separately de
facto. In the present case, it has been established that petitioner and Respondent Loreta were never
married. Hence, that portion of the CA Decision allowing the child to choose which parent to live with is
deleted, but without disregarding the obligation of petitioner to support the child.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that
the disposition allowing the child, upon reaching ten (10) years of age, to choose which parent to live
with is DELETED for lack of legal basis. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED
G.R. No. 206248

February 18, 2014

GRACE M. GRANDE, Petitioner, vs. PATRICIO T. ANTONIO, Respondent.

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, assailing the July 24, 2012
Decision1 and March 5, 2013 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 96406.
As culled from the records, the facts of this case are:
Petitioner Grace Grande (Grande) and respondent Patricio Antonio (Antonio) for a period of time lived
together as husband and wife, although Antonio was at that time already married to someone else.3
Out of this illicit relationship, two sons were born: Andre Lewis (on February 8, 1998) and Jerard Patrick

(on October 13, 1999).4 The children were not expressly recognized by respondent as his own in the
Record of Births of the children in the Civil Registry. The parties relationship, however, eventually
turned sour, and Grande left for the United States with her two children in May 2007. This prompted
respondent Antonio to file a Petition for Judicial Approval of Recognition with Prayer to take Parental
Authority, Parental Physical Custody, Correction/Change of Surname of Minors and for the Issuance of
Writ of Preliminary Injunction before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8 of Aparri, Cagayan (RTC),
appending a notarized Deed of Voluntary Recognition of Paternity of the children.5
On September 28, 2010, the RTC rendered a Decision in favor of herein respondent Antonio, ruling that
"[t]he evidence at hand is overwhelming that the best interest of the children can be promoted if they
are under the sole parental authority and physical custody of [respondent Antonio]."6 Thus, the court a
quo decreed the following:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Court hereby grants [Antonios] prayer for
recognition and the same is hereby judicially approved. x x x Consequently, the Court forthwith issues
the following Order granting the other reliefs sought in the Petition, to wit:
a. Ordering the Office of the City Registrar of the City of Makati to cause the entry of the name of
[Antonio] as the father of the aforementioned minors in their respective Certificate of Live Birth and
causing the correction/change and/or annotation of the surnames of said minors in their Certificate of
Live Birth from Grande to Antonio;
b. Granting [Antonio] the right to jointly exercise Parental Authority with [Grande] over the persons of
their minor children, Andre Lewis Grande and Jerard Patrick Grande;
c. Granting [Antonio] primary right and immediate custody over the parties minor children Andre
Lewis Grandre and Jerard Patrick Grande who shall stay with [Antonios] residence in the Philippines
from Monday until Friday evening and to [Grandes] custody from Saturday to Sunday evening;
d. Ordering [Grande] to immediately surrender the persons and custody of minors Andre Lewis Grande
and Jerard Patrick Grande unto [Antonio] for the days covered by the Order;
e. Ordering parties to cease and desist from bringing the aforenamed minors outside of the country,
without the written consent of the other and permission from the court.
f. Ordering parties to give and share the support of the minor children Andre Lewis Grande and Jerard
Patrick Grande in the amount of P30,000 per month at the rate of 70% for [Antonio] and 30% for
[Grande].7 (Emphasis supplied.)
Aggrieved, petitioner Grande moved for reconsideration. However, her motion was denied by the trial
court in its Resolution dated November 22, 20108 for being pro forma and for lack of merit.
Petitioner Grande then filed an appeal with the CA attributing grave error on the part of the RTC for
allegedly ruling contrary to the law and jurisprudence respecting the grant of sole custody to the
mother over her illegitimate children.9 In resolving the appeal, the appellate court modified in part the
Decision of the RTC. The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is partly GRANTED. Accordingly, the appealed Decision of the Regional Trial
Court Branch 8, Aparri Cagayan in SP Proc. Case No. 11-4492 is MODIFIED in part and shall hereinafter
read as follows:

a. The Offices of the Civil Registrar General and the City Civil Registrar of Makati City are DIRECTED to
enter the surname Antonio as the surname of Jerard Patrick and Andre Lewis, in their respective
certificates of live birth, and record the same in the Register of Births;
b. [Antonio] is ORDERED to deliver the minor children Jerard Patrick and Andre Lewis to the custody of
their mother herein appellant, Grace Grande who by virtue hereof is hereby awarded the full or sole
custody of these minor children;

c. [Antonio] shall have visitorial rights at least twice a week, and may only take the children out upon
the written consent of [Grande]; and
d. The parties are DIRECTED to give and share in support of the minor children Jerard Patrick and Andre
Lewis in the amount of P30,000.00 per month at the rate of 70% for [Antonio] and 30% for [Grande].
(Emphasis supplied.)
In ruling thus, the appellate court ratiocinated that notwithstanding the fathers recognition of his
children, the mother cannot be deprived of her sole parental custody over them absent the most
compelling of reasons.10 Since respondent Antonio failed to prove that petitioner Grande committed
any act that adversely affected the welfare of the children or rendered her unsuitable to raise the
minors, she cannot be deprived of her sole parental custody over their children.
The appellate court, however, maintained that the legal consequence of the recognition made by
respondent Antonio that he is the father of the minors, taken in conjunction with the universally
protected "best-interest-of-the-child" clause, compels the use by the children of the surname
"ANTONIO."11
As to the issue of support, the CA held that the grant is legally in order considering that not only did
Antonio express his willingness to give support, it is also a consequence of his acknowledging the
paternity of the minor children.12 Lastly, the CA ruled that there is no reason to deprive respondent
Antonio of his visitorial right especially in view of the constitutionally inherent and natural right of
parents over their children.13
Not satisfied with the CAs Decision, petitioner Grande interposed a partial motion for reconsideration,
particularly assailing the order of the CA insofar as it decreed the change of the minors surname to
"Antonio." When her motion was denied, petitioner came to this Court via the present petition. In it,
she posits that Article 176 of the Family Codeas amended by Republic Act No. (RA) 9255, couched as
it is in permissive languagemay not be invoked by a father to compel the use by his illegitimate
children of his surname without the consent of their mother.
We find the present petition impressed with merit.
The sole issue at hand is the right of a father to compel the use of his surname by his illegitimate
children upon his recognition of their filiation. Central to the core issue is the application of Art. 176 of
the Family Code, originally phrased as follows:
Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother,
and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. The legitime of each illegitimate child
shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child. Except for this modification, all other
provisions in the Civil Code governing successional rights shall remain in force.
This provision was later amended on March 19, 2004 by RA 925514 which now reads:
Art. 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their
mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. However, illegitimate children
may use the surname of their father if their filiation has been expressly recognized by their father
through the record of birth appearing in the civil register, or when an admission in a public document
or private handwritten instrument is made by the father. Provided, the father has the right to institute
an action before the regular courts to prove non-filiation during his lifetime. The legitime of each
illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child. (Emphasis supplied.)
From the foregoing provisions, it is clear that the general rule is that an illegitimate child shall use the
surname of his or her mother. The exception provided by RA 9255 is, in case his or her filiation is
expressly recognized by the father through the record of birth appearing in the civil register or when
an admission in a public document or private handwritten instrument is made by the father. In such a
situation, the illegitimate child may use the surname of the father.

In the case at bar, respondent filed a petition for judicial approval of recognition of the filiation of the
two children with the prayer for the correction or change of the surname of the minors from Grande to
Antonio when a public document acknowledged before a notary public under Sec. 19, Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court15 is enough to establish the paternity of his children. But he wanted more: a judicial
conferment of parental authority, parental custody, and an official declaration of his childrens
surname as Antonio.
Parental authority over minor children is lodged by Art. 176 on the mother; hence, respondents prayer
has no legal mooring. Since parental authority is given to the mother, then custody over the minor
children also goes to the mother, unless she is shown to be unfit.
Now comes the matter of the change of surname of the illegitimate children. Is there a legal basis for
the court a quo to order the change of the surname to that of respondent?
Clearly, there is none. Otherwise, the order or ruling will contravene the explicit and unequivocal
provision of Art. 176 of the Family Code, as amended by RA 9255.
Art. 176 gives illegitimate children the right to decide if they want to use the surname of their father or
not. It is not the father (herein respondent) or the mother (herein petitioner) who is granted by law the
right to dictate the surname of their illegitimate children.
Nothing is more settled than that when the law is clear and free from ambiguity, it must be taken to
mean what it says and it must be given its literal meaning free from any interpretation.16
Respondents position that the court can order the minors to use his surname, therefore, has no legal
basis.
On its face, Art. 176, as amended, is free from ambiguity. And where there is no ambiguity, one must
abide by its words. The use of the word "may" in the provision readily shows that an acknowledged
illegitimate child is under no compulsion to use the surname of his illegitimate father. The word "may"
is permissive and operates to confer discretion17 upon the illegitimate children.
It is best to emphasize once again that the yardstick by which policies affecting children are to be
measured is their best interest. On the matter of childrens surnames, this Court has, time and again,
rebuffed the idea that the use of the fathers surname serves the best interest of the minor child. In
Alfon v. Republic,18 for instance, this Court allowed even a legitimate child to continue using the
surname of her mother rather than that of her legitimate father as it serves her best interest and there
is no legal obstacle to prevent her from using the surname of her mother to which she is entitled. In
fact, in Calderon v. Republic,19 this Court, upholding the best interest of the child concerned, even
allowed the use of a surname different from the surnames of the childs father or mother. Indeed, the
rule regarding the use of a childs surname is second only to the rule requiring that the child be placed
in the best possible situation considering his circumstances.
In Republic of the Philippines v. Capote,20 We gave due deference to the choice of an illegitimate
minor to use the surname of his mother as it would best serve his interest, thus:
The foregoing discussion establishes the significant connection of a persons name to his identity, his
status in relation to his parents and his successional rights as a legitimate or illegitimate child. For
sure, these matters should not be taken lightly as to deprive those who may, in any way, be affected
by the right to present evidence in favor of or against such change.
The law and facts obtaining here favor Giovannis petition. Giovanni availed of the proper remedy, a
petition for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, and complied with all the procedural
requirements. After hearing, the trial court found (and the appellate court affirmed) that the evidence
presented during the hearing of Giovannis petition sufficiently established that, under Art. 176 of the
Civil Code, Giovanni is entitled to change his name as he was never recognized by his father while his
mother has always recognized him as her child. A change of name will erase the impression that he
was ever recognized by his father. It is also to his best interest as it will facilitate his mothers intended
petition to have him join her in the United States. This Court will not stand in the way of the
reunification of mother and son. (Emphasis supplied.)

An argument, however, may be advanced advocating the mandatory use of the fathers surname upon
his recognition of his illegitimate children, citing the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA
9255,21 which states:

Rule 7. Requirements for the Child to Use the Surname of the Father
7.1 For Births Not Yet Registered
7.1.1 The illegitimate child shall use the surname of the father if a public document is executed by
the father, either at the back of the Certificate of Live Birth or in a separate document.
7.1.2 If admission of paternity is made through a private instrument, the child shall use the surname
of the father, provided the registration is supported by the following documents:
xxxx
7.2. For Births Previously Registered under the Surname of the Mother
7.2.1 If filiation has been expressly recognized by the father, the child shall use the surname of the
father upon the submission of the accomplished AUSF [Affidavit of Use of the Surname of the Father].
7.2.2 If filiation has not been expressly recognized by the father, the child shall use the surname of
the father upon submission of a public document or a private handwritten instrument supported by the
documents listed in Rule 7.1.2.
7.3 Except in Item 7.2.1, the consent of the illegitimate child is required if he/she has reached the
age of majority. The consent may be contained in a separate instrument duly notarized.
xxxx
Rule 8. Effects of Recognition
8.1 For Births Not Yet Registered
8.1.1 The surname of the father shall be entered as the last name of the child in the Certificate of
Live Birth. The Certificate of Live Birth shall be recorded in the Register of Births.
xxxx
8.2 For Births Previously Registered under the Surname of the Mother
8.2.1 If admission of paternity was made either at the back of the Certificate of Live Birth or in a
separate public document or in a private handwritten document, the public document or AUSF shall be
recorded in the Register of Live Birth and the Register of Births as follows:
"The surname of the child is hereby changed from (original surname) to (new surname) pursuant to
RA 9255."
The original surname of the child appearing in the Certificate of Live Birth and Register of Births shall
not be changed or deleted.
8.2.2 If filiation was not expressly recognized at the time of registration, the public document or AUSF
shall be recorded in the Register of Legal Instruments. Proper annotation shall be made in the
Certificate of Live Birth and the Register of Births as follows:
"Acknowledged by (name of father) on (date). The surname of the child is hereby changed from
(original surname) on (date) pursuant to RA 9255." (Emphasis supplied.)
Nonetheless, the hornbook rule is that an administrative issuance cannot amend a legislative act. In
MCC Industrial Sales Corp. v. Ssangyong Corporation,22 We held:

After all, the power of administrative officials to promulgate rules in the implementation of a statute is
necessarily limited to what is found in the legislative enactment itself. The implementing rules and
regulations of a law cannot extend the law or expand its coverage, as the power to amend or repeal a
statute is vested in the Legislature. Thus, if a discrepancy occurs between the basic law and an
implementing rule or regulation, it is the former that prevails, because the law cannot be broadened by
a mere administrative issuance an administrative agency certainly cannot amend an act of
Congress.

Thus, We can disregard contemporaneous construction where there is no ambiguity in law and/or the
construction is clearly erroneous.23 What is more, this Court has the constitutional prerogative and
authority to strike down and declare as void the rules of procedure of special courts and quasi- judicial
bodies24 when found contrary to statutes and/or the Constitution.25 Section 5(5), Art. VIII of the
Constitution provides:
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading,
practice and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal
assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for
the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not
diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial
bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court. (Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, We exercise this power in voiding the above-quoted provisions of the IRR of RA 9255 insofar as it
provides the mandatory use by illegitimate children of their fathers surname upon the latters
recognition of his paternity.
To conclude, the use of the word "shall" in the IRR of RA 9255 is of no moment. The clear,
unambiguous, and unequivocal use of "may" in Art. 176 rendering the use of an illegitimate fathers
surname discretionary controls, and illegitimate children are given the choice on the surnames by
which they will be known.
At this juncture, We take note of the letters submitted by the children, now aged thirteen (13) and
fifteen (15) years old, to this Court declaring their opposition to have their names changed to
"Antonio."26 However, since these letters were not offered before and evaluated by the trial court,
they do not provide any evidentiary weight to sway this Court to rule for or against petitioner.27 A
proper inquiry into, and evaluation of the evidence of, the children's choice of surname by the trial
court is necessary.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The July 24, 2012 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 96406 is MODIFIED, the dispositive portion of which shall read:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is partly GRANTED. Accordingly. the appealed Decision of the Regional Trial
Court Branch 8, Aparri Cagayan in SP Proc. Case No. 11-4492 is MODIFIED in part and shall hereinafter
read as follows:
a. [Antonio] is ORDERED to deliver the minor children Jerard Patrick and Andre Lewis to the custody of
their mother herein appellant, Grace Grande who by virtue hereof is hereby awarded the full or sole
custody of these minor children;
b. [Antonio] shall have visitation rights28 at least twice a week, and may only take the children out
upon the written consent of [Grande]:
c. The parties are DIRECTED to give and share in support of the minor children Jerard Patrick and Andre
Lewis in the amount of P30,000.00 per month at the rate of 70% for [Antonio] and 30% for [Grande];
and

d. The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8 of Aparri, Cagayan for the sole purpose
of determining the surname to be chosen by the children Jerard Patrick and Andre Lewis.
Rule 7 and Rule 8 of the Office of the Civil Registrar General Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 2004
are DISAPPROVED and hereby declared NULL and VOID.
SO ORDERED

LEGITIMATED CHILDREN
DE SANTOS vs. ANGELES GR. No. 105619 December 12, 1995
Facts:
On February 7, 1941, Dr. Antonio de Santos married Sofia Bona, which union was blessed with a
daughter, herein petitioner Maria Rosario de Santos. After some time, their relationship became
strained to the breaking point. Thereafter, Antonio fell in love with a fellow doctor, Conchita Talag,
private respondent herein. Antonio sought a formal dissolution of his first marriage by obtaining a
divorce decree from a Nevada court in 1949. Antonio proceeded to Tokyo, Japan in 1951 to marry
private respondent, with whom he had been cohabiting since his de facto separation from Sofia. This
union produced eleven children. On March 30, 1967, Sofia died in Guatemala. Less than a month later,
on April 23, 1967, Antonio and private respondent contracted a marriage in Tagaytay City celebrated
under Philippine laws. On March 8, 1981, Antonio died intestate leaving properties with an estimated
value of P15, 000,000.00. On May 15, 1981, private respondent went to court for the issuance of
letters of administration in her favour in connection with the settlement of her late husband's estate.
She alleged, among other things, that the decedent was survived by twelve legitimate heirs, namely,
herself, their ten surviving children, and petitioner. After six years of protracted intestate proceedings,
however, petitioner decided to intervene. Thus, in a motion she filed sometime in November 1987, she
argued inter alia that private respondent's children were illegitimate. This was challenged by private
respondent although the latter admitted during the hearing that all her children were born prior to
Sofia's death in 1967. The court, declared private respondent's ten children legitimated and thereupon
instituted and declared them, along with petitioner and private respondent, as the heirs of Antonio de
Santos. Hence, she filed the instant petition for certiorari on June 16, 1992, contending that since only
natural children can be legitimized, the trial court mistakenly declared as legitimated her half brothers
and sisters.
Issue:
Whether or not natural children by legal fiction be legitimized.
Ruling:
Art. 269. Only natural children can be legitimated. Children born outside wedlock of parents, who, at
the time of the conception of the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other,
are natural. In other words, a child's parents should not have been disqualified to marry each other at
the time of conception for him to qualify as a "natural child."
Persons and Family Relation
435

In the case at bench, there is no question that all the children born to private respondent and
deceased Antonio de Santos were conceived and born when the latter's valid marriage to petitioner's
mother was still subsisting. That private respondent and the decedent were married abroad after the
latter obtained in Nevada, U.S.A. a decree of divorce from his legitimate wife does not change this fact,
for a divorce granted abroad was not recognized in this jurisdiction at the time. Evidently, the
decedent was aware of this fact, which is why he had to have the marriage solemnized in Tokyo,
outside of the Philippines. It may be added here that he was likewise aware of the nullity of the Tokyo
marriage for after his legitimate, though estranged wife died, he hastily contracted another marriage
with private respondent, this time here in Tagaytay, attention must be drawn to the fact that this case
has been decided under the provisions of the Civil Code, not the Family Code which now recognizes
only two classes of children: legitimate and illegitimate. "Natural children by legal fiction" are nothing if
not pure fiction.

REPUBLIC VS CAPOTE
Case Doctrines:
A petition for change of name must be heard in an adversarial proceeding; it cannot be decided
through a summary proceeding
The fact that no one opposed the petition did not deprive the court of its jurisdiction to hear the
same nor does it make the proceeding less adversarial in nature.
A proceeding is adversarial where the party seeking relief has given legal warning to the other party
and afforded the latter an opportunity to contest it. All the requirements to make a proceeding
adversarial were satisfied when all interested parties were afforded the opportunity to contest the
petition.

Facts:
In 1998, respondent Trinidad R. A. Capote (guardian ad litem) filed a petition for change of name of
her ward from Giovanni Nadores Gallamaso to Giovanni Nadores. The petition alleged that: Giovanni is
the illegitimate natural child of Corazon P. Nadores and Diosdado Gallamaso; he was born on July 9,
1982, prior to the effectivity of the New Family Code; his mother made him use the surname of the
natural father despite the absence of marriage between them; from the time Giovanni was born and up
to the present, his father failed to take up his responsibilities [to him] on matters of financial, physical,
emotional and spiritual concerns; Giovanni is now fully aware of how he stands with his father and he
desires to have his surname changed to that of his mothers surname; Giovannis mother might
eventually petition him to join her in the United States and his continued use of the surname
Gallamaso, the surname of his natural father, may complicate his status as natural child; and the
change of name will be for the benefit of the minor.
Having found respondents petition sufficient in form and substance, the trial court gave due course to
the petition. Publication of the petition was ordered and the local civil registrar and the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) was notified. Since there was no opposition to the petition, respondent moved
for leave of court to present her evidence ex parte before a court-appointed commissioner. The OSG,

acting through the Provincial Prosecutor, did not object; hence, the lower court granted the motion.
After the reception of evidence, the trial court rendered a decision ordering the change of name from
Giovanni N. Gallamaso to Giovanni Nadores.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, through the OSG, filed an appeal with a lone assignment of error:
the court a quo erred in granting the petition in a summary proceeding. Ruling that the proceedings
were sufficiently adversarial in nature as required, the CA affirmed the RTC decision ordering the
change of name.
Petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court contending that the CA erred in affirming the trial courts
decision which granted the petition for change of name despite the non-joinder of indispensable
parties. The purported parents and all other persons who may be adversely affected by the childs
change of name should have been made respondents to make the proceeding adversarial.

Issues:
1. Whether or not the petition for change of name should be granted.
2. Is a proceeding for change of name adversarial?
3. Did Capote comply with the requirement for an adversarial proceeding?
4. When is a proceeding considered adversarial?

Held:

1. Yes. The law and facts obtaining here favor Giovannis petition. Giovanni availed of the proper
remedy, a petition for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, and complied with all the
procedural requirements. After hearing, the trial court found (and the appellate court affirmed) that the
evidence presented during the hearing of Giovannis petition sufficiently established that, under Art.
176 of the Civil Code, Giovanni is entitled to change his name as he was never recognized by his father
while his mother has always recognized him as her child. A change of name will erase the impression
that he was ever recognized by his father. It is also to his best interest as it will facilitate his mothers
intended petition to have him join her in the United States. This Court will not stand in the way of the
reunification of mother and son.
2. The OSG is correct in stating that a petition for change of name must be heard in an adversarial
proceeding. Unlike petitions for the cancellation or correction of clerical errors in entries in the civil
registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, a petition for change of name under Rule 103 cannot be
decided through a summary proceeding. There is no doubt that this petition does not fall under Rule
108 for it is not alleged that the entry in the civil registry suffers from clerical or typographical errors.
The relief sought clearly goes beyond correcting erroneous entries in the civil registry, although by
granting the petition, the result is the same in that a corresponding change in the entry is also required
to reflect the change in name.
3. Capote complied with the requirement for an adversarial proceeding by posting in a newspaper of
general circulation notice of the filing of the petition. The lower court also furnished the OSG a copy
thereof. Despite the notice, no one came forward to oppose the petition including the OSG. The fact
that no one opposed the petition did not deprive the court of its jurisdiction to hear the same nor does
it make the proceeding less adversarial in nature. The lower court is still expected to exercise its
judgment to determine whether the petition is meritorious or not and not merely accept as true the
arguments propounded. Considering that the OSG neither opposed the petition nor the motion to

present its evidence ex parte when it had the opportunity to do so, it cannot now complain that the
proceedings in the lower court were not adversarial enough.
4. A proceeding is adversarial where the party seeking relief has given legal warning to the other party
and afforded the latter an opportunity to contest it. Respondent gave notice of the petition through
publication as required by the rules. With this, all interested parties were deemed notified and the
whole world considered bound by the judgment therein. In addition, the trial court gave due notice to
the OSG by serving a copy of the petition on it. Thus, all the requirements to make a proceeding
adversarial were satisfied when all interested parties, including petitioner as represented by the OSG,
were afforded the opportunity to contest the petition (Republic of the Philippines vs Trinidad R. A.
Capote, G.R. No. 157043, February 2, 2007).