Nov 17 Coulter Resp. Mtn. To Dismiss

STATE OF COLORADO
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE COURTS

CASE NO.OS20160024
Administrative State Court
1525 Sherman Street
Denver, Colorado 80203
Web page: www.Colorado.gov/OAC
Phone 303-866-2000
_________________________________
PETER COULTER,
Complainant,
v.
COLORADO JUDICIARY et.al.,
Respondents.
Peter Coulter, pro se

151 Summer Street,#654
Morrison, Colorado, 80465
Phone 720 549-5349
TransparentCourts@gmail.com
COMPLAINANTS MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION
TO JUDICIARYS, DENVER JUDGES, CBAs and 104.3FM
MOTIONS TO DISMISS
COMPLAINANT, Peter Coulter pro-se. files this Opposition
Memorandum brief to the Respondent, State Judicial Branchs
[Judiciary]1 Renewed Motion to Dismiss dated November 10, 2016
which only renews their original Judiciarys Motion to Dismiss
for Failure to State a Claim which was filed on October 28th,
For Appellate reference, [as referenced in their Motion] Judiciary includes all Judges and Magistrates of all
Colorado District Courts, the Appellate Court and Colorado Supreme Court.
Page 1 of 49
COMPLAINANTS MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO JUDICIARYS, DENVER JUDGES, CBAs and

104.3FM MOTIONS TO DISMISS
2016, addressing Mr. Coulters Original Complaint filed October

19, 2106, and not addressing his First Amended Complaint filed
November 3rd, 2016, 5 days subsequent to Respondents original
Motion to Dismiss which has extensive changes to the claims for
relief; Respondent Denver County Judges Jurisdictional Motion to
Dismiss filed November 10, and Respondents Colorado Broadcasters
Association
and 104.3FM The Fan Renewed Motion to Dismiss filed
November 10, 20102

At a Motions hearing held November 4th, Judge Spencer
corrected Mr. Coulters First Amended Complaint of Complainant
by verifying that the Complainant meant Colorado Constitution
Article XXVIII Section 2 Definitions 12(a)3 not the typo error
2a.
Additionally, the Court had Mr. Coulter redline changes
in Amended Complaint, including extensive changes in all the
claims for relief, and serve copies on each Respondents
counsel, on November 7th, 2016.
This Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss on November 1, 2016 to Complainants Original Complaint.
Complainant filed an Amended Complaint, accepted by the Court, on November 3 rd with extensive changes in the
claims for relief which the Court had me redline for all the Respondents review. This Respondent then provided a
renewed Motion but didnt address any of the changes and just directed the Court back to their original Motion.
3
Colo. Const. Art. XXVIII, Section 2 (12) (a) "Political committee" means any person, other than a natural
person, or any group of two or more persons ,including natural persons that have accepted or made
contributions or expenditures in excess of $200 to support or oppose the nomination or election of one or
more candidates.
Page 2 of 49

Commented [PC1]:
Respondent Judiciary, Denver County Judges, CBA and 104.3FM

filed their Motion to Dismiss under CRCP 12b on November 10.
Complainant files this Memorandum in Opposition to all 3
Motions as follows:
1. Filing dates for Renewed Motions to Dismiss and Objections

thereto set by Justice Robert Spencer of the Office of
Administrative Courts [OAC] on November 4th, 2016.
2. The Complainant references his First Amended Complaint as though
fully re-written herein.
3.
Complainant reserves his right to Amend his Complaint and

any subsequent documents when Respondents Judiciary and/or
Colorado Broadcasters Association release the names of
Respondents unknown radio stations.
4.
Complainant restates that he is a pro-se litigant4 due to

the nature of the suit and the inclusion of the entire State
Judicial Branch as Respondents, it is impossible to retain
qualified counsel due to perceived and/or real retribution by
the various members of the Judiciary including Judges toward
respective attorneys and members of their legal firms, in the
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 520 (1971); Pro-se case law.
Page 3 of 49

future. I personally know of attorneys that have been wrongfully

threatened by the past director of the Colorado Supreme Court
Office of Attorney Regulation, Mr. John Gleason, for their
boldness in challenging the status quo of the Judiciary.
Additionally, I have also personally experienced my own retained
attorneys purposely sabotaging my case to save their own skin
resulting in the continued disputed ownership of a $4,000,000
property and the leaving of a Supreme Court Judge and Director
of the Office of Attorney Regulation who were involved.
5.
And now, Respondents Judiciary and Colorado Broadcasters

Association
(CBA) have refused to release the names of
associate respondents unknown radio stations in deference to

their own Respondent Colorado Supreme Court rules, necessitating
Respondents Forthwith Amended Motion to Compel.5
PREFACE
There are 5 key parts of the Colorado Constitution Article
XXVIII and the Fair Campaign Practice Act (FCPA) that the
Court must keep in mind at all stages of these proceedings
including these Motions to Dismiss.
A. Colo. Const. Art. XXVIII, Section 1:
Purpose and findingsThe people of the state of Colorado hereby find and declare that large
campaign contributions to political candidates create the potential for corruption and the
5
Motion to Compel denied by the Court on November 14, 2016.
Page 4 of 49

appearance of corruption; that large campaign contributions made to influence election outcomes
allow wealthy individuals, corporations, and special interest groups to exercise a disproportionate
level of influence over the political process; that the rising costs of campaigning for political office
prevent qualified citizens from running for political office; that because of the use of early voting in
Colorado timely notice of independent expenditures is essential for informing the electorate; that
in recent years the advent of significant spending on electioneering communications, as defined
herein, has frustrated the purpose of existing campaign finance requirements; that independent
research has demonstrated that the vast majority of televised electioneering communications
goes beyond issue discussion to express electoral advocacy; that political contributions from
corporate treasuries are not an indication of popular support for the corporation's political ideas
and can unfairly influence the outcome of Colorado elections; and that the interests of the public
are best served by limiting campaign contributions, encouraging voluntary campaign spending
limits, providing for full and timely disclosure of campaign contributions, independent
expenditures, and funding of electioneering communications, and strong enforcement of
campaign finance requirements.
Colo. Const. art. XXVIII, 1. Section 1 explicitly states

that the purpose of article XXVIII is to limit the
disproportionate influence that wealthy individuals,
corporations, and special interest groups can have over the
electoral process because the interests of the public are
best served by [such regulation.] COLORADO ETHICS WATCH v.
SENATE MAJORITY FUND LLC, (Colo. Supreme Ct.)
269 P.3d
1248 2012 WL 566947 (2012). See Colo. Const. art. XXVIII,

1,
The people of the state of Colorado hereby find and
declare that large campaign contributions to political

candidates create the potential for corruption and the
appearance of corruption Keim v. Douglas County School
District, Colorado Court of Appeals, Div. I. May 07, 2015 -- P.3d 2015.
B. Colorado Constitution Article XXVIII Section 11. Conflicting provisions declared

inapplicable.
Page 5 of 49

Any provisions in the statutes of this state in conflict or inconsistent with this article are hereby
declared to be inapplicable to the matters covered and provided for in this Article.
C. The notes of the Legislature concerning their thoughts on who should be included.
D. Statutory and Constitutional Construction:
Courts should ascertain voter intent in adopting a

constitutional amendment by giving words their ordinary and
popular meaning, without engaging in narrow or overly technical
construction of the language. COLORADO CITIZENS FOR ETHICS IN
GOVERNMENT v. COMMITTEE for AMERICAN DREAM Colo. Ct. App.
187P3rd1207(2008). Courts must favor a construction of a
constitutional amendment that will render every word operative,
rather than one that may make some words idle or nugatory. Id.
Courts must favor a construction of a constitutional amendment
that will render every word operative, rather than one that may
make some words idle or nugatory. Id. Courts seek to ascertain
legislative intent, starting with the plain language of the
statute and giving the words their ordinary meaning; if that
language is unambiguous, courts look no further. Id. When
construing a statute, we seek to ascertain and effectuate the
intent of the General Assembly. State v. Nieto, 993 P.2d 493,
500 (Colo. 2000). Initially, we look to the language of the
statute, and give words and phrases effect according to their
plain and ordinary meaning. Robbins v. People, 107 P.3d 384, 387
Colo. 2005).
All of Respondents Motions to Dismiss juke these Constitutional
and Statutory mandates in a concerted effort that just because
they are the Judiciary, with all its power and influence6, they
are exempted from campaign finance mandates when in fact Article
Retired Chief Justice of the Colorado Supreme Court, Rebecca Kourlis, scribed in her book TransparentCourts that
the public follows the recommendations of the Judicial Performance Commissions TO RETAIN or DO NOT RETAIN in
the Blue Book over 99% of the time as was witnessed in this last election on November 8, 2016. The Respondent
Judiciary is therefore considered a special interest group that can exercise a disproportionate level of influence
over the political process.
Page 6 of 49

XXVIII and FCPA were expressly enacted for such entities with a
large influence. Thomas Jefferson is quoted as stating:
The germ of dissolution of our federal government is in the constitution of the federal
Judiciary; an irresponsible body (for impeachment is scarcely a scare-crow) working
like gravity by night and by day, gaining a little today and a little tomorrow, and advancing
its noiseless step like a thief, over the field of jurisdiction, until all shall be usurped. (Letter
to Charles Hammond, August 18, 1821)
The Respondent Judiciary has already self-exempted from Colorado Open Records Act in a
very suspicious, if not unlawful manner7; hiding now in the shadows with no Transparency
or Accountability of their actions.
Two years ago, when Matt Arnold started Clear the bench Colorado; judicial Retain votes
dropped 20% to the low 60 percentiles. At Judicial Performance Meetings, they called it the
Matt Arnold Effect and were already looking for ways to counter his efforts. These
political candidate committees are their answer. They directed traffic to their web site
where they recommended Retention for some judges, and Do not Retain for others; not
unlike Mr. Arnolds Clear the Bench Colorado and my own campaign, Transparent Courts,
where we ask the populous to take pledges to not retain any judge until the Judiciary
becomes 100% Transparent and Accountable. The only difference is the level of influence
over the political process that the Colorado Judicial Branch has being the 3rd branch of
Government with over 3,900 members/employees. And a far greater concern is that they
are not only the Respondent here, they will be the Referee as well in any appeals.
In Gleason v. Judicial Watch, both the Appellate Court and Supreme Court members should have self- recused
themselves when deciding issues that directly affected them in accord with Judicial Ethics and Professional
Conduct mandates. It was a prime example of Judicial Legislation Activism, where the Supreme Court did not
even grant Certiorari to review the decision of the Appellate Court.
Page 7 of 49

I.FACTS
6.
Respondent Judiciary contracted with Respondent CBA,

104.3FM THE FAN, (104.3FM) and unknown radio stations to air
media ads beginning October 1 and ending November 8th, election
day.8
7. On the Morning of October 3rd, I heard the Radio Ads of

Respondents on 104.3FM. The ads were narrated by Governor
Hickenlooper telling the public to go to a link web address9
which went directly to the web page of Respondent Judiciary
Division, Judicial Performance Commission10.
8. The link address [Gettoknowyourjudge.com]is personally owned
by Mr. Daniel Sosa. Mr. Sosa is listed as Program Analyst on
the contact page of the Judiciary web site.
Per Go Daddy, the
host, the web page has never had any content and all traffic was
directed to www.ColoradoJudicialPerformance.gov, the Judicial
Performance Commissions home page. As of November 14, 2016, the
Link page, www.Gettoknowyourjudge.com has been unpublished.
9. On Respondent Judiciarys linked home page, there are
recommendations of various judicial commissions throughout the
8
See Exhibit 4 of First Amended Complaint.

Gettoknowyourjudge.com
10
http://www.coloradojudicialperformance.gov/
9
Page 8 of 49

state to either to vote to RETAIN a respective judge; or in two

cases recommendations to vote to DO NOT RETAIN respective
Judges. Additionally, the State Judicial Commission makes
recommendations to Retain all Appellate Judges and Justice Hood
of the Colorado Supreme Court.
10.
Their political candidate recommendations are no
different than the vote recommendations of
political candidate
committee ClearthebenchColorado.org and/or TransparentCourts,

both which have fulfilled the requirement of registering and
filing financial records with the Colorado Secretary of State.
11.
At the Monthly hearing of the JPC on Oct 3rd, 2016, Mr.
Wagner indicated that the ads started October 1st and were to
last through November 8th 2016, Election Day.[Emphasis added]
12.
Mr. Wagner went on to remind the Commissioners that they
appropriated $50,000 during the summer to finance the campaign.

13.
I one point during the hearing, I asked Mr. Wagner about
complying with Campaign Finance and his response was that the
Commission was acting in accord with the Judicial Performance
Statute instruction to Educate the public and therefore it did
Page 9 of 49

not need to comply with Constitutional and/or Statutory Campaign

Finance mandates.11
III. DISCUSSION
14.
[In Motions to Dismiss] we accept all allegations in the
complaint as true and view them in the light most favorable to

the non-moving party. Bly v. Story, 241 P.3d 529, 533
(Colo.2010) Dismissal under C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5) is only proper
where the factual allegations in the complaint cannot, as a
matter of law, support the claim for relief. Rosenthal v. Dean
Witter Reynolds, Inc., 908 P.2d 1095, 1099 (Colo.1995). Motions
to dismiss for failure to state a claim are disfavored and
should not be granted if relief is available under any theory of
law. Dorman v. Petrol Aspen, Inc., 914 P.2d 909, 911 (Colo.1996)
15.
The primary campaign finance law in Colorado is article
XXVIII of the Colorado Constitution, which was proposed by

citizen's initiative as Amendment 27 and adopted by popular vote
in 2002. As the preamble to Amendment 27 states, it was passed
in an effort to mitigate the fact that large campaign
contributions to political candidates create the potential for
corruption and the appearance of corruption. Colo. Const. art.
11
Listen to Audio Exhibit 17 of Complainants First Amended Complaint starting at 1 minute, 50 sec.
https://www.scribd.com/document/329938833/First-Amended-Complaint
Page 10 of 49

XXVIII, 1. Section 1 explicitly states that the purpose of

article XXVIII is to limit the disproportionate influence that
wealthy individuals, corporations, and special interest groups
can have over the electoral process because the interests of
the public are best served by [such regulation]. Id. To that
end, article XXVIII encourages voluntary spending limits and
imposes reporting requirements, disclosure rules, and
contribution limits on certain entities, including political
committees. Id. 35, 7. Article XXVIII vests the secretary
of state with the authority both to promulgate regulations to
facilitate the enforcement of the amendment and to levy
substantial civil penalties against violators. Id. 9, 10.
COLORADO ETHICS WATCH v. SENATE MAJORITY FUND Colo. Sup. Ct. 269
P.3d 1248 (2012)
16.
When interpreting a constitutional amendment adopted by
citizen's initiative, we give effect to the electorate's intent

in enacting the amendment. Davidson v. Sandstrom, 83 P.3d 648,
654 (Colo.2004). To determine what the voters intended, we give
*1254 words their ordinary and popular meaning. Id. If the
language of an amendment is clear and unambiguous, then it must
be enforced as written. In re Interrogatories Relating to the
Great Outdoors Colorado Trust Fund, 913 P.2d 533, 538
(Colo.1996). If, however, the language of an amendment is
Page 11 of 49

susceptible to multiple interpretations, then we construe the

amendment in light of the objective sought to be achieved and
the mischief to be avoided by the amendment. Zaner v. City of
Brighton, 917 P.2d 280, 283 (Colo.1996). The electorate, as
well as the legislature, must be presumed to know the existing
law at the time [it] amend[s] or clarif[ies] that law. Common
Sense Alliance v. Davidson, 995 P.2d 748, 754 (Colo.2000).
Hence, to resolve this case, we determine if there was a settled
definition of express advocacy when the voter initiative was
adopted by the citizens of Colorado in 2002.
17.
Within the field of campaign finance law, express
advocacy was first defined in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 96

S.Ct. 612, 46 L.Ed.2d 659. There, the Supreme Court reviewed a
challenge to the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA),
which, among other things, limited the amount spent on
independent communications made relative to a clearly
identifiable candidate. Id. at 7, 96 S.Ct. 612 (emphasis
added). After first determining that contribution limits
implicate a fundamental First Amendment rightpolitical speech
the Court proceeded to hold that the limit on independent
expenditures was unconstitutionally vague because it failed to
clearly mark the boundary between permissible and impermissible
speech. Id. at 14, 41, 96 S.Ct. 612. The court reasoned that
Page 12 of 49

even if relative to was interpreted to cover only speech that

could be reasonably understood as advocating for or against a
candidate, the regulation was still constitutionally infirm
because the distinction between discussion of issues and
candidates and advocacy of election or defeat of candidates may
often dissolve in practical application. Id. at 42, 96 S.Ct.
612. In other words, because there is often significant overlap
between candidates and the issues that they champion or oppose,
the Court was concerned that independent speech related to
issues could be interpreted by some to implicate a candidate and
thus trigger the contribution limitation. See id. at 4243, 96
S.Ct. 612. This would be unconstitutional because if speech is
primarily about an issue and not a candidate, the governmental
interest in preventing corruption dissolves and can no longer be
used to justify the restriction on political speech. Id. at 47
51, 96 S.Ct. 612.
22 Accordingly, the Buckley Court held that the limitation on
independent expenditures could only be upheld as constitutional
if it were defined in the narrowest terms. Id. at 44, 96 S.Ct.
612. The Court held that the limitation must be construed to
apply only to expenditures for communications that in express
terms advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified
candidate for federal office. Id. In a now famous footnote, the
Page 13 of 49

Court elaborated that [t]his construction would restrict the

application of [the limitation] to communications containing
express words of advocacy or defeat, such as vote for,
elect, support, cast your ballot for, Smith for
Congress, vote against, defeat, reject. 6 Id. at 44 n.
52, 96 S.Ct. 612. By interpreting the independent expenditure
limitation as narrowly as possible and limiting its application
to only those words that explicitly advocate the election or
defeat of a candidate, the Buckley Court was thus able to uphold
the statute as constitutional. Id. at 4445, 96 S.Ct. 612. As a
result, the use or omission of the magic words has come to
serve as a bright line rule separating express advocacy, which
can be regulated, from issue advocacy, which cannot be
regulated. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 126, 124 S.Ct. 619,
157 L.Ed.2d 491 (2003), overruled in part by Citizens United v.
FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 130 S.Ct. 876, 175 L.Ed.2d 753 (2010).
23 In the aftermath of Buckley, every court that has
confronted this issue has interpreted footnote 52 to cover not
only the magic words, but also other synonymous words or
phrases that clearly advocate for or *1255 against the election
of a candidate. See Glenn J. Moramarco, Magic Words and the Myth
of Certainty, 1 Election L.J. 387, 393 n. 37 (2002) (collecting
cases). Generally, these courts have reasoned that the inclusion
Page 14 of 49

of such as before the list of magic words in footnote 52

indicates that the list was non-exhaustive and thus that the
Court was merely attempting to provide guidance to lower courts
in the future. Id. at 393.
18.
Less than two years before the adoption of article XXVIII,
this interpretation of footnote 52 was adopted in Colorado by a

panel of the court of appeals in League of Women Voters v.
Davidson, 23 P.3d 1266. There, on facts similar to this case, a
non-profit corporation was alleged to have violated Colorado's
Fair Campaign Finance Act (FCFA),7 145101 to 118, C.R.S.
(2001), which placed registration, reporting, and disclosure
requirements on political committees, including organizations
that engaged in independent expenditures for the purpose of
advocating the election or defeat of a candidate. 145
103(7), 103(10)(a), C.R.S. (2001). The plaintiffs alleged that
the non-profit violated the FCFA through the production and
distribution of eight ads, each containing the picture and issue
positions of a candidate or several candidates. League of Women
Voters, 23 P.3d at 126869. Although the plaintiffs conceded
that none of the ads contained any of the magic words listed
in Buckley, they argued that subsection 103(7) went beyond the
narrow scope of Buckley to also cover speech that could only be
Page 15 of 49

interpreted to unambiguouslybut not necessarily explicitly

advocate for the election or defeat of a candidate. Id. at 1276.
25 The League of Women Voters court rejected this approach on
the grounds that it was too vague and too overbroad to survive
the constitutional framework set forth in Buckley. Id. ([A]
narrow or strict interpretation of Buckley is appealing ...
[because] it affords the greatest First Amendment
protection....). Rather than apply a strict magic words test,
however, the court interpreted Buckley's use of the phrase such
as to preface the list of magic words in footnote 52 to mean
that the listed words and phrases constitute an exemplary, not
exclusive, list. Id. at 1277. Accordingly, the court
interpreted Buckley to permit the regulation of speech that used
either the magic words or substantially similar or synonymous
words. Id. The court held that this definition of express
advocacy was constitutional under Buckley because [u]nlike the
broad context-based approach, this approach remains focused on
actual words, not images, symbols, or other contextual factors.
Id. Although the court acknowledged that this test could easily
be circumnavigated by speech that implies rather than explicitly
advocates for the election or defeat of a candidate, it
nonetheless recognized that this careful parsing is required to
protect the most cherished form of free speech, political
Page 16 of 49

speech. Id. at 127677. The court of appeals opinion in League

of Women Voters was not appealed.
10 26 Accordingly, following League of Women Voters, Colorado
law was clear that express advocacy was limited to speech that
contained either Buckley's magic words or substantially
similar synonyms, which explicitly exhort the viewer or reader
to vote for or against a candidate in an upcoming election. Less
than twenty months later, with no intervening alterations to
Colorado campaign finance law, the voters passed Amendment 27,
which explicitly defined expenditure as a payment made for
the purpose of expressly advocating the election or defeat of a
candidate. Colo. Const. art. XXVIII, 2(8)(a) (emphasis
added). Because we presume that the electorate was aware of the
legal significance of the term expressly advocated when
article XXVIII was adopted by voter initiative in 2002, we hold
that the voters intended to define political *1256 committees
as those organizations that engage in communications that
utilize either the magic words or substantially similar
synonyms. Nevertheless, Ethics Watch argues that under the plain
meanings of the words express and advocacy, the definition
of expenditure in section 2(8) of article XXVIII was clearly
intended to cover all ads that unmistakably communicate support
or opposition to a candidate. See Black's Law Dictionary 661
Page 17 of 49

(9th ed. 2009) (defining express as [c]learly and

unmistakably communicated); id. at 64 (defining advocacy as
[t]he act of pleading for or actively supporting a cause).
This interpretation of article XXVIII, however, would require us
to ignore the settled definition of express advocacy that
existed at the time that Amendment 27 was adopted by the voters.
Under Common Sense Alliance, we presume that the electorate knew
the existing law when it adopted a definition of expenditure
that was limited to those ads that expressly advocat[e] the
election or defeat of a candidate. 995 P.2d at 754; see also
City & County of Denver v. Rinker, 148 Colo. 441, 446, 366 P.2d
548, 550 (1961) ([T]here is a presumption that all laws are
passed with knowledge of those already existing....). As
explained above, in Colorado in 2002, express advocacy was a
term of art used to define a discrete category of political
speech. Accordingly, we presume that the voters chose this
phrase intentionally in defining expenditures in an effort to
balance the public concerns related to the impact of independent
financing in elections and the constitutional concerns outlined
in Buckley, which prohibit limitations on speech that are vague
or overinclusive. While Ethics Watch argues that this is an
overly technical reading of article XXVIII, it appears to us
from decades of campaign finance jurisprudence that express
Page 18 of 49

advocacy represents a technical term with a technical

definition that was correctly recognized and applied in League
of Women Voters. See, e.g., Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44, 96 S.Ct.
612; FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238,
24951, 107 S.Ct. 616, 93 L.Ed.2d 539 (1986) (holding that a
publication that listed pro-life candidates and urged readers to
vote for pro-life candidates constituted express advocacy
because the publication was an explicit directive); Citizens
for Responsible Gov't v. Davidson, 236 F.3d 1174, 1187 (10th
Cir.2000) (explaining that express words of advocacy [are] not
simply a helpful way to identify express advocacy ... the
inclusion of such words [is] constitutionally required for
campaign finance regulations to be valid under the First
Amendment).
29 This interpretation is consistent with the intent of the
voters as evinced by the explanation of Amendment 27 in the 2002
Bluebook. Colo. Legislative Council, Research Pub. No. 5027,
2002 Ballot Information Booklet: Analysis of Statewide Ballot
Issues 45 (2002) [hereinafter Bluebook 2002]; see In re
Interrogatories on House Bill 991325, 979 P.2d 549, 554
(Colo.1999) ([A] court may ascertain the intent of the voters
by considering other relevant matters such as ... the biennial
Bluebook, which is the analysis of ballot proposals prepared
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by the legislature.). The Bluebook distinguished between

expenditures and electioneering communications by defining
expenditures as the types of political advertisements that
specifically urge the election or defeat of a candidate.
Bluebook 2002 at 4 (emphasis original). In contrast, the
Bluebook described electioneering communications as the type
of political advertisement ... that clearly refers to a
candidate without specifically urging the election or defeat of
the candidate. Id. at 5 (emphasis original). Thus, the Bluebook
distinguished between electioneering communications, which
merely refer to a candidate without advocating for his or her
election or defeat, and expenditures, which actively instruct
the viewer or reader to take action for or against a candidate.
30 Ethics Watch argues in the alternative that, even if
express advocacy had a settled technical definition in
Colorado at the time that Amendment 27 was adopted, subsequent
jurisprudence from the U.S. Supreme Court requires a more
expansive interpretation under the First Amendment. Ethics Watch
contends that both McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 124 S.Ct. 619,
overruled in part *1257 by Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310, 130
S.Ct. 876, and FEC v. WRTL, 551 U.S. 449, 127 S.Ct. 2652,
mandate that if express advocacy is to provide a workable
standard, it must be interpreted to include advertisements that
Page 20 of 49

are the functional equivalent of express advocacy, which

includes ads that are susceptible to no other reasonable
interpretation than as an appeal to vote for or against a
candidate.We disagree with Ethics Watch's reading of these cases
and decline to adopt a functional equivalence test for express
advocacy,' which we believe could potentially violate the
vagueness and overbreadth concerns at the heart of Buckley.
While it is true that these recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions
have approved of something akin to a functional equivalence
test, both of these decisions can be distinguished because they
involved electioneering communications, which are statutorily
defined to apply in more limited circumstances than the express
advocacy at issue in the present case.
In McConnell, the Court
rejected a facial challenge to the recently enacted Bipartisan

Campaign Reform Act's (BCRA) application to electioneering
communications. 540 U.S. at 19697, 124 S.Ct. 619. The BCRA
placed significant disclosure requirements on groups or persons
who fund electioneering communications, which the Act defined
as any advertisement that: (1) is broadcast on radio or
television; (2) clearly identifies a candidate for federal
office; (3) airs within either thirty days of a primary or sixty
days of a general election; and (4) targets an identified
audience of at least 50,000 listeners or viewers. Id. at 194,
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124 S.Ct. 619. Although the Court recognized that this

definition applied to both express advocacy and the functional
equivalent of express advocacy (that is, something beyond the
magic words), it reasoned that because the definition of
electioneering communication was easily understood and
objectively determinable, it could survive the vagueness
concerns that drove [its] analysis in Buckley. Id. at 19294,
19697, 124 S.Ct. 619. Importantly, however, the Court
recognized that speech that is the functional equivalent of
express advocacy is different from express advocacy, which is
narrowly defined as speech containing the magic words. Id. at
19192, 124 S.Ct. 619. In WRTL, the Court again interpreted the
BCRA's limitations on electioneering communications, but in
this instance held that the regulation was unconstitutional as
applied to three particular advertisements. 551 U.S. at 481, 127
S.Ct. 2652. There, the Court overturned the regulation of
advertisements opposing Senator Feingold's efforts to filibuster
the president's judicial appointments as electioneering
communications. Id. at 45860, 127 S.Ct. 2652. Although the ads
clearly identified Senator Feingold and were broadcast within
the electioneering window to a target audience of more than
50,000 voters, the Court held that the regulation of the ads as
electioneering communications was unconstitutional as applied
Page 22 of 49

because the ads could reasonably be interpreted as something

other than an appeal to vote for or against Senator Feingold.
Id. The Court held that when applied to an ad that could
reasonably be interpreted as pure issue advocacy, the regulation
served to unconstitutionally chill protected political speech.
Id. at 469, 127 S.Ct. 2652.
Notably, the WRTL Court instructed
that in determining whether speech could reasonably be construed

as not advocating for the election or defeat of a candidate,
courts must look at the words used in the ad and not the
intention behind them: [A]n intent-based test would chill core
political speech. Id. at 46870, 127 S.Ct. 2652. The Court
feared that such a test would open[ ] the door to a trial on
every ad ... on the theory that the speaker actually intended to
affect an election. Id. at 468, 127 S.Ct. 2652. The Court
reasoned that the threat of such burdensome litigation would
serve as a deterrent and chill protected political speech. Id.
at 46870, 127 S.Ct. 2652. Accordingly, the Court narrowed the
field of speech that fell under the BCRA's regulation of
electioneering communications to only those ads that are
susceptible of no reasonable interpretation other than as an
appeal to vote for or against a specific candidate. Id. at 470,
127 S.Ct. 2652.
Page 23 of 49

Unlike the definition of electioneering communication at issue

in McConnell and WRTL, the definition of expenditure in
article XXVIII of the Colorado Constitution does not expand
beyond speech that falls under the definition of express
advocacy. Although both McConnell and WRTL allow for some
regulation of speech that is more than just express advocacy,
the Supreme Court was clear in each instance that these
limitations were tolerable because of the objective and brightline criteria used to define electioneering communications
under the BCRA. See WRTL, 551 U.S. at 474 n. 7, 127 S.Ct. 2652.
In other words, the Supreme Court was willing to tolerate the
broader scope of speech that fit under the definition of
electioneering communication precisely because of that
regulation's more narrow application.
In contrast to electioneering communications, which are
narrowly defined by the timing, medium, and reach of such ads,
our constitutional limitations on political committees that
make expenditures apply regardless of the timing or format of
any ads that cost more than $200.8 Thus, if we were to expand our
definition of expenditure in article XXVIII beyond a literal
interpretation of express advocacy to also cover speech that
is the functional equivalent of express advocacy, our law might
violate the vagueness and overbreadth concerns from Buckley that
Page 24 of 49

are the bedrock of all campaign finance and political speech

jurisprudence. WRTL, 551 U.S. at 474, 127 S.Ct. 2652 (Where the
First Amendment is implicated, the tie goes to the speaker, not
the censor.).
Given the well-settled definition of express advocacy from
League of Women Voters at the time Amendment 27 was adopted, we
decline to make a leap that could potentially render article
XXVIII unconstitutional under the federal constitution. Accord
Mesa Cnty. Bd. of Comm'rs v. State, 203 P.3d 519, 527
(Colo.2009) (explaining that when we review a statute, we
presume that the legislature intended the statute to be
constitutional); see also Bickel v. City of Boulder, 885 P.2d
215, 229 (Colo.1994) (explaining that a citizen's initiative
should not be interpreted so as to arrive at an absurd or
unreasonable result). A functional equivalence test might be
found to create an unwieldy standard that would be difficult to
apply and, as a result, potentially serve to unconstitutionally
chill protected political speech. WRTL, 551 U.S. at 46869, 127
S.Ct. 2652. Therefore, we decline to adopt the expansive
interpretation put forth by Ethics Watch.
Having determined the meaning of express advocacy, we apply
this definition to the facts of the case at hand. Under de novo
review, we conclude that the court of appeals did not err in
Page 25 of 49

affirming the dismissal of Ethics Watch's complaint against SMF

and CLF because none of the seventeen ads at issue contained any
of the magic words or substantially similar synonyms that
explicitly urged a vote for or against a candidate. It was
stipulated by all parties that the seventeen ads at issue merely
identify candidates by name and/or picture, identify the offices
for which the candidates are running, identify the positions the
candidates have taken on certain issues, favorably presents the
candidates' positions on issues, and asks the viewers or readers
to contact the candidates and thank them. As held in League of
Women Voters, these facts are insufficient to *1259 render the
ads subject to regulation as express advocacy. 23 P.3d at
1276.
Ethics Watch specially holds out one CLF print ad that states
Local leaders endorse Dave Kerber as what it claims to be a
clear violation of the magic words test. (Emphasis original).
While we agree that in some instances, endorse could be a
magic word, we also agree with the court of appeals that this
particular phrasing is insufficient. Unlike an ad that urges the
reader to endorse the candidate at the ballot box, the phrase
in this CLF ad does not exhort the reader to vote for or against
Mr. Kerber. See Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. at
249, 107 S.Ct. 616 (Buckley adopted the express advocacy
Page 26 of 49

requirement to distinguish discussion of issues and candidates

from more pointed exhortations to vote for particular
persons.).
19.
The epicenter of this case is located in 3 Spanish and 3
English versions of an ad allegedly started [according to Mr.

Kent Wagner] on October 1st 2016 and ending on November 8,
2016,[election day.]
Transcript of 30 second English version of ad:
UNKNOWN VOICE: Everybody knows the Presidential
election is important
UNKNOWN VOICE:
But when has the President dismissed
your traffic ticket or decided your child custody

case?
GOVERNOR HICKENLOOPER: Hi, Im Governor John
Hickenlooper. Voting for Judges is extremely important
to all Coloradans. Come election day, youll play an
important roll. Its your job to retain or dismiss
judges.
UNKNOWN VOICE: Find out more at
[www.]gettoknowyourjudge.com
Sponsored by the Colorado Judiciary Branch, Colorado
Broadcasters Association and this station.
GOVERNOR HICKENLOOPER: Your vote matters.
END OF AD.
20.
Contrary to statements made by Mr. Kent Wagner at the
October 3rd Meeting of the Judicial Performance Commission and in

Page 27 of 49

subsequent emails, there is never a mention that the ad is a

public service announcement or for purposes of educating the
public.
21.
Respondent CBA and 104.3FM state that they are not a
Political Committee as defined by Article XXVIII for the signing

of a contract between themselves and Respondent Judiciary.
22.
They are considered Political Committees under Article
XXVIII for their express sponsorship [at the end of each ad] of
the Political Candidate Ads. And while Complainant has reminded
and advised them on numerous occasions that they could exempt
out. They have elected not to do so. To the best of knowledge
and belief, the only reason they have not taken this road is
because they are sponsors as the ads indicate and are therefore
Political Candidate Committees supporting the recommendations of
Respondent Judiciary to vote to Retain certain Judges, or vote
DO NOT RETAIN.
23.
It is a political campaign ad with the magic words listed
in Buckley v. Valeo. Like CleartheBenchColorado.org and

Transparent Courts, the ads direct the listener directly to a
Judiciary web page where they are encouraged to vote to either
Retain or Do Not Retain respective judges in accord with
Respondent Judiciarys recommendations.
Page 28 of 49

24.
Express advocacy within meaning of campaign finance
provision of state constitution was limited to speech that

contained either magic words listed in Buckley v. Valeo or
substantially similar synonyms which explicitly exhort the
viewer or reader to vote for or against a candidate in an
upcoming election. Colo. Ethics Watch v. Senate Majority Fund,
Colo. Supreme Ct. 269 P.3d 1248 (2012).
25.
As further described in Claimants First Amended Complaint;
the recommendations put forth by the Judiciary on their web page

are the result of corrupted survey distribution, biasing the
recommendation of every judge. This cannot be portrayed as
education, as put forth by Mr. Wagner, but rather propaganda
put forth by the Judiciary to counter the effect of
ClearthebenchColorado.org and Mr. Arnold12 where retention
percentages dropped 20% after he published his recommendations
to vote to retain or not retain certain judges in 2012-2014.
26.
It is self-evident, as expressly indicated in the ad, that
Respondents Colorado Judiciary, Colorado Broadcasters

Association and various unknown radio stations are the
sponsors propagating the voting for Retention and Non-
12
State Commissioners themselves recognized the influence of Mr. Arnold in statements made at meetings in 2014
where they referred to his ability to lower retention vote percentages by 20% and started referring to the
phenomena as the Matt Arnold effect and were looking for ways to counter it.
Page 29 of 49

retention of respective judges via recommendations of Respondent

Judiciary.
27.
Counsel for the Respondent Judiciary asks the Court to
dismiss unnamed members of the said Respondent.

28.
Mrs. Cynthia Coffman, [Colorado Attorney General], Mr. Matt
Grove and Mr. Christopher Jackson [Deputy AGs]made a general

entry of appearance
on October 24, 2016 for various members of
Respondent Judiciary expressly leaving out Denver County Judges.

29.
Before the trial was cancelled by the Court and a
substitute Motions hearing scheduled for November 4th; Respondent

Judiciary refused to give the names of unknown candidates and
Complainants only choice was a shortened time for
interrogatories, which the AG objected to in discussions.
30.
Complainant filed a Motion for a shortened time to respond
to interrogatories [believing the trial was to be held on

November 4th, 2016 as scheduled] whereupon the AGs office made
their Objection to the Motion.
31.
In said Objection, the AGs office specifically states they
have made an appearance for all 3600 employees and 304 judges in
the following statement:
ARGUMENT
Coulter asks this Court to enter an order requiring
3,900 Respondents to individually answer each one of
his breathtakingly broad discovery requests within
three business days. His motion is unreasonable, and
it must be denied.
Page 30 of 49

The AGs office goes on to say:

Coulter is, in other words, demanding that the
Respondents pull together about 55,000 interrogatory
answers in five calendar days. Even if the Respondents
worked around the clock from now until the deadline,
they would have about 9 seconds for each answer.
32.
It is uncontroverted that the AGs office has made a
general appearance to represent all (emphasis added) members of

the Judiciary when they signed this Objection.
33.
Contrary to statements made by the Judiciarys council, the
ad expressly states. Sponsored by the Colorado Judiciary. It

does not say, Sponsored by the Judges of the Judiciary except
the Denver County Judges. Nor does it say, Sponsored by the
Judicial Performance Commission. Nor does it say Sponsored by
the Colorado Supreme Court. The Judiciary wanted to use its
power and influence as a whole, including clerks in Burlington
and Probation officers in Grand Junction, to persuade voters to
follow their recommendations to vote to Retain certain Judges
and not retain other judges. The correct Respondent is the
Judiciary comprised of 3600 members/employees, and 304 judges;
not some subset of the Judiciary.
34.
Additionally, Colorado Constitution Art. XXVIII Section 1
specifically addresses this type group that Campaign Finance is

trying to control with Constitutional mandates:
Page 31 of 49

The people of the state of Colorado hereby find and declare

that large campaign contributions to political candidates create
the potential for corruption and the appearance of corruption;
that large campaign contributions made to influence election
outcomes allow wealthy individuals, corporations, and special
interest groups to exercise a disproportionate level of
influence over the political process.
35.
Wherefore the Complainant, Peter Coulter would pray the
Court Deny Respondents Motion to Dismiss certain members of the

Respondent Judiciary.
36.
Respondent Judiciary goes on to indicate the issue of
serving the vast numbers of Respondent Judiciary pursuant to

CRCP Rule 4.
37.
Since the AGs office has made a general entry of
appearance for all members/employees of the Judiciary as noted

above; service has been waived and the Court has jurisdiction
over every member/employee of Judiciary. Entry of appearance by
defendant to an action waives objections to summons or service
thereof. Russell v. Craig, 10 Colo. App. 428, 51 P. 1017 (1897);
see Brown v. Amen, 147 Colo. 468, 364 P.2d 735 (1961).
38.
Wherefore the Complainant would pray that all members and
employees of Judiciary have waived service by AGs entry of

appearance in their behalf and that the Court has Jurisdiction
of all 3,900 members/employees.
Page 32 of 49

39.
The web site gettoknowyourjudge.com is privately owned by
Mr. Daniel Sosa, described as a Program Analyst on Judiciary

web page.
40.
According to GoDaddy, host administrator for
www.gettoknowyourjudge.com, the site was used strictly as a link

site to www.coloradojudicialperformance.gov and never had any
content itself. As of the date of this filing,
gettoknowyourjudge.com is no longer available on the net and to
the best of knowledge and believe was unlinked by Mr. Sosa the
day after the elections on November 9, 2016.
41.
According to contract documents, the parties to said
contract for the ads are Respondents Colorado Judiciary and

Colorado Broadcasters Association where the first line states in
bold capital type , COLORADO JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT AGREEMENT FOR
SERVICES BY INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR.
42.
Again, it is self-evident and unambiguous within the 4
corners of the document, that the parties to the contract are

Respondents Colorado Judiciary and Colorado Broadcasters
Association and not any division(s) of said parties. (emphasis
added)
43.
According to the Respondent Colorado Judiciarys own web
page; It is self-evident by the Respondents own admittance that

the Respondent Judiciary consist of 3600 employees and 304
Page 33 of 49

judges, not just divisions as put forth by the Attorney

Generals attorneys Motion and indirectly by the Denver County
Attorneys office Motion for the County Judges in
Denver.(emphasis added)
44.
These facts are highlighted in the Judiciarys Object to
Claimants Motion for interrogatories where they indirectly admit

that they will have to review over 55,000 questions through
multiplication of 3900 employees by 14 questions put forth to
each one.13 The Respondents are again admitting that the
Respondent Judiciary consists of approximately 3900 persons; not
just divisions as they now want to argue.
45.
Therefore, Respondent Judiciarys Motion to Dismiss toward
certain members of Respondent Judiciary should be DENIED.

46.
Again, it is self-evident from Respondents own admittance
on their web page that the Denver County Judges are a part of
Respondent Judiciary. There is no provision either in the
Colorado Constitution or Colorado Statutes that just because
Denver County Judges have a different method of Discipline and
13
Coulters motion should be denied.
Coulters motion is fundamentally unreasonable and must be denied for two

reasons. First, it is not physically possible for the Respondents to answer
the interrogatories in the requested timeframe. Coulter propounded fourteen
interrogatories, which all 3,900 Respondents must not only answer
individually but also supply a bevy of related documents and
information. Coulter is, in other words, demanding that the Respondents pull
together about 55,000 interrogatory answers in five calendar days.
Page 34 of 49

Retention of their judges, that they are not still a part of the
Colorado Judicial Branch [Respondent, Judiciary]for purposes of
campaign finance mandates for Political Candidate Committees. To
propose otherwise would beg the question, What branch of
Colorado government do they belong to?
47.
Therefore, the Administrative Court has Jurisdiction over
the 9 Denver County Judges as well as the employees of the

Denver County Judiciary as members of Respondent Judiciary put
forth in ads sponsored by the Colorado Judiciary Branch.
48.
Therefore, Respondent Denver County Judges Motion to
dismiss Denver County Judges from the suit should be DENIED.

49.
Respondents Judiciary did not amend their renewed Motions
to address Mr. Coulters First Amended Complaint which contained

extensive changes to every claim. Therefore the Claimant will
present arguments to every claim in the First Amended Complaint.
CONTROLLING STANDARDS
50.
Defendants Judiciary, CBA and 104.3FM have moved to dismiss
based solely on C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5), asserting that in any of the

Amended Counts for relief, Mr. Coulter failed to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted. Respondent Denver Judges move
to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction under CRCP 12b(2).
51.
C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5) motions to dismiss test a complainants
legal sufficiency to determine whether the plaintiff has

Page 35 of 49

asserted a claim for which relief may be granted. City of

Colorado Springs v. Andersen Mahon Enterprises, LLP, __ P.3d __,
2010 WL 1238873, at *2 (Colo.App. April 1, 2010) (citing Hemmann
Mgmt. Servs. v. Mediacell, Inc., 176 P.3d 856, 858
(Colo.App.2007)).
52.
In evaluating a motion to dismiss, the court must accept
all material factual averments as true, and must view the

complaints allegations in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff. Id. Motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim
under C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5) are generally viewed with disfavor and
should be granted only if it can be shown beyond doubt that the
plaintiff cannot prove facts in support of the claim that would
entitle the plaintiff to relief. Id. (quoting from Coors Brewing
Co. v. Floyd, 978 P.2d 663, 665 (Colo. 1999)).
53.
A court cannot grant a motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim unless no set of facts can prove that the

plaintiff is entitled to relief. Students for Concealed Carry on
Campus, LLC v. Regents of University of Colorado, ___ P.3d ___,
2010 WL 1492308, *2 (Colo.App. April 15, 2010) (citing Lobato v.
State, 218 P.3d 358, 367 (Colo. 2009).
54.
Whether a claim is stated must be determined solely from
the complaint; the court must consider only those matters stated
within the four corners of the complaint. Walsenburg Sand &
Page 36 of 49

Gravel Co., Inc. v. City Council of Walsenburg, 160 P.3d 297,

299 (Colo.App. 2007).
55.
The Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure are subject to the
rules of statutory construction. Seiner v. Zeff, 194 P.3d 467,

470 (Colo. App. 2008). We therefore must give the words their
plain meaning and construe them as a whole, giving consistent,
harmonious effect to all parts of the rule. Id. We also consider
the language in its proper context, in addition to the reason
and necessity of the rule and the objective that it seeks to
accomplish, in order to ascertain the intent of the supreme
court in promulgating the rule. Id.
56.
Under the new practice standards of CRCP12b rendered by the
Colorado Supreme Courts adoption of Iqbal/Thombly determined by

the United States Supreme Court, the court may disregard
conclusory allegations.
COMPLAINANT STATES A CLAIM UNDER COLORADO
CONSTITUION ART. XXVIII SECTION 11.
57.
Section 11 states:
Any provisions in the statutes of this state in conflict or

inconsistent with this article are hereby declared to be
inapplicable to the matters covered and provided for in this
Article.
58.
On October 3, 2016 at the Monthly meeting of the Colorado
Judicial Performance Commission [and in many subsequent Emails]

Mr. Kent Wagner, [Director of the Judicial Performance
Page 37 of 49

Commission] responding to a direct question from the

Complainant, indicates that the Judiciary does not need to
comply with Campaign Finance rules because the statute [CRS 135.5 et. seq.] mandates that the Judiciary Educate the public
concerning Judicial Performance operations.14
59.
Further, as detailed in his Amended Complaint, Mr. Coulter
questions whether recommendations based on false and corrupted

data can be called education; but instead should be labeled
political propaganda.
60.
Section 11 of Article XXVIII above noted specifically
indicates that it takes precedence over all statutory

requirements which necessarily includes alleged education
requirements under CRS 13-5.5 et. seq.
61.
This is not a conclusionary claim but expressly stated in
Article XXVIII and the Claimant is entitled to relief from this

court in accord with the Article.
62.
This same claim applies to Respondents Denver County Judges
CBA, 104.3FM, and unknown radio stations. The Respondents

cannot use the excuse of the requirement(s) of any statute to
avoid the mandates of Article XXVIII and the FCPA.
COMPLAINANT STATES A CLAIM UNDER FCPA
(Violation of CRS 1-45-108.5).
14
See audio Exhibit 14 of First Amended Complaint starting at 1minute and 50 sec.
Page 38 of 49

63.
1-45-108.5.
Political organizations - disclosure. (1)
Any
political organization shall report to the appropriate officer in

accordance with the requirements of sections 1-45-108 and 1-4510.
64. Under FCPA definitions: "Political organization" means a
political organization defined in section 527 (e) (1) of the
federal "Internal Revenue Code of 1986", as amended, that is
engaged in influencing or attempting to influence the selection,
nomination, election, or appointment of any individual to any
state or local public office in the state and that is exempt, or
intends to seek any exemption, from taxation pursuant to section
527 of the internal revenue code.
65. The Respondent Judiciary and Respondent Denver County Judges are
tax exempt as being part of the Government and were engaged in
influencing or attempting to influence the selection of Certain
Judges to be retained; and the selection of certain Judges to not
be retained. Complainant cannot ascertain the status of the other
Respondents until such time as he has had the opportunity for
Discovery.
66. In the October 3rd meeting of the Judicial Performance
Commission; Mr. Wagner indicated they have been preparing for
this campaign since December of 2015 when Mr. Sosa purchased
tablets to go out and survey people. He also stated that they had
Page 39 of 49

received $50,000 and that the ads started October 1 and were to
end November 8, 2016.15
67. Respondents have not denied airing the ads nor have they
changed, edited or stopped the ads once the Complaint was filed.
68. They therefore had the duty to disclose and report to the
Secretary of State pursuant to the statute.
69. They have never disclosed and/or reported.
70. This is not a conclusionary claim but expressly mandated by the
statute and its violation self-admitted by the Respondent
Judiciary and Denver County Judges and the Claimant is entitled
to relief in accord with the statute.
COMPLAINANT STATES A CLAIM UNDER FCPA. THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Violation of CRS 1-45-108(1(a)(I)and
Campaign Finance Rule 4.1 & 4.4)
71.
CRS 1-45-108(1)(a)(I) requires a political candidate
committee to register with the appropriate officer, in this case

the Secretary of State, before making or receiving any
contributions in excess of $200.
72.
On November 4th, 2016, at a Motions hearing the Court
ordered the Complainant to verify that he was referring to

Article XXVIII Section 2, 12a not 2a [typo error] concerning
15
See Audio Exhibit 14 of First Amended Complaint. 1 min. 50 sec.
Page 40 of 49

definition of Political Committee. All Respondents made

appearances at that hearing and heard the Courts Order.
73.
FCPA (12)(a) "Political committee" means any person, other
than a natural person, or any group of two or more persons,
including natural persons that have accepted or made
contributions or expenditures in excess of $200 to support or
oppose the nomination or election of one or more candidates.
(b) "Political committee" does not include political parties,
issue committees, or candidate committees as otherwise defined
in this section.
(c) For the purposes of this Article, the following are treated
as a single political committee:
(I) All political committees established, financed, maintained,
or controlled by a single corporation or its subsidiaries;
(II) All political committees established, financed, maintained,
or controlled by a single labor organization; except that, any
political committee established, financed, maintained, or
controlled by a local unit of the labor organization which has
the authority to make a decision independently of the state and
national units as to which candidates to support or oppose shall
be deemed separate from the political committee of the state and
national unit;
(III) All political committees established, financed,
maintained, or controlled by the same political party;
(IV) All political committees established, financed, maintained,
or controlled by substantially the same group of persons.
74.
Respondents Judiciary and therefore Denver County Judges
have admittedly had contributions and made expenditures in

excess of $200 in an amount of at least $50,000 as indicated by
Mr. Wagner.
Claimant is unable to determine amount of
contributions and expenditures of Respondents CBA, 104.3FM and

unknown radio stations until such time as discovery is allowed.
Page 41 of 49

These Respondents have expressly indicated though, that they

have sponsored the political campaign ads for the Retention
and Non-Retention of judges under the recommendation of
Respondent Judiciary as stated at the end of every radio ad.
Colo. Const. art. XXVIII 2(8)(a) explains that [e]xpenditure
means any purchase, payment, distribution, loan, advance,
deposit, or gift of money by any person for the purpose of
expressly advocating the election or defeat of a candidate or
supporting or opposing a ballot issue or ballot question
(emphasis added).... Harwood v. Senate Majority Fund, LLC
Colorado Court of Appeals, Div. A. June 29, 2006 141 P.3d 962
2006 WL 1775575
75.
Respondents failed to file with the Secretary of State
after receiving or expending more than $200.

76.
This is not a conclusionary claim but expressly stated in
CRS 1-45-101 et.seq. and Article XXVIII of the Colorado

Constitution. The Claimant is entitled to relief from this court
in accord with the Statute.
COMPLAINANT STATES A CLAIM UNDER FCPA. THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Violation of Campaign Finance Rule 4.1 & 4.4)
77.
Campaign Finance Rule 4.1 provides that [a]ll
contributions received of $20 or more during a reporting period

shall be listed individually on the contribution and expenditure
Page 42 of 49

report. All other contributions under $20 may be reported in

total as non-itemized contributions for the reporting period.
Respondents have not reported to Colorado Secretary of State.
78.
65. Campaign Finance Rule 4.4 provides that [a]ll
expenditures made of $20 or more during a reporting period shall

be listed individually on the contribution and expenditure
report. All other expenditures under$20 during a reporting
period may be reported in total as non-itemized expenditures.
Respondents have not reported to Colorado Secretary of State.
79.
These two claims for relief are not a conclusionary claim
but expressly stated in CRS 1-45-101 et.seq. and Article XXVIII

of the Colorado Constitution. The Claimant is entitled to relief
from this court in accord with the Statute for the Respondents
failure to report to the Secretary of State.
COMPLAINANT STATES A CLAIM UNDER COLO. CONSTITUTION ART. XXVIII
AND RULE 12.7 OD FCPA. FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(VIOLATION OF COLO. CONST. ART. XXIII 3(5)
AND CAMPAIGN FINANCE RULE 12.7)
80.
Pursuant to Colo. Const. Art. XXIII 3(5) and Campaign
Finance Rule 12.7, as a political candidate committee,

Respondents are limited to receiving contributions of not more
than $525 per person per election cycle.
Page 43 of 49

81.
At the October 3rd Monthly meeting of the Judicial
Performance Commission16; Mr. Wagner revealed that the campaign

had received $50,000;$49,475 in excess of the allowed
contribution for a political candidate committee.
82.
Pursuant to Colorado Const. Art. XXVIII
10(1) Respondents
is/are individually subject to a civil penalty of at least

double and up to 5 times the amount received in excess of the
applicable contribution limit.
83.
This claim for relief is not a conclusionary claim but
expressly stated in CRS 1-45-101 et.seq. and Article XXVIII of

the Colorado Constitution. The Claimant is entitled to relief
from this court in accord with the Statute for the Respondents
receiving funding in excess of $525 during a campaign cycle from
one person.
CONCLUSION
FOR THE REASONS STATED ABOVE, the Court should deny the motions
to dismiss for all of the Counts of all Respondents.
Respectfully submitted this 17 day of November, 2016,
/s/Peter Coulter
16
See audio Exhibit 17 of Amended Complaint.
Page 44 of 49

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on 11/17/2016 a true and correct copy of the above Motion was served on each of
the following:
Name of Person to Party
Whom
you
are
Sending
this
Document
Judiciary.
Respondents
AG attorneys
Address
Mr. Justin Sasso

Respondents
Colorado Broadcasters
Association
104.3THE FAN
Respondents
mtierney@tierneylawrence.com
E-MAIL
mtierney@tierneylawrence.com
E-mail
Denver Judiciary
Respondents
David.Broadwell@denvergov.org
E-mail
Colo. Supreme Court
Respondents
christopher.ryan@judicial.state.co.us.readnotify.com
Email
matt.grove@coag.gov
Christopher.Jackson@coag.gov
*Insert one of the following: Hand Delivery, First-Class Mail, Certified Mail, E-Served or
Faxed.
Page 45 of 49

Manner
of
Service
*
E-MAIL
EXHIBIT LINKS AND FURTHER PRO SE CASE LAW
RADIO ADS
KNOW YOUR JUDGE KNOW YOUR JUDGE KNOW_YOUR_JUDG KNOW_YOUR_JUDG KNOW YOUR JUDGE KNOW YOUR JUDGE
v2 RADIO AD6.mp3 RADIO _30.mp3
E_RADIO_30.wav E_RADIO_30 (1).wav RADIO AD1.mp3
RADIO AD2.mp3
KNOW YOUR JUDGE KNOW YOUR JUDGE KNOW YOUR JUDGE

SPANISH RADIO AD3.mp3
___________________________________________________________________________________
Gettoknowyourjudge.net is using 4 services which we detected on its website. The major ones are
Go Daddy for hosting the website, Go Daddy for DNS management, Go Daddy as Registrar and Go
Daddy for email services The site was online when this report was compiled on 12 November 2016
16:34. gettoknowyourjudge.net is hosted in United States and owned by Daniel Sosa ().
After checking the site records, we found that it is 2 months 24 days old and will expire on 20
November 2019. For more registration details, refer to this section. We didn't find any SSL certificate
present on the website which is bad for users privacy. The site has a title but meta description is
absent, it will be better for SEO if both are present. Homepage is in English and contain 6 external
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Pro Se Case Law

Haines
v.
Kerner,
404
U.S.
520
(1971)
Plaintiff-inmate filed pro se complaint against prison seeking
compensation for damages sustained while placed in solitary confinement.
In finding plaintiff's complaint legally sufficient, Supreme Court found
that pro se pleadings should be held to "less stringent standards" than
those drafted by attorneys.
Elmore v. McCammon (1986) 640 F. Supp. 905
"... the right to file a lawsuit pro se is one of the most important
rights under the constitution and laws."
Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1959); Picking v.
Pennsylvania R. Co., 151 Fed 2nd 240; Pucket v. Cox, 456 2nd 233
Pro se pleadings are to be considered without regard to technicality;
pro se litigants' pleadings are not to be held to the same high
standards of perfection as lawyers.
Maty v. Grasselli Chemical Co., 303 U.S. 197 (1938)
"Pleadings are intended to serve as a means of arriving at fair and
just settlements of controversies between litigants. They should not
raise barriers which prevent the achievement of that end. Proper
pleading is important, but its importance consists in its
effectiveness as a means to accomplish the end of a just judgment."
Puckett v. Cox, 456 F. 2d 233 (1972) (6th Cir. USCA)
It was held that a pro se complaint requires a less stringent reading
than one drafted by a lawyer per Justice Black in Conley v. Gibson
(see case listed above, Pro Se Rights Section).
Puckett v. Cox, 456 F. 2d 233 (1972) (6th Cir. USCA)
It was held that a pro se complaint requires a less stringent reading
than one drafted by a lawyer per Justice Black in Conley v. Gibson
(see case listed above, Pro Se Rights Section).
Roadway Express v. Pipe, 447 U.S. 752 at 757 (1982)
"Due to sloth, inattention or desire to seize tactical advantage,
lawyers have long engaged in dilatory practices... the glacial pace of
much litigation breeds frustration with the Federal Courts and
ultimately, disrespect for the law."
Sherar v. Cullen, 481 F. 2d 946 (1973)
"There can be no sanction or penalty imposed upon one because of his
exercise of Constitutional Rights."
Page 49 of 49


Nov 17 Coulter Resp. Mtn. To Dismiss

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Nov 17 Coulter Resp. Mtn. To Dismiss

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STATE OF COLORADO

OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE COURTS

Peter Coulter, pro se

COMPLAINANTS MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO JUDICIARYS, DENVER JUDGES, CBAs and

2016, addressing Mr. Coulters Original Complaint filed October

and 104.3FM The Fan Renewed Motion to Dismiss filed

November 10, 20102

COMPLAINANTS MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO JUDICIARYS, DENVER JUDGES, CBAs and

Respondent Judiciary, Denver County Judges, CBA and 104.3FM

1. Filing dates for Renewed Motions to Dismiss and Objections

Complainant reserves his right to Amend his Complaint and

Complainant restates that he is a pro-se litigant4 due to

Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 520 (1971); Pro-se case law.

COMPLAINANTS MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO JUDICIARYS, DENVER JUDGES, CBAs and

future. I personally know of attorneys that have been wrongfully

And now, Respondents Judiciary and Colorado Broadcasters

(CBA) have refused to release the names of

associate respondents unknown radio stations in deference to

Motion to Compel denied by the Court on November 14, 2016.

COMPLAINANTS MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO JUDICIARYS, DENVER JUDGES, CBAs and

Colo. Const. art. XXVIII, 1. Section 1 explicitly states

1248 2012 WL 566947 (2012). See Colo. Const. art. XXVIII,

The people of the state of Colorado hereby find and

declare that large campaign contributions to political

B. Colorado Constitution Article XXVIII Section 11. Conflicting provisions declared

COMPLAINANTS MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO JUDICIARYS, DENVER JUDGES, CBAs and

Courts should ascertain voter intent in adopting a

COMPLAINANTS MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO JUDICIARYS, DENVER JUDGES, CBAs and

COMPLAINANTS MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO JUDICIARYS, DENVER JUDGES, CBAs and

Respondent Judiciary contracted with Respondent CBA,

7. On the Morning of October 3rd, I heard the Radio Ads of

Per Go Daddy, the

See Exhibit 4 of First Amended Complaint.

COMPLAINANTS MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO JUDICIARYS, DENVER JUDGES, CBAs and

state to either to vote to RETAIN a respective judge; or in two

Their political candidate recommendations are no

different than the vote recommendations of

committee ClearthebenchColorado.org and/or TransparentCourts,

At the Monthly hearing of the JPC on Oct 3rd, 2016, Mr.

Mr. Wagner went on to remind the Commissioners that they

appropriated $50,000 during the summer to finance the campaign.

I one point during the hearing, I asked Mr. Wagner about

COMPLAINANTS MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO JUDICIARYS, DENVER JUDGES, CBAs and

not need to comply with Constitutional and/or Statutory Campaign

[In Motions to Dismiss] we accept all allegations in the

complaint as true and view them in the light most favorable to

The primary campaign finance law in Colorado is article

XXVIII of the Colorado Constitution, which was proposed by

COMPLAINANTS MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO JUDICIARYS, DENVER JUDGES, CBAs and

XXVIII, 1. Section 1 explicitly states that the purpose of

When interpreting a constitutional amendment adopted by

citizen's initiative, we give effect to the electorate's intent

COMPLAINANTS MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO JUDICIARYS, DENVER JUDGES, CBAs and

susceptible to multiple interpretations, then we construe the

Within the field of campaign finance law, express

advocacy was first defined in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 96

COMPLAINANTS MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO JUDICIARYS, DENVER JUDGES, CBAs and

even if relative to was interpreted to cover only speech that

COMPLAINANTS MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO JUDICIARYS, DENVER JUDGES, CBAs and

Court elaborated that [t]his construction would restrict the

COMPLAINANTS MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO JUDICIARYS, DENVER JUDGES, CBAs and

of such as before the list of magic words in footnote 52

Less than two years before the adoption of article XXVIII,