SAN LUIS v SAN LUIS

GR No. 134029
FACTS:
Felicisimo T. San Luis (Felicisimo) was the former governor of Laguna. During his lifetime, he
contracted three marriages, which are the following:
1. Virginia Sulit, from March 17, 1942 to August 11, 1963 (upon Virginias death)
Children: Rodolfo (petitioner), Mila (petitioner), Edgar (petitioner), Linda
(petitioner), Emilita and Manuel
2. Merry Lee Corwin, from May 1, 1968 to December 14, 1973 (upon filing of Merry Lee, a
US citizen, of a Complaint of Divorce before the Court of First Circuit in Hawaii, which
was granted)
Child: Tobias
3. Felicidad Sagalongos (respondent), solemnized in the US, from June 20, 1974 to
December 18, 1992 (until Felicisimos death)
No children
On December 17, 1993, the respondent filed a petition for letters of administration before
RTC-Makati, wherein she alleged that she is the widow of Felicisimo; that at the time of
death, Felicisimo was residing at Alabang, Metro Manila; the decedents surviving heirs are
respondent as legal spouse, his six children from his first marriage and one child from
second marriage.

the
his
the
his

On February 1994, petitioners, Rodolfo and Linda, filed two separate motions to dismiss on the
grounds of improper venue and failure to state a cause of action. They (1) alleged that since the
deceased was a resident of Laguna, the petitions for letters of administration should have been
filed there and; (2) the respondent has no legal personality to file the petition because she was
only a mistress as Felicisimos marriage to Merry Lee was still valid under Philippine laws.
However, the RTC denied both motions
The respondent, being unaware that both motions were dismissed, submitted her opposition on
March 15, 1994, wherein she submitted the following documentary evidences: (1) the deceased
regularly went home to their Alabang residence, which they bought in 1982; (2) decree of
absolute divorce between Felicisimo and Merry Lee issued by the Court of First Circuit, Hawaii.
She argued that under FC 261 and Van Dorn v Romillo2 doctrine, Felicisimo regained the legal
capacity to remarry.

1 Article 26 All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the country

where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under
Articles 35(1), (4), (5), (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse, capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have
capacity to remarry under Philippine law.

After numerous motions for reconsideration and inhibition filed by the petitioners, the case was
finally raffled to a third and final RTC judge who ruled against the respondent. On September
12, 1995, Judge Arcangel denied the letters of administration filed by the respondent and ruled
that (1) since the deceased was at the time of his death, the duly elected governor of Laguna,
the petition should have been filed there and not in Makati; (2) that the respondent had no
legal capacity to file her petition as her marriage with the deceased was void ab initio because
the absolute divorce of marriage of the deceased and Merry Lee does not bind to the former as
he was a Filipino citizen and; (3) FC 26 could not be given retroactive effect to because it would
impair the vested rights of the petitioners. The RTC subsequently denied the petitioners motion
for reconsideration.
On February 4, 1998, the CA reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC. The CA held that
(1) under Sec. 1, Rule 73 of the ROC, place of residence of the decedent for purposes of fixing
the venue of the settlement his estate refers to actual residence or place of abode, which in this
case was indeed Alabang, and not Laguna; (2) under FC 26, the divorce obtained by the foreign
spouse granted legal capacity to the deceased to remarry. The CA denied motions for
reconsideration.
Hence, the instant petition.
ISSUES:
1. w/n the RTC-Makati was the proper venue
2. w/n the respondent has the legal capacity to file for a petition for letters of administration
HELD:
1. The Court has distinguished actual residence from legal residence or domicile for
purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of estate under Sec. 1, Rule 73 of the ROC in
Garcia Fule v CA. In said case, residence connotes actual or physical presence of a person
in an abode while domicile contemplates actual habitation and intention to stay in a place.
In the instant case, while the petitioners established that Felicisimo was domiciled in
Laguna, the respondent proved that it was indeed in Alabang that the deceased resided
from 1982 up to his death.
As Felicisimo was a resident of Alabang, the petition was validly filed in the proper venue.
2. FC 26 can trace its origins to the Van Dorn case wherein the Court held that in a mixed
marriage involving a Filipino and a foreigner, a decree of divorce validly obtained by the
foreign spouse is valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacited
to remarry under Philippine law.

2 Van Dorn v Romillo pursuant to his national law, when a foreigner is no longer the spouse of a Filipino due to a
foreign divorce obtained by the Filipino, the foreigner would have no legal standing to sue to exercise control over
conjugal assets

However, due to the fact that the respondent only submitted photocopies of the Marriage
Certificate and an annotated text of the Family Law Act of California, which purportedly
show that the marriage was in accordance with law, the Court held that the case should be
remanded to the RTC for further reception of evidence.
Even assuming that the respondent was not validly married to the deceased in 1974, the
Court held that the former may be considered as a co-owner of the properties acquired
during their cohabitation. Under Sec. 2 of Rule 79 of the ROC, a petition for letters of
administration must be filed by an interested person. An interested person is defined as
someone who would be materially benefit by the estate, such as an heir or one who has
claims against the estate, such as a creditor. The fact that the respondent was cohabiting
with the deceased was not even contended by the petitioners. She is therefore, a proper
interested party.
RULING: petition DISMISSED. CA AFFIRMED. The case is REMANDED to the RTC for further
proceedings.